Internet-Draft fail-closed-limited-domains November 2026
Kumari, et al. Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Internet Area Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains-08
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
W. Kumari
Google, LLC
A. Alston
Alston Networks
É. Vyncke
Cisco
S. Krishnan
Cisco
D. Eastlake
Independent

Fail-closed Limited Domains

Abstract

Documents describing protocols intended solely for use within "limited domains" often rely on edge filtering at every boundary node to prevent domain-internal traffic from leaking to the global Internet (and vice versa). While edge filtering is a critical and standard operational practice, relying solely on administrative policies can create "fail-open" designs if configuration errors, ACL bypass, or hardware table limitations occur.

This document describes design principles and concrete mechanisms that allow limited-domain protocols to "fail-closed" by default. By leveraging Layer-2 encapsulation identifiers (such as dedicated or extended EtherTypes), local address scoping, and / or Hop-Limit boundaries, protocol designers can provide robust defense-in-depth and significantly reduce the operational and security risks associated with limited-domain protocol leakage.

These mechanisms are not applicable to all protocols intended for use in a limited domain, but if implemented on certain classes of protocols, can significantly reduce the risks.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Internet Area Working Group Working Group mailing list (int-area@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/int-area/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/wkumari/draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

[RFC8799] discusses the concept of "limited domains", provides examples of limited domains, as well as Examples of Limited Domain Solutions, including Service Function Chaining (SFC [RFC7665]), Segment Routing, "Creative uses of IPv6 features" (including Extension headers, e.g., for in situ Operations, Administration, and maintenance [RFC9378]).

In order to provide context, this document will quote extensively from [RFC8799], but it is assumed that the reader will actually read [RFC8799] in its entirety.

[RFC8799] Section 3, notes:

Notably, in [RFC8799] Section 2, states:

In addition, [RFC8799] Section 6, notes:

This document discusses some of the mechanisms which protocol designers can use to limit the scope of their protocols to a single link. If the protocol is intended to be used across multiple links, but should not be forwarded beyond a single administrative domain, then the protocol designer should consider making the protocol "fail-closed" rather than "fail-open", as described below.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Types of limited domain protocols

[RFC8799] Section 3 discusses some examples of Limited Domains, based mainly on the network type (e.g. Home, Sensor Networks, Data Centers, etc).

For the functional purposes of this document, limited-domain protocols can be categorized at a high-level into two broad groups (though some protocols may span categories):

4. Fail-open versus Fail-closed

Protocols can be classified based on how they behave when encountering an unconfigured interface or boundary.

"Fail-closed" protocols require explicit device or interface-wide configuration to enable them to be accepted, processed, or forwarded when received on an interface. If the protocol is not explicitly enabled on an interface, incoming packets of that protocol type are dropped or ignored by default. This design ensures that traffic does not transit across boundary nodes into networks where it is not supported or authorized.

"Fail-open" protocols are those that rely on explicit configuration (such as filtering or Access Control Lists) at domain boundaries to prevent them from leaking. Without active filtering, standard forwarding hardware will parse and forward these packets normally across boundaries if the routing table allows it.

While edge filtering is an essential tool, fail-open designs are inherently more susceptible to accidental configuration omissions, ACL resource exhaustion, or transient states during troubleshooting. Fail-closed protocols provide defense-in-depth by eliminating the dependency on boundary filters.

5. IP Hop-Limit Limiting

Some limited-domain protocols are intended to operate strictly within a single IP subnet or link. In these cases, protocol specifications SHOULD require that the IP Hop-Limit (or IPv4 TTL) to be set to 1 upon transmission.

As standard routers decrement the Hop-Limit upon forwarding and discard packets when the count reaches zero, setting the Hop-Limit to 1 ensures that the traffic cannot be forwarded off-link. This differs from the Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM, [RFC3682]), which sets the Hop-Limit to 255 to verify that the sender is on-link and protect against off-link spoofing.

Which option to choose (if either) depends on the specific requirements of the protocol.

6. IPv4 Local Multicast Addressing

Some protocols (e.g. OSPF) use addresses from the IP Local Network Control Block [RFC5771] (224.0.0.0/24). In addition to providing a discovery mechanism, standard routers do not forward this traffic off-link, providing a simple and effective way to limit the scope of the protocol.

In some cases, IPv4 "Link Local" addresses [RFC3927] may be an appropriate mechanism to limit the scope of the protocol, but this is a niche case that is not discussed further here.

