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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3-00" category="info" submissionType="independent" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Homing Pigeon v3">Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 3: DTLS 1.3 via Email</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3-00"/>
    <author initials="A." surname="Slutsky" fullname="Andrew Slutsky">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>slutsky5544@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <keyword>DTLS</keyword>
    <keyword>email</keyword>
    <keyword>store-and-forward</keyword>
    <keyword>perfect forward secrecy</keyword>
    <keyword>platform_info</keyword>
    <abstract>
      

<t>This document specifies version 3 of the Homing Pigeon message
protocol. Version 3 is a transport extension to version 1,
not a replacement for it: every
version 1 message keeps its meaning, the version 1 job
acceptance gate is unchanged, and version 3 changes exactly one
thing -- the carriage of the version 1 DTLS session profile.</t>
      <t>Version 1 defines a DTLS 1.3 session profile: one cipher suite,
a pre-shared key taken from the
protocol's shared secret, ephemeral Diffie-Hellman on every
handshake, and the platform_info disclosure carried in the
server's EncryptedExtensions. Version 1 binds that profile to
a live datagram path. This document binds the same profile to
the email binding: handshake flights and protected records are
carried as email messages over the store-and-forward mailbox,
so a session can be opened by an email, completed over further
emails, and then carry jobs and results inside it, with the
perfect forward secrecy of the version 1 profile intact on a
carrier that has no live path at all.</t>
      <t>The objects carried inside the session remain version 1
objects: a job or a result inside a session is the version 1
object, unchanged, carrying the version value version 1
defines. The 3 of this document's title numbers this document
and its carriage; it is not a value of any object's version
field, and nothing in this document mints a version 3 object.
HP-DTLS/3, the frame header this document defines, is a
carriage label whose digit is the carriage generation, not a
protocol version.</t>
      <t>This document is a local, unsubmitted draft. It has not been
posted to the Internet-Drafts directory, and it requests no
IANA action.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Version 1 <xref target="I-D.slutsky-homing-pigeon"/> is the base document.
Its email binding is store-and-forward: a job object is
an email, a result object is an email, and either can wait in a
mailbox for as long as the mailbox keeps it. Version 1's DTLS
binding is the opposite shape: a live session over datagrams,
with handshake flights exchanged in seconds and records
protected by keys that exist only for that session.</t>
      <t>Each binding gives up what the other has. The email binding
carries a job anywhere mail goes, including to a runner that is
only ever reachable through a mailbox, but the object crypto of
version 1 -- a signature and, by default, per-job encryption
under the shared secret -- provides no forward secrecy: the
shared secret is long-lived, and mail is stored. The DTLS
binding provides forward secrecy, because its session keys are
derived from an ephemeral exchange and erased with the
session, but it needs a live path, and a runner behind a
mailbox has none.</t>
      <t>Version 3 carries the version 1 DTLS profile, unchanged,
over the email binding. What it removes is the
confidentiality side of the trade: a runner reachable only
through a mailbox gains the session's forward secrecy. What
it does not remove is the rest of the trade -- store-and-
forward delay, a transcript stored at every hop, visible
subjects and sizes, and a pre-authentication surface the
size of the mailbox:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A DTLS handshake flight is carried as 1 or more email
messages (Sections 5 and 6).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The receiver's mailbox parser recognizes a DTLS
initialization flight and routes it to the DTLS engine,
never to the job execution path (Section 8).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Once the session is established, jobs and results travel as
application data inside it (Section 10), and each job still
faces the version 1 acceptance gate in full (Section 10.2).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The platform disclosure rides the handshake on this carrier
exactly as on the datagram binding, in EncryptedExtensions,
so the initiator holds it when the session is established
and no post-handshake poll of the mailbox is needed to learn
it (Section 11).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Nothing else in version 1 changes. The deltas in this document
are stated as deltas: where this document says a version 1 rule
applies, it applies as written there.</t>
      <t>The same profile therefore runs on 2 bindings, and their
names are kept distinct. On the version 1 datagram binding
it is DTLS, with no qualifier: the submitter is told the
runner's IP address and port, and DTLS runs over UDP
datagrams as <xref target="RFC9147"/> defines. On this document's
binding it is DTLS via email: the same profile's datagrams
ride email messages, and no inbound UDP listener -- and no
firewall hole for one -- is needed. A deployment <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> offer
either binding, or both; the profile, the handshake, and
the acceptance gate are the same on each.</t>
      <section anchor="status-of-this-document">
        <name>Status of this document</name>
        <t>This is a local working draft, revision -00, dated 2026-11-02.
It is not an Internet-Draft of record: it has not been
submitted to the IETF datatracker or posted to the
Internet-Drafts directory, no submission is requested by this
text, and the IANA considerations (Section 15) request no
assignment. The carriage this document specifies is implemented
and tested in the Homing Pigeon software suite under an opt-in
configuration option; the option is off by default.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="requirements-language">
      <name>Requirements Language</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

</section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The terms of version 1 apply: the runner, the submitter, the
shared secret, the job object, the result object, the
acceptance gate, and the platform disclosure. This document adds:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>flight mail:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>1 email message carrying all or part of exactly 1 DTLS
datagram under this carriage.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>mail session-id:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the identifier in a flight subject (Section 5.1) that names
1 mail-carried session attempt. It is a routing label chosen
by the initiator. It is not a credential, not a DTLS
identity, and not the mailbox's identifier for any message.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>transfer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the set of flight mails that together carry 1 segmented
datagram, named by a transfer identifier (Section 5.2).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>carriage:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>the rules of Sections 5 to 9: how datagrams become flight
mail, how flight mail becomes datagrams again, and how the
mailbox parser dispatches each.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-dtls-profile-on-this-carriage">
      <name>The DTLS Profile on This Carriage</name>
      <section anchor="the-profile-is-version-1s-unchanged">
        <name>The profile is version 1's, unchanged</name>
        <t>The session profile of version 1 Sections 19 and 20 applies to
this carriage without modification, except where a later
section of this document states a delta explicitly. In
particular:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/> is the session protocol. The 1 cipher
suite is TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The pre-shared key is the shared secret of version 1. The
shared secret is an authenticator and only an
authenticator; it is never the session key, which is
derived from the ephemeral exchange of every handshake.
There is no second secret and no new key material in
this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Only the <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> key exchange mode is used. <tt>psk_ke</tt>
              <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be offered, accepted, or fallen back to, in a full
handshake or in resumption. Every handshake, full or resumed,
carries a fresh ephemeral share -- X25519, or the hybrid
share of Section 4.4 where that section applies. This is the rule the
perfect forward secrecy property of Section 16.1 rests on,
and this carriage does not relax it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The responder is stateless until a HelloRetryRequest cookie
validates, exactly as on the datagram binding.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Connection IDs <xref target="RFC9146"/> are used in both directions.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Early data is not used; there is no 0-RTT on this carriage.
