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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery-02" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OAN Resource Discovery">Trust-Governed Resource Identity and Discovery Architecture for OpenAgenet</title>
    <author initials="J." surname="Xu" fullname="Jinliang Xu">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>xujinliang@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Li" fullname="Bingqi Li">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>libingqi@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="R." surname="Zhu" fullname="Runkai Zhu">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>zhurunkai@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="Z." surname="Liu" fullname="Zhiruo Liu">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>liuzhiruo@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <area>General</area>
    <workgroup>Network Working Group</workgroup>
    <abstract>
      <?line 66?>

<t>This document describes a trust-governed resource identity and discovery
architecture for OpenAgenet (OAN).  It covers callable agents, skills, Model
Context Protocol (MCP) servers, tools, and application programming interfaces.
Registrars verify registration authority, a Root accepts versioned resource
packages, and authorized Discovery Nodes expose verified candidates.  Consumers
verify package integrity, acceptance, and current state before using a resource
through its native protocol or artifact format.</t>
      <t>The architecture can be profiled with Decentralized Identifier (DID) document
concepts and credential-based assertions.  This document does not define a new
DID method, media type, URI scheme, transport protocol, ranking algorithm,
blockchain protocol, agent invocation protocol, or product-native schema.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 81?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Open agent ecosystems are moving beyond a single "agent service" abstraction.
They can include callable agent services, reusable skills, MCP-compatible
servers, ordinary HTTP or RPC tools, and domain-specific APIs.  These resources
may be implemented by different operators and may be invoked through different
protocols.  A relying party therefore needs a layer that can answer trust and
discovery questions before product-specific interaction begins:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>What stable resource identity is being advertised?</t>
          <t>What type of resource is it?</t>
          <t>Which provider or controller is bound to the resource identity?</t>
          <t>Which Registrar checked the registration evidence?</t>
          <t>Which Root authority accepted the versioned package?</t>
          <t>Which Discovery Node is authorized to expose the resource for the requested
domain?</t>
          <t>Which hashes, proofs, versions, and lifecycle states must be verified before
use?</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>OpenAgenet (OAN) is an open architecture for resource identity, governed
registration, trusted package publication, authorization-aware discovery, and
pre-use verification.  OAN is intentionally protocol-neutral at the interaction
layer.  After OAN checks pass, a consumer can use MCP, A2A, HTTP, RPC, a Skill
runtime, or another product-native protocol.  OAN does not replace those
protocols; it supplies the trust path used to find and approach resources
safely.</t>
      <t>The central abstraction in this document is a discoverable resource, not only
an agent.  A discoverable resource is a product-shaped subject with a stable
resource identifier, resource metadata, versioned package material, and
verifiable Root acceptance.  The initial resource types are:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t><spanx style="verb">agent_service</spanx></t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">skill</spanx></t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">mcp_server</spanx></t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">tool_api</spanx></t>
        </list></t>
      <t>This resource-first model allows OAN to support common agent ecosystem assets
without forcing all of them into one runtime protocol or one artifact format.</t>
      <t>The model also supports external identifier associations, optional runtime
identity bindings, and federation among independently governed trust domains.</t>
      <section anchor="problem-statement">
        <name>Problem Statement</name>
        <t>Closed platforms can combine account identity, approval workflow, search,
artifact hosting, ranking, and invocation policy into one administrative
system.  In an open multi-operator environment, those functions need clearer
boundaries.  A Discovery result should not be trusted merely because it appears
in a catalog.  A CDN location should not become a trust anchor.  A local
ranking score should not override revocation state.  A Registrar should not be
able to register a resource whose subject key it never verified.  A valid old
package should not silently remain current after the Root has accepted a newer
or revoked state.</t>
        <t>The architectural gap is the lack of a common trust path that binds:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>stable resource identity;</t>
            <t>resource type and semantic metadata;</t>
            <t>subject-control proof;</t>
            <t>Registrar-issued registration evidence;</t>
            <t>Registrar authorization state;</t>
            <t>Root verification and package acceptance;</t>
            <t>package, metadata, and identity-document hashes;</t>
            <t>Discovery authorization scope;</t>
            <t>signed Discovery response provenance; and</t>
            <t>pre-use verification by consumers.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>This document specifies that path at the architectural level.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>This document defines architectural requirements for OAN roles and trust
objects, independently of source code, hosting provider, or storage backend.
It covers:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>architectural roles and their trust boundaries;</t>
            <t>discoverable resource types and identity expectations;</t>
            <t>common resource package semantics;</t>
            <t>Root proof and hash-binding requirements;</t>
            <t>registration and Root verification behavior;</t>
            <t>infrastructure authorization and governance-state boundaries;</t>
            <t>CDN distribution semantics;</t>
            <t>authorization-aware Discovery behavior;</t>
            <t>lifecycle, versioning, and consistency expectations;</t>
            <t>pre-use verification by resource consumers; and</t>
            <t>security and privacy considerations.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Architectural conformance means satisfying the applicable role requirements.
Direct wire interoperability additionally requires a shared binding defining
object encodings, proof inputs, algorithms, version selection, and message
exchange.  This document does not specify that complete binding.  Its field
names and JSON examples illustrate semantic objects rather than a wire schema.</t>
        <t>A profile constrains architectural choices for a use case; a binding maps
those choices to representations and transport.  An extension adds a capability.
Local policy selects acceptable authorities and assurance requirements, but
MUST NOT override mandatory verification.  Peers MUST use a mutually supported
binding, whether selected by configuration or negotiation, and MUST reject an
unsupported required binding rather than guess its semantics.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="open-interoperability-principles">
        <name>Open Interoperability Principles</name>
        <t>Verifiable objects and role behavior form the interoperability boundary.
Operators can vary review policy, ranking, search, and internal processing
while retaining common verification semantics.  Root authority is scoped to a
trust domain; independent domains can federate without a global superior Root.
Required extensions need explicit recognition and failure behavior in the
selected binding so that unsupported features cannot weaken trust decisions.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="non-goals">
        <name>Non-Goals</name>
        <t>This document does not define:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>a new DID method or identifier syntax;</t>
            <t>a new URI scheme;</t>
            <t>a new media type;</t>
            <t>a new transport protocol;</t>
            <t>a replacement for MCP, A2A, HTTP APIs, RPC, Skill packaging, or other
interaction protocols;</t>
            <t>a ranking, recommendation, reputation, or semantic retrieval algorithm;</t>
            <t>a business ontology or product marketplace policy;</t>
            <t>a blockchain protocol or smart contract interface;</t>
            <t>a Root key-management ceremony;</t>
            <t>a database schema, repository layout, or implementation language;</t>
            <t>a requirement to use any particular open-source codebase or hosted service;</t>
            <t>a user interface or operator review workflow; or</t>
            <t>a mandatory artifact hosting model for Skill files, API specifications, MCP
manifests, executable code, or other product-native payloads.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
<xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
shown here.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Agent Service:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A callable business resource, represented as an OAN resource of type
<spanx style="verb">agent_service</spanx>.  It can expose an agent-to-agent endpoint, an HTTP endpoint,
an RPC endpoint, an MCP-related binding, or another product-native
interaction endpoint.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Capability Domain:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A governance-recognized domain used to determine whether a Discovery Node is
authorized to expose a resource.  Capability domains are distinct from local
custom tags and ranking features.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>CDN Service:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A content distribution service that stores and serves Root-published
packages, identity documents, metadata, manifests, and related artifacts.
