Internet-Draft Scientific Data Admissibility Records November 2026
Watts Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Independent Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-watts-scientific-data-admissibility-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
D. Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.

Scientific Data Admissibility Records: A Fail-Closed Layered Model for Research Artifacts

Abstract

Automated research pipelines routinely move scientific data and derived claims from ingestion to publication without a machine-checkable record of what has actually been verified. This document defines a Scientific Data Admissibility Record (SDAR): a small, serializable structure that keeps schema conformance, provenance, numerical verification, empirical evidence, and interpretation as separate layers, each with an explicit status. It specifies a fail-closed aggregation rule so that an unverified or not-yet-run layer can never be silently promoted into an accepted result. The document also defines an XML serialization and processing rules, and is intended as a starting point for discussion rather than a proposed standard.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

This is an individual, personal submission. It has no IETF working group and represents the view of its author only.

Discussion of this document is welcome via the author's contact address given in the Authors' Addresses section.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Scientific datasets, statistical artifacts, and AI-assisted analyses are now commonly produced by automated pipelines. These pipelines usually report a single outcome, such as "passed", for a result that in fact depends on several distinct kinds of checking: whether the data conforms to its declared schema, where it came from, whether the reported numbers can be recomputed, whether independent evidence supports them, and whether the stated interpretation follows from them.

When these kinds of checking are collapsed into one flag, a pipeline can quietly promote a claim: a result that was only schema-valid becomes "verified", or a number that was never recomputed is reported as confirmed. A reader of the final artifact cannot tell which checks were performed, in which environment, or whether a check was run at all.

This document defines the Scientific Data Admissibility Record (SDAR) to make that distinction explicit and machine-readable. The design goals are:

This document does not define how any check is performed, does not assert that any particular scientific claim is true, and does not define a trust framework for the parties that produce records.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Subject:
The artifact a record is about, such as a dataset, a statistical result file, or a derived claim.
Layer:
One independent kind of checking applied to a subject. This document defines five.
Producing environment:
The system, code revision, and configuration in which a layer result was actually computed.
Admissible:
The aggregate state of a record in which every required layer has the status "pass". Admissibility is a statement about the completeness of checking, not about the truth of the subject.

3. Model

3.1. Layers

An SDAR contains one result for each of the following layers.

Table 1: Defined Layers
Layer Question answered
schema Does the subject conform to its declared schema?
provenance Can the subject's origin and transformations be traced, with inputs bound by digest?
numeric Can the reported numerical values be recomputed from the bound inputs?
empirical Is there independent evidence supporting the values, such as an independent reproduction?
interpretation Does the stated interpretation follow from the verified values, as judged by an identified reviewer?

A layer result MUST NOT be derived from the result of a different layer. In particular, a "pass" for schema or numeric MUST NOT cause the empirical or interpretation layers to be recorded as "pass".

3.2. Status Values

Each layer has exactly one status:

pass:
The check was run in an identified producing environment and succeeded.
fail:
The check was run and did not succeed.
not-run:
The check has not been run. This is the initial status of every layer.
pending:
The check has been scheduled or requested but no result is available, for example while awaiting independent reproduction.

A producer MUST NOT record "pass" for a layer unless it can supply the evidence fields required in Section 3.4. The statuses "not-run" and "pending" are first-class values and MUST NOT be presented to consumers as equivalent to "pass".

3.3. Fail-Closed Aggregation

The aggregate state of a record is computed from its required layers as follows:

  1. If any required layer has status "fail", the aggregate state is "rejected".
  2. Otherwise, if every required layer has status "pass", the aggregate state is "admissible".
  3. Otherwise, the aggregate state is "incomplete".

A processor that cannot parse a record, cannot resolve a required digest, or encounters an unknown status value MUST treat the aggregate state as "incomplete" and MUST NOT treat it as "admissible". Which layers are required is a matter of local policy; however, a policy that omits the interpretation layer MUST NOT label the aggregate state in a way that implies interpretive review occurred.

3.4. Evidence Fields for a Passing Layer

A layer with status "pass" MUST carry:

  • an identifier for the producing environment, including a code or tool revision;
  • the time at which the result was produced;
  • the digest of each input the result was computed over; and
  • for the interpretation layer, an identifier for the reviewer.

A layer with status "pass" in the empirical layer SHOULD identify the party that performed the independent reproduction and SHOULD state whether that party is independent of the producer of the subject.

