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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-04" category="info" submissionType="independent" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Homing Pigeon v1">Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 1</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-04"/>
    <author initials="A." surname="Slutsky" fullname="Andrew Slutsky">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>slutsky5544@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <keyword>email</keyword>
    <keyword>HMAC</keyword>
    <keyword>job execution</keyword>
    <keyword>DTLS</keyword>
    <abstract>
      

<t>This document specifies the Homing Pigeon message protocol, version 1: signed JSON job and result objects exchanged over a transport binding. On the email binding, a submitter sends one HMAC-SHA-384 signed JSON object to a mailbox; a runner polls that mailbox, verifies the signature, executes the job, and returns a signed result; the other bindings carry the same objects unchanged. The signature is the object's only authorization: a binding may add a gate of its own, but no gate replaces it. The job object is protected end to end by per-job AEAD encryption, a required part of the protocol: implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support it, the reference software sends encrypted by default, and a receiver refuses a cleartext job unless the operator has explicitly enabled cleartext acceptance - in the reference software, only by a command-line parameter. The store-and-forward bindings open no inbound listener on the host that runs the job.</t>
      <t>The DTLS binding changes the binding and not the messages: the same signed objects travel inside a direct DTLS 1.3 session between the submitter and the runner. It is a binding of version 1, not a new version of the protocol. The shared secret is the session's external pre-shared key; key exchange is ephemeral-only, so sessions have perfect forward secrecy; and the runner discloses a tiered, responder-chosen summary of its platform inside the handshake itself, as an extension in its EncryptedExtensions, so the submitter holds the platform from the flight that establishes the session. The binding opens an inbound listener on the runner's host and is off unless the owner enables it. It is an addition, never a replacement: the store-and-forward bindings remain the ones every submitter can reach.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Some hosts cannot accept inbound connections. The protocol needs a store-and-forward queue so neither side opens a connection to the other. The first binding this document specifies is a mailbox: the submitter does not open a connection to the runner, and the runner does not open a connection to the submitter except to read and write that mailbox.</t>
      <t>The exchange is two messages:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
Submitter                    Mailbox                      Runner
    |                            |                            |
    |  job message (signed JSON) |                            |
    |--------------------------->|                            |
    |                            |  poll                      |
    |                            |<---------------------------|
    |                            |  result message            |
    |                            |  (signed JSON)             |
    |                            |<---------------------------|
    |  result (same mailbox, or  |                            |
    |   signed reply_to)         |                            |
    |<---------------------------|                            |
]]></artwork>
      <t>The deployment this protocol is written for is a person operating their own machines from a cloud-resident agent. The person holds the mailbox and the secret; the agent holds neither the host nor a network path to it. Email is the path that already exists between them. The runner is deliberately plain: it executes what the signature authorizes, on the owner's host, under the owner's account.</t>
      <t>Version negotiation is not a handshake. The message carries <tt>v</tt>. This document defines <tt>v</tt> = 1 only. A receiver that does not implement version 1 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the message.</t>
      <section anchor="why-specify-this-publicly">
        <name>Why specify this publicly</name>
        <t>The protocol is specified in the open so that a submitter does not need the runner's source code. Any implementation of this document can submit jobs: the subject, the JSON object, and the MAC are all specified here, and the reference transport is email, which the submitter already speaks.</t>
        <t>Two things are out of scope for this document and are established out of band: the mailbox address, and the shared secret. The sender asks the owner which address to use, and the owner provides the secret with it. Neither is discovered from the mail. Once the sender knows the address, the secret, and this specification, no further coordination is required.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="versions-in-this-document">
        <name>Versions in this document</name>
        <t>This document specifies one version of the protocol: version 1. Its bindings are the email binding (Section 5), the file binding (Section 5.1), the NATS binding (Section 5.2), and the DTLS session binding (Section 19), which also carries the platform disclosure (Section 20). It consolidates this document's earlier text, which specified the email binding alone, with the DTLS binding text that was first drafted as a companion document. The companion draft draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2 <xref target="I-D.slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2"/> is a different document: it specifies protocol version 2 (the determination, question, and answer exchange) and does not specify a binding.</t>
        <t>A binding does not version the messages. The job and result objects are the same objects on every binding, byte for byte; their <tt>v</tt> member is 1, and a receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject an object for carrying <tt>v</tt> = 1 on any binding. A receiver that does not offer a binding is not non-conformant; it simply does not offer that binding.</t>
        <t>The reference implementation speaks version 1, and it implements the bindings this document specifies, including the DTLS session binding of Section 19. A receiver following this document rejects any message <tt>v</tt> other than 1.</t>
        <t>The sender also requires the shared secret to meet a minimum-entropy floor (Section 17.3). That floor is not a protocol version; it is a requirement of this protocol, and it binds version 1 senders and runners today (Section 17.3). Nothing else in the exchange changes shape.</t>
        <t>Later work also layers behavior this document scopes out (Section 4) onto the base exchange: a local disclosure policy on results, queries against retained output, attestations, and task boards. Those behaviors ride in extra members (Section 8); they do not redefine any message specified here. One consequence a submitter needs: a receiver layered with a disclosure policy can withhold result output that a version 1 receiver would send, so the guidance in Section 13.2 binds only where no such policy is in force.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="requirements-language">
      <name>Requirements Language</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

</section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>Job: a signed request that the runner execute work, or answer a liveness check.</t>
      <t>Result: a signed report of what the runner did with one job.</t>
      <t>Shared secret: an octet string known to the submitter and the runner. It is the HMAC key. It is not sent on the wire.</t>
      <t>Default secret: the shared secret selected when <tt>key_id</tt> is absent.</t>
      <t>Key identifier: the string in <tt>key_id</tt>. It is a label, not a secret.</t>
      <t>Seen-set: the runner's record of <tt>job_id</tt> values already processed. It is local state. It is not a message.</t>
      <t>Freshness window: how far <tt>issued_at</tt> may be from the runner's clock before the job is rejected.</t>
      <t>Preamble: text in the message body before the signed JSON object. It is not signed.</t>
      <t>LOCAL: a parameter or a check this document allows a receiver to set for itself. It is not negotiated.</t>
      <t>Session: one DTLS association between a submitter (the initiator, in the DTLS client role) and a runner (the responder, in the DTLS server role). Defined in Section 19.</t>
      <t>Platform disclosure: the runner's summary of its platform, carried in an extension of the handshake's EncryptedExtensions message (Section 20).</t>
      <t>PSK identity: the <tt>pre_shared_key</tt> identity under which a secret is offered. The default secret's identity is <tt>homing-pigeon</tt>; an additional secret's is <tt>homing-pigeon:</tt> followed by its <tt>key_id</tt>.</t>
      <t>Ticket: the opaque resumption identity a runner issues in a NewSessionTicket message.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="scope">
      <name>Scope</name>
      <t>This document specifies subjects, the signed object, the MAC, <tt>key_id</tt>, <tt>reply_to</tt>, replay, freshness, the <tt>job</tt> message, and the <tt>result</tt> message.</t>
      <t>This document does not specify disclosure policy, queries, attestations, task boards, sensors, confinement, installers, or local models. A job <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry extra members for those uses. Receivers that do not implement them <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore unknown members (Section 8) and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> still reject an unknown <tt>v</tt> or an unknown job <tt>kind</tt> (Sections 8 and 12). Section 1 describes how those uses relate to this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="transport-binding">
      <name>Transport Binding</name>
      <t>This section specifies the email binding. The protocol itself needs only the store-and-forward queue from Section 1. Further bindings are specified in Sections 5.1 and 5.2; both carry the same messages, unchanged. A direct session binding, in which the same messages travel inside a DTLS session and the runner discloses its platform inside the handshake, is specified in Sections 19 and 20.</t>
      <t>The binding layer is abstract. A binding is an interchangeable carrier of the same messages: the objects, the MAC, the per-job encryption of Section 16, and the receiver checks of this document are identical on every binding. An implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> substitute one binding for another, or add a binding, without changing the protocol; two parties interoperate on any binding both offer.</t>
      <t>Conformance is per binding. This document specifies one version of the protocol, version 1, and an implementation conforms for each binding it offers; it need not offer every binding, and no binding is mandatory to implement: a conforming implementation offers at least one binding, and two parties interoperate on any binding both offer. Pairing is established out of band (Section 1) in either case. The email binding of this section is the binding every submitter environment already speaks, and the reference implementation enables it by default; that is guidance, not a requirement.</t>
      <t>Two security properties are <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> of the protocol on every binding, and they attach differently. The first is authentication of the object: the MAC of Section 7, verified as Section 14 specifies. That requirement attaches to the object, never to the transport. No authentication a binding performs, however strong, satisfies or relaxes it, because the MAC is the admission decision, it selects the key (Section 10), it binds the exact object, and it remains verifiable after any session has ended. The second is confidentiality of the object, in transit and at rest, between the submitter and the runner. That requirement attaches to the property, not to a mechanism. A binding whose carriage provides confidentiality end to end, between the holders of the shared secret, with no intermediary that can read the object or store it outside the parties' control, satisfies the property itself, and the per-job encryption of Section 16 is then <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> on that binding. Where a binding's carriage terminates at an intermediary, or stores the object outside the parties' control, the transport does not satisfy the property, and Section 16 is the mechanism that provides it; a message sent in cleartext by the explicit choice Section 16 permits is a message for which the confidentiality property is not claimed. Each binding specified in this document states which case it is: the email binding in this section, the file binding in Section 5.1, the NATS binding in Section 5.2, and the DTLS binding in Section 19.4.</t>
