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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains-08" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="fail-closed-limited-domains">Fail-closed Limited Domains</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains-08"/>
    <author initials="W." surname="Kumari" fullname="Warren Kumari">
      <organization>Google, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <email>warren@kumari.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="A." surname="Alston" fullname="Andrew Alston">
      <organization>Alston Networks</organization>
      <address>
        <email>alston.networks@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="É." surname="Vyncke" fullname="Éric Vyncke">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>evyncke@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Krishnan" fullname="Suresh Krishnan">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>suresh.krishnan@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="Eastlake" fullname="Donald Eastlake">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>d3e3e3@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Internet</area>
    <workgroup>Internet Area Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 78?>

<t>Documents describing protocols intended solely for use within "limited domains"
often rely on edge filtering at every boundary node to prevent domain-internal
traffic from leaking to the global Internet (and vice versa). While edge
filtering is a critical and standard operational practice, relying solely on
administrative policies can create "fail-open" designs if configuration errors,
ACL bypass, or hardware table limitations occur.</t>
      <t>This document describes design principles and concrete mechanisms that allow
limited-domain protocols to "fail-closed" by default. By leveraging Layer-2
encapsulation identifiers (such as dedicated or extended EtherTypes), local
address scoping, and / or Hop-Limit boundaries, protocol designers can provide
robust defense-in-depth and significantly reduce the operational and security
risks associated with limited-domain protocol leakage.</t>
      <t>These mechanisms are not applicable to all protocols intended for use in a
limited domain, but if implemented on certain classes of protocols, can
significantly reduce the risks.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Discussion Venues</name>
      <t>Discussion of this document takes place on the
    Internet Area Working Group Working Group mailing list (int-area@ietf.org),
    which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/int-area/"/>.</t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
    <eref target="https://github.com/wkumari/draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 99?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t><xref target="RFC8799"/> discusses the concept of "limited domains", provides examples of
limited domains, as well as Examples of Limited Domain Solutions, including
Service Function Chaining (SFC <xref target="RFC7665"/>), Segment Routing, "Creative uses
of IPv6 features" (including Extension headers, e.g., for in situ Operations,
Administration, and maintenance <xref target="RFC9378"/>).</t>
      <t>In order to provide context, this document will quote extensively from
<xref target="RFC8799"/>, but it is assumed that the reader will actually read <xref target="RFC8799"/>
in its entirety.</t>
      <t><xref target="RFC8799"/> Section 3, notes:</t>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t>A common argument is that if a protocol is intended for limited use, the
chances are very high that it will in fact be used (or misused) in other
scenarios including the so-called open Internet. This is undoubtedly true and
means that limited use is not an excuse for bad design or poor security. In
fact, a limited use requirement potentially adds complexity to both the
protocol and its security design, as discussed later.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Notably, in <xref target="RFC8799"/> Section 2, states:</t>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t>Domain boundaries that are defined administratively (e.g., by address
filtering rules in routers) are prone to leakage caused by human error,
especially if the limited domain traffic appears otherwise normal to the
boundary routers. In this case, the network operator needs to take active
steps to protect the boundary. This form of leakage is much less likely if
nodes must be explicitly configured to handle a given limited-domain
protocol, for example, by installing a specific protocol handler.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>In addition, <xref target="RFC8799"/> Section 6, notes:</t>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t>Today, where limited domains exist, they are essentially created by careful
configuration of boundary routers and firewalls. If a domain is characterized
by one or more address prefixes, address assignment to hosts must also be
carefully managed. This is an error-prone method, and a combination of
configuration errors and default routing can lead to unwanted traffic
