| Internet-Draft | Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile | November 2026 |
| Goshi | Expires 20 May 2027 | [Page] |
In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own record of the same decision, and none of those records can be verified by the other parties. This document states that problem and defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme dispute-evidence categories, to the agent's delegated scope, to the settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same evidence offline.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
These key words bind conformance to this profile.¶
When an AI agent makes a payment on a user's behalf and the payment is disputed, at least four parties hold a record of what happened: the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator. Each record is produced and stored by a party with an interest in the outcome.¶
Adjudicators -- card-scheme representment (Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0, Mastercard First-Party Trust), and courts applying [FRE901] and [FRE902] -- are therefore left to weigh competing records that none of them can check.¶
This document defines a dispute receipt: an Ed25519
([RFC8032]) signature over an [RFC8785]
(JCS) canonicalized payload, in an envelope of the form
{payload, signature{alg, kid, sig}}, verifiable offline
with keys resolved out of band. It binds four evidence layers to
the receipt -- scheme dispute-evidence categories, agent scope
anchors, a settlement anchor, and an evidentiary-custody wrapper --
and specifies how the receipt is registered with a SCITT
Transparency Service ([RFC9943]) so that every party
can check when it existed and that it was not changed afterwards.¶
A conforming dispute receipt has:¶
PolicyDecisionReceipt
canonical dict -- decision, reason_code, action_hash,
evidence_set_hash, ledger_entry_hash, timestamp, mandate_hash,
rail_anchors_hash, scope_conformance, key_id,
signer_pubkey_hash.¶
alg = EdDSA).¶
receipt_public_key_hex; verifiers
decide whether to trust it -- the
envelope cannot authenticate its own key).¶
Conformance, verified: the reference implementation ships two canonicalizers. The v2 canonicalizer is full RFC 8785 JCS -- ECMAScript Number::toString formatting and UTF-16 code-unit key ordering per [RFC8785] section 3.2, checked against the RFC's own Appendix / cyberphone json-canonicalization test vectors (French, structures, values, weird). The v1 canonicalizer -- unchanged, and what every already-signed receipt was hashed and signed with -- sorts keys by codepoint rather than UTF-16 code unit and defers number formatting to the host language's default JSON serializer. Both diverge from JCS only outside this payload's value domain (no receipt field is a non-decimal number or a non-BMP key), and produce byte-identical output to v2 for every field this profile actually emits: the receipt dict is strings, booleans, null, and nested objects/arrays of the same, with amounts pre-converted to decimal strings before canonicalization. Interop claims for this profile's receipt payload MAY say "JCS" ([RFC8785]) without qualification; a general-purpose caller outside this value domain SHOULD use the JCS-conformant canonicalizer explicitly rather than assume the legacy path is conformant for arbitrary input.¶
So that a second implementation can compute the same values, the receipt fields that bind to other parts of the packet are built as follows. "Canonical hash" means lowercase hex SHA-256 over the canonical bytes of Section 4, except where a field below says otherwise.¶
action_hash: the canonical hash of the executed-action
object recorded in the action's ScopeEvaluated ledger event (its
executed_action); scope_hash is built the same
way from intent_scope. A verifier MUST recompute both from
the recorded objects.¶
ledger_entry_hash: the event hash of a ledger event
present in the packet's ledger slice, recorded for the same action
identifier as the manifest. When that event's payload carries
action_packet_hash, it MUST equal the receipt's
action_hash.¶
approval_event_hash (present only when the policy
required an approval): the event hash of an ApprovalGranted or
ApprovalDenied event in the ledger slice, whose payload carries an
action_hash equal to the receipt's. An approval held