A ClientHello that carries early data is a malformed
flight on this carriage and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected (Section 13).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The platform_info extension is offered empty in the
ClientHello and, when offered, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be answered in
EncryptedExtensions only, exactly as version 1 Section 20
states (Section 11 of this document).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Certificates are not part of this profile, in either
direction: version 1 Section 19 says so of the profile, and
the profile applies here without modification, so the
exclusion covers this carriage as it covers the datagram
binding. Nothing in this document adds a certificate path
or any other authentication mechanism; the shared secret is
the only credential the handshake knows, on this carriage
as on the other. A ClientHello that offers no
pre_shared_key extension is refused before any key is
derived: there is no other credential for it to fall back
to.</t>
        <t>The UDP port 20220 of version 1 is a local default of the
datagram binding. This carriage has no port: its addresses are
mailboxes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="what-the-carriage-changes-and-what-it-does-not">
        <name>What the carriage changes, and what it does not</name>
        <t>The carriage changes the unit of transport. DTLS is written
for datagrams that arrive whole, in order or not, within
seconds. Mail arrives whole per message, in no guaranteed
order, after delays of seconds to days, sometimes more than
once, and with a size limit far below a mailbox's own. Sections
5 to 9 exist to bridge exactly those differences -- size,
ordering, duplication, delay -- and nothing else.</t>
        <t>The carriage does not change the cryptography, the handshake,
the record protection, the session's authentication, or the
job acceptance gate -- with the single exception stated in
Section 4.4, the hybrid ephemeral share, which changes what
the ephemeral exchange is made of and nothing around it. An
implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use this
carriage as a reason to alter any of those beyond that
stated exception.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="enablement">
        <name>Enablement</name>
        <t>This carriage is opt-in. A runner enables it by explicit
configuration (in the reference implementation, the
<tt>dtls_via_email</tt> option, which only the literal boolean true
enables). A runner that has not enabled it treats flight mail
as it treats any other mail its parser does not dispatch, and
its existing secret boundary is unchanged: the shared secret
is handed to the component that terminates DTLS only when the
carriage is enabled, exactly as it is handed to the datagram
binding's listener when that binding is enabled.</t>
        <t>A submitter discovers the carriage the way it discovers the
platform: by attempting it and reading the outcome, or from
the platform card of a prior exchange. There is no negotiation
message, and a failed attempt has no effect on the ordinary
email binding, which continues to work exactly as before.</t>
        <t>A platform card <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> state, as an unauthenticated fact, that
the runner offers this carriage. The fact is trusted for
nothing except whether an attempt is worth making. It grants
nothing. Admission remains the handshake's and the acceptance
gate's (Section 10.2).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-hybrid-share">
        <name>The hybrid share</name>
        <t>The one delta this document states against the profile of
Section 4.1 concerns the ephemeral share itself. On this
carriage, a client offers, beside the X25519 share, the
hybrid share X25519MLKEM768 <xref target="RFC10024"/>: in the client
share, the ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key followed by an
X25519 share; in the server share, the ML-KEM ciphertext
followed by an X25519 share; and a shared secret that is
the ML-KEM secret followed by the X25519 secret, fed into
the same key schedule the X25519 secret feeds on the
datagram binding. A responder on this carriage that is
offered the hybrid share selects it. A responder that does
not implement this section -- and every peer on the
datagram binding, where the version 1 profile stands
unchanged -- selects the X25519 share, and the session is
an ordinary version 1 session. The hybrid rides under the
same <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> rule: a fresh hybrid share in every
handshake, full or resumed, the shared secret still only
authenticating, and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 still the
suite. The home of the group is this carriage's profile;
the datagram binding does not offer it.</t>
        <t>The responder <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform the encapsulation-key check of
FIPS 203 Section 7.2 on a hybrid client share and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
abort the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert when
it fails, as <xref target="RFC10024"/> requires. A hybrid share of any
size other than the one <xref target="RFC10024"/> fixes, and a hybrid
session whose Finished does not verify, fail the handshake
closed; nothing falls back to a weaker exchange in answer
to a failure (Section 12).</t>
        <t>What the hybrid buys is stated in Section 16.1: it narrows
the recorded-session limit of the bare X25519 exchange. It
changes nothing else in this document: not the gate, not
the framing, not the disclosure, not the bounds.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="message-format">
      <name>Message Format</name>
      <section anchor="the-flight-subject">
        <name>The flight subject</name>
        <t>Flight mail is recognized by its subject, under the subject
grammar of version 1 (spelled out in the reference
implementation in 1 place, so every reader routes the same
subjects). The flight subject is:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
[HOMING-PIGEON] dtls <mail session-id>
]]></artwork>
        <t>In ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/>, with the separator set as version 1
defines it:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
flight-subject  = "[HOMING-PIGEON]" gap "dtls" gap
                  session-id
session-id      = 1*128 session-id-char
                  ; and not "." or ".."
