{
  "draft": "draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03",
  "doc_id": "RFC5746",
  "title": "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension",
  "authors": [
    "E. Rescorla",
    "M. Ray",
    "S. Dispensa",
    "N. Oskov"
  ],
  "format": [
    "TEXT",
    "HTML"
  ],
  "page_count": "15",
  "pub_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "source": "Transport Layer Security",
  "abstract": "Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client.  The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data.  This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]",
  "pub_date": "February 2010",
  "keywords": [
    "ssl",
    "secure socket layer"
  ],
  "obsoletes": [],
  "obsoleted_by": [],
  "updates": [
    "RFC2246",
    "RFC4346",
    "RFC4347",
    "RFC4366",
    "RFC5246"
  ],
  "updated_by": [],
  "see_also": [],
  "doi": "10.17487/RFC5746",
  "errata_url": null
}