escaping the domain. Our basic assumption is therefore that it should be
possible for domains to be created and managed automatically, with minimal
human configuration. We now discuss requirements for automating domain
creation and management.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document discusses some of the mechanisms which protocol designers can use
to limit the scope of their protocols to a single link. If the protocol is
intended to be used across multiple links, but should not be forwarded beyond a
single administrative domain, then the protocol designer should consider making
the protocol "fail-closed" rather than "fail-open", as described below.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="types-of-limited-domain-protocols">
      <name>Types of limited domain protocols</name>
      <t><xref target="RFC8799"/> Section 3 discusses some examples of Limited Domains, based mainly
on the network type (e.g. Home, Sensor Networks, Data Centers, etc).</t>
      <t>For the functional purposes of this document, limited-domain protocols can be
categorized at a high-level into two broad groups (though some protocols may span
categories):</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Layer-2 type limited domain protocols: These are protocols that are intended
to be used within a single local-area network (LAN) segment or broadcast
domain.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Transport and infrastructure-type services: These protocols provide multi-hop
transport or routing functionality, intended to remain strictly within a single
administrative domain (such as an Enterprise or a Service Provider network).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="fail-open-versus-fail-closed">
      <name>Fail-open versus Fail-closed</name>
      <t>Protocols can be classified based on how they behave when encountering an
unconfigured interface or boundary.</t>
      <t>"Fail-closed" protocols require explicit device or interface-wide configuration
to enable them to be accepted, processed, or forwarded when received on an
interface. If the protocol is not explicitly enabled on an interface, incoming
packets of that protocol type are dropped or ignored by default. This design
ensures that traffic does not transit across boundary nodes into networks where
it is not supported or authorized.</t>
      <t>"Fail-open" protocols are those that rely on explicit configuration (such as
filtering or Access Control Lists) at domain boundaries to <em>prevent</em> them from
leaking. Without active filtering, standard forwarding hardware will parse and
forward these packets normally across boundaries if the routing table allows
it.</t>
      <t>While edge filtering is an essential tool, fail-open designs are inherently
more susceptible to accidental configuration omissions, ACL resource
exhaustion, or transient states during troubleshooting. Fail-closed protocols
provide defense-in-depth by eliminating the dependency on boundary filters.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ip-hop-limit-limiting">
      <name>IP Hop-Limit Limiting</name>
      <t>Some limited-domain protocols are intended to operate strictly within a single
IP subnet or link. In these cases, protocol specifications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> require that
the IP Hop-Limit (or IPv4 TTL) to be set to 1 upon transmission.</t>
      <t>As standard routers decrement the Hop-Limit upon forwarding and discard packets
when the count reaches zero, setting the Hop-Limit to 1 ensures that the
traffic cannot be forwarded off-link. This differs from the Generalized TTL
Security Mechanism (GTSM, <xref target="RFC3682"/>), which sets the Hop-Limit to 255 to
verify that the sender is on-link and protect against off-link spoofing.</t>
      <t>Which option to choose (if either) depends on the specific requirements of the
protocol.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ipv4-local-multicast-addressing">
      <name>IPv4 Local Multicast Addressing</name>
      <t>Some protocols (e.g. OSPF) use addresses from the IP Local Network Control
Block <xref target="RFC5771"/> (224.0.0.0/24). In addition to providing a discovery
mechanism, standard routers do not forward this traffic off-link, providing a
simple and effective way to limit the scope of the protocol.</t>
      <t>In some cases, IPv4 "Link Local" addresses <xref target="RFC3927"/> may be an appropriate
mechanism to limit the scope of the protocol, but this is a niche case that is
not discussed further here.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ipv6-link-local-and-multicast-addresses">
      <name>IPv6 Link Local and Multicast Addresses</name>
      <t>Link-Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses (<xref target="RFC4291"/> Section 2.5.6) are used for
communication between nodes on a single link. They are not routable and are not
forwarded by routers. In cases where a limited-domain protocol is intended to
be used only within a single link, the use of IPv6 Link-Local addresses is an
effective containment mechanism.</t>
      <t>Similarly, IPv6 Link-Local Multicast Addresses in the <tt>ff02::/16</tt> range
(<xref target="RFC4291"/> Section 2.7) are restricted to the local link scope and are not
