<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rfc category="info" docName="draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile-02"
     ipr="trust200902" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en"
     version="3">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile">
      Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts
    </title>

    <author fullname="Xavier Goshi" initials="X." surname="Goshi">
      <organization>ActaSeal</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>India</country>
        </postal>
        <email>xavier@actaseal.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>SCITT</workgroup>

    <keyword>signed receipts</keyword>
    <keyword>payment disputes</keyword>
    <keyword>JCS</keyword>
    <keyword>SCITT</keyword>
    <keyword>agentic commerce</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>
        In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the
        payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own
        record of the same decision, and none of those records can be
        verified by the other parties. This document states that problem and
        defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a
        SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme
        dispute-evidence categories, to the agent's delegated scope, to the
        settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody
        record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same
        evidence offline.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>

    <section anchor="conventions" title="Conventions and Definitions">
      <t>
        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
        NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
        "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
        described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when,
        they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
      </t>
      <t>
        These key words bind conformance to this profile.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="problem" title="Problem Statement">
      <t>
        When an AI agent makes a payment on a user's behalf and the payment
        is disputed, at least four parties hold a record of what happened:
        the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent
        operator. Each record is produced and stored by a party with an
        interest in the outcome.
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>No party can verify another party's record without trusting
        that party's systems.</li>
        <li>The records are not bound to the money that actually settled,
        so a decision log and a settlement record can disagree with nothing
        to show which one is true.</li>
        <li>The records are not ordered against each other by a service all
        parties accept, so a record can be produced or changed after the
        dispute is raised.</li>
        <li>Nothing records whether the agent acted inside the scope its
        user delegated, which is the question adjudication usually turns
        on.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        Adjudicators -- card-scheme representment (Visa Compelling Evidence
        3.0, Mastercard First-Party Trust), and courts applying
        <xref target="FRE901"/> and <xref target="FRE902"/> -- are therefore
        left to weigh competing records that none of them can check.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
      <t>
        This document defines a dispute receipt: an Ed25519
        (<xref target="RFC8032"/>) signature over an <xref target="RFC8785"/>
        (JCS) canonicalized payload, in an envelope of the form
        <tt>{payload, signature{alg, kid, sig}}</tt>, verifiable offline
        with keys resolved out of band. It binds four evidence layers to
        the receipt -- scheme dispute-evidence categories, agent scope
        anchors, a settlement anchor, and an evidentiary-custody wrapper --
        and specifies how the receipt is registered with a SCITT
        Transparency Service (<xref target="RFC9943"/>) so that every party
        can check when it existed and that it was not changed afterwards.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="receipt-profile" title="Receipt Profile">
      <t>
        A conforming dispute receipt has:
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>
          Payload: the implementation's <tt>PolicyDecisionReceipt</tt>
          canonical dict -- decision, reason_code, action_hash,
          evidence_set_hash, ledger_entry_hash, timestamp, mandate_hash,
          rail_anchors_hash, scope_conformance, key_id,
          signer_pubkey_hash.
        </li>
        <li>
          Signature: Ed25519, lowercase hex
          (<tt>alg</tt> = EdDSA).
        </li>
        <li>
          Keys MUST be resolved out of band (the packet manifest carries
          <tt>receipt_public_key_hex</tt>; verifiers
          decide whether to trust it -- the
          envelope cannot authenticate its own key).
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        Conformance, verified: the reference implementation ships two
        canonicalizers. The v2 canonicalizer is full RFC 8785 JCS --
        ECMAScript Number::toString formatting and UTF-16 code-unit key
        ordering per <xref target="RFC8785"/> section 3.2, checked against
        the RFC's own Appendix / cyberphone json-canonicalization test
        vectors (French, structures, values, weird). The v1 canonicalizer
        -- unchanged, and what every already-signed receipt was hashed and
        signed with -- sorts keys by codepoint rather than UTF-16 code
        unit and defers number formatting to the host language's default
        JSON serializer. Both diverge from JCS only outside this payload's
        value domain (no receipt field is a non-decimal number or a
        non-BMP key), and produce byte-identical output to v2 for every
        field this profile actually emits: the receipt dict is strings,
        booleans, null, and nested objects/arrays of the same, with amounts
        pre-converted to decimal strings before canonicalization. Interop
        claims for this profile's receipt payload MAY say "JCS"
        (<xref target="RFC8785"/>) without qualification; a general-purpose
        caller outside this value domain SHOULD use the JCS-conformant
        canonicalizer explicitly rather than assume the legacy path is
        conformant for arbitrary input.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="constructions" title="Field Constructions">
      <t>
        So that a second implementation can compute the same values, the
        receipt fields that bind to other parts of the packet are built as
        follows. "Canonical hash" means lowercase hex SHA-256 over the
        canonical bytes of <xref target="receipt-profile"/>, except where a field below says otherwise.