session-id-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "_" / "-"
]]></artwork>
        <t>The session-id alphabet is stated here in full and does not
inherit version 1's <tt>word-char</tt>: it is an alphabet safe in
a mail header field (<xref target="RFC5322"/>, Section 2.2) and as a
filesystem name, and a future widening of version 1's
production <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> widen it.</t>
        <t>The mail session-id is chosen by the initiator, 1 per session
attempt; a resumption attempt is a new attempt and takes a new
mail session-id. The responder answers flight mail for an
attempt under the same mail session-id it arrived under.</t>
        <t>A mail user agent that replies to flight mail may prepend a
reply prefix to its subject. A receiver <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept at most 1
leading "Re:" or "Fwd:" (case-insensitive), and only when the
remainder is exactly a flight subject. A chain of prefixes,
or any other text before the marker, is not a flight subject.</t>
        <t>The prefixes are mail user agent convention, not subject
syntax: the Subject field is unstructured, and <xref target="RFC5322"/>
Section 3.6.5 describes "Re:" as something a reply's field
body may start with. The acceptance rule here is this
carriage's own, stated so a receiver's tolerance is a
decision of this document and not a claim about the message
format.</t>
        <t>Subjects route; they never authenticate. A receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
treat a flight subject, a mail session-id, or any mail header
(<tt>From</tt>, <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Reply-To</tt>, <tt>Message-ID</tt>, the mailbox UID, or
arrival order) as evidence of who sent a flight. Authentication
is the DTLS handshake's, applied to the datagram after
reassembly (Section 6), and to nothing else.</t>
        <t>An implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also accept the unaddressed harness
shape -- subject exactly <tt>[HOMING-PIGEON] dtls</tt> and a body that
is the base64 of 1 datagram -- inside an in-process test
harness that is not a mailbox. That shape carries no mail
session-id, cannot be bound to a session under Section 9.2,
and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be required by any deployment. A deployment
mailbox <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> feed it to a DTLS stack. On that mailbox it
is malformed flight mail (Section 8.3): consumed, dropped,
and worth no answer.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-flight-frame">
        <name>The flight frame</name>
        <t>The frame of a flight mail is carried in a dedicated MIME
part of the message, whose content type is
<tt>application/hp-dtls3</tt> -- a name in the standards tree that
no registration backs: this document is local and requests
no media type registration for it (Section 15). The part's content, under
Content-Transfer-Encoding base64, is 1 header line, 1 line
break, and 1 base64 chunk:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
HP-DTLS/3 transfer=<t> part=<i> parts=<n> bytes=<b> sha384=<d>
<base64 chunk>
]]></artwork>
        <t>where:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>t</tt> is the transfer identifier: 16 lowercase hexadecimal
digits, chosen fresh by the sender for each datagram it
sends under this carriage.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>i</tt> and <tt>n</tt> are the 0-based index of this part and the total
number of parts, in decimal. An unsegmented datagram is
part 0 of 1.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b</tt> is the total length of the datagram in octets, in
decimal. The field publishes the datagram's exact length,
which is consistent while this document specifies no
padding (Section 16.2); if padding is ever added, <tt>b</tt> is
the padded length, or the field would undo the padding.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>d</tt> is the SHA-384 digest of the whole datagram, as 96
lowercase hexadecimal digits.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the chunk is a slice of the base64 encoding (<xref target="RFC4648"/>
Section 4, with padding) of the whole datagram. Slices are
cut on base64 group boundaries, so each chunk decodes on its
own and the decoded chunks, concatenated in index order,
are the datagram exactly.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The digest binds the parts of a transfer to each other and to
the datagram they claim to carry. It is not a signature and
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as authentication: a receiver verifies it
to know the datagram is whole, and authenticates the datagram
afterwards, by DTLS.</t>
        <t>The frame rides as its own part, and not as text in the
message's text part, precisely so that what intermediate
agents do to text cannot reach it: a mail gateway that
appends a disclaimer or a banner to the text part -- the
routine rewriting of real mail paths -- does not touch the
flight. This is the dedicated-part practice <xref target="RFC8551"/>
records for the same reason. Text outside the part is not
the frame and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored for framing.</t>
        <t>The part is a leaf part: a direct part of the message's
multipart structure, not the content of a message/rfc822
part. A sender <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> wrap it in one. A receiver finds
the frame part by its content type wherever it sits in the
part tree, and the wrapped shape is read where it is met --
but an intermediary that treats a message/rfc822 container
as an opaque attachment can drop the flight with the
container, and a sender has no reason to hand it the
chance: the serialization this document pins is the leaf.</t>
        <t>The header line is the part's 1st line. Base64 folding at
76 columns inside the part is accepted: the chunk is read
with its whitespace removed. Quoted-printable <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
used for the part and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be accepted for it: a part
whose transfer encoding is not base64 carries no frame.</t>
        <t>A message with no <tt>application/hp-dtls3</tt> part is read in
the naked shape this carriage began with: the frame as the
1st text/plain part's text, as a job body under version 1
is read, with no preamble and no trailer. When a typed part
is present it is the only frame source: a frame-shaped text
part does not rescue a typed part that does not frame, and
a part that does not frame is malformed flight mail
(Section 8.3).</t>
        <t>The naked shape is read for senders that never used the
typed part: a local harness, and senders that predate the
part. It is not a 2nd copy of the frame. A sender that uses
the typed part places the frame there and nowhere else; its
text part carries at most a note for a human, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
carry the frame. A receiver cannot tell that a typed part
was removed on the way. It applies the rule it can check:
no typed part means the naked shape, and a naked body that
does not frame is malformed flight mail (Section 8.3). A
conforming sender's text does not frame, so an intermediary
that removes the typed part ends that flight. The flight is
repaired, if at all, by the DTLS retransmission of Section
7.1 as a new flight mail, never by a reading of the text
part. An intermediary that drops the typed part from every
flight ends every attempt through it: this carriage does
not pass such an intermediary, and says so rather than
pretending the text part is a fallback.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="size-gates">
        <name>Size gates</name>
        <t>A flight mail is subject to the version 1 size cap for mail on
this binding, and that cap applies 1st: a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse
a flight mail whose raw object exceeds the cap before it
decodes any base64, allocates any reassembly state, or feeds
any octet to a DTLS stack.</t>
        <t>Within the carriage, a datagram <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed the carriage
datagram limit. The reference implementation's limit is 262144
octets, and its default chunk is 32768 base64 characters (24576
decoded octets at most per part before the header). Both are
local limits, configurable within the bounds of Sections 6
and 16.4; a sender that does not know the receiver's limits
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep a datagram within the reference limit. A part
count <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed 1024.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="segmentation-and-reassembly">
      <name>Segmentation and Reassembly</name>
      <t>A sender segments a datagram when its base64 form exceeds 1
chunk. Every part of 1 transfer carries the same transfer
identifier, part count, byte count, and digest, and a distinct
index. A sender <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> place parts of 2 datagrams in 1 flight
mail, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> place any datagram octets in a mail whose
subject is not a flight subject.</t>
      <t>The receiver's reassembly state is keyed by (mail session-id,
transfer identifier). Its rules are:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Parts <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> arrive in any order. Duplicate parts are
idempotent: the same index with the same chunk changes
nothing.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A part that contradicts its transfer -- a different chunk
for an index already held, or different header fields for
the transfer -- destroys the transfer. The receiver drops
the state and completes nothing from it. The sender may
start the transfer again under a new transfer identifier.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A transfer completes when every index is held and the
concatenated datagram matches the declared byte count and
digest. A completed datagram is delivered upward exactly
once, and the state is discarded.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Incomplete state is bounded in count, in total size, and in
age, and expires. The reference implementation holds at most
64 transfers. A transfer's age runs from its FIRST part as
well as its last: the reference implementation keeps a
transfer for at most 3600 seconds from its first part, and
3600 seconds from its last part, and no arriving part
extends the first-part deadline -- a sender dripping 1 part
just inside the idle window would otherwise hold a transfer
slot indefinitely. Expired parts complete nothing: a part
that arrives after its transfer expired starts a new,
incomplete transfer.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Reassembly is deliberately unauthenticated and therefore
deliberately cheap to discard: it holds bytes, it decides
nothing, and the first decision any reassembled datagram faces
is the DTLS stack's.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="retransmission-duplicates-and-ordering">
      <name>Retransmission, Duplicates, and Ordering</name>
      <section anchor="retransmission-is-dtlss">
        <name>Retransmission is DTLS's</name>
        <t>The carriage defines no acknowledgement and no retransmission
timer of its own. Retransmission is the DTLS handshake's, as
version 1's profile inherits it from <xref target="RFC9147"/>: each side
re-sends its current flight when its timer expires, and the
timers' values are the profile's. On this carriage a flight's
re-send is a new flight mail, under a new transfer identifier.
