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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-03" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title>Using KYAPay Tokens</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-03"/>
    <author initials="A." surname="Agarwal" fullname="Ankit Agarwal">
      <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com</email>
        <uri>https://skyfire.xyz</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="M. B." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones">
      <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
      <address>
        <email>michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</email>
        <uri>https://self-issued.info/</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Thumma" fullname="Srinivasa Thumma">
      <organization>Akamai</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sthumma@akamai.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>agent</keyword>
    <keyword>agentic commerce</keyword>
    <keyword>agentic</keyword>
    <keyword>commerce</keyword>
    <keyword>identity</keyword>
    <keyword>JWT</keyword>
    <keyword>bot management</keyword>
    <keyword>fraud</keyword>
    <keyword>account takeover</keyword>
    <keyword>payment</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 136?>

<t>The KYAPay Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that carries verified identity ("Know Your Agent", KYA) and payment (PAY) information for requests made by software agents on behalf of human principals.
This document describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot: "did a verified human authorize this agent?", rather than "is this a human?".
It specifies how KYAPay tokens are carried in HTTP requests, how they are validated (including in combination with request-signing layers such as HTTP Message Signatures), and how the verified, layered identity in a token is used to make access, routing, fraud detection, account-lifecycle, and step-up decisions.
It defines the token-consuming "recipient" role that the KYAPay Token leaves unspecified.
It is intentionally non-prescriptive about how tokens are created, because agent architectures, agent-identity technologies, and agent-communication protocols are diverse and still emerging;
the token itself is the interoperability contract.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://skyfire-xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 145?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Legitimate automated traffic acting on behalf of users is a long-standing feature of the web. Financial aggregation tools, automated booking agents, and data synchronizers routinely interact with web services at the direction of their subscribers. To prevent legitimate automation from being blocked by defenses designed to detect malicious bots, security intermediaries have traditionally relied on a combination of static network metadata -- including published IP ranges, Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs), HTTP header name/value pairs, use of a specific header name, or matching keyword in the User-Agent strings -- to identify bots that serve a legitimate and valuable purpose and apply configured policies.</t>
      <t>This model identifies bots primarily by associating their traffic with a known operator, network, and/or an HTTP header signature.  However, its verification mechanisms are brittle: HTTP headers are easily forged, IP ranges change across cloud providers and shared egress infrastructure, and network metadata cannot establish which individual subscriber authorized a particular request. Worst yet, not all legitimate bots identify themselves through these methods, resulting in traffic being blocked by security intermediaries running a bot detection layer. Traditional bot identification can only approximately establish where automated traffic comes from, but not which principal it is acting for.</t>
      <t>The rise of capable AI agents makes this limitation more significant. An account aggregation service reimplemented as an LLM-orchestrated agent may perform the same task for the same subscriber, but through dynamic execution flows. The relevant distinction is therefore not simply between human and automated traffic, but between:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>direct human interaction,</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a human or organization acting through an authorized agent, and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>unattended automation without verifiable authorization from an identified principal.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Rather than relying on fragile network indicators to establish legitimacy, an agent presenting a KYAPay token can provide cryptographically verifiable assertions about the agent and the principal it is authorized to represent.</t>
      <t>KYAPay tokens provide issuer-signed assertions that can be verified against trusted public keys. A KYAPay token is a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) <xref target="RFC7519"/> <xref target="RFC7515"/> that can carry the agent instance (<tt>aid</tt>), the execution platform (<tt>apd</tt>), and the identified principal the issuer asserts the agent acts for (<tt>hid</tt>) -- the KYA ("Know Your Agent") information -- and optionally payment credentials (the PAY information). A validated KYA token asserts that a trusted issuer has verified, to an established level of assurance, that the identified principal authorized the identified agent, running on the identified platform, to act on their behalf. A validated PAY token further asserts that a trusted issuer has authorized the agent to execute a payment within specified parameters.</t>
      <t>Crucially, identification is distinct from admission. Recipients consume KYAPay tokens as authenticated context for site-configured policy engines, not as an automatic grant of access. A design goal of this specification is that recipients can reliably distinguish attributable, human-authorized agentic traffic from unattributed automation, so that site operators can apply appropriate policy -- admit, rate-limit, require step-up, or deny -- based on verified identity rather than default blocking.</t>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>This document describes how <em>consumers</em> of KYAPay tokens -- in particular the security intermediaries that guard websites, APIs, and accounts -- convey, validate, and act on KYAPay tokens.
It does not redefine the token;
the claims, their meanings, and the base validation rules are specified in the KYAPay Token <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> and are referenced normatively here.</t>
        <t>This document is deliberately <strong>normative about consumption</strong> and <strong>non-prescriptive about creation</strong>.
<xref target="SecInt"/> places requirements on how intermediaries validate and use tokens.
<xref target="TokCreat"/> discusses token creation as a software-architecture problem and intentionally does not mandate a mechanism;
the rationale is given in <xref target="NonPrescCreat"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-other-documents">
        <name>Relationship to Other Documents</name>
        <t>This document builds directly on the KYAPay Token <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, which defines the KYA, PAY, and KYA-PAY token types, the claim schema (including the layered identity claims <tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt>, and <tt>aid</tt>), and the core token validation procedure.
The specification defines the token and the roles of issuer, initiator, and target, but it does not define the role of the party that receives and validates a token in order to make a security decision.
This document defines that role -- the <em>recipient</em> (or relying party) -- and specifies its behavior.</t>
        <t>Three related specifications define JWT claims and values that a recipient can use to reason about how a principal was authenticated and verified, and that <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> appear in KYAPay tokens:
the Additional Authentication Method Reference Values specification <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>, which defines additional <tt>amr</tt> <xref target="RFC8176"/> claim values,
the Identity Verification Methods Values specification <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>, which defines the <tt>ivm</tt> claim and values, and
the Anti-Money Laundering Methods Values specification <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>, which defines the <tt>aml</tt> claim and values.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>This specification uses the Initiator/Target and agent identity terms Initiator Agent, Initiator Principal, Agent Platform,
and the identity grouping claims <tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt>, and <tt>aid</tt> defined by <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>.</t>
        <t>This document defines the following terms:</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><strong>Human-via-agent request</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An HTTP request or protocol message issued by an agent that carries a valid KYAPay token attesting that the agent is acting on behalf of an identified, authorizing human principal (an individual or an organization).
The principal need not be present at the time of the request: the agent may be acting on an instruction given earlier, or on a standing authorization that the agent itself triggers, for example on a price change or on a schedule.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><strong>Bot</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Unattended automation that is not acting on behalf of, or with the authorization of, an identified human principal, and that does not present a valid KYAPay token.
This document does not attempt to further classify bots;
existing "good bot" / "bad bot" mechanisms are orthogonal and continue to apply.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><strong>Recipient (Relying Party)</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The entity that receives a KYAPay token, validates it, and acts on the result.
A recipient may be a security intermediary (below), a Target's own resource server, or an edge/CDN provider acting on a Target's behalf.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><strong>Security intermediary</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A recipient, typically operated by a security vendor or by the Target, that inspects requests and makes an admission, routing, scoring, or lifecycle decision before or as the request reaches the Target's application.
This document addresses four common (and often overlapping) kinds of security intermediary:
</t>
            <dl newline="true">
              <dt><strong>Bot manager</strong>:</dt>
              <dd>
                <t>An inline application-layer system that detects automated traffic -- using behavioral telemetry, fingerprinting, and network-derived signals -- to decide whether to admit, challenge, throttle, or block a request.</t>
              </dd>
              <dt><strong>Fraud manager</strong>:</dt>
              <dd>
                <t>An application-layer system that scores the risk of a transaction or action, typically using identity, reputation, behavioral, and device signals.</t>
              </dd>
              <dt><strong>Account-takeover (ATO) protector</strong>:</dt>
              <dd>
                <t>A system that detects and prevents unauthorized access to existing accounts, for example by distinguishing legitimate sessions from hijacked or automated ones.</t>
              </dd>
              <dt><strong>CIAM (customer identity and access management) system</strong>:</dt>
              <dd>
                <t>A system that manages account creation, authentication, and login for a Target's customers.</t>
              </dd>
            </dl>
          </dd>
          <dt><strong>Human presence signal</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The aggregate assurance, derived from a validated KYAPay token, that a request is authorized by an identified human principal.
See <xref target="HumanPresence"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><strong>Assurance level</strong>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A per-entity indication of how strongly an identity in the token was verified (for example, the identity-proofing level of the human principal).
See <xref target="HumanPresence"/>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="DesignPrinc">
      <name>Design Principles</name>
      <t>This section is informative.
It records the assumptions that motivate the normative requirements in later sections.</t>
      <section anchor="human-identity-is-paramount">
        <name>Human Identity is Paramount</name>
        <t>An underlying hypothesis of KYAPay is that commerce -- with or without payment -- is conducted between humans and human organizations, not between machines.
An agent is a tool through which a human or organization acts.
Consequently, the identity that matters most is the human identity behind the request, and liability for a request must ultimately be assignable to a human party: the principal, the developer of the agent, the operator of the agent platform, or some other identified party.
KYAPay tokens are structured to convey these identities so that this auditable, cryptographically verifiable chain of responsibility -- from agent action back to an accountable human -- can be established.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ubiquity-of-access-on-the-existing-web">
        <name>Ubiquity of Access on the Existing Web</name>
        <t>Agents are useful in proportion to the breadth of the web they can act across.