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li><tt>action_hash</tt>: the canonical hash of the executed-action
        object recorded in the action's ScopeEvaluated ledger event (its
        <tt>executed_action</tt>); <tt>scope_hash</tt> is built the same
        way from <tt>intent_scope</tt>. A verifier MUST recompute both from
        the recorded objects.</li>
        <li><tt>ledger_entry_hash</tt>: the event hash of a ledger event
        present in the packet's ledger slice, recorded for the same action
        identifier as the manifest. When that event's payload carries
        <tt>action_packet_hash</tt>, it MUST equal the receipt's
        <tt>action_hash</tt>.</li>
        <li><tt>approval_event_hash</tt> (present only when the policy
        required an approval): the event hash of an ApprovalGranted or
        ApprovalDenied event in the ledger slice, whose payload carries an
        <tt>action_hash</tt> equal to the receipt's. An approval held
        outside the ledger is out of scope for this revision.</li>
        <li><tt>signer_pubkey_hash</tt>: SHA-256 of the raw Ed25519 public
        key bytes; <tt>key_id</tt> names that key in the operator's
        published keyring.</li>
        <li><tt>anchor_hash</tt> (<xref target="settlement-anchor"/>): the
        canonical hash of the <tt>anchor</tt> object inside the block
        <tt>{status: "anchored", anchor, anchor_hash}</tt>. An unanchored
        packet carries exactly <tt>{status: "SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED"}</tt>
        and nothing else.</li>
        <li><tt>evidence_set_hash</tt> and <tt>rail_anchors_hash</tt> are
        signed but not re-derived by the reference verifier in this
        revision; a verifier MUST NOT report them as checked.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        Failure names the reference verifier emits for these bindings
        include <tt>RECEIPT_LEDGER_ENTRY_NOT_IN_SLICE</tt>,
        <tt>RECEIPT_BOUND_TO_DIFFERENT_ACTION</tt>,
        <tt>RECEIPT_ACTION_HASH_MISMATCH</tt>,
        <tt>SCOPE_HASH_MISMATCH</tt>,
        <tt>APPROVAL_MANIFESTATION_INCONSISTENT</tt>,
        <tt>RECEIPT_SIGNER_PUBKEY_HASH_MISMATCH</tt>,
        <tt>SETTLEMENT_FIELD_MISSING</tt> and
        <tt>SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_INVALID</tt>.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="scitt" title="Registration with a SCITT Transparency Service">
      <t>
        A dispute receipt SHOULD be registered as the payload of a SCITT
        Signed Statement with a Transparency Service conforming to
        <xref target="RFC9943"/>. The Transparency Service's receipt then
        gives every party in the dispute the same independent evidence of
        when the dispute receipt existed and that it has not been changed,
        without any party having to trust another party's storage.
      </t>
      <t>
        The Signed Statement carrying the dispute receipt is a COSE_Sign1
        object as specified by <xref target="RFC9943"/>, and the
        Transparency Service uses one of the verifiable data structures
        that architecture permits. Offline verification of the
        Transparency Service's receipt is required, as in
        <xref target="RFC9943"/>.
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>The Signed Statement is a COSE_Sign1 <xref target="RFC9052"/>
        whose payload is the receipt's canonical bytes, signed with the
        receipt's own signing key, with the CWT claims issuer set to an
        identifier the registering party supplies (the receipt payload
        carries none) and subject set to the action identifier from the
        packet manifest, or to the receipt's <tt>action_hash</tt> when no
        manifest is at hand.
        A party that already trusts the receipt key needs no other key to
        check the statement.</li>
        <li>Registration follows <xref target="SCRAPI"/>: the statement is
        sent with POST to /entries, and the Transparency Service's Receipt
        is obtained from the response or from the location it names.</li>
        <li>A Receipt that is only structurally valid MUST NOT be reported
        as verified.</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="related" title="Relation to Other Work">
      <t>
        The receipt envelope is format-compatible with
        <xref target="FARLEY"/>, which is not required to implement this
        document. <xref target="LEMONNIER"/> addresses the provenance of
        decisions in general; this document addresses the narrower case
        where parties with opposed interests must verify the same evidence
        in a payment dispute. The author is open to merging the
        dispute-specific requirements into a common SCITT document.