The re-sent flight is the DTLS stack's own retransmission --
from the record layer's perspective a new record, with a new
record sequence number (<xref target="RFC9147"/> Section 5.2) -- not a
copy of the earlier mail. A sender <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> re-send a
flight mail at the mail layer on its own schedule: 2
retransmission machines on 1 path multiply mail without adding
reliability.</t>
        <t>Timers that are reasonable on a live path are short on a
store-and-forward one. An implementation on this carriage
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> stretch its retransmission timers toward the mailbox
poll rhythm it operates on: concretely, the initial
retransmission interval <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be at least 2 of the
implementation's mailbox poll periods, and an attempt <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
be given up after about 8 retransmissions -- that give-up is
the attempt deadline of Section 9.4. <xref target="RFC9147"/> Section
5.8.2 permits a profile to recommend longer timer values
than its defaults; this paragraph is that recommendation for
a store-and-forward path. Stretching a timer changes no
message and no state machine; it is a local matter.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="duplicates-at-each-layer">
        <name>Duplicates, at each layer</name>
        <t>Mail is delivered at least once by some hops and exactly
observed twice by some pollers; DTLS is written for a network
that duplicates datagrams; and the job layer is written to run
each job at most once. The carriage keeps the 3 layers'
duplicate handling separate, and each layer's rule is its own:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Mail layer: the carriage suppresses exact duplicates,
split by phase. A receiver keeps a digest of each datagram
it has accepted from flight mail, bounded and in arrival
order; the reference implementation's cache holds 4096
digests, evicting the least recently seen (a hit refreshes
an entry's place). The cache is an optimization
against a poller or a sender delivering the same mail
twice; it is not the replay defense (Section 13 names the
defenses). The connection-id binding check of Section 9.2
runs before a datagram's digest is recorded, so a
misaddressed copy cannot poison the cache against the same
record arriving under its own session's mail. A digest hit
on a handshake-phase datagram is not fed to the DTLS stack
again -- nothing is derived twice -- and the receiver
instead re-posts its saved last outbound flight, under a
new transfer identifier: the duplicate is the signal that
the answer was lost (<xref target="RFC9147"/> Section 5.8.1). The
re-post is budgeted, because on this carriage it costs an
outbound mail that an unauthenticated sender can provoke
with a captured hello: a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> re-post a saved
flight at most once per generation of that flight. A
digest hit spends the 1 re-post the saved flight carries;
only a new flight from the DTLS stack -- a new answer, or
the stack's own retransmission on its timer -- arms
another; further bit-identical copies of a handshake-phase
datagram are dropped. A thousand copies of 1 ClientHello
therefore cost the responder at most 1 HelloRetryRequest
mail beyond the 1 it already sent (Section 16.4). A digest
hit on application data is dropped and does nothing. A
replayed mail is therefore not a new record at either
layer, and a lost flight is still repaired. A
retransmission under <xref target="RFC9147"/> Section 5.2 is not this
case. It is a new record, with a new record sequence
number, carrying the same handshake message, so it is not
bit-identical to the datagram already accepted. It misses
this cache, enters the stack, and is answered by the
stack. The budget does not limit it, and if the single
re-post was itself lost, that retransmission is what
repairs the attempt.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>DTLS layer: records are protected and sequenced by the
record layer as <xref target="RFC9147"/> specifies; a record that does
not authenticate is dropped by the stack, whether it is a
forgery, a corruption, or a replay the mail layer did not
catch.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Job layer: a job inside a session faces the version 1
acceptance gate, whose seen-set runs it at most once
(Section 10.2), under the same priced replay windows as any
other binding.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A duplicate flight mail <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> create a 2nd session, <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> deliver an application message twice, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> cause
a job to run twice. A duplicate part <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> complete a
transfer twice.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ordering">
        <name>Ordering</name>
        <t>No ordering is assumed anywhere in this carriage. Flight mails
of 1 attempt can arrive in any order; the handshake state
machines of <xref target="RFC9147"/> already tolerate reordered flights,
and parts tolerate reordering under Section 6. Application
messages inside a session keep the session's own order, which
the record layer defines; the order in which different jobs'
mails reached the mailbox is not an input to anything.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-mailbox-parser-lane-dispatch-and-recognition">
      <name>The Mailbox Parser: Lane Dispatch and Recognition</name>
      <section anchor="dispatch-order">
        <name>Dispatch order</name>
        <t>On a runner that has enabled this carriage, the mailbox parser
classifies each message it fetches before anything is
delivered anywhere. The classification is by subject grammar
and body shape, in this order:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>A message whose subject matches the flight subject is DTLS
input. It goes to the carriage, and to nothing else. The
unaddressed harness subject is not this case on a
deployment mailbox: it is malformed flight mail (Section
5.1) and is not fed to a DTLS stack.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A message whose subject is a version 1 job subject is a job
for the acceptance gate, as before.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Everything else is other mail, handled as before.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>DTLS classification happens in the component that owns the
mailbox (in the reference implementation, the email transport
extension), because that is where the DTLS server for this
carriage runs (Section 4.3). The runner core -- the acceptance
gate -- never sees flight mail.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="recognizing-the-initialization-flight">
        <name>Recognizing the initialization flight</name>
        <t>A complete datagram is an initialization flight when its 1st
record is a plaintext handshake record whose handshake
message is one complete ClientHello. A fragmented or
incomplete first handshake message is not an initialization.
