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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentation-01" category="std" consensus="true" updates="9048">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="EAP-AKA' Large Identity">EAP-AKA' Large Identity</title>

    <author initials="T." surname="Wan" fullname="T. Wan">
      <organization>CableLabs</organization>
      <address>
        <email>t.wan@cablelabs.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>EMU</workgroup>
    <keyword>EAP-AKA'</keyword> <keyword>EAP</keyword> <keyword>SUCI</keyword> <keyword>SUPI</keyword> <keyword>large identity</keyword> <keyword>fragmentation</keyword> <keyword>post-quantum cryptography</keyword>

    <abstract>


<t>This document updates EAP-AKA’ (RFC 9048) so that a peer can send an identity
that is too large for the initial EAP-Response/Identity packet, such as a
Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) in Network Access Identifier (NAI)
format protected by a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) scheme. The peer sends a
realm-only identity in EAP-Response/Identity and the large identity in
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity. If the identity fits in an AT_IDENTITY attribute, the
peer sends it there. Otherwise, the peer sends it in a new attribute,
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, which is fragmented using the AT_FRAGMENT attribute defined
in I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka. A peer that supports several SUCI protection
schemes (for example PQC and classical schemes) uses the presence or absence of
the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED attribute in the server’s request to select a
scheme whose SUCI can be carried in an identity attribute that the server can
process. These procedures support large SUCI values, and do not change the
EAP-AKA’ authentication or key derivation.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">

<t>EAP-AKA’ <xref target="RFC9048"/> is an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
<xref target="RFC3748"/> method based on the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
protocol. It supports 5G identifiers, including the Subscription Concealed
Identifier (SUCI). A peer can send its identity in the initial
EAP-Response/Identity packet or in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of an
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet. In 5G, the identity is normally sent outside
EAP. This document applies when the identity is carried in EAP, as described in
Section 5.3 of <xref target="RFC9048"/>.</t>

<t>The identity in the initial EAP-Response/Identity packet is usually copied
into the RADIUS User-Name attribute <xref target="RFC2865"/>, which is at most 253 octets
long, so RADIUS cannot carry a longer NAI <xref target="RFC7542"/>. <xref target="RFC7542"/> requires
devices to support NAIs of at least 72 octets and recommends support for 253
octets. EAP <xref target="RFC3748"/> itself limits this identity only by the EAP packet
length. A peer therefore limits the NAI in EAP-Response/Identity to 253 octets
by default. This document calls this limit the initial NAI limit.</t>

<t>A SUCI in NAI format can be longer than the initial NAI limit. <xref target="TS23003"/>
writes the binary fields of the scheme output in hexadecimal digits, so a
field of n octets takes 2n octets in the NAI. There are two cases:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The identity fits in an AT_IDENTITY attribute within one EAP packet. The
attribute and the packet headers fit within 1020 octets, the minimum EAP MTU
that lower layers provide <xref target="RFC3748"/>. This can happen with a classical ECIES
scheme when the SUPI is a NAI with a long username: the encrypted username is
as long as the username, and it doubles in size when written in hexadecimal.
Such an identity is sent in AT_IDENTITY as specified in <xref target="RFC9048"/>.</t>
  <t>The identity does not fit in an AT_IDENTITY attribute. This is the case for
ML-KEM-based schemes. For example, an ML-KEM-768 ciphertext is 1088 octets
long <xref target="FIPS203"/>, and 2176 octets in hexadecimal in the NAI, before the other
fields of the SUCI. A proprietary protection scheme can produce a longer
scheme output: <xref target="TS33501"/> limits it to 3000 octets plus the size of the
input. These are binary octets. In the hexadecimal encoding of the NAI, they
take up to 6000 octets plus twice the size of the input.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The sizes above assume the hexadecimal encoding of <xref target="TS23003"/>. The procedures
in this document depend only on the length of the NAI in octets, not on the
encoding.</t>

<t>An AT_IDENTITY attribute cannot carry such an identity. The Length field of
AT_IDENTITY is one octet and counts units of four octets, so an AT_IDENTITY
attribute is at most 255 x 4 = 1020 octets long, and the identity in it is at
most 1016 octets long <xref target="RFC4187"/>. The two-octet Actual Identity Length field
cannot raise this limit, because it counts octets inside the attribute.
Changing the format of AT_IDENTITY would violate <xref target="RFC4187"/>. This document
therefore defines a new attribute, AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, which has a two-octet
Length field and can carry a large identity of more than 1008 octets, which
does not fit in an AT_IDENTITY attribute in a 1020-octet EAP packet. EAP does
not define generic fragmentation <xref target="RFC3748"/>, so this document fragments
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY using the AT_FRAGMENT attribute of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/>.</t>

