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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture-01" category="info" submissionType="independent" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Agentic Overlay Networks">Architecture for Agentic Overlay Networks</title>
    <author initials="J." surname="Xu" fullname="Jinliang Xu">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>xujinliang@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Li" fullname="Bingqi Li">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>libingqi@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="R." surname="Zhu" fullname="Runkai Zhu">
      <organization>CAICT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>No. 52, Huayuan North Road</street>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <region>Haidian District</region>
          <code>100191</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>zhurunkai@caict.ac.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <area>General</area>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>
    <abstract>
      <?line 49?>

<t>This document describes an architecture for agentic overlay networks.
It describes how autonomous software agents, agent gateways,
registries, discovery services, and enterprise service hubs interact
across administrative domains without replacing the existing Internet
protocol stack.</t>
      <t>The architecture separates control-plane coordination from runtime
agent interaction.  Management root nodes coordinate trust anchors,
semantic taxonomies, and network-wide policy.  Registry service nodes onboard
agents and publish signed capability metadata.  Discovery service nodes provide
intent-driven candidate selection.  Enterprise service hubs adapt private
systems and legacy interfaces into agent-compatible capabilities.  After
discovery, runtime authentication and execution are performed by the invoking
and target endpoints, which can be agents or gateways, using mutual
verification; discovery and management nodes are not required in the runtime
path.</t>
      <t>This document defines architectural roles, functional boundaries, metadata
expectations, operational workflows, and security considerations for such
networks.  It does not define a new transport protocol, a new URI scheme, or a
mandatory discovery ranking algorithm.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 73?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Autonomous software agents increasingly act as networked principals that can
interpret intent, select tools, invoke remote services, and cooperate with
other agents.  Existing Internet mechanisms remain essential for packet
delivery and host reachability, but they do not by themselves provide the
agent-specific functions needed for large-scale cross-domain collaboration:
capability registration, semantic discovery, verifiable identity, policy
coordination, protocol adaptation, and auditable commercial metering.</t>
      <t>An agentic overlay network adds these functions above the existing Internet.
It is an overlay because it preserves IP, DNS, TLS, HTTP, QUIC, and other
deployed infrastructure where those mechanisms are suitable.  It is agentic
because its primary subjects are autonomous agents and agent gateways rather
than only hosts, users, or conventional web applications.</t>
      <t>In multi-operator environments, coordination distributes trust anchors and
shared semantics while execution remains between selected runtime endpoints.
No single platform is assumed to control all participating services.</t>
      <section anchor="problem-statement">
        <name>Problem Statement</name>
        <t>Agent deployments are converging on several recurring interoperation problems:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>independently developed services use different boundaries between capability
registration, semantic discovery, credential verification, and invocation;</t>
            <t>discovery systems often mix search, authorization, routing, and execution in
one platform-specific service, which makes cross-domain deployment hard;</t>
            <t>existing host and service discovery mechanisms can identify hosts or
endpoints, but they do not by themselves define agent capability semantics,
freshness, proof of control, or agent-specific lifecycle state; and</t>
            <t>enterprises need a way to expose selected internal tools as agent
capabilities without placing private systems or raw data in a global
registry.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>This document addresses those problems by defining architectural roles and
boundaries.  It deliberately stops short of defining a complete product
ecosystem, commercial governance model, or mandatory implementation backend.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="applicability">
        <name>Applicability</name>
        <t>This architecture is applicable when multiple organizations need to publish,
discover, verify, and invoke autonomous agents or agent gateways across
administrative boundaries.  It is less useful for single-application systems
where all agents, tools, credentials, and discovery functions are controlled by
one implementation and do not need interoperable metadata or cross-domain
trust.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="goals">
        <name>Goals</name>
        <t>The architecture has the following goals:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>enable agents to register stable identities, endpoint references, supported
protocols, and capability metadata;</t>
            <t>enable discovery services to find candidate agents based on user or agent
intent, capability tags, operational status, and policy constraints;</t>
            <t>permit heterogeneous agent protocols and legacy APIs to be adapted without
forcing all deployments onto one interaction protocol;</t>
            <t>support decentralized runtime authentication between interacting endpoints;</t>
            <t>keep management nodes out of the runtime traffic path;</t>
            <t>allow operator-neutral governance of trust anchors, revocation, taxonomy
synchronization, and audit artifacts; and</t>
            <t>provide a basis for interoperable metering and audit evidence without
requiring every runtime interaction to be recorded on a public ledger.</t>
          </list></t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="non-goals">
        <name>Non-Goals</name>
        <t>This document does not define:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>a replacement for IP, DNS, TLS, HTTP, QUIC, or other deployed Internet
protocols;</t>
            <t>a new agent URI scheme;</t>
            <t>a mandatory agent-to-agent invocation protocol;</t>
            <t>a single global discovery algorithm;</t>
            <t>a universal reputation system;</t>
            <t>an economic settlement protocol; or</t>
            <t>an application-specific workflow language.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Concrete bindings define message formats and transport; profiles constrain
architectural choices such as credential types or discovery schemas.  Extensions
add capabilities, while local policy determines acceptable authorities and
operations without overriding mandatory security properties.  Architectural
conformance alone does not establish wire interoperability: peers also need
shared bindings, selected through configuration or negotiation.  This document
does not require adoption of any particular companion specification.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
<xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
shown here.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Agent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An autonomous or semi-autonomous software system that can receive an intent
or request, perform planning or tool use, and return a result or state
transition.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agent Gateway:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A domain-local component that adapts an internal API, tool, service, or
legacy system into an agent-compatible interface.  An Agent Gateway is not a
global discovery service unless it also implements that role.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agentic Overlay Network:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An overlay architecture that adds agent identity, capability registration,
semantic discovery, trust coordination, and operational metering above the
existing Internet.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Capability Metadata:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Structured and human-readable information describing what an agent can do,
how it can be invoked, which protocols it supports, and which operational
constraints apply.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Discovery Service Node:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A node that accepts discovery requests and returns candidate agents.  It
performs search and candidate ranking, but it is not in the runtime execution
path between agents.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Enterprise Service Hub:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A private-domain component that encapsulates enterprise data sources,
tools, and internal APIs and exposes selected capabilities through an Agent
Gateway or Registry Service Node.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Management Root Node:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A control-plane node that coordinates trust anchors, credential issuer
authorization, semantic taxonomy synchronization, revocation information,
and network-wide policy artifacts.  It does not forward agent traffic.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Registry Service Node:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A node that onboards agents or Agent Gateways, validates registration
metadata, issues or requests identity credentials, and publishes capability
metadata to authorized discovery infrastructure.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Semantic Taxonomy:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A controlled hierarchy or graph of capability labels used to normalize
registration and discovery across administrative domains.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Trusted Metering Log:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A tamper-evident record or digest that summarizes an invocation, discovery,
referral, or metering-relevant event without necessarily exposing private
payload data.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="architectural-principles">
      <name>Architectural Principles</name>
      <t>The architecture follows these principles:</t>
      <t>Control-plane coordination is limited.  Management Root Nodes provide
coordination and trust bootstrapping.  They MUST NOT be required for ordinary
runtime endpoint-to-endpoint message exchange.</t>
      <t>Execution is decentralized.  After discovery, the invoking agent or its
gateway communicates directly with the target agent or target gateway.  The
parties perform mutual verification without relying on the Discovery Service
Node as a trusted intermediary.</t>
      <t>Metadata and payloads are separated.  Registries and discovery services
operate on capability metadata, endpoint references, operational status, and
policy hints.  They SHOULD NOT require access to private task payloads.</t>
      <t>Protocol adaptation is local.  Heterogeneous enterprise systems and agent
protocols are adapted by Agent Gateways and Enterprise Service Hubs close to
the systems they protect.</t>
      <t>Semantic coordination is explicit.  Capability labels and taxonomies SHOULD be
synchronized through controlled processes so that discovery results have
consistent meaning across domains.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="architecture-overview">
      <name>Architecture Overview</name>
      <t>An agentic overlay network is composed of a coordination plane, a service
exchange plane, and a runtime interaction plane.</t>
      <figure>
        <artwork type="ascii-art">
          +-------------------------------+
          |     Management Root Nodes     |
          | trust, policy, taxonomy       |
          +---------------+---------------+
                          |
              control synchronization
                          |
       +------------------+------------------+
       |                                     |
+------+-----------+                 +-------+----------+
| Registry Service |                 | Discovery Service|
| Nodes            |                 | Nodes            |
| onboarding and   |                 | semantic search  |
| capability data  |                 | candidate lists  |
+------+-----------+                 +-------+----------+
       |                                     |
       | registration                        | discovery
       |                                     |
+------+--------------+              +-------+----------+
| Agents, Gateways,   |&lt;------------&gt;| Invoking Agents |
| Enterprise Hubs     | execution    | and Users       |
+---------------------+              +-----------------+
</artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The key architectural boundary is that discovery and execution are separate.
A Discovery Service Node returns candidates and metadata.  The invoking party
then verifies identity, policy, credentials, and endpoint information before
using any candidate.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="logical-layers">
      <name>Logical Layers</name>
      <t>The architecture can be understood as four logical layers.  These layers are
not wire-protocol layers; they are functional groupings used to assign
responsibilities.</t>
      <texttable>
        <ttcol align="left">Layer</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Function</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Typical Components</ttcol>
        <c>Underlay Support</c>
        <c>Existing network transport, compute, storage, and optional deterministic networking support</c>
        <c>IP, DNS, TLS, HTTP, QUIC, edge compute</c>
        <c>Interconnection</c>
        <c>Registration, addressing references, endpoint discovery, and protocol adaptation</c>
        <c>Registry Service Nodes, Discovery Service Nodes, Agent Gateways</c>
        <c>Collaboration</c>
        <c>Identity, trust, taxonomy synchronization, policy coordination, metering, and audit</c>
        <c>Management Root Nodes, credential issuers, audit services</c>
        <c>Application</c>
        <c>User-facing and agent-facing services that express or satisfy intents</c>
        <c>Agents, applications, enterprise services</c>
      </texttable>
      <t>The architecture intentionally keeps most agent-specific semantics above the
existing transport layer.  Underlay technologies MAY provide quality,
latency, or reliability enhancements, but they are not required to understand
agent capability metadata.</t>
      <t>Layers group functions; planes group interactions among those functions.
