Internet-Draft Payment-Dispute Receipt Profile November 2026
Goshi Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
SCITT
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
X. Goshi
ActaSeal

Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts

Abstract

In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own record of the same decision, and none of those records can be verified by the other parties. This document states that problem and defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme dispute-evidence categories, to the agent's delegated scope, to the settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same evidence offline.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

These key words bind conformance to this profile.

2. Problem Statement

When an AI agent makes a payment on a user's behalf and the payment is disputed, at least four parties hold a record of what happened: the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator. Each record is produced and stored by a party with an interest in the outcome.

Adjudicators -- card-scheme representment (Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0, Mastercard First-Party Trust), and courts applying [FRE901] and [FRE902] -- are therefore left to weigh competing records that none of them can check.

3. Introduction

This document defines a dispute receipt: an Ed25519 ([RFC8032]) signature over an [RFC8785] (JCS) canonicalized payload, in an envelope of the form {payload, signature{alg, kid, sig}}, verifiable offline with keys resolved out of band. It binds four evidence layers to the receipt -- scheme dispute-evidence categories, agent scope anchors, a settlement anchor, and an evidentiary-custody wrapper -- and specifies how the receipt is registered with a SCITT Transparency Service ([RFC9943]) so that every party can check when it existed and that it was not changed afterwards.

4. Receipt Profile

A conforming dispute receipt has:

Conformance, verified: the reference implementation ships two canonicalizers. The v2 canonicalizer is full RFC 8785 JCS -- ECMAScript Number::toString formatting and UTF-16 code-unit key ordering per [RFC8785] section 3.2, checked against the RFC's own Appendix / cyberphone json-canonicalization test vectors (French, structures, values, weird). The v1 canonicalizer -- unchanged, and what every already-signed receipt was hashed and signed with -- sorts keys by codepoint rather than UTF-16 code unit and defers number formatting to the host language's default JSON serializer. Both diverge from JCS only outside this payload's value domain (no receipt field is a non-decimal number or a non-BMP key), and produce byte-identical output to v2 for every field this profile actually emits: the receipt dict is strings, booleans, null, and nested objects/arrays of the same, with amounts pre-converted to decimal strings before canonicalization. Interop claims for this profile's receipt payload MAY say "JCS" ([RFC8785]) without qualification; a general-purpose caller outside this value domain SHOULD use the JCS-conformant canonicalizer explicitly rather than assume the legacy path is conformant for arbitrary input.

5. Field Constructions

So that a second implementation can compute the same values, the receipt fields that bind to other parts of the packet are built as follows. "Canonical hash" means lowercase hex SHA-256 over the canonical bytes of Section 4, except where a field below says otherwise.

Failure names the reference verifier emits for these bindings include RECEIPT_LEDGER_ENTRY_NOT_IN_SLICE, RECEIPT_BOUND_TO_DIFFERENT_ACTION, RECEIPT_ACTION_HASH_MISMATCH, SCOPE_HASH_MISMATCH, APPROVAL_MANIFESTATION_INCONSISTENT, RECEIPT_SIGNER_PUBKEY_HASH_MISMATCH, SETTLEMENT_FIELD_MISSING and SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_INVALID.

6. Registration with a SCITT Transparency Service

A dispute receipt SHOULD be registered as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement with a Transparency Service conforming to [RFC9943]. The Transparency Service's receipt then gives every party in the dispute the same independent evidence of when the dispute receipt existed and that it has not been changed, without any party having to trust another party's storage.

The Signed Statement carrying the dispute receipt is a COSE_Sign1 object as specified by [RFC9943], and the Transparency Service uses one of the verifiable data structures that architecture permits. Offline verification of the Transparency Service's receipt is required, as in [RFC9943].

8. Evidence Layers Bound to the Receipt

8.1. CE 3.0 / First-Party Trust Categories

The reference implementation's CE 3.0 view emits the three scheme categories -- device identity, delivery information, additional identity factor -- each populated only from fields the packet actually holds. At the time of writing the packet genuinely holds one identity data point (the actor login identifier confirmed by an ActorValidated ledger event); device identity and delivery information are emitted unpopulated with explicit gap notes. A missing dispute reason code MUST cause the mapper to raise rather than pass silently. The mapper MUST NOT invent evidence.