      <t>The runner reads the mailbox with IMAP and writes with SMTP. Mail authentication is out of band. The signature check does not change with the mail credential.</t>
      <t>IMAP and SMTP <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used over TLS. An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry this protocol over a cleartext IMAP or SMTP session. The TLS version <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 1.2 or higher; TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used <xref target="RFC8996"/>. The recommendations of <xref target="RFC9325"/> apply. Cleartext mail access is obsolete <xref target="RFC8314"/>: implicit TLS is preferred, and where STARTTLS is used it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be required rather than opportunistic, and the peer certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be verified. TLS protects a hop. It does not hide the message from the mailbox provider (Section 17.2). The TLS requirements of this section therefore do not satisfy the confidentiality property stated above: the mailbox provider is an intermediary that stores the object and can read it. On this binding the confidentiality property is carried by the per-job encryption of Section 16, and the authentication property by the MAC, as it is on every binding.</t>
      <t>An implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> additionally support PGP/MIME protection of the mail on this binding. Such support is not required, and it is not this protocol's confidentiality mechanism: that mechanism is the per-job encryption of Section 16, which travels with the object on every binding.</t>
      <t>The body is UTF-8 text in a <tt>text/plain</tt> part. This document does not register a media type. If the message is multipart, the receiver uses the first <tt>text/plain</tt> part that is not an attachment.</t>
      <t>The message <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected before the MAC if the raw RFC822 object exceeds the receiver's size cap. The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> cap is 4194304 octets. A cap of 0 means no limit. This cap is LOCAL.</t>
      <section anchor="the-file-binding">
        <name>The File Binding</name>
        <t>The file binding carries the same envelope as a file in a pair of watched directories on a filesystem both parties can reach. It exists for deployments where the submitter and the runner share a filesystem (a mounted volume, a synchronized folder, a removable medium) and for testing: it is the email binding's envelope with the mailbox removed, and nothing else changes.</t>
        <t>The envelope mapping is byte-for-byte the email form: a subject line in the shape of Section 6, a blank line, then the signed body. A job is a regular file in the inbox directory. The file <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be named <tt>&lt;ident&gt;.job.txt</tt>, where <tt>&lt;ident&gt;</tt> is the binding-local name of the job (the <tt>job_id</tt> serves), but a receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> condition acceptance on the name: every regular file in the inbox is read as a candidate job and judged by its contents, and symbolic links and directories are not read. A result is a file named <tt>&lt;ident&gt;.result.txt</tt> in the outbox directory. A receiver polls the directories on its ordinary poll cycle.</t>
        <t>Acknowledgement is consumption. Whichever side has taken a file moves it into a sibling <tt>done/</tt> directory; files are never deleted by the binding. A redelivery of the same job rewrites the same file name, and the seen-set (Sections 14 and 17.6) deduplicates the repeat: delivery is at-least-once, exactly as on the email binding (Section 17.10).</t>
        <t>Two gates stand in series on this binding. The first is the inbox directory's operating-system access control: only principals the owner has given write access can present envelopes at all. The second is the signature, which remains the authorization, unchanged. A deployment <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the directory's access control as a real gate and set it deliberately; the signature check does not excuse a world-writable inbox.</t>
        <t>The binding's limits are the filesystem's. Both parties need access to the same directories, so the binding does not cross a network by itself (a network filesystem under it is the deployment's own affair, with its own failure modes). There is no store-and-forward beyond the disk, no ordering beyond arrival, and the size cap of Section 5 applies to envelope files.</t>
        <t>Of the two security properties of Section 5, this binding provides neither itself, and needs neither from a transport: the carriage never leaves storage both parties already control, and no intermediary reads or holds the object. The MAC carries the authentication property, as on every binding. Whether Section 16 is applied on this binding is a local policy decision about the readers of that storage; a sender <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply it, and a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to receive it, as Section 16 requires of every receiver.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-nats-binding">
        <name>The NATS Binding</name>
        <t>The NATS binding carries the same envelope over core NATS publish/subscribe. It exists for deployments where submitter and runner already share a NATS broker: a low-latency pipe with no store-and-forward pretensions.</t>
        <t>The envelope mapping is the email form carried as a message payload: the subject line of Section 6, a blank line, then the signed body, as one payload. Jobs are published on a jobs subject (a LOCAL name; the reference default is <tt>homing-pigeon.jobs</tt>). Results are published on a per-job subject formed from a LOCAL prefix and the <tt>job_id</tt> (the reference default is <tt>homing-pigeon.results.&lt;job_id&gt;</tt>).</t>
        <t>Core NATS is at-most-once: the broker acknowledges nothing and retains nothing. A job published while no runner is subscribed is lost, and a result published while no submitter is subscribed is lost. The protocol's own machinery is the recovery: the submitter retries per Section 15, and the seen-set makes a repeat harmless. A deployment that needs broker-side retention needs a persistence layer this binding does not specify.</t>
        <t>Two gates stand in series. The first is the broker's own authentication: broker authentication is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> by default -- a conforming receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> consume jobs over an unauthenticated broker connection, and the credential is supplied in configuration or in the broker URL's userinfo. A deployment <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> relax this by an explicit local setting (LOCAL), in which case the signature is the only gate and the deployment <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> claim the two-gate posture. The second gate is the signature, unchanged. A required-auth NATS deployment is, for this reason, the more strongly gated of the bindings in this document: email's mailbox login authorizes the runner's reading, never the sender, so email stands on the signature alone.</t>
        <t>The binding's limits are the broker's: payload sizes are bounded by the broker's maximum and by the cap of Section 5, and ordering is per-subject arrival only.</t>
        <t>Of the two security properties of Section 5, broker authentication satisfies neither: it authenticates a party to the broker, not the object to the runner, and the broker is an intermediary that can read what it carries. TLS on a broker connection, where a deployment uses it, protects a hop to the broker in the same sense as Section 5's mail TLS, and no further. The MAC therefore carries the authentication property on this binding, as on every binding, and the confidentiality property is carried by the per-job encryption of Section 16, where the sender applies it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="subjects">
      <name>Subjects</name>
      <t>Subjects are part of the email binding (Section 5): they are how the receiver recognizes a job message in the mailbox.</t>
      <t>Subjects are matched case-insensitively. A preamble such as <tt>Re:</tt> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> appear before the marker. The marker need not be the first character of the subject.</t>
      <t>A job or result subject matches this grammar, in the sense of a search, not a full-string match. The grammar is ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/> written over Unicode code points in the style of <xref target="RFC3987"/>. A gap is one or more characters of one explicit set, not the single character SP: an email subject that was folded in transit unfolds to runs of spaces and tabs (<xref target="RFC5322"/>, Section 2.2.3), and a receiver that insisted on exactly one %x20 would drop a legal job. The set is the ECMAScript WhiteSpace and LineTerminator code points:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
job-subject    = marker *( gap word ) gap "job" gap job-id
result-subject = marker *( gap word ) gap ( "result" / "qresult" )
               gap job-id
marker         = "[HOMING-PIGEON]"
gap            = 1*gap-char
gap-char       = WSP / %x0A / %x0B / %x0C / %x0D / %xA0 / %x1680
               / %x2000-200A / %x2028 / %x2029 / %x202F / %x205F
               / %x3000 / %xFEFF
word           = 1*word-char
; every code point that is not a gap-char
word-char      = %x00-08 / %x0E-1F / %x21-9F / %xA1-167F
               / %x1681-1FFF / %x200B-2027 / %x202A-202E
               / %x2030-205E / %x2060-2FFF / %x3001-FEFE
               / %xFF00-10FFFF
job-id         = 1*128 word-char
]]></artwork>
      <t>A control character other than those listed in <tt>gap-char</tt> is part of a word, not a gap between two, so <tt>[HOMING-PIGEON]&lt;US&gt;job x</tt> names no job. The words between the marker and <tt>job</tt> are decoration. <tt>TEST</tt> is a legal decoration.</t>
      <t>The <tt>job_id</tt> in the subject <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the <tt>job_id</tt> member. A mismatch <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected (Section 14).</t>
      <t><tt>job-id</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be <tt>.</tt> or <tt>..</tt>.</t>
      <t>A UUID <xref target="RFC9562"/> is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> as the <tt>job_id</tt>.</t>
      <t>A message whose subject is not a job subject is not a job. The receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> execute it. The receiver <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> mark it seen so that a later poll skips it. Result messages use the result pattern above and are produced by the runner. They are not jobs.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="body-and-signature-marker">
      <name>Body and Signature Marker</name>
      <t>The signed object is one JSON object <xref target="RFC8259"/>. The receiver ignores preamble and trailer. Verification uses the object that ends in the signature marker.</t>
      <t>Line endings are normalized before both signing and verifying: every CRLF becomes LF, then every remaining CR becomes LF. Trailing whitespace after that normalization is not part of the signed octets.</t>
      <t>The sender builds the object without <tt>sig</tt>, serializes it, normalizes line endings, computes the MAC over those octets (Section 7.1), and replaces the final <tt>}</tt> with:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
,"sig":"<96 hex digits>"}
]]></artwork>
      <t>JSON member order before <tt>sig</tt> is the sender's choice. <tt>sig</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be last. Senders <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> serialize with no insignificant whitespace. Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept insignificant whitespace inside the object, because the MAC covers the octets the sender actually produced, not a re-encoding.</t>