If a human must pre-configure access for an agent at each site before the agent can act, the result is indistinguishable from the workflow automation that already exists, and the principal loses the probabilistic discovery -- of new merchants, products, services, and alternatives -- that is one of the main reasons to use an agent at all.
The goal is therefore agentic access to the existing web, not a parallel, agent-only surface that must be set up in advance.
This goal can only be met if security intermediaries admit legitimate human-via-agent requests without per-site setup when a valid token is present and the verified identity it carries meets the site's policy for the requested action (<xref target="BotMgr"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="works-with-todays-web-at-zero-merchant-tech-lift">
        <name>Works with Today's Web at Zero Merchant Tech Lift</name>
        <t>Websites exist today, in the millions, and merchants and services already know how to sell through them, manage fraud, make offers, build brand loyalty, and test changes.
A key property of a website (and, similarly, of a merchant-controlled MCP <xref target="MCP"/> server) is that the merchant controls its own interface and is not locked into an API schema that must be carefully versioned;
agents driven by large language models (LLMs) can frequently learn to use these interfaces automatically.
A protocol for delivering agent identity and payment credentials should therefore work with today's web without requiring merchants to build new APIs.
KYAPay meets this by conveying credentials in the HTTP request itself (<xref target="ConveyingRequests"/>), which requires no change to how a merchant's site is built.
This holds where the party attaching the token controls the header fields of the request that reaches the Target.
Where it does not, the token is conveyed by another binding (<xref target="OtherInterfaces"/>) or the interaction does not use this header field.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="one-source-of-truth-across-all-layers-of-defense">
        <name>One Source of Truth Across All Layers of Defense</name>
        <t>Bot managers, fraud managers, ATO protectors, and CIAM systems all operate at the application layer.
Today, each makes its decision in isolation, and their verdicts on the same request can contradict one another.
A single validated KYAPay token gives every layer the same verified identity and, where present, payment context, so that their decisions are more likely to be consistent than conflicting.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="runtime-business-decisions">
        <name>Runtime Business Decisions</name>
        <t>A further goal is to give the Target the information it needs to make a business decision at request time: do I want to do business with this human, arriving via this agent, on this platform, for this action?
Because the token carries verified, layered identity and (optionally) payment context, the Target and its intermediaries can decide at runtime whether to admit, price, personalize, step up, or decline.
As one illustration, a merchant that recognizes a KYAPay-bearing request <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> adapt its existing pages for agent consumption using the same techniques it already uses to restyle pages, retaining ownership of its interface and its existing fraud and good/bad-actor signals rather than exposing a separate API surface.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="TrustStack">
      <name>The Trust Stack: Bearer Tokens Today, Proof of Possession Ahead</name>
      <t>This section is informative.
It situates KYAPay tokens among the other mechanisms a recipient encounters and, importantly, distinguishes what is deployed today from the planned evolution, so that the consumption requirements in <xref target="SecInt"/> are read against the correct baseline.</t>
      <section anchor="Bearer">
        <name>KYA is an Issuer-Signed Bearer Token Today</name>
        <t>As currently deployed, a KYA (or KYA-PAY) token is an issuer-signed, short-lived bearer token.
Its single most valuable operational property is that a Target has to do almost nothing to consume it: verify a JWT against the issuer's public key via JWKS, exactly as it would verify any OpenID Connect <xref target="OpenID.Core"/> or OAuth <xref target="RFC6749"/> token.
Any Target with a standard JWT library can participate, including those behind CDNs, API gateways, and serverless platforms.
Preserving that low bar is a primary design goal (<xref target="DesignPrinc"/>);
mechanisms that would raise it are weighed against the adoption they would cost.</t>
        <t>A bearer token establishes identity but not proof of possession: possession of the token is all that is needed to present it, so a token captured within its validity window can be replayed.
Today this residual, in-window risk is bounded rather than eliminated, by means that do not raise the consumption bar:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>short token lifetimes (<tt>exp</tt>), so a captured token expires quickly;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>audience binding (<xref target="Counterparty"/>), so a token minted for one Target cannot be presented to another;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>TLS on every hop, which mitigates on-the-wire capture and man-in-the-middle; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>issuer-gated onboarding (KYC/KYB), which mitigates malicious agents and Targets being admitted to the network in the first place.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The accepted residual threats, and the irreducible ones, are stated in <xref target="SecCon"/>.</t>
        <t>A KYAPay token is reusable within its validity period and audience.
Unless a recipient knows that the issuer issues a distinct token for each request, it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat repeated presentation of the same token, within that period and audience, as evidence of replay.
Nothing here prevents an issuer from issuing a distinct token for each request where that is practical; this document describes the general case, in which a token is presented more than once.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identity-and-proof-of-possession-are-different-layers">
        <name>Identity and Proof of Possession are Different Layers</name>
        <t>It is useful to separate two questions a recipient may want answered:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><em>Who is behind this request?</em>
This is answered by the KYA token: a trusted, neutral issuer that performs KYC/KYB attests to the identity of the human principal (<tt>hid</tt>), agent platform (<tt>apd</tt>), and agent (<tt>aid</tt>), acting as a client-side trust anchor analogous to a Certificate Authority.
KYA is a set of verifiable <em>nouns</em> -- identity, verification status, authorization, payment -- and, being a JWT, it is transport-agnostic: the same token rides HTTP, WebSockets, gRPC metadata, a message queue, or a stdio MCP channel, and a recipient that needs it for audit or dispute resolution can retain it and re-verify it later (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Did the sender actually hold the credential's key?</em>
This is proof of possession, which a bearer token does not provide.
Establishing it requires the agent to sign the request itself;
over HTTP, HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/> are a mechanism for this.
A signature proves control of a key but says nothing about whose key it is -- it is a <em>verb</em>, not an identity format.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Because these are different layers, HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/> and similar request-signing mechanisms are complementary to KYA, not alternatives to it;
request signing supplies authenticity and possession, while KYA supplies identity, authorization, and payment.
A complete proof-of-possession design uses both, bound together, as described next.</t>
        <t>A KYA token is verified the same way however a request is routed, because it is a self-contained JWT and not a signature over the request.
A signature over the request is different: it can be verified only where the request still has the form the agent signed.
Requests are routinely rewritten on the way to an origin.
CDNs, load balancers, API gateways and edge workers add or strip path prefixes, route to internal host names and normalize URIs, and sites deliberately keep their external and internal URLs separate so as not to expose their internal architecture.
A design in which every recipient verified a signature over the request would fail at each such hop, or need special handling there.
This is why KYA is a bearer token by default (<xref target="Bearer"/>), and why, where proof of possession is used, the request signature is verified at the first hop (<xref target="PoPSignatures"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="PoPPath">
        <name>The Proof-of-Possession Path (Planned Evolution)</name>
        <t>When per-request signing becomes practical at scale, the planned evolution of KYA is a Certificate-Authority-like model that adds proof of possession without changing the trust anchor:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>the issuer onboards the agent as a CA would;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the agent generates a key pair and provides its public key to the issuer;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the issuer binds that public key into the KYA token using the JWT confirmation claim <tt>cnf</tt> <xref target="RFC7800"/>. The token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>cnf.jwk</tt> -- the key itself. A key identifier would satisfy <xref target="RFC7800"/> only on its own terms, which hold "provided the recipient is able to obtain the identified key": a recipient meeting the agent for the first time holds no such key, and a thumbprint is a one-way hash from which none can be recovered. The issuer cannot determine when that proviso is met -- it knows neither which recipients a token will reach, nor the initiator's intent, nor the state of any interaction between initiator and target. Nor can it rely on continuity between tokens: a recipient may meet any given token first, so each token must stand on its own. Carrying the key is therefore the only form that works in the general case. Other confirmation members <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> additionally be present; a recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be required to obtain the key by any means other than reading <tt>cnf.jwk</tt>; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the agent signs each request in place using <xref target="RFC9421"/>, covering the components listed in <xref target="PoPSignatures"/>, and the signature is verified against the key in <tt>cnf</tt>, with no separate proof-of-possession token.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>This yields an unbroken chain from request to key to identity: the request is signed by a key, and that key is vouched for as the initiator's by the issuer.
Preferring a request signed against the <tt>cnf</tt> key over a detached, DPoP-style proof <xref target="RFC9449"/> keeps a single token -- the recipient validates the KYA token once (per session), caches the <tt>cnf</tt> key, then performs only a fast per-request signature check, instead of validating two artifacts and confirming they are bound to each other.
When present, this binding is consumed as specified in <xref target="ProcModel"/> and closes the malicious-Target-reuse risk of the bearer model and stops a stolen token being used on its own (<xref target="SecCon"/>).</t>
        <t>Adoption remains the constraint on when this becomes mandatory.
Per-request signing is costly: hardware-protected keys are secure but slow, software keys are fast but exfiltratable, and post-quantum algorithms do not make signing faster.
Binding the signature to the request (<xref target="PoPSignatures"/>) stops a captured signature from being altered or presented with a different request; an identical request can still be resent until the signature expires, and this document does not rely on per-Target nonce caches to prevent that (<xref target="Replay"/>).
Other request-bound designs considered (mutual TLS <xref target="RFC8705"/>, TLS channel binding, session-based schemes) each raise the participation bar or add Target-side state.