forwarded by routers, providing a reliable on-link multicast discovery and
communication channel.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="making-a-layer-3-type-limited-domain-protocol-fail-closed">
      <name>Making a layer-3 type limited-domain protocol fail-closed</name>
      <t>One way to make a limited-domain protocol fail-closed is to assign it a unique
layer-2 protocol identifier, usually an EtherType. In modern router and host
interfaces, if a specific Layer-2 protocol identifier is not administratively
enabled on that port, the network interface card or chipset will ignore the
frame.</t>
      <t>Thus, the protocol must be explicitly enabled on all relevant interfaces inside
the domain, automatically blocking it at the domain boundary where the protocol
has not been enabled. This is a robust and simple mechanism that ensures the
protocol does not leak out of the limited domain, even if an operator makes a
mistake in configuring filters based on identifiers appearing deeper in the
packet (such as IP addresses, IP protocols, or header options).</t>
      <t>A Layer-2 protocol identifier is a powerful tool, but it is not the only option
for fail-closed designs, and protocol designers should evaluate it alongside
other mechanisms such as local address scoping, hop-limit boundaries, and
cryptographic mechanisms, depending on the target environment.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ethernet-protocol-identification">
      <name>Ethernet Protocol Identification</name>
      <t>Figure 1 shows the general format of Ethernet frames. The relevant protocol
identification field occurs after the destination and source MAC addresses and
any tags (such as VLAN tags). The alternatives for protocol identification are
discussed in Section 3 of <xref target="RFC9542"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig1">
        <name>Ethernet Frame Format</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
+-----------+-----------+- - - - +----------+--------- - - -+-------+
|Destination|  Source   |Optional| Protocol |  Body of      |Trailer|
|MAC Address|MAC Address|  Tags  |Identifier|   Frame        |       |
+-----------+-----------+ - - - -+----------+--------- - - -+-------|
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>This document considers EtherType protocol identification. An EtherType is an
unsigned 16-bit field in an Ethernet frame with a value in the range of 0x0600
to 0xFFFF, and so it is a somewhat limited resource; however, there exists a
special Extended EtherType (0x88B7) that can be suffixed by an Organizationally
Unique Identifier (OUI) followed by a further 16-bits identifying the protocol
relative to that OUI as discussed in Section 3 of <xref target="RFC9542"/>. These
alternatives of a direct EtherType or use of the Extended EtherType for the
case of the IANA OUI are illustrated in Figure 2. The following subsections
discuss the factors which may influence the choice between these alternatives
when use of such layer 2 protocol identification, to make the isolation of a
limited domain more robust, is warranted.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig2">
        <name>EtherType Based Protocol Identification</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
  01234567 01234567
+--------+--------+
|    EtherType    |
+--------+--------+
Specific EtherType

  01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|  0x88  |  0xB7  |  0x00  |  0x00  |  0x5E  | Protocol Number |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Extended EtherType|         IANA OUI         |IANA Protocol Number
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>Because specific EtherTypes are a limited resource, an Extended EtherType
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used unless there is a strong reason why it will not work
satisfactorily and a specific EtherType is required.</t>
      <section anchor="extended-ethertype-protocol-identification">
        <name>Extended EtherType Protocol Identification</name>
        <t>The main advantage of using an Extended EtherType with an IANA Protocol Number,
as shown in Figure 2, is that such a number can be allocated by IANA with
Expert Review based on an Internet Draft and is thus relatively easy to obtain.
The main disadvantage is that the protocol identification is 5 bytes longer
than a specific dedicated EtherType.</t>
        <section anchor="hardware-forwarding-considerations">
          <name>Hardware Forwarding Considerations</name>
          <t>While Extended EtherTypes (<xref target="RFC9542"/>) solve namespace exhaustion, protocol
designers should remain mindful of hardware parsing pipelines. High-throughput
switching ASICs are heavily optimized to parse standard 16-bit Layer-2
EtherTypes at line rate within a fixed-depth initial parsing window.</t>
          <t>8-octet Extended EtherType or variable-length encapsulations can introduce
forwarding trade-offs on certain switching silicon:
* Parser Depth: Some hardware engines cannot parse beyond a fixed offset in a
  single pass, potentially triggering packet recirculation or forcing packets
  to a slower exception path.