The coordination plane primarily serves Collaboration, the service exchange
plane serves Interconnection, and runtime interactions connect Application
components through gateways where needed.  All planes use Underlay Support;
identity and policy functions can be applied across more than one plane.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="deployment-profiles">
      <name>Deployment Profiles</name>
      <t>Deployments can combine the following four deployment profiles according to
their administrative scope and coordination needs.</t>
      <texttable>
        <ttcol align="left">Profile</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Name</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="left">Description</ttcol>
        <c>P0</c>
        <c>Local Gateway</c>
        <c>A single domain exposes local tools through Agent Gateways.  No cross-domain registry is required.</c>
        <c>P1</c>
        <c>Domain Registry</c>
        <c>A domain operates a Registry Service Node and publishes signed capability metadata for local agents.</c>
        <c>P2</c>
        <c>Federated Discovery</c>
        <c>Multiple domains exchange catalog summaries and allow authorized Discovery Service Nodes to query or synchronize metadata.</c>
        <c>P3</c>
        <c>Coordinated Overlay</c>
        <c>Management Root Nodes coordinate trust anchors, taxonomy versions, revocation state, and audit digests across multiple operators.</c>
      </texttable>
      <t>Implementations SHOULD document the profiles and functions they support.
Clients SHOULD use available functions when optional coordination functions are
absent, but MUST NOT silently relax a locally required security property.
The profiles are neither cumulative requirements nor security assurance levels:
a P0 endpoint, for example, need not provide cross-operator taxonomy or
revocation coordination.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="node-roles">
      <name>Node Roles</name>
      <section anchor="management-root-nodes">
        <name>Management Root Nodes</name>
        <t>Management Root Nodes are control-plane coordination nodes.  A deployment MAY
use one Management Root Node or a federation of such nodes operated by neutral
or authorized organizations.</t>
        <t>Management Root Nodes are responsible for:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>authorizing Registry Service Nodes and Discovery Service Nodes;</t>
            <t>publishing credential issuer metadata and revocation information;</t>
            <t>coordinating semantic taxonomy versions;</t>
            <t>publishing policy digests or governance artifacts;</t>
            <t>receiving compact catalog summaries or audit digests; and</t>
            <t>distributing synchronized control-plane state to authorized service nodes.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Management Root Nodes MUST NOT be required for:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>runtime request forwarding;</t>
            <t>target agent selection for an individual user request;</t>
            <t>access to private invocation payloads;</t>
            <t>direct enforcement of endpoint-level authorization decisions; or</t>
            <t>maintaining real-time fine-grained search indices for all agents.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>This boundary reduces central bottlenecks and limits the operational power of
the control plane.</t>
        <section anchor="trust-domains-and-multiple-roots">
          <name>Trust Domains and Multiple Roots</name>
          <t>A Management Root Node has authority within an explicitly identified trust
domain.  A trust domain defines which authorities and assertions a relying
party accepts; it need not coincide with one administrative domain.  Several
organizations can participate in one trust domain, and one organization can
participate in several domains.</t>
          <t>Multiple service instances of one logical root are distinct from multiple
independent roots.  Replicas of one logical authority are expected to present
consistent authoritative state; this document does not specify their replication
or consensus protocol.  Independent roots retain separate authority and MAY
federate without a globally mandatory superior root.  Hierarchical delegation
is another possible model, not a requirement for every deployment.</t>
          <t>A federation MUST make the accepted authority, assertion types, roles, scope,
and validity conditions explicit.  Acceptance can be directional and MUST NOT
be assumed to be transitive.  Accepting another domain's organization-identity
attestations does not automatically accept its infrastructure authorizations.
Delegated authority MUST remain within the scope and lifetime granted by its
issuer; delegation and further delegation require defined validation rules.</t>
          <t>Discovering a root endpoint or receiving its public key does not establish
trust in that root.  Trust anchors MUST be selected through trusted bootstrap
material or local policy, not solely through an untrusted candidate's claims.
Federation does not place roots in the ordinary runtime forwarding path.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registry-service-nodes">
        <name>Registry Service Nodes</name>
        <t>Registry Service Nodes are supply-side onboarding hubs.  They receive agent
registrations, validate metadata, and publish capability records to discovery
infrastructure.</t>
        <t>A Registry Service Node SHOULD perform the following functions:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>validate that mandatory registration fields are present;</t>
            <t>verify endpoint reachability where applicable;</t>
            <t>validate imported OpenAPI, tool, or agent-card descriptions when supplied;</t>
            <t>assign or verify a stable agent identifier;</t>
            <t>issue, request, or bind credentials that associate the agent identifier with
capability metadata;</t>
            <t>monitor lifecycle events such as update, suspension, deletion, and
heartbeat status; and</t>
            <t>synchronize catalog summaries with authorized Management Root Nodes or
Discovery Service Nodes.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>A Registry Service Node MUST preserve the distinction between asserted
capabilities and verified capabilities.  If it cannot verify a claim, it MUST
NOT mark that claim as verified.</t>
        <t>Registrations SHOULD be soft state.  A Registry Service Node SHOULD assign an
expiration time to each active registration and require refresh before
expiration.  If an agent fails to refresh, the Registry Service Node SHOULD
mark the registration <spanx style="verb">inactive</spanx> or remove it from discovery results.</t>
        <t>Registration expiry is distinct from expiry of an identifier, credential,
key, or endpoint.  A stable identifier can remain meaningful after its active
registration lease ends.  Historical records MUST NOT be represented as
currently usable solely because their original signatures still verify.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="discovery-service-nodes">
        <name>Discovery Service Nodes</name>
        <t>Discovery Service Nodes are demand-side search and candidate selection nodes.
