Network Working Group D. O. Watts Internet-Draft GoodShyt Group Inc. Intended status: Experimental 15 November 2026 Expires: 19 May 2027 Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): Signed Epoch Acknowledgements and Accountable Revocation Closure draft-watts-sink-attested-closure-00 Abstract Revoking delegated authority in an agentic system is complete only when every place that can still act on that authority has stopped. Existing work defines the states of that process but leaves its evidence format open. This document defines Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): a small set of COSE-signed objects and one deterministic algorithm. An authority root signs a Scope Manifest naming the sinks a closure claim covers, and a Cut Statement raising the minimum admissible authority epoch. Each sink signs an Epoch Acknowledgement with its own key, binding the cut to the sequence number of the last effect it committed before applying it. Each committed effect yields a signed Effect Receipt. From these objects any party can compute one of three verdicts: CLOSED, UNKNOWN, or VIOLATED. A VIOLATED verdict comes with a transferable proof consisting of two signatures by the same sink. A sink that never acknowledges blocks CLOSED until it is removed from scope. An optional binding ties the acknowledging key to remote attestation evidence. This document makes no claim that a sink which signs an acknowledgement actually enforces it; it makes a sink that does not enforce it provably accountable for every effect it receipts. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Relationship to Other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Terminology and Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Sink State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Scope Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Cut Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Sink Epoch Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. Effect Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. Closure Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. The Silent-Sink Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11. Violation Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12. Signed Verdict Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 13.1. P1: An Honest Sink Is Never Convicted . . . . . . . . . 19 13.2. P2: Every Receipted Breach Is Detectable . . . . . . . . 20 13.3. P3: Evidence Is Monotone and VIOLATED Is Terminal . . . 20 13.4. P4: The Verdict Is a Function of the Object Set . . . . 20 13.5. P5: What CLOSED Implies, and Under Which Assumptions . . 20 13.6. What Is Not Guaranteed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 14. Checkpoints and Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 15. Attestation Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 16. Use with Attested Fence Receipts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 17. Cross-Implementation Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 18. Implementation Guidance for Database-Backed Sinks . . . . . . 26 18.1. Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 18.2. Committing an Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 18.3. Applying a Cut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 18.4. Isolation and Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 18.5. Rollback Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 19. Evidence Store and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 19.1. Store Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 19.2. Analysis Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 19.3. Operational Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 20. Operational Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 21. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 21.1. sace_ref (Python) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 21.2. sace-eval (Go) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 21.3. Limits of This Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 22. Evidence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 23. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 23.1. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 24. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 25. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 25.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 25.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Appendix A. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Appendix B. Validation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix C. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix D. Worked Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Appendix E. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 E.1. Since -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 E.2. Since -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 E.3. Since -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 1. Introduction A revocation request, a token invalidation, and the end of delegated authority are three different events. [I-D.watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure] names that distinction, defines authority epochs and closure states, and leaves the wire encoding of closure receipts to a future profile. It defines no acknowledgement signed by an enforcement point, no manifest format, no sequence mechanism, and no state for a detected breach. This document is such a profile. A simple two-sink arrangement shows why the gap matters. Sink A commits a cut to epoch 8. Sink B, which has not received the cut, then accepts an epoch-7 request from a delegation descendant that A has never seen. The cut is committed at A, and closure does not hold over {A, B}. Four things are missing in that arrangement: * A cut delivered to a sink is an update. It is not evidence that the sink applied anything. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * "All sinks" means "all sinks that happened to be known". Without a signed membership list, closure cannot be stated. * The useful test is not "an old-epoch effect after A's cut". It is "an old-epoch effect at a sink after that sink's own acknowledgement". * Rejections caused by clock expiry are indistinguishable from rejections caused by revocation. SACE answers each point with a concrete object. 1.1. Scope SACE defines evidence objects and their evaluation. It does not define how cuts are transported, how grants are issued, or any new token format. It works with any authorization system that can attach an integer authority epoch to each admitted request. 1.2. Relationship to Other Work The building blocks used here are established. Admission by a monotonically increasing number is the fencing technique long used with leases [LEASES]. The watermark recorded by a sink is a local component of a consistent cut [SNAPSHOTS]. Proofs made of two conflicting signed statements are the basis of accountability in distributed systems [PEERREVIEW]. Signed receipts and transparency are provided by [RFC9943] and [RFC9942], and per-action agent receipts are profiled in [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt]. Revocation signalling exists in [RFC7009], [I-D.chen-oauth-agent-revocation], [I-D.sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation], and [CAEP]; requirements for revocation freshness across organizations are collected in [I-D.reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation]. Delivery acknowledgement in those systems is a transport property. What this document adds is an acknowledgement signed by the sink that carries the sink's own commit watermark, together with a deterministic verdict over a signed membership list. The closest related document is [I-D.watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt], which defines a receipt emitted by the hardware-rooted Attesting Environment of a sink after it applies an epoch fence, together with a closure evaluation over a declared sink set. That document and this one address the same gap from two sides. The fence receipt answers "what state was the sink's enforcement hardware in when it applied the fence". SACE answers "what did the sink sign, and does anything it signed later contradict it". SACE needs no hardware support, adds a membership list signed Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 by the authority root, adds per-effect receipts, and adds violation proofs that a third party can check from two signatures. Section 16 describes how the two are used together. 1.3. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Design Principles Seven principles constrain the mechanism. Each is enforced by a specific rule later in this document. 1. Delivery is not application. Only a statement signed by the sink's own key counts as evidence that the sink applied a cut (Section 8). 2. Closure is bounded by a signed list. A verdict names exactly one Scope Manifest and says nothing about any system outside it (Section 6, Section 10). 3. Missing evidence is UNKNOWN. No timeout, quorum, or majority converts an absent acknowledgement into closure (Section 10). 4. An acknowledgement is a safety claim. By signing, a sink commits to a watermark. Anything it later receipts beyond that watermark under a revoked epoch convicts it (Section 11). 5. No clock in the safety predicate. Verdicts depend on epochs and sequence numbers. Timestamps are informational (Section 10). 6. Agreement is not correctness. Two evaluators producing the same verdict shows that they implement the same function, not that the sinks are honest (Section 17). 7. Attestation describes the signer, not its behaviour. Evidence about the code that signed an acknowledgement does not prove that the code enforces it (Section 15). 3. Terminology and Roles Authority Root (AR): The party entitled to revoke. Signs Scope Manifests and Cut Statements. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Sink: A system where delegated authority becomes a durable effect, such as a database write, a payment, or a message sent. Holds its own signing key. Authority epoch: An unsigned integer attached to every grant. Opaque to SACE except for ordering. Floor: The lowest authority epoch a sink will admit. Raised by a cut, never lowered. Effect sequence number (seq): A per-sink, per-scope counter, starting at 1, incremented by exactly one for each committed effect. Watermark (w): The value of a sink's seq at the instant it raised its floor; 0 if it had committed nothing. Evaluator: Any party that runs the algorithm in Section 10. An Evaluator needs no secret. Digest of an object: SHA-256 over the complete tagged COSE_Sign1 encoding of that object. All SACE objects are COSE_Sign1 structures [RFC9052] whose payload is a CBOR map with integer keys, encoded using the deterministic encoding requirements of Section 4.2 of [RFC8949]. The protected header MUST carry "alg", "kid", and "typ" [RFC9596]. A receiver MUST reject an object whose payload is not deterministically encoded, has duplicate keys, or has keys that this document does not define. 4. Protocol Overview One closure round has six steps. Transport between parties is out of scope; any channel works because every object is self-authenticating. 