8.2. Agent Anchors

Agent-native facts with no scheme-defined slot ride in a distinct agent_anchors block: AP2 mandate_hash, TAP agent_id, approval event hash, receipt signature. Network token id and 3DS/ACS result are part of the block's shape but null when the implementation has no source for them. The receipt's scope_conformance field (the intent-scope vs. executed-action diff) is the adjudication headline -- one of in_scope, BREACH:<field>, or not_evaluated -- and MUST be re-derived by the verifier from recorded inputs, never asserted without re-derivation.

8.3. Settlement Anchor

The manifest's settlement_anchor block records what money actually moved: {rail, txn_ref, finality_status, amount_minor, currency, captured_at, network, payer}, plus unanchored_fields naming what the settlement rail's public artifact did not witness (for example, an x402 v2 settlement response carries no amount). The block is bound by an anchor_hash (a canonical hash of the anchor content). Absence MUST be stated as SETTLEMENT_UNANCHORED; a manifest without the block MUST fail verification.

8.4. FRE 901 Wrapper

The packet carries an acquisition record (who captured the evidence, when, with what tool and clock source -- gaps declared, custodian never invented), a custody record (each custody event bound to a ledger event hash), and an authentication statement naming exactly what a challenger can independently re-derive, aligned with [FRE901](b)(9) and [FRE902](13)-(14).

In the reference implementation these three records are not covered by the receipt signature or the ledger chain: their contents, such as a named custodian, are the producer's claims. A verifier MUST NOT report them as authenticated.

9. Verification

Verification is re-derivation, not trust: the packet ships a verifier with no non-standard-library dependency beyond a cryptographic primitives library, which recomputes event hashes and chain links, the receipt signature over canonical bytes, the scope verdict from the recorded intent scope and executed action, the settlement anchor hash, and headline consistency across manifest, receipt, and ledger slice. Every failure MUST be named (for example, SCOPE_HEADLINE_MISMATCH, SETTLEMENT_ANCHOR_HASH_MISMATCH).

10. Implementation Status

[Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, per [RFC7942].]

This section records the status of known implementations of this profile at the time of posting, per [RFC7942]. It is not an endorsement, and the listing is not exhaustive.

11. Security Considerations

The timestamp field of a dispute receipt is claimed by its producer and MUST NOT be treated as trusted time. A record created or altered after a dispute is raised can carry an earlier claimed time. Only registration with a Transparency Service gives an independent upper bound: the receipt existed no later than its registration. Verifiers MUST report producer-claimed time and registration time separately.

In addition: the settlement anchor is only as strong as its source. A reference implementation that plugs a test-only fixture into the settlement-anchor seam witnesses nothing; production deployments MUST plug a real acquirer or facilitator feed into that seam -- for example, a facilitator implementing [X402] or an equivalent settlement rail. Independent time requires an external anchor proof ([RFC3161], a transparency log per [RFC6962], or a SCITT Transparency Service per [RFC9943]); absent that, the host clock MUST be declared untrusted in the acquisition record.

A packet MAY carry a copy of the verifier for convenience, but a party checking a packet MUST NOT rely on that copy: whoever produced the packet could replace it with one that reports success. The verifier MUST be obtained independently of the packet. Likewise, a signature checked only against the key the packet itself declares shows internal consistency, not origin; without a key resolved out of band, a packet re-signed end to end with another key verifies.

The dispute-evidence categories in Section 8.1 are named for, but not endorsed or specified by, the card schemes: see [CE3] and [FPT] for the scheme-owned program requirements this profile's category names reference. [LCP] is an unrelated but complementary mechanism for binding the terms of service in force at transaction time; it is out of scope for this profile but referenced here for implementers who need both.

12. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

13. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", RFC 9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[RFC9943]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9943>.