      <t>The receiver finds the signature as follows:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Normalize line endings and remove trailing whitespace.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Let <tt>marker</tt> be the last occurrence of the eight characters <tt>,</tt> <tt>"</tt> <tt>s</tt> <tt>i</tt> <tt>g</tt> <tt>"</tt> <tt>:</tt> <tt>"</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If <tt>marker</tt> is absent, the message is malformed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The 96 characters after <tt>marker</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be hexadecimal. The two characters after those <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>"</tt> and <tt>}</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The signed octets are the bytes from the <tt>{</tt> that opens this object through the character before <tt>marker</tt>, plus one <tt>}</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>That <tt>{</tt> is the start of the object that contains the marker, not a <tt>{</tt> inside a string. If no such <tt>{</tt> exists, the message is malformed.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A sender <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> place the character sequence <tt>,"sig":"</tt> inside any string value. The receiver uses the last occurrence.</t>
      <t>One fallback is part of this verification. A transport between the sender and the receiver can insert control characters into the body in transit. If verification of the received octets fails, the reference receiver retries verification over the body with every control character (code point below 32) except the tab removed. The retry is over that cleaned form only: the sender signs the body it produced, and no sender is required to sign a cleaned form. A receiver that implements the fallback accepts exactly the bodies the primary verification accepts, plus bodies whose only difference from a verifiable body is inserted control characters of that class.</t>
      <section anchor="mac">
        <name>MAC</name>
        <t>The MAC is HMAC-SHA-384 <xref target="RFC2104"/> using SHA-384 <xref target="FIPS180-4"/>.</t>
        <t>The HMAC key is the UTF-8 octets of the shared secret. Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> hash, stretch, or otherwise derive that key. The secret is a string of characters. Two sides that disagree on the characters disagree on the key.</t>
        <t><tt>sig</tt> is the 48-octet HMAC value encoded as 96 hexadecimal digits. Senders <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use lowercase digits. Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare in constant time after mapping ASCII <tt>A-F</tt> to <tt>a-f</tt>.</t>
        <t>Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a malformed tail. Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a MAC mismatch. A mismatch produces no result message (Section 14).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="constant-time-compare">
        <name>Constant-time compare</name>
        <t>The compare covers all 96 digits. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> stop at the first differing digit in a way that a network observer can time. A local reject log <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> record that the MAC failed. It <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> record the expected digest.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="unknown-members">
      <name>Unknown Members</name>
      <t>A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore object members it does not implement, except:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>v</tt> other than 1 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected (a receiver that implements the version 2 document opens version 2 messages under that document, never as jobs)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>type</tt> other than <tt>job</tt>, on a message the receiver is executing as a job, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>kind</tt> other than <tt>exec</tt> or <tt>ping</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be executed; a base version 1 receiver rejects any other value except <tt>sensor_alert</tt>, which it files as a signed alert for its Oracle and never executes. A receiver that implements the layered local features also executes the <tt>recipe</tt> and <tt>change</tt> kinds, and only when the owner has configured them; those kinds are local features, not version 1 kinds, and a receiver without that configuration rejects them as above</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Ignoring a member means the member is still covered by the MAC and has no effect on version 1 processing.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="common-members">
      <name>Common Members</name>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Member</th>
            <th align="left">JSON type</th>
            <th align="left">Presence</th>
            <th align="left">Rule</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>v</tt></td>
            <td align="left">number</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Integer 1. No other value is defined.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>type</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>job</tt> or <tt>result</tt>.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>job_id</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 6.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>key_id</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Selects the HMAC key. Absent selects the default secret.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>aud</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Audience claim. Enforcement is LOCAL. <tt>runner_id</tt> is accepted as its older spelling; when both are present <tt>aud</tt> is the claim.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>sig</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 7. Not part of the signed octets.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t><tt>key_id</tt> is covered by the MAC. Key identifiers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> appear in logs. An unknown <tt>key_id</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected before the MAC is computed. The receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> try another secret.</t>
      <t>If a receiver enforces <tt>runner_id</tt>, the expected value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> come from the receiver's configuration. The signed value is what the submitter claimed. It is not the source of the expected value.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="key-selection">
      <name>Key Selection</name>
      <t>The receiver holds a map from <tt>key_id</tt> to secret. The empty identifier names the default secret.</t>
      <t>Selection, before the MAC:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>If <tt>key_id</tt> is absent, select the default secret.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If <tt>key_id</tt> is present and is a string in the map, select that secret.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Otherwise reject. Do not compute a MAC.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>How keys are stored is LOCAL. Two values <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be assigned to one <tt>key_id</tt>. The default identifier has one slot.</t>
      <section anchor="fingerprint-names">
        <name>Fingerprint names</name>
        <t>A secret <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be named by its fingerprint. The reference software does so. The fingerprint is <tt>k-</tt> followed by the first eight lowercase hexadecimal digits of SHA-384 over the UTF-8 octets of the label <tt>homing-pigeon key id v1\n</tt> and then the secret's UTF-8 octets:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
key_id = "k-" ||
  hex(SHA-384("homing-pigeon key id v1\n" || secret))[:8]
]]></artwork>
        <t>The reference receiver puts that identifier in the map of Section 10, pointing at the same secret the empty identifier names. An operator-chosen name, when one was configured, is a further identifier for that same secret. One <tt>key_id</tt> still names one secret. One secret <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> have several identifiers. Two secrets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> share one.</t>
        <t>The reference sender includes <tt>key_id</tt> on every message it signs. The value is the fingerprint, unless the sender was told to use a chosen name. The empty identifier is how a sender asks for the unnamed form. A receiver that has not registered the fingerprint <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject that message as an unknown <tt>key_id</tt> (step 3). An absent <tt>key_id</tt> still selects the default secret.</t>
        <t>A fingerprint that is not in the map is an unknown <tt>key_id</tt>. So is a near-miss: a different length, a different case, or the fingerprint of a secret the receiver does not hold. The receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> select the default secret for any of those.</t>
        <t>The name is a label. It is 32 bits of a one-way function over a secret of at least 128 bits of entropy (Section 17.3). It is not invertible. As an oracle for a guessed secret it is weaker than the HMAC on any captured message, which already tests a guess in full. The label keeps this hash apart from that HMAC and from the HKDF that derives a job key, so a name cannot be confused with a signature or turned into one. Publishing the name discloses nothing a signed message does not already disclose.</t>
        <t>The DTLS PSK identity (Section 3) is a different label. <tt>homing-pigeon</tt> names the default secret. <tt>homing-pigeon:</tt> followed by a configured <tt>key_id</tt> names an additional secret. The fingerprint is not a PSK identity unless the operator stored that string as a <tt>key_id</tt>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="job-message">
      <name>Job Message</name>
      <t><tt>type</tt> is <tt>job</tt>.</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "v": 1,
  "type": "job",
  "job_id": "3f9a1c2e-7b14-4e0a-9c2d-6f0a1b2c3d4e",
  "issued_at": "2026-10-13T12:00:00Z",
  "kind": "exec",
  "script": "date\n",
  "timeout_sec": 60,
  "key_id": "submitter-a",
  "reply_to": "submitter@example.com",
  "sig": "001122...eeff"
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The <tt>sig</tt> line above is abbreviated. On the wire it is 96 hex digits.</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Member</th>
            <th align="left">JSON type</th>
            <th align="left">Presence</th>
            <th align="left">Rule</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>issued_at</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 11.1.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>kind</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>exec</tt> or <tt>ping</tt>.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>reply_to</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 11.2.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>script</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">see 11.3</td>
            <td align="left">Inline script. <tt>exec</tt> only.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>script_url</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">see 11.3</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>https</tt> URL of the script. <tt>exec</tt> only.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>script_sha384</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">96 lowercase hex digits over the script octets.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>interpreter</tt></td>
            <td align="left">array of strings</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Program, then its arguments.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>args</tt></td>
            <td align="left">array of strings</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Appended after the script path.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>env</tt></td>