<t>This document updates RFC 9048 as follows:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>It requires a peer whose identity is longer than the initial NAI limit to
send a realm-only identity in EAP-Response/Identity, and to send the large
identity in EAP-Response/AKA-Identity: in the AT_IDENTITY attribute if it fits,
and otherwise in the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute.</t>
  <t>It defines the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute.</t>
  <t>It defines the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED attribute, with which a server
tells the peer that it can process AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, and the maximum
identity length that it can process.</t>
  <t>It allows a peer to fragment AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, using AT_FRAGMENT attributes,
when the attribute does not fit in one EAP packet.</t>
  <t>It describes how a peer uses the presence or absence of
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED to select, among its supported SUCI protection
schemes, one whose SUCI can be carried in an identity attribute that the
server can process.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The mechanism updates only the selection and transmission of a large identity
in RFC 9048. It does not change any other aspect of RFC 9048.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="requirements-language" title="Requirements Language">

<t>The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL
NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”,
“MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology" title="Terminology">

<t>This document uses the terminology of <xref target="RFC3748"/>, <xref target="RFC4187"/>, <xref target="RFC7542"/>,
and <xref target="RFC9048"/>. “Server” means the EAP server.</t>

<t><list style="hanging">
  <t hangText="Initial NAI limit:">
  The longest NAI, in octets, that a peer sends in EAP-Response/Identity. The
default is 253 octets. A peer MAY use a smaller value, but not less than 72
octets, if devices on the path support only the minimum NAI length required
by <xref target="RFC7542"/>. This is a local parameter, not a protocol field.</t>
  <t hangText="Large identity:">
  An identity, for example a PQC protected SUCI in NAI format, that is longer
than the initial NAI limit.</t>
  <t hangText="Single-packet large identity:">
  A large identity that fits in one AT_IDENTITY attribute within a 1020-octet
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet. It is sent in AT_IDENTITY.</t>
  <t hangText="Multi-packet large identity:">
  A large identity that does not fit in one AT_IDENTITY attribute within a
1020-octet EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet. It is sent in an
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute, which is fragmented.</t>
  <t hangText="Realm-only identity:">
  An identity in EAP-Response/Identity of the form “@realm”. The username is
omitted, so the identity does not contain the peer’s permanent or concealed
subscriber identifier, and AAA entities can route the exchange using the
realm.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="large-identity" title="Large Identity">

<section anchor="overview" title="Overview">

<t>A peer MUST NOT send an identity longer than the initial NAI limit in
EAP-Response/Identity. EAP does not define fragmentation, so a large identity
cannot be split across EAP-Response/Identity packets. A peer with a large
identity therefore sends a realm-only identity in EAP-Response/Identity, and
sends the large identity in EAP-Response/AKA-Identity: in the AT_IDENTITY
attribute if it fits, and otherwise in the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute, which is
fragmented.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="msgflow" title="Message Flow">

<t>Figure 1 shows the message flow. Case A and case B in the figure are
alternatives. Attributes in square brackets are present only if the server sent
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED.</t>

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<g class="text">
<text x="20" y="36">Peer</text>
<text x="420" y="36">Server</text>
<text x="228" y="84">1.</text>
<text x="324" y="84">EAP-Request/Identity</text>
<text x="12" y="132">2.</text>
<text x="112" y="132">EAP-Response/Identity</text>
<text x="68" y="148">realm-only</text>
<text x="148" y="148">identity</text>
<text x="228" y="196">3.</text>
<text x="340" y="196">EAP-Request/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="296" y="212">AT_ANY_ID_REQ</text>
<text x="360" y="228">[AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED]</text>
<text x="44" y="276">Case</text>
<text x="76" y="276">A:</text>
<text x="104" y="276">the</text>
<text x="156" y="276">identity</text>
<text x="212" y="276">fits</text>
<text x="244" y="276">in</text>
<text x="304" y="276">AT_IDENTITY</text>
<text x="12" y="292">4.</text>
<text x="128" y="292">EAP-Response/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="72" y="308">AT_IDENTITY</text>
<text x="144" y="308">(full</text>
<text x="208" y="308">identity)</text>
<text x="44" y="356">Case</text>
<text x="76" y="356">B:</text>
<text x="104" y="356">the</text>
<text x="156" y="356">identity</text>
<text x="212" y="356">does</text>
<text x="248" y="356">not</text>
<text x="280" y="356">fit</text>
<text x="308" y="356">in</text>
<text x="368" y="356">AT_IDENTITY</text>
<text x="12" y="372">4.</text>
<text x="128" y="372">EAP-Response/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="72" y="388">AT_FRAGMENT</text>
<text x="148" y="388">(first</text>
<text x="212" y="388">fragment</text>
<text x="260" y="388">of</text>
<text x="348" y="388">AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)</text>
<text x="228" y="436">5.</text>
<text x="340" y="436">EAP-Request/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="312" y="452">(acknowledgement,</text>
<text x="396" y="452">no</text>
<text x="456" y="452">attributes)</text>
<text x="12" y="500">6.</text>
<text x="128" y="500">EAP-Response/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="72" y="516">AT_FRAGMENT</text>
<text x="144" y="516">(next</text>
<text x="204" y="516">fragment</text>
<text x="252" y="516">of</text>
<text x="340" y="516">AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)</text>
<text x="228" y="564">7.</text>
<text x="340" y="564">EAP-Request/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="312" y="580">(acknowledgement,</text>
<text x="396" y="580">no</text>
<text x="456" y="580">attributes)</text>
<text x="12" y="628">8.</text>
<text x="128" y="628">EAP-Response/AKA-Identity</text>
<text x="72" y="644">AT_FRAGMENT</text>
<text x="148" y="644">(final</text>
<text x="212" y="644">fragment</text>
<text x="260" y="644">of</text>
<text x="348" y="644">AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)</text>
<text x="228" y="692">9.</text>
<text x="344" y="692">EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge</text>
<text x="276" y="708">AT_RAND,</text>
<text x="348" y="708">AT_AUTN,</text>
<text x="416" y="708">AT_KDF,</text>
<text x="464" y="708">...</text>
<text x="304" y="724">[AT_CHECKCODE],</text>
<text x="396" y="724">AT_MAC</text>
<text x="16" y="772">10.</text>
<text x="84" y="772">EAP-Response</text>
<text x="192" y="772">AKA-Challenge</text>
<text x="64" y="788">AT_RES,</text>
<text x="160" y="788">[AT_CHECKCODE],</text>
<text x="252" y="788">AT_MAC</text>
<text x="232" y="836">11.</text>
<text x="296" y="836">EAP-Success</text>
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</artwork><artwork  type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Peer                                             Server
----                                             ------