They accept discovery requests and return candidate agents with metadata that
allows the requester to make its own trust decision.</t>
        <t>A Discovery Service Node SHOULD support:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>lookup by stable identifier;</t>
            <t>discovery by capability tags;</t>
            <t>discovery by natural-language intent;</t>
            <t>filtering by protocol support, domain, policy, trust level, or operational
status;</t>
            <t>ranking that combines semantic relevance with operational and policy
signals; and</t>
            <t>explainable result metadata sufficient for clients to understand why a
candidate was returned.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>A Discovery Service Node MUST treat its own results as recommendations, not as
authorization decisions.  It MUST NOT require target agents to route runtime
traffic through it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="agent-gateways">
        <name>Agent Gateways</name>
        <t>Agent Gateways adapt local systems into agent-compatible interfaces.  They are
often deployed inside enterprises, clouds, or application platforms.</t>
        <t>An Agent Gateway MAY:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>translate between agent protocols and internal REST, RPC, message bus, or
tool interfaces;</t>
            <t>enforce local policy;</t>
            <t>perform local authentication and authorization;</t>
            <t>redact or transform private data before exposing a capability;</t>
            <t>maintain local logs required by the enterprise domain; and</t>
            <t>present a standardized capability record to a Registry Service Node.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Agent Gateways SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally trusted.  Remote agents
SHOULD verify the gateway's credentials and policy claims before invocation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="enterprise-service-hubs">
        <name>Enterprise Service Hubs</name>
        <t>Enterprise Service Hubs are private-domain integration components.  They are
used when an organization wants to expose selected internal capabilities while
keeping raw systems and data inside a protected environment.</t>
        <t>An Enterprise Service Hub SHOULD expose only the minimum metadata needed for
discovery.  Sensitive schemas, raw datasets, internal credentials, and private
business logic SHOULD remain local unless explicitly authorized by local
policy.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="capability-metadata">
      <name>Capability Metadata</name>
      <section anchor="assurance-and-provenance">
        <name>Assurance and Provenance</name>
        <t>Capability claims identify their subject and scope: identifier control,
organization identity, resource-management authority, endpoint control,
runtime-content conformance, or invocation authorization.  Deployments MUST
distinguish verified claims from relayed assertions.  A third-party catalog
entry MUST NOT be represented as provider-authorized solely because it was
indexed.</t>
        <t>Review policies can differ by domain.  Credentials conveying review outcomes
need an identifiable issuer, subject, claim scope, and applicable validity
conditions; their presence does not imply universal real-world identity review.
Semantic ranking and metering records do not replace these distinctions.</t>
        <t>Build provenance describes how an artifact was produced; a deployment statement
associates an artifact with an instance; runtime attestation supplies claims
about an observed execution environment.  To relate these claims to a contacted
endpoint, the relying party needs evidence binding that endpoint and resource
to the covered instance and measurement.  An artifact or model digest alone
does not establish that binding.</t>
        <t>Where remote attestation is used, the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> distinguishes
an Attester producing Evidence, a Verifier appraising it, and a Relying Party
using Attestation Results.  Integration associates the appraised environment
with the expected resource and interaction, and identifies the accepted Verifier,
appraisal policy, measurement scope, and freshness basis.  Successful appraisal
does not establish unrestricted application safety or business authorization.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="metadata-expectations">
        <name>Metadata Expectations</name>
        <t>Capability metadata is the primary object exchanged between registration and
discovery functions.  A concrete serialization is out of scope for this
document.  The following table lists semantic elements, not literal wire field
names; requirement levels apply to their information content.</t>
        <texttable>
          <ttcol align="left">Field</ttcol>
          <ttcol align="left">Requirement</ttcol>
          <ttcol align="left">Description</ttcol>
          <c>agent_id</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Stable identifier for the agent or gateway</c>
          <c>name</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Human-readable name</c>
          <c>description</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Natural-language capability description</c>
          <c>capability_tags</c>
          <c>SHOULD</c>
          <c>Normalized tags selected from a semantic taxonomy</c>
          <c>endpoints</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Endpoint references or protocol-specific contact data</c>
          <c>protocols</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Supported invocation protocols or transport bindings</c>
          <c>auth_methods</c>
          <c>SHOULD</c>
          <c>Supported authentication methods</c>
          <c>credential_refs</c>
          <c>SHOULD</c>
          <c>References to credentials or attestations</c>
          <c>status</c>
          <c>SHOULD</c>
          <c>Operational status such as active, suspended, deprecated</c>
          <c>freshness</c>
          <c>MUST</c>
          <c>Information identifying revision and applicable validity</c>
          <c>ttl</c>
          <c>MAY</c>
          <c>Suggested registration lifetime in seconds</c>
          <c>constraints</c>
          <c>MAY</c>
          <c>Rate limits, regions, data handling limits, cost hints</c>
          <c>examples</c>
          <c>MAY</c>
          <c>Example tasks or invocation patterns</c>
        </texttable>
        <t>Capability metadata SHOULD be signed by the publisher or by a Registry Service
Node.  Before relying on it for security-sensitive decisions, consumers MUST
validate the covering signature, the signer's authority for the claimed scope,
and applicable freshness.  Unsigned metadata can support candidate search but
cannot satisfy a requirement for authenticated metadata.</t>
        <t>Implementations MAY ignore unrecognized non-critical metadata fields.  A binding
supporting critical extensions MUST specify how they are identified.  Receivers
MUST reject decisions requiring an unsupported extension.  Relays MUST preserve
the signed representation or identify transformations that prevent verification
of the original signature.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operational-workflows">
      <name>Operational Workflows</name>
      <section anchor="agent-registration">
        <name>Agent Registration</name>
        <t>Agent registration brings a new agent or gateway into the overlay.</t>
        <t><list style="numbers" type="1">
            <t>The agent operator submits capability metadata to a Registry Service Node.</t>
            <t>The Registry Service Node validates mandatory fields and endpoint
reachability.</t>
            <t>The Registry Service Node verifies or assigns the agent identifier.</t>
            <t>The Registry Service Node binds the identifier to capability metadata using
a credential, signed record, or equivalent mechanism.</t>
            <t>The Registry Service Node stores the local catalog entry.</t>
            <t>The Registry Service Node synchronizes a catalog summary or signed record
to authorized discovery infrastructure.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Registrations SHOULD support incremental updates.  A metadata update MUST
carry a freshness indicator that allows receivers to reject stale records.</t>
        <t>An update to an existing identifier MUST be authorized under its previously
accepted control state, not merely by keys introduced in the proposed update.
