<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="yes"?>
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc linkmailto="no" ?>
<?rfc rfcedstyle="yes"?>
<?rfc-ext allow-markup-in-artwork="yes" ?>
<?rfc-ext include-references-in-index="yes" ?>

<!DOCTYPE rfc []>

<!-- Notes for Paul and Tony

Have a section that is just examples of what is new in v3 (such as new table features)
	Want to add examples of <blockquote>
		Example of a cite for a reference that is already in the spec.
	In the v3-only examples, use "ascii" attributes liberally

-->

<rfc
  xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
  category="std"
  docName="draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2-05"
  ipr="trust200902"
  obsoletes=""
  updates=""
  submissionType="IETF"
  xml:lang="en"
  version="2">
<!-- [REPLACE] 
       * docName with name of your draft
     [CHECK] 
       * category should be one of std, bcp, info, exp, historic
       * ipr should be one of trust200902, noModificationTrust200902, noDerivativesTrust200902, pre5378Trust200902
       * updates can be an RFC number as NNNN
       * obsoletes can be an RFC number as NNNN 
       * obsoletes can be an RFC number as NNNN 
-->

<front>
<title abbrev="KEM-based Authentication for IKEv2"> KEM-based Authentication for IKEv2 with Post-quantum Security </title>
<!--  [REPLACE/DELETE] abbrev. The abbreviated title is required if the full title is longer than 39 characters -->

<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2-05"/>
   
    <author fullname="Guilin Wang" initials="G." role="editor" surname="Wang">
      <!-- [CHECK]
             * initials should not include an initial for the surname
             * role="editor" is optional -->
    <!-- Can have more than one author -->
      
    <!-- all of the following elements are optional -->
      <organization>Huawei Int. Pte Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
          <street>9 North Buona Vista Drive, #13-01</street>
		  <street> The Metropolis Tower 1</street>
          <city>Singapore</city>
          <code>138588</code>
          <country>Singapore</country>
          <!-- Uses two letter country code -->
        </postal>        
        <email>Wang.Guilin@huawei.com</email>  
      </address>
    </author>

    <author initials='V.' surname="Smyslov" role="editor" fullname='Valery Smyslov'>
      <organization>ELVIS-PLUS</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>PO Box 81</street>
            <city>Moscow (Zelenograd)</city>
            <code>124460</code>
            <country>RU</country>
          </postal>
        <email>svan@elvis.ru</email>
      </address>
    </author>
	
<date/>
<!-- On draft subbmission:
         * If only the current year is specified, the current day and month will be used.
         * If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, the current day will
           be used
         * If the year is not the current one, it is necessary to specify at least a month and day="1" will be used.
    -->
	
<area>General</area>
    <workgroup> IP Security Maintenance and Extensions </workgroup>
	<!-- "Internet Engineering Task Force" is fine for individual submissions.  If this element is 
          not present, the default is "Network Working Group", which is used by the RFC Editor as 
          a nod to the history of the RFC Series. -->

    <keyword>keyword</keyword>
    <!-- [REPLACE/DELETE]. Multiple allowed.  Keywords are incorporated into HTML output files for 
         use by search engines. -->

    <abstract>
      <!-- RFC 9370 specifies a framework that supports mulitple key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) by allowing up to 7 layers of additiona KEMs employed with the oringal ECDH to derive the final shared secret keys for IPsec protocols. The primitive goal is to mitigate the security threat against quantum computers by hybriding additional post-quantum (PQ) KEMs with the orinigal ECDH key exchange. This draft specifies how one QP KEMs, FrodoKEM, is instantiated in the IKEv2 as the additional KEMs with the main ECDH to achieve hybrid key agreement.-->
	  
	 <t> This draft specifies a new authentication mechanism, called KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) -based authentication, 
     for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2). This is motivated by the fact that some post-quantum KEMs (like  ML-KEM)
     are more efficient than post-quantum signature algorithms (like ML-DSA).
     </t>
    </abstract>

<!-- <note title="Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)">
<t> Discussion of this draft takes place on the rfc-interest mailing list (rfc-interest@rfc-editor.org), which has its home page at
<eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-interest"/>. </t>
</note> -->

</front>

<middle>

<!-- <section title="Revision history"> 

<\section> -->

<section title="Introduction">

<section title="Notes of Change">
<t> Version 05: <xref target="Security" /> was fully updated, with togther a number of editorial changes. </t>
<t> Version 04: Leave only one exchange sequence.</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">     
        <li> Making the alternative sequence 2 as the main and the only sequence of exchanges to achieve the minimum number of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges and
aligns PQuAKE <xref target="I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake"> </xref>. </li>
        <li> Removed alternative sequences to Appendix?  </li>
        </ul>
<t> Version 03:  Add identity protection against active attackers.</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">     
        <li> Initiator’s identity protection against active attacker is added. </li>
        <li> New payload Encrypted Certificate (ECERT). </li>
        <li> New Certificate Encoding X.509 bundle.  </li>
        <li> New notifications: AUTHKEM_CT, AUTHKEM_SSCONF, AUTHKEM_DATA. </li>
        <li> Notification AUTHKEM_DATA in version 02 is deleted. </li>
        </ul>       
<t> Version 02:  Completely rewritten to accommodate ideas expressed in PQuAKE protocol.</t>
<t> Version 01: Two changes have been made, as a response to comments received at 122 meeting. </t>
<ul spacing="normal">     
        <li> More details about how each side run KEM-based authentication in <xref target="Exchanges"></xref>. </li>
        <li> Added section about KEM authentication with preshared public key. </li>
        </ul>
</section>

<section title="Introduction">

    <t> Cryptographically-relevant quantum computers (CRQC) pose a threat to cryptographically protected data. In particular, 
    the so-called harvest-now-and-decrypt-later (HNDL) attack is considered an imminent threat. To mitigate this threat against 
    the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) <xref target="RFC7296"> </xref>, an extension allowing multiple key exchanges in 
    IKEv2 <xref target="RFC9370"></xref> was introduced to achieve post-quantum (PQ) security for the key exchange. 
    <!-- To offering post-quantum security for the authentication in the IKEv2, "Announcing Supported Authentication Methods 
    in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)" <xref target="RFC9593"></xref> specifies a new Notify type, 
    called the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS, which allows two peers to indicate the list of supported authentication methods 
    while establishing IKEv2 SA. One purpose of <xref target="RFC9593"></xref> is to support post-quantum signature algorithms 
    for authenticaion in the IKEv2, as further described by the following drafts.--></t>  

    <t> "Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC" <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth"></xref> specifies 
    how NIST PQ digital algorithms ML-DSA <xref target="FIPS204"></xref> and SLH-DSA <xref target="FIPS205"></xref> can be used in IKEv2. 
    <!-- by indicating the supported signature algorithms via exchanging the Notify SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS, defined in <xref target="RFC7427"></xref>. --> 
    <!-- Similarly, "IKEv2 Support of ML-DSA" <xref target="I-D.sfluhrer-ipsecme-ikev2-mldsa"></xref> specifies how ML-DSA can be run in the IKEv2, by indicating 
    the supported signature algorithms via exchanging the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS Notify, defined in <xref target="RFC9593"></xref>.  --> On the other hand, 
    "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid PKI Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)" 
    <xref target="I-D.hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth"> </xref> specifies how to run general hybrid PQ/T digital algorithms in IKEv2<!-- via introducing 
    some extensions in the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS Notify -->. </t>

    <!-- <t> For all of those Internet standard drafts, it is the same that the corresponding public key certificates and signatures for the involved 
    signature algorithms are exchanged via the IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchange, defined in <xref target="RFC9242"></xref>. </t> -->

    <t> Motivated by the fact that ML-KEM <xref target="FIPS203"></xref> is much more efficient than ML-DSA <xref target="FIPS204"></xref>, 
    "KEM-based Authentication for TLS 1.3" <xref target="I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem"></xref> <xref target="I-D.wiggers-tls-authkem-psk"></xref> 
    specifies how a KEM can be used to achieve post-quantum secure authentication for the TLS 1.3 protocol. The basic idea is as follows: 
    when one entity A receives the certified long term public key of another entity B, A can authenticate B by encapsulating a secret key k 
    using B's KEM public key, and confirming that the communicating entity is indeed B if the entity can successfully return the correct k to A, explicitly or implicitly. 
    This idea was previously presented in <xref target="SSW20"></xref>, followed by a number of research papers then. 
    Besides saving communication overhead and computational time, as pointed out in <xref target="I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem"></xref>, 
    KEM-based authentication also reduces implementation code size, as the code for PQ signature may not be needed, and KEM-based authentication 
    can re-use the KEM code for ephemeral key establishment. </t>
    