            <td align="left">object</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">String values merged into the environment.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>files</tt></td>
            <td align="left">array</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 11.4.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>timeout_sec</tt></td>
            <td align="left">number</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Positive integer. <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> default 300. <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> maximum 3600.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <section anchor="issuedat">
        <name>issued_at</name>
        <t><tt>issued_at</tt> is an ISO 8601 timestamp. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry a timezone designator, <tt>Z</tt> or a numeric offset. A value without a timezone <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected. A value that does not parse <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected. Senders <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use UTC in the form <tt>YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ</tt>.</t>
        <t>Let <tt>age</tt> be the runner's clock minus <tt>issued_at</tt>, in seconds.</t>
        <t>The receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the job if <tt>age</tt> is greater than its past window. The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> past window is 3600 seconds. That window is LOCAL.</t>
        <t>The receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the job if <tt>issued_at</tt> is too far in the future. The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> future allowance is 300 seconds.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replyto">
        <name>reply_to</name>
        <t><tt>reply_to</tt> is a single address, at most 254 characters, of the form <tt>local@domain</tt>, with no display name, no angle brackets, and no comma. The domain contains a dot.</t>
        <t>If the member is absent, or present but invalid, the result goes to the runner's own mailbox. The job is not rejected for an invalid <tt>reply_to</tt>.</t>
        <t>The receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> take the result address only from this member. The email <tt>From</tt> header and the email <tt>Reply-To</tt> header <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> select it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ping-and-exec">
        <name>ping and exec</name>
        <t><tt>kind</tt> <tt>ping</tt> carries no script. The runner <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> start a script. The result has <tt>kind</tt> <tt>ping</tt>.</t>
        <t><tt>kind</tt> <tt>exec</tt> requires at least one of <tt>script</tt> or <tt>script_url</tt>. If neither is present, the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the job (Section 12). If both are present, the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use <tt>script_url</tt> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore <tt>script</tt>.</t>
        <t>If <tt>script_sha384</tt> is present, the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hash the script octets with SHA-384 and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the job if the digest differs. The digest is 96 lowercase hex digits.</t>
        <t>If <tt>interpreter</tt> is absent, the runner uses a LOCAL default.</t>
        <t>The script is written to a new file in a fresh directory for this <tt>job_id</tt> and run as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
<interpreter...> <script-file> <args...>
]]></artwork>
        <t>The working directory is that job directory. On timeout the receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> kill the process tree. A <tt>timeout_sec</tt> above the receiver's maximum <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be reduced to that maximum; the job <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be rejected for an excessive timeout alone. The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> maximum is 3600.</t>
        <t>That clamping rule governs the receiver-wide maximum. A per-key policy (Section 14, step 11) is a separate, LOCAL ceiling: a job whose <tt>timeout_sec</tt> exceeds the ceiling of the key it was signed under <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be rejected at that step instead of reduced. A <tt>timeout_sec</tt> that is not positive is not a valid value (the table above requires a positive integer); the reference receiver clamps a negative value to 1 rather than rejecting the job for it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="files">
        <name>files</name>
        <t>Each element is an object:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Member</th>
              <th align="left">JSON type</th>
              <th align="left">Presence</th>
              <th align="left">Rule</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>name</tt></td>
              <td align="left">string</td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">File name inside the job directory.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>url</tt></td>
              <td align="left">string</td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https</tt> URL.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>sha384</tt></td>
              <td align="left">string</td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">96 lowercase hex digits.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t><tt>name</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be absolute, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain <tt>..</tt> as a path segment, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> escape the job directory. A violation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected before the file is used.</t>
        <t>Downloads <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use HTTPS. If <tt>sha384</tt> is present, a digest mismatch <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="kind-and-type-failures">
      <name>Kind and Type Failures</name>
      <t>Unknown <tt>kind</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be executed.</t>
      <t>A job the receiver rejects after the MAC has verified, because the kind, the script hash, the file name, or a similar check failed, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> produce a result (Section 13) with <tt>exit_code</tt> -2 and a short reason in <tt>stderr</tt>. That job <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be marked seen and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be retried.</t>
      <t>Two LOCAL checks are the exception. The <tt>max_script_bytes</tt> size check and the unpaired-surrogate check (Section 14, step 7) <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reject a job without producing a result: both guard the receiver's own resources and well-formedness limits rather than the job's content, and a receiver that applies them silently marks the message seen and sends nothing.</t>
      <t>A job rejected before the MAC verifies produces no result. See Section 14.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="result-message">
      <name>Result Message</name>
      <t>The result is signed with the same secret that verified the job. <tt>key_id</tt> on the result, when present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name that secret. The reference sender includes it (Section 10.1): the identifier the job carried, or, when the job carried none, the default secret's fingerprint.</t>
      <t><tt>type</tt> is <tt>result</tt>. The subject is the result pattern in Section 6.</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "v": 1,
  "type": "result",
  "job_id": "3f9a1c2e-7b14-4e0a-9c2d-6f0a1b2c3d4e",
  "kind": "exec",
  "completed_at": "2026-10-13T12:01:23Z",
  "exit_code": 0,
  "timed_out": false,
  "stdout": "",
  "stderr": "",
  "stdout_truncated": false,
  "stderr_truncated": false,
  "duration_sec": 12.345,
  "runner": "host.example",
  "sig": "001122...eeff"
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Member</th>
            <th align="left">JSON type</th>
            <th align="left">Presence</th>
            <th align="left">Rule</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>completed_at</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Same form as <tt>issued_at</tt>.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>kind</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">The job's kind.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>exit_code</tt></td>
            <td align="left">number</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Section 13.1.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>timed_out</tt></td>
            <td align="left">boolean</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">True if the process tree was killed for time.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>stdout</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Captured standard output. May be empty.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>stderr</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Captured standard error. May be empty.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>stdout_truncated</tt></td>
            <td align="left">boolean</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">True if <tt>stdout</tt> was cut.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>stderr_truncated</tt></td>
            <td align="left">boolean</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">True if <tt>stderr</tt> was cut.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>duration_sec</tt></td>
            <td align="left">number</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Seconds, as a JSON number.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>runner</tt></td>
            <td align="left">string</td>
            <td align="left">
              <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
            <td align="left">Host label. Authenticated only by the result MAC.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <section anchor="exitcode">
        <name>exit_code</name>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Value</th>
              <th align="left">Meaning</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">0</td>
              <td align="left">The process exited 0, or <tt>ping</tt> succeeded.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">-1</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>timed_out</tt> is true. The process tree was killed.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">-2</td>
              <td align="left">Rejected before execution. Reason in <tt>stderr</tt>. Not retried.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">other</td>
              <td align="left">The process exit status.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>If <tt>timed_out</tt> is true, <tt>exit_code</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be -1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="truncation">
        <name>Truncation</name>
        <t>Each stream <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be cut at a LOCAL limit on the decoded text. The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> limit is 100000 characters. When a stream is cut, its <tt>*_truncated</tt> member <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be true. When it is not cut, that member <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be false.</t>
        <t>A result specified here includes the output the receiver chose to send. Omitting output for a local privacy policy is outside version 1. A submitter <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume output will be withheld. Where a disclosure policy is layered on the exchange (Section 1), this guidance does not hold and the submitter <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="receiver-processing">
      <name>Receiver Processing</name>
      <t>The receiver maintains a seen-set. The key <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be <tt>job_id</tt> prefixed by the receiver's configured <tt>runner_id</tt> when one is configured, so two runners sharing a mailbox do not treat each other's jobs as replays.</t>