Until fast, secure signing and a workable anti-replay approach exist that keep the Target's job about as simple as verifying a JWT, KYA remains a bearer token by default and proof of possession is an optional, forward-compatible upgrade rather than a precondition for participation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="PoPSignatures">
        <name>Request Signatures for Proof of Possession</name>
        <t>Where a token carries a proof-of-possession key (<xref target="PoPPath"/>), the agent signs each request with that key using HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/>.
The signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the <tt>@method</tt> derived component;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the <tt>@target-uri</tt> derived component;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> header field, so that a signature cannot be presented with a different token; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the <tt>Content-Digest</tt> header field <xref target="RFC9530"/>, whenever the request has content.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the <tt>created</tt> and <tt>expires</tt> parameters.</t>
        <t>Proof of possession is optional.
A token that carries no proof-of-possession key is a bearer token (<xref target="Bearer"/>), and nothing in this section applies to it.</t>
        <t>A covered component has to hold the same value when the signature is verified as when it was created, and a hop that rewrites a request changes the components that say where it is going.
The signature is therefore verified by the first recipient to receive the request as the agent sent it, before any rewriting, which is usually the CDN, bot manager, or edge worker in front of the Target.
The first recipient that rewrites a request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the signature before rewriting it.
The recipient that verifies the signature <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> forward a request whose signature is absent or invalid; it rejects the request (<xref target="ProcModel"/>).
Where the signature covers <tt>Content-Digest</tt>, the field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be checked against the content <xref target="RFC9530"/> before the request is acted on, by the recipient that verifies the signature or by a recipient behind it that receives both the content and the signed <tt>Content-Digest</tt> value unchanged; a mismatch, or a digest that cannot be checked, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated as an invalid signature.
A recipient behind that hop <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> rely on it instead of verifying the signature itself, but only where the deployment ensures that requests cannot reach it without passing through that hop.
It still validates the token as described in <xref target="ProcModel"/>.</t>
        <t>The other elements that <xref section="1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9421"/> requires a profile to specify, including the source of the verification key, the <tt>keyid</tt> and <tt>tag</tt> parameters, and error responses, are expected to be specified in a future revision of this document.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ConveyingRequests">
      <name>Conveying KYAPay Tokens in Requests</name>
      <section anchor="HeaderField">
        <name>The KYAPay-Token HTTP Header Field</name>
        <t>When KYAPay tokens are used with websites and HTTP APIs, a human-via-agent request carries its token(s) in an HTTP header field, in the same spirit that a human's browser conveys identity and payment details in the request itself.
For a directly interacting human, such details are typically carried in the request body (for example, form fields at checkout);
for a human-via-agent request, they are carried in the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> header field defined here.</t>
        <t>The <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> header field is an HTTP request header field whose value is a KYA, PAY, or KYA-PAY token, as defined in <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>.
HTTP field names are case-insensitive <xref target="RFC9110"/>.</t>
        <t><tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> is a List Structured Field (<xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9651"/>).
Each member is a Token (<xref section="3.3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9651"/>) whose value is a JWT, with no parameters.
A compact JWT consists only of base64url characters and periods, and it begins with the encoding of a JSON object, so its first character is a letter; it is therefore a valid Token as it stands.
For example:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
KYAPay-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Imt5YStqd3QifQ.eyJpc3Mi...
]]></artwork>
        <t>A request <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> convey more than one token (for example, separate KYA and PAY tokens), either as members of one field line or in several <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field lines, which are combined before parsing as described in <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9651"/>.</t>
        <t>A sender:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> place exactly one JWT in each list member;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> send more than one token of the same <tt>typ</tt> (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>) in a single request; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on the ordering of tokens within the field to convey meaning.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A recipient:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> determine the type of each token from its <tt>typ</tt> header parameter (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>), not from its position;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reject a request that carries more than one token of the same <tt>typ</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> parse the field as a List <xref target="RFC9651"/>. A field that fails to parse fails as a whole, and a recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> attempt to recover individual members from it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request if the field fails to parse, or if any member is not a Token whose value is a well-formed JWT. <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9651"/> permits either ignoring a field that fails to parse or treating the message as malformed; this document requires the latter; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept List members of up to the length given in <xref target="TokenSize"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Intermediaries and caches <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> as containing sensitive, request-specific credentials;
it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be cached in a way that would allow it to be replayed on a different request, and it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be logged or forwarded to parties other than legitimate participants (see <xref target="PrivCon"/>).</t>
        <t>The <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> header field is intended for use over TLS.
A token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be sent over a non-TLS-protected connection.
When the token carries a proof-of-possession key (<xref target="TrustStack"/>), it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be accompanied by a request Message Signature <xref target="RFC9421"/> over that key;
otherwise it is a bearer token, subject to the controls and accepted risks in <xref target="SecCon"/>.</t>
        <t>A CORS preflight request does not carry the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field: the user agent sends it to ask whether the field may be sent.
A recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply its token-absent policy to a preflight request.</t>
        <t>Where a response depends on the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field, the response <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>Vary: KYAPay-Token</tt> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be marked so that shared caches do not store it, for example with <tt>Cache-Control: private</tt>.
The protection in <xref section="3.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9111"/> applies only to requests that carry the <tt>Authorization</tt> field.</t>
        <t>KYAPay tokens are carried in a dedicated header field rather than in <tt>Authorization</tt>.
A Target commonly uses <tt>Authorization</tt> for its own authentication; a KYAPay token is not a credential for access to the Target's resources; and the same token is carried over transports other than HTTP (<xref target="OtherInterfaces"/>), where <tt>Authorization</tt> has no meaning.
For the same reasons, a recipient states its requirements in the <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> response field (<xref target="AcceptField"/>) rather than in a <tt>WWW-Authenticate</tt> challenge.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="TokenSize">
        <name>Token Size</name>
        <t>A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept a <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field value of at least 6144 octets. The
minimum applies to the field value as a whole, however many tokens it carries, and
a recipient's parser <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept List members of that length. A recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
truncate the field value, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat a field it rejects for its size as
absent. When it rejects a field for its size, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> respond with 431 (Request
Header Fields Too Large) <xref target="RFC6585"/>. With a typical JOSE header and an ES256
signature, 6144 octets fits a token whose claims total 4096 octets of JSON, the
limit <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> asks issuers to observe. It also stays
within common origin-server limits for a single header field.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="OtherInterfaces">
        <name>Conveying Tokens over Other Interfaces</name>
        <t>Beyond HTTP requests to websites and APIs, agents interact through a growing set of interfaces and protocols, including agent-to-tool interactions such as MCP <xref target="MCP"/>, agent-to-agent interactions such as A2A <xref target="A2A"/>, agent-to-API interactions (for example, OpenAPI descriptions converted into locally callable tools), and emerging protocols such as Universal Commerce Protocol <xref target="UCP"/> and Verifiable Intent <xref target="VINTENT"/>.
KYAPay is designed so that the same self-contained token can be conveyed across any of these interfaces -- as an HTTP header field, a message field, or a tool argument -- to deliver verified identity and payment credentials to the receiving service, API, or agent.
Because a KYA token is a self-contained JWT, it is transport-agnostic in a way that a request-signing mechanism is not: HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/> are meaningful only for HTTP exchanges, whereas the same token can ride HTTP, WebSockets, gRPC metadata, message queues, or a stdio MCP channel, and can be retained by a recipient that needs it for audit or dispute resolution and verified again later (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>).
This document specifies only the HTTP header binding in <xref target="HeaderField"/>;
bindings for other protocols are expected to be defined by those protocols or by companion specifications.
In all cases, the validation and usage rules of <xref target="SecInt"/> apply to the token, once received.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="Counterparty">
        <name>Authenticating the Counterparty</name>
        <t>The <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> claims are identifiers assigned by the Token Issuer (the Identifying the Target section of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>); their values are known to a Target that has onboarded to that issuer and are not otherwise discoverable.
The <tt>tdm</tt> claim names the Target's domain, is not issuer-specific, and requires no relationship with the issuer to interpret.
A Target that has onboarded to an issuer checks <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt>, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also check <tt>tdm</tt>; a security intermediary acting for such a Target <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be configured with that Target's <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> values and check them.
A recipient that has not onboarded, including a security intermediary acting for many Targets, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> check at least that <tt>tdm</tt> names the domain it is protecting for that request; where <tt>tdm</tt> also names a host or a path, the recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> check those too.
<tt>tdm</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present in tokens whose Target is identified by a domain name.
At the transport and discovery layers, mechanisms such as DNS domain names (with TLS server authentication), A2A agent cards <xref target="A2A"/>, and MCP server identification <xref target="MCP"/> help an agent confirm that it is communicating with the correct counterparty before presenting a token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="Attaching">
        <name>Attaching Tokens to Requests</name>
        <t>How an agent attaches a token to a request is an implementation matter, for the reasons given in <xref target="TokCreat"/>.
Any kind of request may carry a <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field; whether it does, and which token it carries, depends on where the request is sent:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A request to the Target carries the token requested for that Target.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A Target may rely on other hosts, such as its own hosts in other domains or vendors acting on its behalf.
A request to such a host carries a token that names the Target in its audience claims (<xref target="Counterparty"/>) and carries the claims that apply to that host, which may include payment claims.
Where no claims are set for the host, the token carries only the base claims: <tt>hid</tt> limited to its <tt>id</tt> member and assurance claims, <tt>apd</tt>, and <tt>aid</tt> without <tt>creation_ip</tt>, with no payment claims.