* Flow Matching: Access Control Lists (ACLs) and flow-match engines often have
  native 16-bit EtherType primitives. Matching on an OUI plus extended ID may
  consume extra TCAM resources.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="specific-ethertype-protocol-identification">
        <name>Specific EtherType Protocol Identification</name>
        <t>The primary disadvantage of using a specific EtherType, as opposed to an
Extended EtherType, is that assignment of such an EtherType is significantly
more difficult. As discussed in <xref target="RFC9542"/>, a specific EtherType can only be
assigned by the IEEE Registration Authority under the following policy: "Since
EtherTypes are a fairly scarce resource, the IEEE RAC has let us know that they
will not assign a new EtherType to a new IETF protocol specification until the
IESG has approved the protocol specification for publication as an RFC."
(<xref target="RFC9542"/> Appendix B.1, citing <xref target="IESG_EtherType"/>)</t>
        <t>During development and testing, a protocol can use a "Local Experimental
Ethertype" (0x88b5 and 0x88b6 - <xref target="IANA_EtherType"/>). Once approved, the IESG
can request an EtherType from the IEEE.</t>
        <t>The primary advantage of using a specific EtherType is the saving of 5 bytes
relative to the use of the Extended EtherType.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="non-ethernet-encapsulations-and-layer-3-overlays">
      <name>Non-Ethernet Encapsulations and Layer-3 Overlays</name>
      <t>Many modern data centers, enterprise networks, and WANs deploy limited-domain
features across routed multi-hop IP underlays using Layer-3 encapsulations
(such as Geneve <xref target="RFC8926"/>, VXLAN-GPE <xref target="RFC9674"/>, GRE <xref target="RFC2784"/>, or generic
UDP encapsulation <xref target="RFC8085"/>).</t>
      <t>When designing limited-domain protocols for Layer-3 overlay environments, the
same fundamental tension between fail-open and fail-closed designs applies:</t>
      <section anchor="the-fragility-of-ip-level-filtering-in-overlays">
        <name>The Fragility of IP-Level Filtering in Overlays</name>
        <t>Tunneling limited-domain traffic inside standard unicast IP/UDP packets without
domain-specific transport identifiers exposes the traffic to the same leakage
risks as native IP:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><strong>Routability by Default</strong>: If an inner packet is encapsulated in a standard
UDP/IP header destined for an IP address that leaks into the global routing
table, intermediate underlay routers will forward the encapsulated frame
across domain boundaries unless explicitly filtered.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Transit Inspection Invisibility</strong>: Intermediate nodes that inspect only
the outer IP/UDP headers cannot distinguish between legitimate transit
traffic and sensitive limited-domain control payloads.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="alternative-isolation-mechanisms">
      <name>Alternative Isolation Mechanisms</name>
      <t>This layer-2 protocol identifier technique discussed in Section 8 is primarily
effective for transport-type limited-domain protocols running directly at Layer
3. Higher-layer protocols or those running on top of complex routing substrates
may not be easily protectable via Layer-2 EtherTypes.</t>
      <t>In such scenarios, alternative isolation methods must be considered. These
include cryptographically enforced containment and automated control-plane
isolation, such as the mechanisms standardized by ANIMA in <xref target="RFC8994"/> and
<xref target="RFC8995"/>, where domain boundaries are enforced through secure cryptographic
handshakes and mutual trust verification.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Protocols are designated as "limited domain" because unexpected security issues
might arise if they leak outside of a unified management domain. For example,
VLAN, VPN, or overlay identifiers may be misinterpreted, resulting in the
delivery of data to (or acceptance of data from) unauthorized network nodes.</t>
      <t>Implementing a "fail-closed" boundary via Layer-2 protocol identifiers, strict
link-local address scoping, or Hop-Limit boundaries significantly improves
security by ensuring that unconfigured or external nodes drop the traffic by
default, preventing unintended leakage and misinterpretation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8799">
          <front>
            <title>Limited Domains and Internet Protocols</title>
            <author fullname="B. Carpenter" initials="B." surname="Carpenter"/>
            <author fullname="B. Liu" initials="B." surname="Liu"/>
            <date month="July" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>There is a noticeable trend towards network behaviors and semantics that are specific to a particular set of requirements applied within a limited region of the Internet. Policies, default parameters, the options supported, the style of network management, and security requirements may vary between such limited regions. This document reviews examples of such limited domains (also known as controlled environments), notes emerging solutions, and includes a related taxonomy. It then briefly discusses the standardization of protocols for limited domains. Finally, it shows the need for a precise definition of "limited domain membership" and for mechanisms to allow nodes to join a domain securely and to find other members, including boundary nodes.</t>
              <t>This document is the product of the research of the authors. It has been produced through discussions and consultation within the IETF but is not the product of IETF consensus.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8799"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8799"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2784">
          <front>
            <title>Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Farinacci" initials="D." surname="Farinacci"/>
            <author fullname="T. Li" initials="T." surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hanks" initials="S." surname="Hanks"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <author fullname="P. Traina" initials="P." surname="Traina"/>
