| Internet-Draft | fail-closed-limited-domains | November 2026 |
| Kumari, et al. | Expires 20 May 2027 | [Page] |
Documents describing protocols intended solely for use within "limited domains" often rely on edge filtering at every boundary node to prevent domain-internal traffic from leaking to the global Internet (and vice versa). While edge filtering is a critical and standard operational practice, relying solely on administrative policies can create "fail-open" designs if configuration errors, ACL bypass, or hardware table limitations occur.¶
This document describes design principles and concrete mechanisms that allow limited-domain protocols to "fail-closed" by default. By leveraging Layer-2 encapsulation identifiers (such as dedicated or extended EtherTypes), local address scoping, and / or Hop-Limit boundaries, protocol designers can provide robust defense-in-depth and significantly reduce the operational and security risks associated with limited-domain protocol leakage.¶
These mechanisms are not applicable to all protocols intended for use in a limited domain, but if implemented on certain classes of protocols, can significantly reduce the risks.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Internet Area Working Group Working Group mailing list (int-area@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/int-area/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/wkumari/draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains.¶
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[RFC8799] discusses the concept of "limited domains", provides examples of limited domains, as well as Examples of Limited Domain Solutions, including Service Function Chaining (SFC [RFC7665]), Segment Routing, "Creative uses of IPv6 features" (including Extension headers, e.g., for in situ Operations, Administration, and maintenance [RFC9378]).¶
In order to provide context, this document will quote extensively from [RFC8799], but it is assumed that the reader will actually read [RFC8799] in its entirety.¶
A common argument is that if a protocol is intended for limited use, the chances are very high that it will in fact be used (or misused) in other scenarios including the so-called open Internet. This is undoubtedly true and means that limited use is not an excuse for bad design or poor security. In fact, a limited use requirement potentially adds complexity to both the protocol and its security design, as discussed later.¶
Notably, in [RFC8799] Section 2, states:¶
Domain boundaries that are defined administratively (e.g., by address filtering rules in routers) are prone to leakage caused by human error, especially if the limited domain traffic appears otherwise normal to the boundary routers. In this case, the network operator needs to take active steps to protect the boundary. This form of leakage is much less likely if nodes must be explicitly configured to handle a given limited-domain protocol, for example, by installing a specific protocol handler.¶
In addition, [RFC8799] Section 6, notes:¶
Today, where limited domains exist, they are essentially created by careful configuration of boundary routers and firewalls. If a domain is characterized by one or more address prefixes, address assignment to hosts must also be carefully managed. This is an error-prone method, and a combination of configuration errors and default routing can lead to unwanted traffic escaping the domain. Our basic assumption is therefore that it should be possible for domains to be created and managed automatically, with minimal human configuration. We now discuss requirements for automating domain creation and management.¶
This document discusses some of the mechanisms which protocol designers can use to limit the scope of their protocols to a single link. If the protocol is intended to be used across multiple links, but should not be forwarded beyond a single administrative domain, then the protocol designer should consider making the protocol "fail-closed" rather than "fail-open", as described below.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
[RFC8799] Section 3 discusses some examples of Limited Domains, based mainly on the network type (e.g. Home, Sensor Networks, Data Centers, etc).¶
For the functional purposes of this document, limited-domain protocols can be categorized at a high-level into two broad groups (though some protocols may span categories):¶
Layer-2 type limited domain protocols: These are protocols that are intended to be used within a single local-area network (LAN) segment or broadcast domain.¶
Transport and infrastructure-type services: These protocols provide multi-hop transport or routing functionality, intended to remain strictly within a single administrative domain (such as an Enterprise or a Service Provider network).¶
Protocols can be classified based on how they behave when encountering an unconfigured interface or boundary.¶
"Fail-closed" protocols require explicit device or interface-wide configuration to enable them to be accepted, processed, or forwarded when received on an interface. If the protocol is not explicitly enabled on an interface, incoming packets of that protocol type are dropped or ignored by default. This design ensures that traffic does not transit across boundary nodes into networks where it is not supported or authorized.¶