      <t>For each unseen message:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>If the subject is not a job subject, do not execute. This is not an error. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the seen-set already contains this <tt>job_id</tt>, do not execute. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the raw message exceeds the size cap (Section 5), reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Parse the signed octets as one JSON object, in a bounded parse: the nesting depth is bounded, and an object with unpaired surrogates is not well-formed for this protocol. If the octets do not parse as one object, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop. (Parsing precedes key selection because the <tt>key_id</tt> that selects the key is a member of the object; the parse at this step establishes the object's shape only - no member is acted on until the MAC has verified at step 6.)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Select the key (Section 10), using the <tt>key_id</tt> the parse recovered. On failure, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Verify the MAC (Section 7). On failure, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop. The <tt>From</tt> header is not an input to this step.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>LOCAL checks that need only the verified object run here, before the member checks below: the audience check, the lone-surrogate check, and the <tt>max_script_bytes</tt> size check on the script the object carries. A failure of the lone-surrogate or <tt>max_script_bytes</tt> check rejects with no result (Section 12 names these two as LOCAL checks that <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reject without a result); an audience failure is handled as step 11 provides.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If <tt>v</tt> is not 1 or <tt>type</tt> is not <tt>job</tt>, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the subject <tt>job_id</tt> and the member <tt>job_id</tt> differ, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop. (A <tt>job_id</tt> that is illegal under Section 6 is a shape failure of step 13: the job verified, so it is answered with an <tt>exit_code</tt> -2 result and enters the seen-set.)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Check <tt>issued_at</tt> (Section 11.1). On failure, reject with no result. Mark seen. Stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>LOCAL checks (audience, per-key policy) <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reject here. A reject at this step <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> execute the job. Whether a result is sent is LOCAL. The reference receiver sends no result for an audience failure.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If <tt>kind</tt> is <tt>ping</tt>, go to step 14.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If <tt>kind</tt> is <tt>exec</tt>, resolve the script and files (Section 11). On failure, send a result with <tt>exit_code</tt> -2, mark seen, stop. If <tt>kind</tt> is anything else, send a result with <tt>exit_code</tt> -2, mark seen, stop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Execute. Honor <tt>timeout_sec</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Build the result (Section 13) and sign it with the secret from step 5.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stash the signed result in a LOCAL outbox, record <tt>job_id</tt> in the seen-set, and mark seen, in that order, before any send is attempted.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Send the result to <tt>reply_to</tt> if that member is valid, otherwise to the runner mailbox. If the send fails, the stashed result is resent on later polls, the same octets each time, until it lands or the stash's retention lapses. The job is never executed again (Section 15).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>If the object verified at step 6 is an encryption envelope, Section 16 applies: decrypt after step 6 and process the recovered body from step 5. The envelope's verification never substitutes for the body's own.</t>
      <t>The email <tt>From</tt> address <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be logged after step 6. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> authorize the job. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> choose the result address.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="retry">
      <name>Retry</name>
      <t>Execution is at most once; delivery of the result is at least once.</t>
      <t>A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> record <tt>job_id</tt> in the seen-set once it holds a signed result for the job (step 16), before the first send, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> execute the job again because a send failed. A send that fails is retried from the stash; the resent result is the same octets.</t>
      <t>Submitters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> still treat <tt>exec</tt> as repeatable: a receiver whose seen-set was cleared, or a job delivered to two receivers, runs it twice.</t>
      <t>Two senses of "seen" are kept apart. Marking a message seen (Section 14, steps 3 through 13 and 16) is the binding-level flag: that copy of the message is not reprocessed. Recording a <tt>job_id</tt> in the seen-set is the replay state of Section 14, and a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> add a <tt>job_id</tt> to the seen-set only after it has produced a result for it: the stashed result of step 16, or the <tt>exit_code</tt> -2 result of step 13. A reject that produces no result (steps 3 through 10, and step 11 when the LOCAL choice is silence) <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> enter the seen-set. A redelivered copy of such a message is therefore processed afresh and rejected afresh. This is deliberate: a message that never verified cannot burn a <tt>job_id</tt>, so a forger holding a victim's <tt>job_id</tt> cannot block the genuine job from running.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="per-job-encryption">
      <name>Per-Job Encryption</name>
      <t>This section defines per-job encryption: encrypting the job object itself, so the binding's store-and-forward hops carry ciphertext instead of the signed body. It is a required part of version 1. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support receiving and decrypting objects encrypted as this section specifies. Senders <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> encrypt; the reference software encrypts by default on the sending side, and encryption <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fail silently into cleartext. A receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> execute a job object received in cleartext unless the operator has explicitly enabled cleartext acceptance on that receiver. In the reference software the enable is a command-line parameter (<tt>--allow-cleartext</tt>), deliberately not a configuration setting, so the posture holds only for the invocation that asks for it; the sender's corresponding explicit choice is the reference sender's <tt>--cleartext</tt> parameter. The MAC of Section 7 is verified before the form of the object is considered, in every posture: cleartext is never unauthenticated.</t>
      <t>This section is the protocol's confidentiality mechanism at the object layer. Receiver support is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> on every binding, because a sender <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply this section on any binding. Sender application is <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> on a binding that itself provides the confidentiality property as Section 5 states; the DTLS binding of Section 19 is that case (Section 19.4). On a binding that does not provide the property, this section is the only mechanism that does, and the sender posture above applies in full.</t>
      <section anchor="construction">
        <name>Construction</name>
        <t>The plaintext is the complete signed job body in its Section 7 form - the payload object with the signature spliced in. The cipher is AES-256-GCM <xref target="SP800-38D"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Key: HKDF <xref target="RFC5869"/> with HMAC-SHA-384. The input keying material is the UTF-8 octets of the secret selected per Section 10. The salt is the nonce. The info string is "homing-pigeon job-encryption v1". The output is 32 octets.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nonce: 12 octets, freshly random for each message.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Additional authenticated data: the <tt>job_id</tt>, the <tt>key_id</tt> (empty for the default secret), and the algorithm string, each UTF-8, joined by single NUL (0x00) octets, in that order.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The transmitted body is a JSON envelope object, signed exactly as Section 7 specifies - the MAC covers the envelope as transmitted:</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{"hp_enc": {"alg": "aes-256-gcm/hkdf-sha384",
            "nonce": "<base64>", "ct": "<base64>"}}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t><tt>ct</tt> is the ciphertext with the 16-octet GCM tag appended, base64-encoded. When the selected secret is not the default, the envelope carries the same <tt>key_id</tt> member a cleartext body would. <tt>hp_enc</tt> is a reserved member name: a body whose members are exactly the envelope's is an envelope, and senders <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use <tt>hp_enc</tt> for any other purpose.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="receiver-processing-1">
        <name>Receiver processing</name>
        <t>An envelope is processed inside Section 14's steps, not beside them:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The envelope's <tt>key_id</tt> selects the secret (Section 10), exactly as for a cleartext body.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The envelope's MAC is verified - step 6 applied to the envelope. On failure, reject as step 6 specifies. A receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> attempt decryption before the MAC verifies.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Decrypt. Any failure - an unknown <tt>alg</tt>, a malformed member, a tag mismatch - is a rejection with no result, marked seen, as in step 6. No partial plaintext is processed.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The recovered body re-enters Section 14 at step 5, as if it had arrived directly; its own MAC is verified again, and its <tt>key_id</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match the envelope's.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Support of this section is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> (Section 16). A receiver that does not implement it is not conformant; presented with an envelope, it sees an object without <tt>v</tt> or <tt>type</tt> and rejects it at step 8.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="results">
        <name>Results</name>
        <t>The result for an encrypted job <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be encrypted in the same construction, with the job's <tt>job_id</tt> in the additional data, so an exchange is encrypted in both directions or neither. A receiver's local policy <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> override in either direction; the reference receiver exposes that policy as configuration and defaults to mirroring the job.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="no-forward-secrecy">
        <name>No forward secrecy</name>
        <t>Per-job encryption provides confidentiality against observers of the transport. It provides NO forward secrecy, and the two statements travel together wherever the mechanism is described: the key derives from the static shared secret, so compromise of the secret exposes every recorded encrypted job and result, past and future. Encryption also raises the value of a captured secret under Section 17.3's analysis; it does not lower it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="the-signer-controls-the-host">
        <name>The signer controls the host</name>
        <t>A valid MAC is permission to run as the runner's account. Anyone who holds the secret can operate the host. This protocol does not define a sandbox. LOCAL confinement <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be assumed by the submitter.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="confidentiality-and-its-limits">
        <name>Confidentiality and its limits</name>