                           1. EAP-Request/Identity
<------------------------------------------------------

2. EAP-Response/Identity
   realm-only identity
------------------------------------------------------>

                           3. EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
                              AT_ANY_ID_REQ
                              [AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED]
<------------------------------------------------------

   Case A: the identity fits in AT_IDENTITY
4. EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
   AT_IDENTITY (full identity)
------------------------------------------------------>

   Case B: the identity does not fit in AT_IDENTITY
4. EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
   AT_FRAGMENT (first fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)
------------------------------------------------------>

                           5. EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
                              (acknowledgement, no attributes)
<------------------------------------------------------

6. EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
   AT_FRAGMENT (next fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)
------------------------------------------------------>

                           7. EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
                              (acknowledgement, no attributes)
<------------------------------------------------------

8. EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
   AT_FRAGMENT (final fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY)
------------------------------------------------------>

                           9. EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
                              AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_KDF, ...
                              [AT_CHECKCODE], AT_MAC
<------------------------------------------------------

10. EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge
    AT_RES, [AT_CHECKCODE], AT_MAC
------------------------------------------------------>

                           11. EAP-Success
<------------------------------------------------------
]]></artwork></artset></figure>

<t><list style="numbers">
  <t>The server sends EAP-Request/Identity.</t>
  <t>The peer sends EAP-Response/Identity with a realm-only identity. This
identity only routes the EAP exchange to the server, and it does not identify
the peer. An AAA proxy that routes on the realm treats the username part as
opaque and forwards it unchanged. A peer SHOULD send a realm-only identity,
because Section 2.4 of <xref target="RFC7542"/> recommends omitting the username in this
case: a fixed username such as “anonymous” cannot be distinguished from the
name of a real user. A peer MAY instead send a NAI with a fixed username, such
as “anonymous@realm”, if its deployment or access technology requires it, for
example the anonymous SUCI in <xref target="TS23003"/>. A server MUST accept both forms,
and MUST NOT use the username part to identify the peer.</t>
  <t>The server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Identity with AT_ANY_ID_REQ (or another
identity request attribute permitted by <xref target="RFC9048"/>). A server that can
process AT_LARGE_IDENTITY also includes AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, which
carries Max-Identity-Length (see <xref target="at-large-identity-supported"/>).  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The peer then selects the identity to send. A peer can support several SUCI
protection schemes, for example PQC schemes and classical ECIES schemes,
which produce identities of different lengths. Local policy decides which
scheme the peer prefers. An example is a priority list of protection
schemes, as in <xref target="TS33501"/>.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The peer uses the presence or absence of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED to
select a scheme whose SUCI can be carried in an identity attribute that the
server can process. Every server can process AT_IDENTITY. The presence of
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED tells the peer that the server can also process
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, fragmented using AT_FRAGMENT, and so that the peer can
send a multi-packet large identity. The peer first determines which
identities it can send to this server:  <list style="symbols">
      <t>If the server did not send AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, the peer treats
the server as unable to process AT_LARGE_IDENTITY. The peer MUST NOT
select a multi-packet large identity. It can select only an identity that
fits in AT_IDENTITY.</t>
      <t>If the server sent AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, the peer can select any
identity that is not longer than Max-Identity-Length, including a
multi-packet large identity. The peer MUST NOT select an identity longer
than Max-Identity-Length.</t>
    </list>
Among the identities that it can send to this server, the peer selects the
one that local policy prefers. If the policy is a priority list, the peer
selects the highest-priority scheme that can be used. For example, if the
list has PQC schemes before ECIES schemes and the server did not send
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, the peer skips the PQC schemes and selects the
highest-priority ECIES scheme. If the server sent
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, the peer selects the highest-priority scheme
whose identity is not longer than Max-Identity-Length, which here is a PQC
scheme if the server’s maximum is large enough for it.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The peer decides whether an identity fits in AT_IDENTITY by the length of
the EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet that would carry it. The packet consists
of the 8-octet EAP-AKA’ header and the AT_IDENTITY attribute, which is a
4-octet attribute header, the identity, and padding to a multiple of four