It is malformed flight mail: consumed, dropped, not answered,
and allocated no reassembly state. The profile's ClientHello
is one message, and this carriage does not reassemble
handshake fragments before a cookie has validated. A complete
datagram that parses as DTLS records but is not an
initialization is a session datagram. The recognition is of
the DTLS bytes, not of the subject: the subject routes a
message to the carriage, and the bytes decide what the
carriage does with it.</t>
        <t>An initialization flight is answered as version 1's profile
answers it: statelessly, with a HelloRetryRequest, before any
session state exists. A first flight that is not a complete
ClientHello draws no HelloRetryRequest.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="fail-closed">
        <name>Fail closed</name>
        <t>A message with a DTLS subject whose body does not frame a
datagram under Section 5.2, whose session-id is not a valid
session-id, whose declared sizes are out of range, whose
digest does not match a completed datagram, or whose datagram
is not a DTLS record at all, is malformed flight mail. It is:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>consumed as DTLS input -- marked seen, so it is not offered
again on every poll; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>dropped -- it produces no session, no application message,
no job, and no result; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>never reinterpreted as a job or as any other kind of mail.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fall back from a DTLS-shaped
failure to any other reading of the same message. The lane a
message enters by its subject is the only lane it is ever read
in.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="seen-flags-and-fetches">
        <name>Seen flags and fetches</name>
        <t>Flight mail is consumed by the component that owns the
mailbox, and consumption is what marks it seen. A party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
mark a flight message seen only when it has consumed it --
fed it to the carriage, or determined it malformed under
Section 8.3. A fetch made to decide, before consumption,
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> set the seen flag: over IMAP <xref target="RFC9051"/> that is a
BODY.PEEK fetch, because a plain body fetch sets the flag as
a side effect, and a fetcher that marks its peer's flights
seen starves every other consumer of the same mailbox. An
initiator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore flight mail whose mail session-id is
not an attempt it has open: on a shared mailbox, stale
flights of dead attempts are normal, and they are not input.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="session-establishment">
      <name>Session Establishment</name>
      <section anchor="the-attempt-flight-by-flight">
        <name>The attempt, flight by flight</name>
        <t>An attempt proceeds exactly as the datagram binding's
handshake, with mail as the datagram path:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The initiator sends its ClientHello as flight mail under a
fresh mail session-id.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The responder, stateless, answers with a HelloRetryRequest
flight mail under the same mail session-id.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The initiator answers with its cookied ClientHello.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The responder validates the cookie and the PSK binder,
derives the handshake keys from the ephemeral exchange, and
sends its flight: ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions
(carrying the platform disclosure, Section 11), and
Finished.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The initiator verifies the flight, holds the disclosure
(Section 11), and sends its Finished. The session is
established at both ends when the responder verifies that
Finished.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>No step of this exchange is a job, produces a job, or is
visible to the acceptance gate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identity-binding-at-establishment">
        <name>Identity binding at establishment</name>
        <t>The responder's DTLS core needs a peer address to bind its
cookie and its session to. On the datagram binding that is the
datagram's source address. On this carriage there is no source
address a receiver may trust: the <tt>From</tt> header is a claim any
sender can write, and the mailbox's identifiers are local to
the mailbox. The peer address on this carriage is the ASCII
string <tt>email:</tt> followed by the mail session-id. That string
is an untrusted routing label: it demultiplexes concurrent
attempts on 1 mailbox, and it is not a credential, not a
mailbox identity, and not a key selector. The cookie key is a
secret of the responder, generated by the responder and not
derived from the address or from anything the message
asserts, so binding the cookie to an attacker-chosen label is
safe exactly while that key stays secret. The key's lifetime
is the matter of Section 9.4. The PSK identity inside the
handshake selects the shared secret, including any
additional secret, exactly as version 1 specifies; the mail
session-id never selects a key.</t>
        <t>When a session establishes, the carriage binds the mail
session-id to the session's connection ID. From then on:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A protected record is accepted under a mail session-id only
if its destination connection ID is the connection ID bound
to that mail session-id.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A record whose connection ID is bound to a different mail
session-id is dropped, whichever subject it arrived under.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A record therefore cannot be moved from 1 session to another
by relabeling its mail, and a session cannot be entered by
naming it: entry is the record protection itself, which only
the session's keys satisfy.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resumption">
        <name>Resumption</name>
        <t>Resumption over this carriage follows the profile: tickets
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be issued and, on this carriage, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be single-use.
A ticket is stored mail like any other flight, in the same
archive as the transcript, and a replayed ticket <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
become a second long-lived secret. (Version 1's <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> for
the datagram binding is unchanged.) A resumed handshake
is a full handshake in everything that matters here -- a fresh
mail session-id, a fresh ephemeral share, <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> only,
and a fresh platform disclosure (Section 11). A deployment <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
disable resumption on this carriage by configuration; doing so
changes no message, only how often full handshakes happen.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="attempt-deadline-and-failure">
        <name>Attempt deadline and failure</name>
        <t>An attempt that cannot complete -- a flight that never comes,
a binder that never verifies, a peer that stops answering --
is abandoned by the side waiting on it when its retransmission
gives up, and its partial state (reassembly state, digest
cache entries, the mail session-id binding) expires with the
bounds of Sections 6 and 7.2. A failed attempt leaves the
ordinary email binding untouched and has no effect on any
other attempt.</t>
        <t>The cookie key of Section 9.2 has a lifetime this path tests
and the datagram path never did. On the datagram binding a
HelloRetryRequest is answered within a round trip, inside 1
process lifetime of the responder. On this carriage it is
answered on a later poll -- an hour later on a slow poller --
which may be after the responder's process has restarted. A
responder <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep its cookie key across its own restarts
for at least the attempt deadline, kept as the shared secret
is kept: in the responder's own state, never in a flight, and
never derived from the address or from anything a message
asserts (Section 9.2). The reference implementation keeps it
beside the mailbox's own state, readable by its owner only.
A responder whose cookie key does not survive a restart
abandons every attempt in flight at that restart: the cookied
ClientHello fails the cookie check and is ignored, each
retransmission of it fails the same way, and the initiator
abandons the attempt when its retransmission gives up.
Recovery is a fresh attempt under a new mail session-id,
never a repair of the old one. Established sessions do not
survive a restart of either end on any binding -- their keys
are erased with the process, as Section 16.1 requires -- and
a result held for such a session follows Section 10.3.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="session-end">
        <name>Session end</name>
        <t>A session ends by alert, by the profile's own mechanisms, or
by being forgotten: a store-and-forward peer can vanish
without a farewell, and an implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> keep a
session's keys, or its mail session-id binding, past the
session's configured lifetime. Keys are erased with the
session (Section 16.1). A result that is waiting for a dead
session is not sent on any other path (Section 12); it is
held under Section 10.3's bounds and expires under them --
it is not kept forever, and expiry never sends it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="jobs-and-results-inside-a-session">
      <name>Jobs and Results Inside a Session</name>
      <section anchor="framing">
        <name>Framing</name>
        <t>Application data on the session is framed as version 1's
session profile frames it: a 4-octet big-endian length prefix
per message, and each application message is exactly 1
envelope -- the subject line, a blank line, and the object
body -- in the shape the version 1 channel envelope uses. A
job travels as the envelope of its job object. A result
travels as the envelope of its result object.</t>
        <t>On the runner, a completed application message is converted
back into that ordinary envelope and delivered to the runner
core through the same channel an ordinary mail job crosses.
