<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.4.12) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-04" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title>KYAPay Token</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-04"/>
    <author initials="A." surname="Agarwal" fullname="Ankit Agarwal">
      <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com</email>
        <uri>https://skyfire.xyz</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones">
      <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
      <address>
        <email>michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</email>
        <uri>https://self-issued.info/</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>agent</keyword>
    <keyword>identity</keyword>
    <keyword>agentic</keyword>
    <keyword>payment</keyword>
    <keyword>commerce</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 128?>

<t>This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment tokens in
JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from
different vendors can leverage this token format to consume identity and payment
tokens in an interoperable manner.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://skyfire-xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 135?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>As software agents evolve from pre-orchestrated workflow automations to truly
autonomous or semi-autonomous assistants, they require the ability to identify
themselves -- and more importantly, identify their human principals -- to external
systems. Agents acting on behalf of users to discover services, create accounts,
or execute actions currently face significant operational barriers.</t>
      <t>The KYAPay token addresses these challenges by providing a standard envelope to
carry verified identity and payment information. By utilizing "kya" (Agent
Identity) and "pay" (Payment) tokens, agents can identify their human principals
to services, sites, bot managers, customer identity and access management (CIAM)
systems, and fraud detectors. This enables agents to bypass common blocking
mechanisms and access services that were previously restricted to manual human
interaction.</t>
      <t>KYAPay does not aim to define agentic identity in its entirety. Rather, it specifies
a standard and extensible JSON Web Token (JWT) <xref target="RFC7519"/> that can be used to securely share human
principal and agent identity information with websites and APIs. KYAPay tokens
provide a strong signal of human presence behind agentic requests that are
otherwise indistinguishable from programmatic and potentially malicious bot requests.</t>
      <t>Note that, in the future,
the payment token functionality could be split into a separate specification,
if desired by a working group adopting the specification.
It is retained here at present for ease of reviewing.</t>
      <section anchor="use-cases-for-the-kyapay-token">
        <name>Use Cases for the KYAPay Token</name>
        <t>Enabling agents to access websites and APIs on behalf of
the human principals they represent is a design goal of KYAPay tokens.
Today’s internet is designed primarily for humans, meaning that automated systems
are often classified as malicious and blocked by web security infrastructure.
However, the rise of AI agents has introduced a new paradigm where
programmatic clients legitimately access websites and APIs
on behalf of human principals.
Because these agents can be hard to distinguish from traditional bots,
they are often inadvertently blocked,
creating a need for the web security ecosystem to distinguish between
legitimate agentic traffic and potentially malicious activity.
KYAPay tokens are designed to address this challenge by enabling agents to convey
verified identity and payment credentials.
These tokens can provide web security systems and merchants with
a strong signal that the requests are authorized by a human,
allowing them to safely permit legitimate programmatic transactions
while aggressively blocking undesired traffic.</t>
        <t>Enabling agents to create accounts and/or log in to accounts
on behalf of their human principals is a related design goal.
To achieve this, systems can utilize a token exchange workflow <xref target="RFC8693"/>.
In this process, a Security Token Service (STS), Identity Provider (IdP),
or OAuth Authorization Server verifies incoming KYA tokens
and extracts claims associated with the human principal, such as <tt>hid.id</tt>,
or an email address where it requested one.
The authorization server then performs a token exchange,
swapping the KYA token for a standard OAuth Access Token,
which the agent subsequently uses to interact with the target service.
Crucially, this architecture allows the service to know
that the agent is acting on behalf of the user,
making it possible to differentiate between
direct, human-present sessions and human-initiated, agentic sessions
for authorization, auditing, and security purposes.</t>
        <t>Enabling agents to have ubiquity of access across the Internet just like their
human principals is a related design goal.
Automation typically scales as it achieves higher reliability and lower
cost-to-entry. Unlike the structured logic required by cron jobs or
low-code / no-code platforms, agentic automation leverages LLMs to execute
tasks via natural language, effectively removing the software-skill barrier.
As model reasoning improves and infrastructure scales, these agents become
increasingly dependable and affordable for the human principal.
To maximize utility, agents require ubiquitous Internet access, a feat made
possible by KYAPay Token Issuers. By providing a client-side verification
framework analogous to the server-side role of Certificate Authorities (CAs),
KYAPay builds a standardized network of acceptance across the web security
ecosystem. This allows for the seamless attestation of both the agent’s and
the human principal’s identity, ensuring secure, cross-domain task execution
without the friction of fragmented authentication silos.</t>
        <t>Enabling the ecosystem of web security vendors to engage in finer-grained and
deliberate bad-actor mitigation is a related design goal.
KYA tokens provide a layered, verified, and extensible identity stack
specifically engineered for autonomous agents. This framework
allows the web security ecosystem to distinguish among individual agent
instances, the platforms they run on, and the human principals behind them.