Transfer and key rotation require authorization under that state; recovery
requires an explicitly designated authority.  Concurrent conflicting updates
MUST NOT both replace the same exclusive prior state.  Bindings define the
revision and proof representations used to enforce these conditions.</t>
        <t>Acceptance, publication, synchronization, and query visibility can progress
asynchronously.  A receipt MUST NOT claim a later stage than the receiver has
actually achieved.  Confirmed reliable acceptance needs recoverable publication
intent or an equivalent recovery mechanism.  Backpressure and unavailable
downstream services MUST NOT silently discard reliably accepted records.</t>
        <t>An explicit deregistration request SHOULD be supported.  Deregistration MUST
be authenticated with the same or stronger proof of control as registration.
After deregistration, Registry Service Nodes SHOULD either remove the record
from discovery or return it only as an inactive historical record according to
local retention policy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="taxonomy-synchronization">
        <name>Taxonomy Synchronization</name>
        <t>Capability labels are useful only if different parties interpret them in
compatible ways.  Management Root Nodes or authorized taxonomy services SHOULD
publish versioned semantic taxonomies.</t>
        <t>Taxonomy updates SHOULD include:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>a taxonomy identifier;</t>
            <t>a version number or timestamp;</t>
            <t>label identifiers;</t>
            <t>parent-child or graph relationships;</t>
            <t>deprecation markers;</t>
            <t>mappings to related labels where available; and</t>
            <t>a signature from the taxonomy authority.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Registry Service Nodes SHOULD validate submitted capability tags against a
supported taxonomy version.  Discovery Service Nodes SHOULD expose which
taxonomy versions were used when producing results.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="agent-discovery">
        <name>Agent Discovery</name>
        <t>Agent discovery returns candidate agents for a requested intent or constraint
set.</t>
        <t><list style="numbers" type="1">
            <t>The requester sends a discovery request to a Discovery Service Node.</t>
            <t>The Discovery Service Node normalizes the request against supported
taxonomies and policies.</t>
            <t>The Discovery Service Node searches local or synchronized catalogs.</t>
            <t>The Discovery Service Node ranks candidates using implementation-specific
relevance and policy signals.</t>
            <t>The Discovery Service Node returns candidate metadata, credential
references, endpoint references, and matching evidence.</t>
            <t>The requester validates the returned metadata before selecting a target.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Discovery results MUST NOT be treated as proof that an agent is safe,
authorized, or suitable for a particular regulated use.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mutual-verification-runtime-interaction">
        <name>Mutual Verification Runtime Interaction</name>
        <t>After selecting a candidate, the invoking party establishes trust directly with
the target endpoint, which can be an agent or gateway.</t>
        <t><list style="numbers" type="1">
            <t>The invoking party retrieves the target's endpoint and verification material.</t>
            <t>The parties establish a protected channel and authenticate as required by
the selected binding.  Authentication can occur during channel establishment
or through protected application messages.</t>
            <t>Each party checks the peer's identity binding, credential validity and
applicable status, and authorization for the requested interaction.</t>
            <t>The target enforces local authorization policy.</t>
            <t>The parties exchange runtime requests and responses directly.</t>
            <t>Each party records local audit or metering evidence according to policy.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>Discovery Service Nodes SHOULD NOT be in this execution path unless the
deployment explicitly uses them as application gateways.  If a Discovery
Service Node also acts as a gateway, the two roles MUST be distinguishable in
metadata and policy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="runtime-security-boundaries">
        <name>Runtime Security Boundaries</name>
        <section anchor="identity-integration-and-protected-execution">
          <name>Identity Integration and Protected Execution</name>
          <t>Identity verification can be embedded in an endpoint, enforced by a colocated
adapter, or mediated by a domain gateway.  These are illustrative deployment
forms, not required products.  A deployment can adopt directory verification
without modifying the remote service, but MUST NOT describe such one-sided
integration as mutual runtime authentication.</t>
          <t>For an interaction claimed to be protected, applicable authentication,
message binding, and local authorization MUST succeed before the business
handler produces effects.  The client MUST verify the response's binding to
the actual request and returned content before treating it as authenticated
input to further actions.  A detached handshake does not authenticate an
unbound business URL or unrelated handler.</t>
          <t>Domain control, endpoint control, and authority to act for an agent are separate
claims.  DNS records, hosted files, and endpoint challenges can support different
admission checks; they are not equivalent proofs.  A claim of endpoint control
identifies the checked origin or endpoint, resource identity, challenge purpose,
observation time, and validity scope.  During use, the client validates the
selected transport endpoint and the peer's resource authority or delegation.