The core cannot tell, and does not need to tell, that the
envelope arrived inside a session.</t>
        <t>The objects are version 1 objects. A job inside a session is
a version 1 job object and a result inside a session is a
version 1 result object, with the version value version 1
defines; the 3 of this document numbers the document and its
carriage only, and no object in a session carries it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-acceptance-gate-in-full-inside-the-session">
        <name>The acceptance gate, in full, inside the session</name>
        <t>Completing a DTLS handshake <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> bypass, widen, or
substitute for the job acceptance gate. A job carried inside
a session is admitted exactly as the same job arriving as
ordinary mail: it needs its valid HMAC signature under the
shared secret, its correct audience, and its compliance with
the size caps (the whole-job cap, the script cap, and the
envelope cap of version 1), and it is refused on the same
terms -- staleness, key policy, and the rest of version 1
Section 14's checks -- as any other job.</t>
        <t>The session authenticates the channel; the signature
authenticates the object. Neither stands in for the other,
and the version 1 rule stands verbatim on this carriage: a
cleartext object inside a session is still refused unless the
operator has enabled cleartext acceptance, because the
session's confidentiality is not the object's provenance.</t>
        <t>The 2 keys are checked independently. The PSK identity that
opened the session and the key id that signed a job inside
it need not name the same key: the gate reads the job's own
key id and applies that key's policy, and the session's key
confers nothing on the job and takes nothing from it. A job
signed under 1 key <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be carried by a session opened under
another, exactly as a signed job may be carried by any
mailbox. An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> admit, widen, or narrow
a job on the strength of the PSK identity of the session
that carried it: the session does not authorize the job,
and the job does not authorize the session. (The session's
key does decide 1 thing, which is not admission: where the
job's result may go, Section 10.3.)</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="results-are-session-bound">
        <name>Results are session-bound</name>
        <t>A result for a job that arrived inside a session is sent
inside that session, sealed as application data. The
carriage remembers, for each job it delivered from a session,
the session's connection ID and the job ident together, and
the PSK identity the session authenticated under -- never the
job ident alone, which the submitter chooses and which
collides across submitters. The hold is kept as the result
is kept, in the responder's own state and across a restart
of the process. A hold that died with the process would send
the result by the ordinary path on the next pass, which
Section 12 forbids. If that session no longer exists
when the result is ready, the result waits, and it can still
leave on this carriage in exactly 1 way: inside a later
session that authenticated under the same PSK identity and
that carries the same job ident again. The acceptance gate
refuses the repeated job as a replay (Section 13); the held
result is what answers it. A job whose ident is held for
another PSK identity's job is not delivered: it is logged and
dropped, because the hold belongs to the submitter whose job
it was, and delivering it would put that submitter's result,
or that submitter's job file, in the wrong hands. A held
result <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be sent as an ordinary mail result, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
be sent inside a session under a different PSK identity, and
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be sent inside a different job's session as if it
were that job's. Section 12 states the general rule this
follows from.</t>
        <t>The PSK identity distinguishes submitters only as finely as
the key directory. Two peers that authenticate with the same
secret are the same identity, and a later session of that
identity which carries the job ident again is a legitimate
destination for the held result. Distinct submitters are
distinct keys, which version 1's additional secrets already
are. This carriage does not invent a finer name for a
submitter, and a mail session-id is not one: the initiator
chooses it, and a resumption uses a fresh one (Section 9.3).</t>
        <t>The hold is bounded, as the hold of any state on this
carriage is bounded. A held result expires by age -- the
reference implementation's bound is 7 days -- and the held
set as a whole is bounded in count and in total bytes,
oldest first. An expired result is dropped and the expiry
is logged; it is never sent. Dropping is not downgrade:
downgrade would be sending the result by a weaker path.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="platform-disclosure-on-this-carriage">
      <name>Platform Disclosure on This Carriage</name>
      <t>The platform disclosure is the version 1 Section 20 mechanism,
unchanged: the initiator offers the platform_info extension,
empty, in its ClientHello; the responder <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> answer with a
disclosure object, and answers only in EncryptedExtensions;
it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send the disclosure unsolicited or in any other
message; the tiers are version 1's (none, family by default,
standard, full); the initiator cannot ask for a wider tier;
and a resumed session carries the disclosure again.</t>
      <t>The carriage is why the mechanism matters most here. On a live
path, a post-handshake greeting costs a round trip of
milliseconds. Over a mailbox, it costs a poll cycle at best
and a day of latency at worst -- and for a submitter that
plans work from the platform card, it costs that on
every session, before any work can be planned against the
platform it is about to address. Riding the final handshake
flight -- the pattern version 1 lifts from IKEv2's
Configuration Payload <xref target="RFC7296"/>, Section 3.15 -- means the
initiator holds the platform at the moment the session is
established, having sent and received exactly the flights the
handshake already needed. Even a rudimentary exchange counts:
a responder that can say only its disclosure tier and its
operating system family has still saved the round trip.</t>
      <t>The precondition that makes the early disclosure acceptable
is stated here, not left to the flight order alone: the
responder sends EncryptedExtensions only in a flight it
builds after the cookie has validated and the PSK binder has
verified (Section 9.1, step 4). A peer that does not hold the
shared secret cannot produce a verifying binder, and never
receives the disclosure; an unauthenticated ClientHello is
not enough to extract a platform card. The accepted cost of
version 1 Section 20 stands on this carriage too: the
disclosure is made a half-step earlier than a post-handshake
mechanism would make it, before the responder has verified
the initiator's Finished. Version 1's security
considerations argue the point; this document adopts the
argument.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="no-downgrade-rules">
      <name>No-Downgrade Rules</name>
      <t>The following are stated in 1 place because downgrade is the
failure this carriage is most often suspected of, and each
rule already exists somewhere above or in version 1:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>psk_ke</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be offered, accepted, or fallen back to,
on this carriage or any other (Section 4.1). A peer that
offers only <tt>psk_ke</tt> gets no session.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A session's keys are never a fallback for the object crypto,
and the object crypto is never a fallback for a session: a
job that was to travel inside a session does not travel as
an ordinary encrypted mail job instead when the session
fails (Section 10.2's gate is the same, but the carriage of
the object is part of what the submitter chose).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A cleartext object inside a session is refused on the
version 1 terms (Section 10.2). DTLS carriage is not a way
to make cleartext acceptable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A result bound to a session is never downgraded to an
ordinary mail result (Sections 10.3 and 12).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Flight mail that fails is never reinterpreted as a job
(Section 8.3). There is no reading of a message under which
a failed handshake becomes work.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The mail hop's own TLS (Section 16.2) is never a substitute
for the session: a deployment <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept "the mailbox
connection was encrypted" as a reason to run a session-less
job with session-level trust.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="replay-handling">
      <name>Replay Handling</name>
      <t>Replay is handled at 3 layers, each in its own terms, and no
layer is asked to do another's work:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A replayed flight mail meets the mail layer's rule, split
by phase (Section 7.2): a handshake-phase replay re-posts
the saved flight without re-entering the stack -- once per
generation of that flight, and then it is dropped -- and
an application-data replay is dropped before it. A replayed
initialization therefore cannot create a duplicate
session: at worst, a replay that evades the cache meets the
cookie exchange and the handshake state machine, which
answer a retransmitted ClientHello with the flight it
already produced and derive nothing twice. Early data has
no layer here at all: a ClientHello carrying early data is
rejected as a malformed flight (Section 4.1), and this
profile derives no epoch-1 keys for a replay to use.