            <date month="March" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an arbitrary network layer protocol over another arbitrary network layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2784"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2784"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3031">
          <front>
            <title>Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rosen" initials="E." surname="Rosen"/>
            <author fullname="A. Viswanathan" initials="A." surname="Viswanathan"/>
            <author fullname="R. Callon" initials="R." surname="Callon"/>
            <date month="January" year="2001"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the architecture for Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3031"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3031"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3682">
          <front>
            <title>The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)</title>
            <author fullname="V. Gill" initials="V." surname="Gill"/>
            <author fullname="J. Heasley" initials="J." surname="Heasley"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <date month="February" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The use of a packet's Time to Live (TTL) (IPv4) or Hop Limit (IPv6) to protect a protocol stack from CPU-utilization based attacks has been proposed in many settings (see for example, RFC 2461). This document generalizes these techniques for use by other protocols such as BGP (RFC 1771), Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP), Bidirectional Forwarding Detection, and Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) (RFC 3036). While the Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) is most effective in protecting directly connected protocol peers, it can also provide a lower level of protection to multi-hop sessions. GTSM is not directly applicable to protocols employing flooding mechanisms (e.g., multicast), and use of multi-hop GTSM should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3682"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3682"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3927">
          <front>
            <title>Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses</title>
            <author fullname="S. Cheshire" initials="S." surname="Cheshire"/>
            <author fullname="B. Aboba" initials="B." surname="Aboba"/>
            <author fullname="E. Guttman" initials="E." surname="Guttman"/>
            <date month="May" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>To participate in wide-area IP networking, a host needs to be configured with IP addresses for its interfaces, either manually by the user or automatically from a source on the network such as a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. Unfortunately, such address configuration information may not always be available. It is therefore beneficial for a host to be able to depend on a useful subset of IP networking functions even when no address configuration is available. This document describes how a host may automatically configure an interface with an IPv4 address within the 169.254/16 prefix that is valid for communication with other devices connected to the same physical (or logical) link.</t>
              <t>IPv4 Link-Local addresses are not suitable for communication with devices not directly connected to the same physical (or logical) link, and are only used where stable, routable addresses are not available (such as on ad hoc or isolated networks). This document does not recommend that IPv4 Link-Local addresses and routable addresses be configured simultaneously on the same interface. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3927"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3927"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4291">
          <front>
            <title>IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="R. Hinden" initials="R." surname="Hinden"/>
            <author fullname="S. Deering" initials="S." surname="Deering"/>
            <date month="February" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines the addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes the IPv6 addressing model, text representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 node's required addresses.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4291"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4291"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5771">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Guidelines for IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="L. Vegoda" initials="L." surname="Vegoda"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <date month="March" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides guidance for the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in assigning IPv4 multicast addresses. It obsoletes RFC 3171 and RFC 3138 and updates RFC 2780. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="51"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5771"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5771"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7665">
          <front>
            <title>Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="J. Halpern" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Halpern"/>
            <author fullname="C. Pignataro" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Pignataro"/>
            <date month="October" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an architecture for the specification, creation, and ongoing maintenance of Service Function Chains (SFCs) in a network. It includes architectural concepts, principles, and components used in the construction of composite services through deployment of SFCs, with a focus on those to be standardized in the IETF. This document does not propose solutions, protocols, or extensions to existing protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7665"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7665"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8085">
          <front>
            <title>UDP Usage Guidelines</title>