3.5. Digest Binding

Digests identify the exact bytes a result was computed over. A digest MUST be expressed as an algorithm name and a value; whitespace inside a serialized digest value is not significant and MUST be ignored by processors. Producers SHOULD use a SHA-2 family algorithm [RFC6234]. Where the subject is structured data, producers SHOULD digest a canonical serialization so that equivalent content yields the same digest; for JSON, [RFC8785] is one such canonicalization.

If any digest in a record does not match the corresponding artifact at verification time, every layer bound to that digest MUST be treated as "not-run" by the verifier.

4. XML Serialization

This section defines an XML serialization of an SDAR. The namespace shown is a placeholder and is not registered; see Section 6.

4.1. Structure

The root element is "sdar". It contains one "subject" element, one "layers" element containing exactly five "layer" elements (one per layer name), and one OPTIONAL "aggregate" element. A "layer" element has a "name" attribute and a "status" attribute, and MAY contain "environment", "produced", "input", and "reviewer" child elements. An "aggregate" element, when present, is informational; consumers MUST recompute the aggregate state from the layers using Section 3.3 and MUST NOT trust a supplied value.

4.2. Example

The following record describes a dataset whose schema and provenance checks have passed, whose numeric check has failed, and whose remaining checks have not been run. All identifiers, digests, and the namespace are illustrative.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<sdar xmlns="https://example.org/ns/sdar" version="0">
  <subject id="dataset-0001" kind="dataset">
    <digest alg="sha-256">
      00000000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000
    </digest>
    <title>Example measurement series</title>
  </subject>
  <layers>
    <layer name="schema" status="pass">
      <environment>validator rev a1b2c3d</environment>
      <produced>2026-11-16T12:00:00Z</produced>
      <input alg="sha-256" ref="dataset-0001">
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
      </input>
    </layer>
    <layer name="provenance" status="pass">
      <environment>lineage tool rev 4d5e6f7</environment>
      <produced>2026-11-16T12:05:00Z</produced>
      <input alg="sha-256" ref="dataset-0001">
        00000000000000000000000000000000
        00000000000000000000000000000000
      </input>
    </layer>
    <layer name="numeric" status="fail"/>
    <layer name="empirical" status="not-run"/>
    <layer name="interpretation" status="not-run"/>
  </layers>
  <aggregate state="rejected"/>
</sdar>

In this example, a processor following Section 3.3 computes the aggregate state "rejected" because the numeric layer has status "fail". Had the numeric layer been "not-run", the aggregate state would have been "incomplete".

5. Processing Rules

  1. A consumer MUST verify all digests against the artifacts they name before using any layer result bound to them.
  2. A consumer MUST recompute the aggregate state and MUST ignore any supplied aggregate value for decision purposes.
  3. A consumer MUST reject a record that contains more than one layer with the same name, or that lacks any of the five layer names, by treating the aggregate state as "incomplete".
  4. A producer that later changes a layer result MUST issue a new record rather than altering the existing record in place, so that earlier states remain auditable.

6. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions. The namespace used in the examples is a placeholder, and no registration is requested.

7. Security Considerations

An SDAR is only as trustworthy as the party that produced it. This document does not define signing, authentication of producers, or a trust framework; a record that is unsigned can be forged or altered. Deployments that rely on records for decisions SHOULD protect them with an integrity mechanism appropriate to their environment and SHOULD record which party signed each layer result.

Digest binding detects substitution of artifacts only if the digest was obtained over an authenticated channel. A producer who controls both a record and the artifact it names can make them consistent while both are wrong.

The "admissible" aggregate state describes completeness of checking only. Consumers MUST NOT read it as a statement that the subject is correct or that the interpretation is true. Presenting "admissible" in a user interface without the underlying layer statuses invites exactly the silent promotion this document aims to prevent.

Records can contain environment identifiers, reviewer identifiers, and timestamps that may be sensitive. Implementations SHOULD consider whether these fields should be disclosed beyond the parties that need them.

General guidance on writing security considerations is given in [RFC3552].

8. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9. Informative References

[RFC3552]
Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC6234]
Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

Acknowledgements

The layered separation described here follows the author's ongoing work on evidence-to-consequence governance for research and AI-assisted claims.

Author's Address

Deonté O'dell Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.
San Francisco, CA
United States of America