Where the claims for the host match those of the Target's token, the agent <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send the Target's token.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A request to any other host <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> carry a token.
If it does, the token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry more than the base claims.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This applies however the token is attached. An agent that adds the field below the page, for example by browser-level header injection, applies these rules to each request according to its destination, because a page also sends requests to hosts that are neither the Target nor acting on its behalf.</t>
        <t>The Target determines which hosts act on its behalf and which claims each receives.
Until a mechanism exists for the Target to declare this, an agent learns it by configuration or from an arrangement with the Target.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="AcceptField">
        <name>The Accept-KYAPay-Token Response Field</name>
        <t><tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> is a Dictionary Structured Field (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9651"/>) that a recipient sends in a response to state what a request needs to carry for the recipient to accept it.
Each member states one requirement.
The member's key is a label chosen by the recipient.
Its value is an Inner List of Strings, each naming a claim, using the claim names of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> with a period between a claim and its sub-claim (for example, "hid.email").</t>
        <t>Parameters on a member qualify the requirement.
Uses of KYAPay vary too widely for this document to define a complete set, so recipients define the parameters and values they need.
Three that are commonly useful are:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>purpose</tt>: a Token saying why the recipient needs the claims, which an agent can show to the human principal when asking for consent;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>optional</tt>: a Boolean; when true, the recipient would like the claims but does not require them; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>issuers</tt>: a String listing the issuers whose tokens the recipient accepts for this requirement, each as the value it uses in the <tt>iss</tt> claim, separated by single spaces.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>For example (with line wrapping per <xref target="RFC8792"/>):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

Accept-KYAPay-Token: checkout=("hid.email");purpose=checkout, \
  fraud=("hid.phone_number");purpose=fraud_prevention;optional
]]></artwork>
        <t>A recipient that requires payment names payment claims in the same way, for example <tt>pay=("amt" "cur");purpose=checkout</tt>.</t>
        <t>An agent <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore parameters it does not recognize.
A recipient that responds to cross-origin requests <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> list <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> in <tt>Access-Control-Expose-Headers</tt>, so that a browser-based agent can read it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="SecInt">
      <name>Using KYAPay Tokens at Security Intermediaries</name>
      <t>This section is normative.
It defines a common processing model and then describes how each kind of security intermediary uses the validated token.
Throughout, "validate the token" means to perform the validation procedure defined in <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, Section 4 (JWT header validation, signature and issuer validation, and validation of <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, the audience, and <tt>env</tt>), plus the PAY-specific validation for <tt>pay+jwt</tt> and <tt>kya-pay+jwt</tt> tokens.</t>
      <section anchor="ProcModel">
        <name>Common Processing Model</name>
        <t>A recipient first decides, from its own policy for the resource and action requested, whether it uses KYAPay tokens for that request.
A recipient that does not <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> ignore the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> field.
A recipient that does, on receiving a request that carries one or more KYAPay tokens, processes the tokens of the types it accepts (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>) as follows, and sets aside tokens of other types (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, Section 4).
A security intermediary:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> extract each token as described in <xref target="ConveyingRequests"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the token's issuer is one the recipient trusts for the claims being relied upon (see <xref target="SecCon"/>).
This check <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> precede any processing that resolves a value taken from the token, and in particular any network retrieval driven by the <tt>iss</tt> claim.
Until the token has been verified, <tt>iss</tt> is supplied by the sender: resolving it before the issuer is known to be trusted would allow an unauthenticated request to cause an outbound fetch to an arbitrary URL of the sender's choosing.
The trusted-issuer set is configured out of band and is not derived from the token.
A recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> retrieve key material for an issuer that is not in its configured set of trusted issuers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate each token as specified in <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, Section 4.
A token that fails validation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as conveying a human presence signal, and the intermediary <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> decline what it governs for that request, rather than applying its policy for requests that carry no token: a bot manager blocks the request, a fraud manager declines the transaction, or, where it inspects the token only after the action, handles the failure as it handles any other fraud finding on a completed transaction, an ATO protector blocks the sign-in, a CIAM system refuses the account action or token exchange, and a payment service does not proceed with the payment.
Where the decline is returned to the agent in an HTTP response, that response is as described in <xref target="StepUp"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the token signature against a key obtained from the issuer's JWK Set, discovered via the <tt>iss</tt> claim using the <tt>/.well-known/jwks.json</tt> mechanism (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>).
Because KYAPay tokens are self-contained, this verification <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be performed locally, without a synchronous callout to the issuer per request;
issuer keys <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be cached and refreshed according to standard JWK Set practice.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the token is intended for this recipient, as described in <xref target="Counterparty"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the <tt>env</tt> claim (for example, <tt>production</tt>) matches the environment the intermediary is operating in.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When the token carries a proof-of-possession key (the <tt>cnf</tt> claim <xref target="RFC7800"/>, <xref target="PoPPath"/>), <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the request is signed by that key as described in <xref target="PoPSignatures"/>, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request, and not forward it, if the signature is absent or invalid.
An intermediary behind a hop that has already done so <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> rely on that hop instead, as <xref target="PoPSignatures"/> describes.
When the token carries no such key, this step does not apply.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When the token carries no such key, it is a bearer token: the intermediary <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> rely on the controls in <xref target="SecCon"/> (short lifetime, audience binding, TLS, issuer-gated onboarding) and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that mere presentation of the token proves the sender holds a key bound to it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the token's claims to inform its decision, as described in the following subsections, only after successful validation.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A security intermediary <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the mere presence of a <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> header field as a human presence signal;
only a successfully validated token from a trusted issuer conveys that signal.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="HumanPresence">
        <name>Determining Human Presence and Assurance</name>
        <t>The core purpose of consuming a KYAPay token is to distinguish a human-via-agent request from a bot, and to gauge how strongly to trust it.
After validation, a recipient <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> derive the human presence signal from the layered identity in the token, treating each layer as a distinct entity verified by distinct means:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the human principal (<tt>hid</tt>): the presence and content of the human identity claim, and how strongly it was verified -- for example a verified status and verifier (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>), and, where a deployment conveys it, an identity-proofing assurance level (such as an Identity Assurance Level per <xref target="NIST-800-63A"/>) and the
<tt>amr</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>,
<tt>ivm</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>, and
<tt>aml</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>
claims describing how the principal was authenticated and verified;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the agent platform (<tt>apd</tt>): the identity of the operator that built and runs the agent, and whether it was verified (for example, a business/Know-Your-Business attestation), which supports reputation-based logic about the platform; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the agent instance (<tt>aid</tt>): the specific agent, including a meaningful name and, where present, references to its OAuth identity (<xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document"/>) and a proof-of-possession key bound to the token via <tt>cnf</tt> <xref target="RFC7800"/> (or a request-signing key published in an A2A Agent Card <xref target="A2A"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Because these are different entities verified to different degrees, a recipient <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> collapse them into a single yes/no signal.
Instead, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply per-entity, per-action policy.
For example, a recipient might require a higher human-principal assurance level and a "registered" agent for a payment than for browsing:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
/checkout: require hid assurance >= document+biometric
           require apd verified as a business
           require aid bound to a verified domain
/payment:  require hid assurance >= document+biometric
           require hid authenticated with a hardware key
           require aid registered by its platform
]]></artwork>
        <t>The strength of the human presence signal is a function of which identities are present, how strongly each was verified, and how much the recipient trusts the attesting issuer and verifier.
A recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> combine the token signal with its existing signals rather than replacing them, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept a lower assurance for low-risk actions while requiring step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) for higher-risk ones.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BotMgr">
        <name>Bot Managers</name>
        <t>A bot manager sits inline in the request path to make per-request admission decisions with minimal added latency. Traditionally, it relies on a detection pipeline -- client-side behavioral telemetry, browser fingerprinting, request timing, and network-signal analysis -- to infer whether a request is automated and who operates it.</t>
        <section anchor="token-is-present-and-valid">
          <name>Token is present and valid</name>
          <t>KYAPay tokens transform this detection model into a self-identification model. By presenting a valid KYA token, an agent explicitly identifies itself as automated up front. The bot manager verifies the token -- checking the cryptographic signature against the issuer's published keys, issuer trust, validity window, and audience -- and classifies the request as a verified agent.</t>
          <t>For token-bearing traffic, the identification question is settled: the bot manager does not need to execute its behavioral or fingerprinting detection heuristics to prove the request is automated. Requests that carry no token fall back to the standard detection pipeline; a request whose token fails validation is declined (<xref target="ProcModel"/>).</t>
          <t>Settling identification, however, does not grant automatic access. Identification is distinct from admission: classifying a request as a verified agent simply provides authenticated context. The bot manager uses the token's verified identity layer -- the human principal (<tt>hid</tt>), the agent platform (<tt>apd</tt>), and the agent instance (<tt>aid</tt>) -- to select and evaluate the site's configured access policy to determine the final disposition (admit, rate-limit, require step-up, or deny) rather than applying bot-blocking challenges designed for unattended, unattributed automation.</t>
          <t>Per-entity rate and abuse limits (<xref target="BadActor"/>) continue to apply to admitted requests, and a site <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> still challenge, or require step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) for, sensitive actions.</t>
          <t>KYAPay tokens are well-suited to inline bot management for several reasons:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><strong>Low Latency.</strong>
Because the token is a self-contained, signed JWT, the bot manager performs standard JWT verification locally and needs no per-request callout to a third party. Issuer keys <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be cached.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Policy Selection via Identity Context.</strong>
A validated token provides verified initiator identity (and, when targeting an agent, target identity), which the bot manager uses to select and evaluate the appropriate site policy rather than treating the traffic as suspected automation. By contrast, network-origin claims (such as declared source IP ranges) are unreliable as proof of origin -- addresses change and can be masked by VPNs, CGNAT, or shared pools -- so a recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use them as a weak corroborating signal only, but <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat an IP match alone as sufficient to bypass controls nor an IP mismatch as conclusive. Short lifetimes, audience binding, and proof-of-possession (<xref target="TrustStack"/>), not IP correlation, are the recommended controls against token misuse.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Replay Resistance.</strong>
A bearer token captured within its validity window can be replayed; a bot manager bounds this with short lifetimes, audience binding, and TLS (<xref target="SecCon"/>). Where a token carries a proof-of-possession key (<xref target="PoPPath"/>), the per-request signature is verified at the first hop, before any rewriting, which is usually the bot manager or the edge/CDN provider acting for the Target (<xref target="PoPSignatures"/>); this stops a stolen token being used on its own (<xref target="Replay"/>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="token-present-but-invalid">
          <name>Token present but invalid</name>
          <t>In some cases, a KYA token may be present in the request but the validation process may reveal some anomalies.