      </t>
      <t>
        <xref target="THAHA"/> profiles SCITT for the execution records of
        AI agents, and <xref target="WRIGHT"/> defines an issuer-bound
        verdict record. <xref target="ASQAV"/> and <xref target="ATTEST"/>
        define signed receipts for AI agent actions and inference decisions
        outside SCITT. This document is not another general agent profile:
        it records what one use, a payment dispute, needs from whichever
        single SCITT agent profile the working group develops.
      </t>
      <t>
        <xref target="MIH"/> defines settlement records as a companion to
        an agent action capsule profile, and <xref target="HOPLEY"/>
        defines a categorical refund receipt for agentic-payment flows.
        Both touch the money-movement side that the settlement anchor of
        <xref target="settlement-anchor"/> covers; this document binds that
        movement to the dispute decision and its evidence rather than
        defining a settlement or refund record of its own.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="evidence-layers" title="Evidence Layers Bound to the Receipt">

      <section anchor="ce3" title="CE 3.0 / First-Party Trust Categories">
        <t>
          The reference implementation's CE 3.0 view emits the three
          scheme categories -- device identity, delivery information,
          additional identity factor -- each populated only from fields
          the packet actually holds. At the time of writing the packet
          genuinely holds one identity data point (the actor login
          identifier confirmed by an ActorValidated ledger event); device
          identity and delivery information are emitted unpopulated with
          explicit gap notes. A missing dispute reason code MUST cause the
          mapper to raise rather than pass silently. The mapper MUST NOT
          invent evidence.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="agent-anchors" title="Agent Anchors">
        <t>
          Agent-native facts with no scheme-defined slot ride in a
          distinct <tt>agent_anchors</tt> block: AP2
          <tt>mandate_hash</tt>, TAP
          <tt>agent_id</tt>, approval event hash,
          receipt signature. Network token id and 3DS/ACS result are part
          of the block's shape but null when the implementation has no
          source for them. The receipt's
          <tt>scope_conformance</tt> field (the
          intent-scope vs. executed-action diff) is the adjudication
          headline -- one of
          <tt>in_scope</tt>,
          <tt>BREACH:&lt;field&gt;</tt>, or
          <tt>not_evaluated</tt> -- and MUST be
          re-derived by the verifier from recorded inputs, never asserted
          without re-derivation.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="settlement-anchor" title="Settlement Anchor">
        <t>
          The manifest's <tt>settlement_anchor</tt>
          block records what money actually moved:
          <tt>{rail, txn_ref, finality_status,
          amount_minor, currency, captured_at, network, payer}</tt>,
          plus <tt>unanchored_fields</tt> naming what
          the settlement rail's public artifact did not witness (for
          example, an x402 v2 settlement response carries no amount). The
          block is bound by an <tt>anchor_hash</tt> (a
          canonical hash of the anchor content). Absence MUST be stated as
          <tt>SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED</tt>; a manifest
          without the block MUST fail verification.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="fre901" title="FRE 901 Wrapper">
        <t>
          The packet carries an acquisition record (who captured the
          evidence, when, with what tool and clock source -- gaps
          declared, custodian never invented), a custody record (each
          custody event bound to a ledger event hash), and an
          authentication statement naming exactly what a challenger can
          independently re-derive, aligned with
          <xref target="FRE901"/>(b)(9) and
          <xref target="FRE902"/>(13)-(14).
        </t>
        <t>
          In the reference implementation these three records are not
          covered by the receipt signature or the ledger chain: their
          contents, such as a named custodian, are the producer's claims.
          A verifier MUST NOT report them as authenticated.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="verification" title="Verification">
      <t>
        Verification is re-derivation, not trust: the packet ships a
        verifier with no non-standard-library dependency beyond a
        cryptographic primitives library, which recomputes event hashes
        and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the
        scope verdict from the recorded intent scope and executed action,
        the settlement anchor hash, and headline consistency across
        manifest, receipt, and ledger slice. Every failure MUST be named
        (for example, <tt>SCOPE_HEADLINE_MISMATCH</tt>,
        <tt>SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_HASH_MISMATCH</tt>).
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="impl-status" title="Implementation Status">
      <t>
        [Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
        publication, per <xref target="RFC7942"/>.]