1. The AR publishes a Scope Manifest listing each sink by identifier and key thumbprint. 2. To revoke, the AR signs a Cut Statement that names the manifest by digest and sets a new floor epoch e. 3. Each sink that receives the cut, in one atomic step with its effect commits, raises its floor to e and records its current seq as watermark w. 4. The sink signs an Epoch Acknowledgement over the cut digest, e, w, and the head of its receipt chain, and returns or publishes it. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 5. For every effect it commits, before and after the cut, the sink emits an Effect Receipt carrying seq and the authority epoch of the grant it admitted. 6. An Evaluator collects the manifest, the cut, the acknowledgements, and any receipts, and computes CLOSED, UNKNOWN, or VIOLATED. The admission rule at a sink is one comparison: admit a request only if its authority epoch is greater than or equal to the floor. This is the admission fencing of [I-D.watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure]; SACE adds the evidence that it happened. 5. Sink State Machine A sink is in exactly one of four states for each scope. The state, the floor, the sequence counter, and the chain head are a single durable record and change only inside the transaction described for each event. +============+=========================+===========================+ | State | Meaning | Requests in the scope | +============+=========================+===========================+ | UNENROLLED | The sink holds no | Refused. | | | manifest that lists it. | | +------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+ | ACTIVE(f) | The sink is listed and | Admitted if the authority | | | its floor is f. | epoch is at least f. | +------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+ | HALTED | The sink cannot show | Refused until the sink | | | that its durable record | re-acknowledges the | | | is current. | latest cut. | +------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+ | RETIRED | A later manifest no | Refused. | | | longer lists the sink. | | +------------+-------------------------+---------------------------+ Table 1: Sink States Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +====================+============+===========+===================+ | Event | From | To | Action in one | | | | | transaction | +====================+============+===========+===================+ | Manifest lists the | UNENROLLED | HALTED | Store the | | sink | | | manifest digest; | | | | | seq = 0; chain | | | | | head = zero. | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Cut with epoch e > | ACTIVE(f) | ACTIVE(e) | Set floor to e; | | f | or HALTED | | record w = seq; | | | | | sign and store | | | | | the SEA. | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Cut with epoch e | ACTIVE(f) | ACTIVE(f) | None; return the | | <= f | | | stored SEA for f. | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Request with epoch | ACTIVE(f) | ACTIVE(f) | seq = seq + 1; | | >= f | | | write the effect; | | | | | sign and store | | | | | the ER; advance | | | | | the chain head. | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Request with epoch | ACTIVE(f) | ACTIVE(f) | None; refuse with | | < f | | | reason "floor". | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | Restore, or | ACTIVE(f) | HALTED | None; refuse all | | rollback-resistant | | | requests. | | counter disagrees | | | | | with the record | | | | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ | New manifest omits | any | RETIRED | Store the | | the sink | | | manifest digest. | +--------------------+------------+-----------+-------------------+ Table 2: Sink Events A newly listed sink starts in HALTED, not ACTIVE, so that it cannot admit a request before it has acknowledged the latest cut. Its first SEA has watermark 0. Three invariants follow from the table and are what an implementation needs to preserve: I1 (monotonic floor): The floor never decreases. I2 (dense sequence): The sequence counter increases by exactly one per committed effect, and each value is used once. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 I3 (atomic fence): The floor raise and the watermark read are one atomic step with respect to every effect commit. No effect commit observes the old floor and receives a sequence number above the watermark. 6. Scope Manifest A Scope Manifest is the signed, complete list of sinks that one closure claim covers. Its "typ" is "application/sace-manifest+cose". It is signed by the AR. +=====+===============+========+============================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+===============+========+============================+ | 1 | scope_id | bstr, | Random; fixed for the life | | | | 16 | of the scope. | | | | bytes | | +-----+---------------+--------+----------------------------+ | 2 | manifest_seq | uint | Starts at 1. Each new | | | | | manifest increments it by | | | | | one. | +-----+---------------+--------+----------------------------+ | 3 | prev_manifest | bstr / | Digest of the preceding | | | | null | manifest; null when | | | | | manifest_seq is 1. | +-----+---------------+--------+----------------------------+ | 4 | members | array | Sorted by sink_id in | | | | of | bytewise order. No | | | | member | duplicates. | +-----+---------------+--------+----------------------------+ | 5 | att_profile | tstr | OPTIONAL. If present, | | | | | every acknowledgement | | | | | carries attestation under | | | | | this profile (Section 15). | +-----+---------------+--------+----------------------------+ Table 3: Scope Manifest Payload Each member is an array [sink_id, key_thumbprint, class]: a text identifier, the COSE Key Thumbprint [RFC9679] (SHA-256) of the sink's acknowledgement key, and a text label for the sink class. The following rules apply: * A grant issued within a scope MUST name scope_id, and its audience MUST be a sink_id present in the current manifest. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * A sink MUST refuse any request in a scope for which it holds a manifest if its own sink_id and key are not in that manifest. This turns an unlisted sink from a silent gap into a refusal. * Adding or removing a sink requires a new manifest. A sink added by manifest n+1 starts in HALTED (Section 5) and MUST acknowledge the latest cut before it admits any request in the scope; its watermark is 0. * A closure verdict over manifest n is not a verdict over manifest n+1. 7. Cut Statement A Cut Statement raises the floor for one scope. Its "typ" is "application/sace-cut+cose". It is signed by the AR. +=====+============+==========+================================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+============+==========+================================+ | 1 | scope_id | bstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ | 2 | manifest | bstr | Digest of the Scope Manifest | | | | | this cut applies to. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ | 3 | epoch | uint | The new floor e. Authority | | | | | epochs below e are revoked. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ | 4 | prev_epoch | uint | The floor this cut supersedes. | | | | | Less than epoch. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ | 5 | cut_nonce | bstr, 16 | Random. Makes two cuts to the | | | | bytes | same epoch distinguishable. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ | 6 | issued_at | uint | Seconds since the Unix epoch. | | | | | Informational only. | +-----+------------+----------+--------------------------------+ Table 4: Cut Statement Payload A sink processes a Cut Statement as follows, entirely inside the same serializable transaction that guards effect commits: 1. Verify the AR signature and that "manifest" matches a manifest that the sink holds and is listed in. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 2. If "epoch" is less than or equal to the current floor, change nothing and return the stored acknowledgement for the current floor. 3. Otherwise, set the floor to "epoch", set w to the current seq, and durably store both together with the cut digest. Step 2 makes reordered and replayed cuts harmless: a cut to 9 arriving before a cut to 8 leaves the floor at 9, and a replayed cut to 7 cannot lower it. A sink MUST store the exact bytes of each acknowledgement it signs and return those bytes on any repeat, so that an honest sink never produces two different acknowledgements for one cut. 8. Sink Epoch Acknowledgement A Sink Epoch Acknowledgement (SEA) is a sink's own signed statement that it raised its floor, and where its effect counter stood when it did. Its "typ" is "application/sace-ack+cose". It MUST be signed by the key whose thumbprint the manifest lists for that sink. An acknowledgement signed by the AR, a proxy, or a coordinator on the sink's behalf is not an SEA. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +=====+===============+======+===================================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+===============+======+===================================+ | 1 | scope_id | bstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 2 | manifest | bstr | Digest of the manifest the sink | | | | | is listed in. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 3 | sink_id | tstr | The sink's identifier in that | | | | | manifest. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 4 | cut | bstr | Digest of the Cut Statement that | | | | | caused this floor. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 5 | applied_epoch | uint | The floor now in force at this | | | | | sink. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 6 | prev_epoch | uint | The floor it replaced at this | | | | | sink. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 7 | watermark | uint | w: the sink's seq at the instant | | | | | the floor was raised. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 8 | chain_head | bstr | Digest of the Effect Receipt with | | | | | seq = w; 32 zero bytes if w is 0. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 9 | applied_at | uint | Sink-local time. Informational | | | | | only. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ | 10 | attestation | bstr | OPTIONAL. An EAT, per | | | | | Section 15. | +-----+---------------+------+-----------------------------------+ Table 5: Sink Epoch Acknowledgement Payload By signing an SEA, a sink asserts two things and nothing else: * Every effect it committed under an authority epoch below applied_epoch has seq less than or equal to watermark. * It will commit no further effect under an authority epoch below applied_epoch. The watermark is what makes the second assertion checkable. Without it, an old-epoch receipt could always be explained as having been committed just before the cut. With it, the sink has fixed in advance which side of the line every sequence number falls on. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 An SEA satisfies a cut with epoch e if it is validly signed, names the same scope and manifest, and has applied_epoch greater than or equal to e. A sink that moved directly to a later epoch therefore also acknowledges every earlier cut. 9. Effect Receipt An Effect Receipt (ER) is a sink's signed record of one committed effect. Its "typ" is "application/sace-effect+cose". It is signed by the same key as the sink's SEAs. +=====+=================+======+================================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+=================+======+================================+ | 1 | scope_id | bstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ | 2 | sink_id | tstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ | 3 | seq | uint | Previous seq plus one. No | | | | | gaps, no reuse. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ | 4 | authority_epoch | uint | The epoch of the grant under | | | | | which the effect was admitted. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ | 5 | effect | bstr | SHA-256 of the canonical | | | | | effect description. Never the | | | | | effect itself. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ | 6 | prev | bstr | Digest of the ER with seq | | | | | minus one; 32 zero bytes when | | | | | seq is 1. | +-----+-----------------+------+--------------------------------+ Table 6: Effect Receipt Payload The sink MUST assign seq, write the effect, and persist the ER in one atomic transaction. An effect without a receipt, or a receipt without an effect, is a sink fault. A deployment that already emits per-action receipts in another format, for example a signed statement as in [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt], MAY use that format instead, provided that each receipt is signed by the manifest-listed key and carries sink_id, seq, authority_epoch, and prev under the sink's signature. Registering receipts in a Transparency Service [RFC9943] is RECOMMENDED where a sink might withhold them (Section 23). Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 10. Closure Evaluation The verdict is a pure function of its inputs: one Scope Manifest M, one Cut Statement C with epoch e, a set of SEAs, a set of ERs, an optional set of Checkpoints (Section 14), and, when M sets att_profile, the Evaluator's appraisal policy for that profile (Section 15). It uses no clock and no network. A sink makes a sequence commitment whenever it signs a statement that binds a sequence number n to a receipt digest d. Four statements do so: * An ER with seq n commits (n, digest of that ER). * An ER with seq n greater than 1 commits (n - 1, its "prev"). * An SEA with watermark w greater than 0 commits (w, its chain_head). * A Checkpoint with seq n greater than 0 commits (n, its chain_head). For each member s of M, an Evaluator computes a member status: 1. Discard every SEA, ER, and Checkpoint that is not validly signed by the key M lists for s, that names a different scope, or, for an SEA, that names a different manifest. 2. If two SEAs from s have the same "cut" but are not byte- identical, s is VIOLATED (equivocation). 3. If two sequence commitments from s bind the same n to different digests, s is VIOLATED (forked chain). 4. If any SEA A from s and any ER from s satisfy authority_epoch < A.applied_epoch and seq > A.watermark, s is VIOLATED (stale commit). 5. If no remaining SEA satisfies C, s is UNACKED. 6. If M has att_profile and no SEA satisfying C carries attestation that passes Section 15, s is UNACKED. 7. Otherwise, s is ACKED. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Steps 2 to 4 apply to every SEA from s, not only to those that satisfy C. The reported watermark of s is that of the satisfying SEA with the lowest applied_epoch, or null if there is none. It is reported for UNACKED and VIOLATED members too, when a satisfying SEA exists. The verdict over M and C is then: +==========+===============================+=====================+ | Verdict | Condition | State in the base | | | | model | +==========+===============================+=====================+ | VIOLATED | At least one member is | FAILED, with proof | | | VIOLATED. | attached | +----------+-------------------------------+---------------------+ | CLOSED | Every member is ACKED, and | CLOSED | | | the non-vacuity check passes. | | +----------+-------------------------------+---------------------+ | UNKNOWN | Anything else. | PROPAGATING, | | | | PARTIAL, or UNKNOWN | +----------+-------------------------------+---------------------+ Table 7: Verdicts Non-vacuity: CLOSED additionally requires a witness: either an ER from a member with a satisfying SEA, with authority_epoch below e and seq at or below that member's watermark; or a Checkpoint from such a member, with seq at or below its watermark, whose "counts" map gives a non-zero count for some epoch below e. This corresponds to the normal-path witness of [I-D.watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure]: it shows that the revoked authority could reach a sink before the cut, so the result is not closure of an empty graph. Without a witness, the verdict is UNKNOWN. Monotonicity: Adding evidence can move a verdict from UNKNOWN to CLOSED, and from anything to VIOLATED. Nothing moves a verdict out of VIOLATED. 10.1. The Silent-Sink Rule A member that has not signed a satisfying SEA is UNACKED, and a verdict with an UNACKED member is not CLOSED. No other evidence changes this. In particular, an Evaluator MUST NOT report CLOSED on the basis of: * elapsed time since the cut, or any timeout; Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * acknowledgements from a majority or any other proportion of members; * activity by the member under the new epoch, receipts, or Checkpoints, none of which is an acknowledgement; * a statement by the AR, a transport, or another member that the cut was delivered; * a verdict record from another Evaluator. The only way to reach CLOSED without a member's acknowledgement is to remove the member from scope: the AR issues a new manifest that omits it and a new cut over that manifest. The verdict over the old manifest stays UNKNOWN and is retained (Section 20). Removal is therefore always visible as a change of scope and never as a closure. This rule chooses safety over liveness. A deployment that cannot tolerate one unresponsive sink blocking closure needs smaller scopes, not a weaker rule. 11. Violation Proofs Every VIOLATED status is backed by exactly two objects signed by the same sink key. Anyone holding the manifest can check the proof offline, and the sink cannot attribute it to the network, the AR, or another sink. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +==============+=============================+====================+ | Type | The two objects | What they show | +==============+=============================+====================+ | 1: Stale | An SEA with applied_epoch = | The sink committed | | commit | a and watermark = w; an ER | revoked authority | | | with authority_epoch < a | after stating that | | | and seq > w | it had stopped. | +--------------+-----------------------------+--------------------+ | 2: | Two SEAs with the same cut | The sink told two | | Equivocation | and any differing field | parties different | | | | things about one | | | | cut. | +--------------+-----------------------------+--------------------+ | 3: Forked | Two objects, each an ER, an | The sink keeps two | | chain | SEA, or a Checkpoint, that | histories, or | | | make conflicting sequence | acknowledged a | | | commitments (Section 10) | chain head it did | | | | not have. | +--------------+-----------------------------+--------------------+ Table 8: Violation Proof Types A violation proof is a CBOR array [proof_type, object_1, object_2]. It needs no signature of its own, because its force comes from the two signatures it contains. Type 3 covers four concrete forms, all detected by one rule: two ERs with the same seq; an ER whose "prev" disagrees with the receipt it names; an SEA whose chain_head disagrees with the receipt at its watermark; and a Checkpoint whose chain_head disagrees with a receipt, an SEA, or another Checkpoint. To verify a proof, a party holding the manifest checks that both objects are validly signed by the same manifest-listed key, that they are different objects, and that running steps 2 to 4 of Section 10 over those two objects alone yields the stated type. A pair that does not convict on its own is not a proof, even if the member is VIOLATED on other evidence. The distinction from simpler tests is deliberate. "An old-epoch effect after A's cut" proves nothing about B. "An old-epoch effect at B beyond B's own signed watermark" proves that B broke its word. A sink restored from a backup taken before a cut will have a lower floor and will produce a stale-commit proof against itself once it commits. Sinks therefore MUST persist the floor in storage that a restore cannot roll back, or refuse all requests in the scope after a restore until they have re-acknowledged the latest cut. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 12. Signed Verdict Record An Evaluator MAY publish its result as a Verdict Record. Its "typ" is "application/sace-verdict+cose". It is signed by the Evaluator's key and is a wire encoding for the closure receipt of [I-D.watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure]. +=====+================+=======+====================================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+================+=======+====================================+ | 1 | manifest | bstr | Digest of the manifest | | | | | evaluated. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ | 2 | cut | bstr | Digest of the cut | | | | | evaluated. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ | 3 | verdict | uint | 0 UNKNOWN, 1 CLOSED, 2 | | | | | VIOLATED. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ | 4 | members | array | [sink_id, status, | | | | | watermark / null] per | | | | | member, sorted by sink_id. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ | 5 | verdict_digest | bstr | As defined in Section 17, | | | | | over keys 1 to 4. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ | 6 | proofs | array | Present if and only if the | | | | | verdict is VIOLATED. One | | | | | violation proof per | | | | | VIOLATED member. | +-----+----------------+-------+------------------------------------+ Table 9: Verdict Record Payload A relying party that receives a Verdict Record MUST check, in order: 1. The signature, against an Evaluator key it trusts. How Evaluator keys become trusted is out of scope. 2. That verdict_digest equals the digest recomputed from keys 1 to 4. 3. That the verdict is VIOLATED if and only if some member has status 2, and that key 6 is present exactly when it is. 4. That a CLOSED verdict has every member at status 1. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 5. If it holds the manifest: that the manifest digest matches key 1, and that every proof in key 6 verifies under Section 11. These checks establish less than re-evaluation does, and the difference matters: * A VIOLATED record whose proofs verify is self-supporting. Anyone with the manifest can confirm the conviction without trusting the Evaluator. * A CLOSED or UNKNOWN record is a signed claim by the Evaluator. Step 4 stops a record from claiming CLOSED with a member that is not ACKED, but nothing in the record proves that a member is ACKED or that the non-vacuity witness exists. A relying party that needs that assurance re-runs Section 10 over the objects. * A record speaks only for the objects its Evaluator held. A later object can turn UNKNOWN into CLOSED, or anything into VIOLATED. A CLOSED record is superseded by any valid violation proof against a member. 