The bot manager then responds as described in <xref target="StepUp"/>, with 403 (Forbidden), and can include the <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> field stating what a request needs in order to succeed.</t>
          <t>In the examples in this section and the next, the <tt>issuers</tt> parameter (<xref target="AcceptField"/>) lists the issuers from which the bot manager accepts tokens, and a problem details body <xref target="RFC9457"/> gives the reason.
This document does not define those problem types; they are examples for discussion only.</t>
          <t><strong>Token expired.</strong>
Because tokens have a short validity window, a bot manager may occasionally detect a token that expires during the validation process.
The agent can obtain a new token from one of the listed issuers and retry the request.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/problem+json
Accept-KYAPay-Token: admit=("hid" "apd" "aid"); \
  issuers="https://issuer.example.com https://iss.example.org"

{"type": "https://bot-manager.example/problems/expired-token"}
]]></artwork>
          <t><strong>Token invalid.</strong>
Some anomalies may be detected when validating the token as described in <xref target="ProcModel"/> and <xref target="HumanPresence"/>.
The response has the same form, with a different problem type:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
{"type": "https://bot-manager.example/problems/invalid-token"}
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="token-not-present">
          <name>Token not present</name>
          <t>Organizations and individuals developing AI agents may be unaware of the requirement to identify their traffic using a Know Your Agent (KYA) token. Consequently, bot managers utilizing advanced detection methods may misclassify this agentic traffic as malicious and block it. To prevent a degraded user experience, which can lead to lost business opportunities for the host website, bot managers should issue a custom challenge response instead of an outright block. This proactive approach gently encourages developers to adopt and implement the KYA standard.</t>
          <t>When a bot manager detects advanced automation that lacks a Know Your Agent (KYA) token or other standard forms of identification, it responds in the same way, with the problem type <tt>https://bot-manager.example/problems/missing-token</tt>.
After the agent acquires a valid KYA token and reissues the request, the transaction can complete successfully.</t>
          <t>This light challenge is designed to help with KYA standard adoption and improve agentic traffic acceptance with merchants and increase agent autonomy in successfully completing tasks on behalf of their user principal.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="fraud-managers">
        <name>Fraud Managers</name>
        <t>A fraud manager operates at the application layer and scores the risk of an action or transaction.
It benefits from the token's layered identity and verification metadata:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> incorporate the per-entity verified identity (<tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt>, <tt>aid</tt>) and assurance levels into its risk model, distinguishing a request backed by a strongly verified human principal on a reputable platform from a weakly verified or anonymous one.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the <tt>verifier</tt>/<tt>verified</tt>/<tt>verification_id</tt> sub-claims, and the
<tt>amr</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>
              <tt>ivm</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>, and
<tt>aml</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>
claims where present, to weight how the principal was authenticated and verified.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For <tt>pay+jwt</tt> and <tt>kya-pay+jwt</tt> tokens, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the payment context (<tt>amt</tt>, <tt>cur</tt>, <tt>stp</tt>, <tt>sti</tt>, and the pricing claims <tt>tpr</tt> and <tt>tps</tt>) as additional transaction risk signals, after performing the PAY-token validation of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, Section 4.
Because the PAY token pins amount, currency, and target, the fraud manager <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> rely on those as hard limits enforced by the token rather than re-deriving them.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A fraud manager need not sit inline in the request path.
In practice the token is made available to it either inline (the Target forwards the received token to its fraud manager) or out of band (for example, script running on the Target's page captures the <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> value and sends it to the fraud manager before the request reaches the Target's application).
The same token <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be inspected before the action, after it, or both.
A recipient that inspects the token after the action evaluates its time-based claims, such as <tt>exp</tt>, against the time it received the request, as recorded by the recipient and not as supplied by the sender.
In all of these arrangements, the token issuer is not in the transaction path;
the fraud manager verifies the self-contained token locally by JWKS, as described in <xref target="ProcModel"/>.
The fraud manager <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> continue to apply its existing behavioral and device models;
the token supplements, and does not replace, those signals.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="StepUp">
        <name>Responding When a Token Falls Short</name>
        <t>A recipient can decline a request because it carries no KYAPay token, because the token fails validation (<xref target="ProcModel"/>), or because the token is valid but does not carry what the action requires: for example identity claims, a higher assurance level for a sensitive action, or a payment token.
Not all actions carry the same risk; viewing a loyalty balance is far less sensitive than making a large payment, and a token attests only the assurance established when it was issued.</t>
        <t>Where the decline is returned to the agent in an HTTP response, that response is 403 (Forbidden), or 402 (Payment Required) where what is missing or insufficient is payment, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> field (<xref target="AcceptField"/>) stating what a request needs in order to succeed (<xref target="DisclosingRequirements"/>).
Where the request is to an endpoint whose protocol specifies its own error responses, the recipient instead responds as that protocol specifies, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> field; for example, an OAuth 2.0 authorization server that declines a token exchange responds as specified in <xref section="2.2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>.
Over other interfaces (<xref target="OtherInterfaces"/>), how a decline is signaled is left to the binding for that interface.
A recipient <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use 401 (Unauthorized) for these cases: that status requires a <tt>WWW-Authenticate</tt> challenge (<xref section="15.5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9110"/>), and a KYAPay token is not an <tt>Authorization</tt> credential.
A recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> describe the reason in a problem details body <xref target="RFC9457"/> (<xref target="DisclosingRequirements"/>).</t>
        <t>An agent that receives such a response can compare it with what it sent.
If it sent no token, or a token that was refused, it can obtain a new token and retry.
If the token lacked something the recipient requires, obtaining it may involve the human principal, for example, to agree to share an attribute or to complete further verification with the issuer, which can take minutes to days.</t>
        <t>The same requirements can also be published in advance, so that an agent obtains a suitable token the first time.
This document does not define how.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ATOProt">
        <name>Account-Takeover Protectors</name>
        <t>An ATO protector distinguishes legitimate account sessions from hijacked or unauthorized ones.
KYAPay tokens let it separate three cases that previously looked alike: a direct human-present session, a human-initiated agentic session, and an unauthorized automated session.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat a validated KYAPay token, bound to its request per <xref target="TrustStack"/>, as evidence that a session is a human-initiated agentic session rather than an unattended attack, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record that distinction for auditing.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When the agent needs to act within an existing account, the token <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be exchanged for an OAuth access token using KYAPay Token Exchange <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange"/> or OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/>.
A Security Token Service, Identity Provider, or OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> Authorization Server validates the KYA token, extracts principal claims from <tt>hid</tt> (<tt>hid.id</tt>, and an email address or other identifier where the Target requested it), and issues an access token that the agent uses against the Target.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The access token resulting from such an exchange <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sender-constrained (for example, via DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> or mutual TLS <xref target="RFC8705"/>) rather than issued as a freely transferable bearer token, so that exchanging the KYA token does not simply reintroduce a replayable credential.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Cross-domain trust must be established: the Target's authorization server can fetch the issuer's keys via the <tt>iss</tt> JWKS endpoint, but it must also decide whether to trust that issuer and how to interpret its claims (see <xref target="SecCon"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A valid token attests authorization at the moment of issuance, not continuous human control.
An ATO protector <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> assume that the human remains in control for the token's whole lifetime, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> prefer short token lifetimes, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) for sensitive actions.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A KYAPay token attests the identity of the principal who authorized the agent.
It does not convey authority over any account at the Target.
An ATO protector <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat a validated token, on its own, as evidence that the session is authorized for the account it is acting on.</t>
        <t>Where a KYAPay token is presented to gain access to an account (at sign-in, at account creation, or when the token is exchanged for an access token as described above), a recipient <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> check that the token's principal is linked to that account.
The principal is linked when the account already records the token's <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>hid.id</tt>, or when a verified identifier in <tt>hid</tt> matches one the account records as verified.
A match is a strong positive signal that the agent is acting within its own principal's account, and a recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> weight it accordingly.
A mismatch <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be treated as grounds for step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) rather than as conclusive.
Because an issuer asserts an identifier only where it has verified that the principal controls it, a match is evidence of control rather than of mere knowledge.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ciam-systems">
        <name>CIAM Systems</name>
        <t>A CIAM system manages account creation and login for a Target's customers.