            <author fullname="L. Eggert" initials="L." surname="Eggert"/>
            <author fullname="G. Fairhurst" initials="G." surname="Fairhurst"/>
            <author fullname="G. Shepherd" initials="G." surname="Shepherd"/>
            <date month="March" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides a minimal message-passing transport that has no inherent congestion control mechanisms. This document provides guidelines on the use of UDP for the designers of applications, tunnels, and other protocols that use UDP. Congestion control guidelines are a primary focus, but the document also provides guidance on other topics, including message sizes, reliability, checksums, middlebox traversal, the use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN), Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCPs), and ports.</t>
              <t>Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as an Internet transport must employ mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse and to establish some degree of fairness with concurrent traffic. They may also need to implement additional mechanisms, depending on how they use UDP.</t>
              <t>Some guidance is also applicable to the design of other protocols (e.g., protocols layered directly on IP or via IP-based tunnels), especially when these protocols do not themselves provide congestion control.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 5405 and adds guidelines for multicast UDP usage.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="145"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8085"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8085"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8754">
          <front>
            <title>IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Filsfils" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Filsfils"/>
            <author fullname="D. Dukes" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Dukes"/>
            <author fullname="S. Previdi" initials="S." surname="Previdi"/>
            <author fullname="J. Leddy" initials="J." surname="Leddy"/>
            <author fullname="S. Matsushima" initials="S." surname="Matsushima"/>
            <author fullname="D. Voyer" initials="D." surname="Voyer"/>
            <date month="March" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane using a new type of Routing Extension Header called the Segment Routing Header (SRH). This document describes the SRH and how it is used by nodes that are Segment Routing (SR) capable.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8754"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8754"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8926">
          <front>
            <title>Geneve: Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation</title>
            <author fullname="J. Gross" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Gross"/>
            <author fullname="I. Ganga" initials="I." role="editor" surname="Ganga"/>
            <author fullname="T. Sridhar" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Sridhar"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Network virtualization involves the cooperation of devices with a wide variety of capabilities such as software and hardware tunnel endpoints, transit fabrics, and centralized control clusters. As a result of their role in tying together different elements of the system, the requirements on tunnels are influenced by all of these components. Therefore, flexibility is the most important aspect of a tunneling protocol if it is to keep pace with the evolution of technology. This document describes Geneve, an encapsulation protocol designed to recognize and accommodate these changing capabilities and needs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8926"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8926"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8994">
          <front>
            <title>An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)</title>
            <author fullname="T. Eckert" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Eckert"/>
            <author fullname="M. Behringer" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Behringer"/>
            <author fullname="S. Bjarnason" initials="S." surname="Bjarnason"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane should ideally be self-managing and be as independent as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual out-of-band channel" for Operations, Administration, and Management (OAM) communications over a network that provides automatically configured, hop-by-hop authenticated and encrypted communications via automatically configured IPv6 even when the network is not configured or is misconfigured.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8994"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8994"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8995">
          <front>
            <title>Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Pritikin" initials="M." surname="Pritikin"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="T. Eckert" initials="T." surname="Eckert"/>
            <author fullname="M. Behringer" initials="M." surname="Behringer"/>
            <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic Control Plane. To do this, a Secure Key Infrastructure is bootstrapped. This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509 certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online and offline. We call this process the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol. Bootstrapping a new device can occur when using a routable address and a cloud service, only link-local connectivity, or limited/disconnected networks. Support for deployment models with less stringent security requirements is included. Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device. The established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8995"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8995"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9378">
          <front>
            <title>In Situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) Deployment</title>