octets. The identity fits if the packet is at most 1020 octets, the minimum
EAP MTU, which means that the identity is at most 1008 octets long. A longer
identity is sent in AT_LARGE_IDENTITY.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
If the server rejects the exchange, for example because of its local limits,
the peer MAY start a new exchange with another scheme, if local policy
allows.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The selection is always subject to local policy. The peer MUST NOT select a
scheme in a way that violates local policy, for example a policy that
requires a PQC scheme or a minimum security level. The peer MUST NOT fall
back to an unconcealed identity unless local policy explicitly allows it. If
no scheme can be used, the peer fails the authentication.</t>
  <t>The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA-Identity with the selected identity.  <list style="symbols">
      <t>Case A, a single-packet large identity: the peer sends the full identity
in one AT_IDENTITY attribute in one EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet, as
specified in <xref target="RFC9048"/>. The peer MUST NOT use AT_LARGE_IDENTITY or
AT_FRAGMENT, whether or not the server sent AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED.
The limit on the RADIUS User-Name attribute does not apply to this
identity, because it is carried in EAP-Message attributes <xref target="RFC3579"/>. The
exchange skips steps 5 to 8, and continues at step 9.</t>
      <t>Case B, a multi-packet large identity: the peer includes the full identity
in an AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute (see <xref target="at-large-identity"/>) and fragments
that attribute. This packet carries an AT_FRAGMENT attribute with the first
fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY. The peer follows the AT_FRAGMENT procedures
specified in <xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/>. If the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute
fits in one EAP packet, the peer sends it unfragmented, as specified in
that document.</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>The server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Identity with no attributes, to acknowledge
the fragment. This packet does not contain an identity-requesting attribute.</t>
  <t>The peer sends the next fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY in
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity.</t>
  <t>The server sends an acknowledgement, as in step 5.</t>
  <t>The peer sends the final fragment of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY in
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity. The server then reassembles the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY
attribute as specified in <xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/>, and processes the
identity in it as if it had been received in AT_IDENTITY, as specified in
<xref target="RFC9048"/>.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The figure shows three fragments as an example. If AT_LARGE_IDENTITY needs
more than three fragments, steps 6 and 7 repeat for each additional fragment
before the final one. If it needs only two fragments, steps 6 and 7 are
omitted.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The fragments are parts of one AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute, so steps 3 to 8
are one EAP/AKA-Identity round. The EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packets in steps
5 and 7 only acknowledge fragments, as specified in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/>. They contain no attributes and do not request an
identity, so they are not counted for the limit of three
EAP-Request/AKA-Identity messages in Section 4.1.5 of <xref target="RFC4187"/>, and the
requirement of Section 9.1 of <xref target="RFC4187"/> for an identity-requesting
attribute does not apply to them.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The server processes the reassembled identity before any AT_MAC can be
verified, because the keys for AT_MAC are derived from the authentication
vector that the server obtains using the identity. Section 7.4 of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/> requires that data in a reassembled attribute be
processed only after AT_MAC verification. It also requires every fragment,
including the final one, to be acknowledged by a separate message. This
document specifies AT_LARGE_IDENTITY as an exception to both rules. The
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge in step 9 acknowledges the final fragment, which
avoids an extra round trip.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
The identity exchange happens before the peer is authenticated, so the
server MUST be able to process an identity up to the Max-Identity-Length that
it sent, and MUST enforce local limits on the length of the reassembled
identity, the number of concurrent reassemblies, and the lifetime of an
incomplete reassembly. The server MUST fail the EAP-AKA’ exchange if a limit
is exceeded.  <vspace blankLines='1'/>
<xref target="TS33501"/> limits the scheme output of a proprietary protection scheme to
3000 octets plus the size of the input. In the hexadecimal encoding of the
NAI, this is up to 6000 octets plus twice the size of the input. A server that
supports such schemes SHOULD send a Max-Identity-Length that is large enough
for such an identity, including the other fields of the NAI-format SUCI.</t>
  <t>The server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge. If the server sent
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED in step 3, it MUST include AT_CHECKCODE, as
specified in Section 3.4.3 of <xref target="RFC9048"/>. In case B, this also acknowledges
the final fragment.</t>
  <t>The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge. If the peer sent
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, the peer MUST include AT_CHECKCODE.</t>
  <t>The server sends EAP-Success.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="at-large-identity" title="AT_LARGE_IDENTITY">