With KYAPay tokens it can manage agents consistently with humans:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> create an account for an agent (or for the human principal behind an agent) directly from a validated KYA or KYA-PAY token, drawing account attributes from the <tt>hid</tt> claim, such as an email address where the CIAM system requested it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use KYAPay Token Exchange <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange"/> or OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> to exchange a KYA token for an access token, enabling logged-in experiences (loyalty, saved preferences, offers) for human-via-agent sessions, applying the sender-constraining and cross-domain-trust considerations of <xref target="ATOProt"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> maintain the linkage between a human principal and the agents authorized to act for them, so that a principal can be given visibility into, and control over, agent activity and vice versa.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A validated token identifies the principal who authorized the agent; it does not by itself convey authority over an existing account.
A CIAM system <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> create a new account from a validated token, in which case the token's principal is the account holder by construction, and it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record the token's <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>hid.id</tt> against the account.
To admit an agent to an existing account, a CIAM system <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> additionally establish that the token's principal is linked to that account.
Any of the following is sufficient: the account already records the token's <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>hid.id</tt>; a verified identifier in <tt>hid</tt> matches one the account records as verified; or an existing session for that account authenticated by other means.
A mismatch, or the absence of any link, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be treated as grounds for step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) rather than as conclusive.
A validated token alone <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as sufficient.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="consistency-across-layers">
        <name>Consistency Across Layers</name>
        <t>Because all of the intermediaries above validate the <em>same</em> token and draw on the <em>same</em> verified claims, an operator <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> configure them to reach consistent verdicts on a given request: a request admitted as a verified human-via-agent request by the bot manager should not be scored as an anonymous bot by the fraud manager.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BadActor">
        <name>Granular Bad-Actor Mitigation and Triage</name>
        <t>The layered identity in a KYA token (<tt>hid</tt> for the principal, <tt>apd</tt> for the platform, <tt>aid</tt> for the agent instance) lets intermediaries choose the scope of a mitigation deliberately, rather than being forced into a single broad, "nuclear" block.
Because every request carries all three identities, a recipient can select the narrowest scope that is effective and escalate only as warranted:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the individual <strong>human principal</strong> (<tt>hid</tt>) -- e.g., block or throttle one abusive user while all other users of the same agent continue to be served;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the specific <strong>agent instance</strong> (<tt>aid</tt>) -- e.g., isolate one compromised or malfunctioning agent without affecting the principal's other agents or the rest of the platform; or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the entire <strong>agent platform</strong> (<tt>apd</tt>) -- e.g., when an operator is systematically abusive, unresponsive, or untrusted, block or de-rate all traffic from that platform.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The same granularity supports responses short of blocking the requests, such as throttling, requiring step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>), or lowering an assurance score, applied at whichever tier is appropriate.
Choosing the tightest effective scope isolates threats while protecting the reputation of well-behaved platforms and avoiding collateral damage to legitimate human-via-agent requests;
reserving platform-wide action for cases that genuinely warrant it keeps that option available without making it the default.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="IssuerFeedback">
        <name>Feedback to the Token Issuer</name>
        <t>The mitigation described above is local: a recipient acts on its own traffic.
Because the token issuer is the party that vouches for the initiator and can decline to vouch again, there is value in a feedback loop that lets a security intermediary report observed bad behavior back to the issuer, so that action can be taken at the source rather than only at each recipient independently.
When a security intermediary observes abusive or anomalous behavior that it can attribute, using the layered identity in the token, to a particular entity, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> report that observation to the token's issuer (identified by <tt>iss</tt>).
The attribution follows the same tiers as <xref target="BadActor"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the individual human principal (<tt>hid</tt>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the specific agent instance (<tt>aid</tt>); or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the agent platform as a whole (<tt>apd</tt>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>On receiving such feedback, and subject to its own verification and anti-abuse safeguards, the issuer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> take appropriate action, up to and including ceasing to issue tokens to the implicated initiator, agent, or platform -- the issuance-side counterpart to a recipient's refusal to accept a token, and complementary to the token-lifetime and revocation considerations of <xref target="SecCon"/>.
This mirrors the Certificate-Authority analogy of <xref target="SecCon"/>: just as a CA can stop issuing (and can revoke) certificates for a misbehaving subscriber, a KYAPay issuer can stop vouching for a misbehaving initiator.</t>
        <t>This document does not define the mechanism, format, or trust model for this feedback channel;
how a recipient authenticates to an issuer, how reports are structured, how issuers guard against false or malicious reports, and what evidence is required are all open items.
Feedback <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be treated as sensitive: reports identify principals, agents, or platforms and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be shared only with the relevant issuer and handled per <xref target="PrivCon"/>.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> corroborate feedback (for example, requiring reputation, multiple independent reports, or evidence) before taking action that would affect a principal, so that the channel cannot itself be used to deny service to legitimate initiators.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="non-payment-and-handoff-flows">
        <name>Non-Payment and Handoff Flows</name>
        <t>Not every human-via-agent flow includes a payment made by the agent.
In a common pattern, the agent performs discovery and assembles a cart but does not pay;
it then hands off to the human, who completes checkout in a browser, in a later session, or even in a physical store.
In such flows, the KYA token (carried without a PAY token) still provides the human presence signal that lets a security intermediary admit the agent's discovery and cart-building activity.
Intermediaries <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> accept KYA-only requests (those conveying a KYA token but no PAY token) for actions that do not themselves settle a payment, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the absence of a PAY token as a reason to classify an otherwise valid human-via-agent request as a bot.</t>
        <t>Because <tt>hid.id</tt> is stable for the human principal at a Target service, for a given issuer and agent platform, a Target or its fraud manager <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> link the agent's earlier work at that service to the principal's eventual purchase there, for attribution, personalization and fraud analysis.
<tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> differ at every other Target (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>).
Linking to a purchase completed outside the agent session, or on a different channel, needs an identifier available in both places, such as an email address, which a token carries only where the Target requested it and the principal authorized its disclosure.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="TokCreat">
      <name>Token Creation Considerations</name>
      <t>This section is non-normative with respect to <em>how</em> tokens are created.
It records considerations that KYAPay Token Issuers and agent developers should weigh, but it deliberately does not mandate a mechanism.
The normative interoperability contract is the token defined by <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> and consumed as specified in <xref target="SecInt"/>;
how a given agent obtains a valid token is an implementation and architecture choice.</t>
      <section anchor="NonPrescCreat">
        <name>Why this Document is Not Prescriptive about Creation</name>
        <t>Readers accustomed to fixed API contracts may expect a specification to prescribe exactly how a credential is minted.
For agents, such prescription is neither possible nor desirable at this time, for several reasons:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><strong>Agent architectures are diverse.</strong>
Agents are built in fundamentally different ways -- computer-use agents that drive a desktop, browser-use agents that drive a browser, and programmatic agents that call APIs or tools -- and there is no single formula for building one.
An agent may be an individual's personal, ad hoc creation, or a highly governed and deterministic enterprise agent for a regulated workflow, or anything in between.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Credentials may need to be shielded from the LLM.</strong>
In many designs, it is desirable that the LLM driving an agent never sees raw credentials.
Token creation may therefore be placed inside deterministic tools that the LLM can invoke but whose outputs (the tokens, or the secrets used to mint them) it cannot read.
Whether this matters depends on the deployment;
a specification that mandated a single creation flow could not accommodate both shielded and unshielded designs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Agent-identity and communication protocols are still emerging.</strong>
Multiple protocols for agent identity and for agent communication -- agent-to-tool (MCP <xref target="MCP"/>), agent-to-agent (A2A <xref target="A2A"/>), request signing (<xref target="RFC9421"/>), OAuth client identity (<xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document"/>), agent-to-API, Verifiable Intent <xref target="VINTENT"/>, UCP <xref target="UCP"/>, and others -- are under active development and require significant investment to reach production.
Standardizing a single creation mechanism now would bind KYAPay to choices that are not yet settled.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>The web already exists.</strong>
In contrast to those emerging interfaces, websites and merchant-controlled endpoints exist today at scale and require no new integration effort from merchants (<xref target="DesignPrinc"/>).
A usable protocol must therefore work now, over the existing web, which argues for standardizing the delivered token rather than the creation path.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>KYAPay's position is that the token is the fixed point, and creation is allowed to vary.
This is what lets a single token type serve individual and enterprise agents, shielded and unshielded designs, and today's web alongside tomorrow's agent protocols.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="guidance-for-kyapay-token-issuers">
        <name>Guidance for KYAPay Token Issuers</name>
        <t>Given the above, KYAPay Token Issuers are encouraged to make token creation possible and easy regardless of the technology an agent uses:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><strong>Match the issuing interface to the agent.</strong>
A programmatic agent using a deterministic tool may be well served by a single REST endpoint with optional arguments -- one call that can mint a KYA, PAY, or KYA-PAY token with any supported settlement type (payment cards, stablecoins, and so on).
An agent driven through MCP <xref target="MCP"/> may instead be better served by several narrow, specific tools (one per token type and per settlement type), so as to reduce the decision burden placed on the LLM.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Support multiple identity technologies.</strong>
Because there is no single agent-identity standard today, issuers should be prepared to accept and bind a variety of identity inputs when minting tokens, including (for example) CIMD <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document"/>, WIMSE / SPIFFE <xref target="SPIFFE"/>, Agent Name Service (ANS), request-signing keys published in A2A Agent Cards <xref target="A2A"/>, and public/private key pairs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Be available across agent technologies and protocols.</strong>
Issuers should be reachable by agents irrespective of the agent's runtime technology, the identity protocol it uses, and the communication protocol it speaks.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Origination and issuance need not be performed by the same party.