    <t> This draft specifies how to use KEM-based authentication for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) <xref target="RFC7296"> </xref>. 
    <!-- This is achieved by defining a new authenication method, called KEM-based Authentication. Namely, this draft asks to add a new value of 
    the "IKEv2 Authenticaion Method" registry <xref target="IANA-IKEv2"></xref>, mantained by IANA. To run this new authenticaiton method, 
    two peers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS Notify, defined by  <xref target="RFC9593"> </xref>, in the IKE_SA_INIT Exchange, 
    to negotiate the supported KEM algorithms. After that, the correponding KEM certificates and cipthertext are exchanged via 
    the IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchange <xref target="RFC9593"> </xref>.--> <!-- This documents also specified the instantiation with ML-KEM for this new 
    general authenticaiton method for the IKEv2. --></t>
		
</section>
</section>

    <section>
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t> The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", 
        "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",  "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", 
        and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" /> <xref target="RFC8174" /> when, 
        and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
    </section>
      <!-- [CHECK] The 'Requirements Language' section is optional -->
	  
<section>  <name> Key Encapsulation Mechanism and Digital Signature</name>
    
	<t> A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a set of algorithms that enables key exchange to be performed, which allows one entity to encapsulate a secret key under a 
    (longterm or ephemeral) public key of another entity. By following the definition given in <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem"></xref>, 
    a KEM consists of three algorithms:
    </t>

	<ul spacing="normal">
        <li>KeyGen(k) -> (pk, sk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm, which generates a public encapsulation key pk and 
        a secret decapsulation key sk, when a security parameter k is given.</li>
        <li>Encaps(pk) -> (ct, ss): A probabilistic encapsulation algorithm, which takes as input a public encapsulation key pk and 
        outputs a ciphertext ct and a shared secret ss. </li>
        <li> Decaps(sk, ct) -> ss: A decapsulation algorithm, which takes as inputs a secret decapsulation key sk and a ciphertext ct and
        outputs a shared secret ss.</li>
      </ul>
	  
	<t>  By following the definition given in <xref target="I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums"></xref>, a signature scheme 
    consists of the following three algorithms: </t>

      <ul spacing="normal">
	  <li> SKeyGen(k) -> (spk, ssk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm, which generates a public verifying key spk and 
      a private signing key ssk, when a security parameter k is given..</li>
	  
	  <li> Sign(ssk, m) -> s: A deterministic or probabilistic signature generation algorithm, which takes as input 
      a private signing key ssk and a message m, and outputs a signature s. </li>
      
	  <li> Verify(spk, s, m) -> b: A deterministic verification algorithm, which takes as input a public verifying key spk, 
      a signature s and a message m, and outputs a bit b indicating acceptance (b=1) or rejection (b=0) of the signature-message pair (s, m). </li>
      </ul>

	  <t> In August of 2024, NIST released ML-KEM <xref target="FIPS203"></xref> and ML-DSA <xref target="FIPS204"></xref>, which are both 
      module-lattice-based post-quantum algorithms. Each of both algorithms has three sets of parameters corresponding to three NIST security levels. 
      Namely, ML-KEM-512 for Level 1, ML-KEM-768 for Level 3, and ML-KEM-1024 for Level 5, while ML-DSA-44 for Level 2, ML-DSA-65 for Level 3, 
      and ML-DSA-87 for Level 5. </t>
	  
	  </section>

    <section>  <name> Comparison of ML-KEM and ML-DSA </name>
    
	  <t> This section compares ML-KEM and ML-DSA, with respect to the sizes of key, ciphertext and signature, and also the computational 
      overhead of key generation, encapsulation, signing, decapsulation, and verifying. </t>
	  
	  <t> To compare the communication overhead when using ML-DSA and ML-KEM, data from Table 2 in <xref target="FIPS204"></xref> and 
      Table 3 in <xref target="FIPS204"></xref> are used to generate the following <xref target="size_comp" />. The results show the comparison 
      of keys and signature over ciphertext between ML-DSA and ML-KEM. For all corresponding security levels, the following statements can be concluded: </t>
	  
	  <ul spacing="normal">
         
        <li> The private key size of ML-DSA is about 1.5 times of the decapsulation key size of ML-KEM,  </li>
		<li> The public size of ML-DSA is about 1.6 times of that of ML-KEM, and  </li>
        <li> The signature size of ML-DSA is about 3 times of the ciphertext size of ML-KEM.  </li>
        </ul>

      <table anchor="size_comp">
        <name>Communication Overhead Comparison of ML-DSA and ML-KEM</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th></th>
            <th align="center">Private Key/Decapsulation Key</th>
            <th align="center">Public Key/Encapsulation Key</th>
            <th align="center">Signature/Ciphertext</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td>ML-DSA-44/ML-KEM-512</td>
            <td align="center">2,650/1,632<br/>=157%</td>
            <td align="center">1,312/800<br/>=164%</td>
            <td align="center">2,420/768<br/>=315%</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>ML-DSA-65/ML-KEM-768</td>
            <td align="center">4,032/2,400<br/>=168%</td>
            <td align="center">1,952/1,184<br/>=165%</td>
            <td align="center">3,309/1,088<br/>=304%</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>ML-DSA-87/ML-KEM-1024</td>
            <td align="center">4,896/3,168<br/>=155%</td>
            <td align="center">2,592/1,568<br/>=165%</td>
            <td align="center">4,627/1,568<br/>=295%</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>

      <t> For the three security levels, when ML-KEM is used to replace ML-DSA for authentication, the saved communication overhead, 
      namely public key+signature for ML-DSA over encapsulation key+ciphertext for ML-KEM, is 2,164, 2,989, and 4,083 bytes, respectively. 
      Those savings are helpful to improve the performance of IKEv2. In fact, as shown in the experiment in simulated environment, 
      the average time delay for IKEv2 can increase a few times due to large size of PQ public key, ciphertext and signature, 
      especially when the IP packet loss rate reaches 1% or more. </t>

      <t> About the computation overhead comparison, <xref target="HAZ24"></xref> present implementation 
      results of Dilithium and Kyber, via various optimization techniques for Keccak and the two PQ algorithms. Concretely, Table 6 
      in <xref target="HAZ24"></xref> shows the performance comparison of Dilithium and Kyber on ARMv7 Cortex-M4 processor, presented by clock cycles. 
      By ignoring the small difference between ML-KEM and its informal version Kyber, also ML-DSA and its informal version Dilithium, 
      the following <xref target="computation_comp" /> is obtained. </t>

      <table anchor="computation_comp">
          <name>Computational Overhead Comparison of ML-DSA and ML-KEM</name>
          <thead>
    <tr>
      <th></th>
      <th align="center">SKeyGen Time/KeyGen Time</th>
      <th align="center">Sign Time/Encap Time</th>
      <th align="center">Verify Time/Decap Time</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>ML-DSA-44/ML-KEM-512</td>
      <td align="center">1,357k/369k<br/>=368%</td>
      <td align="center">3,487k/448k<br/>=778%</td>
      <td align="center">1,350k/409k<br/>=330%</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>ML-DSA-65/ML-KEM-768</td>
      <td align="center">2,394k/604k<br/>=396%</td>
      <td align="center">5,574k/732k<br/>=761%</td>
      <td align="center">2,302k/674k<br/>=342%</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>ML-DSA-87/ML-KEM-1024</td>
      <td align="center">4,069k/962k<br/>=423%</td>
      <td align="center">7,730k/1,119k<br/>=691%</td>
      <td align="center">3,998k/1,043k<br/>=383%</td>
    </tr>
        </tbody>
    </table>

    <t> By assuming that the computational comparison shown in <xref target="computation_comp" /> reasonably presents a performance difference 
    of ML-KEM and ML-DSA on the same platform with optimal implementations, for all three corresponding security levels, 
    the following statements can be derived: </t>

    <ul>
    <li> The private key generation time of ML-DSA is about 4 times of that of ML-KEM. </li> 
    <li> The signature signing time of ML-DSA is about 7 times of the encapsulation time of ML-KEM. </li>
    <li> The signature verifying time of ML-DSA is over 3 times of the decapsulation time of ML-KEM. </li>
    </ul>

    <t> In the scenario of KEM-based authentication, both the private keys for ML-DSA and ML-KEM will be long term keys, so the private key generation time 
    can be ignored, as it is just one time overhead. Therefore, by combining signature signing and verifying together, 
    and also combining encapsulation and decapsulation together, we may simply say that the computational time of ML-DSA is about 5 times of that of ML-KEM. </t>

    </section>
	
    <section title="Protocol Overview for KEM-based Authentication" anchor="Overview">
		