"Fail-open" protocols are those that rely on explicit configuration (such as filtering or Access Control Lists) at domain boundaries to prevent them from leaking. Without active filtering, standard forwarding hardware will parse and forward these packets normally across boundaries if the routing table allows it.¶
While edge filtering is an essential tool, fail-open designs are inherently more susceptible to accidental configuration omissions, ACL resource exhaustion, or transient states during troubleshooting. Fail-closed protocols provide defense-in-depth by eliminating the dependency on boundary filters.¶
Some limited-domain protocols are intended to operate strictly within a single IP subnet or link. In these cases, protocol specifications SHOULD require that the IP Hop-Limit (or IPv4 TTL) to be set to 1 upon transmission.¶
As standard routers decrement the Hop-Limit upon forwarding and discard packets when the count reaches zero, setting the Hop-Limit to 1 ensures that the traffic cannot be forwarded off-link. This differs from the Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM, [RFC3682]), which sets the Hop-Limit to 255 to verify that the sender is on-link and protect against off-link spoofing.¶
Which option to choose (if either) depends on the specific requirements of the protocol.¶
Some protocols (e.g. OSPF) use addresses from the IP Local Network Control Block [RFC5771] (224.0.0.0/24). In addition to providing a discovery mechanism, standard routers do not forward this traffic off-link, providing a simple and effective way to limit the scope of the protocol.¶
In some cases, IPv4 "Link Local" addresses [RFC3927] may be an appropriate mechanism to limit the scope of the protocol, but this is a niche case that is not discussed further here.¶
Link-Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses ([RFC4291] Section 2.5.6) are used for communication between nodes on a single link. They are not routable and are not forwarded by routers. In cases where a limited-domain protocol is intended to be used only within a single link, the use of IPv6 Link-Local addresses is an effective containment mechanism.¶
Similarly, IPv6 Link-Local Multicast Addresses in the ff02::/16 range
([RFC4291] Section 2.7) are restricted to the local link scope and are not
forwarded by routers, providing a reliable on-link multicast discovery and
communication channel.¶
One way to make a limited-domain protocol fail-closed is to assign it a unique layer-2 protocol identifier, usually an EtherType. In modern router and host interfaces, if a specific Layer-2 protocol identifier is not administratively enabled on that port, the network interface card or chipset will ignore the frame.¶
Thus, the protocol must be explicitly enabled on all relevant interfaces inside the domain, automatically blocking it at the domain boundary where the protocol has not been enabled. This is a robust and simple mechanism that ensures the protocol does not leak out of the limited domain, even if an operator makes a mistake in configuring filters based on identifiers appearing deeper in the packet (such as IP addresses, IP protocols, or header options).¶
A Layer-2 protocol identifier is a powerful tool, but it is not the only option for fail-closed designs, and protocol designers should evaluate it alongside other mechanisms such as local address scoping, hop-limit boundaries, and cryptographic mechanisms, depending on the target environment.¶
Figure 1 shows the general format of Ethernet frames. The relevant protocol identification field occurs after the destination and source MAC addresses and any tags (such as VLAN tags). The alternatives for protocol identification are discussed in Section 3 of [RFC9542].¶
+-----------+-----------+- - - - +----------+--------- - - -+-------+ |Destination| Source |Optional| Protocol | Body of |Trailer| |MAC Address|MAC Address| Tags |Identifier| Frame | | +-----------+-----------+ - - - -+----------+--------- - - -+-------|
This document considers EtherType protocol identification. An EtherType is an unsigned 16-bit field in an Ethernet frame with a value in the range of 0x0600 to 0xFFFF, and so it is a somewhat limited resource; however, there exists a special Extended EtherType (0x88B7) that can be suffixed by an Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) followed by a further 16-bits identifying the protocol relative to that OUI as discussed in Section 3 of [RFC9542]. These alternatives of a direct EtherType or use of the Extended EtherType for the case of the IANA OUI are illustrated in Figure 2. The following subsections discuss the factors which may influence the choice between these alternatives when use of such layer 2 protocol identification, to make the isolation of a limited domain more robust, is warranted.¶
01234567 01234567 +--------+--------+ | EtherType | +--------+--------+ Specific EtherType 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 01234567 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ | 0x88 | 0xB7 | 0x00 | 0x00 | 0x5E | Protocol Number | +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ Extended EtherType| IANA OUI |IANA Protocol Number
Because specific EtherTypes are a limited resource, an Extended EtherType SHOULD be used unless there is a strong reason why it will not work satisfactorily and a specific EtherType is required.¶