The <tt>iss</tt> claim identifies the party that signs (issues) the token, while the optional <tt>ori</tt> claim (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>) identifies the party that originated -- that is, assembled and requested -- it;
these can be the same entity or different entities.
Likewise, the verified identity information carried in <tt>hid</tt> and <tt>apd</tt> may be supplied by the agent platform or a third-party verifier and merely attested by the issuer.
Verification itself need not be completed up front: it can be progressive, beginning with a lightweight check (such as email verification) and stepping up as a Target's requirements demand.
Consumers observe the result of these choices through the <tt>verifier</tt>/<tt>verified</tt> sub-claims and, where used, the
<tt>ivm</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>,
<tt>amr</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>, and
<tt>aml</tt> <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>
claims, rather than through any mandated creation flow.</t>
        <t>The objective of all of the above is a single outcome: a valid KYAPay JWT that is consumable by every transacting party -- the Initiator, the Target, and the bot managers, fraud managers, ATO protectors, and CIAM systems in between.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="SecCon">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>When validating the JWTs described here and in <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, implementers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the JSON Web Token Best Current Practices, BCP 225 <xref target="RFC8725"/>, in addition to the validation steps of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>, Section 4.</t>
      <section anchor="transport-confidentiality">
        <name>Transport Confidentiality</name>
        <t>KYAPay tokens convey identity and, for PAY tokens, payment credentials.
They <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be transmitted over TLS and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be sent in the clear.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-freshness-and-lifetime">
        <name>Token Freshness and Lifetime</name>
        <t>A long-lived token is a credential that can be captured, farmed, and resold for reuse against the same Target.
The <tt>exp</tt> claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present;
recipients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> require short lifetimes (for high-assurance actions, on the order of a few minutes) and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject tokens whose lifetime exceeds their local policy maximum.
Recipients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject tokens whose <tt>iat</tt> is outside an acceptable window.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="Replay">
        <name>Replay and Proof of Possession</name>
        <t>A bare bearer token can be replayed by anyone who captures it within its validity window.
As deployed today (<xref target="TrustStack"/>), KYAPay accepts this bounded in-window risk and mitigates rather than eliminates it: recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the token is intended for them, as described in <xref target="Counterparty"/>, so that a token minted for one Target cannot be presented to another, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep accepted lifetimes short.
In-window replay within the token's audience is an accepted risk of the bearer model.
Because a conforming token is presented on many requests within its lifetime, a repeated <tt>jti</tt> is not by itself evidence of replay, and the claim is used for correlation, audit, and issuer feedback (<xref target="IssuerFeedback"/>) rather than for replay detection.
Where a deployment issues a distinct token for each request, a repeated <tt>jti</tt> does carry that meaning; this document describes the general case, in which it does not.
Where a token carries a proof-of-possession key (<tt>cnf</tt> <xref target="RFC7800"/>), recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> additionally verify a per-request signature <xref target="RFC9421"/> over that key (<xref target="PoPSignatures"/>).
This stops a stolen token from being used on its own, turning an open-ended token-theft exposure into a bounded window in which a captured signed request could be replayed verbatim; it does not prevent that verbatim replay.
Access tokens produced by token exchange (<xref target="ATOProt"/>) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sender-constrained (<xref target="RFC9449"/>, <xref target="RFC8705"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="malicious-or-compromised-target-reuse">
        <name>Malicious or Compromised Target Reuse</name>
        <t>A Target that legitimately receives a bearer token can, within the token's window, reuse it to act elsewhere on the agent's behalf.
Audience binding limits this to the intended Target;
the proof-of-possession model (<xref target="TrustStack"/>), which binds each use to a fresh request signature, closes it.
Recipients and Targets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> forward received tokens to other parties (see <xref target="PrivCon"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="compromised-agent-host-irreducible">
        <name>Compromised Agent Host (Irreducible)</name>
        <t>Malware resident on the agent's host can drive the agent's legitimate key as a signing oracle for as long as it is present.
Proof of possession does not prevent this: the malware's requests convey valid bindings and are indistinguishable from the real agent's.
This risk is bounded not by the token bindings but by short token lifetimes -- so anything signed during a compromise expires quickly once the malware is evicted -- together with host-level controls such as attestation, anomaly detection, and hygiene.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="RuntimeExposure">
        <name>Token Exposure in the Agent Runtime</name>
        <t>Agents driven by language models process untrusted content and record their activity in ways that conventional HTTP clients do not.
A KYAPay token can therefore leave the agent through normal operation, without the agent host being compromised.
Examples include:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the token appearing in model context, conversation transcripts, or tool-call inputs and outputs that are logged, retained, or sent to a model provider;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>agent tracing, observability, or debugging systems that record outbound request headers;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>prompt injection, where content retrieved from a website or tool instructs the agent to reveal the token or to include it in a request to a party other than the intended Target.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>For a bearer token (<xref target="Bearer"/>), anyone who obtains a leaked token can present it at the Target it was minted for until it expires.
Audience binding (<xref target="Counterparty"/>) does not help if the attacker presents the token at that Target.</t>
        <t>Agent developers and KYAPay Token Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> mint and attach tokens in deterministic components (<xref target="NonPrescCreat"/>) whose outputs are not placed in model context.
Agents <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> attach a token only to requests sent to the Target for which the token was requested; where the token carries <tt>tdm</tt>, that means a destination within the domain that <tt>tdm</tt> names.
The component that attaches a token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> make that decision without relying on model output.</t>
        <t>Agent runtimes <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> write KYAPay token values to logs, traces, or observability exports.</t>
        <t>Agents <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> request a new token for each Target and task rather than reusing one broadly, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> request the shortest lifetime that fits the task.
Proof of possession (<xref target="PoPPath"/>) reduces this exposure only if the private key is also kept out of model context.</t>
        <t>Some architectures place a token in model context unavoidably.
Where an agent obtains a token by invoking a tool, the tool result is returned to the model, and any retained transcript of that session therefore contains the token.
A deployment in that position <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat the token as disclosed to every party with access to that context, including the model provider.
For such a deployment, per-Target, short-lived tokens are the main mitigation, together with proof of possession where the private key is held outside model context.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="issuer-trust">
        <name>Issuer Trust</name>
        <t>A token is only as trustworthy as its issuer and the verifiers it cites.
The system is federated: many issuers are possible, and a recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> maintain an explicit set of trusted issuers and the claims and assurance levels it will accept from each.
Establishing this trust at scale is an open problem analogous to the Certificate Authority model (audits, a maintained issuer list, a removal mechanism, and possibly transparency logs);
this document does not define such a framework, and deployments should not assume one exists.
Until it does, trust is established out of band (for example, configured relationships with well-known issuers).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="revocation">
        <name>Revocation</name>
        <t>An agent whose platform is deregistered, or a human whose identity verification is revoked, may still hold unexpired tokens.
This specification does not define a revocation mechanism.
Recipients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep accepted lifetimes short to bound exposure, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> consult an issuer's live-status or revocation endpoint, where one is offered, for high-assurance or high-value actions.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="continuity-of-human-control">
        <name>Continuity of Human Control</name>
        <t>A valid token attests that the human principal authorized the agent at the time of issuance.
It does not prove the human remains in control -- for example, if the agent is later prompt-injected, or if credentials are exfiltrated from the agent or its host.
Recipients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat high-value actions as warranting step-up (<xref target="StepUp"/>) rather than relying solely on a previously issued token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-management">
        <name>Key Management</name>
        <t>If an issuer or platform rotates a signing key, tokens signed with the old key may fail validation prematurely.
Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> retain superseded verification keys in their JWK Set for at least the maximum token lifetime after rotation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="DisclosingRequirements">
        <name>Disclosing Requirements</name>
        <t>The <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> field (<xref target="AcceptField"/>) and any problem details a recipient returns (<xref target="StepUp"/>) tell the sender what the recipient requires.
That helps a legitimate agent obtain a suitable token, and it also reaches anyone else who sends a request.
How much to state is a decision for the recipient, in light of its own risk:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It can omit the field, state only some of its requirements, or leave out the <tt>issuers</tt> parameter, which names the issuers it accepts.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It can instead publish its requirements in advance, or agree them with initiators out of band.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Requirements that differ by principal, by account, or by the outcome of a risk assessment can reveal those facts, for example, which accounts are of high value or that a request has been flagged (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9470"/> describes the same risk for authentication requirements).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Saying which validation check a token failed can help an attacker probe the recipient; a generic reason avoids this (<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9457"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Stating requirements does not weaken the token itself: a request still succeeds only with a token signed by an issuer the recipient trusts.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="PrivCon">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The privacy considerations of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> apply.
In particular:</t>
      <section anchor="minimal-disclosure">
        <name>Minimal Disclosure</name>
        <t>Only the information needed to facilitate the intended interaction should be placed in a token and conveyed to intermediaries and Targets.
Issuers and senders <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> prefer the least revealing set of claims sufficient for the decision at hand -- for example, an assurance level or a boolean verified status rather than underlying identity documents or personally identifying verification data.