A CDN Service is not a protocol trust authority in this architecture.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Discoverable Resource:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resource that can be registered, Root-verified, distributed, indexed,
discovered, and verified before use.  Initial OAN resource types are
<spanx style="verb">agent_service</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">skill</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">mcp_server</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">tool_api</spanx>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Discovery Node:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An infrastructure service that synchronizes Root-verified resource packages,
verifies them, applies authorization-domain filtering, builds local indexes,
and returns signed discovery responses.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Governance State:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The current authorization lifecycle state of an infrastructure subject, such
as a Registrar Node, Discovery Node, or credential issuer.  Governance state is
separate from ordinary resource package lifecycle state.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>MCP Server:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resource of type <spanx style="verb">mcp_server</spanx> that describes an MCP-compatible server and
its OAN-facing identity, endpoint, metadata, and verification material.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Registrar Node:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An infrastructure service that assists resource providers, checks candidate
resource material, verifies subject control, issues registration evidence,
and submits complete registration packages to the Root Node.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Resource Consumer:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A user agent, application, orchestrator, service, or other relying party that
queries Discovery and verifies resource material before download, invocation,
or other use.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Resource Identity Document:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The identity-facing document for a discoverable resource.  A deployment can
express it as a DID Document profile or another verifiable representation that
provides equivalent identifier, key, endpoint or artifact-reference,
metadata, and verification properties.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Resource Package:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A versioned Root-verified package that binds a resource identifier, resource
type, package version, resource identity document, resource metadata, hashes,
lifecycle state, and Root proof.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Resource Provider:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The subject, operator, or organization responsible for preparing and
controlling a discoverable resource.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Root Node:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The trust anchor role for one OAN trust domain.  It verifies Registrar
submissions, accepts or rejects resource packages, signs Root proofs,
publishes package facts, maintains or consumes infrastructure authorization
state, and coordinates downstream distribution.  A Root Node is not assumed
to be globally unique across all OAN deployments.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Skill:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resource of type <spanx style="verb">skill</spanx> that describes a capability.  A Skill can refer to
one or more Agent Service, MCP Server, or Tool/API implementations.  The
Skill artifact itself can be hosted outside OAN, provided that OAN metadata
includes verifiable references.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Tool/API:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resource of type <spanx style="verb">tool_api</spanx> that describes a callable tool, API, function
gateway, enterprise connector, or similar interface.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="architecture-overview">
      <name>Architecture Overview</name>
      <t>OAN separates governance, registration, Root acceptance, distribution,
Discovery, and product-native use.  The high-level relationship is:</t>
      <figure>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Resource Provider
   | prepares resource identity, metadata, package, hashes
   v
Registrar Node
   | verifies subject control and issues registration evidence
   | submits signed upstream request
   v
Root Node
   | verifies Registrar authorization, evidence, hashes, package
   | signs Root proof and queues publication
   v
CDN Service
   | distributes Root-published packages and metadata
   v
Discovery Node
   | verifies packages, enforces authorized domains, signs responses
   v
Resource Consumer
   | verifies Discovery response and selected package before use
   v
Product-native protocol or artifact retrieval
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The architecture has several important invariants:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>Root acceptance is the authoritative resource-package trust event within the
applicable trust domain.</t>
          <t>Registrar review is not sufficient without Root verification.</t>
          <t>CDN distribution is not a trust decision.</t>
          <t>Discovery indexing is not a Root lifecycle state.</t>
          <t>Discovery ranking is not authorization.</t>
          <t>Product-native invocation or artifact retrieval begins only after OAN
verification has succeeded.</t>
        </list></t>
      <section anchor="role-responsibilities">
        <name>Role Responsibilities</name>
        <section anchor="root-node">
          <name>Root Node</name>
          <t>Within its trust domain, the Root Node is responsible for:</t>
          <t><list style="symbols">
              <t>verifying Registrar-origin resource submissions;</t>
              <t>verifying signed upstream envelopes, timestamp freshness, nonce uniqueness,
and body-hash binding;</t>
              <t>verifying registration evidence, issuer authorization, and subject-control
binding;</t>
              <t>verifying resource identity document structure, resource type consistency,
package hashes, metadata hashes, and package versions;</t>
              <t>creating Root proofs over accepted package claims;</t>
              <t>preserving versioned resource package history;</t>
              <t>publishing or queuing packages for CDN distribution;</t>
              <t>notifying or enabling Discovery synchronization;</t>
              <t>issuing or validating infrastructure authorization credentials when the
deployment profile uses them; and</t>
              <t>enforcing current governance state for infrastructure subjects.</t>
            </list></t>
          <t>The Root Node MUST NOT treat CDN location, Discovery ranking, local search
signals, or Registrar policy recommendation as a substitute for Root
verification.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="registrar-node">
          <name>Registrar Node</name>
          <t>A Registrar Node is the onboarding and submission gateway for resources.  It
is responsible for:</t>
          <t><list style="symbols">
              <t>assisting resource providers with draft resource identity documents and
metadata;</t>
              <t>validating resource type, resource identifier, metadata, package version,
hashes, and hash algorithm fields;</t>
              <t>verifying subject authority and required external-controller authorization;</t>
              <t>issuing registration evidence after successful policy review and
subject-control verification;</t>
              <t>preserving local evidence for audit and resubmission; and</t>
              <t>submitting complete resource packages to the Root Node with a signed
upstream envelope.</t>
            </list></t>
          <t>A Registrar Node MUST NOT issue authoritative registration evidence for a
resource subject unless the subject-control proof or an equivalent verified
binding has succeeded.  A Registrar Node MUST fail closed for Root-facing
authoritative submission when its own infrastructure authorization credential
or current governance state is missing, stale beyond policy, suspended,
revoked, expired, or unknown.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="discovery-node">
          <name>Discovery Node</name>
          <t>A Discovery Node is responsible for:</t>
          <t><list style="symbols">
              <t>synchronizing Root-verified resource packages from approved distribution
locations;</t>
              <t>verifying Root proofs, package hashes, metadata hashes, identity-document
hashes, and lifecycle state;</t>
              <t>enforcing its authorized capability domains;</t>
              <t>maintaining accepted and rejected package state;</t>
              <t>building local indexes over accepted packages; and</t>
              <t>returning signed Discovery responses.</t>
            </list></t>
          <t>Discovery Nodes MAY use local ranking, semantic matching, reputation, or
operator policy after package verification and authorization filtering.  These
local signals MUST NOT cause a resource to be exposed outside the Discovery
Node's authorized domains, override Root revocation state, or hide verification
failures.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cdn-service">
          <name>CDN Service</name>
          <t>The CDN Service is a distribution layer.  It stores and serves Root-published
resource packages, identity documents, metadata, manifests, and related
artifacts.  The CDN Service is not an OAN trust authority, is not necessarily a
chain-governed infrastructure subject, and does not decide whether a resource
is accepted.</t>
          <t>Relying parties MUST verify Root proofs and package hashes after fetching
content from a CDN Service.  A manifest entry, storage location, URL, or CDN
identity MUST NOT be treated as sufficient proof of resource trust.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="resource-provider">
          <name>Resource Provider</name>
          <t>A Resource Provider prepares the resource identity document, metadata,
endpoint descriptors, artifact references, package version, and hash material.
The provider supplies evidence of applicable subject or controller authority
and maintains product-native endpoints or artifacts.  OAN does
not require Discovery Nodes or CDN Services to host provider-native Skill
files, OpenAPI specifications, MCP manifests, executables, or other external
payloads.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="resource-consumer">
          <name>Resource Consumer</name>
          <t>A Resource Consumer queries Discovery and verifies selected candidates before
use.  It is responsible for checking the Discovery response signature, Root
proofs, hashes, lifecycle state, endpoint or artifact-reference binding,
resource type consistency, and any product-specific credential requirements.
After these checks pass, the consumer can use the relevant product-native
protocol or retrieve the referenced artifact.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="resource-identity-model">
      <name>Resource Identity Model</name>
      <section anchor="subjects-controllers-and-providers">
        <name>Subjects, Controllers, and Providers</name>
        <t>A resource subject, its controller, its metadata publisher, its service
operator, and its credential issuer can be different parties.  A controller
is authorized to manage the resource identity within the selected profile;
that relationship does not automatically grant business invocation rights or
permission to sign all runtime messages as the resource.  A resource can use
its own operational verification material even when externally controlled.</t>
        <t>For DID-based resources, DID Core <xref target="DID-CORE"/> defines controller and
verification-relationship concepts, while the selected DID method defines
authorization for create, update, and deactivate operations.  Merely adding a
<spanx style="verb">controller</spanx> value to a proposed document does not establish authority over the
previously accepted state.  A DID Document need not carry an embedded signature;
its authenticity can be established by method-specific resolution and evidence.
An OAN Root proof binds package acceptance and does not replace those method rules.
These OAN authorization requirements are not a claim that DID Core mandates
one universal document-update signature format or controller-transfer protocol.</t>
        <t>For a self-controlled resource, the applicant proves the applicable subject
authority.  For an externally controlled resource, the Registrar and Root MUST
verify the controller's authority and a scoped authorization for the submitted
resource and operation.  That authorization MUST bind the resource identifier,
submitted content or digest, purpose, intended accepting authority, and validity
conditions, with replay protection.  Resource-key possession alone MUST NOT
replace required external-controller authorization.</t>
        <t>A profile permitting delegation MUST define allowed scope, further delegation,
path validation, cycle detection, and bounded chain processing.  A controller
reference alone is not a validated delegation chain.  These requirements do not
mandate arbitrary-depth delegation or one operational key-management product.</t>
        <t>For example, an accepted issuer can attest to enterprise E's association with
controller C, while C authorizes resource R and R authorizes a subordinate
resource S.  A relying party tracing S to E validates each applicable control
relationship and the identity attestation, including scope and current status.
