SCITT X. Goshi Internet-Draft ActaSeal Intended status: Informational 16 November 2026 Expires: 20 May 2027 Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile-02 Abstract In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own record of the same decision, and none of those records can be verified by the other parties. This document states that problem and defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme dispute-evidence categories, to the agent's delegated scope, to the settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same evidence offline. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Receipt Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Field Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Registration with a SCITT Transparency Service . . . . . . . 5 7. Relation to Other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Evidence Layers Bound to the Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.1. CE 3.0 / First-Party Trust Categories . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.2. Agent Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.3. Settlement Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.4. FRE 901 Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 14. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Interoperability Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix B. Changes Since -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix C. Changes Since -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. These key words bind conformance to this profile. 2. Problem Statement When an AI agent makes a payment on a user's behalf and the payment is disputed, at least four parties hold a record of what happened: the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator. Each record is produced and stored by a party with an interest in the outcome. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 * No party can verify another party's record without trusting that party's systems. * The records are not bound to the money that actually settled, so a decision log and a settlement record can disagree with nothing to show which one is true. * The records are not ordered against each other by a service all parties accept, so a record can be produced or changed after the dispute is raised. * Nothing records whether the agent acted inside the scope its user delegated, which is the question adjudication usually turns on. Adjudicators -- card-scheme representment (Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0, Mastercard First-Party Trust), and courts applying [FRE901] and [FRE902] -- are therefore left to weigh competing records that none of them can check. 3. Introduction This document defines a dispute receipt: an Ed25519 ([RFC8032]) signature over an [RFC8785] (JCS) canonicalized payload, in an envelope of the form {payload, signature{alg, kid, sig}}, verifiable offline with keys resolved out of band. It binds four evidence layers to the receipt -- scheme dispute-evidence categories, agent scope anchors, a settlement anchor, and an evidentiary-custody wrapper -- and specifies how the receipt is registered with a SCITT Transparency Service ([RFC9943]) so that every party can check when it existed and that it was not changed afterwards. 4. Receipt Profile A conforming dispute receipt has: * Payload: the implementation's PolicyDecisionReceipt canonical dict -- decision, reason_code, action_hash, evidence_set_hash, ledger_entry_hash, timestamp, mandate_hash, rail_anchors_hash, scope_conformance, key_id, signer_pubkey_hash. * Signature: Ed25519, lowercase hex (alg = EdDSA). * Keys MUST be resolved out of band (the packet manifest carries receipt_public_key_hex; verifiers decide whether to trust it -- the envelope cannot authenticate its own key). Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 Conformance, verified: the reference implementation ships two canonicalizers. The v2 canonicalizer is full RFC 8785 JCS -- ECMAScript Number::toString formatting and UTF-16 code-unit key ordering per [RFC8785] section 3.2, checked against the RFC's own Appendix / cyberphone json-canonicalization test vectors (French, structures, values, weird). The v1 canonicalizer -- unchanged, and what every already-signed receipt was hashed and signed with -- sorts keys by codepoint rather than UTF-16 code unit and defers number formatting to the host language's default JSON serializer. Both diverge from JCS only outside this payload's value domain (no receipt field is a non-decimal number or a non-BMP key), and produce byte- identical output to v2 for every field this profile actually emits: the receipt dict is strings, booleans, null, and nested objects/ arrays of the same, with amounts pre-converted to decimal strings before canonicalization. Interop claims for this profile's receipt payload MAY say "JCS" ([RFC8785]) without qualification; a general- purpose caller outside this value domain SHOULD use the JCS- conformant canonicalizer explicitly rather than assume the legacy path is conformant for arbitrary input. 5. Field Constructions So that a second implementation can compute the same values, the receipt fields that bind to other parts of the packet are built as follows. "Canonical hash" means lowercase hex SHA-256 over the canonical bytes of Section 4, except where a field below says otherwise. * action_hash: the canonical hash of the executed-action object recorded in the action's ScopeEvaluated ledger event (its executed_action); scope_hash is built the same way from intent_scope. A verifier MUST recompute both from the recorded objects. * ledger_entry_hash: the event hash of a ledger event present in the packet's ledger slice, recorded for the same action identifier as the manifest. When that event's payload carries action_packet_hash, it MUST equal the receipt's action_hash. * approval_event_hash (present only when the policy required an approval): the event hash of an ApprovalGranted or ApprovalDenied event in the ledger slice, whose payload carries an action_hash equal to the receipt's. An approval held outside the ledger is out of scope for this revision. * signer_pubkey_hash: SHA-256 of the raw Ed25519 public key bytes; key_id names that key in the operator's published keyring. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 * anchor_hash (Section 8.3): the canonical hash of the anchor object inside the block {status: "anchored", anchor, anchor_hash}. An unanchored packet carries exactly {status: "SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED"} and nothing else. * evidence_set_hash and rail_anchors_hash are signed but not re- derived by the reference verifier in this revision; a verifier MUST NOT report them as checked. Failure names the reference verifier emits for these bindings include RECEIPT_LEDGER_ENTRY_NOT_IN_SLICE, RECEIPT_BOUND_TO_DIFFERENT_ACTION, RECEIPT_ACTION_HASH_MISMATCH, SCOPE_HASH_MISMATCH, APPROVAL_MANIFESTATION_INCONSISTENT, RECEIPT_SIGNER_PUBKEY_HASH_MISMATCH, SETTLEMENT_FIELD_MISSING and SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_INVALID. 6. Registration with a SCITT Transparency Service A dispute receipt SHOULD be registered as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement with a Transparency Service conforming to [RFC9943]. The Transparency Service's receipt then gives every party in the dispute the same independent evidence of when the dispute receipt existed and that it has not been changed, without any party having to trust another party's storage. The Signed Statement carrying the dispute receipt is a COSE_Sign1 object as specified by [RFC9943], and the Transparency Service uses one of the verifiable data structures that architecture permits. Offline verification of the Transparency Service's receipt is required, as in [RFC9943]. * The Signed Statement is a COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] whose payload is the receipt's canonical bytes, signed with the receipt's own signing key, with the CWT claims issuer set to an identifier the registering party supplies (the receipt payload carries none) and subject set to the action identifier from the packet manifest, or to the receipt's action_hash when no manifest is at hand. A party that already trusts the receipt key needs no other key to check the statement. * Registration follows [SCRAPI]: the statement is sent with POST to /entries, and the Transparency Service's Receipt is obtained from the response or from the location it names. * A Receipt that is only structurally valid MUST NOT be reported as verified. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 7. Relation to Other Work The receipt envelope is format-compatible with [FARLEY], which is not required to implement this document. [LEMONNIER] addresses the provenance of decisions in general; this document addresses the narrower case where parties with opposed interests must verify the same evidence in a payment dispute. The author is open to merging the dispute-specific requirements into a common SCITT document. [THAHA] profiles SCITT for the execution records of AI agents, and [WRIGHT] defines an issuer-bound verdict record. [ASQAV] and [ATTEST] define signed receipts for AI agent actions and inference decisions outside SCITT. This document is not another general agent profile: it records what one use, a payment dispute, needs from whichever single SCITT agent profile the working group develops. [MIH] defines settlement records as a companion to an agent action capsule profile, and [HOPLEY] defines a categorical refund receipt for agentic-payment flows. Both touch the money-movement side that the settlement anchor of Section 8.3 covers; this document binds that movement to the dispute decision and its evidence rather than defining a settlement or refund record of its own. 8. Evidence Layers Bound to the Receipt 8.1. CE 3.0 / First-Party Trust Categories The reference implementation's CE 3.0 view emits the three scheme categories -- device identity, delivery information, additional identity factor -- each populated only from fields the packet actually holds. At the time of writing the packet genuinely holds one identity data point (the actor login identifier confirmed by an ActorValidated ledger event); device identity and delivery information are emitted unpopulated with explicit gap notes. A missing dispute reason code MUST cause the mapper to raise rather than pass silently. The mapper MUST NOT invent evidence. 8.2. Agent Anchors Agent-native facts with no scheme-defined slot ride in a distinct agent_anchors block: AP2 mandate_hash, TAP agent_id, approval event hash, receipt signature. Network token id and 3DS/ACS result are part of the block's shape but null when the implementation has no source for them. The receipt's scope_conformance field (the intent- scope vs. executed-action diff) is the adjudication headline -- one of in_scope, BREACH:, or not_evaluated -- and MUST be re- derived by the verifier from recorded inputs, never asserted without re-derivation. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 8.3. Settlement Anchor The manifest's settlement_anchor block records what money actually moved: {rail, txn_ref, finality_status, amount_minor, currency, captured_at, network, payer}, plus unanchored_fields naming what the settlement rail's public artifact did not witness (for example, an x402 v2 settlement response carries no amount). The block is bound by an anchor_hash (a canonical hash of the anchor content). Absence MUST be stated as SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED; a manifest without the block MUST fail verification. 