For example, a bot manager deciding whether to admit a request to browse a catalog needs no identifying claim: <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>hid.id</tt> let it rate-limit and recognize a returning principal at that Target service, and the assurance claims in <tt>hid</tt> say how strongly the principal was verified.
By default, a token identifies the principal only by <tt>hid.id</tt> (<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>); identifying claims are added only where a Target requires them for the action at hand.
Because KYA tokens are JWTs, selective disclosure (for example, SD-JWT <xref target="RFC9901"/>) is a forward-compatible path to revealing only the claims a given Target needs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="consent">
        <name>Consent</name>
        <t>Tokens assert that an agent acts on behalf of a principal.
That assertion is only legitimate when the principal has authorized the interaction.
Systems <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be designed so that tokens are minted only with the principal's authorization.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="handling-by-intermediaries">
        <name>Handling by Intermediaries</name>
        <t>Security intermediaries receive verified personal data in the course of making decisions.
They <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> values and their decoded contents as sensitive personal data: not caching them for replay, not logging them in the clear, and not sharing them with parties other than legitimate participants in the interaction.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="http-field-name-registration">
        <name>HTTP Field Name Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name" registry established by <xref target="RFC9110"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Field Name: KYAPay-Token</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Status: permanent</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Structured Type: List</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="HeaderField"/> of this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Comments: Carries one or more KYAPay tokens in an HTTP request</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Field Name: Accept-KYAPay-Token</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Status: permanent</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Structured Type: Dictionary</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="AcceptField"/> of this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Comments: States what a request must carry for a KYAPay recipient to accept it</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="jwt-and-media-type-registrations">
        <name>JWT and Media Type Registrations</name>
        <t>This document defines no new JWT claims, JWT confirmation methods, or media types.
The claims and media types used by KYAPay tokens are registered by <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>.
The <tt>amr</tt> extensions and the <tt>ivm</tt> and <tt>aml</tt> claims and values are registered by
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>,
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>, and
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>, respectively.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8725">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token Best Current Practices</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in the area of digital identity and in other application areas. This Best Current Practices document updates RFC 7519 to provide actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="225"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8725"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8725"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9651">
          <front>
            <title>Structured Field Values for HTTP</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="P-H. Kamp" surname="P-H. Kamp"/>
            <date month="September" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a set of data types and associated algorithms that are intended to make it easier and safer to define and handle HTTP header and trailer fields, known as "Structured Fields", "Structured Headers", or "Structured Trailers". It is intended for use by specifications of new HTTP fields.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8941.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9651"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9651"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9421">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7800">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7800"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7800"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9530">
          <front>
            <title>Digest Fields</title>
            <author fullname="R. Polli" initials="R." surname="Polli"/>
            <author fullname="L. Pardue" initials="L." surname="Pardue"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests. The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP message content. The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP representations. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for receiving the respective Integrity fields.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9530"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9530"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6585">
          <front>
            <title>Additional HTTP Status Codes</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <date month="April" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies additional HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status codes for a variety of common situations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6585"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6585"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay Token</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment
   tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this token
   format to consume identity and payment tokens in an interoperable
   manner.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Abhishek Hingnikar" initials="A." surname="Hingnikar">
              <organization>WorkOS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeffrey Hickman" initials="J." surname="Hickman">
              <organization>Ory</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes how KYAPay tokens can be exchanged for
   OAuth access tokens to dynamically grant agents access to resources
   they need to accomplish their mission.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-03"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8176">
          <front>
            <title>Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim is defined and registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry, but no standard Authentication Method Reference values are currently defined. This specification establishes a registry for Authentication Method Reference values and defines an initial set of Authentication Method Reference values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8176"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8176"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8705">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8705"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8705"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8792">
          <front>
            <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
            <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9457">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Details for HTTP APIs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wilde" initials="E." surname="Wilde"/>
            <author fullname="S. Dalal" initials="S." surname="Dalal"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a "problem detail" to carry machine-readable details of errors in HTTP response content to avoid the need to define new error response formats for HTTP APIs.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7807.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9457"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9457"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9470">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Step Up Authentication Challenge Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>It is not uncommon for resource servers to require different authentication strengths or recentness according to the characteristics of a request. This document introduces a mechanism that resource servers can use to signal to a client that the authentication event associated with the access token of the current request does not meet its authentication requirements and, further, how to meet them. This document also codifies a mechanism for a client to request that an authorization server achieve a specific authentication strength or recentness when processing an authorization request.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9470"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9470"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9111">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Caching</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7234.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="98"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9111"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9111"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9901">
          <front>
            <title>Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yasuda" initials="K." surname="Yasuda"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a mechanism for the selective disclosure
of individual elements of a JSON data structure used as the payload
of a JSON Web Signature (JWS). The primary use case is the selective
disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9901"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9901"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values">
          <front>
            <title>Additional Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The JWT "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim contains
   values conveying authentication methods used in the authentication.
   This specification defines additional Authentication Method Reference
   values beyond those already registered to represent additional
   authentication methods in use today.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification">
          <front>
            <title>Identity Verification Methods Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Knowing how a person's identity was verified can be important when
   making trust decisions.  This specification defines a claim and
   values for declaring how the person's identity was verified.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods">
          <front>
            <title>Anti-Money Laundering Methods Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Financial regulations require application of Anti-Money Laundering
   (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) methods in many
   jurisdictions worldwide.  This specification defines a claim and
   values for declaring what AML/CFT methods were employed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-aml-methods-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Client ID Metadata Document</title>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Emelia Smith" initials="E." surname="Smith">
              <organization>independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a mechanism through which an OAuth client
   can identify itself to authorization servers, without prior dynamic
   client registration or other existing registration.  This is through
   the usage of a URL as a client_id in an OAuth flow, where the URL
   refers to a document containing the necessary client metadata,
   enabling the authorization server to fetch the metadata about the
   client as needed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NIST-800-63A" target="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63a.html">
          <front>
            <title>Digital Identity Guidelines: Identity Proofing and Enrollment (NIST SP 800-63A)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCP" target="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25">
          <front>
            <title>Model Context Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Anthropic and the Model Context Protocol Contributors</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="A2A" target="https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/specification">
          <front>
            <title>Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>A2A Project</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="UCP" target="https://ucp.dev/latest/specification/overview/">
          <front>
            <title>Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>UCP Contributors</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="VINTENT" target="https://verifiableintent.dev/spec/">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Intent Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Verifiable Intent Contributors</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPIFFE" target="https://spiffe.io/docs/latest/spiffe-about/overview/">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>SPIFFE Project / Cloud Native Computing Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-ORG" target="https://kyapay.org/">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay: Verified Agent Identity and Payments</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OpenID.Core" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="Nat Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M. B." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B. de" surname="Medeiros" fullname="Breno de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Mortimore" fullname="Chuck Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="15"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1015?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors thank the contributors to the KYAPay Token <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/> specification and the partners in the KYAPay consortium (see <xref target="KYAPAY-ORG"/>) -- including bot-management, fraud, CIAM, and ATO vendors and merchants -- whose deployment and review experience informed the usage patterns and open issues described here.</t>
      <t>We would like to thank
Bhasker Allam,
Jean Diaconu,
and
David Senecal
for their contributions to the specification.
Bhasker Allam also wrote the text on which <xref target="RuntimeExposure"/> is based.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <t>[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]</t>
      <t>-03</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Aligned with KYAPay Token: <tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> differ at every other
Target.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-02</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Updated the traditional bot detection methods in the introduction</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Updated the Bot Managers section and introduce the concept of feedback loop to the agent through an error response in case of token assessment failure</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that the principal need not be present at the time of a human-via-agent request.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made admission depend on the site's policy for the requested action, and stated that rate and abuse limits and step-up still apply to admitted requests.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that a token is reusable within its validity period and audience, and that a repeated <tt>jti</tt> is not by itself evidence of replay, and rewrote the replay considerations to match.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Described how a recipient confirms the audience: <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> where it has onboarded to the issuer, <tt>tdm</tt> otherwise; required <tt>tdm</tt> where the Target is identified by a domain name.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Prohibited retrieving key material for an issuer that is not trusted.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made BCP 225 a normative reference, and let a recipient reject a request carrying more than one token of the same <tt>typ</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added Token Exposure in the Agent Runtime to the Security Considerations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added Request Signatures for Proof of Possession: the covered components, and verification at the first hop.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added Attaching Tokens to Requests, scoped the zero-tech-lift principle to agents that control a request's header fields, and added CORS preflight and caching requirements.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Described retaining a token for audit or dispute resolution.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Defined <tt>KYAPay-Token</tt> as a List of Tokens, replacing the ABNF, and required a recipient to reject a field that fails to parse.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added the <tt>Accept-KYAPay-Token</tt> response field, which a recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send, replaced Step-Up Authentication with Responding When a Token Falls Short (over HTTP, 403, or 402 for payment, unless the protocol in use specifies its own errors; not 401), changed the Bot Managers error examples to match, made a recipient decide from its own policy whether it uses tokens for a request and decline, within its role, a request whose token fails validation, rather than treat it as carrying no token, and added Disclosing Requirements.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Used <tt>hid.id</tt> for account binding at ATO protectors and CIAM systems, defined the base claims for hosts with no claims set, made linkage per Target service, and added a minimal-disclosure example.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-01</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Rewrote the Introduction to frame agents as an evolution of verified bot traffic.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Clarified the meaning of Verifier and differentiated from Recipient.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-00</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Initial draft.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
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