        <t>HMAC authenticates; it does not encrypt. The protocol's confidentiality is Section 16, and nothing else in this document provides it. Where cleartext is in use under an operator's explicit enable (Section 16), the transport operator (in this binding, the mailbox provider) can read every job and every result, and an observer who can read the transport learns the script, the arguments, the environment, and the output.</t>
        <t>With per-job encryption in use, the job and result bodies are encrypted end to end on the binding: an observer of the transport learns the subject (which names the <tt>job_id</tt>), the timing, and the size, and nothing of the content. The reference software encrypts by default. A receiver that has not explicitly enabled cleartext acceptance refuses a cleartext object; an enabled receiver logs each cleartext arrival, so the choice is visible.</t>
        <t>Per-job encryption provides NO forward secrecy. Its key derives from the static shared secret, so compromise of the secret exposes every recorded encrypted job and result, past and future. A confidentiality claim for this protocol <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be read with that limit attached.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="offline-guessing">
        <name>Offline guessing</name>
        <t>One captured message is enough to test candidate secrets. More messages do not reduce that search. HMAC-SHA-384 does not yield the key from the tags.</t>
        <t>The secret <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be 32 octets from a cryptographic generator, stored as characters and used as UTF-8. Sixty-four hexadecimal characters are the usual form. A long human sentence is not a substitute. The secret <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be the mailbox password.</t>
        <t>The floor is normative for this protocol: the shared secret <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry at least 128 bits of entropy, estimated as the secret's length times log2 of its alphabet size, and a sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse to sign with a secret below that floor. The requirement answers the offline-guessing attack above, and it binds version 1 today: the reference runner refuses to start with a secret below the floor, and the reference sender refuses to sign with one.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="headers-are-not-authentication">
        <name>Headers are not authentication</name>
        <t><tt>From</tt>, <tt>Reply-To</tt>, <tt>Sender</tt>, and <tt>To</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> satisfy the MAC and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> select <tt>reply_to</tt>. An invalid MAC <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> cause any result to be sent.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="unknown-key-identifiers">
        <name>Unknown key identifiers</name>
        <t>Failing closed before the MAC stops a message from verifying under the default secret because of a typo, and it avoids using MAC time as a probe of which identifiers exist. A near-miss fingerprint is this case (Section 10.1): it is not the default secret under another spelling.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay">
        <name>Replay</name>
        <t>The past window rejects stale <tt>issued_at</tt>. The seen-set rejects a repeated <tt>job_id</tt>. A receiver with a wrong clock will accept stale jobs or reject fresh ones. A receiver whose seen-set is cleared will accept a replay that is still inside the past window. Jobs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be safe to repeat for that reason; a lost result no longer causes one (Section 15).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="two-secrets">
        <name>Two secrets</name>
        <t>The transport credentials and the HMAC secret, which authorizes jobs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="marker-collision">
        <name>Marker collision</name>
        <t>The splitter uses the last <tt>,"sig":"</tt>. A string value that contains that sequence will not verify as the sender intended. Senders <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep that sequence out of values.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="output">
        <name>Output</name>
        <t>Version 1 results carry <tt>stdout</tt> and <tt>stderr</tt> up to the truncation limit. A receiver that wants to withhold output is implementing a different policy. That policy is not signaled by <tt>v</tt>. How that layering relates to this document is stated in Section 1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="at-least-once">
        <name>At-least-once</name>
        <t>An attacker who can drop the result mail delays delivery: the receiver resends the stashed result, the same octets, and does not execute the job again (Section 15). This protocol does not add a separate ack.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has one IANA action.</t>
      <t>Section 20 defines one TLS extension, <tt>platform_info</tt>, carried in the EncryptedExtensions message of the DTLS handshake. A code point for it in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry is requested; in this document the value is TBD. Until IANA assigns a value, this document uses 0xFFA0 as the interim type. 0xFFA0 is Private Use (first byte 255) and is not an assignment. Implementations of this revision send 0xFFA0. 0xFE00 is not Private Use and is not this extension. No new port, service name, media type, or object identifier is required. HMAC-SHA-384 is already named by <xref target="RFC2104"/> and <xref target="FIPS180-4"/>. The algorithm OID <tt>hmacWithSHA384</tt> (<tt>1.2.840.113549.2.10</tt>) already exists. This protocol identifies the algorithm by name, not by OID.</t>
      <t>The reference port for the DTLS binding (Section 19), UDP 20220, is a LOCAL default of the reference implementation, not a registered assignment; deployments may use any port, and submitters learn the port out of band, with the address and the secret.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-dtls-binding">
      <name>The DTLS Binding</name>
      <t>This section and the three that follow it specify one further binding of version 1 and one behavior on it: a direct DTLS 1.3 session between submitter and runner, with the shared secret as the session's pre-shared key (this section), and the platform disclosure the runner carries in the handshake (Section 20). The messages do not change on this binding; everything this document specifies for them applies unchanged.</t>
      <t>The store-and-forward bindings need no path between submitter and runner: a mailbox both can reach is enough, and the runner opens no listener. That is the right default, and it is also a ceiling. Where a direct path does exist -- the submitter can open a UDP flow to the runner's host -- a session buys three things the mailbox cannot: latency measured in round trips instead of poll cycles, confidentiality of the job and result objects themselves (not merely of one mail hop), and that confidentiality with forward secrecy.</t>
      <t>The cost is real, and it falls on the submitter. The store-and-forward bindings ask the submitter only to produce a signed object and hand it to a store-and-forward system it already speaks. This binding asks the submitter to terminate DTLS itself: the handshake, retransmission timers, connection IDs, session resumption -- a network stack obligation, discharged in the submitter's own environment. Many submitter environments cannot open a UDP socket at all. That is why this binding is optional, why the platform disclosure (Section 20) hangs on the session existing, and why the email binding remains the binding every submitter reaches. Section 21 states the conformance burden plainly.</t>
      <t>Two consequences of a direct binding deserve emphasis up front. First, the runner listens: enabling this binding opens an inbound UDP listener on the runner's host, a posture the store-and-forward bindings deliberately never take. The binding is therefore off unless an owner enables it; nothing about installing or running the runner opens it. Second, channel security is not delivery. A session protects what crosses it while it lives; it acknowledges nothing at the protocol layer. Delivery, retry, and deduplication remain the protocol's own machinery (Sections 19.3 and 22.5).</t>
      <section anchor="shape">
        <name>Shape</name>
        <t>The submitter initiates. The runner listens on a UDP port (LOCAL; the reference default is 20220, which is not registered -- see Section 18) only when the binding is enabled. One session carries any number of job and result messages in each direction while it lives. Roles do not reverse: the runner never initiates a session to a submitter.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-profile">
        <name>The Profile</name>
        <t>This binding is a bounded profile of DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>. An implementation of this binding implements exactly this profile; a peer proposing anything outside it is refused, and the refusal ends that handshake, not the listener.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Transport: DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/> over UDP. DTLS 1.2 <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be negotiated.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Ciphersuite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 <xref target="RFC9846"/> only. No other suite is offered or accepted.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Authentication: pre-shared key only. The external PSK is the shared secret, under the identities of Section 3. Certificates are not part of this profile, in either direction. The shared secret <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> meet the minimum-entropy floor of this protocol (Section 17.3); a secret below the floor <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be offered as a PSK.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Key exchange: <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> only. The <tt>psk_key_exchange_modes</tt> extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> offer mode 1 and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> offer mode 0 (<tt>psk_ke</tt>); a responder <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a handshake that does not offer <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt>. An ephemeral X25519 <xref target="RFC7748"/> key share <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ride every handshake, full or resumed. Section 22.1 gives the reason: this is the profile's perfect-forward-secrecy requirement, and it is not negotiable within the profile.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Address validation: the responder <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform the HelloRetryRequest cookie exchange of <xref target="RFC9147"/> before allocating session state, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send any flight larger than the retry itself before the cookie returns. The cookie is stateless and is bound to the initiator's address.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Connection ID: both sides <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> negotiate the <tt>connection_id</tt> extension <xref target="RFC9146"/> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept records under the negotiated IDs from a changed source address, so that a NAT rebinding does not kill a session.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Retransmission: handshake flights are retransmitted on the timers <xref target="RFC9147"/> specifies. Duplicate or retransmitted handshake messages are consumed exactly once per handshake; a duplicate <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> corrupt the transcript or the session.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Early data: none. 0-RTT <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be offered, sent, or accepted; epoch 1 keys are never derived.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Resumption: a responder <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> issue a NewSessionTicket. A resumed session <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a fresh ephemeral key share (the <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt> rule admits no exception for resumption), <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as a new session for platform disclosure purposes (Section 20), and the ticket <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be single-use.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>KeyUpdate: an implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> initiate KeyUpdate. An implementation that receives a KeyUpdate with <tt>update_requested</tt> set <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> answer it as <xref target="RFC9147"/> requires; an implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instead ignore KeyUpdate, and peers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> depend on it, as this profile never initiates one.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Malformed input: a malformed or undecryptable datagram is dropped and logged. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be fatal to the listener or to any session but, at most, its own.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="carrying-the-messages">