8.4. FRE 901 Wrapper The packet carries an acquisition record (who captured the evidence, when, with what tool and clock source -- gaps declared, custodian never invented), a custody record (each custody event bound to a ledger event hash), and an authentication statement naming exactly what a challenger can independently re-derive, aligned with [FRE901](b)(9) and [FRE902](13)-(14). In the reference implementation these three records are not covered by the receipt signature or the ledger chain: their contents, such as a named custodian, are the producer's claims. A verifier MUST NOT report them as authenticated. 9. Verification Verification is re-derivation, not trust: the packet ships a verifier with no non-standard-library dependency beyond a cryptographic primitives library, which recomputes event hashes and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the scope verdict from the recorded intent scope and executed action, the settlement anchor hash, and headline consistency across manifest, receipt, and ledger slice. Every failure MUST be named (for example, SCOPE_HEADLINE_MISMATCH, SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_HASH_MISMATCH). 10. Implementation Status [Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, per [RFC7942].] This section records the status of known implementations of this profile at the time of posting, per [RFC7942]. It is not an endorsement, and the listing is not exhaustive. * Organization: ActaSeal. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 * Name: DisputeEvidencePacket (packet producer) and actaseal-verify (standalone offline verifier), , published on PyPI as actaseal-verify, archived at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23309307. * Description: produces the receipt and the four evidence layers of this profile as one packet; the verifier recomputes event hashes and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the scope verdict, the settlement anchor hash and headline consistency, and names every failure as in Section 9. * Maturity: prototype. * Independent use: ap2-evidence-pack 1.6.0, a separate project for AP2 dispute evidence, publishes an informative mapping of its receipt fields to -01 of this document. * Coverage: the receipt, the four evidence layers and offline packet verification, with published conformance vectors. Not yet covered: verification of a Transparency Service Receipt (the registration client is tested against a local stub only), and re- derivation of evidence_set_hash and rail_anchors_hash; signing of the acquisition, custody and authentication records; and rejecting packet members the verifier does not check (an added file is currently ignored). * Licensing: verifier under the Apache License 2.0. * Contact: the author of this document. 11. Security Considerations The timestamp field of a dispute receipt is claimed by its producer and MUST NOT be treated as trusted time. A record created or altered after a dispute is raised can carry an earlier claimed time. Only registration with a Transparency Service gives an independent upper bound: the receipt existed no later than its registration. Verifiers MUST report producer-claimed time and registration time separately. In addition: the settlement anchor is only as strong as its source. A reference implementation that plugs a test-only fixture into the settlement-anchor seam witnesses nothing; production deployments MUST plug a real acquirer or facilitator feed into that seam -- for example, a facilitator implementing [X402] or an equivalent settlement rail. Independent time requires an external anchor proof ([RFC3161], a transparency log per [RFC6962], or a SCITT Transparency Service per [RFC9943]); absent that, the host clock MUST be declared untrusted in the acquisition record. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 A packet MAY carry a copy of the verifier for convenience, but a party checking a packet MUST NOT rely on that copy: whoever produced the packet could replace it with one that reports success. The verifier MUST be obtained independently of the packet. Likewise, a signature checked only against the key the packet itself declares shows internal consistency, not origin; without a key resolved out of band, a packet re-signed end to end with another key verifies. The dispute-evidence categories in Section 8.1 are named for, but not endorsed or specified by, the card schemes: see [CE3] and [FPT] for the scheme-owned program requirements this profile's category names reference. [LCP] is an unrelated but complementary mechanism for binding the terms of service in force at transaction time; it is out of scope for this profile but referenced here for implementers who need both. 12. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 13. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", May 2017, . [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", January 2017, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", June 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", RFC 9052, August 2022, . [RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, June 2026, . 