Internet-Draft Pre-Silicon Evidence Profile November 2026
Watts Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-watts-rats-presilicon-evidence-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
D. Watts
ai-id-engine project

An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Profile for Signed Pre-Silicon Hardware Security Evidence

Abstract

Hardware security designs are increasingly assessed before fabrication: by gate-level leakage simulation, fault-injection simulation, formal proofs and equivalence checking. The results of these assessments are routinely copied into reports, slide decks and certification packages with no binding to the design that was assessed, the stimulus that was used, the conditions under which the numbers hold, or the platform that produced them. This document defines an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) profile for carrying such pre-silicon assessment results as signed Evidence. Every claim is classified as identifying the assessed artifact, describing a measured behavior, or describing the measurement conditions. A provenance claim, which states whether the signing key is rooted in hardware or software, is mandatory, and a simulated Trusted Platform Module is always reported as a software root. The profile is explicitly not a certification format: it records what was measured and under which envelope, so that a Relying Party can decide what the numbers are evidence of.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

A reference implementation (schema "aiid-evidence/v1", JSON encoding, TPM 2.0 or software-key signing) is in the ai-id-engine repository, files hwid/src/evidence.rs and docs/EVIDENCE.md. This draft describes that implementation and proposes how it maps onto EAT. It is experimental.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The RATS architecture [RFC9334] describes how an Attester produces Evidence about itself, how a Verifier appraises that Evidence, and how a Relying Party consumes the resulting Attestation Results. The Entity Attestation Token [RFC9711] provides a claims-based encoding for Evidence and allows profiles that constrain and extend it for a particular use.

This document addresses a use that existing profiles do not cover: Evidence about a hardware design, produced before that design exists as silicon. Typical sources are:

Such results are only meaningful relative to the exact netlist, cell library, power model, stimulus set and statistical parameters that produced them. A first-order |t| value of 3.15 says nothing on its own. Together with "4000 traces per group, 4000 samples, alpha 0.05, Bonferroni threshold 4.37, sky130 typical corner, zero-delay cell models, noiseless", it becomes a reproducible statement with a known minimum detectable effect. This profile binds the numbers to those conditions under a signature, and records the trust root of that signature honestly.

This profile does not define how to perform any of these assessments, and it does not turn their results into a certification. A report that conforms to this profile can be evidence for a certification process; it is never itself a certificate.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terms

Assessed artifact:
The design under assessment: RTL source, synthesized netlist, derived power model, cell models and cell library.
Assessment host:
The machine that ran the assessment and signs the report. In RATS terms it is the Attester. Its Target Environment is the assessment run, not the assessed artifact.
Measurement envelope:
The set of modelling assumptions under which the behavior claims hold, together with an explicit list of effects that were not modelled.
Provenance root:
"hardware" if the report signature is produced by a key held in a physical TPM; "software" otherwise.

2. Evidence Model

A report is a body of named fields plus an attestation over the body. Each field carries exactly one class:

identity
The field identifies what was assessed or who signed: artifact digests, the assessment host's identifier, and provenance.
behavior
The field is a measured outcome: leakage statistics, a gate verdict, area, latency, fault-detection counts, proof status.
neither
The field describes the conditions of the measurement: statistical parameters, the stimulus set, the measurement envelope, tool versions.

The classification is part of the signed body. A Verifier MUST reject a report in which:

The classes let a Relying Party apply policy mechanically. For example, it can accept behavior claims only when the identity claims match a netlist digest it has independently obtained, and only when the neither claims show a trace count at or above its own minimum.

2.1. Required Fields

Table 1: Fields every conforming report carries
Name Class Content
provenance identity Signing root; see Section 3.
hwid identity Salted identifier of the assessment host.
model_digest identity Map from artifact path to SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] digest. It covers the RTL, netlists, power-model netlists and capacitance files, cell models and the cell library.
stimulus_set neither Digests of the stimulus generator, harness and configuration, plus seeds, modes and trace counts per group.
tvla_parameters neither Profile name, assessed design, traces per group, samples per trace (M), alpha, the first- and second-order critical values, and the number of second-order tests.
measurement_envelope neither See Section 2.3.
tvla_result behavior Null-control and positive-control peaks, first- and second-order peaks, minimum detectable effect, verdict and gate exit code.

Additional fields MAY be present (for example area, latency, fault-injection counts or equivalence status). Each additional field MUST carry a class.

2.2. Controls Are Part of the Result

A leakage statistic without controls cannot be interpreted. The null control (random versus random inputs on the assessed design) bounds the false-positive behavior of the harness. The positive control (fixed versus random on an unprotected reference) shows that the harness can see a leak. A conforming tvla_result MUST include both control results. A Verifier MUST NOT treat a report as evidence of absence of leakage if the null control exceeded its threshold or the positive control did not.

2.3. Measurement Envelope

The measurement_envelope states what the behavior claims are evidence of. It MUST contain:

  • a kind string that says whether the traces were simulated or measured; for simulated traces it MUST contain the words "not silicon";
  • the cell library and process corner;
  • the power model and the wire-load model;
  • the measurement chain parameters (for example low-pass time constant and additive noise);
  • samples per trace;
  • a list of effects not modelled (for example glitches, coupling, IR drop, electromagnetic emanation, process variation, parasitics after placement and routing);
  • tool names and versions.