<t>AT_LARGE_IDENTITY carries a multi-packet large identity. It has the same
meaning as AT_IDENTITY, except that it carries an identity of more than 1008
octets, which does not fit in an AT_IDENTITY attribute in a 1020-octet EAP
packet. The peer and the server use the identity in AT_LARGE_IDENTITY wherever
<xref target="RFC9048"/> uses the identity in AT_IDENTITY: in the EAP-AKA’ key derivation
(Section 5.3.1 of <xref target="RFC9048"/>) and as the exported Peer-Id (Section 6 of
<xref target="RFC9048"/>), for which only the Actual Identity Length octets of the identity
are used. This document does not change the key derivation.</t>

<t>The attribute has this format:</t>

<figure title="AT_LARGE_IDENTITY"><artset><artwork  type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="208" width="528" viewBox="0 0 528 208" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
<path d="M 8,64 L 8,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 136,64 L 136,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 264,64 L 264,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 520,64 L 520,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,64 L 520,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,96 L 520,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,128 L 264,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,176 L 520,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<g class="text">
<text x="16" y="36">0</text>
<text x="176" y="36">1</text>
<text x="336" y="36">2</text>
<text x="496" y="36">3</text>
<text x="16" y="52">0</text>
<text x="32" y="52">1</text>
<text x="48" y="52">2</text>
<text x="64" y="52">3</text>
<text x="80" y="52">4</text>
<text x="96" y="52">5</text>
<text x="112" y="52">6</text>
<text x="128" y="52">7</text>
<text x="144" y="52">8</text>
<text x="160" y="52">9</text>
<text x="176" y="52">0</text>
<text x="192" y="52">1</text>
<text x="208" y="52">2</text>
<text x="224" y="52">3</text>
<text x="240" y="52">4</text>
<text x="256" y="52">5</text>
<text x="272" y="52">6</text>
<text x="288" y="52">7</text>
<text x="304" y="52">8</text>
<text x="320" y="52">9</text>
<text x="336" y="52">0</text>
<text x="352" y="52">1</text>
<text x="368" y="52">2</text>
<text x="384" y="52">3</text>
<text x="400" y="52">4</text>
<text x="416" y="52">5</text>
<text x="432" y="52">6</text>
<text x="448" y="52">7</text>
<text x="464" y="52">8</text>
<text x="480" y="52">9</text>
<text x="496" y="52">0</text>
<text x="512" y="52">1</text>
<text x="68" y="84">Type</text>
<text x="196" y="84">Reserved</text>
<text x="388" y="84">Length</text>
<text x="68" y="116">Actual</text>
<text x="132" y="116">Identity</text>
<text x="196" y="116">Length</text>
<text x="164" y="148">Identity</text>
<text x="244" y="148">(variable)</text>
<text x="304" y="148">and</text>
<text x="352" y="148">padding</text>
</g>
</svg>
</artwork><artwork  type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Type      |   Reserved    |            Length             |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |    Actual Identity Length     |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
 |               Identity (variable) and padding                 |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></artset></figure>

<t><list style="hanging">
  <t hangText="Type:">
  TBD1. The value is in the non-skippable range (0 to 127) of the attribute
types <xref target="RFC4187"/>.</t>
  <t hangText="Reserved:">
  One octet. The sender MUST set it to zero. The receiver MUST ignore it.</t>
  <t hangText="Length:">
  Two octets. The length of the attribute in units of four octets, including the
Type, Reserved, Length, Actual Identity Length, Identity, and padding fields.
The length of the attribute in octets is this value multiplied by 4. This
differs from AT_IDENTITY, whose Length field is one octet and limits the
attribute to 255 x 4 = 1020 octets. The attribute is at most 65535 octets
long, because the Total Attribute Length field of AT_FRAGMENT in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/> has two octets.</t>
  <t hangText="Actual Identity Length:">
  Two octets. The length of the identity in octets, without padding.</t>
  <t hangText="Identity:">
  The identity, in the same format as the identity in AT_IDENTITY
<xref target="RFC4187"/>, followed by zero to three octets of padding, set to zero, so that
the length of the attribute is a multiple of four octets.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A peer MUST NOT send AT_LARGE_IDENTITY unless the server sent
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED in the same EAP-AKA’ exchange, because a server that
does not implement this document does not recognize the attribute, which is
non-skippable. A peer MUST NOT send AT_LARGE_IDENTITY and AT_IDENTITY in the
same packet.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="at-large-identity-supported" title="AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED">