      </t>
      <t>
        This section records the status of known implementations of this
        profile at the time of posting, per <xref target="RFC7942"/>. It is
        not an endorsement, and the listing is not exhaustive.
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>Organization: ActaSeal.</li>
        <li>Name: DisputeEvidencePacket (packet producer) and
        actaseal-verify (standalone offline verifier),
        &lt;https://github.com/actaseal/actaseal-verify&gt;, published on
        PyPI as actaseal-verify, archived at
        https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23309307.</li>
        <li>Description: produces the receipt and the four evidence layers
        of this profile as one packet; the verifier recomputes event hashes
        and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the
        scope verdict, the settlement anchor hash and headline consistency,
        and names every failure as in <xref target="verification"/>.</li>
        <li>Maturity: prototype.</li>
        <li>Independent use: ap2-evidence-pack 1.6.0, a separate project
        for AP2 dispute evidence, publishes an informative mapping of its
        receipt fields to -01 of this document.</li>
        <li>Coverage: the receipt, the four evidence layers and offline
        packet verification, with published conformance vectors. Not yet
        covered: verification of a Transparency Service Receipt (the
        registration client is tested against a local stub only), and
        re-derivation of evidence_set_hash and rail_anchors_hash; signing
        of the acquisition, custody and authentication records; and
        rejecting packet members the verifier does not check (an added
        file is currently ignored).</li>
        <li>Licensing: verifier under the Apache License 2.0.</li>
        <li>Contact: the author of this document.</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
      <t>
        The timestamp field of a dispute receipt is claimed by its
        producer and MUST NOT be treated as trusted time. A record created
        or altered after a dispute is raised can carry an earlier claimed
        time. Only registration with a Transparency Service gives an
        independent upper bound: the receipt existed no later than its
        registration. Verifiers MUST report producer-claimed time and
        registration time separately.
      </t>
      <t>
        In
        addition: the settlement anchor is only as strong as its source.
        A reference implementation that plugs a test-only fixture into the
        settlement-anchor seam witnesses nothing; production deployments
        MUST plug a real acquirer or facilitator feed into that seam --
        for example, a facilitator implementing <xref target="X402"/> or
        an equivalent settlement rail. Independent time requires an
        external anchor proof (<xref target="RFC3161"/>, a transparency
        log per <xref target="RFC6962"/>, or a SCITT Transparency Service
        per <xref target="RFC9943"/>); absent that, the host clock
        MUST be declared untrusted in the acquisition record.
      </t>
      <t>
        A packet MAY carry a copy of the verifier for convenience, but a
        party checking a packet MUST NOT rely on that copy: whoever produced
        the packet could replace it with one that reports success. The
        verifier MUST be obtained independently of the packet. Likewise, a
        signature checked only against the key the packet itself declares
        shows internal consistency, not origin; without a key resolved out
        of band, a packet re-signed end to end with another key verifies.
      </t>
      <t>
        The dispute-evidence categories in <xref target="ce3"/> are named
        for, but not endorsed or specified by, the card schemes: see
        <xref target="CE3"/> and <xref target="FPT"/> for the scheme-owned
        program requirements this profile's category names reference.
        <xref target="LCP"/> is an unrelated but complementary mechanism
        for binding the terms of service in force at transaction time; it
        is out of scope for this profile but referenced here for
        implementers who need both.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
      <t>
        This document has no IANA actions.