The attestation about E does not certify every capability of R or S.  Missing
evidence supports no verified-enterprise conclusion; it does not establish
that the represented provider is necessarily illegitimate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identity-and-version-scopes">
        <name>Identity and Version Scopes</name>
        <t>An OAN resource identity model separates stable identity, package version,
protocol version, and endpoint or artifact version.</t>
        <t>The stable resource identifier identifies the resource subject.  It SHOULD NOT
encode a package version, endpoint version, protocol version, cryptographic
algorithm, mutable URL, or mutable descriptive metadata.</t>
        <t>The package version identifies a Root-verified release of resource identity and
metadata.  A resource can publish multiple package versions under the same
stable resource identifier.  A new resource identifier SHOULD be used when the
controller boundary, trust boundary, or core product semantics change enough
that treating the change as a new package version would mislead relying
parties.</t>
        <t>The protocol or interface version identifies a product-native interface such
as an MCP version, HTTP API version, A2A profile, Skill format version, schema
version, or endpoint contract version.  OAN can record these versions as
metadata, but it does not define their native semantics.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-types">
        <name>Resource Types</name>
        <t>An OAN deployment that implements this document SHOULD support the following
initial resource types:</t>
        <texttable>
          <ttcol align="left">Resource Type</ttcol>
          <ttcol align="left">Product Form</ttcol>
          <ttcol align="left">Typical OAN Material</ttcol>
          <c>
            <spanx style="verb">agent_service</spanx></c>
          <c>Callable agent service</c>
          <c>endpoint, supported protocols, capabilities</c>
          <c>
            <spanx style="verb">skill</spanx></c>
          <c>Capability description or package</c>
          <c>artifact URI, digest, semantics, implementations</c>
          <c>
            <spanx style="verb">mcp_server</spanx></c>
          <c>MCP-compatible server</c>
          <c>endpoint, transport, protocol hints, tools summary</c>
          <c>
            <spanx style="verb">tool_api</spanx></c>
          <c>Tool or API</c>
          <c>endpoint or schema reference, auth mode, policy</c>
        </texttable>
        <t>Resource-type-specific data SHOULD be represented in typed extension fields or
profile-specific objects rather than by creating unrelated package formats.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-identifier-and-type-consistency">
        <name>Resource Identifier and Type Consistency</name>
        <t>When a deployment uses a DID-based identifier profile, the resource identity
document SHOULD make the product form explicit in its OAN metadata.  A
deployment MAY use subject-code conventions, method-specific syntax, or another
profile mechanism to distinguish resource types.  When such a mechanism is
used, the following values MUST be mutually consistent:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>the public resource identifier;</t>
            <t>the resource type declared in the registration submission;</t>
            <t>the resource type declared in OAN metadata; and</t>
            <t>the resource type bound by the Root proof.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Registrars, Root Nodes, Discovery Nodes, and consumers MUST reject or quarantine
resource packages where the resource identifier profile and declared resource
type conflict, unless a future OAN profile explicitly defines an alias or
migration rule.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-identity-document-expectations">
        <name>Resource Identity Document Expectations</name>
        <t>A Resource Identity Document SHOULD contain or reference:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>the stable resource identifier;</t>
            <t>verification methods and verification relationships needed by the profile;</t>
            <t>controller or provider information;</t>
            <t>resource type and product-form metadata;</t>
            <t>semantic metadata used for discovery;</t>
            <t>capability tags or capability domains;</t>
            <t>endpoint descriptors for service resources;</t>
            <t>artifact references for resource types that use external artifacts;</t>
            <t>credential references or registration evidence references;</t>
            <t>package version information;</t>
            <t>lifecycle-state information or references; and</t>
            <t>extension fields, with clear criticality semantics where supported.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>The document MUST NOT be trusted merely because it resolves or parses.  It is
trusted only when it is bound to a verified package, Root proof, and acceptable
current lifecycle state.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="capability-metadata">
        <name>Capability Metadata</name>
        <t>Capability metadata has two components:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>governance-recognized capability domains; and</t>
            <t>custom tags, local labels, search hints, embeddings, examples, or other
descriptive fields.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Only governance-recognized capability domains can expand Discovery
authorization scope.  Custom tags MAY refine local search after authorization
has succeeded, but they MUST NOT cause a Discovery Node to expose a resource
outside its authorized domains.</t>
        <t>Unknown non-critical extension fields MAY be ignored.  Unknown critical fields
MUST cause rejection by a verifier that does not understand them.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="external-identifier-associations">
        <name>External Identifier Associations</name>
        <t>A resource MAY retain identifiers assigned by external platforms, enterprise
directories, industrial identification systems, or other identifier schemes.
An association MUST identify the native value, namespace or issuance scope,
relationship being asserted, and declaring party, and MUST be bound to the
applicable resource revision.  A resolver location MAY be provided separately;
it is neither the identifier's ownership proof nor necessarily its authority.
Local identifier strings need not be rewritten as DIDs or absolute URIs.</t>
        <t>Root acceptance protects the association as submitted metadata; it does not
necessarily establish that the external association is true.  Control,
equivalence, membership, and descriptive reference are different relationships.
Equal names, URLs, or alias declarations MUST NOT alone establish control or
identifier equivalence.  DID-specific equivalence properties, when used, retain
their applicable method and data-model semantics in DID Core <xref target="DID-CORE"/>.</t>
        <t>Associations need not be one-to-one.  Profiles MUST define their update and
withdrawal semantics, including external reassignment or reuse.  An old valid
signature does not indefinitely establish current external ownership.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="external-artifact-references">
        <name>External Artifact References</name>
        <t>Some resources, especially <spanx style="verb">skill</spanx>, can reference external artifacts.  Examples
include Skill files, MCP manifests, OpenAPI descriptions, source archives,
schemas, or executable packages.  OAN does not require these artifacts to be
hosted by a Discovery Node or CDN Service.</t>
        <t>An external artifact reference SHOULD include:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>URI;</t>
            <t>media type or profile identifier;</t>
            <t>expected version;</t>
            <t>digest algorithm;</t>
            <t>digest value;</t>
            <t>retrieval policy where applicable; and</t>
            <t>the identity or package claims that bind the artifact to the resource.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>The Root proof can make the reference and digest trustworthy as accepted
metadata.  It does not make the remote artifact host trustworthy.  Consumers
MUST verify the artifact digest after retrieval when the artifact is used for a
trust-sensitive purpose.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="resourcepackage-and-root-proof-model">
      <name>ResourcePackage and Root Proof Model</name>
      <t>The ResourcePackage is the common Root-verified registry object.  It binds a
resource identity document, normalized metadata, version information, hashes,
lifecycle state, and Root proof.</t>
      <t>A ResourcePackage SHOULD include:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t><spanx style="verb">resourceDid</spanx> or an equivalent stable resource identifier;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">resourceType</spanx>;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">packageVersion</spanx>;</t>
          <t>the resource identity document or a verifiable reference to it;</t>
          <t>resource metadata;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">didDocumentHash</spanx>;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">metadataHash</spanx>;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">packageHash</spanx>;</t>
          <t><spanx style="verb">hashAlgorithm</spanx>;</t>
          <t>lifecycle state;</t>
          <t>Registrar identity and registration evidence reference;</t>
          <t>Root proof claims;</t>
          <t>publication cursor or sequence where applicable; and</t>
          <t>endpoint or artifact-reference metadata needed for verification.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>The Root proof over an accepted package MUST bind at least:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>stable resource identifier;</t>
          <t>resource type;</t>
          <t>package version;</t>
          <t>identity-document hash;</t>
          <t>metadata hash;</t>
          <t>package hash;</t>
          <t>hash algorithm identifier; and</t>
          <t>lifecycle state at the time of acceptance or publication.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>The proof MUST also bind any critical extension fields affecting verification.
It SHOULD bind Registrar identity, registration evidence reference, and the
publication cursor when those values form part of the acceptance claim.</t>
      <section anchor="hash-and-canonicalization-requirements">
        <name>Hash and Canonicalization Requirements</name>
        <t>OAN relies on hash binding.  A binding MUST define exact input bytes for each
digest or signature.  It can preserve an original byte representation or select
a deterministic canonicalization; canonicalization is not required for arbitrary
opaque artifact bytes.  Objects whose signed or hashed representation needs
such a definition include:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>resource identity documents;</t>
            <t>normalized resource metadata;</t>
            <t>registration evidence;</t>
            <t>signed upstream envelopes;</t>
            <t>ResourcePackage payloads;</t>
            <t>Root proof claims;</t>
            <t>Discovery response payloads; and</t>
            <t>trusted invocation or access envelopes, when used.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Hashes MUST identify their algorithm.  A bare digest value without an
algorithm identifier is insufficient for interoperable verification.</t>
        <t>Profiles MUST define the exact input for each digest and signature: raw bytes
or a specified canonical object; character and value encoding; duplicate-key
handling; unknown signed fields; and inclusion or exclusion of proofs and
self-referencing digest fields.  A package digest cannot recursively include
its own final value.  Mutable distribution fields MUST NOT be implicitly added
to an immutable signed claim.  Equivalent digest encodings, if accepted, MUST
be explicitly defined and MUST NOT conflate different algorithms.</t>
        <t>Verification MUST compare signed claims with the actual outer object, not just
validate a signature mathematically.  Profiles SHOULD supply cross-language
vectors covering unknown fields, field ordering, altered identities, algorithm
substitution, conflicting content at one revision, and transformed displays.
Different proof suites MUST be selected by explicit profile rules rather than
unauthorized trial-and-error fallback.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="version-and-lifecycle-binding">
        <name>Version and Lifecycle Binding</name>
        <t>Package-version lifecycle is distinct from resource-identifier lifecycle.  A
package version can be superseded, suspended, expired, or revoked while the
stable resource identifier remains active.  If the resource identity itself is
deactivated, the resource subject is inactive even if older package files are
still reachable from caches.</t>
        <t>Discovery Nodes SHOULD return the latest active package version by default.