The main advantage of using an Extended EtherType with an IANA Protocol Number, as shown in Figure 2, is that such a number can be allocated by IANA with Expert Review based on an Internet Draft and is thus relatively easy to obtain. The main disadvantage is that the protocol identification is 5 bytes longer than a specific dedicated EtherType.¶
While Extended EtherTypes ([RFC9542]) solve namespace exhaustion, protocol designers should remain mindful of hardware parsing pipelines. High-throughput switching ASICs are heavily optimized to parse standard 16-bit Layer-2 EtherTypes at line rate within a fixed-depth initial parsing window.¶
8-octet Extended EtherType or variable-length encapsulations can introduce forwarding trade-offs on certain switching silicon: * Parser Depth: Some hardware engines cannot parse beyond a fixed offset in a single pass, potentially triggering packet recirculation or forcing packets to a slower exception path. * Flow Matching: Access Control Lists (ACLs) and flow-match engines often have native 16-bit EtherType primitives. Matching on an OUI plus extended ID may consume extra TCAM resources.¶
The primary disadvantage of using a specific EtherType, as opposed to an Extended EtherType, is that assignment of such an EtherType is significantly more difficult. As discussed in [RFC9542], a specific EtherType can only be assigned by the IEEE Registration Authority under the following policy: "Since EtherTypes are a fairly scarce resource, the IEEE RAC has let us know that they will not assign a new EtherType to a new IETF protocol specification until the IESG has approved the protocol specification for publication as an RFC." ([RFC9542] Appendix B.1, citing [IESG_EtherType])¶
During development and testing, a protocol can use a "Local Experimental Ethertype" (0x88b5 and 0x88b6 - [IANA_EtherType]). Once approved, the IESG can request an EtherType from the IEEE.¶
The primary advantage of using a specific EtherType is the saving of 5 bytes relative to the use of the Extended EtherType.¶
Many modern data centers, enterprise networks, and WANs deploy limited-domain features across routed multi-hop IP underlays using Layer-3 encapsulations (such as Geneve [RFC8926], VXLAN-GPE [RFC9674], GRE [RFC2784], or generic UDP encapsulation [RFC8085]).¶
When designing limited-domain protocols for Layer-3 overlay environments, the same fundamental tension between fail-open and fail-closed designs applies:¶
Tunneling limited-domain traffic inside standard unicast IP/UDP packets without domain-specific transport identifiers exposes the traffic to the same leakage risks as native IP:¶
Routability by Default: If an inner packet is encapsulated in a standard UDP/IP header destined for an IP address that leaks into the global routing table, intermediate underlay routers will forward the encapsulated frame across domain boundaries unless explicitly filtered.¶
Transit Inspection Invisibility: Intermediate nodes that inspect only the outer IP/UDP headers cannot distinguish between legitimate transit traffic and sensitive limited-domain control payloads.¶
This layer-2 protocol identifier technique discussed in Section 8 is primarily effective for transport-type limited-domain protocols running directly at Layer 3. Higher-layer protocols or those running on top of complex routing substrates may not be easily protectable via Layer-2 EtherTypes.¶
In such scenarios, alternative isolation methods must be considered. These include cryptographically enforced containment and automated control-plane isolation, such as the mechanisms standardized by ANIMA in [RFC8994] and [RFC8995], where domain boundaries are enforced through secure cryptographic handshakes and mutual trust verification.¶
Protocols are designated as "limited domain" because unexpected security issues might arise if they leak outside of a unified management domain. For example, VLAN, VPN, or overlay identifiers may be misinterpreted, resulting in the delivery of data to (or acceptance of data from) unauthorized network nodes.¶
Implementing a "fail-closed" boundary via Layer-2 protocol identifiers, strict link-local address scoping, or Hop-Limit boundaries significantly improves security by ensuring that unconfigured or external nodes drop the traffic by default, preventing unintended leakage and misinterpretation.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
Much thanks to Deborah Brungard and Brian Carpenter for their review and comments.¶
Also much thanks to everyone else with whom we have discussed this topic; I've had numerous discussions with many many people on this, and I'm sure that I've forgotten some of them. Apologies if you were one of them.¶
02-08:¶
Title changed to "Fail-closed Limited Domains".¶
Abstract updated to reframe edge filtering as a positive, standard practice.¶
Section 3 updated to qualify categorization.¶
Removed Appendix A comparing MPLS/SRv6 to avoid direct protocol-specific comparisons.¶
Added Section 7 detailing IPv6 Link-Local Multicast scoping (ff02::/16).¶
Moved cryptographic/higher-layer discussion out of Section 8 into a new Section 11.¶
Streamlined hardware considerations in Section 9.1.1.¶
Added clarifying language regarding fail-closed design options and boundary behaviors.¶
-02-03:¶
Add Security Considerations text about the risks of fail-open protocols and the benefits of fail-closed protocols.¶
01-02:¶
00-01:¶
Deborah pointed out that "this only works for transport-type limited domain protocols (e.g., SRv6)" could be read as SRv6 fails-closed.¶