      </t>
    </section>

  </middle>

  <back>
    <references title="Normative References">
      <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
        <front>
          <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"/>
          <date year="1997" month="March"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
        <front>
          <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"/>
          <date year="2017" month="May"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032">
        <front>
          <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson"/>
          <author initials="I." surname="Liusvaara" fullname="I. Liusvaara"/>
          <date year="2017" month="January"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785">
        <front>
          <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
          <author initials="A." surname="Rundgren" fullname="A. Rundgren"/>
          <author initials="B." surname="Jordan" fullname="B. Jordan"/>
          <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman" fullname="S. Erdtman"/>
          <date year="2020" month="June"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052">
        <front>
          <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
          <author initials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="Jim Schaad"/>
          <date year="2022" month="August"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9943" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9943">
        <front>
          <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
          <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud" fullname="Antoine Delignat-Lavaud"/>
          <author initials="C." surname="Fournet" fullname="Cedric Fournet"/>
          <author initials="Y." surname="Deshpande" fullname="Yogesh Deshpande"/>
          <author initials="S." surname="Lasker" fullname="Steve Lasker"/>
          <date year="2026" month="June"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
      </reference>
    </references>

    <references title="Informative References">
      <reference anchor="FARLEY" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/">
        <front>
          <title>Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-Machine Access Control</title>
          <author initials="T." surname="Farley" fullname="T. Farley">
            <organization>Veritas Acta</organization>
          </author>
          <date year="2026" month="August" day="29"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3161" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3161">
        <front>
          <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
          <author initials="C." surname="Adams" fullname="C. Adams"/>
          <author initials="P." surname="Cain" fullname="P. Cain"/>
          <author initials="D." surname="Pinkas" fullname="D. Pinkas"/>
          <author initials="R." surname="Zuccherato" fullname="R. Zuccherato"/>
          <date year="2001" month="August"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6962" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962">
        <front>
          <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="Laurie" fullname="B. Laurie"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Langley" fullname="A. Langley"/>
          <author initials="E." surname="Kasper" fullname="E. Kasper"/>
          <date year="2013" month="June"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9162" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162">
        <front>
          <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="Laurie" fullname="B. Laurie"/>
          <author initials="E." surname="Messeri" fullname="E. Messeri"/>
          <author initials="R." surname="Stradling" fullname="R. Stradling"/>
          <date year="2021" month="December"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942">
        <front>
          <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
          <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Farrel" fullname="A. Farrel"/>
          <date year="2016" month="July"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="FRE901" target="https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_901">
        <front>
          <title>Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901: Authenticating or Identifying Evidence</title>
          <author><organization>Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="FRE902" target="https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_902">
        <front>
          <title>Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 902: Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating</title>
          <author><organization>Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="CE3" target="https://usa.visa.com/support/small-business/regulations-fees.html">
        <front>
          <title>Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0</title>
          <author><organization>Visa Inc.</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="FPT" target="https://www.mastercard.us/">
        <front>
          <title>Mastercard First-Party Trust Program</title>
          <author><organization>Mastercard International</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="LCP" target="https://github.com/legal-context-protocol/legal-context-protocol">
        <front>
          <title>Legal Context Protocol v1</title>
          <author><organization>Integra Ledger and AAA-ICDR</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="X402" target="https://github.com/x402-foundation/x402">
        <front>
          <title>x402 Payment Protocol</title>
          <author><organization>x402 Foundation</organization></author>
          <date/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="SCRAPI" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi/">
        <front>
          <title>Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) Reference APIs</title>
          <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz"/>
          <author initials="J." surname="Geater" fullname="Jon Geater"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud" fullname="Antoine Delignat-Lavaud"/>
          <date year="2026" month="June"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-11"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="THAHA" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence/">
        <front>
          <title>Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Thaha" fullname="Shameer Thaha"/>
          <author initials="S." surname="Shamsudeen" fullname="Shaibi Shamsudeen"/>
          <date year="2026" month="November"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence-02"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="LEMONNIER" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance/">
        <front>
          <title>Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them</title>
          <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier"/>
          <date year="2026" month="November"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="WRIGHT" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wright-verdict-record/">
        <front>
          <title>Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence</title>
          <author initials="D." surname="Wright" fullname="Darren Wright"/>
          <date year="2026" month="November"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wright-verdict-record-02"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="ASQAV" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts/">
        <front>
          <title>Compliance Receipts for AI Agent Actions</title>
          <author initials="J." surname="Marques" fullname="Marques"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts-09"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="ATTEST" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts/">
        <front>
          <title>Attestation Receipts for AI Inference Decisions</title>
          <author initials="C." surname="Chueayen" fullname="Chueayen"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts-03"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8792" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792">
        <front>
          <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
          <author initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="K. Watsen"/>
          <author initials="E." surname="Auerswald" fullname="E. Auerswald"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Farrel" fullname="A. Farrel"/>
          <author initials="Q." surname="Wu" fullname="Q. Wu"/>
          <date year="2020" month="June"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="MIH" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mih-agent-settlement-records/">
        <front>
          <title>Agent Settlement Records</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Mih" fullname="S. Mih"/>
          <date year="2026" month="October"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-agent-settlement-records-00"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="HOPLEY" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt/">
        <front>
          <title>Categorical Refund Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows</title>
          <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley"/>
          <date year="2026" month="May"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt-02"/>
      </reference>
    </references>

    <section anchor="test-vector" title="Interoperability Test Vector">
      <t>
        This vector was produced independently by Raghuvar Karthik Durga
        and checked against this profile by the author: the Ed25519
        signature verifies over JCS(payload), signer_pubkey_hash is the
        SHA-256 of the raw 32-byte public key, and the key derives from
        the seed below.