When a Discovery Node returns a historical version, the response MUST indicate
the exact version, package hash, metadata hash, Root proof reference, lifecycle
state, and whether the version is recommended for new use.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="trust-and-governance-layers">
      <name>Trust and Governance Layers</name>
      <t>OAN separates governance review, credential issuance, subject-control proof,
runtime verification, and resource package lifecycle.</t>
      <section anchor="governance-review">
        <name>Governance Review</name>
        <t>Operator review, legal review, organizational checks, contact validation, or
manual approval can be useful before a Registrar, Discovery Node, credential issuer, or
ordinary resource is admitted.  These processes are policy decisions.  They are
not protocol proofs by themselves.</t>
        <t>Email addresses, phone numbers, SMS codes, web account login, and similar
account-centric factors MAY be used in private review workflows.  They MUST
NOT be required as OAN protocol trust primitives for cross-network
interoperability.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="credential-issuance">
        <name>Credential Issuance</name>
        <t>After review and cryptographic checks succeed, an authorized issuer can issue a
credential or credential-like assertion.  A registration credential binds the
issuer, subject resource identifier, credential type, claims, issuance time,
expiration time if present, and proof.</t>
        <t>The credential is the protocol-facing result of review.  It does not replace
Root acceptance, package verification, or current lifecycle-state checks.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject-control-proof">
        <name>Subject-Control Proof</name>
        <t>Subject-control proof binds the applicant's authority to the resource and
submitted content.  For self-controlled resources it proves resource-key
authority; for externally controlled resources it includes controller
authorization as specified in the identity model.
The proof SHOULD be challenge-response based and bind:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>challenge identifier;</t>
            <t>resource identifier;</t>
            <t>Registrar identifier;</t>
            <t>identity-document hash or equivalent stable representation hash;</t>
            <t>proof purpose;</t>
            <t>verification method;</t>
            <t>nonce;</t>
            <t>issuance time; and</t>
            <t>expiration time.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>The Registrar MUST verify subject-control proof before issuing authoritative
registration evidence.  Root verification MUST ensure that registration
evidence remains bound to the subject-control process and target resource
identifier.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="external-attestations-and-review-scope">
        <name>External Attestations and Review Scope</name>
        <t>A Registrar or another accepted issuer MAY attest to organization identity,
platform-account control, qualifications, or an external identifier association.
The evidence MUST identify its subject, claim, issuer, applicable scope,
validity conditions, and status mechanism when required.  A registration
credential MUST NOT be interpreted as real-world identity verification unless
its actual claims and accepted issuance policy establish that fact.</t>
        <t>Issuer acceptance is scoped: authorization to attest one fact does not authorize
every external claim.  External credential verification does not replace
controller authorization, Root acceptance, or target-side business permission.
A resource manager is responsible under the applicable policy for accurate
registered descriptions and timely material updates; traceability alone does
not guarantee runtime conformance or define legal liability.</t>
        <t>Third-party collected records MAY describe external services, with the collector
identified as the source.  The collector's control covers its description record,
not the external service.  Such records MUST NOT be labeled provider-authorized
without corresponding evidence or replace a provider-authorized record solely
because both refer to the same URL or external identifier.  Source relationships
remain explicit when records are linked or deduplicated.</t>
        <t>Under an enterprise-verified admission policy, a Registrar checks the entity
behind a controller and issues claims identifying that review and its policy.
Root verifies the accepted issuer's authority and the binding of those claims;
it need not repeat the underlying enterprise investigation.  Minimal public
claims or restricted evidence references can support this process without
publishing identity documents or personal review records.</t>
        <section anchor="implementation-and-capability-evidence">
          <name>Implementation and Capability Evidence</name>
          <t>Optional evidence can bind an artifact digest, build provenance, deployment
instance, model measurement, or capability inventory to a resource revision.
The binding MUST identify the claim type, subject, evidence producer, covered
object or measurement scope, and applicable validity conditions.  A declared
fingerprint or evidence URL alone is not a successful verification result.
Consumers evaluate the evidence under their accepted verification policy;
Root acceptance of the reference does not certify the running implementation.</t>
          <t>A capability-inventory binding can compare a live tool or operation list with
an accepted baseline.  It MUST define covered fields, completeness, ordering,
canonicalization and digest algorithm, baseline revision, and how the live
observation is authenticated and scoped.  An MCP tool list is one possible
inventory, not a required OAN object.  Differences require a new accepted
baseline or explicit mismatch handling before relying on the affected claim.
A matching digest establishes consistency only for the covered observation;
it proves neither tool safety nor that execution remains unchanged afterward.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="infrastructure-governance-state">
        <name>Infrastructure Governance State</name>
        <t>Infrastructure subjects, such as Registrar Nodes, Discovery Nodes, and future
third-party credential issuers, can have lifecycle state governed by a bulletin,
committee process, on-chain event source, or another deployment-specific
governance mechanism.</t>
        <t>This infrastructure governance state is separate from ordinary resource
package state.  It governs whether an infrastructure subject is active,
suspended, revoked, expired, unknown, or otherwise inactive.  It does not by
itself create a resource package, validate a DID Document, host an artifact, or
make a Discovery result trustworthy.</t>
        <t>Where an OAN deployment uses Root-issued infrastructure authorization
credentials, effective infrastructure authorization is the conjunction of:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>a valid Root-issued authorization credential for the infrastructure subject;
and</t>
            <t>latest governance-derived state showing that the same subject and role are
active within the applicable scope.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>If either condition is missing, stale beyond policy, suspended, revoked,
expired, or unknown, infrastructure peers MUST fail closed for
trust-sensitive operations.</t>
        <t>The two conditions MUST refer to the same subject, role, trust domain, and
applicable scope.  Combining unrelated credentials and governance facts does
not establish authorization.  Source state time or coverage MUST be distinct
from local retrieval time; rereading an old projection cannot make it current.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="governance-evidence-and-service-side-execution">
        <name>Governance Evidence and Service-Side Execution</name>
        <t>Governance facts, protocol authorization credentials, resource acceptance,
distribution, discovery, and business execution have different responsibilities.
A governance event can establish infrastructure status; it does not establish
a resource document's correctness or authorize a particular business action.
An indexer or state projection relays source facts and MUST NOT independently
expand their scope.  A credential remains insufficient when applicable current
governance state has become inactive.</t>
        <t>Governance evidence MUST identify its authority, revision or checkpoint scope,
and validity conditions.  A verifier MUST distinguish native source proofs,
assertions by an accepted state attester, and unproved index responses.
The selected governance binding defines their encoding, freshness limits, and
failure behavior, including any additional attester the verifier trusts.
Lightweight clients can use scoped state assertions under that trust model.</t>
        <section anchor="on-chain-governance">
          <name>On-Chain Governance</name>
          <t>An OAN deployment MAY publish infrastructure lifecycle outcomes through
blockchain events.  Infrastructure peers combine these facts with applicable
authorization credentials as described above.  Resource packages, credentials,
artifacts, and business payloads remain separate service-side objects;
ordinary consumers need not subscribe to the ledger.</t>
          <t>An on-chain profile MUST define when relevant facts become effective and how
non-final or rolled-back state is handled.  Finality does not remove projection
delay or cache staleness.  This document specifies no confirmation count,
consensus algorithm, contract ABI, wallet, or indexer implementation.  Ordinary
resource registration, discovery, and invocation do not require individual
ledger transactions.  An optional ledger commitment proves inclusion of the
committed object, not its current validity or business truth.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="bulletin-boundary">
        <name>Bulletin Boundary</name>
        <t>A governance bulletin can publish infrastructure authorization outcomes,
package publication events, or other deployment-specific facts.  A profile MAY
implement the bulletin as an append-only signed log, an on-chain event stream,
a committee-approved record, or a combination of these mechanisms.</t>
        <t>The bulletin MUST NOT be assumed to store complete resource identity
documents, full credentials, private credential material, resource packages,
external artifacts, or product-native payloads unless a future profile
explicitly defines such storage.  In the architecture described here, resource
package trust remains based on Root verification, Root proof, hashes, package
state, and Discovery verification.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="multiple-trust-domains-and-root-federation">
      <name>Multiple Trust Domains and Root Federation</name>
      <t>A trust domain is the scope within which specified authorities and assertion
policies apply.  It need not coincide with one operator or administrative
boundary.</t>
      <t>One logical Root can have multiple service instances without creating multiple
independent authorities.  Independent Roots instead govern separate trust
domains and MAY federate under explicit acceptance policies.  This architecture
does not require a global superior Root or a particular replication protocol.
Hierarchical, scope-limited delegation is possible but is not the mandatory
topology.</t>
      <t>Root proofs, current-state evidence, and infrastructure authorization MUST be
attributable to their applicable trust domain and authority.  Even a globally
unique resource identifier can have distinct acceptance records in different
domains.  Root endpoints and identifier routing hints locate services; they
MUST NOT independently establish trust anchors.</t>
      <t>A relying party MUST explicitly determine which remote authority it accepts,
for which assertion types, roles, scopes, and validity conditions.  Acceptance
need not be symmetric and MUST NOT be assumed transitive.  Acceptance of
organization attestations does not grant acceptance of infrastructure delegation.