14. Informative References Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 [FARLEY] Farley, T., "Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to- Machine Access Control", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03, 29 August 2026, . [RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)", August 2001, . [RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate Transparency", June 2013, . [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", December 2021, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, July 2016, . [FRE901] Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, "Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901: Authenticating or Identifying Evidence", . [FRE902] Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, "Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 902: Evidence That Is Self- Authenticating", . [CE3] Visa Inc., "Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0", . [FPT] Mastercard International, "Mastercard First-Party Trust Program", . [LCP] Integra Ledger and AAA-ICDR, "Legal Context Protocol v1", . [X402] x402 Foundation, "x402 Payment Protocol", . Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 [SCRAPI] Birkholz, H., Geater, J., and A. Delignat-Lavaud, "Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) Reference APIs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt- scrapi-11, June 2026, . [THAHA] Thaha, S. and S. Shamsudeen, "Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thaha-scitt-agent- execution-evidence-02, November 2026, . [LEMONNIER] Lemonnier, L., "Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01, November 2026, . [WRIGHT] Wright, D., "Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-02, November 2026, . [ASQAV] Marques, J., "Compliance Receipts for AI Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-marques-asqav- compliance-receipts-09, September 2026, . [ATTEST] Chueayen, C., "Attestation Receipts for AI Inference Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- chueayen-attestation-receipts-03, September 2026, . [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, . [MIH] Mih, S., "Agent Settlement Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih-agent-settlement-records-00, October 2026, . Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 [HOPLEY] Hopley, C., "Categorical Refund Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt-02, May 2026, . Appendix A. Interoperability Test Vector This vector was produced independently by Raghuvar Karthik Durga and checked against this profile by the author: the Ed25519 signature verifies over JCS(payload), signer_pubkey_hash is the SHA-256 of the raw 32-byte public key, and the key derives from the seed below. The seed is TEST-ONLY. It is public and MUST NOT be used to sign anything other than test material. Seed (TEST-ONLY, SHA-256 of "actaseal-durga-interop-vector-seed- v1"): 5def0cf4af80b8a628a00716b415573486663869fc55d89c0ac4b417e1c0e0c9 Ed25519 public key (raw, hex): 0dae9a128c629264f1dda4b6e7e1bc1679f7960c6ed59f9a9ac0f98f3fd16d8e Envelope length: 862 octets; JCS(payload) is 659 octets. SHA-256(R): b29b8545c198afad28e1039626e4685e0b874d41c4815da690034899ab37f6cf Leaf hash per [RFC9162], SHA-256(0x00 || R): 9fd30a27f4018ac40689d2d70e50b4f721c35fdd262d52ec76394c50e9131578 The envelope R follows, folded with the single backslash strategy of [RFC8792]: remove each trailing backslash and the line break after it to recover R. Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ {"payload":{"action_hash":"4351fb489db1f767f953e01cd6fbdae64b4b7b585\ 80bd7c78471fd8372c7d5e4","decision":"allow","evidence_set_hash":"a1b\ 3733ca57b6cb66530672299f5875b08caf047cdf346874f34bba003734fb9","key_\ id":"audit-ed25519-kid","ledger_entry_hash":"841fd4cd8f20a67759b4734\ 3832d5b16e86b768513d2924d23014fb152495510","mandate_hash":"b80f5d50a\ 332fce298217f81292c494b6cf0904ae7a0b54e3dd76a6f22652fac","rail_ancho\ rs_hash":"fee5198cc30048d35f822349c2f38bd947c633aaff54d9a6a2223c42fc\ b368ef","reason_code":"IN_SCOPE","scope_conformance":"in_scope","sig\ ner_pubkey_hash":"e4014067dd1941b5e722c7ad1d9da9643be1b8d2e1f963322b\ 24ee8f367c6157","timestamp":"2026-10-31T18:00:00.000000Z"},"signatur\ e":{"alg":"EdDSA","kid":"audit-ed25519-kid","sig":"5ba48413aa8e95903\ d5d5a530a4180d1282d69c53282037731227481a703e01aa5abe9839918e386e96b1\ e6e985a951a8a6df8c949415abec37c45723df9460e"}} Appendix B. Changes Since -01 * Stated that the acquisition, custody and authentication records are producer claims, and that a verifier carried inside a packet, or a key declared only by the packet, does not authenticate it. * Added a Problem Statement section. * Defined the receipt envelope here, so that draft-farley-acta- signed-receipts is now an informative reference. The packet manifest, the ledger slice and the ledger event hash are named but not yet defined in this document. * Added registration of the receipt as a SCITT Signed Statement. * Added a Relation to Other Work section. * Added constructions for action_hash, ledger_entry_hash, approval_event_hash, signer_pubkey_hash and anchor_hash, after an independent reading of -01 by Laurent Lemonnier showed they were named but not constructed. * Added an interoperability test vector. * Retargeted from an Independent Submission vendor profile to consideration by the SCITT working group. Appendix C. Changes Since -00 * Added an Implementation Status section (RFC 7942). Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026 * Updated the base-draft reference to draft-farley-acta-signed- receipts-03. * Named a SCITT Transparency Service (RFC 9943) as a third kind of external time anchor. * Updated the x402 reference to the x402 Foundation repository. Appendix D. Acknowledgements Thanks to Laurent Lemonnier for an independent reading of -01, and to Raghuvar Karthik Durga for the interoperability test vector. Author's Address Xavier Goshi ActaSeal India Email: xavier@actaseal.com Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14]