Internet-Draft Proof-of-Record November 2026
Watts Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Individual Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-watts-proof-of-record-system-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
D. O. Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.

Proof-of-Record Packages for Source-Grounded Agentic and Scientific Archives

Abstract

This document specifies a proof-of-record package for source-grounded agentic outputs and scientific archives. The package proves structural validation, conformance evaluation, byte integrity, sequence integrity, governance authorization, and provenance recoverability. It does not prove scientific truth.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Document Status and Scope

This experimental individual Internet-Draft describes a proposed proof-of-record package for review. It is not an RFC, and posting does not establish IETF approval or scientific validity.

2. Boundary

A proof-of-record system proves what was submitted, validated, attested, signed, stored, retrieved, and governed. It does not prove that a scientific claim is true.

3. Proof Layers

A complete proof pack contains schema, conformance, integrity, sequence, governance, and provenance proof components.

4. Authority Classes

Results are tagged as structural, integrity, diagnostic, admissibility, governance, or provenance. Diagnostic and integrity classes do not imply admissibility.

5. Security Considerations

Signatures provide tamper evidence for canonical event cores under a key. They do not prove the truth or scientific admissibility of claims.

6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no IANA requests. It neither establishes an IANA registry nor allocates protocol parameter values.

7. Normative References

Appendix A. Changes since -00

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Editorial and tooling-conformance changes only; no technical content was changed.

Author's Address

Deonté O'dell Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.
San Francisco, CA
United States of America