A multi-homed Registrar or Discovery Node MUST keep the authorization scope of
each domain distinct; permission granted in one domain does not expand another.</t>
      <t>Direct validation of a remote Root's package and local reacceptance of remote
material are different paths.  Local reacceptance MUST identify the local
authority and retained source evidence, and MUST NOT masquerade as the remote
Root's original assertion or erase source restrictions.  A new local assertion
does not by itself renew an external credential's validity.</t>
      <t>Versions and current-state revisions are compared within their defined authority
scope.  Different Roots' revision numbers or receipt times are not a global
order.  Conflicting packages, controllers, or lifecycle states MUST NOT be
silently merged because signatures verify.  Without an agreed coordinating
authority or migration rule, a relying party MUST retain the conflict and apply
an explicit selection or rejection policy.</t>
      <t>Federation profiles MUST define the effects of source revocation, withdrawal
of inter-domain acceptance, and local policy changes on new assertions and
cached evidence.  Historical authenticity remains distinct from current
acceptability.  This document does not require a globally synchronized registry,
cross-chain bridge, cross-Root transaction consensus, or online Root traversal
for every business invocation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="registration-and-root-verification">
      <name>Registration and Root Verification</name>
      <t>The standard OAN registration flow is:</t>
      <t><list style="numbers" type="1">
          <t>The Resource Provider prepares a resource identity document, metadata,
package version, hashes, endpoint descriptors, or artifact references.</t>
          <t>The Registrar validates resource type, resource identifier consistency,
identity-document shape, metadata, hashes, and hash algorithm fields.</t>
          <t>The applicant proves subject authority and, for externally controlled
resources, supplies the controller authorization defined in the identity model.</t>
          <t>The Registrar applies local policy and issues registration evidence.</t>
          <t>The Registrar creates a complete registration submission.</t>
          <t>The Registrar signs an upstream request envelope and submits it to Root.</t>
          <t>Root verifies infrastructure authorization, request integrity, freshness,
replay protection, registration evidence, subject-control binding, hashes,
and package semantics.</t>
          <t>Root accepts or rejects the package.</t>
          <t>On acceptance, Root archives the version, creates a Root proof, and queues
package publication and Discovery synchronization.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>Create and update operations SHOULD use a complete-document path.  Root SHOULD
verify a complete new resource identity representation rather than applying
ambiguous partial patches.</t>
      <section anchor="signed-upstream-envelope">
        <name>Signed Upstream Envelope</name>
        <t>Registrar-to-Root submissions and other trusted upstream writes MUST use an
authenticated, integrity-protected envelope.  Its signed content MUST bind:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>request identifier;</t>
            <t>protocol version or profile identifier;</t>
            <t>request purpose;</t>
            <t>HTTP method or equivalent operation;</t>
            <t>path or target operation name;</t>
            <t>audience identifier;</t>
            <t>signer identifier;</t>
            <t>timestamp;</t>
            <t>nonce;</t>
            <t>body hash;</t>
            <t>canonicalization or byte-representation rule.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>The envelope carries a proof over those inputs.  The proof's final signature
value is excluded from its own signature input; the selected proof suite defines
how proof options and algorithm identifiers are authenticated.</t>
        <t>Receivers MUST verify the sender's authorization state, proof validity, body
hash, timestamp freshness, nonce uniqueness, audience binding, and expected
operation before processing the body.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="root-verification-requirements">
        <name>Root Verification Requirements</name>
        <section anchor="updates-transfers-and-recovery">
          <name>Updates, Transfers, and Recovery</name>
          <t>For an existing resource, update authority MUST be evaluated against the
previously accepted control state.  Validating only the proposed document's
self-declared keys or controller is insufficient.  A transfer from controller
A to B requires A's authorization under that prior state, unless an explicitly
authorized recovery procedure applies.  B's acceptance MAY also be required
but cannot substitute for A's authorization.</t>
          <t>Receivers MUST distinguish ordinary updates, key rotation, controller transfer,
and recovery.  Recovery MUST have a defined authority and verifiable provenance;
it MUST NOT permit any Registrar to reset a resource using an unrelated new
self-signature.  Concurrent updates MUST be checked against an expected prior
revision or equivalent state condition within the acceptance decision, so that
conflicting transfers cannot both succeed from one old state.</t>
          <t>For example, when R is controlled by A, A authorizes the revision assigning
control to B.  Root evaluates that request against the accepted A-controlled
revision.  Only after acceptance does B authorize subsequent updates.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="verification-responsibility">
          <name>Verification Responsibility</name>
          <t>Root verification MUST be deterministic and auditable.  At a minimum, Root
MUST verify:</t>
          <t><list style="symbols">
              <t>the Registrar is currently authorized for the requested operation;</t>
              <t>the upstream envelope signature is valid;</t>
              <t>the request timestamp is fresh according to policy;</t>
              <t>the nonce has not been replayed within the replay window;</t>
              <t>the body hash matches the received body;</t>
              <t>the resource identifier syntax or profile is valid;</t>
              <t>the identity document is bound to the submitted resource identifier;</t>
              <t>the declared resource type is consistent across submitted objects;</t>
              <t>the identity-document hash matches the submitted identity document;</t>
              <t>the metadata hash matches normalized metadata;</t>
              <t>the package hash and hash algorithm are valid;</t>
              <t>registration evidence is issued by an authorized Registrar;</t>
              <t>registration evidence is bound to the target resource identifier;</t>
              <t>subject-control proof or an equivalent verified binding is present; and</t>
              <t>the requested lifecycle transition is valid.</t>
            </list></t>
          <t>Root MUST reject a submission if a required verification step fails.  Silent
partial acceptance is unsafe because downstream consumers can treat Root
acceptance as evidence that the complete trust path succeeded.</t>
          <t>Verification can be optimized within a trust boundary, but an upstream boolean
report cannot replace required checks across that boundary.  If a profile permits
an accepted attestation to discharge a check, it MUST specify the attester's
authority, exact object binding, check scope, and validity.  Reused results
MUST remain bound to unchanged material and applicable policy; time-sensitive
governance or lifecycle conclusions need the current checks required by policy.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="replay-and-logical-submission-identity">
          <name>Replay and Logical Submission Identity</name>
          <t>Within the replay scope defined by a profile, concurrent use of the same valid
nonce MUST NOT admit the message more than once.  Cleanup, restart, or state
migration MUST NOT reopen a still-valid replay window.  Persistent state or
an equivalent mechanism invalidating old messages MAY provide this property.
Scope and retention MUST account for the authenticated context and permitted
clock tolerance.  Replay protection unavailable for a protected write MUST
cause explicit failure rather than bypass.</t>
          <t>Consuming a nonce does not prove that registration completed.  A new envelope
for the same logical submission differs from replaying an old signed message.
The registration binding MUST provide an idempotency or conditional-submission
contract binding a logical operation to its content and authority scope.  Reuse
of that identity with different content MUST conflict.  A lost response SHOULD
be recoverable by correlating the accepted result rather than creating a new
resource or revision blindly.  No database or internal receipt format is mandated.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registration-outcome">
        <name>Registration Outcome</name>
        <t>On successful verification, Root SHOULD:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>archive the accepted identity document and metadata;</t>
            <t>assign or confirm the package version;</t>
            <t>create Root proof claims over required package fields;</t>
            <t>create or update the latest-version index;</t>
            <t>record publication state or cursor information;</t>
            <t>queue CDN publication or equivalent distribution; and</t>
            <t>make Discovery synchronization possible.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>A successful Root response indicates Root acceptance of a specific package
version.  It does not prove product quality, endpoint liveness, ranking value,
or suitability for a particular task.</t>
        <t>The acceptance result MUST bind the resource, trust domain, submitted content,
accepted revision or digest, and achieved stage.  Reliably confirmed acceptance
MUST survive a process failure with recoverable package state and publication
intent, or an equivalent reconstruction path.  It does not imply immediate
visibility at every Discovery Node.  When the submission outcome is unknown,
clients SHOULD reconcile existing acceptance before retrying a state change.</t>
        <t>Root MUST distinguish repeat delivery of identical content from conflicting
content at the same revision.  The registration binding defines comparable
revisions within an authority; timestamps alone need not provide that ordering.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="distribution-model">
      <name>Distribution Model</name>
      <t>OAN distribution has two layers:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>Root-to-Discovery distribution of Root-verified package material; and</t>
          <t>provider-to-consumer distribution of product-native external artifacts.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>The CDN Service belongs to the Root-to-Discovery distribution path.  It can
serve ResourcePackages, identity documents, metadata, manifests, and package
indexes.  It does not make bytes trustworthy.</t>
      <t>Provider-to-consumer artifact distribution remains outside the OAN core.  A
Skill file, MCP manifest, OpenAPI document, source archive, executable, or
other artifact can be hosted by the provider, a repository, object storage, an
institutional website, or another distribution service.  OAN verifies the
reference, digest, package binding, publisher identity, and Root proof; it does
not require OAN infrastructure to host the artifact.</t>
      <t>Discovery Nodes and consumers MUST verify fetched package material before
using it.  Verification includes Root proof, package hash, metadata hash,
identity-document hash, resource type, lifecycle state, and applicable bulletin
or publication facts.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authorization-aware-discovery">
      <name>Authorization-Aware Discovery</name>
      <t>Discovery has three separate outputs:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>eligibility from verified Root-anchored package data;</t>
          <t>matching and ordering from local query logic; and</t>
          <t>response provenance from the Discovery Node signature.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>These outputs MUST NOT be conflated.  A resource can be valid but not highly
ranked.  A response can be signed by a Discovery Node but still contain only
local ranking decisions.  A high local score does not make an unverifiable or
revoked package trusted.</t>
      <section anchor="synchronization">
        <name>Synchronization</name>
        <t>Discovery synchronization SHOULD follow this order:</t>
        <t><list style="numbers" type="1">
            <t>identify the Root trust anchor or Root endpoint for the deployment;</t>
            <t>obtain current Root or bulletin facts needed by the profile;</t>
            <t>resolve distribution locations from verifiable Root-controlled material
when available;</t>
            <t>fetch manifests or package indexes;</t>
            <t>fetch resource packages;</t>
            <t>verify identity-document hash, metadata hash, package hash, and Root proof;</t>
            <t>verify lifecycle state and current-version expectations;</t>
            <t>enforce Discovery authorized domains;</t>
            <t>persist accepted packages into the query index; and</t>
            <t>persist rejected packages with inspectable reasons.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Discovery MUST NOT index packages that fail verification as trusted
candidates.  Discovery SHOULD keep accepted and rejected package state
separate so operators can distinguish missing publication, verification
failure, authorization-domain mismatch, and query mismatch.</t>
        <t>Publication sequence, per-target delivery progress, and resource revision are
different coordinates.  Publication batches and synchronization batches need
not correspond.  A synchronization profile MUST define whether its checkpoint
acknowledges a contiguous accepted prefix or only scanned progress.  If progress
passes rejected items, those outcomes MUST remain recoverable and MUST NOT be
counted as trusted acceptance.</t>
        <t>Transiently unavailable packages can be retried; invalid proofs and scope
denials MUST NOT become acceptable merely through retry.  Repair processing
MUST recheck applicable current authorization, package integrity, and lifecycle
state, and MUST NOT overwrite a newer suspension with an old active package.