        <t> With a KEM-based authentication in IKEv2 peers first perform an ephemeral key exchange that allows
        them to derive session keys for protecting subsequent exchanges. This ephemeral key exchange
        may take place entirely in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange or be accompanied by a series of subsequent IKE_INTERMEDIATE
        exchanges <xref target="RFC9370" />, in which case it would be a hybrid key exchange.
        </t>

<!--        <t> After that peers exchange their long-term KEM certificates and then exchange random
        values encrypted with each other's certificate, both using IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges.
        In the subsequent IKE_AUTH exchange peers confirm that they both know the random values
        send by the other side, thus confirming that they can decapsulate these values,
        thus confirming that they do possess the private keys for their certificates.
        </t> -->

        <t> To run KEM-based Authentication in IKEv2, the two peers first exchange their long-term KEM certificates, 
        and then exchange random values encapsulated with each other's long-term KEM public key, certified by the corresponding KEM certificate. 
        Here, both long-term KEM certificates and the KEM ciphertexts encapsulating the random values are sent via the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges. 
        After decapsulating these random values the two peers can demonstrate their knowledge of the random values 
        sent by the other side in the subsequent IKE_AUTH exchange, thus confirming that they do possess the corresponding KEM 
        private keys linked to their long-term KEM certificates.
        </t>

        <t> More details about the KEM-based authentication are provided in <xref target="I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake" /> and the corresonding paper. </t>
		
    </section>
    
    <section title="Protocol Details for KEM-based Authentication" anchor="Protocol">

        <t> The KEM-based authentication in IKEv2 relies on the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange <xref target="RFC9242" />
        that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supported. In addition, the following extensions can contribute 
        to the security and the robustness of the protocol.
            <ul>
                <li> IKE fragmentation <xref target="RFC7383" /> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be negotiated in case peers use UDP as a transport for IKE,
                since KEM public key and KEM ciphertext can be of significant size.</li>
                <li> Multiple key exchanges <xref target="RFC9370" /> has to be utilized if a hybrid key exchange combining
                traditional and post-quantum key exchange methods is required.</li>
                <li> Using group Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) <xref target="RFC9867" /> can
                contribute to the identity hiding, thus it is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> to use.</li>
                <li> The ability to authenticate the full protocol transcript <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention" /> protects
                peers against downgrade attacks and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used.</li>
            </ul>
        </t>
	
<!--	<t> By following <xref target="RFC9593"></xref>, two communicating peers send ech other the Notify Message Type SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS 
    to negotiate which authentication method will be used to authenticate them to each other. The authentication method can be 
    any one registered in the "IKEv2 Authentication Method" registry under "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" <xref target="IANA-IKEv2"></xref>, 
    maintained by IANA. To run KEM-based Authentication, the draft is supposed to apply the value of &lt;TBD&gt; for "KEM-based Authentication" 
    in the "IKEv2 Authentication Method" registry (<xref target="IANA "></xref>).</t> -->
	
    <section title="Exchanges for KEM-based Authentication" anchor="Exchanges">

<!--        <t> After the initiator starts the IKE_SA_INIT exchange as usual, the responder sends the notify SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS with value of &lt;TBD&gt; 
        to indicate that the responder wants to run KEM-based Authentication with respect to some specific KEM algorithms, which the responder supports. 
        These KEMs will be listed in the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS Notify Payload (<xref target="Payload"></xref>), ordered by the responder's preference, 
        among other possible authentication methods. </t>

        <t> After the initiator receives SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS from the resonder, it will select the KEM algorithm from the list of KEMs sent by the responder 
        that has the highest preference and is supported by the initator as well. After that, the responder <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use this KEM algorithm 
        to authenticate itself to the initiator. </t>

        <t> <xref target="exchanges_example" /> below gives an example to show how two peers use the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification to run KEM-based 
        authentication. In the protocol, the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange may be used to faciliate the hybrid key exchange in the IKEv2 
        as specified in <xref target="RFC9370"></xref>, and to transfer PQ certifates between the responder and the intitator 
        for completing KEM-based authentication. </t>
 
        <t> Once the responder and the inititator have negotiated to run KEM-based authentication, shown as the value of 16 in the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS 
        notification, one specific KEM algorithm <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be selected by the initiator. After that, both parties <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> encapsulate 
        a shared secret under the public key of the other party and send out the resulting ciphertext. Then, the peer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> decapsualte 
        the ciphertext received to obtain the shared secret key encapsulated by the other party. Next, the AUTH data <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be calculated 
        according to the specification <xref target="RFC7296"></xref> via using the MAC algorithm selected. Finally, once each party 
        successfully verifies the MAC code for the AUTH data received from the other party, the whole IKE key exchange and authentication is successful. </t> -->
 
 <!-- RFC 9593: If these payloads are sent, they MUST be identical to the IDi/IDr payloads sent later in the IKE_AUTH request -->

        <section anchor="ike_sa_init" title="IKE_SA_INIT Exchange">

            <t> The initiator wishing to use the KEM-based authentication indicates this to the responder
            by including a new status type notification USE_AUTHKEM (with type &lt;TBA2&gt; by IANA) into the IKE_SA_INIT request message.
            This notification has the Protocol ID and SPI Size both set to 0 (meaning no SPI is present), and its notification data is empty.
            To be able to use the KEM-based authentication the initiator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also include
            the INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED notification.
            </t>

            <t> If the responder receives the IKE_SA_INIT request containing the USE_AUTHKEM
            notification and it supports and is configured to use the KEM-based authentication,
            then it sends this notification back in the response. The responder can optionally
            include the Certificate Request payload (as defined in <xref target="RFC7296" />)
            to help the initiator to select the right KEM certificate. The responder can also 
            indicate which KEMs it is willing to use for authentication by including
            the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification <xref target="RFC9593" /> in the response.
            In this case the notification <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> contain announcements
            with the Auth Method other than a newly defined "KEM-based Authentication" (&lt;TBA1&gt; by IANA).
            The format of announcement is defined in <xref target="announcement" />.
            </t>

            <t> Peers can also negotiate other IKEv2 extensions during IKE_SA_INIT. Some of them are listed in <xref target="Protocol" />.
            In particular, the figures below show the optional use of PPK <xref target="RFC9867" /> during
            KEM-based authentication.
            </t>

            <figure anchor="fig_ike_sa_init" title="The IKE_SA_INIT Exchange">
            <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1, KEi, Ni,    --->
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED), 
[N(USE_PPK_INT),] 
N(USE_AUTHKEM)
                     <--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ,]
                                  N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED),
                                         [N(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS),]
                                                    [N(USE_PPK_INT),]
                                                       N(USE_AUTHKEM)
            ]]></artwork> 
            </figure>

            <t> Peers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore the USE_AUTHKEM notification in the message if it is not accompanied 
            by the INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED notification.
            </t>

            <t> If using KEM-based authentication is mandatory for the responder and the initiator did not propose
            it or failed to make a valid proposal, then the responder <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send the NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification
            indicating that the proposed parameters are unacceptable.
            Otherwise the responder can continue establishing IKE SA using other authentication method.
            </t>

            <t> If using the KEM-based authentication is mandatory for the initiator and it failed
            to negotiate it with the responder, then the initiator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cancel
            establishing IKE SA. Otherwise the initiator can continue using other authentication method.
            </t>

            <t> After the IKE_SA_INIT exchange completes, peers calculate the session keys as defined in Section 2.14
            of <xref target="RFC7296" /> and use these keys to protect the next exchange.
            </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="ike_intermediate" title="IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges">
            <t> Once the KEM-based authentication is negotiated in IKE_SA_INIT, a series of the
            IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges takes place. These exchanges can be classified as those
            for the purpose of the KEM-based authentication and those for other purposes.
            The exchanges for the KEM base authentication <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow all
            other IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges, so that they take place right before the IKE_AUTH exchange.
            </t>

            <section anchor="ike_intermediate_no_pqake" title="IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges for Purposes Other than KEM-based Authentication">

                <t> First, if multiple key exchanges were negotiated, then one or more IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges 
                are performed, right after the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, as defined in <xref target="RFC9370" />.
                </t>

                <figure anchor="fig_intermediate_addke" title="Additional Key Exchange(s)">
                <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(n)}   --->
                            <---   HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(n)}
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                <t> Each of these exchanges updates the session keys as defined in Section 2.2.2 of <xref target="RFC9370" />.
                </t>

                <t> If the use of PPKs as defined in <xref target="RFC9867" /> is negotiated,
                then the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange negotiating the PPK to use is performed as defined 
                in Section 3.1 of <xref target="RFC9867" />.
                </t>