By establishing this level of granular visibility, security systems can
transition from broad defensive measures to specific mitigation; rather than
being forced to block an entire platform, administrators can now isolate
and neutralize a single malicious human user or a malfunctioning software
instance without disrupting legitimate traffic.</t>
        <t>Note that the protocols using these tokens to achieve these goals
are not defined by this specification.
The interoperable use of them for these purposes will require further specification.</t>
        <t>Early production deployments of KYAPay tokens are described at https://kyapay.org.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>The claims <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, and <tt>jti</tt> are defined by <xref target="RFC7519"/>.
The header parameters <tt>alg</tt>, <tt>kid</tt>, and <tt>typ</tt> are defined by <xref target="RFC7515"/>.</t>
      <t>The <tt>alg</tt> value <tt>ES256</tt> is a digital signature algorithm defined in
<xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7518"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="roles">
        <name>Roles</name>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt>Agent:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An application, service, or specific software process, executing on behalf
of a Principal.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Agent Identity:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A unique identifier and a set of claims describing an agent. Grouped into the
<tt>aid</tt> claim for convenience. Because an agent can be public or confidential
(as described in <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>), the level of assurance for these
claims varies dramatically. Agents also vary in terms of longevity -- they can
have stable long-running identities (such as those of a server-side confidential
client), or they can be transient and ephemeral, and correspond to individual
API calls or compute workloads.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Agent Platform:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The service provider and runtime environment hosting the Agent, such as a
cloud compute provider or AI operator service. Assertions about the agent
platform are grouped into the <tt>apd</tt> claim, and are primarily used to identify
the Principal entity operating the platform, allowing consumers of the token to
apply reputation-based logic or offer platform-specific services.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Principal:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A legal entity (human or organization) on whose behalf / in whose authority
an agent or service is operating.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <section anchor="initiator-roles">
          <name>Initiator Roles</name>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>Initiator Agent:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>An Agent performing tasks on behalf of an Initiator Principal, that has its own
Agent Identity, grouped into the <tt>aid</tt> claim.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Initiator Agent Platform:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The Agent Platform hosting the Initiator Agent. Some use cases require the Platform
to have its own verified identity assertions, grouped into the <tt>apd</tt> claim.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Initiator Principal:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A legal entity (human or organization) behind the purchase / consumption of a
product or service.
In buyer/seller transactions, the Initiator is the buyer.
The Principal typically interacts with the target via an
Initiator Agent. Many targets are required to be able to determine the Initiator
Identity in order to comply with KYC/AML regulations, accounting standards,
and to maintain a direct customer relationships. The initiator principal's
identity is grouped into the <tt>hid</tt> claim.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Initiator Identity:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The aggregate verified identity assertions of the initiator entities, typically
encompassing the Initiator Principal, the Initiator Agent Platform, and the Initiator Agent
itself. This composite identity is conveyed via the KYA token, allowing the
target to verify the entire chain of responsibility behind a request.
The initiator identity utilizes the <tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt>, and <tt>aid</tt> claims.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="target-roles">
          <name>Target Roles</name>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>Target Agent:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>An Agent performing tasks on behalf of a Target Principal, directly interacting
with Initiator Agents to facilitate discovery and purchase. Typically runs on
Internet-connected infrastructure, and discoverable via service directories.
Target agent identity claims are also grouped into the <tt>aid</tt> claim
if KYA tokens are generated for the targets.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Target Agent Platform:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The Agent Platform that hosts Target Agents. Some use cases require the Platform
to have its own verified identity assertions, grouped into the <tt>apd</tt> claim.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Target Principal:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A human principal (individual or organization) that owns the product,
service, API, website, or content being consumed or sold, and serves as the
ultimate beneficiary of a transaction.
In buyer/seller transactions, the Target is the seller.
The target principal's identity is grouped into the <tt>hid</tt> claim.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Target Identity:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The aggregate verified identity assertions of the target entities, typically
encompassing the Target Principal, the Target Agent Platform, as well as the
Target Agent Identity.
These various aspects of Target Identity allow Initiators and Initiator Agents to
perform reputation-based logic, to verify that they are interacting with
the authorized (and expected) counter-party, and to fulfill KYC/AML regulation
requirements.
The target identity utilizes the <tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt>, and <tt>aid</tt> claims.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ecosystem-infrastructure-roles">
          <name>Ecosystem Infrastructure Roles</name>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>KYA Token Issuer:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A trusted neutral entity that conducts Know Your Customer (KYC) and Know Your
Business (KYB) (for organizations) verifications. It is responsible for issuing
cryptographically signed Know Your Agent (KYA) tokens that attest to the identity of the
Principal, Agent, and Agent Platform, for both Initiators and Targets.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Payment Token Issuer:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A trusted entity responsible for facilitating the exchange of payments and
credentials between the Initiator and Target. It issues signed <tt>pay</tt> tokens that
enable settlement via various schemes (Cards, Banks, Cryptocurrency), without
exposing raw credentials or secrets. Like a KYA Token Issuer, it conducts Know
Your Customer (KYC) and Know Your Business (KYB) verifications of the Initiator.