Failure isolation across resources and receiving nodes is RECOMMENDED, without
requiring a particular batch scheduler or unbounded parallelism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorized-domains">
        <name>Authorized Domains</name>
        <t>A Discovery Node's authorized domains limit which resources it may expose.
Profiles can express these domains through a capability tree, tags, policy
attributes, or another governance-recognized mechanism.</t>
        <t>A Discovery Node MUST NOT expose a resource as trusted unless the resource is
eligible under the Discovery Node's authorized domains.  Custom tags, semantic
embeddings, local labels, or ranking features MUST NOT expand the authorized
domain set.</t>
        <t>This infrastructure scope differs from caller-specific visibility.  Where
access policy restricts discovery, the node MUST also enforce the requester's
permitted records and fields.  Neither test grants permission to invoke the
resource; the target service enforces that independent business decision.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="query-model">
        <name>Query Model</name>
        <t>A Discovery query MAY include text, capability tags, resource type, protocol
binding, provider identifier, endpoint type, version requirement, package hash,
authorization domain, lifecycle state, or other profile-specific filters.</t>
        <t>Discovery SHOULD return the latest active package version by default.  If a
consumer asks for an exact version, version constraint, or package hash,
Discovery MUST NOT silently substitute a different package version unless the
response clearly indicates the substitution and the consumer policy allows it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signed-discovery-response">
        <name>Signed Discovery Response</name>
        <t>A Discovery response presented as trusted under this architecture MUST be
signed by the Discovery Node.  The signed payload MUST bind the query or query
digest, responding identity, generation and expiry conditions, candidate
identifiers, versions, package digests, and the returned result scope.
Root proof references, lifecycle states, and matching explanations, when
returned, MUST be covered by that signature.  A binding can additionally use
a nonce or correlation identifier to link the response to the requesting client.</t>
        <t>The Discovery signature proves response provenance from that Discovery Node.
It does not prove product quality, endpoint liveness, user suitability, or
business trustworthiness.</t>
        <t>Response authentication does not replace Root acceptance, current-state
evidence, or local business authorization.  Partial responses and page scope
MUST be explicit where they affect interpretation.  The consumer MUST NOT infer
global completeness or the globally latest version from one domain's response.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="pre-use-verification">
      <name>Pre-Use Verification</name>
      <t>Before treating a discovered resource as trusted for downloading, invocation,
composition, or other use, a Resource Consumer MUST perform the applicable
checks below.  Profiles MUST identify which conditional checks apply and MUST
NOT omit checks needed for the claimed assurance:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>Discovery response signature and freshness;</t>
          <t>Discovery Node authorization, where required by the profile;</t>
          <t>selected candidate identifier and resource type;</t>
          <t>ResourcePackage Root proof;</t>
          <t>identity-document hash;</t>
          <t>metadata hash;</t>
          <t>package hash and hash algorithm;</t>
          <t>package version and lifecycle state;</t>
          <t>endpoint descriptor or artifact-reference binding;</t>
          <t>external artifact digest after retrieval, when an artifact is used;</t>
          <t>credential requirements and issuer authorization where applicable;</t>
          <t>resource identifier and resource type consistency; and</t>
          <t>timestamp, nonce, audience, target, and body-hash binding for signed access
or invocation envelopes.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>For service resources, a client MUST complete applicable verification before
invocation.  For Skill resources, it MUST verify the referenced file or manifest
before using it to resolve or invoke implementation resources.</t>
      <t>OAN verification is a pre-use guard.  After it succeeds, control moves to the
product-native protocol or artifact format.  Product-native behavior remains
outside this document.</t>
      <t>The object used MUST be the object verified.  Consumers MUST retain the selected
identity, revision or digest, endpoint or artifact binding, and applicable
security profile through actual use.  Resolving a different package, changing
routes, or following a redirect cannot silently inherit the first object's
verification result.  Artifact digests cover the retrieved bytes, not merely
the URL or a server-supplied digest.  This reduces substitution risk; it does
not prove that remote runtime code permanently matches its description.</t>
      <section anchor="runtime-identity-integration">
        <name>Runtime Identity Integration</name>
        <t>Embedded middleware, colocated enforcement, and delegated gateways can apply
identity evidence at native protocol boundaries.  A directory-only or one-sided
integration MUST NOT claim mutual authentication of actual business exchanges.</t>
        <t>For protected exchanges, the selected binding MUST require verification and
local authorization before execution, response verification before trusted
consumption, and protection against bypass of an external enforcement boundary.
It MUST distinguish original-subject forwarding from delegated proxy signing,
and define canonical native inputs, target and operation binding, correlation,
replay, errors, and covered asynchronous operations.  Controller authority and
gateway channel authentication do not substitute for resource-message identity
or task access control.  Native TLS and authorization remain in force.</t>
        <t>Timeout does not prove non-execution.  A fresh nonce does not make repetition
of a side-effecting operation safe; retry needs known non-delivery or a defined
idempotency contract.  Otherwise outcomes require reconciliation.  For streams
authenticated only by terminal proof, prior chunks remain provisional and MUST
NOT cause actions requiring authenticated input before successful verification.
Interruption without a valid completion proof is not authenticated completion.
Per-event authenticated delivery is a separate optional security binding.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="lifecycle-versioning-and-consistency">
      <name>Lifecycle, Versioning, and Consistency</name>
      <t>OAN uses multiple lifecycle scopes.  Implementations MUST keep them distinct.</t>
      <section anchor="registrar-draft-state">
        <name>Registrar Draft State</name>
        <t>Registrar draft state is local onboarding workflow state.  Example states can
include draft, challenged, control-verified, credentialed, submitted,
accepted, or rejected.  Draft existence MUST NOT imply Root acceptance or
Discovery visibility.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-package-state">
        <name>Resource Package State</name>
        <t>Resource package state is Root-governed version state.  Example states include
accepted, published, active, superseded, suspended, expired, and revoked.
These states apply to a versioned package, not necessarily to every historical
package or to every local Discovery index row.</t>
        <t>Root MUST avoid ambiguous current-version state for the same resource
identifier.  Discovery Nodes SHOULD suppress revoked, suspended, expired, or
otherwise inactive package versions from default trusted query results.</t>
        <t>Historical package integrity, current revision, and permission for current use
are separate checks.  Authoritative current-state evidence binds the issuing
authority and trust domain, resource identifier, state revision, applicable
package digest or revision, lifecycle state, and validity conditions.  A profile
selects its representation, such as an online status response, signed
short-lived statement, or status-list mechanism.</t>
        <t>For a signed current-state statement, those conditions include observation or
effective time, issuance time, and expiry.  The verifier MUST check the issuer's
authority for current-state assertions and enforce expiry and its maximum
acceptable observation age.  A freshly signed Discovery response carrying an
old statement does not reset that age.  The selected binding defines clock
tolerance and any propagation bounds; expiry alone does not provide
instantaneous revocation.  This architecture specifies no universal expiry
duration or revocation deadline.</t>
        <t>A remembered highest verified state can detect rollback, but first-time clients
also need a trusted freshness basis; local cache history cannot solve their
initial old-state replay.  A recent HTTP response or locally pinned historical
Root snapshot alone does not establish live revocation or governance status.