<xref target="RFC9846"/> is the reason the rule is a rejection and not
a quiet skip: 0-RTT data is not forward secret, is
replayable between connections, and an application
protocol must not use it without a profile that says how
(<xref target="RFC9846"/> Sections 2.3 and 8, Appendix F.5). A job that
runs a program is not safe to replay, and on a mailbox the
ClientHello can sit for a day.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A replayed record meets the record layer: sequence numbers
and AEAD verification under <xref target="RFC9147"/> decide, and a record
that does not verify is dropped. A replayed application
message that somehow reached the core would meet the job
layer next in any case.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A replayed job meets the acceptance gate's seen-set: at
most once, with the 2 priced windows version 1 documents
(a crash between run and result, and the seen record ageing
out), and no 3rd window is opened by this carriage -- the
carriage adds no execution path, so it adds no replay path
to execution.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Resumption tickets on this carriage <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be single-use
(Section 9.3); version 1's <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> stands for the datagram
binding. A replayed ticket can at most restart a handshake
that still demands fresh ephemeral keys and a fresh binder
under the ticket's key.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operational-considerations">
      <name>Operational Considerations</name>
      <t>The carriage shares the mailbox with the ordinary email
binding. Flight mail and job mail are distinguished by the
parser's dispatch (Section 8.1) and neither delays the other
beyond 1 poll pass; an operator enables the carriage per
runner, and disabling it returns the mailbox to exactly its
previous behavior, with any in-flight attempts expiring under
Section 9.4.</t>
      <t>Poll rhythm is the operational dial that matters. A runner
that polls its mailbox every 20 seconds completes a handshake
in about 4 poll cycles when both sides are prompt; a runner
that polls hourly completes it in about 4 hours. Nothing in
the protocol changes -- only the timers an implementation
should choose (Section 7.1) and the patience of the submitter.
Operators pairing this carriage with a slow poll <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> say
so in the platform card's customary ways, so a submitter can
tell a slow session from a dead one.</t>
      <t>Sessions are state, and state on a store-and-forward path
should be visible to the operator: an implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
log session establishment, abandonment, and expiry, and the
dropping of malformed flight mail, at the same verbosity it
logs refused jobs. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> log session keys, ephemeral
material, or the shared secret, on this carriage or any other.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document requests no IANA action.</t>
      <t>The platform_info extension's code point is version 1's IANA
action, stated in version 1 Section 18: a value in the TLS
ExtensionType Values registry, TBD there, with 0xFFA0 in
interim private use. This document reuses that extension
exactly as version 1 defines it, on a new carriage; it does
not request a 2nd value, a new registry, a port, a service
name, a media type, or an OID. The DTLS reference port 20220
remains version 1's local default for the datagram binding and
is not used by this carriage.</t>
      <t>The carriage's MIME content type (Section 5.2) is an
unregistered name in the standards tree, used by a local
draft; this document requests no media type registration
for it. A future standards-track revision is where such a
request would belong.</t>
      <t>As a local, unsubmitted draft, this document could not ground
an assignment in any case: nothing in it is to be read as
requesting that IANA act, early or otherwise.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="perfect-forward-secrecy">
        <name>Perfect forward secrecy</name>
        <t>The property this version exists for: a session's keys are
derived from an ephemeral exchange performed fresh in
that session's handshake -- X25519, or the hybrid exchange
of Section 4.4 -- combined with the pre-shared key
(Section 4.1), and are
erased when the session ends. The shared secret authenticates;
it does not encrypt the session.</t>
        <t>It follows that recording every flight mail of a session --
and mail is recorded by design: it is stored by the sender's
provider, the receiver's provider, and the mailbox itself --
and later obtaining the shared secret does not decrypt the
session. The recorded flights are a ClientHello, a
HelloRetryRequest, a cookied ClientHello, a server flight, a
Finished, and protected records. Without the ephemeral private
keys, which never leave the endpoints and do not survive the
session, the protected records stay protected.</t>
        <t>The limits of the property are the usual ones, and are stated
plainly: compromise of the shared secret permits impersonation
in future handshakes and an active man-in-the-middle of a
future session, because the PSK is the authentication; it
permits reading ordinary version 1 mail jobs that rely on the
object crypto, which is why this carriage exists; and it does
nothing for an endpoint that is itself compromised while a
session is live. Forward secrecy is a property of recorded
sessions against later key compromise, and that is the
property claimed -- no more, and no less.</t>
        <t>One further limit belongs to this carriage in particular,
because mail is archived by design. Where the ephemeral
exchange is the bare X25519 <xref target="RFC7748"/> -- the ephemeral
exchange <xref target="RFC9325"/>
tells operators to prefer, and the right choice against the
adversary above -- a party that records a session's
flights (and on this carriage the sender's provider, the
receiver's provider, and the mailbox all hold them) and
that later breaks X25519, by whatever means, decrypts the
recorded session without ever learning the shared secret.