The list of effects not modelled is REQUIRED because it is the part of a pre-silicon report most often lost when results are quoted elsewhere.

3. Provenance

The provenance field records the root of the key that signs the report. Its value contains:

The following rules apply:

4. Signing and Binding

The body is serialized canonically: compact JSON [RFC8259] with fields in the order written. The report nonce is:

  nonce = SHA-256( "AIID-EVIDENCE-V1" || canonical(body) )

The nonce is used as the freshness value of the platform attestation.

The report is the triple (body, body hash, attestation). A Verifier MUST:

  1. validate the body against Section 2;
  2. recompute the canonical body hash and compare it;
  3. verify the attestation over the recomputed nonce;
  4. check provenance agreement as described in Section 3.

5. Mapping to EAT

This section describes how the model maps onto an EAT [RFC9711] profile, so that reports can travel in RATS conceptual messages.

6. Appraisal Guidance

A Verifier producing Attestation Results from such Evidence SHOULD:

A Relying Party SHOULD compare model_digest against artifacts it obtained independently, for example from a reproducible build whose digests are themselves published.

7. Example

The following abbreviated body comes from the reference implementation. It describes a 2-share masked Montgomery multiplier at 4000 traces per group, which fails second-order TVLA as expected. Digests are truncated.

{"schema":"aiid-evidence/v1","created":"2026-11-16T16:10:00Z",
 "fields":[
  {"name":"provenance","class":"identity","value":{
     "attestation_kind":"software-fallback",
     "source":"none: no TPM, software-fallback key file",
     "tpm_manufacturer":"","simulated_tpm":false,"root":"software"}},
  {"name":"hwid","class":"identity","value":"9f2c...e1"},
  {"name":"model_digest","class":"identity","value":{
     "build/sky130_masked_v2.v":"4b1e...07",
     "build/tvla_masked_v2.caps":"c3a9...5d"}},
  {"name":"stimulus_set","class":"neither","value":{
     "files":{"config/tvla.toml":"77d0...2a"},
     "description":{"fixed_vs_random":{"seed":17,
                    "traces_per_group":4000}}}},
  {"name":"tvla_parameters","class":"neither","value":{
     "profile":"ci","traces_per_group":4000,"samples":4000,
     "alpha":0.05,"crit_first_order":4.37,"crit_second_order":4.46}},
  {"name":"measurement_envelope","class":"neither","value":{
     "kind":"simulated gate-level power traces; not silicon",
     "library":"sky130_fd_sc_hd__tt_025C_1v80",
     "not_modelled":["glitches","coupling and IR drop","EM"]}},
  {"name":"tvla_result","class":"behavior","value":{
     "null_control":{"peak":3.24,"crit":4.37,"passed":true},
     "positive_control_plain":{"peak":82.96,"detected":true},
     "first_order_peak":3.15,"second_order_peak":26.50,
     "mde_sigma":0.0977,"exit":2,
     "verdict":"second-order leak in 2-share design"}}]}

8. Security Considerations

This profile improves the binding and honesty of pre-silicon results. It does not make them stronger than the assessment that produced them.

Simulation is not silicon.
Zero-delay gate-level simulation does not model glitches, coupling, IR drop or electromagnetic emanation, and second-order statistics may be validated only synthetically. A Relying Party MUST NOT treat a conforming report as a side-channel certification.
Trace count bounds what a pass means.
A pass at N traces per group shows only that no leak larger than the stated minimum detectable effect was found at N.
Provenance is host-reported.
The platform information comes from the host's TPM software stack. It is covered by the Attestation Key signature, but a compromised host can misreport the TPM vendor unless the Verifier also validates the Endorsement Key certificate chain, which the reference implementation does not yet do.
A software root is a file key.
It proves possession of a key file, not the integrity of the host. Reports from continuous-integration systems will typically have a software root.
Digests bind; they do not judge.
model_digest ties the results to particular files, but the Relying Party must still establish that those files are the design it cares about.
Replay.
The nonce is derived from the body, so the same body always yields the same nonce. Verifiers that need freshness SHOULD also check the attestation timestamp or request a report bound to their own challenge.

9. Privacy Considerations

The hwid field is a salted identifier of the assessment host. Different salts yield unlinkable identifiers. Implementations SHOULD use a per-deployment salt and MUST NOT include raw hardware identifiers. Artifact paths in model_digest can reveal project structure, so publishers MAY replace them with opaque labels if the digests remain stable.

10. IANA Considerations

10.1. EAT Profile Identifier

This document uses the profile identifier "tag:ai-id-engine,2026:presilicon-evidence/v1". No IANA action is requested for the identifier itself.

10.2. Claims

If this document progresses, it would request registration of a "presilicon-evidence" claim in the CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims and JSON Web Token Claims registries, with the semantics of Section 5. Until then, implementations use a private claim key.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[FIPS180-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[RFC9711]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9711>.

11.2. Informative References

[TPM2]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library Specification, Family "2.0"", , <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/>.
[TVLA]
Goodwill, G., Jun, B., Jaffe, J., and P. Rohatgi, "A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation", NIST Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop, .

Implementation Status

[RFC Editor: remove before publication.]

The ai-id-engine project implements this profile in JSON form:

The EAT and COSE encoding of Section 5 is not yet implemented.

Author's Address

Deonte Watts
ai-id-engine project