Reindexing MUST NOT extend source validity.  Key revocation, credential status,
resource deactivation, and individual package suspension remain distinct events.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-specific-governance-actions">
        <name>Resource-Specific Governance Actions</name>
        <t>Profiles MAY authorize a separate governance path to suspend or revoke one
resource or revision without requiring its controller to cooperate.  Such a
path MUST identify the acting authority, scope, target, state revision, proof,
and any restoration rules.  It MUST NOT be inferred from arbitrary operator
access or from the mere ability to issue registration credentials.  Governance
process and appeals are outside this document.  Resource action is distinct
from revoking all historical packages associated with a Registrar.</t>
        <t>An admitting Registrar can receive reports and retain evidence for review or
escalation.  A report is an allegation, not an authoritative status change.
Only a designated status authority can issue the verifiable suspension or
revocation decision.  A Discovery operator's local suppression remains a local
policy action unless that operator is separately authorized to change resource
state.  Status distribution and consumer checks convey the resulting decision;
reporting channels and review procedures remain operational policy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="discovery-index-state">
        <name>Discovery Index State</name>
        <t>Discovery index state is local to a Discovery Node.  Example states include
fetched, accepted, indexed, rejected, quarantined, or stale.  These states
describe Discovery-local processing outcomes.  They do not modify Root package
lifecycle state.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="infrastructure-authorization-state">
        <name>Infrastructure Authorization State</name>
        <t>Infrastructure authorization state applies to Registrar Nodes, Discovery
Nodes, and future infrastructure issuers.  It is separate from ordinary
resource package state.  Revoking a Registrar does not automatically revoke all
historical resource packages that Registrar helped onboard, unless the Root or
profile defines such a consequence.  However, a revoked Registrar MUST NOT be
accepted for new authoritative submissions.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="asynchronous-publication">
        <name>Asynchronous Publication</name>
        <t>Root acceptance, CDN publication, Discovery synchronization, and query
visibility can be asynchronous.  A newly accepted package may not be
immediately queryable.  This is acceptable if implementations expose enough
state for operators and consumers to distinguish publication delay,
verification failure, authorization-domain filtering, and query mismatch.</t>
        <t>Discovery MUST NOT compensate for staleness by accepting unverifiable packages.
If synchronization is stale beyond policy, Discovery SHOULD fail closed for
trust-sensitive results or clearly mark the response freshness state.</t>
        <t>Marking stale evidence is not permission to claim a mandatory current-state
check passed.  Newer inactive state MUST take precedence over a reachable old
active package, including while replacement material is still being distributed.
Root acceptance, CDN recoverable availability, receiver verification, and query
readiness SHOULD be independently distinguishable; one slow receiver need not
block all other receivers.  No fixed delivery deadline is implied.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cross-domain-registration-and-migration">
        <name>Cross-Domain Registration and Migration</name>
        <t>Concurrent registration in multiple domains, migration between domains, and
key rotation of one logical Root are different operations.  Migration requires
authorization by the resource's currently valid controller or a defined recovery
authority, independent admission by the destination, and explicit source/target
record relationships and cutover conditions.  Changing a Root URL alone does
not transfer authority or reconcile conflicting state.</t>
        <t>Identifier preservation depends on the selected identifier method's routing
and authority rules; this architecture does not promise unchanged identifiers
for every scheme.  When a new identifier is necessary, continuity requires
authorized association evidence, not name matching.  Profiles MUST address an
unavailable or compromised source domain without silently bypassing prior control;
a source-root migration acknowledgement is not inherently required for every
independent registration in another domain.  Migration does not automatically
transfer business privileges or erase historical authenticity.  Detailed
cross-domain transaction and recovery messages belong in migration profiles.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-other-protocols">
      <name>Relationship to Other Protocols</name>
      <t>OAN is an identity, registration, package, and discovery trust layer.  It can
be used before or around product-native protocols.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>MCP:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>OAN can discover and verify an <spanx style="verb">mcp_server</spanx> resource, then allow an MCP
client to connect using MCP semantics.  OAN does not define MCP tool
behavior.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>A2A or Agent Interaction Protocols:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>OAN can discover and verify an <spanx style="verb">agent_service</spanx> resource and provide identity
and package evidence before the agent interaction protocol begins.  OAN does
not define the full task conversation.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>HTTP or RPC APIs:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>OAN can discover and verify a <spanx style="verb">tool_api</spanx> resource, endpoint descriptor, and
schema or artifact reference.  The API's business semantics remain native to
that API.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Skills:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>OAN can discover and verify a <spanx style="verb">skill</spanx> resource and its external artifact
reference.  Skill package format, execution, and composition semantics remain
outside the OAN core.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="protocol-object-expectations">
      <name>Protocol Object Expectations</name>
      <t>The following lists summarize the semantic content of registration and discovery
objects.  Bindings define concrete schemas and can convey content directly or
through verifiable references.  These summaries do not relax the proof,
authorization, and verification requirements defined above.</t>
      <section anchor="registration-submission">
        <name>Registration Submission</name>
        <t>A registration submission SHOULD contain:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>Registrar identifier;</t>
            <t>resource identifier;</t>
            <t>resource type;</t>
            <t>complete resource identity document;</t>
            <t>normalized metadata;</t>
            <t>package version;</t>
            <t>identity-document hash;</t>
            <t>metadata hash;</t>
            <t>package hash;</t>
            <t>hash algorithm;</t>
            <t>registration evidence;</t>
            <t>subject-control proof or equivalent binding; and</t>
            <t>signed upstream envelope.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registration-evidence">
        <name>Registration Evidence</name>
        <t>Registration evidence SHOULD contain:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>issuer identifier;</t>
            <t>subject resource identifier;</t>
            <t>credential or evidence type;</t>
            <t>issued-at time;</t>
            <t>expiration time where applicable;</t>
            <t>registration purpose;</t>
            <t>identity-document hash;</t>
            <t>subject-control proof hash or equivalent reference;</t>
            <t>verified verification method; and</t>
            <t>proof.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="discovery-candidate">
        <name>Discovery Candidate</name>
        <t>A Discovery candidate SHOULD contain:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>resource identifier;</t>
            <t>resource type;</t>
            <t>package version;</t>
            <t>package hash;</t>
            <t>metadata hash;</t>
            <t>identity-document hash;</t>
            <t>lifecycle state;</t>
            <t>endpoint descriptors or artifact references;</t>
            <t>matched capability domains or tags;</t>
            <t>Root proof reference; and</t>
            <t>product-native protocol hints where applicable.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="error-taxonomy">
      <name>Error Taxonomy</name>
      <t>Precise errors improve interoperability and operations.  Implementations
SHOULD distinguish at least the following categories:</t>
      <texttable>
        <ttcol align="left">Category</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Example</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Expected Behavior</ttcol>
        <c>syntax</c>
        <c>malformed object</c>
        <c>reject before trust checks</c>
        <c>crypto</c>
        <c>bad signature</c>
        <c>reject and audit signer</c>
        <c>authorization</c>
        <c>inactive Registrar</c>
        <c>reject as unauthorized</c>
        <c>freshness</c>
        <c>stale timestamp</c>
        <c>reject as expired</c>
        <c>replay</c>
        <c>repeated nonce</c>
        <c>reject and audit</c>
        <c>binding</c>
        <c>wrong resource identifier</c>
        <c>reject as mismatch</c>
        <c>hash</c>
        <c>metadata hash mismatch</c>
        <c>reject or quarantine</c>
        <c>scope</c>
        <c>out-of-domain package</c>
        <c>do not index</c>
        <c>state</c>
        <c>revoked package</c>
        <c>suppress from trusted results</c>
        <c>artifact</c>
        <c>digest mismatch</c>
        <c>do not use artifact</c>
      </texttable>
      <t>External error messages MAY avoid exposing sensitive operator details, but
internal logs SHOULD preserve enough information for audit and debugging.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The threat analysis uses the general guidance in <xref target="RFC3552"/>.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Malicious Registrar:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Registrar can attempt to register resources without verifying subject
control or after losing authorization.  Root MUST verify Registrar
authorization, signed upstream envelopes, freshness, replay protection,
registration evidence, and subject-control binding.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Subject-control failure:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An applicant can try to register a resource identifier controlled by another
party.  Registrars MUST verify subject-control proof before issuing
authoritative registration evidence, and Root MUST verify that the evidence
remains bound to the target resource.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Tampered CDN content:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A CDN or intermediary can serve modified packages or stale manifests.
Discovery Nodes and consumers MUST verify Root proofs and all relevant hashes
after retrieval.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Overbroad Discovery exposure:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Discovery Node can expose resources outside its authorized domains.
Discovery implementations MUST enforce authorized-domain filtering before
indexing or returning trusted candidates.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Ranking as authorization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Local ranking, semantic search, or reputation features can be mistaken for
trust decisions.  Implementations MUST apply ranking only after Root package
verification and Discovery authorization filtering.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Stale lifecycle state:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A stale cache can return superseded or revoked resources.  Discovery Nodes
SHOULD track freshness and fail closed for trust-sensitive results when
lifecycle state is stale beyond policy.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay attacks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Attackers can replay upstream submissions or signed invocation envelopes.
Signed envelopes MUST bind timestamp, nonce, audience, operation, and body
hash.  Receivers MUST enforce freshness windows and nonce uniqueness.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Wrong-target invocation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A request prepared for one resource can be redirected to another endpoint.