                <figure anchor="fig_intermediate_ppk" title="PPK Negotiation">
                <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {PPK_IDENTITY_KEY)}   --->
                   <---   HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {N(PPK_IDENTITY)}
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                <t> After this exchange the session keys are updated as defined in Section 3.1.1 of 
                <xref target="RFC9867" />.
                </t>

                <t> If both additional key exchange(s) and the use of PPKs as defined in <xref target="RFC9867" /> are negotiated,
                then the last additional key exchange <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> alternatively be combined with negotiating the PPK 
                in a single IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange as shown in <xref target="fig_intermediate_ppk" />. Note that in many cases only one
                additional key exchange will be negotiated (as a part of PQ/T hybrid key exchange), thus 
                in this case the last additional key exchange will also be the only one.
                </t>

                <figure anchor="fig_intermediate_addke_ppk" title="Last Additional Key Exchange Combined with PPK Negotiation">
                <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(m), 
(PPK_IDENTITY_KEY)}   --->
                            <---   HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(m),
                                                     N(PPK_IDENTITY)}
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                <t> If this combined IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange takes place, then upon its completion session 
                keys are updated twice - fist as defined in Section 2.2.2 of <xref target="RFC9370" /> and
                then, provided the peers negotiate the PPK to use, as defined in Section 3.1.1 of 
                <xref target="RFC9867" />.
                </t>

                <t> Note, that while <xref target="RFC9867" /> generally requires that the PPK negotiation
                is performed in the last IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange right before the IKE_AUTH exchange, it also allows
                this requirement to be overridden by other specification. This document specifically overrides
                this requirement by allowing the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges concerned with the KEM-based authentication
                to take place between the negotiation of PPK and the IKE_AUTH exchange.
                </t>
            </section>

            <section anchor="ike_intermediate_pqake" title="IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges for KEM-based Authentication">

                <t> KEM-based authentication requires two exchanges, but the first of them is usually combined with the last 
                IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange performed for other purposes (see <xref target="fig_intermediate_addke" />, 
                <xref target="fig_intermediate_ppk" />, and <xref target="fig_intermediate_addke_ppk" />), so that 
                only one additional IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange takes place in this case. If no IKE_INTERMEDIATE
                exchanges preceed, then two such exchanges are needed for KEM-based authentication.
                </t>

                <t> In the first exchange (which is combined with the preceeding IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, if any) 
                the responder sends its KEM certificate to the initiator.
                The initiator can optionally include Certificate Request payloads in the request message 
                to help the responder to select the right KEM certificate. The Certificate Request payload
                can also be used to indicate which format(s) of certificate are acceptable for the sender
                of this payload. This is done by setting the Cert Encoding field to appropriate value.
                For KEM-based authentication this field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be either "X.509 bundle" 
                (new certificate encoding defined in this document, it value is &lt;TBA5 by IANA&gt;)
                or "Hash and URL of X.509 bundle" (value 13). If both encodings are acceptable, then two Certificate Request payloads 
                <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be included (with possibly different list of CAs) each with its own value in the Cert Encoding field.
                Since the Certificate Request payload is optional, its absence leaves the choice of the certificate
                and its encoding on the certificate sender's discretion. Note that these rules are also 
                applicable to the Certificate Request payload sent by the responder in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange
                (see <xref target="ike_sa_init" />).
                </t>

                <t> The initiator can also indicate which KEMs it is willing to use for authentication by including
                the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification <xref target="RFC9593" /> in the request.
                In this case the notification <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> contain announcements
                with the Auth Method other than the  "KEM Authentication" (&lt;TBA1&gt; by IANA).
                The format of announcement is defined in <xref target="announcement" />.
                </t>

                <t> The responder provides its KEM certificate in the response. Besides the KEM certificate, additional 
                intermediate certificates and CRLs can be provided. All these certificates and CRLs are packed into
                the CertificateBundle ASN.1 structure defined in Section 3.6 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
                The KEM certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the only KEM certificate in the bundle.
                </t>

                <t> The certificate bundle can either be sent directly in the response or be provided by a reference using Hash and URL syntax.
                In both cases this content (either bundle or hash and URL) is sent in a new payload "Encrypted Certificate" 
                (with type &lt;TBA0 by IANA&gt;), denoted as ECERT below. The content is encrypted using key 
                derived from the SK_d for the next exchange (see <xref target="encryptedcert" /> for details).
                </t>

                <aside>
                    <t> Note that while the next exchange is not started yet, the responder can already calculate the session keys for it 
                    and can uses these "future" keys (purposed for the next exchange) to encrypt the content of the Encrypted Certificate payload, 
                    that itself will be protected with the "current" session keys in the Encrypted payload.
                    </t>
                </aside>

                <t> If the certificate bundle is sent inband, then the Cert Encoding field in the Encrypted Certificate payload is set to 
                a new value "X.509 bundle", otherwise it is set to "Hash and URL of X.509 bundle".
                If certificate bundle is provided by reference, then a host can avoid downloading the peer's certificates 
                if it cached them from a previous connection.
                </t>

                <t> Exactly one Encrypted Certificate payload <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present in the response.
                </t>

                <t> Since this exchange can be combined with the preceeding IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange,
                we use notation "..." to indicate payloads for the purposes other than
                KEM-based authentication. In case of no preceeding IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges, 
                no payloads for other purposes are present in this exchange. 
                </t>

                <figure anchor="fig_intermediate_cert" title="Obtaining Responder's KEM Certificate">
                <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {... [CERTREQ+,]
[N(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS)]}   --->
                         <---   HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {... ECERT}
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                <t> Whether this exchange updates the current session keys or not depends on the 
                purpose of the preceeding exchange. In particular, in case of <xref target="fig_intermediate_addke" />, 
                <xref target="fig_intermediate_ppk" />, and <xref target="fig_intermediate_addke_ppk" />), the keys are updated
                as the result of those exchanges. If this exchange is not combined with other IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges,
                then it does not update the current session keys.
                </t>

                <t> The initiator verifies the responder's certificate to make sure that it is valid, 
                properly signed by a certificate chain leaded to a trusted CA, and that it is acceptable for responder authentication 
                based on the initiator's local policy. The exact verification steps are out of scope of this document, 
                but generally should follow those defined in <xref target="RFC5280" />.
                </t>

                <t> Then the initiator starts the next IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange. In the request message it sends the ciphertext CT_i, produced as a result 
                of encapsulation of a random value SS_i using the KEM public key from the responder's certificate. CT_i is sent in a new status type 
                notification AUTHKEM_CT (with type &lt;TBA3&gt; by IANA). The Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to 0 (meaning no SPI is present). 
                The notification data contains the ciphertext CT_i.
                </t>

                <t> In the same request the initiator also sends its KEM certificate. Besides the KEM certificate, additional 
                intermediate signing certificates and CRLs can be sent. All these certificates and CRLs are packed into
                the CertificateBundle ASN.1 structure defined in Section 3.6 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
                The KEM certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the only KEM certificate in the bundle.
                The bundle can either be present in the message or be provided by reference 
                In both cases this content (either bundle or hash and URL) is sent in the "Encrypted Certificate" payload. 
                The content is encrypted using key derived from SS_i. The details of the Certificate payload encryption 
                are provided in <xref target="encryptedcert" />.
                </t>

                <t> The encryption provides protection of initiator's identity against active attackers, since only 
                a responder with the private key corresponding to the responder's certificate is able to decrypt the 
                initiator's KEM certificate. 
                </t>

                <aside>
                    <t> Note that if the bundle is provided
                    by reference and an attacker can monitor the responder's network activity, then this identity protection
                    might not work.
                    </t>
                </aside>

                <t> If the certificate bundle is sent inband, then the Cert Encoding field in the Encrypted Certificate payload is set to 
                a "X.509 bundle", otherwise it is set to "Hash and URL of X.509 bundle".
                If certificate bundle is provided by reference, then a host can avoid downloading the peer's certificates 
                if it cached them from a previous connection.
                </t>

                <t> Exactly one Encrypted Certificate payload <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present in the message.
                </t>

<!--                <t> DISCUSSION: do we have to define a new payload type or we can define a new certificate encodings 
                for encrypted Certificate payload content? Alternatively, the Certificate payload with encrypted content can be wrapped in a new
                status notification, but this also looks not perfect.
                </t> -->

                <t> The responder decrypts the initiator's certificate, verifies it to make sure that it is valid, 
                properly signed by a certificate chain leaded to a trusted CA, and that it is acceptable for initiator authentication 
                based on the responder's local policy. The exact verification steps are out of scope of this document, 
                but generally should follow those defined in <xref target="RFC5280" />.
                </t>