13. Properties This section states what the mechanism guarantees, under which assumptions, and what it does not guarantee. The arguments are informal sketches, not machine-checked proofs. A sink is called honest if it follows Sections 5 to 9, its signing key is not known to any other party, and its durable record is not rolled back. 13.1. P1: An Honest Sink Is Never Convicted Claim: no set of objects signed by an honest sink contains a violation proof. Sketch. Stale commit: let the sink sign an SEA with applied_epoch a and watermark w. By I3, every effect committed after the fence has seq above w and was admitted against a floor of at least a (by I1), so its authority_epoch is at least a. Every effect with authority_epoch below a was therefore committed before the fence and has seq at most w. Equivocation: the sink stores the bytes of each SEA and returns them on repeat, so it signs one SEA per floor value. Forked chain: by I2 each seq value is assigned once, so one ER exists per seq. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 This property holds under any message ordering, partition, or clock offset, because none of them is an input to the sink's transaction or to the evaluation. 13.2. P2: Every Receipted Breach Is Detectable Claim: if a sink signs an SEA with applied_epoch a and watermark w, and also signs an ER with authority_epoch below a and seq above w, then every Evaluator that holds both objects and the manifest reports the member, and the verdict, as VIOLATED. Sketch. Both objects pass step 1 of Section 10 because they are validly signed by the listed key. Step 4 compares every SEA with every ER from the same member, so the pair is found regardless of which cut is being evaluated. The claim is conditional on the Evaluator holding both objects. A sink that never emits the ER is outside it; see Section 23. 13.3. P3: Evidence Is Monotone and VIOLATED Is Terminal Claim: for evidence sets X and Y with X a subset of Y, if the verdict over X is VIOLATED then the verdict over Y is VIOLATED, and if the verdict over Y is UNKNOWN then the verdict over X is not CLOSED. Sketch. A violation proof contained in X is contained in Y. A member that is ACKED over X has a satisfying SEA in X, which is also in Y, so it is ACKED or VIOLATED over Y; the non-vacuity witness in X is also in Y. Hence CLOSED over X implies CLOSED or VIOLATED over Y. 13.4. P4: The Verdict Is a Function of the Object Set Claim: the verdict, the member statuses, and the verdict digest depend only on the set of valid objects supplied, not on their order, their arrival time, or the Evaluator's clock. Sketch. Every step of Section 10 quantifies over sets. The member list is sorted before the digest is taken. Where more than one SEA satisfies the cut, the reported watermark is taken from the one with the lowest applied_epoch, which is unique for an unconvicted member. 13.5. P5: What CLOSED Implies, and Under Which Assumptions Claim: if the verdict over manifest M and a cut to epoch e is CLOSED, and (A1) every member of M is honest, and (A2) every system able to commit an effect under a grant in the scope is a member of M, then no effect under an authority epoch below e is committed anywhere after the last member's acknowledgement. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Sketch. By A1 and P1's argument, each member commits no such effect after its own fence. By A2 there is no other place where one could be committed. Neither assumption is established by SACE. A1 is supported, not proven, by attestation (Section 15) and by the accountability of P2. A2 is a statement about the deployment: the manifest is the authority root's signed assertion of it, and the rules of Section 6 make a compliant unlisted sink refuse, but a non-compliant unlisted system is invisible to every object defined here. 13.6. What Is Not Guaranteed * Liveness. No bound exists on the time to reach CLOSED. Under a partition that isolates one member, CLOSED is unreachable until the partition heals or a new manifest removes the member. This is a deliberate choice of safety over availability. * Prevention. A dishonest sink can commit a stale effect. SACE makes that provable if the effect is receipted. * Unreceipted effects. A sink that commits without signing a receipt leaves no proof. Detection then depends on parties that observe the effect requiring a receipt for it. * Reversal. Effects at or below a watermark stand. 14. Checkpoints and Retention Effect Receipts accumulate without bound. A Checkpoint lets a sink commit to its history up to a sequence number so that evidence stores can discard older receipts without losing the ability to detect a fork. Checkpoints are OPTIONAL. Its "typ" is "application/sace- checkpoint+cose". It is signed by the sink key. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +=====+============+======+====================================+ | Key | Name | Type | Rule | +=====+============+======+====================================+ | 1 | scope_id | bstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ | 2 | sink_id | tstr | As in the manifest. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ | 3 | seq | uint | The sequence number the checkpoint | | | | | covers up to and including. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ | 4 | chain_head | bstr | Digest of the ER with that seq. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ | 5 | floor | uint | The sink's floor when the | | | | | checkpoint was signed. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ | 6 | counts | map | For each authority epoch that | | | | | appears in receipts 1..seq, the | | | | | number of such receipts. | +-----+------------+------+------------------------------------+ Table 10: Checkpoint Payload An evidence store MAY discard the bytes of an ER from a sink once all of the following hold: 1. The store holds a valid Checkpoint from that sink with seq at or above the ER's seq, and has verified the receipt chain from seq 1, or from the previous retained Checkpoint, up to the Checkpoint's chain_head. 2. Every SEA held from that sink has been compared with every ER to be discarded, no comparison yields a stale-commit proof, and a valid verdict record (Section 12) covering that sink is retained. 3. The store retains the pair (seq, digest) for the ER. Condition 2 preserves stale-commit detection: an ER can convict a sink only against an SEA whose watermark is below its seq, and those comparisons have been made. Condition 3 preserves fork detection: a conflicting ER presented later for the same seq has a different digest. The "counts" map preserves the non-vacuity witness after the receipts that supplied it are gone: a non-zero count for an epoch below e in a Checkpoint with seq at or below the member's watermark is an acceptable witness. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 A Checkpoint makes a sequence commitment, so a Checkpoint that disagrees with a receipt, an SEA, or another Checkpoint about the digest at some seq is a forked-chain proof (type 3). After discarding, the retained (seq, digest) pairs keep this detectable: a conflicting ER presented later is checked against them. A Checkpoint is not an acknowledgement. It never makes a member ACKED, whatever floor it reports (Section 10.1). A sink MUST NOT discard its own receipts or acknowledgements on the strength of a Checkpoint. Checkpoints permit pruning by evidence stores, not by the party the evidence is about. 15. Attestation Binding An SEA says that a key signed a promise. Attestation says what software held that key. This section is OPTIONAL unless the manifest sets att_profile. When present, the "attestation" field of an SEA is an Entity Attestation Token [RFC9711] in CWT form, used as Evidence or as an Attestation Result in the sense of [RFC9334]. The following rules bind it to the acknowledgement: * The "eat_nonce" claim MUST equal SHA-256 of the concatenation of the cut digest and the sink's key thumbprint. This ties the evidence to this cut and this key, and prevents replay of earlier evidence. * The token MUST contain a "cnf" claim [RFC8747] holding the public key that signs the SEA. A verifier MUST check that it matches the manifest thumbprint. * The token's measurement claims MUST cover the code that implements floor storage, admission, and receipt signing. * The "eat_profile" claim MUST equal the manifest's att_profile. An Evaluator appraises the token under a policy for the profile that names the attester keys it accepts and the reference values for the measurement claims. The token passes only if it is signed by an accepted attester key, its "eat_nonce" and "cnf" claims match as above, and every measurement claim the profile defines equals a reference value. Any other outcome, including a missing token, an unknown profile, or a policy the Evaluator does not hold, leaves the member UNACKED. It never makes the member VIOLATED: a failed appraisal shows that the evidence is insufficient, not that the sink broke a promise. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 This document does not define a concrete profile. A profile document specifies the measurement claims, their encoding, and how attester keys are endorsed. The test vectors in Appendix C use a test-only profile, "urn:example:sace-sim-attester:1", with a software attester key and a single 32-byte measurement claim under the private-use claim key -75000. It demonstrates the binding rules above and has no security value. Where a sink is an agent runtime built on a layered device identity, in which a device secret is extended through each boot stage and the model weights and runtime configuration are measured before any key is released, a profile SHOULD require the model digest and the configuration digest among the measured components. An acknowledgement is then tied to one exact model and configuration, and stops verifying when either changes. The limit of this section is as follows. Attestation appraises the signer's software state at signing time. It does not show that the software is correct, that it enforces the floor, or that it stays in that state afterwards. A member with valid attestation that later produces a stale-commit proof is VIOLATED like any other. 16. Use with Attested Fence Receipts [I-D.watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt] defines an EAT profile in which a sink's Attesting Environment reports, among other claims, the sink-local sequence number at which the fence took effect and the highest sequence number of any effect committed under the previous epoch. Those two claims carry the same information as the SACE watermark. A deployment can combine the documents in either of two ways: * Nested: the manifest sets att_profile to the fence-receipt profile, and the "attestation" field of each SEA carries a fence receipt for the same cut. An Evaluator MUST then treat a member as UNACKED unless the fence receipt verifies under that document's procedure and its fence sequence claim is consistent with the SEA watermark. An inconsistency between the two, both produced by the same sink, is evidence against the sink and SHOULD be retained. * Side by side: fence receipts are evaluated under their own document and SEAs under this one. The two verdicts are reported separately. A relying party that requires both MUST NOT treat one as a substitute for the other. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 The division of labour is as follows. The fence receipt carries hardware-rooted evidence of the sink's enforcement state at one moment. SACE carries the signed membership list, the per-effect record after that moment, and the two-signature proof when the record contradicts the acknowledgement. The exact claim-by-claim mapping, including whether the fence sequence number equals the watermark or the watermark plus one, is left to a profile document, because it depends on the numbering convention of the fence-receipt profile. 17. Cross-Implementation Agreement A verdict that depends on which library computed it is not evidence. Two Evaluators written independently, in different programming languages, given the same input objects, MUST produce the same verdict digest. The verdict digest is SHA-256 over the deterministic CBOR encoding of: verdict-input = [ manifest_digest : bstr, cut_digest : bstr, verdict : 0 / 1 / 2, ; UNKNOWN / CLOSED / VIOLATED members : [ + [ sink_id : tstr, status : 0 / 1 / 2, ; UNACKED / ACKED / VIOLATED watermark : uint / null ] ] ; sorted by sink_id ] Conformance requirements: * An implementation MUST reject, not repair, any input that is not deterministically encoded. Lenient parsing is a common way for two implementations to come to disagree. * An implementation MUST derive every verification result itself. It MUST NOT accept a field in which the sender asserts that a signature or attestation was already checked. * A conformance corpus MUST include negative vectors for each rejection rule and for each of the three violation types, and each vector MUST state the expected verdict digest. The verdict digest identifies the outcome: who is convicted, who is acknowledged, at which watermark. It does not identify the evidence. Two evaluations that convict the same member on different proofs, or over different but equivalent sets of objects, produce the same Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 digest. This is intended, because Evaluators holding different copies of the same evidence should agree. Proofs are compared separately, by verifying them. Matching digests show that two Evaluators compute the same function. They show nothing about whether the sinks told the truth. Agreement is a precondition for trusting a verdict, not a reason to trust it. 18. Implementation Guidance for Database-Backed Sinks Most sinks are, or sit in front of, a transactional database. This section shows how the three invariants of Section 5 map onto ordinary database features. It is guidance; the normative requirements are in Sections 5 to 9. 18.1. Schema Three tables hold the SACE state. They live in the same database as the application data they protect, so that one transaction can cover both. CREATE TABLE sace_state ( scope_id BLOB PRIMARY KEY, sink_id TEXT NOT NULL, manifest BLOB NOT NULL, -- digest of the current manifest floor INTEGER NOT NULL, -- lowest admissible authority epoch seq INTEGER NOT NULL, -- last assigned sequence number head BLOB NOT NULL -- digest of the receipt with that seq ); CREATE TABLE sace_ack ( scope_id BLOB NOT NULL, applied_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL, cut BLOB NOT NULL, watermark INTEGER NOT NULL, raw BLOB NOT NULL, -- exact signed bytes PRIMARY KEY (scope_id, applied_epoch) ); CREATE TABLE sace_effect ( scope_id BLOB NOT NULL, seq INTEGER NOT NULL, authority_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL, effect BLOB NOT NULL, raw BLOB NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY (scope_id, seq) ); Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 The primary key on sace_effect enforces I2: a second receipt with the same seq cannot be stored. The primary key on sace_ack enforces one acknowledgement per floor value. 18.2. Committing an Effect Admission, the application write, the receipt, and the counter update are one transaction. The state row is read with a write lock so that no cut can be applied between the admission check and the commit. BEGIN; -- with a write lock on sace_state; see below SELECT floor, seq, head FROM sace_state WHERE scope_id = :scope FOR UPDATE; -- refuse here if :authority_epoch < floor (reason: floor) -- refuse here if :audience <> this sink (reason: audience) -- application write(s) for the effect INSERT INTO sace_effect (scope_id, seq, authority_epoch, effect, raw) VALUES (:scope, :seq_plus_1, :authority_epoch, :effect_digest, :er); UPDATE sace_state SET seq = :seq_plus_1, head = :er_digest WHERE scope_id = :scope; COMMIT; The receipt is signed inside the transaction, after seq and head are known and before COMMIT. If signing fails, the transaction is rolled back and no effect is committed. 18.3. Applying a Cut BEGIN; SELECT manifest, floor, seq, head FROM sace_state WHERE scope_id = :scope FOR UPDATE; -- if :epoch <= floor: -- read sace_ack for floor, COMMIT, return its raw UPDATE sace_state SET floor = :epoch WHERE scope_id = :scope; INSERT INTO sace_ack (scope_id, applied_epoch, cut, watermark, raw) VALUES (:scope, :epoch, :cut_digest, :seq, :sea); COMMIT; The watermark written into the SEA is the seq value read under the same lock. This is I3. 18.4. Isolation and Durability Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * The row lock on sace_state serializes effect commits and cut application for a scope. A database without row locks can use a single writer per scope, or serializable isolation with retry. Snapshot isolation without the lock is not sufficient: two transactions could each read the same seq, or an effect could be admitted against a floor that a concurrent cut has already raised. * The recipes above use "FOR UPDATE" as found in most relational databases. An embedded database with a single writer, such as SQLite, obtains the same effect by starting the transaction in its immediate (write-locking) mode. * The lock makes each scope a single-writer sequence. Throughput for one scope at one sink is therefore bounded by the commit rate of that row. Deployments needing more can partition a workload into several scopes, each with its own counter. * An acknowledgement MUST NOT leave the sink before its transaction is durable. With asynchronous commit, a crash could lose the floor raise after the SEA was sent, which produces a stale-commit proof against an otherwise correct sink. * Replicas: a read replica MUST NOT admit requests. In a failover, the new primary MUST have applied every transaction for which an SEA was released, or enter HALTED. Synchronous replication of the sace_ tables satisfies this. * Queues and deferred work: a request that is admitted now and executed later is checked against the floor at execution time, inside the commit transaction, not at enqueue time. 18.5. Rollback Resistance A restore from backup returns the floor to an earlier value. Three techniques, in increasing strength, keep a restored sink from admitting revoked authority: 1. Procedure: after any restore the sink starts in HALTED and obtains the latest Cut Statement before admitting. 2. External high-water mark: the sink records each floor in a second system that is not part of the backup set, and compares on start. 3. Hardware counter: the floor is bound to a monotonic counter in a secure element or trusted execution environment, as in [I-D.watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt]. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 19. Evidence Store and Analysis An Evaluator that follows many scopes and sinks needs to keep the objects it receives and to ask questions of them. This section describes an evidence store and the analysis queries that correspond to the rules of Section 10. A query result is a lead, not a verdict: every finding is confirmed by running the evaluation algorithm over the signed objects the query points to. 19.1. Store Rules * Append-only. Objects are never updated. Deletion happens only under Section 14. * Verify before indexing. An object is parsed strictly and its signature checked against the manifest-listed key before any of its fields are written to an index table. Fields from unverified objects are never queryable. * Keep the bytes. The index tables are derived data. The signed bytes are the evidence, addressed by their digest. * Record receipt time separately. The time an object arrived is useful for latency analysis and is never an input to a verdict. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 CREATE TABLE ev_object ( digest BLOB PRIMARY KEY, typ TEXT NOT NULL, scope_id BLOB NOT NULL, sink_id TEXT, raw BLOB NOT NULL, received_at INTEGER NOT NULL ); CREATE TABLE ev_ack ( digest BLOB PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES ev_object(digest), scope_id BLOB, manifest BLOB, sink_id TEXT, cut BLOB, applied_epoch INTEGER, prev_epoch INTEGER, watermark INTEGER, chain_head BLOB ); CREATE TABLE ev_effect ( digest BLOB PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES ev_object(digest), scope_id BLOB, sink_id TEXT, seq INTEGER, authority_epoch INTEGER, effect BLOB, prev BLOB ); CREATE TABLE manifest_member ( manifest BLOB, sink_id TEXT, thumbprint BLOB, class TEXT, PRIMARY KEY (manifest, sink_id) ); CREATE INDEX ev_effect_ix ON ev_effect (scope_id, sink_id, seq); CREATE INDEX ev_ack_ix ON ev_ack (scope_id, sink_id, applied_epoch); 19.2. Analysis Queries Stale commits: every pair of an acknowledgement and a later receipt under a revoked epoch. SELECT a.sink_id, a.digest AS sea, e.digest AS er FROM ev_ack a JOIN ev_effect e ON e.scope_id = a.scope_id AND e.sink_id = a.sink_id WHERE e.authority_epoch < a.applied_epoch AND e.seq > a.watermark; Equivocation and forked chains: two different objects where one is allowed. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 SELECT a.sink_id, a.digest, b.digest FROM ev_ack a JOIN ev_ack b ON a.scope_id = b.scope_id AND a.sink_id = b.sink_id AND a.cut = b.cut WHERE a.digest < b.digest; SELECT a.sink_id, a.digest, b.digest FROM ev_effect a JOIN ev_effect b ON a.scope_id = b.scope_id AND a.sink_id = b.sink_id AND a.seq = b.seq WHERE a.digest < b.digest; Members that have not acknowledged a cut to epoch e. The member list comes from the manifest. SELECT m.sink_id FROM manifest_member m WHERE m.manifest = :manifest AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM ev_ack a WHERE a.scope_id = :scope AND a.manifest = :manifest AND a.sink_id = m.sink_id AND a.applied_epoch >= :e); Withheld receipts: gaps in a sink's sequence, and receipts whose "prev" does not match the stored predecessor. SELECT sink_id, seq + 1 AS missing_from FROM ev_effect e WHERE scope_id = :scope AND seq < (SELECT MAX(seq) FROM ev_effect WHERE scope_id = e.scope_id AND sink_id = e.sink_id) AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM ev_effect n WHERE n.scope_id = e.scope_id AND n.sink_id = e.sink_id AND n.seq = e.seq + 1); SELECT e.sink_id, e.seq FROM ev_effect e JOIN ev_effect p ON p.scope_id = e.scope_id AND p.sink_id = e.sink_id AND p.seq = e.seq - 1 WHERE e.prev <> p.digest; A gap is not a violation proof. It shows that the store is missing a receipt, which may be the sink's doing or the transport's. A gap that persists after the sink has been asked for the missing sequence numbers is a reason to treat the sink's receipts as incomplete. 