<t>The server sends AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED in an EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
packet to tell the peer that it can process AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, fragmented using
AT_FRAGMENT, during the identity exchange. The peer uses the presence or
absence of the attribute to select a protection scheme whose SUCI can be carried
in an identity attribute that the server can process.</t>

<t>The attribute has this format:</t>

<figure title="AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED"><artset><artwork  type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="128" width="528" viewBox="0 0 528 128" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
<path d="M 8,64 L 8,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 136,64 L 136,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 264,64 L 264,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 520,64 L 520,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,64 L 520,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<path d="M 8,96 L 520,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
<g class="text">
<text x="16" y="36">0</text>
<text x="176" y="36">1</text>
<text x="336" y="36">2</text>
<text x="496" y="36">3</text>
<text x="16" y="52">0</text>
<text x="32" y="52">1</text>
<text x="48" y="52">2</text>
<text x="64" y="52">3</text>
<text x="80" y="52">4</text>
<text x="96" y="52">5</text>
<text x="112" y="52">6</text>
<text x="128" y="52">7</text>
<text x="144" y="52">8</text>
<text x="160" y="52">9</text>
<text x="176" y="52">0</text>
<text x="192" y="52">1</text>
<text x="208" y="52">2</text>
<text x="224" y="52">3</text>
<text x="240" y="52">4</text>
<text x="256" y="52">5</text>
<text x="272" y="52">6</text>
<text x="288" y="52">7</text>
<text x="304" y="52">8</text>
<text x="320" y="52">9</text>
<text x="336" y="52">0</text>
<text x="352" y="52">1</text>
<text x="368" y="52">2</text>
<text x="384" y="52">3</text>
<text x="400" y="52">4</text>
<text x="416" y="52">5</text>
<text x="432" y="52">6</text>
<text x="448" y="52">7</text>
<text x="464" y="52">8</text>
<text x="480" y="52">9</text>
<text x="496" y="52">0</text>
<text x="512" y="52">1</text>
<text x="68" y="84">Type</text>
<text x="196" y="84">Length</text>
<text x="392" y="84">Max-Identity-Length</text>
</g>
</svg>
</artwork><artwork  type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Type      |    Length     |      Max-Identity-Length      |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></artset></figure>

<t><list style="hanging">
  <t hangText="Type:">
  TBD2. The value is in the skippable range (128 to 255) of the attribute
types <xref target="RFC4187"/>, so that a peer that does not implement this document
ignores the attribute.</t>
  <t hangText="Length:">
        <list style="numbers">
        <t>The length of the attribute in units of four octets. The attribute is 4
octets long.</t>
      </list>
  </t>
  <t hangText="Max-Identity-Length:">
  Two octets. The maximum length, in octets, of an identity that the server can
process in AT_LARGE_IDENTITY. It is in the same unit as the Actual Identity
Length field of AT_LARGE_IDENTITY. A server MUST be able to process an
identity up to this length. A server MUST NOT send a value larger than 65526,
because the Total Attribute Length field of AT_FRAGMENT in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka"/> limits an AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute to 65535
octets, and the attribute has a header of 6 octets and is padded to a multiple
of four octets.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The peer MUST NOT select an identity longer than Max-Identity-Length.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="error-handling" title="Error Handling">

<t>If a peer or a server detects an error in the identity exchange defined in this
document, it MUST fail the EAP-AKA’ exchange as specified in <xref target="RFC9048"/>.</t>

<t>A server SHOULD treat the following as errors:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>AT_LARGE_IDENTITY or AT_FRAGMENT received without
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED having been sent;</t>
  <t>a malformed AT_LARGE_IDENTITY or AT_FRAGMENT attribute, including an Actual
Identity Length that is inconsistent with the Length;</t>
  <t>an identity in AT_LARGE_IDENTITY that is longer than Max-Identity-Length or
another server limit;</t>
  <t>an identity that has invalid syntax after reassembly;</t>
  <t>a reassembly timeout;</t>
  <t>a missing or invalid AT_CHECKCODE, if AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED was sent.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The server MAY send EAP-Failure after it detects such an error.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="backward-compatibility" title="Backward Compatibility">

<t>This document is backward compatible with existing EAP-AKA’ peers and servers.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A single-packet large identity is sent using only the messages and attributes
already defined in <xref target="RFC9048"/>.</t>
  <t>A peer that does not implement this document ignores
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, because the attribute is skippable.</t>
  <t>A peer that implements this document sends AT_LARGE_IDENTITY and AT_FRAGMENT
only if the server sent AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED.</t>
  <t>A server that does not implement this document treats it as an error when 
receiving AT_FRAGMENT or AT_LARGE_IDENTITY.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations" title="Security Considerations">