                <t> The initiator's certificate and the responder's one, sent in the previous exchange, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain public keys 
                for different KEMs, provided that peers support these KEMs, - there is no requirement that the KEMs must be the same.
                </t>

                <t> The responder then sends a response message containing the ciphertext CT_r, produced as a result 
                of encapsulation of a random value SS_r using the KEM public keys from the initiator's certificate. CT_r is sent in the
                AUTHKEM_CT notification in the same manner as SS_i.
                </t>

                <t> The responder also includes a new status type notification AUTHKEM_SSCONF (with type &lt;TBA3&gt; by IANA).
                The Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are set to 0 (meaning no SPI is present). 
                The notification data contains an SSCONF value computed as:

<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
SSCONF = prf(SK_pr, SS_r)
]]></artwork> 
</figure>
                where prf is the negotiated PRF for this SA and SK_pr is from the current 
                session keys (see Section 3.3.1 of <xref target="RFC9242" />).
                </t>

                <figure anchor="fig_intermediate_kem" title="Obtaining Initiator's KEM Certificate and Exchange of Encrypted Random Values">
                <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {N(AUTHKEM_CT), ECERT}   --->
                     <---   HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {N(AUTHKEM_CT),
                                                   N(AUTHKEM_SSCONF)}
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                <t> Upon receiving the response message, the initiator decapsulates the received ciphertext CT_r and obtains
                the SS_r key. Then the initiator computes re-computes the SSCONF value using the obtained SS_r and verifies
                that the value matches the content of the AUTHKEM_SSCONF notification data. This ensures that there are no
                mis-configurations and the received SS_r value is indeed the same that was encapsulated.
                </t>

                <t> Upon completion of this exchange the session keys are updated. A new value of SKEYSEED is computed as:

                <figure>
                <artwork><![CDATA[
SKEYSEED' = prf(SK_d, SS_i | SS_r)
                ]]></artwork> 
                </figure>

                Then all the session keys (SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, SK_er, SK_pi, and SK_pr)
                are computed as defined in Section 2.14 of <xref target="RFC7296" />. These session
                keys are then used for protecting all subsequent exchanges starting from the IKE_AUTH exchange.
                </t>

            </section>
        </section>

        <section anchor="ike_auth" title="IKE_AUTH Exchange">
            <t> The IKE_AUTH exchange immediately follows the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange
            where peers sent each other encrypted SS values. The IKE_AUTH exchange is basically 
            unchanged from that defined in <xref target="RFC7296" />.
            The Auth Method field in the AUTH payloads <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be "KEM Authentication".
            The format of the AUTH payload is computed as defined in <xref target="kem-auth-method" />.

            <figure anchor="fig_ike_auth" title="The IKE_AUTH Exchange">
            <artwork><![CDATA[
Initiator                                                   Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{IDi, [IDr,] 
AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr}   --->
                                        <---   HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{IDr,
                                                AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
            ]]></artwork> 
            </figure>

            The AUTH payloads are composed as defined in <xref target="kem-auth-method" />.
            </t>

            <section anchor="ike_auth_id" title="Identities in the IKE_AUTH Exchange">
                <t> With KEM based authentication peers have to exchange their KEM certificates
                before actual authentication of each other. Certificates usually contain
                some identity information, that the CA asserts the included public key is bound to.
                This makes peers aware of each other's identity before the IKE_AUTH exchange starts.
                </t>

                <t> However, IKEv2 doesn't rely on the identities from certificates when performing authentication.
                Instead, Identification payloads (IDi and IDr) are mandatory in the IKE_AUTH exchange
                and exactly they are included into the AUTH payload calculation.
                The content of the IDi and IDr payload may differ from the identification
                information in the corresponding certificate, as stated in Section 3.5 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
                </t>
            </section>

        </section>

<!--    <t> If the resulting SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification with list of autehnticiton methods is too long such 
    that IP fragmentation <xref target="RFC7383"></xref> of the IKE_SA_INIT response may happen, the responder <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose 
    to send empty SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange response. Then, the responder and the intiatior can send 
    each other the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification with list of authentictatin methods they support by using the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, 
    as desribed in Section 3.1 of <xref target="RFC9593"></xref>. </t>

	<t> [EDNOTE: More examples may be provided later.] </t> -->
	
	</section>


<!--    <section title="KEM-based Authentication with Preshared Public Key" anchor="PPK">

        <t> In <xref target="Exchanges"></xref>, the protocol may need to run one additional round as KEM-based authentication has to first send out 
        one's KEM public key and the associated certificate, so that the other party can return back an encapsualted secret as a challenge, 
        before finally releasing the MAC for the AUTH data. This is naturally not as efficient as signature authentication, 
        which can be sent out in one message consisting of message being authenticated, the digital signarure, and also the corresponing 
        public key certificate used to verify the signature.</t>

        <t> However, the situation will be changed when both parties have already acquied each other's public key (and the associated certificate) 
        before running KEM-based authentication. Such a public key may be pre-installed, cached, or provisoned via out-bound ways. 
        For TLS authentication, the situation has been specified in <xref target="I-D.wiggers-tls-authkem-psk"></xref>. 
        This KEM-based authentication with preshared public key is expected to be useful in scenarios where one or 
        both parties have constrained capabilities, e.g, IoT devices. </t>

        <t> [EDNOTE: An example may be provided later.] </t>
	
     </section>
-->

    <section title="Data Formats" anchor="formats">
        <section title="Authentication Payload for KEM-based Authentication" anchor="kem-auth-method">
            <t> The format of the Authentication payload is defined in Section 3.8 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
            In case of KEM-based authentication the Auth Method is set to "KEM Authentication" (&lt;TBA1&gt; by IANA).
            The Authentication Data is computed as:

            <figure>
                <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
For the initiator:

  AUTH = prf( prf(SK_pi, "Key Pad for IKEv2"),
                   <InitiatorSignedOctets>)

For the responder:

  AUTH = prf( prf(SK_pr, "Key Pad for IKEv2"),
                   <ResponderSignedOctets>)
            ]]></artwork>
            </figure>

            The keys SK_pi and SK_pr used for these calculations are from the latest generation of the SK* keys
            that is computed from SKEYSEED' (see <xref target="ike_intermediate_pqake" />).
            </t>

            <t> The content of the InitiatorSignedOctets and the ResponderSignedOctets is defined 
            in Section 3.3.2 of <xref target="RFC9242" />. If full transcript authentication
            is employed as specified in <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention" />,
            then the InitiatorSignedOctets and the ResponderSignedOctets are additionally
            modified as defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention" />.
            </t>
        </section>

        <section title="Authentication Announcement for KEM Authentication" anchor="announcement">
            <t> The format of the announcement for the "KEM Authentication" is the same as for 
            "Digital Signature" as shown in Section 3.2.3 of <xref target="RFC9593" />. For convenience 
            the format is also shown below.

                <figure align="center" anchor="authmethod3" title="Supported Authentication Method">
                    <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
                     1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Length (>3)  |  Auth Method  |   Cert Link   |               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               +
|                                                               |
~                AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object               ~
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                   ]]></artwork>
                </figure>
            
                <list style="symbols">
                    <t>Length - Length of the announcement in octets, must be greater than 3.</t>
                    <t>Auth Method - Announced authentication method, in this case it is "KEM Authentication" &lt;TBA1 by IANA&gt;.</t>
                    <t>Cert Link - Links this announcement with a particular CA; see Section 3.2.2 of <xref target="RFC9593" /> for details.</t>
                    <t>AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object - the AlgorithmIdentifier of PKIX (see Section 4.1.1.2 of <xref target="RFC5280" />), 
                    encoded using distinguished encoding rules (DER) <xref target="X.690" />. 
                    </t>
                </list>

                For "KEM Authentication" announcement the AlgorithmIdentifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain 
                identifier of a KEM algorithm (and not, for example, of a signature algorithm). Identifiers
                for KEM algorithms are specified in the corresponding documents for these algorithms
                (e.g., for ML-KEM see <xref target="RFC9935" />).
            </t>
        </section>

        <section title="Encrypted Certificate Payload" anchor="encryptedcert">
            <t> The Encrypted Certificate payload, denoted ECERT in this document, provides a
            means to transport certificates or other authentication-related
            information in encrypted form. The payload type for the Encrypted Certificate payload is &lt;TBA0 by IANA&gt;.
            This payload is semantically equivalent to the Certificate payload (defined in Section 3.6 of <xref target="RFC7296" />, 
            but it provides a means to encrypt the certificate information. For this purpose the format of the Encrypted Certificate payload 
            mirrors the format of the Encrypted payload (defined in Section 3.14 of <xref target="RFC7296" />) with the difference,
            that it contains not the encrypted IKE payloads, but the encrypted Cert Encoding and Certificate Data
            as defined in Section 3.6 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
            </t>