      </t>
      <t>
        The seed is TEST-ONLY. It is public and MUST NOT be used to sign
        anything other than test material.
      </t>
      <dl newline="true">
        <dt>Seed (TEST-ONLY, SHA-256 of "actaseal-durga-interop-vector-seed-v1"):</dt>
        <dd><tt>5def0cf4af80b8a628a00716b415573486663869fc55d89c0ac4b417e1c0e0c9</tt></dd>
        <dt>Ed25519 public key (raw, hex):</dt>
        <dd><tt>0dae9a128c629264f1dda4b6e7e1bc1679f7960c6ed59f9a9ac0f98f3fd16d8e</tt></dd>
        <dt>Envelope length:</dt>
        <dd>862 octets; JCS(payload) is 659 octets.</dd>
        <dt>SHA-256(R):</dt>
        <dd><tt>b29b8545c198afad28e1039626e4685e0b874d41c4815da690034899ab37f6cf</tt></dd>
        <dt>Leaf hash per <xref target="RFC9162"/>, SHA-256(0x00 || R):</dt>
        <dd><tt>9fd30a27f4018ac40689d2d70e50b4f721c35fdd262d52ec76394c50e9131578</tt></dd>
      </dl>
      <t>
        The envelope R follows, folded with the single backslash strategy
        of <xref target="RFC8792"/>: remove each trailing backslash and the
        line break after it to recover R.
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{"payload":{"action_hash":"4351fb489db1f767f953e01cd6fbdae64b4b7b585\
80bd7c78471fd8372c7d5e4","decision":"allow","evidence_set_hash":"a1b\
3733ca57b6cb66530672299f5875b08caf047cdf346874f34bba003734fb9","key_\
id":"audit-ed25519-kid","ledger_entry_hash":"841fd4cd8f20a67759b4734\
3832d5b16e86b768513d2924d23014fb152495510","mandate_hash":"b80f5d50a\
332fce298217f81292c494b6cf0904ae7a0b54e3dd76a6f22652fac","rail_ancho\
rs_hash":"fee5198cc30048d35f822349c2f38bd947c633aaff54d9a6a2223c42fc\
b368ef","reason_code":"IN_SCOPE","scope_conformance":"in_scope","sig\
ner_pubkey_hash":"e4014067dd1941b5e722c7ad1d9da9643be1b8d2e1f963322b\
24ee8f367c6157","timestamp":"2026-10-31T18:00:00.000000Z"},"signatur\
e":{"alg":"EdDSA","kid":"audit-ed25519-kid","sig":"5ba48413aa8e95903\
d5d5a530a4180d1282d69c53282037731227481a703e01aa5abe9839918e386e96b1\
e6e985a951a8a6df8c949415abec37c45723df9460e"}}
]]></sourcecode>
    </section>

    <section anchor="changes-01" title="Changes Since -01">
      <ul>
        <li>Stated that the acquisition, custody and authentication records
        are producer claims, and that a verifier carried inside a packet, or
        a key declared only by the packet, does not authenticate it.</li>
        <li>Added a Problem Statement section.</li>
        <li>Defined the receipt envelope here, so that
        draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts is now an informative reference.
        The packet manifest, the ledger slice and the ledger event hash are
        named but not yet defined in this document.</li>
        <li>Added registration of the receipt as a SCITT Signed
        Statement.</li>
        <li>Added a Relation to Other Work section.</li>
        <li>Added constructions for action_hash, ledger_entry_hash,
        approval_event_hash, signer_pubkey_hash and anchor_hash, after an
        independent reading of -01 by Laurent Lemonnier showed they were
        named but not constructed.</li>
        <li>Added an interoperability test vector.</li>
        <li>Retargeted from an Independent Submission vendor profile to
        consideration by the SCITT working group.</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="changes" title="Changes Since -00">
      <ul>
        <li>Added an Implementation Status section (RFC 7942).</li>
        <li>Updated the base-draft reference to
        draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03.</li>
        <li>Named a SCITT Transparency Service (RFC 9943) as a third kind
        of external time anchor.</li>
        <li>Updated the x402 reference to the x402 Foundation
        repository.</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="ack" title="Acknowledgements">
      <t>
        Thanks to Laurent Lemonnier for an independent reading of -01, and
        to Raghuvar Karthik Durga for the interoperability test vector.
      </t>
    </section>

  </back>
</rfc>