8. Making a layer-3 type limited-domain protocol fail-closed

One way to make a limited-domain protocol fail-closed is to assign it a unique layer-2 protocol identifier, usually an EtherType. In modern router and host interfaces, if a specific Layer-2 protocol identifier is not administratively enabled on that port, the network interface card or chipset will ignore the frame.

Thus, the protocol must be explicitly enabled on all relevant interfaces inside the domain, automatically blocking it at the domain boundary where the protocol has not been enabled. This is a robust and simple mechanism that ensures the protocol does not leak out of the limited domain, even if an operator makes a mistake in configuring filters based on identifiers appearing deeper in the packet (such as IP addresses, IP protocols, or header options).

A Layer-2 protocol identifier is a powerful tool, but it is not the only option for fail-closed designs, and protocol designers should evaluate it alongside other mechanisms such as local address scoping, hop-limit boundaries, and cryptographic mechanisms, depending on the target environment.

9. Ethernet Protocol Identification

Figure 1 shows the general format of Ethernet frames. The relevant protocol identification field occurs after the destination and source MAC addresses and any tags (such as VLAN tags). The alternatives for protocol identification are discussed in Section 3 of [RFC9542].

+-----------+-----------+- - - - +----------+--------- - - -+-------+
|Destination|  Source   |Optional| Protocol |  Body of      |Trailer|
|MAC Address|MAC Address|  Tags  |Identifier|   Frame        |       |
+-----------+-----------+ - - - -+----------+--------- - - -+-------|
Figure 1: Ethernet Frame Format

This document considers EtherType protocol identification. An EtherType is an unsigned 16-bit field in an Ethernet frame with a value in the range of 0x0600 to 0xFFFF, and so it is a somewhat limited resource; however, there exists a special Extended EtherType (0x88B7) that can be suffixed by an Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) followed by a further 16-bits identifying the protocol relative to that OUI as discussed in Section 3 of [RFC9542]. These alternatives of a direct EtherType or use of the Extended EtherType for the case of the IANA OUI are illustrated in Figure 2. The following subsections discuss the factors which may influence the choice between these alternatives when use of such layer 2 protocol identification, to make the isolation of a limited domain more robust, is warranted.

  01234567 01234567
+--------+--------+
|    EtherType    |
+--------+--------+
Specific EtherType

  01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|  0x88  |  0xB7  |  0x00  |  0x00  |  0x5E  | Protocol Number |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Extended EtherType|         IANA OUI         |IANA Protocol Number
Figure 2: EtherType Based Protocol Identification

Because specific EtherTypes are a limited resource, an Extended EtherType SHOULD be used unless there is a strong reason why it will not work satisfactorily and a specific EtherType is required.

9.1. Extended EtherType Protocol Identification

The main advantage of using an Extended EtherType with an IANA Protocol Number, as shown in Figure 2, is that such a number can be allocated by IANA with Expert Review based on an Internet Draft and is thus relatively easy to obtain. The main disadvantage is that the protocol identification is 5 bytes longer than a specific dedicated EtherType.

9.1.1. Hardware Forwarding Considerations

While Extended EtherTypes ([RFC9542]) solve namespace exhaustion, protocol designers should remain mindful of hardware parsing pipelines. High-throughput switching ASICs are heavily optimized to parse standard 16-bit Layer-2 EtherTypes at line rate within a fixed-depth initial parsing window.

8-octet Extended EtherType or variable-length encapsulations can introduce forwarding trade-offs on certain switching silicon: * Parser Depth: Some hardware engines cannot parse beyond a fixed offset in a single pass, potentially triggering packet recirculation or forcing packets to a slower exception path. * Flow Matching: Access Control Lists (ACLs) and flow-match engines often have native 16-bit EtherType primitives. Matching on an OUI plus extended ID may consume extra TCAM resources.

9.2. Specific EtherType Protocol Identification

The primary disadvantage of using a specific EtherType, as opposed to an Extended EtherType, is that assignment of such an EtherType is significantly more difficult. As discussed in [RFC9542], a specific EtherType can only be assigned by the IEEE Registration Authority under the following policy: "Since EtherTypes are a fairly scarce resource, the IEEE RAC has let us know that they will not assign a new EtherType to a new IETF protocol specification until the IESG has approved the protocol specification for publication as an RFC." ([RFC9542] Appendix B.1, citing [IESG_EtherType])

During development and testing, a protocol can use a "Local Experimental Ethertype" (0x88b5 and 0x88b6 - [IANA_EtherType]). Once approved, the IESG can request an EtherType from the IEEE.

The primary advantage of using a specific EtherType is the saving of 5 bytes relative to the use of the Extended EtherType.