            <!-- Should we say more about the Payload Header of the Encrypted Certificate payload? -->
            
            <figure align="center" anchor="enccertpld" title="Encrypted Certificate Payload Format">
                <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                     Initialization Vector                     ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~         Encrypted Cert Encoding and Certificate Data          ~
   |                                                               |
   |               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |               |             Padding (0-255 octets)            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                               |  Pad Length   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                    Integrity Checksum Data                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
               ]]></artwork>
            </figure>

            <t> Initialization Vector, Padding, Pad Length and Integrity Checksum Data
            are defined in Section 3.14 of <xref target="RFC7296" />.
            </t>

            <t> This document restricts the possible values of Cert Encoding in the ECERT payload 
            to either "X.509 bundle" (&lt;TBA5 by IANA&gt;) or "Hash and URL of X.509 bundle" (13).
            Future specifications may define additional encodings allowed for use in this payload.
            </t>

            <t> The cryptographic processing of the Encrypted Certificate payload is identical to that
            described in Section 3.14 of <xref target="RFC7296" /> (as well as any document updating
            such processing for particular algorithms or modes, such as <xref target="RFC5282" />).
            </t>

            <t> The payload is encrypted and authenticated using the same encryption and integrity algorithms 
            as were negotiated for IKE SA. The encryption key EC_e and the authentication key EC_a 
            for protecting the Encrypted Certificate payload play the same role as SK_ei/SK_er and SK_ai/SK_ar keys for the Encrypted payload.
            They are calculated as follows:
            </t>

            <figure>
                <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
  EC_a | EC_e = prf+ ( K, Ni | Nr )
            ]]></artwork>
            </figure>

            <t>where Ni and Nr are the nonces from the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, stripped of any headers, and K is a key used 
            to protect the certificate data in a particular step of the protocol. Depending on the place where the Encrypted Certificate 
            is sent in the protocol, the value of K will be different. In particular:
            <ul>
                <li> For ECERT sent by the responder (as per <xref target="fig_intermediate_cert" />) the SK_d value for the next IKE_INTERMEDIATE is used as the K, 
                which resulted to the following calculation:

                <figure>
                    <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
      EC_a | EC_e = prf+ ( SK_d(next), Ni | Nr )
                ]]></artwork>
                </figure>

                </li>
                <li> For ECERT sent by the initiator (as per <xref target="fig_intermediate_kem" />) the SS_i value is used as the K,
                which resulted to the following calculation:

                <figure>
                    <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
      EC_a | EC_e = prf+ ( SS_i, Ni | Nr )
                ]]></artwork>
                </figure>

                </li>
            </ul>
            </t>

            <aside>
                <t> Note that if AEAD transform is negotiated, then the EC_a key will not be used and thus will be empty.
                This is the same as for SK_ai/SK_ar keys for the Encrypted payload.
                </t>
            </aside>

        </section>
    </section>

    </section>

    <section title="Interaction with Other IKEv2 Extensions" anchor="interaction">
        <t> Note: Initial thoughts, need expanding.</t>

        <t> KEM can be replaced as a composite KEM, as defined in Lamps WG. The composition job is done at crypto-engineering level, 
        so using a composite KEM for KEM based authentication does not require to change any thing at the protocol layer of IKEv2.
        </t>

        <t> Extension is straightforward using  reliable transport.
        </t>
    </section>

    <section title="Security Considerations" anchor="Security">
        <!--
		<t> To be done later.  1) It may be not a good idea by directly showing the decapsulated secret ss as the means of authentication here. 
        The reason is that the entity being authenticated may employ the owner of the KEM public/private key pair as an oracle to decapsualte 
        the secret via running a different session, normally within a separate protocol or scenario where directly showing such a secret is harmless. 
        2) It may be preferable or <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> limit the use of such a KEM certificate only for KEM authentication. </t>
		--> 

  <section title="Security Objectives and Assumptions" anchor="Sec1">
	<t> The security considerations of IKEv2 and the extensions used with KEM based mechanism continue to apply. In particular, encryption of an exchange before completion of authentication does not, by itself, establish the identity of the communicating peer. Implementations MUST distinguish protection under provisional session keys from successful peer authentication. See <xref target="RFC7296" /> and <xref target="RFC9242" />. </t>

	  <t> The intended security properties are mutual authentication, confidentiality of established session keys, binding of authentication to the current exchange, and protection against replay and modification. Identity protection and forward secrecy require additional conditions described below. </t>

	  <t> These properties depend on secure KEMs, a cryptographically strong pseudorandom function, secure encryption and integrity algorithms, adequate randomness, correct credential validation, and correct implementation of the complete protocol state machine. Selection of a post-quantum KEM alone does not establish post-quantum security for the complete protocol. </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Authentication and Authorization" anchor="Sec2">
	  <t>KEM-based authentication establishes possession of a private decapsulation key through confirmation of secrets encapsulated to the corresponding public key. A valid certificate establishes a binding between a public key and an identity; receipt of that certificate does not establish that the current peer possesses its private key. </t>
	  <t>An implementation MUST NOT declare authentication successful solely because a certificate validates, a ciphertext decapsulates, or an encrypted payload passes its integrity check. Authentication requires successful verification of the peer's final AUTH payload using the keys and authenticated octets prescribed for the current exchange. </t>
	  <t>Certificate validation and local authorization policy MUST establish that the credential is acceptable for the claimed IKE identity and requested access. An implementation MUST NOT infer authorization merely from membership in a trusted certification hierarchy. In particular, differences between a certificate's identity information and an Identification payload require an explicit policy decision. </t>
	<t> A group preshared key establishes, at most, membership in the group of entities possessing that key. It MUST NOT replace individual peer authentication where individual accountability or authorization is required. </t>
  </section>

   <section title="Transcript Binding and Downgrade Resistance" anchor="Sec3">
	   <t>Authentication MUST bind the peer's identity and role to the current protocol instance. Implementations MUST preserve the prescribed ordering of exchanges, key updates, and transcript processing. A message accepted in one role, session, or key generation MUST NOT be accepted as evidence of authentication in another. </t>
	   <t>The intermediate-exchange authentication rules are security-critical: they connect exchanges protected before authentication to the eventual AUTH verification. Implementations MUST apply those rules consistently, including when an exchange combines several extensions. See <xref target="RFC9242"/>, Section 3.3.2. </t>
	   <t>Deployments requiring KEM authentication, post-quantum key establishment, or preshared-key protection MUST enforce those requirements through local policy. Failure to negotiate a required mechanism MUST terminate establishment rather than trigger an automatic retry with weaker requirements. </t>
	   <t>Full-transcript authentication <xref target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention" /> <xref target="RFC9370" />
SHOULD be used. Implementations MUST NOT treat an unauthenticated capability announcement, error, or timeout as authorization to weaken security policy. </t>
  </section>
	
   <section title="Key Separation and Decapsulation Oracles" anchor="Sec4">
	   <t> Long-term authentication keys MUST be separated from ephemeral key-establishment keys. A long-term authentication private key MUST NOT also be exposed through a service that returns raw decapsulation results or otherwise enables an attacker to obtain the secret needed to authenticate in this protocol. </t>
	   <t>Certificates and key-management policy SHOULD restrict authentication KEM keys to their intended use. Where an applicable certificate profile provides usage restrictions, implementations MUST enforce them. </t>
	   <t>Raw KEM shared secrets MUST NOT be transmitted as authentication evidence or recorded in ordinary diagnostic logs. Key confirmation MUST use the protocol-defined cryptographic computations and session context. </t>  
       <t>Keys for certificate protection, final authentication, IKE protection, and application traffic require separation by purpose and, where applicable, direction. A protocol revision introducing additional derivations MUST specify unambiguous inputs and domain separation; implementations MUST NOT invent incompatible derivation rules locally. </t>
  </section>
	
	<section title="Forward Secrecy and Post-Quantum Protection" anchor="Sec5">
	   <t>Forward secrecy concerns compromise of long-term credentials after completion of an otherwise uncompromised session. It does not protect a session whose ephemeral secrets or traffic keys were exposed during execution. </t>
	   <t>Post-quantum forward secrecy requires a suitable ephemeral post-quantum contribution, or a suitable hybrid construction containing such a contribution, that remains secure against the adversary under consideration. Long-term KEM authentication secrets alone do not provide this property: an adversary retaining ciphertexts AUTHKEM_CTs may recover their shared secrets after obtaining the corresponding long-term KEM private keys. </t>
	   <t>The selected key schedule must preserve the protection provided by the ephemeral contribution. Implementations MUST erase obsolete ephemeral private keys, encapsulation randomness, intermediate shared secrets, and superseded key material when they are no longer required.</t>
	   <t>When multiple key exchanges are used, their negotiation, combination, and key updates MUST follow the applicable specification. Security of the resulting composition must not be inferred simply from the presence of several algorithms (See <xref target="RFC9370"/>). </t>
	   <t>A claim of post-quantum authentication also depends on the credential-validation path. A quantum-vulnerable certification signature can undermine authentication against an attacker capable of forging that signature, even when the certified public key belongs to a post-quantum KEM. </t>
  </section>
	