            <author fullname="F. Brockners" initials="F." role="editor" surname="Brockners"/>
            <author fullname="S. Bhandari" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Bhandari"/>
            <author fullname="D. Bernier" initials="D." surname="Bernier"/>
            <author fullname="T. Mizrahi" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Mizrahi"/>
            <date month="April" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) collects operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet traverses a path between two points in the network. This document provides a framework for IOAM deployment and provides IOAM deployment considerations and guidance.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9378"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9378"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9542">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802 Parameters</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="J. Abley" initials="J." surname="Abley"/>
            <author fullname="Y. Li" initials="Y." surname="Li"/>
            <date month="April" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Some IETF protocols make use of Ethernet frame formats and IEEE 802 parameters. This document discusses several aspects of such parameters and their use in IETF protocols, specifies IANA considerations for assignment of points under the IANA Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and provides some values for use in documentation. This document obsoletes RFC 7042.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="141"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9542"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9542"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9674">
          <front>
            <title>Same-Origin Policy for the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)</title>
            <author fullname="J. Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders"/>
            <date month="December" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a Same-Origin Policy (SOP) requirement for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) servers and clients. Application of a SOP in RRDP client/server communication isolates resources such as Delta and Snapshot files from different Repository Servers, reducing possible attack vectors. This document updates RFC 8182.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9674"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9674"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IESG_EtherType">
          <front>
            <title>IESG Statement on EtherTypes</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="May" day="01"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Web" value="&lt;https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/ethertypes&gt;"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA_EtherType">
          <front>
            <title>IANA EtherType Registry</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Web" value="&lt;https://www.iana.org/assignments/ieee-802-numbers/ieee-802-numbers.xhtml#ieee-802-numbers-1&gt;"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 412?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Much thanks to Deborah Brungard and Brian Carpenter for their review and
comments.</t>
      <t>Also much thanks to everyone else with whom we have discussed this topic; I've
had numerous discussions with many many people on this, and I'm sure that I've
forgotten some of them. Apologies if you were one of them.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="changelog">
      <name>Changelog</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>02-08:</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Title changed to "Fail-closed Limited Domains".</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Abstract updated to reframe edge filtering as a positive, standard
practice.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Section 3 updated to qualify categorization.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Removed Appendix A comparing MPLS/SRv6 to avoid direct protocol-specific
comparisons.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Added Section 7 detailing IPv6 Link-Local Multicast scoping (<tt>ff02::/16</tt>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Moved cryptographic/higher-layer discussion out of Section 8 into a new
Section 11.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Streamlined hardware considerations in Section 9.1.1.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Added clarifying language regarding fail-closed design options and boundary
behaviors.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>02-07:</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Add Security Considerations text about the risks of fail-open protocols and
the benefits of fail-closed protocols.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Added Appendix contrasting MPLS and SRv6.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Added hardware processing notes.
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Used Gemini to help me reformulate mess into something readable.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Rewrite Abstract.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>-02-03:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Add Security Considerations text about the risks of fail-open protocols and
the benefits of fail-closed protocols.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>01-02:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Add Donald Eastlake as an author.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Substantial re-write and expansion of material concerning specific and
Extended EtherType protocol identification.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Add initial Security Considerations text.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>00-01:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Deborah pointed out that "this only works for transport-type limited domain
protocols (e.g., SRv6)" could be read as SRv6 fails-closed.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
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