14. Informative References

[FARLEY]
Farley, T., "Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-Machine Access Control", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/>.
[RFC3161]
Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3161>.
[RFC6962]
Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate Transparency", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC9162]
Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[FRE901]
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, "Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901: Authenticating or Identifying Evidence", <https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_901>.
[FRE902]
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, "Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 902: Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating", <https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_902>.
[CE3]
Visa Inc., "Visa Compelling Evidence 3.0", <https://usa.visa.com/support/small-business/regulations-fees.html>.
[FPT]
Mastercard International, "Mastercard First-Party Trust Program", <https://www.mastercard.us/>.
[LCP]
Integra Ledger and AAA-ICDR, "Legal Context Protocol v1", <https://github.com/legal-context-protocol/legal-context-protocol>.
[X402]
x402 Foundation, "x402 Payment Protocol", <https://github.com/x402-foundation/x402>.
[SCRAPI]
Birkholz, H., Geater, J., and A. Delignat-Lavaud, "Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) Reference APIs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi/>.
[THAHA]
Thaha, S. and S. Shamsudeen, "Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence/>.
[LEMONNIER]
Lemonnier, L., "Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance/>.
[WRIGHT]
Wright, D., "Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wright-verdict-record/>.
[ASQAV]
Marques, J., "Compliance Receipts for AI Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts-09, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts/>.
[ATTEST]
Chueayen, C., "Attestation Receipts for AI Inference Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts/>.
[RFC8792]
Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
[MIH]
Mih, S., "Agent Settlement Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih-agent-settlement-records-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mih-agent-settlement-records/>.
[HOPLEY]
Hopley, C., "Categorical Refund Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt/>.

Appendix A. Interoperability Test Vector

This vector was produced independently by Raghuvar Karthik Durga and checked against this profile by the author: the Ed25519 signature verifies over JCS(payload), signer_pubkey_hash is the SHA-256 of the raw 32-byte public key, and the key derives from the seed below.

The seed is TEST-ONLY. It is public and MUST NOT be used to sign anything other than test material.

Seed (TEST-ONLY, SHA-256 of "actaseal-durga-interop-vector-seed-v1"):
5def0cf4af80b8a628a00716b415573486663869fc55d89c0ac4b417e1c0e0c9
Ed25519 public key (raw, hex):
0dae9a128c629264f1dda4b6e7e1bc1679f7960c6ed59f9a9ac0f98f3fd16d8e
Envelope length:
862 octets; JCS(payload) is 659 octets.
SHA-256(R):
b29b8545c198afad28e1039626e4685e0b874d41c4815da690034899ab37f6cf
Leaf hash per [RFC9162], SHA-256(0x00 || R):
9fd30a27f4018ac40689d2d70e50b4f721c35fdd262d52ec76394c50e9131578

The envelope R follows, folded with the single backslash strategy of [RFC8792]: remove each trailing backslash and the line break after it to recover R.

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{"payload":{"action_hash":"4351fb489db1f767f953e01cd6fbdae64b4b7b585\
80bd7c78471fd8372c7d5e4","decision":"allow","evidence_set_hash":"a1b\
3733ca57b6cb66530672299f5875b08caf047cdf346874f34bba003734fb9","key_\
id":"audit-ed25519-kid","ledger_entry_hash":"841fd4cd8f20a67759b4734\
3832d5b16e86b768513d2924d23014fb152495510","mandate_hash":"b80f5d50a\
332fce298217f81292c494b6cf0904ae7a0b54e3dd76a6f22652fac","rail_ancho\
rs_hash":"fee5198cc30048d35f822349c2f38bd947c633aaff54d9a6a2223c42fc\
b368ef","reason_code":"IN_SCOPE","scope_conformance":"in_scope","sig\
ner_pubkey_hash":"e4014067dd1941b5e722c7ad1d9da9643be1b8d2e1f963322b\
24ee8f367c6157","timestamp":"2026-10-31T18:00:00.000000Z"},"signatur\
e":{"alg":"EdDSA","kid":"audit-ed25519-kid","sig":"5ba48413aa8e95903\
d5d5a530a4180d1282d69c53282037731227481a703e01aa5abe9839918e386e96b1\
e6e985a951a8a6df8c949415abec37c45723df9460e"}}

Appendix B. Changes Since -01

Appendix C. Changes Since -00

Appendix D. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Laurent Lemonnier for an independent reading of -01, and to Raghuvar Karthik Durga for the interoperability test vector.

Author's Address

Xavier Goshi
ActaSeal
India