<section title="Identity Protection" anchor="Sec6">
	   <t>Identity protection must be evaluated separately for passive observers, active attackers, authorized peers, and holders of any group preshared key. </t>
	   <t>For the initiator, as shown in Figure 6, confidentiality of credentials encrypted using a secret encapsulated to the responder depends on validating the responder's credential and checking that it represents an acceptable intended peer before releasing the initiator's credentials. Accepting an arbitrary trusted credential can disclose identity information to an unintended but credentialed responder. </t>
	   <t>An unauthenticated active initiator can establish its own ephemeral exchange with a responder. Consequently, as shown in Figure 5, ephemeral encryption alone does not prevent that initiator from obtaining responder identity information. A group preshared key can restrict this exposure to parties possessing that key, provided its contribution protects the credentials before they are disclosed. The placement of preshared-key mixing therefore matters; RFC 9867 provides protection earlier in IKE establishment than the mechanism it extends. </t>
	   <t>Neither credential encryption nor a group preshared key hides identities from an authorized peer or a compromised group member. Group-key compromise expands the population able to probe protected identities and requires an appropriate revocation and replacement policy. </t>
	   <t>Certificate retrieval, revocation checking, message sizes, timing, addresses, and stable identifiers can reveal information independently of credential encryption. Privacy-sensitive deployments SHOULD prefer in-band credential delivery and SHOULD assess the observable behavior of external retrieval and validation services. Session-key forward secrecy does not automatically imply forward secrecy of identity information. Recorded encrypted credentials may become readable after later compromise of the secrets used specifically to protect them. </t>
</section>
		
<section title="Invalid Inputs, Failure Handling, and Side Channels" anchor="Sec7">
	   <t>Implementations MUST validate payload lengths, algorithm identifiers, encodings, certificate structures, and algorithm-specific public-key and ciphertext requirements before using them. Validation MUST include bounds on allocation, certificate-chain processing, and nested structures. </t>
	   <t>For KEMs providing implicit rejection, implementations MUST preserve that behavior. They MUST NOT expose whether a correctly sized ciphertext produced an ordinary shared secret or an implicit-rejection secret through explicit notifications, logging interfaces accessible to the attacker, or avoidable timing differences. </t>
	   <t>Cryptographic comparisons MUST use appropriate constant-time operations. Private-key operations and subsequent failure processing SHOULD avoid secret-dependent observable behavior. </t>
	   <t>Malformed framing may require immediate rejection. Failures involving credential identity, authorization, or decapsulation require additional care because distinguishable responses can disclose identity or private-key information. Implementations SHOULD minimize such distinctions without reporting successful authentication or allowing unauthorized access. </t>
	   <t>Failure handling MUST release provisional state and prevent application use of keys from an unsuccessful exchange. </t>	
</section>

<section title="Resource Exhaustion and Retransmission" anchor="Sec8">
	   <t>Certificate processing, KEM operations, external retrieval, and fragment reassembly create opportunities for denial of service before peer authentication completes. </t>
	   <t>Implementations SHOULD apply bounded concurrency, timeouts, rate limits, and limits on message size, certificate-chain depth, retrieval activity, and reassembly storage. Appropriate IKEv2 cookie mechanisms SHOULD be used where applicable. </t>
	   <t>Retransmission MUST preserve the original exchange semantics. In particular, an implementation MUST NOT accidentally repeat a key update, change an encapsulated secret within the same retransmitted exchange, or reuse an encryption nonce with different plaintext under the same key. </t>
	   <t>URLs received from an unauthenticated peer MUST NOT permit unrestricted access to local files, internal services, or unbounded remote resources. </t>
	   </section>
		
</section>
	

<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="IANA">

        <t> IANA is requested to make the following changes in the IKEv2 registries 
         "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" <xref target="IANA-IKEv2"></xref>:
        </t>

        <ol>

            <li> <t>Define a new payload type in the "IKEv2 Payload Types" registry:</t>

            <table>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="center">Value</th>
                  <th align="center">Next Payload Type</th>
                  <th align="center">Notation</th>
<!--                  <th align="center">Reference</th> -->
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA0</td>
                  <td align="center">Encrypted Certificate</td>
                  <td align="center">ECERT</td>
<!--                   <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            </li>

            <li> <t>Define a new authentication method in the "IKEv2 Authentication Method" registry:</t>
    	 
            <table>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="center">Value</th>
                  <th align="center">IKEv2 Authentication Method</th>
<!--                  <th align="center">Reference</th> -->
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA1</td>
                  <td align="center">KEM Authentication</td>
<!--                   <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            </li>

            <li> <t>Define three new status type notifications in the "IKEv2 Notify Message Status Types" registry:</t>

            <table>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="center">Value</th>
                  <th align="center">Notify Message Status Type</th>
<!--                  <th align="center">Reference</th> -->
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA2</td>
                  <td align="center">USE_AUTHKEM</td>
<!--                  <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA3</td>
                  <td align="center">AUTHKEM_CT</td>
<!--                  <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA4</td>
                  <td align="center">AUTHKEM_SSCONF</td>
<!--                  <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            </li>

            <li> <t>Define a new certificate encoding in the "IKEv2 Certificate Encodings" registry:</t>

            <table>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="center">Value</th>
                  <th align="center">Certificate Encoding</th>
<!--                  <th align="center">Reference</th> -->
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="center">TBA5</td>
                  <td align="center">X.509 bundle</td>
<!--                   <td align="center">This document</td> -->
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            </li>

        </ol>

    </section>

</middle>

<back>
  
<!--  
    <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth" to="I-D.RSF25"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.sfluhrer-ipsecme-ikev2-mldsa" to="I-D.Flu25"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth" to="I-D.HMW"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem" to="I-D.WCS"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.wiggers-tls-authkem-psk" to="I-D.WCSSS"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums" to="I-D.BHCD"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem" to="I-D.KR24"/>
-->

    <references title="Normative References">

        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7296.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9242.xml"/>

        <reference anchor="IANA-IKEv2" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/ikev2-parameters.xhtml">
          <front>
            <title> Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters </title>
            <author fullname=" " initials=" " surname=" "/>
		 
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
        </reference>
		
        <!-- The recommended and simplest way to include a well known reference -->
 
    </references>

    <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
		
		<reference anchor="HAZ24" target="https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11419">
          <front>
            <title> Revisiting Keccak and Dilithium Implementations on ARMv7-M </title>
            <author fullname="J. Huang" initials="J." surname="Huang"/>
            <author fullname="A. Adomnicai" initials="A." surname="Adomnicai"/>
			<author fullname="J. Zhang" initials="J." surname="Zhang"/>
			<author fullname="W. Dai" initials="W." surname="Dai"/>
            <author fullname="Y. Liu" initials="Y. " surname="Liu"/>
			<author fullname="R. C. C. Cheung" initials="R. C. C." surname="Cheung"/>
			<author fullname="C. K. Koc" initials="C. K." surname="Koc"/>
			<author fullname="D. Chen" initials="D." surname="Chen"/>
            <date month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems. " value="ISSN 2569-2925, Vol. 2024, No. 2, pp. 1–24."/>
        </reference>
		
		<reference anchor="SSW20"  target=" ">
          <front>
            <title> Post-quantum TLS without handshake signatures </title>
            <author fullname="P. Schwabe" initials="P." surname="Schwabe"/>
            <author fullname="D. Stebila" initials="D." surname="Stebila"/>
			<author fullname="T. Wiggers" initials="T." surname="Wiggers"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="In the Proceedings of ACM CCS 2020, pages 1461–1480. ACM Press." value="doi:10.1145/3372297.3423350."/>
        </reference>
				
        <reference anchor="FIPS203"  target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.203.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard </title>
            <author fullname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" initials="" surname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" />
            <date month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Federal Information Processing Standards Publication" value=""/>
        </reference>

    <reference anchor="FIPS204"  target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard </title>
            <author fullname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" initials="" surname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" />
            <date month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Federal Information Processing Standards Publication" value=""/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="FIPS205"  target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard </title>
            <author fullname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" initials="" surname="National Institute of Standards and Technology" />
            <date month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Federal Information Processing Standards Publication" value=""/>
        </reference>