A redirect or gateway hop requires applicable binding checks rather than
inheriting authentication from an unrelated earlier handshake.</t>
          <t>An external enforcement boundary MUST prevent unauthorized bypass to its
protected backend and MUST reject or remove caller-forged verified-identity
claims.
Forwarding an original signed object differs from signing on behalf of a
resource: the latter requires scoped delegation.  Management authority over a
resource does not automatically authorize business signing or task access.</t>
          <t>A runtime security binding identifies protected operations and defines their
canonical message inputs, target and audience binding, request/response
correlation, freshness, and replay handling.  A receiver MUST reject a required
protection it cannot enforce rather than downgrade at peer request.  Protection
claims for callbacks, errors, cancellation, or task results require explicit
coverage.  TLS and native application authorization retain their responsibilities;
private signing keys remain with their authorized holders.</t>
          <t>Key custody can be separated from applications through an authorized signing
service, hardware-backed provider, or colocated enforcement component.
The signing boundary MUST authorize the requesting principal and bind the
signature to the permitted identity, operation, target, and content.  Merely
restricting key export does not prevent misuse of an unrestricted signing API.
Encrypted storage and external signing do not themselves authorize key recovery;
replacement keys still follow the accepted rotation or recovery rules.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="outcomes-retries-and-streaming">
          <name>Outcomes, Retries, and Streaming</name>
          <t>A timeout, disconnection, or cancellation of local waiting does not prove
that an operation produced no remote effect.  A nonce rejects message replay;
it does not alone prevent a new signed request from repeating a logical action.
For side-effecting operations, automatic retry SHOULD occur only when delivery
to the execution boundary is known not to have occurred or an applicable
idempotency contract permits it.  Otherwise the outcome is unknown and needs
reconciliation through the native protocol or local policy.</t>
          <t>A binding using stable operation identifiers defines their scope, content
binding, conflict handling, and retention.  Correlation alone is not idempotency.
Multi-hop forwarding SHOULD coordinate bounded waiting budgets rather than
amplify retries after an outer timeout; exactly-once execution is not assumed.</t>
          <t>A terminal signature over a stream authenticates the covered completed
content only after successful verification; it is not per-event authentication.
Provisional display is possible, but unverified chunks MUST NOT trigger actions
requiring authenticated input.  Interrupted or invalid terminal proofs MUST
NOT be reported as authenticated completion.  A streaming security binding
distinguishes terminal integrity from independently authenticated events and
defines order, task correlation, and completion coverage.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trusted-metering-records">
        <name>Trusted Metering Records</name>
        <t>Commercial deployments may require metering for billing, audit, reconciliation,
or contribution tracing.  The architecture supports metering without requiring
every interaction payload to be globally visible.</t>
        <t>A metering record SHOULD include:</t>
        <t><list style="symbols">
            <t>a record identifier;</t>
            <t>identities of the metering parties or pseudonymous references;</t>
            <t>timestamp or time window;</t>
            <t>invocation or discovery event type;</t>
            <t>service or capability identifier;</t>
            <t>usage counters or metering-relevant units;</t>
            <t>policy or contract reference;</t>
            <t>privacy-preserving digest of evidence where applicable; and</t>
            <t>signature by the recording party.</t>
          </list></t>
        <t>High-frequency private interaction data SHOULD remain off-chain or local.</t>
        <t>Signed metering evidence proves that its signer made the recorded assertion;
it does not alone establish billing fairness or agreement by all parties.
Metering, audit, and settlement remain distinct functions.