19.3. Operational Measures The following measures are derived from the store. They describe a deployment; none of them is an input to a verdict. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +=================+=========================+======================+ | Measure | Definition | Use | +=================+=========================+======================+ | Acknowledgement | Members with a | Progress of a | | coverage | satisfying SEA, divided | closure round. | | | by members in the | Below 1 the verdict | | | manifest. | cannot be CLOSED. | +-----------------+-------------------------+----------------------+ | Acknowledgement | For each member, | Sizing a closure | | latency | received_at of its SEA | budget. Uses store | | | minus received_at of | clocks only. | | | the cut. | | +-----------------+-------------------------+----------------------+ | Exposure window | For each member, the | How much revoked | | count | number of receipts | authority was | | | under an epoch below e | exercised between | | | with seq at or below | the AR's cut and the | | | its watermark and | sink's fence. These | | | received after the cut. | effects are | | | | permitted and stand. | +-----------------+-------------------------+----------------------+ | Receipt | Receipts held for a | Detecting withheld | | completeness | sink divided by its | receipts. | | | highest seen seq. | | +-----------------+-------------------------+----------------------+ | Refusal | Counts of refusals at | Separating | | breakdown | each sink by reason: | revocation effects | | | floor, audience, | from clock and | | | expired, not enrolled. | configuration | | | | effects. Reported | | | | by sinks; not signed | | | | evidence. | +-----------------+-------------------------+----------------------+ Table 11: Measures The exposure window count is the quantity that revocation latency actually costs. It can be read directly from signed objects, which is not true of a timeout-based estimate. 20. Operational Management Backup and restore: Back up the sace_ tables together with the application data, in one consistent snapshot. After a restore, the sink is HALTED (Section 5). It fetches the latest Cut Statement, applies it, and resumes. Effects committed between the backup and the failure are lost from the sink but their receipts may exist elsewhere; the Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 restored sink MUST continue its sequence from the highest seq for which any receipt was released, not from the backup's seq, or it will fork its own chain. If that value cannot be established, the sink key is retired and the sink re-enters under a new key and a new manifest. Sink key rotation: A new key is a new manifest entry. The AR issues manifest n+1 with the new thumbprint; the sink acknowledges the latest cut under the new key with the watermark it holds. Objects signed by the old key remain valid evidence about the period in which manifest n was current. AR key rotation: The new AR key is introduced by a manifest signed by the old key whose successor is signed by the new key. Relying parties that pin the prev_manifest chain follow the change. How relying parties first learn an AR key is out of scope. Removing a silent sink: A sink that will not acknowledge blocks CLOSED for its manifest indefinitely. The AR resolves this by issuing a manifest without it and a cut over the new manifest. The verdict record for the old manifest stays UNKNOWN and SHOULD be retained, so that the removal is visible as a change of scope and not as a closure. Monitoring: Operators watch acknowledgement coverage per open cut, sequence gaps per sink, and any non-empty result from the stale-commit, equivocation, and fork queries. The last three warrant immediate action; each is one evaluation run away from a transferable proof. Schema migration: Changes to the sace_ tables are made without rewriting the "raw" columns. The signed bytes are never re-encoded. 21. Implementation Status This section records the status of known implementations at the time of posting, per [RFC7942]. It is to be removed before publication as an RFC. Two implementations exist, both written by the author of this document. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 21.1. sace_ref (Python) Size: About 670 lines of implementation and 880 lines of tests. Coverage: Every object in this document as COSE_Sign1 with EdDSA, with strict deterministic decoding; the evaluation algorithm of Section 10 including sequence commitments, all forms of the three violation proofs, the Checkpoint witness, and the silent-sink rule; attestation appraisal under the test-only profile of Section 15; proof verification; signing and verification of Verdict Records; a sink on SQLite following Section 18, including Checkpoint signing; an evidence store with the queries of Section 19 and pruning under the conditions of Section 14. Not implemented: A real attestation profile or hardware attester; the attester is a software key. Sink-side rollback resistance beyond the HALTED-after-restore procedure. Tests: 92 tests pass. Beyond the cases listed in earlier revisions, they cover attestation (accepted, missing, wrong measurement, unknown attester, replayed from another cut, bound to another key, and an attested sink that is still convicted), Checkpoints (witness after receipts are gone, Checkpoint after the watermark not a witness, and conflicts with receipts, SEAs, and other Checkpoints), broken prev links, Verdict Records (round trip, wrong signer, altered statuses, fabricated proofs), pruning (success, incomplete chain, unreported stale commit, later fork against retained digests), the silent-sink rule, and 40 randomized runs in which the VIOLATED status of each member is compared with a ground-truth record of whether that member committed a stale effect. Concurrency and crashes: Five operating-system processes write to one sink database while the cut is applied; the test checks a dense, correctly linked chain and that no epoch-7 effect lies above the watermark. The test fails when the write lock of Section 18.2 is removed. A second test kills three writers with SIGKILL mid-run and checks that the chain is intact and the sink resumes. 21.2. sace-eval (Go) Size: About 520 lines, Go standard library only. Coverage: The Evaluator only: its own strict CBOR decoder (shortest- Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 form arguments, sorted unique map keys, no indefinite lengths), COSE_Sign1 verification, attestation appraisal, sequence commitments, the three violation types, the Checkpoint witness, and the verdict digest. It does not produce proofs, only verdicts. Agreement: It reproduces the verdict and verdict digest of all 13 vectors in Appendix C. Disabling each of eight checks in turn (stale commit, prev link, SEA chain head, Checkpoint chain head, equivocation, measurement comparison, non-vacuity, Checkpoint witness) changes the result of exactly the vector intended to exercise it. It rejects a manifest with a corrupted signature, and ignores an acknowledgement with a corrupted signature, a non- shortest length encoding, or a key that does not match the manifest. 21.3. Limits of This Evidence Both implementations have the same author and were written against the same text, so they share any misreading of it. Their agreement is evidence that the text is precise enough to implement twice, not the independent agreement that Section 17 asks for. All tests ran on one host. The partition is simulated by not delivering a cut, and the dishonest sink is the honest code with its admission check disabled. The conditions for an independent run in Appendix B are not yet met. 22. Evidence Analysis Each object supports a narrow statement. Reading more into an object than the table below allows is the most likely way to misuse this document. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +=============+===========+========================+================+ | Object | Signed by | Shows | Does not show | +=============+===========+========================+================+ | Scope | AR | Which sinks and | That the set | | Manifest | | keys the AR asserts | is in fact | | | | are the complete | complete. | | | | set for the scope. | | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | Cut | AR | That the AR ordered | That any sink | | Statement | | the floor raised to | received or | | | | e. | applied it. | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | SEA | Sink | That the holder of | That the sink | | | | the sink key states | enforces the | | | | its floor is a and | floor. | | | | its counter stood | | | | | at w. | | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | SEA with | Sink and | Additionally, the | That the | | attestation | its | measured software | software is | | | attester | that held the key | correct or | | | | at signing. | unchanged | | | | | since. | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | Effect | Sink | That the sink | That no other | | Receipt | | states it committed | effect was | | | | effect number seq | committed. | | | | under a given | | | | | epoch. | | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | Violation | Sink, | That the key holder | Whether the | | proof | twice | made two statements | cause was | | | | that cannot both be | malice, a bug, | | | | true of an honest | a rollback, or | | | | sink. | key theft. | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ | Verdict | Evaluator | The result of the | Anything about | | record | | algorithm over a | objects the | | | | stated set of | Evaluator did | | | | objects. | not hold. | +-------------+-----------+------------------------+----------------+ Table 12: What Each Object Shows Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 The following table places the acknowledgement defined here beside the nearest existing mechanisms, as this document reads them. It compares only the property at issue: evidence that a specific enforcement point stopped. The rows refer, in order, to [RFC7009], [CAEP], [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt], [I-D.watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt], and this document. +===============+=============+==================+=================+ |Mechanism |Statement | Says the | Later breach | | |signed or | enforcement | provable from | | |returned by | point applied | signatures | | | | the revocation | | +===============+=============+==================+=================+ |Revocation |Authorization| No; the request | No | |endpoint |server | was processed by | | |response | | the server. | | +---------------+-------------+------------------+-----------------+ |Session-revoked|Transmitter; | No; delivery | No | |event with |receiver | only. | | |delivery |acknowledges | | | |acknowledgement|delivery | | | +---------------+-------------+------------------+-----------------+ |Per-action |The recording| Not its purpose; | Not by itself; | |receipt |boundary | it records | it has no | | | | individual | acknowledgement | | | | actions. | to contradict. | +---------------+-------------+------------------+-----------------+ |Attested fence |Sink's | Yes, with | Within the | |receipt |Attesting | hardware-rooted | receipt itself, | | |Environment | state. | when its own | | | | | sequence claims | | | | | conflict. | +---------------+-------------+------------------+-----------------+ |SEA (this |Sink key | Yes, as a signed | Yes; an SEA and | |document) | | claim with a | a later ER form | | | | watermark. | the proof. | +---------------+-------------+------------------+-----------------+ Table 13: Comparison of Revocation Evidence 23. Security Considerations SACE gives accountability for what sinks sign. It does not give prevention, and it does not see what sinks decline to sign. Sink acknowledges, then commits stale effects and receipts them: A stale-commit proof results (Section 11). Detection is after the fact; irreversible effects stay done. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Sink acknowledges, then commits stale effects without receipts: SACE does not detect this directly. Downstream systems SHOULD refuse effects that arrive without a receipt, and receipts SHOULD be registered in a Transparency Service so that gaps in seq are visible. Sink never acknowledges: The verdict stays UNKNOWN. One silent sink blocks CLOSED; this is intended. Removing the sink requires a new manifest. Sink outside the manifest holds live authority: Grants name a listed audience and unlisted sinks refuse (Section 6). A sink that ignores both rules is outside SACE's reach, and CLOSED never covers it. Compromised sink key: An attacker can sign a false SEA. Recovery is by a new manifest. Attestation with key binding narrows the exposure to compromise of the measured environment. Compromised AR key: An attacker can issue cuts and manifests. Because cuts only raise floors, forged cuts cause denial of service rather than restored authority. Forged manifests can shrink the scope; relying parties SHOULD pin the prev_manifest chain. Replayed or reordered cuts: The floor is monotonic and repeats return stored bytes (Section 7). State rollback at a sink: Rollback produces a stale-commit proof against the sink. Rollback-resistant floor storage is required (Section 11). Clock skew: Clocks have no effect on verdicts. Grant expiry still depends on clocks; implementations MUST report expiry rejections separately from floor rejections. Colluding sink and Evaluator: The evidence is public and any other Evaluator can recompute the verdict. This holds only as far as the objects remain available. Closure is prospective. Effects with seq at or below w were committed under authority that was valid at the time. SACE identifies them; it does not reverse them. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 A CLOSED verdict means that every listed sink has signed that it stopped, and that no signed evidence contradicts any of them. It does not mean that the sinks stopped. 23.1. Privacy Considerations Effect Receipts carry digests, not effect contents. Sequence numbers and sink identifiers still reveal activity volume per sink. Deployments that publish receipts need to consider whether that volume is sensitive. 24. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to register six media types in the "Media Types" registry. The template below is for the first; the other five are identical except for the subtype name and the object named under "Applications that use this media type". Type name: application Subtype name: sace-manifest+cose Required parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR) Security considerations: Section 23 of this document Interoperability considerations: Payloads use deterministic CBOR encoding; see Section 3. Published specification: This document Applications that use this media type: Revocation closure evaluation; carries a Scope Manifest. Fragment identifier considerations: N/A Person to contact for further information: See the Author's Address section. Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: None Change controller: IETF Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +==================================+============================+ | Media type | Object | +==================================+============================+ | application/sace-manifest+cose | Scope Manifest | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/sace-cut+cose | Cut Statement | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/sace-ack+cose | Sink Epoch Acknowledgement | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/sace-effect+cose | Effect Receipt | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/sace-verdict+cose | Verdict record | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/sace-checkpoint+cose | Checkpoint | +----------------------------------+----------------------------+ Table 14: Media Types Payload map keys are scoped to each object type and need no registry. An EAT profile identifier for Section 15 would be registered by a document defining a concrete profile, not by this one. 25. References 25.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, June 2019, . [RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March 2020, . Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9596] Jones, M. and O. Steele, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) "typ" (type) Header Parameter", RFC 9596, DOI 10.17487/RFC9596, June 2024, . [RFC9679] Isobe, K., Tschofenig, H., and O. Steele, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint", RFC 9679, DOI 10.17487/RFC9679, December 2024, . [RFC9711] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025, . 25.2. Informative References [CAEP] Cappalli, T. and A. Tulshibagwale, "OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0", OpenID Foundation, August 2025, . [I-D.chen-oauth-agent-revocation] Chen, M. and L. Su, "OAuth 2.0 Agent Authorization Explicit Revocation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chen-oauth-agent-revocation-00, 27 April 2026, . [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt] Toraman, T., "A SCITT Profile for AI-Agent Action Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-noa- scitt-ai-agent-receipt-01, 15 August 2026, . [I-D.reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation] Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements", Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross- org-delegation-01, July 2026, . [I-D.sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation] Sweeney, K., "Credential Delegation Protocol for AI Agents in Multi-System Environments", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation-02, October 2026, . [I-D.watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure] Watts, D. O., "Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-02, October 2026, . [I-D.watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt] Watts, D. O., "Attested Fence Receipts: Hardware-Rooted Evidence of Authority-Epoch Enforcement at Consequential Sinks", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-watts- rats-attested-fence-receipt-00, 14 November 2026, . [LEASES] Gray, C. and D. Cheriton, "Leases: An Efficient Fault- Tolerant Mechanism for Distributed File Cache Consistency", Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), December 1989. [PEERREVIEW] Haeberlen, A., Kouznetsov, P., and P. Druschel, "PeerReview: Practical Accountability for Distributed Systems", Proceedings of the 21st ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), October 2007. [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, . [RFC9942] Steele, O., Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts", RFC 9942, DOI 10.17487/RFC9942, June 2026, . [RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026, . [SNAPSHOTS] Chandy, K. M. and L. Lamport, "Distributed Snapshots: Determining Global States of Distributed Systems", ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 1985. Appendix A. CDDL This appendix gives payload definitions for the five objects in the notation of [RFC8610]. Each payload is carried in a COSE_Sign1. digest = bstr .size 32 scope-id = bstr .size 16 epoch = uint sink-id = tstr manifest = { 1 => scope-id, 2 => uint, ; manifest_seq 3 => digest / null, ; prev_manifest 4 => [ + member ], ; sorted by sink-id ? 5 => tstr ; att_profile } member = [ sink-id, digest, tstr ] ; id, key thumbprint, class cut = { 1 => scope-id, 2 => digest, ; manifest 3 => epoch, ; new floor 4 => epoch, ; prev_epoch 5 => bstr .size 16, ; cut_nonce Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 6 => uint ; issued_at (informational) } ack = { 1 => scope-id, 2 => digest, ; manifest 3 => sink-id, 4 => digest, ; cut 5 => epoch, ; applied_epoch 6 => epoch, ; prev_epoch 7 => uint, ; watermark 8 => digest, ; chain_head 9 => uint, ; applied_at (informational) ? 10 => bstr ; attestation (EAT, CWT) } effect = { 1 => scope-id, 2 => sink-id, 3 => uint, ; seq 4 => epoch, ; authority_epoch 5 => digest, ; effect 6 => digest ; prev } verdict-record = { 1 => digest, ; manifest 2 => digest, ; cut 3 => 0 / 1 / 2, ; UNKNOWN / CLOSED / VIOLATED 4 => [ + [ sink-id, 0 / 1 / 2, uint / null ] ], 5 => digest, ; verdict digest ? 6 => [ + violation-proof ] } violation-proof = [ 1 / 2 / 3, bstr, bstr ] ; 1 stale commit: ack, effect ; 2 equivocation: ack, ack ; 3 forked chain: any two of ack, effect, checkpoint checkpoint = { 1 => scope-id, 2 => sink-id, 3 => uint, ; seq covered 4 => digest, ; chain_head at seq 5 => epoch, ; floor 6 => { * epoch => uint } ; receipt counts by authority epoch } Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Appendix B. Validation Plan This appendix describes the experiment that would test this specification, stating first the outcomes that would count against it. The two single-author implementations described in Section 21 exercise these arms in simulation; they do not meet the conditions for an independent run listed at the end of this appendix. Primary falsifier: An effect with authority epoch below e commits at a listed sink, with seq above that sink's signed watermark, and an Evaluator reports anything other than VIOLATED. One such run falsifies the evaluation algorithm. Design falsifier: An honest sink, following Sections 5 to 9 exactly, is reported VIOLATED under any ordering, partition, or clock offset. One such run means that the protocol convicts the innocent and the watermark rule is wrong. Usefulness falsifier: Under partition, an arrangement using only AR-side cut commitment reaches the same correct verdicts as SACE. In that case the acknowledgement adds nothing. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +=============+===========+===========+=======+====================+ | Arm | Link AR | Cut | Clock | Expected verdict | | | to sink B | ordering | at B | | +=============+===========+===========+=======+====================+ | Baseline | up | in order | true | CLOSED, no stale | | | | | | commits | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Partition | down | none | true | UNKNOWN | | | | delivered | | | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Repair with | up | 9 before | true | CLOSED at 9 and at | | reorder | | 8 | | 8 | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Replayed | up | 7 after 8 | true | CLOSED, floor | | old cut | | | | unchanged | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Skew only | up | in order | +5 | CLOSED; expiry | | | | | min | rejections counted | | | | | | separately | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Unlisted | up | in order | true | Refused by | | descendant | | | | audience rule; | | | | | | verdict unaffected | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Listed | late | in order | true | UNKNOWN until B | | descendant, | | | | acknowledges; then | | unseen by A | | | | CLOSED | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Dishonest | up | in order | true | VIOLATED with | | sink | | | | stale-commit proof | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Rolled-back | up | in order | true | VIOLATED, or | | sink | | | | refusal if | | | | | | rollback-resistant | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ | Vacuous | up | in order | true | UNKNOWN (non- | | scope | | | | vacuity fails) | +-------------+-----------+-----------+-------+--------------------+ Table 15: Experiment Arms The following conditions apply to any run reported as a test of this document: * The descendant in the "listed descendant" arm is pinned at B and signs for B's audience. Otherwise B rejects it for an unrelated reason and the epoch rule is never exercised. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * Outcome columns separate floor denial, missing acknowledgement, and clock expiry. * The two sinks are written by different implementers, not only in different languages, and run on separately administered hosts. A run that does not meet this is reported as cross-language on one host, not as independent. * Both Evaluators produce identical verdict digests on every arm. Appendix C. Test Vectors 13 vectors accompany this document as a JSON file. Each gives the AR public key, the sink public keys, the full bytes of the manifest, cut, acknowledgements, effect receipts, and Checkpoints in hexadecimal, the attester policy where one applies, and the expected result. Signing keys are derived from fixed test labels and are for testing only. Two sinks, sink-a and sink-b, are listed; each commits one epoch-7 effect before a cut to epoch 8, except where noted. manifest digest, no att_profile (all but two vectors) 6e57db47d44c041d513e6473e4328588dc92d04c2270de558f9be16538ae8497 cut digest over that manifest (epoch 8, prev_epoch 7) 40c8147351189afe761875dd5c8adca31e0a8d0c05eab7e20135a47085847c68 manifest digest with att_profile (attested-*, attestation-*) 3a04fd4cc0477f1508cf88d57daf5f253945c00251d0c16edefa72ad28dbde4f cut digest over that manifest ea22aeca5b7e133c6f66d865ccb591bfb39c1853494b1d64746da2e2380a32bf Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 47] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 +==============================+===============+==========+=======+ | Vector | Members | Verdict | Proof | | | (sink:status/ | | types | | | watermark) | | | +==============================+===============+==========+=======+ | baseline-closed | sink-a:1/1 | CLOSED | - | | | sink-b:1/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | partition-unknown | sink-a:1/1 | UNKNOWN | - | | | sink-b:0/- | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | stale-commit-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 1 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | vacuous-unknown | sink-a:1/0 | UNKNOWN | - | | | sink-b:1/0 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | attested-closed | sink-a:1/1 | CLOSED | - | | | sink-b:1/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | attestation-mismatch-unknown | sink-a:1/1 | UNKNOWN | - | | | sink-b:0/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | checkpoint-witness-closed | sink-a:1/1 | CLOSED | - | | | sink-b:1/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | equivocation-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 2 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | forked-chain-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 3 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | ack-head-fork-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 3 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | checkpoint-fork-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 3 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | broken-prev-link-violated | sink-a:1/1 | VIOLATED | 3 | | | sink-b:2/1 | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ | silent-sink-unknown | sink-a:1/1 | UNKNOWN | - | | | sink-b:0/- | | | +------------------------------+---------------+----------+-------+ Table 16: Expected Results Expected verdict digests: Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 48] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 baseline-closed ae4bb0ce0590efcb55fcf0effed92139f9b610bf0c99243e0cd35fbfa5b56199 partition-unknown f647d8963f1d868b7bdc037fea06a1cf7530b4f75487a2f04897f2d7a474f100 stale-commit-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 vacuous-unknown baee56483dc6332bb653481c90c0ffa1d2cfe005c3d75873621d5b2c2b72c723 attested-closed b3b28e877b38da9ec86a629ef1db9a90a6bbd3d532b9a43010a0b7e8408eb3ac attestation-mismatch-unknown 8fc77f708789b841d6923df3098b29d3adf6a538485a44aa40ce31c996dd7e07 checkpoint-witness-closed ae4bb0ce0590efcb55fcf0effed92139f9b610bf0c99243e0cd35fbfa5b56199 equivocation-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 forked-chain-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 ack-head-fork-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 checkpoint-fork-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 broken-prev-link-violated 09f64b653e191e8d6cff34f11ac5f022b64d1b366e033a97e19915db290cecf2 silent-sink-unknown f647d8963f1d868b7bdc037fea06a1cf7530b4f75487a2f04897f2d7a474f100 Several vectors are worth reading closely. In vacuous-unknown both members are ACKED and the verdict is UNKNOWN, because no epoch-7 effect exists. In attestation-mismatch-unknown, sink-b's acknowledgement carries a token with the wrong measurement: sink-b is UNACKED, not VIOLATED, and its watermark is still reported. In checkpoint-witness-closed no receipts are supplied and the Checkpoints alone provide the witness. In silent-sink-unknown, sink-a has acknowledged and committed five further effects and signed a Checkpoint, and sink-b has signed nothing; the verdict and its digest are identical to partition-unknown. All five VIOLATED vectors share one verdict digest because they convict the same member (Section 17). These results were produced by the Python implementation and reproduced by the Go implementation described in Section 21. Appendix D. Worked Example Two sinks, sink-a and sink-b, are listed in manifest 1 of a scope. Both have floor 7. Each has committed one effect under epoch 7, so each has seq = 1. Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 49] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Case 1, both acknowledge. The AR signs a cut to epoch 8. Each sink raises its floor to 8 and signs an SEA with applied_epoch = 8, prev_epoch = 7, watermark = 1. An Evaluator holding the manifest, the cut, both SEAs, and the two ERs finds both members ACKED and the non-vacuity witness present (an epoch-7 ER with seq 1 at or below watermark 1). The verdict is CLOSED. Case 2, partition. Only sink-a receives the cut. sink-b, still at floor 7, admits a further epoch-7 request and receipts it with seq = 2. The Evaluator finds sink-a ACKED and sink-b UNACKED. The verdict is UNKNOWN. The epoch-7 effect at sink-b is not a violation: sink-b has signed nothing that it contradicts. When the cut reaches sink-b, its SEA carries watermark = 2, and the verdict becomes CLOSED. The watermark records that the second effect fell on the permitted side of sink-b's own line. Case 3, breach. Both sinks acknowledge as in case 1, with watermark = 1. sink-b then commits an epoch-7 request and receipts it with seq = 2. The Evaluator finds an SEA from sink-b with applied_epoch 8 and watermark 1, and an ER from sink-b with authority_epoch 7 and seq 2. Since 7 is below 8 and 2 is above 1, sink-b is VIOLATED, and the verdict is VIOLATED. The proof is the array [1, SEA, ER]. The only difference between the permitted effect in case 2 and the breach in case 3 is the position of seq 2 relative to the watermark that sink-b itself signed. Appendix E. Changes This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC. E.1. Since -02 * Generalized the forked-chain rule to sequence commitments, so that broken prev links, false SEA chain heads, and conflicting Checkpoints are all type 3 proofs (Section 10, Section 11). * Stated the silent-sink rule normatively, with the list of evidence that cannot substitute for an acknowledgement (Section 10.1). * Added Checkpoints as a source of the non-vacuity witness, and stated that a Checkpoint is never an acknowledgement. * Specified attestation appraisal and its outcome: failure makes a member UNACKED, never VIOLATED (Section 15). * Added the Verdict Record section with its verification procedure and what that procedure does not establish (Section 12). Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 50] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 * Defined proof verification for a single pair of objects. * Noted that the verdict digest identifies the outcome, not the evidence. * Second implementation in Go; 13 vectors; concurrency and crash tests (Section 21, Appendix C). E.2. Since -01 * Added implementation guidance for database-backed sinks: schema, transaction recipes, isolation, durability, and rollback resistance (Section 18). * Added the evidence store, its analysis queries, and operational measures (Section 19). * Added operational management: backup and restore, key rotation, removal of a silent sink, monitoring (Section 20). * Added the optional Checkpoint object and retention rules (Section 14). * Added an implementation status section and test vectors (Section 21, Appendix C). E.3. Since -00 * Positioned the document against the attested fence receipt draft and added Section 16 on combined use. * Added the sink state machine and its three invariants (Section 5). * Added a properties section with five claims, their assumptions, and what is not guaranteed (Section 13). * Added an evidence analysis and a comparison with neighbouring mechanisms (Section 22). * Newly listed sinks now start in HALTED and acknowledge before admitting. * Added a full media type registration template and a worked example (Appendix D). Author's Address Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 51] Internet-Draft Sink-Attested Closure Evidence November 2026 Deonté O'dell Watts GoodShyt Group Inc. San Francisco, CA United States of America Email: deonte@goodshyt.fun URI: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8586-3650 Watts Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 52]