        <name>Carrying the Messages</name>
        <t>Inside a session, application data is a stream of messages, each framed by a four-octet big-endian length prefix. Each message is one protocol envelope in the same form the store-and-forward bindings carry: the subject line, a blank line, then the signed body, exactly as the email binding carries it. A job message is answered, in due course, by its result message on the same session.</t>
        <t>Acknowledgement and deduplication are the protocol's own, unchanged: the runner's seen-set governs whether a job executes (Section 14), the submitter retries per Section 15, and DTLS record protection contributes neither an acknowledgement nor a duplicate suppression at the protocol layer. A result produced after its session has died cannot be delivered on that session; the submitter learns of the loss by timeout, re-asks on a fresh session, and the seen-set makes the repeat safe.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="composition-with-per-job-encryption">
        <name>Composition with Per-Job Encryption</name>
        <t>This binding provides the confidentiality property of Section 5 itself: the session is direct between the holders of the shared secret, no intermediary stores the object or can read it, and the session AEAD protects the object in transit with forward secrecy (Section 22.1). Application of the per-job encryption of Section 16 (the <tt>hp_enc</tt> envelope) on this binding is therefore <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A sender may send a cleartext signed job inside a session; the envelope remains available where protection at rest, beyond the session's lifetime, is wanted (the reference sender applies it by default and offers <tt>--cleartext</tt>). The receiver rule of Section 16 is unchanged on this binding: a cleartext object is executed only where the operator has explicitly enabled cleartext acceptance. Receiver support of Section 16 remains <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>, on this binding as on every binding. Neither layer's presence relaxes the other's checks where it is applied: the envelope signature is verified before decryption, and the object signature is verified before execution, session or no session. The session's authentication of its peer does not substitute for the object signature: authentication attaches to the object (Section 5), not to the transport, on this binding as on every other.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="platform-disclosure-in-the-handshake">
      <name>Platform Disclosure in the Handshake</name>
      <t>The platform is what the initiator needs before it can choose what to send: the runner's OS family, its default interpreter, the protocol versions it opens. The session gives the handshake itself a place to carry it. The pattern is the Configuration Payload of IKEv2 <xref target="RFC7296"/>: responder-chosen attributes, carried inside the authenticated exchange, in the responder's flight, so the initiator holds them at the moment it considers the session established -- not in a message after establishment, which the initiator would have to wait for as a separate step, and on a store-and-forward carriage would have no way to know to poll for.</t>
      <t>The carriage is one TLS extension, <tt>platform_info</tt> (extension type TBD; Section 18), in the EncryptedExtensions message <xref target="RFC9846"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>An initiator that implements this section includes the <tt>platform_info</tt> extension, empty, in its ClientHello. The offer says only that the initiator can receive the disclosure; it asks for nothing.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A responder <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> answer the offer by including the <tt>platform_info</tt> extension in its EncryptedExtensions, carrying the disclosure object defined below. A responder <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send the extension to an initiator that did not offer it, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send it in any other handshake message.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>EncryptedExtensions is encrypted under the handshake traffic keys, so only a peer that holds the pre-shared key and has derived those keys can read the disclosure. A stranger at the listener learns nothing from the flight: before the key exchange, the only thing a stranger can obtain is the cookie exchange of Section 19.2.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The disclosure is the responder's choice. Its tier is the runner's LOCAL configuration. The bare offer above is not a request, and the initiator cannot negotiate or widen what it is given; this document defines no mechanism by which it could.</t>
      <t>The extension value is a JSON object <xref target="RFC8259"/> in the protocol's idiom:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
{"disclosure": "family",
 "platform": {"os_family": "linux",
              "default_interpreter": ["sh"],
              "protocol_versions": [1]}}
]]></artwork>
      <t>The member <tt>disclosure</tt> (the tier in force) is always present. The <tt>platform</tt> member is present unless the tier is <tt>none</tt>, and its members depend on the tier:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>none</tt>: no <tt>platform</tt> member. The responder declines to describe the host. A responder at this tier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> omit the extension altogether; an initiator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat an omitted extension and a <tt>none</tt> disclosure as the same answer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>family</tt>: <tt>os_family</tt> (one of <tt>windows</tt>, <tt>macos</tt>, <tt>linux</tt>, <tt>other</tt>), <tt>default_interpreter</tt> (the argv the receiver runs a script with when the job names none) and <tt>protocol_versions</tt> (the message versions it opens). This is the reference default.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>standard</tt>: <tt>family</tt> plus <tt>os_release</tt> (the operating system's release string), <tt>python_version</tt> (the runner runtime's version), and <tt>runner_version</tt> (the runner software's release string).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>full</tt>: <tt>standard</tt> (including <tt>runner_version</tt>) plus <tt>path_tools</tt>, an object naming a fixed, bounded set of common tools and whether each is on the runner's PATH.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The platform values above are strings on the wire; a future enterprise profile <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> map them under an OID arc.</t>
      <t>The disclosure precedes work, in the only form a handshake allows: the initiator holds the platform from the flight that establishes the session, before it sends any job, and no application message in either direction precedes that flight. A responder that implements this section does not also send the platform as an application message; the disclosure has exactly one carriage.</t>
      <t>The disclosure is proportioned the way the protocol already proportions result content: a deployment that answers jobs with full output discloses more in results than one that answers with attestations, and the same owner's posture, expressed as a tier, governs the disclosure. The information itself is of the kind any job the runner accepts could observe by running; the disclosure gives it to the initiator in the handshake, where it is useful for choosing what to send (an interpreter name, a script form), without spending a job to learn it.</t>
      <t>A sender <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add members to the disclosure object defined above, and a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore object members it does not recognize. The reference implementation includes the platform disclosure in the handshake in this form: it answers an offer when the handshake carries one, at the tier its local configuration sets, and it sends no disclosure to an initiator that did not offer the extension.</t>
      <t>A resumed session is a new session for this section: the disclosure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be carried again, in the resumed session's handshake, under the tier in force at that time.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-submitters-conformance-burden">
      <name>The Submitter's Conformance Burden</name>
      <t>This section is candid because the Introduction's promise -- that a submitter needs nothing but the specification and tools it already has -- does not survive contact with a session binding, and a specification that hides its costs invites broken deployments.</t>
      <t>A conforming submitter for this binding implements DTLS 1.3 in the profile of Section 19.2 for itself: the handshake state machine, PSK binders, the cookie exchange, handshake retransmission timers (a UDP peer that cannot retransmit cannot finish a handshake on a lossy path), connection IDs, and resumption. It needs a UDP path to the runner, which is an environment property, not a code property: a submitter running inside a hosted tool that offers only HTTPS egress, or no raw sockets at all, cannot use this binding no matter how correct its implementation is.</t>
      <t>None of this is required of a submitter that uses only the store-and-forward bindings. The conformance of the messages and their checks is untouched by this section, a runner without this binding is a complete deployment, and an owner enables the binding as an additional door on a host they choose, for submitters that can reach it. The bindings coexist: the same runner, the same secrets, the same objects; the session is a faster, confidential carriage for submitters equipped for it, and the mailbox remains for those that are not.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations-dtls-binding">
      <name>Security Considerations (DTLS Binding)</name>
      <section anchor="forward-secrecy-is-a-requirement-not-a-property">
        <name>Forward secrecy is a requirement, not a property</name>
        <t>The profile's load-bearing rule is that <tt>psk_ke</tt> is prohibited. In <tt>psk_ke</tt>, session keys derive from the pre-shared key alone; anyone who later obtains the secret and has recorded the session decrypts it in full. Because this protocol's shared secret is long-lived and is also the job-signing key, that failure mode would be catastrophic and silent. In <tt>psk_dhe_ke</tt>, every session -- full or resumed -- mixes a fresh ephemeral X25519 secret into its keys, so a later compromise of the shared secret yields the ability to impersonate going forward (which the version 1 analysis already grants a secret-holder) but decrypts no recorded session. An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> offer, accept, or fall back to <tt>psk_ke</tt>, including on resumption and including when a peer insists. One limit is stated plainly: forward secrecy here is not post-quantum secrecy. The ephemeral exchange is X25519, so a recorded session is exposed to a future cryptographically relevant quantum computer in a way the symmetric constructions of this protocol (the object MAC of Section 7.1 and the per-job encryption of Section 16) are not. A hybrid post-quantum key exchange is the known remedy. It is future work for this profile; for the email carriage it is specified, as an option, by the version 3 document (X25519MLKEM768).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="one-secret-two-constructions">
        <name>One secret, two constructions</name>