<!--        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7427.xml"/> -->
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9370.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7383.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9593.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9867.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9935.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5282.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth.xml"/>
<!--        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.sfluhrer-ipsecme-ikev2-mldsa.xml"/> -->
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.wiggers-tls-authkem-psk.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake.xml"/>
		
        <reference anchor="X.690"  target="">
          <front>
            <title>Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) </title>
            <author fullname="ITU-T " initials="" surname="ITU-T" />
            <date month="February" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021 (E),  " value="ITU-T Recommendation X.690"/>
        </reference>
		
      </references>

	<section title="Relationship to PQuAKE" anchor="Relationship">
	   
	   <section title="Shared Design" anchor="R1">
	      <t>PQuAKE achieves authenticated key establishment with four conceptual stages:</t>
	      <ul spacing="normal">
              <li> Establish provisional confidentiality and exchange protected credentials. </li>
	          <li> Encapsulate fresh secrets to the peers' long-term authentication public keys. </li>
			  <li> Combine the ephemeral and authentication contributions to derive session keys. </li>
	          <li> Confirm possession of the resulting keys. </li>
          </ul> 


		  <t>This construction avoids requiring each endpoint to generate an online digital signature over the handshake. Certificate signatures may still be required to validate the long-term public keys. </t>
	      <t> The mechanism in this document adopts the same general approach within IKEv2. Verion-04 of this draft explicitly identifies alignment with PQuAKE <xref target="I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake" /> as a design objective. Its IKE-specific processing remains authoritative for interoperability (see <xref target="Protocol"/> of the draft). </t>
	      
	   </section>
	   
	   <section title="Conceptual Correspondence" anchor="R2">
	      
		  <table anchor="Corres_table" align="center">
          <name>Conceptual Correspondence</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left"> PQuAKE <xref target="I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake" /> Component</th>
              <th align="left"> Corresponding IKEv2 Mechanism Specified in This Draft</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>

          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Ephemeral shared secret </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Initial and any additional key exchanges </tt> </td>
            </tr>
           
           <tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Optional identity-hiding preshared secret </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> PPK contribution before credential disclosure </tt> </td>
            </tr>
           
           <tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Protected certificate exchange </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> ECERT payloads </tt> </td>
            </tr>

            <tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Encapsulation to long-term peer keys </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> AUTHKEM_CT notifications </tt> </td>
            </tr>
			
			<tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Combination of authentication secrets </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Post-encapsulation IKE key update </tt> </td>
            </tr>

            <tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Directional key confirmation </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Final IKE_AUTH AUTH payloads </tt> </td>
            </tr>
			
			<tr>
              <td align="left"> <tt> Binding of exchanged messages </tt></td>
              <td align="left"> <tt> IKEv2 authenticated octets and intermediate-exchange transcript processing </tt> </td>
            </tr>
			
          </tbody>
        </table>
		
		<t> This correspondence identifies functional roles. It does not necessarily imply identical encodings, derivation functions, or security proofs. </t>
		
	   </section>
	   
	   <section title="Differences Relevant to Security" anchor="R3">
	      
		  <t> PQuAKE defines a protocol-specific transcript and derives separate confirmation and session keys. An IKEv2 integration must instead be evaluated using the actual IKEv2 key hierarchy, authenticated octets, extension interactions, and acceptance conditions. </t>
	      
		  <t> Revision -04 also introduces asymmetric credential protection: the initiator's ECERT protection depends on a secret encapsulated to the responder. Its AUTHKEM_SSCONF check precedes final authentication and MUST NOT be treated as a replacement for AUTH verification. See <xref target="ike_intermediate_pqake" /> for detail. </t>
	      
		  <t>These differences affect what each participant knows at each stage. In particular, analysis must distinguish knowledge of a provisional encryption key, possession of a certified private key, agreement on an identity, and successful authorization. </t>

	   </section>
	   
	   <!--
	   <section title="Scope of Formal Analysis" anchor="R4">
	   
	      <t> The PQuAKE document <xref target="I-D.uri-cfrg-pquake" /> reports analysis using Verifpal and CryptoVerif, while stating that publication of the complete proof artifacts is in progress. Those reported results do not, by themselves, establish the security of this IKEv2 adaptation.</t>
		  
	      <t> A dedicated analysis should model: </t>
		  <ul spacing="normal">
              <li> The exact key schedule and transcript construction. </li>
	          <li> Concurrent sessions, retransmissions, and combined intermediate exchanges. </li>
			  <li> Disclosure of long-term, ephemeral, and group secrets at different times. </li>
	          <li> Credential validation and agreement on IKE identities.</li>
			  <li> The separate identity-protection claims for initiator and responder. </li>
	          <li> Failure behavior, implicit rejection, and cross-protocol use of authentication keys.</li>
          </ul> 
		  
	      <t> Claims about quantum adversaries must state the computational model and assumptions explicitly. A symbolic result or a proof in the classical random-oracle model must not be presented as establishing security in the quantum random-oracle model without additional justification. </t>
	      
	   </section>
	   
	   <section title="Specification Details Requiring Resolution" anchor="R5">
	   
	      <t> Before making a precise security argument for the IKEv2 adaptation, this draft may need to unambiguously specify the derivation inputs, key generation, direction, and authenticated coverage for each use of ECERT. <xref target="encryptedcert" /> currently uses a generic input K; its relationship to the responder-side “future” keys needs particular clarity. </t>
		  
	      <t> The specification should also define acceptance and failure behavior for every confirmation check and document interactions with other authentication extensions. Similarity to PQuAKE provides design rationale; those concrete definitions are necessary for interoperable implementations and a defensible security analysis. </t>
	      
	   </section>
	   --> 
	   
  </section>

	
    <section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="false">
        <name>Acknowledgements</name>
        <t>Thom Wiggers shared an idea to provide identity protection of one of the peers against active attackers.
        </t>
    </section>
	
    <section anchor="Contributors" numbered="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>

      <t>Uri Blumenthal and Brandon Luo contributed a lot to the design of this protocol as authors of PQuAKE protocol. 
      </t>
    </section>

</back>

</rfc>

<!--

<reference anchor="I-D.Kyber24"  target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cfrg-schwabe-kyber/">
          <front>
            <title>Kyber Post-Quantum KEM </title>
            <author fullname="Peter Schwabe" initials="P. " surname="Schwabe" />
			<author fullname="Bas Westerbaan" initials="B. " surname="Westerbaan" />
            <date month="January" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Work in Progress, " value="Internet-Draft, "/>
        </reference>
		
	
		<reference anchor="OPM23"  target="">
          <front>
            <title>Where Is the Research on Cryptographic Transition and Agility?</title>
            <author fullname="D. Ott" initials="D." surname="Ott"/>
            <author fullname="K. Paterson" initials="K." surname="Paterson"/>
			<author fullname="D. Moreau" initials="D." surname="Moreau"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Communications of the ACM, " value="66(4): 29-32"/>
        </reference>
		
		<reference anchor="FrodoKEM"  target="https://frodokem.org/files/FrodoKEM-standard_proposal-20230314.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>FrodoKEM: Learning With Errors Key Encapsulation</title>
            <author fullname="E. Alkim" initials="E." surname="Alkim"/>
            <author fullname="J. W. Bos" initials="J. W." surname="Bos"/>
			<author fullname="L. Ducas" initials="L." surname="Ducas"/>
			<author fullname="P. Longa" initials="P." surname="Longa"/>
            <author fullname="I. Mironov" initials="I. " surname="Mironov"/>
			<author fullname="M. Naehrig" initials="N." surname="Naehrig"/>
			<author fullname="V. Nikolaenko" initials="V." surname="Nikolaenko"/>
			<author fullname="C. Peikert" initials="C." surname="Peikert"/>
			<author fullname="A. Raghunathan" initials="A." surname="Raghunathan"/>
            <author fullname="D. Stebila" initials="D. " surname="Stebila"/>
            <date month="March" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Preliminary Standardization Proposal submitted to ISO" value=""/>
        </reference>
		
<reference anchor="CD22"  target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975">
          <front>
            <title> An Efficient Key Recovery Attack on SIDH </title>
            <author fullname="W. Castryck" initials="W." surname="Castryck"/>
            <author fullname="T. Decru" initials="T." surname="Decru"/>
            <date month="July" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
	         <seriesInfo name="Formal version published in the proceddings of EUROCRYPT 2023" value=""/>
			 </reference>
			 
			 <reference anchor="I-D.D24"  target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology/">
          <front>
            <title>Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes</title>
            <author fullname="F. Driscoll" initials="F." surname="F. Driscoll"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t> .. </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Work in Progress, " value="Internet-Draft, "/>
        </reference>
		
-->