<t>AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED, AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, AT_FRAGMENT, and the EAP
Request/Response messages that carry them are not protected by AT_MAC, because
the keys do not exist yet.  AT_CHECKCODE (see steps 9 and 10 in <xref target="msgflow"/>) 
lets the peer and the server detect, in the challenge round, that someone may 
have tampered with the other attributes. For example, an attacker could remove
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED to downgrade a peer with several allowed protection
schemes toward a scheme that needs no fragments, such as a classical ECIES
scheme instead of a PQC scheme. AT_CHECKCODE detects such a change but does not
prevent it. A peer whose local policy requires a PQC scheme does not fall back
to a classical scheme.</t>

<t>The SUCI, carried in AT_LARGE_IDENTITY attribute, is integrity protected by its protection
scheme. A modified SUCI therefore fails deconcealment at the home network, and
the authentication fails. If the protection scheme does not provide integrity
protection, a modified identity still leads to different keys, because the key
derivation depends on the identity (see Section 5.3.1 of <xref target="RFC9048"/>), and the
AT_MAC verification in the challenge round fails.</t>

<t>Fragments can increase the risk of denial of service, because the server holds
state before the peer is authenticated. Servers MUST enforce the limits
described in step 8 in <xref target="msgflow"/>.</t>

<t>The choice of protection scheme is a local decision of the peer. The peer needs
to make sure that a fallback to a scheme that needs no fragments does not weaken
its security or privacy beyond what its local policy allows.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="privacy-considerations" title="Privacy Considerations">

<t>This document lets a peer keep using concealed identities when they become
large. Without it, a peer that cannot send a large SUCI, because the SUCI
exceeds the initial NAI limit or fragmentation is not available, might have to
fail the authentication or use a less private identity.</t>

<t>The length of a concealed identity can reveal the approximate length of the
identity. This document does not hide the length of the concealed identity. A
peer MAY pad the identity before fragmenting it if local policy requires hiding
the length. Padding is outside the scope of this document.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations" title="IANA Considerations">

<t>IANA is requested to allocate two Attribute Type values in the “EAP-AKA and
EAP-SIM Parameters” registry. AT_LARGE_IDENTITY is allocated from the non-skippable 
range (0-127), as specified in Section 8.1 of <xref target="RFC4187"/>.
AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED is allocated from the skippable range (128-255), 
so that a peer that does not implement this document ignores it.</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Value</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Attribute Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Range</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c>TBD1</c>
      <c>AT_LARGE_IDENTITY</c>
      <c>non-skippable</c>
      <c>RFC-TBD</c>
      <c>TBD2</c>
      <c>AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED</c>
      <c>skippable</c>
      <c>RFC-TBD</c>
</texttable>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>