        <t>The shared secret does two jobs on this binding: it is the DTLS external PSK, and it remains the HMAC key of the job and result objects. These are independent constructions (the TLS key schedule's HKDF derivation chain, and HMAC-SHA-384 over the object), and neither's outputs feed the other. The composition does not weaken the analysis of Section 17: the session authenticates the channel, the signature authorizes the object, and a job's authority comes from the signature alone, so a job captured anywhere -- a mailbox, a session recording -- is exactly as powerful as it is on any other binding, and replay is governed by the same seen-set and freshness rules. The offline-guessing analysis of Section 17.3 applies to the PSK unchanged: the entropy floor is normative for the secret in both roles.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-platform-disclosure">
        <name>The platform disclosure</name>
        <t>The disclosure of Section 20 is a deliberate, bounded disclosure, and its timing is stated plainly because the timing is the design. The responder sends the disclosure inside its handshake flight, in EncryptedExtensions, and it sends that flight before it has verified the initiator's Finished. The alternative placement - the same information as the session's first application message, after that verification - was not chosen: on a store-and-forward carriage a post-establishment message is one more arrival the initiator cannot know to wait for, while the handshake flight is a flight it is already waiting for, on every carriage.</t>
        <t>What protects the disclosure at the earlier moment is the channel, not the Finished. EncryptedExtensions is encrypted under the handshake traffic keys <xref target="RFC9846"/>, and in this profile those keys derive from an ephemeral exchange the pre-shared key authenticates (Section 19.2): only a peer holding the shared secret can derive them and read the extension. A peer without the secret harvests nothing from the flight; before the key exchange, it can obtain only the cookie exchange. This placement depends on that prohibition. Were <tt>psk_ke</tt> permitted, the handshake keys would derive from the pre-shared key alone, and every holder of the secret could read the disclosure of a session it did not take part in. This document does not permit that mode. The audience of the disclosure is therefore the same as it would be after the Finished - every possible reader is a secret-holder - and the information class is unchanged: platform shape, of the kind any job the runner accepts could observe by running. What moved is only the moment, one flight earlier, and only relative to readers who hold the secret. An owner who weighs even that sets the tier to <tt>none</tt>, and the disclosure then names nothing about the host.</t>
        <t>Its other bounds are its defenses: it contains no identifiers beyond platform shape (no hostname, no addresses, no user names, no filesystem paths beyond tool presence), its richest tier names a fixed tool set rather than enumerating the system, and its tier is set by the party being described. What the disclosure must never become is a negotiation: a future extension that lets the initiator ask for more would invert the design and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be added compatibly.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="amplification-and-the-listener">
        <name>Amplification and the listener</name>
        <t>A UDP listener is a reflection surface. The cookie exchange is the mitigation this profile adopts: the responder is stateless and sends nothing larger than the retry flight until the initiator proves it can receive at its claimed address, so the binding cannot be used to amplify traffic at a third party beyond that small, fixed flight. The listener's other exposure is computational: handshakes cost more than datagrams. The stateless cookie keeps pre-authentication cost to one MAC verification per first hello; malformed datagrams are dropped at parse, and per-session failure is contained to the session.</t>
        <t>Enabling this binding changes the host's posture from the store-and-forward bindings' no-listener stance, and this document does not minimize that: the listener is off unless enabled, its port is LOCAL, and an owner who does not need the session binding should leave it off and lose nothing.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-security-is-not-delivery">
        <name>Channel security is not delivery</name>
        <t>DTLS authenticates and encrypts records; it does not promise that a job arrived, ran, or was answered. This profile deliberately keeps the protocol's at-least-once semantics (Section 19.3) rather than letting a reliable-looking channel imply reliable delivery: sessions die (reboots, NAT timeouts past the connection ID's rescue, key exhaustion), and when one dies mid-exchange the loss is visible as a timeout, recoverable by a retry the seen-set makes safe. An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat session establishment as job acceptance, nor session delivery of a result as its acknowledgement; the signed result message is the acknowledgement, as on every binding.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="termination-in-the-middle">
        <name>Termination in the middle</name>
        <t>The confidentiality claim is end to end between the submitter and the runner process. A middlebox that terminates DTLS -- an inspecting proxy the path forces traffic through -- ends the claim at that box: the session is then confidential in two hops, and the operator of the middlebox can read job and result objects in clear, though per-job encryption (Section 19.4) still protects an encrypted object past it. Deployments that route this binding through such a box should enable the object layer and understand which guarantee each layer is carrying.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author initials="H." surname="Krawczyk" fullname="H. Krawczyk">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Bellare" fullname="M. Bellare">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="R." surname="Canetti" fullname="R. Canetti">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1997" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">
          <front>
            <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
            <author initials="D. C." surname="Ed." fullname="D. Crocker, Ed.">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="P. Overell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2008" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5869" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)</title>
            <author initials="H." surname="Krawczyk" fullname="H. Krawczyk">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Eronen" fullname="P. Eronen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2010" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5869"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5869"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7748" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748">
          <front>
            <title>Elliptic Curves for Security</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Langley" fullname="A. Langley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Hamburg" fullname="M. Hamburg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="S. Turner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2016" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7748"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7748"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">
          <front>
            <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
            <author initials="T. B." surname="Ed." fullname="T. Bray, Ed.">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8314" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314">
          <front>
            <title>Cleartext Considered Obsolete: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission and Access</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Moore" fullname="K. Moore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Newman" fullname="C. Newman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2018" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8314"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8314"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9846" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8996" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996">
          <front>
            <title>Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Moriarty" fullname="K. Moriarty">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8996"/>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8996"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9146" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9146">
          <front>
            <title>Connection Identifier for DTLS 1.2</title>
            <author initials="E. R." surname="Ed." fullname="E. Rescorla, Ed.">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H. T." surname="Ed." fullname="H. Tschofenig, Ed.">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Kraus" fullname="A. Kraus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9146"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9146"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="E. Rescorla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="H. Tschofenig">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="N." surname="Modadugu" fullname="N. Modadugu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="April"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9325" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9325"/>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9325"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS180-4">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB" value="180-4"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SP800-38D">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Dworkin" fullname="M. Dworkin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2007" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-38D"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9562" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9562">
          <front>
            <title>Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs)</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Davis" fullname="K. Davis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Peabody" fullname="B. Peabody">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Leach" fullname="P. Leach">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9562"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9562"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3987" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Duerst" fullname="M. Duerst">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Suignard" fullname="M. Suignard">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2005" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3987"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3987"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5322" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Message Format</title>
            <author initials="P. R." surname="Ed." fullname="P. Resnick, Ed.">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2008" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5322"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7296" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Kaufman" fullname="C. Kaufman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="P. Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Y. Nir">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Eronen" fullname="P. Eronen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Kivinen" fullname="T. Kivinen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2014" month="September"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7296"/>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="79"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7296"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2">
          <front>
            <title>Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 2: Determinations, Questions, and Shared Context</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Slutsky" fullname="Andrew Slutsky">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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