Forward secrecy there is secrecy against later compromise of
the long-term secret; it is not secrecy against a later
break of the ephemeral's algorithm.</t>
        <t>The remedy is the hybrid share of Section 4.4,
X25519MLKEM768 <xref target="RFC10024"/>, and it is part of this
profile, not a shape reserved for a later revision: the
reference implementation implements it, and a session on
this carriage negotiates it whenever both endpoints offer
it. In a hybrid session the ephemeral secret is the ML-KEM
secret and the X25519 secret together, so the limit above
narrows to the sessions that negotiated the bare share: a
later break of X25519 alone does not decrypt a hybrid
session, and neither does a later break of ML-KEM alone;
the recorded session falls only if both halves fall, or
the endpoint itself does. The <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> rule is
unchanged -- the PSK still only authenticates, the
ephemeral share, bare or hybrid, is what encrypts, and
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 remains the suite.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-mailbox-as-intermediary">
        <name>The mailbox as intermediary</name>
        <t>On this carriage the mailbox provider, and any hop that stores
flight mail, holds the session's whole transcript in the clear
at the DTLS-record layer: subjects, sizes, timing, counts, and
the handshake's public values are visible to it, and protected
records are visible as ciphertext. The provider cannot read
application data, cannot forge a record that verifies, and
cannot complete a handshake, not holding the shared secret.
It can delay, drop, duplicate, and reorder mail; Sections 7
and 13 are written so that each of those is survivable and
none is profitable. Deployments that care about the metadata
itself should note that the mail session-id, the flight
cadence, and datagram sizes are all observable; this document
specifies no padding or cover traffic.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="headers-are-not-authentication">
        <name>Headers are not authentication</name>
        <t>Every routing decision in this carriage is made from
untrusted text -- the subject -- and every authentication
decision is made from protected bytes. The synthetic peer
address of Section 9.2 exists precisely so that no spoofable
header becomes a security input: a flight mail that claims
any <tt>From</tt> whatsoever is treated identically, and is worth
exactly what its datagram proves. A deployment <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add a
sender allowlist as a substitute gate on this carriage; the
version 1 properties already record that the email binding
carries no sender gate and claims none.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pre-authentication-resource-bounds">
        <name>Pre-authentication resource bounds</name>
        <t>Everything a receiver does before a binder verifies is a
resource an unauthenticated sender can spend, so the
pre-authentication surface is bounded at each step, and
each action such a sender can cause is listed here with the
number that bounds it:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A fresh ClientHello costs the responder 1 HelloRetryRequest
mail and no session state: the cookie exchange keeps the
responder stateless until a cookie validates (Section 4.1). That is
1 small mail out for 1 mail in -- the price of a stateless
responder on any binding, with no amplification.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A bit-identical copy of a handshake-phase flight costs at
most 1 re-post of the saved flight per generation of that
flight (Section 7.2), so a captured hello is worth at most
1 extra outbound mail and never a mail per copy.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A flight mail is refused above the mail size cap before any
decoding (Section 5.3).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A reassembly slot is 1 of at most 64, bounded in total
size, and held at most 3600 seconds from its first part and
from its last; a contradiction destroys the transfer rather
than arbitrating it (Section 6).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A digest-cache entry is 1 of 4096, the least recently seen
evicted first (Section 7.2).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A saved outbound flight is 1 of 4096, first in first out,
the same bound as the digest cache. Evicting one drops
only the spare re-post for that peer. A retransmission is
a new record and is answered by the stack without the
saved flight (Section 7.2).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A malformed flight is consumed in 1 pass and 1 log line,
not re-offered on every poll (Section 8.3). A fragmented
or incomplete first handshake message is this case: it
draws no HelloRetryRequest and no reassembly state
(Section 8.2).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The unaddressed harness subject, on a deployment mailbox,
is this case too: consumed, not fed to a DTLS stack, and
worth no answer (Section 5.1).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>An action an unauthenticated sender can cause that has no
number in this list is a defect in this document. The platform
disclosure's cost -- disclosure before the initiator's
Finished is verified -- is inherited from version 1
Section 20 and bounded by its tiers; a responder that
discloses at the <tt>none</tt> or <tt>family</tt> tier spends little on an
unauthenticated peer, and the choice of tier is the
responder's.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="downgrade-and-substitution">
        <name>Downgrade and substitution</name>
        <t>Section 12 collects the no-downgrade rules. The general
statement behind them: at no point does this carriage answer
a failure by doing the same thing more weakly. A failed
handshake is a failed handshake; a dead session holds its
results; a malformed flight is dropped. An implementation
that adds a fallback -- plain job crypto for a session's job,
ordinary mail for a session's result, a job reading for a
flight's bytes -- has left this specification, and should
expect the security properties of Sections 16.1 and 10.2 to
leave with it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-gate-is-the-security-boundary-for-execution">
        <name>The gate is the security boundary for execution</name>
        <t>It is worth restating the architecture once, because the
carriage can make it look otherwise: DTLS authenticates a
channel between holders of the shared secret, of which there
may be several (version 1's additional secrets and key
policies distinguish them). The acceptance gate -- signature,
audience, caps, key policy, seen-set -- is what decides
whether a job runs, whose it is, and whether it has run
before. Carrying a job inside a session changes the
confidentiality and integrity of its transport and adds
forward secrecy; it changes its admission not at all. Any
future extension of this carriage that proposes to admit a
job on the session's authority alone is proposing to remove
the gate, and should be reviewed as such.</t>
        <t>The constraint that narrows what a session may cause is the
key policy of the key that signs the job, which is version
1's and is unchanged here. A deployment that wants one key
to run only a pinned script states that on the key: the
kinds it may name, the interpreters it may name, and the
digest of the script it may carry. The session does not
widen that policy, and the policy does not depend on this
carriage. A holder of a different key, or of only the
traffic keys of the session, does not inherit it. The gate
reads the job's own key and applies that key's policy
(Section 10.2).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.slutsky-homing-pigeon">
          <front>
            <title>Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 1</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Slutsky" fullname="Andrew Slutsky">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9846" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">
          <front>
            <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="D. Crocker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="P. Overell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2008" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2006" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7748" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748">
          <front>
            <title>Elliptic Curves for Security</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Langley" fullname="A. Langley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Hamburg" fullname="M. Hamburg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="S. Turner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2016" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7748"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7748"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9146" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9146">
          <front>
            <title>Connection Identifier for DTLS 1.2</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="H. Tschofenig">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Kraus" fullname="A. Kraus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9146"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9146"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="H. Tschofenig">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="April"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5322" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Message Format</title>
            <author initials="P." surname="Resnick" fullname="P. Resnick">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2008" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5322"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8551" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551">
          <front>
            <title>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Message Specification</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Ramsdell" fullname="B. Ramsdell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="S. Turner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2019" month="April"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8551"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8551"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9051" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="A. Melnikov">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9051"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9051"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC10024" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10024">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Kwiatkowski" fullname="K. Kwiatkowski">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Kampanakis" fullname="P. Kampanakis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Westerbaan" fullname="B. Westerbaan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Stebila" fullname="D. Stebila">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10024"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC10024"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7296" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Kaufman" fullname="C. Kaufman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Eronen" fullname="P. Eronen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2014" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7296"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7296"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9325" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9325"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9325"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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