Consumers and service resources SHOULD bind signed access or invocation
envelopes to the selected target identifier and verified endpoint metadata.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>External artifact substitution:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Skill file, MCP manifest, API description, or executable can be replaced at
its external host.  Consumers MUST verify artifact digests and package
binding before use.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Canonicalization mismatch:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Independent implementations can compute different hashes for the same
logical object.  Bindings MUST define the signed or hashed representation,
including canonicalization where used, and SHOULD provide test vectors.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Untrusted references:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Identity documents, descriptors, and artifact references can trigger costly
retrieval or access to unintended services.  Verifiers SHOULD bound input
size, nesting, reference depth, redirects, and retrieval time, and restrict
destinations.  An advertised URL MUST NOT itself authorize access to private
network services or disclosure of credentials to another origin.  A required
check that exceeds those limits fails explicitly rather than being skipped.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Root key compromise:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A compromised Root signing key can undermine a trust domain.  Deployments
SHOULD define key rotation, compromise response, revocation, and recovery
procedures.  Higher-assurance deployments SHOULD consider threshold signing
or other operational controls.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Denial of service:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Attackers can submit many registrations, trigger expensive verification, or
overload Discovery queries.  Registrars, Root Nodes, CDN Services, and
Discovery Nodes SHOULD apply rate limits, quotas, backpressure, input size
limits, and monitoring.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>OAN metadata can reveal provider identities, service endpoints, capability
areas, business relationships, policy requirements, and organizational
structure.  Deployments SHOULD minimize public metadata and avoid publishing
private endpoint details, unnecessary internal schemas, private credentials,
or sensitive operational information.</t>
      <t>Discovery queries can reveal user or enterprise intent.  Discovery Nodes
SHOULD provide transport confidentiality, access control where appropriate,
retention limits, privacy-preserving logs, and clear operator policies for
query data.</t>
      <t>External artifact references can leak which users or organizations retrieve a
Skill, API description, or package from a third-party host.  Consumers SHOULD
consider retrieval privacy and artifact caching policies for sensitive
deployments.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document makes no IANA requests.</t>
      <t>Future OAN profiles that define media types, URI schemes, HTTP fields, well-
known URIs, registries, or protocol parameter values are expected to include
their own IANA considerations.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.</t>
      <t>A research implementation of OAN has been developed with
separate Root, Registrar, Discovery, and CDN services; resource-oriented
registration; <spanx style="verb">did:oan</spanx> resource identifiers; first-class resource types for
Agent Service, Skill, MCP Server, and Tool/API; subject-control proof;
Registrar-issued registration evidence; Root-verified ResourcePackage objects;
signed upstream envelopes; Root-to-CDN package publication; Discovery package
verification; authorized-domain filtering; signed Discovery responses; and
pre-use verification examples.</t>
      <t>The open-source project is available at <eref target="https://github.com/OpenAgenet">https://github.com/OpenAgenet</eref>.
The repository set is expected to evolve as the implementation and draft are
refined.  The existence of this code is intended to support experimentation,
review, and interoperability feedback; it is not required for conformance.</t>
      <t>Implementation details such as repository layout, programming language,
database backend, HTTP route names, local file paths, and operator tooling are
not specified by this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conformance-checklist">
      <name>Conformance Checklist</name>
      <t>An implementation or deployment can be reviewed against the following
checklist:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>resource type consistency is checked across identifiers, metadata,
submissions, packages, and Root proofs;</t>
          <t>subject-control proof is required before authoritative registration evidence
is issued;</t>
          <t>trusted upstream writes are signed and bind method, path, audience,
timestamp, nonce, and body hash;</t>
          <t>Registrar and Discovery infrastructure authorization checks fail closed when
state is missing, stale, suspended, revoked, expired, or unknown;</t>
          <t>Root proof binds resource identifier, resource type, package version,
identity-document hash, metadata hash, package hash, hash algorithm, and
lifecycle state;</t>
          <t>CDN content is verified after retrieval;</t>
          <t>Discovery enforces authorized domains before ranking or returning trusted
candidates;</t>
          <t>custom tags do not expand authorization scope;</t>
          <t>latest active package version is returned by default;</t>
          <t>historical versions are explicitly identified when returned;</t>
          <t>external artifacts are verified by digest before use;</t>
          <t>signed Discovery responses are verified by consumers; and</t>
          <t>replayed or stale signed envelopes are rejected.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>Where the corresponding features are supported, the review also checks that:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>updates and transfers are authorized against previously accepted control;</t>
          <t>concurrent updates cannot both consume one exclusive prior-state condition;</t>
          <t>concurrent nonce replay and restart do not reopen an active replay window;</t>
          <t>an uncertain submission can be reconciled without blind duplicate mutation;</t>
          <t>scanned synchronization progress is not confused with accepted content;</t>
          <t>repair never restores an obsolete active state over a newer suspension;</t>
          <t>external-identifier association does not imply verified external ownership;</t>
          <t>governance evidence and credentials refer to the same authority scope;</t>
          <t>cross-Root acceptance is explicit, scoped, and not assumed transitive;</t>
          <t>independent Roots' conflicting revisions are not silently merged; and</t>
          <t>verified package and endpoint bindings survive through actual use.</t>
        </list></t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references title="References" anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <references title="Normative References" anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references title="Informative References" anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <reference anchor="DID-CORE" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2022/REC-did-core-20220719/">
          <front>
            <title>Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="July" day="19"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3552">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/>
            <date month="July" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1629?>

<section anchor="example-resourcepackage-informative">
      <name>Example ResourcePackage (Informative)</name>
      <t>The HTTPS identifiers below are illustrative stable identifiers, not a new
identifier method or a definition of did:oan syntax.  A concrete profile
defines their authority and resolution semantics.  The examples omit fields
not needed to illustrate each relationship and are not complete test vectors.</t>
      <t>The following JSON fragment illustrates a ResourcePackage.  It is not a
mandatory wire format.</t>
      <figure>
        <sourcecode type="json">
{
  "resourceDid": "https://resources.example.org/id/translator",
  "resourceType": "agent_service",
  "packageVersion": "3",
  "lifecycleState": "active",
  "didDocumentHash": "sha256:012345...",
  "metadataHash": "sha256:abcdef...",
  "packageHash": "sha256:789abc...",
  "hashAlgorithm": "sha256",
  "metadata": {
    "name": "Example Translator",
    "capabilityTags": ["translation", "translation.zh-en"],
    "customTags": ["legal-contract-translation"],
    "protocolBindings": ["https"]
  },
  "registrarDid": "https://registrar.example.org/id",
  "rootProof": {
    "type": "ExampleDataIntegrityProof2026",
    "verificationMethod": "https://root.example.org/id#key-1",
    "packageClaims": {
      "resourceDid": "https://resources.example.org/id/translator",
      "resourceType": "agent_service",
      "packageVersion": "3",
      "didDocumentHash": "sha256:012345...",
      "metadataHash": "sha256:abcdef...",
      "packageHash": "sha256:789abc...",
      "hashAlgorithm": "sha256",
      "lifecycleState": "active"
    },
    "proofValue": "..."
  }
}
</sourcecode>
      </figure>
    </section>
    <section anchor="example-skill-artifact-reference-informative">
      <name>Example Skill Artifact Reference (Informative)</name>
      <t>The following JSON fragment illustrates an external artifact reference for a
Skill resource.  It is not a mandatory wire format.</t>
      <figure>
        <sourcecode type="json">
{
  "resourceDid": "https://resources.example.org/id/invoice-review",
  "resourceType": "skill",
  "packageVersion": "1.0.0",
  "artifact": {
    "uri": "https://example.org/skills/invoice-review.skill.json",
    "mediaType": "application/example-skill+json",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "digest": "sha256:13579b...",
    "retrievalPolicy": "public-read"
  },
  "implementedBy": [
    {
      "resourceDid": "https://resources.example.org/id/mcp",
      "resourceType": "mcp_server"
    }
  ]
}
</sourcecode>
      </figure>
    </section>
    <section anchor="example-discovery-response-informative">
      <name>Example Discovery Response (Informative)</name>
      <t>The following JSON fragment illustrates a signed Discovery response.  It is not
a mandatory wire format.</t>
      <figure>
        <sourcecode type="json">
{
  "discoveryDid": "https://discovery.example.org/id",
  "issuedAt": "2026-06-06T08:01:00Z",
  "expiresAt": "2026-06-06T08:06:00Z",
  "resultScope": {"completeForQuery": true},
  "queryHash": "sha256:2468ac...",
  "results": [
    {
      "resourceDid": "https://resources.example.org/id/translator",
      "resourceType": "agent_service",
      "packageVersion": "3",
      "packageHash": "sha256:789abc...",
      "metadataHash": "sha256:abcdef...",
      "lifecycleState": "active",
      "matchedTags": ["translation.zh-en"],
      "rootProofRef": "root-proof:4812"
    }
  ],
  "proof": {
    "type": "ExampleDataIntegrityProof2026",
    "verificationMethod": "https://discovery.example.org/id#key-1",
    "proofValue": "..."
  }
}
</sourcecode>
      </figure>
    </section>
    <section anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The authors thank participants in discussions on open agent networks, resource
identity, trusted discovery, and cross-protocol agent interoperability.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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