    <references title='Normative References'>



<reference anchor='RFC2119' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119'>
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname='S. Bradner' initials='S.' surname='Bradner'/>
    <date month='March' year='1997'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2119'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC3748' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748'>
  <front>
    <title>Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)</title>
    <author fullname='B. Aboba' initials='B.' surname='Aboba'/>
    <author fullname='L. Blunk' initials='L.' surname='Blunk'/>
    <author fullname='J. Vollbrecht' initials='J.' surname='Vollbrecht'/>
    <author fullname='J. Carlson' initials='J.' surname='Carlson'/>
    <author fullname='H. Levkowetz' initials='H.' role='editor' surname='Levkowetz'/>
    <date month='June' year='2004'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an authentication framework which supports multiple authentication methods. EAP typically runs directly over data link layers such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) or IEEE 802, without requiring IP. EAP provides its own support for duplicate elimination and retransmission, but is reliant on lower layer ordering guarantees. Fragmentation is not supported within EAP itself; however, individual EAP methods may support this. This document obsoletes RFC 2284. A summary of the changes between this document and RFC 2284 is available in Appendix A. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3748'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC3748'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC4187' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4187'>
  <front>
    <title>Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)</title>
    <author fullname='J. Arkko' initials='J.' surname='Arkko'/>
    <author fullname='H. Haverinen' initials='H.' surname='Haverinen'/>
    <date month='January' year='2006'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanism for authentication and session key distribution that uses the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism. AKA is used in the 3rd generation mobile networks Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and CDMA2000. AKA is based on symmetric keys, and typically runs in a Subscriber Identity Module, which is a UMTS Subscriber Identity Module, USIM, or a (Removable) User Identity Module, (R)UIM, similar to a smart card.</t>
      <t>EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy support, optional result indications, and an optional fast re-authentication procedure. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4187'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4187'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC7542' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542'>
  <front>
    <title>The Network Access Identifier</title>
    <author fullname='A. DeKok' initials='A.' surname='DeKok'/>
    <date month='May' year='2015'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In order to provide inter-domain authentication services, it is necessary to have a standardized method that domains can use to identify each other's users. This document defines the syntax for the Network Access Identifier (NAI), the user identifier submitted by the client prior to accessing resources. This document is a revised version of RFC 4282. It addresses issues with international character sets and makes a number of other corrections to RFC 4282.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7542'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7542'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC9048' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9048'>
  <front>
    <title>Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')</title>
    <author fullname='J. Arkko' initials='J.' surname='Arkko'/>
    <author fullname='V. Lehtovirta' initials='V.' surname='Lehtovirta'/>
    <author fullname='V. Torvinen' initials='V.' surname='Torvinen'/>
    <author fullname='P. Eronen' initials='P.' surname='Eronen'/>
    <date month='October' year='2021'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The 3GPP mobile network Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is an authentication mechanism for devices wishing to access mobile networks. RFC 4187 (EAP-AKA) made the use of this mechanism possible within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework. RFC 5448 (EAP-AKA') was an improved version of EAP-AKA.</t>
      <t>This document is the most recent specification of EAP-AKA', including, for instance, details about and references related to operating EAP-AKA' in 5G networks.</t>
      <t>EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a key derivation function that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the access network. The key derivation function has been defined in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). EAP-AKA' allows its use in EAP in an interoperable manner. EAP-AKA' also updates the algorithm used in hash functions, as it employs SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 / HMAC-SHA-1, which is used in EAP-AKA.</t>
      <t>This version of the EAP-AKA' specification defines the protocol behavior for both 4G and 5G deployments, whereas the previous version defined protocol behavior for 4G deployments only. While EAP-AKA' as defined in RFC 5448 is not obsolete, this document defines the most recent and fully backwards-compatible specification of EAP-AKA'. This document updates both RFCs 4187 and 5448.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='9048'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC9048'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC8174' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174'>
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname='B. Leiba' initials='B.' surname='Leiba'/>
    <date month='May' year='2017'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8174'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8174'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka' target='https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka-05'>
   <front>
      <title>Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) in EAP-AKA prime</title>
      <author fullname='Tirumaleswar Reddy.K' initials='T.' surname='Reddy.K'>
         <organization>Nokia</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Aritra Banerjee' initials='A.' surname='Banerjee'>
         <organization>Nokia</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='30' month='October' year='2026'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for
   Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA&#x27; FS) is specified in
   [RFC9678].  It updates [RFC9048] with an optional extension that
   provides ephemeral key exchange using the traditional Ephemeral
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement algorithm.  This
   extension enables perfect forward secrecy (PFS).  However, it is
   susceptible to future threats from Cryptographically Relevant Quantum
   Computers, which could potentially compromise a traditional ephemeral
   public key.  If the adversary has also obtained knowledge of the
   long-term key and ephemeral public key, it could compromise session
   keys generated as part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA&#x27;.

   This draft aims to enhance the security of EAP-AKA&#x27; FS protocol by
   making it quantum-safe using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation
   Mechanisms (PQ KEMs).

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka-05'/>
   
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References'>



<reference anchor='RFC2865' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865'>
  <front>
    <title>Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)</title>
    <author fullname='C. Rigney' initials='C.' surname='Rigney'/>
    <author fullname='S. Willens' initials='S.' surname='Willens'/>
    <author fullname='A. Rubens' initials='A.' surname='Rubens'/>
    <author fullname='W. Simpson' initials='W.' surname='Simpson'/>
    <date month='June' year='2000'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a protocol for carrying authentication, authorization, and configuration information between a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links and a shared Authentication Server. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2865'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2865'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC3579' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3579'>
  <front>
    <title>RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)</title>
    <author fullname='B. Aboba' initials='B.' surname='Aboba'/>
    <author fullname='P. Calhoun' initials='P.' surname='Calhoun'/>
    <date month='September' year='2003'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) support for the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), an authentication framework which supports multiple authentication mechanisms. In the proposed scheme, the Network Access Server (NAS) forwards EAP packets to and from the RADIUS server, encapsulated within EAP-Message attributes. This has the advantage of allowing the NAS to support any EAP authentication method, without the need for method- specific code, which resides on the RADIUS server. While EAP was originally developed for use with PPP, it is now also in use with IEEE 802. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3579'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC3579'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="FIPS203" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="TS23003" target="https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/23_series/23.003/">
  <front>
    <title>3GPP TS 23.003: Numbering, addressing and identification</title>
    <author >
      <organization>3GPP</organization>
    </author>
    <date />
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="TS33501" target="https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.501/">
  <front>
    <title>3GPP TS 33.501: Security architecture and procedures for 5G System</title>
    <author >
      <organization>3GPP</organization>
    </author>
    <date />
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>


<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments" title="Acknowledgments">

<t>The author thanks the participants of 3GPP SA3 and IETF EMU working groups
for discussions on supporting large SUCI values. The author also thanks the
authors of I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka for defining the AT_FRAGMENT mechanism that
is reused in this document.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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