Deployments MAY publish compact digests, Merkle roots, revocation events, or
metering commitments to a distributed ledger when tamper-evidence or
cross-operator reconciliation is required.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="interoperability-considerations">
      <name>Interoperability Considerations</name>
      <t>The architecture is protocol-neutral.  It can coexist with agent cards,
well-known metadata files, DNS-based discovery hints, MCP-style tool
interfaces, A2A-style messaging, HTTP APIs, gRPC services, local process
bindings, and future agent protocols.</t>
      <t>A concrete interoperability binding specifies:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>how an agent identifier is represented;</t>
          <t>how capability metadata is serialized;</t>
          <t>how signatures and credential references are encoded;</t>
          <t>how endpoints and protocols are selected;</t>
          <t>how taxonomy labels are named and versioned;</t>
          <t>how discovery queries and results are encoded; and</t>
          <t>how status, revocation, and freshness are checked.</t>
        </list></t>
      <t>Profiles SHOULD avoid requiring one specific machine-learning model or ranking
algorithm for discovery.  Discovery algorithms affect quality and performance,
but the interoperable surface is the query, metadata, result, and validation
contract.</t>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-existing-mechanisms">
        <name>Relationship to Existing Mechanisms</name>
        <t>DNS and well-known URIs <xref target="RFC8615"/> can provide bootstrap hints, domain
control signals, or descriptor locations.  They SHOULD NOT be overloaded with
high-frequency, large, or privacy-sensitive agent metadata.</t>
        <t>Mutual TLS, signed application messages, and public-key credentials can
authenticate peers or messages.  OAuth 2.0 provides delegated authorization;
an access token is not by itself proof of an end-user identity or of mutual
authentication.  Deployments MUST specify the identity, authorization, and
credential-status semantics of their selected mechanisms.</t>
        <t>Deployments that use TLS SHOULD follow the security properties of the TLS
version they negotiate; TLS 1.3 is specified in <xref target="RFC8446"/>.  Server-authenticated
TLS alone does not authenticate the application client.  TLS 1.3 early data
can be replayed across connections; side-effecting operations MUST NOT rely
on 0-RTT transport protection alone to prevent duplicate effects.
OAuth deployments should apply the security best current practice in
<xref target="RFC9700"/>, which updates OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> and bearer-token usage
<xref target="RFC6750"/>, including audience restriction and applicable token replay defenses.</t>
        <t>Agent interaction protocols such as tool invocation protocols, message-based
agent protocols, or local process protocols remain above or beside this
architecture.  The overlay discovers and verifies candidates; the selected
interaction protocol carries the task.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="versioning-and-extension">
        <name>Versioning and Extension</name>
        <t>Deployment profiles, metadata objects, taxonomy versions, and credential
profiles SHOULD carry explicit version identifiers.  Implementations MUST NOT
assume that all nodes in an overlay support the same profile version.</t>
        <t>Unknown non-critical fields MAY be ignored subject to preservation of signed
objects.  Unknown critical extensions MUST NOT be accepted for decisions that
depend on them.  Unsupported profiles, taxonomies, or credentials require an
explicit error or a fallback that still satisfies the client's minimum policy.</t>
        <t>Private extensions SHOULD use collision-resistant names, such as URIs or
reverse-DNS names.  Extensions affecting interoperability SHOULD be documented
in a stable specification.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="external-names-and-governance-mechanisms">
        <name>External Names and Governance Mechanisms</name>
        <t>External names, DIDs, enterprise accounts, and directory identifiers can be
associated with an agent without replacing their original namespaces.  Parsing
an identifier, locating its resolver, proving key control, accepting a subject
association, and authorizing an action are different steps.  Equal names or
URLs MUST NOT alone establish identity equivalence or management authority.
Association profiles need provenance, claim scope, and lifecycle rules; no
particular identifier technology is mandatory in this architecture.</t>
        <t>A signed bulletin, organizational trust framework, distributed ledger, or
combination can publish governance facts.  Such facts are distinct from
credential issuance, metadata acceptance, search, and runtime execution.
Neither ordinary registration nor invocation needs a ledger transaction under
this architecture.  A ledger inclusion proof does not establish current
authorization or the truth of every advertised capability.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="federation-and-state-exchange">
        <name>Federation and State Exchange</name>
        <t>Federated exchange MUST retain source authority, object revision, integrity
evidence, and withdrawal or inactive-state meaning.  Receivers MUST apply
source-scoped revision comparison and retain conflicts rather than silently
overwrite them.  A federation binding defines duplicate and out-of-order
handling, gap recovery, and acknowledged progress.  Different roots'
revision numbers are not a global sequence.  Scope or taxonomy mappings MUST
NOT silently expand delegated authority.</t>
        <t>Publication and each receiving directory can advance independently.  Failure
of one receiver SHOULD be isolated from others.  Acknowledging scan progress
does not necessarily acknowledge verification of every object; receivers MUST
report which meaning applies.  These requirements do not prescribe batching,
queues, databases, or worker scheduling.</t>
        <t>Source update time, local receipt time, indexing time, and response generation
time are distinct.  Reindexing MUST NOT extend source evidence validity.
An unavailable coordination service need not interrupt existing interactions
with sufficient valid evidence, but MUST NOT justify silently accepting expired
or unknown evidence for operations requiring current authorization.</t>
        <t>Withdrawal of federation acceptance, resource revocation, and root key rotation
have different scopes.  Withdrawal prevents new reliance on that acceptance
relationship; resource revocation affects its identified resource state.
Bindings define how these changes affect cached evidence and ongoing sessions
under the declared freshness and authorization policy.  Cross-domain migration differs
from root replication: identifier continuity depends on the identifier scheme,
while transfer needs prior-control authorization or a defined recovery path
and independent acceptance by the destination domain.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="failure-handling">
        <name>Failure Handling</name>
        <t>Implementations SHOULD distinguish at least the following failure conditions:</t>
        <texttable>
          <ttcol align="left">Condition</ttcol>
          <ttcol align="left">Typical Handling</ttcol>
          <c>stale_metadata</c>
          <c>Reject for security-sensitive use or request refresh</c>
          <c>revoked_credential</c>
          <c>Do not invoke; report revocation to the user or policy engine</c>
          <c>taxonomy_mismatch</c>
          <c>Fall back to text search or request a supported taxonomy version</c>
          <c>discovery_unavailable</c>
          <c>Use cached signed metadata if local policy permits</c>
          <c>endpoint_unreachable</c>
          <c>Try alternate binding or mark candidate degraded</c>
          <c>policy_denied</c>
          <c>Do not invoke even if semantic match is high</c>
        </texttable>
        <t>Discovery clients SHOULD surface these conditions separately.  Collapsing all
failures into "not found" can hide security problems and make operational
debugging difficult.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Agentic overlay networks introduce risks beyond ordinary service discovery.