outside the ledger is out of scope for this revision.¶
signer_pubkey_hash: SHA-256 of the raw Ed25519 public
key bytes; key_id names that key in the operator's
published keyring.¶
anchor_hash (Section 8.3): the
canonical hash of the anchor object inside the block
{status: "anchored", anchor, anchor_hash}. An unanchored
packet carries exactly {status: "SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED"}
and nothing else.¶
evidence_set_hash and rail_anchors_hash are
signed but not re-derived by the reference verifier in this
revision; a verifier MUST NOT report them as checked.¶
Failure names the reference verifier emits for these bindings
include RECEIPT_LEDGER_ENTRY_NOT_IN_SLICE,
RECEIPT_BOUND_TO_DIFFERENT_ACTION,
RECEIPT_ACTION_HASH_MISMATCH,
SCOPE_HASH_MISMATCH,
APPROVAL_MANIFESTATION_INCONSISTENT,
RECEIPT_SIGNER_PUBKEY_HASH_MISMATCH,
SETTLEMENT_FIELD_MISSING and
SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_INVALID.¶
A dispute receipt SHOULD be registered as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement with a Transparency Service conforming to [RFC9943]. The Transparency Service's receipt then gives every party in the dispute the same independent evidence of when the dispute receipt existed and that it has not been changed, without any party having to trust another party's storage.¶
The Signed Statement carrying the dispute receipt is a COSE_Sign1 object as specified by [RFC9943], and the Transparency Service uses one of the verifiable data structures that architecture permits. Offline verification of the Transparency Service's receipt is required, as in [RFC9943].¶
action_hash when no
manifest is at hand.
A party that already trusts the receipt key needs no other key to
check the statement.¶
The reference implementation's CE 3.0 view emits the three scheme categories -- device identity, delivery information, additional identity factor -- each populated only from fields the packet actually holds. At the time of writing the packet genuinely holds one identity data point (the actor login identifier confirmed by an ActorValidated ledger event); device identity and delivery information are emitted unpopulated with explicit gap notes. A missing dispute reason code MUST cause the mapper to raise rather than pass silently. The mapper MUST NOT invent evidence.¶
Agent-native facts with no scheme-defined slot ride in a
distinct agent_anchors block: AP2
mandate_hash, TAP
agent_id, approval event hash,
receipt signature. Network token id and 3DS/ACS result are part
of the block's shape but null when the implementation has no
source for them. The receipt's
scope_conformance field (the
intent-scope vs. executed-action diff) is the adjudication
headline -- one of
in_scope,
BREACH:<field>, or
not_evaluated -- and MUST be
re-derived by the verifier from recorded inputs, never asserted
without re-derivation.¶
The manifest's settlement_anchor
block records what money actually moved:
{rail, txn_ref, finality_status,
amount_minor, currency, captured_at, network, payer},
plus unanchored_fields naming what
the settlement rail's public artifact did not witness (for
example, an x402 v2 settlement response carries no amount). The
block is bound by an anchor_hash (a
canonical hash of the anchor content). Absence MUST be stated as
SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED; a manifest
without the block MUST fail verification.¶
The packet carries an acquisition record (who captured the evidence, when, with what tool and clock source -- gaps declared, custodian never invented), a custody record (each custody event bound to a ledger event hash), and an authentication statement naming exactly what a challenger can independently re-derive, aligned with [FRE901](b)(9) and [FRE902](13)-(14).¶
In the reference implementation these three records are not covered by the receipt signature or the ledger chain: their contents, such as a named custodian, are the producer's claims. A verifier MUST NOT report them as authenticated.¶
Verification is re-derivation, not trust: the packet ships a
verifier with no non-standard-library dependency beyond a
cryptographic primitives library, which recomputes event hashes
and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the