10. Non-Ethernet Encapsulations and Layer-3 Overlays

Many modern data centers, enterprise networks, and WANs deploy limited-domain features across routed multi-hop IP underlays using Layer-3 encapsulations (such as Geneve [RFC8926], VXLAN-GPE [RFC9674], GRE [RFC2784], or generic UDP encapsulation [RFC8085]).

When designing limited-domain protocols for Layer-3 overlay environments, the same fundamental tension between fail-open and fail-closed designs applies:

10.1. The Fragility of IP-Level Filtering in Overlays

Tunneling limited-domain traffic inside standard unicast IP/UDP packets without domain-specific transport identifiers exposes the traffic to the same leakage risks as native IP:

  1. Routability by Default: If an inner packet is encapsulated in a standard UDP/IP header destined for an IP address that leaks into the global routing table, intermediate underlay routers will forward the encapsulated frame across domain boundaries unless explicitly filtered.

  2. Transit Inspection Invisibility: Intermediate nodes that inspect only the outer IP/UDP headers cannot distinguish between legitimate transit traffic and sensitive limited-domain control payloads.

11. Alternative Isolation Mechanisms

This layer-2 protocol identifier technique discussed in Section 8 is primarily effective for transport-type limited-domain protocols running directly at Layer 3. Higher-layer protocols or those running on top of complex routing substrates may not be easily protectable via Layer-2 EtherTypes.

In such scenarios, alternative isolation methods must be considered. These include cryptographically enforced containment and automated control-plane isolation, such as the mechanisms standardized by ANIMA in [RFC8994] and [RFC8995], where domain boundaries are enforced through secure cryptographic handshakes and mutual trust verification.

12. Security Considerations

Protocols are designated as "limited domain" because unexpected security issues might arise if they leak outside of a unified management domain. For example, VLAN, VPN, or overlay identifiers may be misinterpreted, resulting in the delivery of data to (or acceptance of data from) unauthorized network nodes.

Implementing a "fail-closed" boundary via Layer-2 protocol identifiers, strict link-local address scoping, or Hop-Limit boundaries significantly improves security by ensuring that unconfigured or external nodes drop the traffic by default, preventing unintended leakage and misinterpretation.

13. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8799]
Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.

14.2. Informative References

[IANA_EtherType]
"IANA EtherType Registry", Web <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ieee-802-numbers/ieee-802-numbers.xhtml#ieee-802-numbers-1>.
[IESG_EtherType]
"IESG Statement on EtherTypes", Web <https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/ethertypes>, .
[RFC2784]
Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P. Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784, DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2784>.
[RFC3031]
Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, "Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture", RFC 3031, DOI 10.17487/RFC3031, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3031>.
[RFC3682]
Gill, V., Heasley, J., and D. Meyer, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 3682, DOI 10.17487/RFC3682, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3682>.
[RFC3927]
Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927, DOI 10.17487/RFC3927, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3927>.
[RFC4291]
Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4291>.
[RFC5771]
Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., and D. Meyer, "IANA Guidelines for IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments", BCP 51, RFC 5771, DOI 10.17487/RFC5771, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5771>.
[RFC7665]
Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7665>.
[RFC8085]
Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8085>.
[RFC8754]
Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J., Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8754>.
[RFC8926]
Gross, J., Ed., Ganga, I., Ed., and T. Sridhar, Ed., "Geneve: Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation", RFC 8926, DOI 10.17487/RFC8926, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8926>.
[RFC8994]
Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994, DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.
[RFC8995]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[RFC9378]
Brockners, F., Ed., Bhandari, S., Ed., Bernier, D., and T. Mizrahi, Ed., "In Situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) Deployment", RFC 9378, DOI 10.17487/RFC9378, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9378>.
[RFC9542]
Eastlake 3rd, D., Abley, J., and Y. Li, "IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802 Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 9542, DOI 10.17487/RFC9542, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9542>.
[RFC9674]
Snijders, J., "Same-Origin Policy for the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 9674, DOI 10.17487/RFC9674, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9674>.

Acknowledgments

Much thanks to Deborah Brungard and Brian Carpenter for their review and comments.

Also much thanks to everyone else with whom we have discussed this topic; I've had numerous discussions with many many people on this, and I'm sure that I've forgotten some of them. Apologies if you were one of them.

Changelog

Authors' Addresses

Warren Kumari
Google, LLC
Andrew Alston
Alston Networks
Éric Vyncke
Cisco
Suresh Krishnan
Cisco
Donald Eastlake
Independent