Agents can initiate actions, combine tools, and operate across administrative
domains.  Implementations MUST treat discovery data as untrusted input.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Identity spoofing:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Attackers may register names or descriptions similar to trusted agents.
Registries SHOULD require proof of control over identifiers and SHOULD
distinguish unverified claims from verified credentials.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Capability exaggeration:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Agents may claim capabilities they do not possess.  Registries SHOULD mark
whether capabilities are self-asserted, registry-validated, or attested by a
third party.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Stale metadata:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Discovery results may include outdated endpoints, revoked credentials, or
deprecated capabilities.  Metadata MUST include freshness information.
Clients MUST check revocation and expiration before invocation.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Discovery poisoning:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Malicious operators may attempt to bias ranking or inject misleading
metadata.  Discovery Service Nodes SHOULD apply abuse detection, provenance
checks, and rate limits.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Centralization risk:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Management Root Nodes could become governance bottlenecks.  Deployments
SHOULD scope their authority narrowly and publish auditable policy artifacts.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Payload exposure:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Registries and discovery services SHOULD NOT require private invocation
payloads.  Enterprise Service Hubs SHOULD redact sensitive metadata and keep
raw data local unless policy permits disclosure.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Confused deputy attacks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An agent may be tricked into invoking another agent using credentials or
authority outside the user's intent.  Runtime agents SHOULD use scoped,
task-specific credentials and SHOULD bind authorization to the requested
action.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Downgrade attacks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An attacker may try to force a client into an insufficient configuration,
for example by suppressing credential references
or taxonomy versions.  Clients MUST enforce minimum acceptable credential
requirements for sensitive tasks.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Registry compromise:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A compromised Registry Service Node can publish false metadata for many
agents.  Management Root Nodes or governance services SHOULD support rapid
revocation of registry credentials and distribution of registry compromise
indicators.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Metering privacy:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Metering records can reveal business relationships or user behavior.
Deployments SHOULD minimize metering data, aggregate where possible, and use
privacy-preserving digests when detailed evidence is not required.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Capability metadata can reveal sensitive information about enterprise systems,
available tools, regions, customers, or business processes.  Registrations
SHOULD disclose only what is necessary for discovery and safe invocation.</t>
      <t>Deployments SHOULD evaluate privacy risks using the general guidance for
Internet protocols in <xref target="RFC6973"/>.</t>
      <t>Discovery requests can reveal user intent.  Discovery Service Nodes SHOULD
provide transport confidentiality, access control, retention limits, and
privacy-preserving logging options.</t>
      <t>Enterprise Service Hubs SHOULD keep private data, internal schemas, and
credentials within the local domain unless a specific policy authorizes
external disclosure.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document does not create new registries, media types, URI schemes, HTTP
fields, or protocol parameter values.  It makes no IANA requests.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-checklist">
      <name>Implementation Checklist</name>
      <t>An implementation of this architecture can be reviewed against the following
checklist:</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>which deployment profile is supported;</t>
          <t>how capability metadata is signed and refreshed;</t>
          <t>how unknown metadata fields are handled;</t>
          <t>how taxonomy versions are negotiated or rejected;</t>
          <t>how registry compromise and credential revocation are distributed;</t>
          <t>how discovery results are separated from authorization decisions;</t>
          <t>how endpoint reachability and stale metadata failures are reported; and</t>
          <t>what information is retained in metering or audit logs.</t>
        </list></t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references title="References" anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <references title="Normative References" anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references title="Informative References" anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8615">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <date month="May" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9700">
          <front>
            <title>Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="A. Labunets" initials="A." surname="Labunets"/>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <date month="January" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0. It updates and extends the threat model and security advice given in RFCs 6749, 6750, and 6819 to incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader application of OAuth 2.0. Further, it deprecates some modes of operation that are deemed less secure or even insecure.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="240"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9700"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9700"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6750">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to use bearer tokens in HTTP requests to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources. Any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") can use it to get access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens need to be protected from disclosure in storage and in transport. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6750"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6750"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6973">
          <front>
            <title>Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols</title>
            <author fullname="A. Cooper" initials="A." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="B. Aboba" initials="B." surname="Aboba"/>
            <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
            <author fullname="J. Morris" initials="J." surname="Morris"/>
            <author fullname="M. Hansen" initials="M." surname="Hansen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Smith" initials="R." surname="Smith"/>
            <date month="July" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document offers guidance for developing privacy considerations for inclusion in protocol specifications. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-related design choices. It suggests that whether any individual RFC warrants a specific privacy considerations section will depend on the document's content.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6973"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6973"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 944?>

<section anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The authors thank participants in discussions on agent networking, agent
discovery, and cross-domain agent interoperability.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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