scope verdict from the recorded intent scope and executed action,
the settlement anchor hash, and headline consistency across
manifest, receipt, and ledger slice. Every failure MUST be named
(for example, SCOPE_HEADLINE_MISMATCH,
SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_HASH_MISMATCH).¶
[Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, per [RFC7942].]¶
This section records the status of known implementations of this profile at the time of posting, per [RFC7942]. It is not an endorsement, and the listing is not exhaustive.¶
The timestamp field of a dispute receipt is claimed by its producer and MUST NOT be treated as trusted time. A record created or altered after a dispute is raised can carry an earlier claimed time. Only registration with a Transparency Service gives an independent upper bound: the receipt existed no later than its registration. Verifiers MUST report producer-claimed time and registration time separately.¶
In addition: the settlement anchor is only as strong as its source. A reference implementation that plugs a test-only fixture into the settlement-anchor seam witnesses nothing; production deployments MUST plug a real acquirer or facilitator feed into that seam -- for example, a facilitator implementing [X402] or an equivalent settlement rail. Independent time requires an external anchor proof ([RFC3161], a transparency log per [RFC6962], or a SCITT Transparency Service per [RFC9943]); absent that, the host clock MUST be declared untrusted in the acquisition record.¶
A packet MAY carry a copy of the verifier for convenience, but a party checking a packet MUST NOT rely on that copy: whoever produced the packet could replace it with one that reports success. The verifier MUST be obtained independently of the packet. Likewise, a signature checked only against the key the packet itself declares shows internal consistency, not origin; without a key resolved out of band, a packet re-signed end to end with another key verifies.¶
The dispute-evidence categories in Section 8.1 are named for, but not endorsed or specified by, the card schemes: see [CE3] and [FPT] for the scheme-owned program requirements this profile's category names reference. [LCP] is an unrelated but complementary mechanism for binding the terms of service in force at transaction time; it is out of scope for this profile but referenced here for implementers who need both.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
This vector was produced independently by Raghuvar Karthik Durga and checked against this profile by the author: the Ed25519 signature verifies over JCS(payload), signer_pubkey_hash is the SHA-256 of the raw 32-byte public key, and the key derives from the seed below.¶
The seed is TEST-ONLY. It is public and MUST NOT be used to sign anything other than test material.¶
5def0cf4af80b8a628a00716b415573486663869fc55d89c0ac4b417e1c0e0c9¶
0dae9a128c629264f1dda4b6e7e1bc1679f7960c6ed59f9a9ac0f98f3fd16d8e¶
b29b8545c198afad28e1039626e4685e0b874d41c4815da690034899ab37f6cf¶
9fd30a27f4018ac40689d2d70e50b4f721c35fdd262d52ec76394c50e9131578¶
The envelope R follows, folded with the single backslash strategy of [RFC8792]: remove each trailing backslash and the line break after it to recover R.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{"payload":{"action_hash":"4351fb489db1f767f953e01cd6fbdae64b4b7b585\
80bd7c78471fd8372c7d5e4","decision":"allow","evidence_set_hash":"a1b\
3733ca57b6cb66530672299f5875b08caf047cdf346874f34bba003734fb9","key_\
id":"audit-ed25519-kid","ledger_entry_hash":"841fd4cd8f20a67759b4734\
3832d5b16e86b768513d2924d23014fb152495510","mandate_hash":"b80f5d50a\
332fce298217f81292c494b6cf0904ae7a0b54e3dd76a6f22652fac","rail_ancho\
rs_hash":"fee5198cc30048d35f822349c2f38bd947c633aaff54d9a6a2223c42fc\
b368ef","reason_code":"IN_SCOPE","scope_conformance":"in_scope","sig\
ner_pubkey_hash":"e4014067dd1941b5e722c7ad1d9da9643be1b8d2e1f963322b\
24ee8f367c6157","timestamp":"2026-10-31T18:00:00.000000Z"},"signatur\
e":{"alg":"EdDSA","kid":"audit-ed25519-kid","sig":"5ba48413aa8e95903\
d5d5a530a4180d1282d69c53282037731227481a703e01aa5abe9839918e386e96b1\
e6e985a951a8a6df8c949415abec37c45723df9460e"}}
¶
Thanks to Laurent Lemonnier for an independent reading of -01, and to Raghuvar Karthik Durga for the interoperability test vector.¶