KYAPay does not provide for anonymous payment, so a Payment Token Issuer does
not issue a <tt>pay</tt> token for an Initiator it has not verified.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Verifier:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The party used by the KYA Token Issuer
to verify the identity of the human, organization, or agent
or the party used by the Payment Token Issuer
to verify the payment method.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="kyapay-token-schemas">
      <name>KYAPay Token Schemas</name>
      <section anchor="common-claims">
        <name>Common Token Claims</name>
        <t>The following are claims in common, used within the KYA (Know Your Agent),
PAY (Payment), and KYA-PAY (combined Know Your Agent and Payment) Tokens.</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>iss</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - URL of the token's issuer. The value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an origin as defined
in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6454"/>: a scheme, a host, and an optional port, with no
path, query or fragment component. Used for locating the JWK Set for token
signature verification, as described in <xref target="key-discovery"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>sub</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Subject Identifier. <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be pairwise unique within a given
issuer: unique, and different at each Target. As for
<tt>hid.id</tt>, the value <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be, or reveal, a directly identifying
attribute, and values at different Targets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be linkable
to one another without the issuer's cooperation.
The subject identifies the combination of identities the issuer has verified
for the initiator: the human principal, the agent platform and the agent.
An issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the same <tt>sub</tt> value at a given Target service while that
combination remains unchanged, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a different value at each other
Target, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use that value for a different combination, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
assign a new <tt>sub</tt> when any of those identities changes. KYA and KYA-PAY
tokens carry the human principal, the agent platform and the agent as the
<tt>hid</tt>, <tt>apd</tt> and <tt>aid</tt> claims. PAY tokens carry none of them. The subject identifies the same
combination in either case, since an issuer does not issue a token without
having verified the initiator. Tokens of different types issued by the same
issuer for the same initiator at the same Target service therefore carry the
same <tt>sub</tt>. A recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> associate a PAY
token with a KYA token on that basis, but <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat them as referring to
the same initiator only when both the <tt>iss</tt> and the <tt>sub</tt> values are equal.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>aud</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Audience (used for audience binding and replay attack mitigation).
The audience identifies the combination of identities the issuer holds for the
Target: the human principal, the agent platform and the agent, where "agent" is
understood broadly (<xref target="identifying-target"/>). A single string value.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>iat</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - as defined in <xref section="4.1.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>.  Identifies the time
at which the JWT was issued.  This claim must have a value in the past and can
be used to determine the age of the JWT.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>jti</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Unique ID of this JWT as defined in <xref section="4.1.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>.
This claim identifies the token, not the request. A token may be presented on
more than one request within its lifetime, so a repeated <tt>jti</tt> is not by itself
evidence of replay.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>exp</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - as defined in <xref section="4.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>.  Identifies the expiration
time on or after which the JWT <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be accepted for processing.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>tdm</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> where the Target is identified by a domain name; <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> otherwise.
A host name, optionally followed by a path, identifying the Target the token is
intended for. See <xref target="identifying-target"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ori</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - URL of the token's originator.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>env</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Issuer environment (such as "production" or "sandbox").  Additional values
may be defined and used.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>tsi</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Target Service ID, assigned by the Token Issuer, identifying the
service offered under the Target agent named by <tt>aud</tt>. See <xref target="identifying-target"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>itg</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Initiator tag - an opaque reference ID internal to the initiator.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>cnf</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Confirmation claim, as defined in <xref target="RFC7800"/>, binding the token to
a key held by the agent identified in the <tt>aid</tt> claim.
When present, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the <tt>jwk</tt> member: the agent's public key
represented as a JWK <xref target="RFC7517"/>. The JWK <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain only public key
material; a <tt>cnf</tt> containing private key material <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.
Other confirmation members <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> additionally be present, but a recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
be required to obtain the key by any means other than reading <tt>cnf.jwk</tt>.
A token carrying <tt>cnf</tt> is sender-constrained rather than bearer: the presenter
is required to demonstrate possession of the confirmation key. Recipient
processing is specified in <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Additional claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be defined and used in these tokens.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any unrecognized claims.</t>
        <section anchor="identifying-target">
          <name>Identifying the Target</name>
          <t>Three claims identify the party a token was minted for, and they answer
different questions.</t>
          <t>The <tt>aud</tt> claim is the counterpart, on the Target side, of <tt>sub</tt> on the
initiating side, and it names the same three things. Where <tt>sub</tt> identifies the
combination of identities the issuer has verified for the initiator (the human
principal, the agent platform and the agent), <tt>aud</tt> identifies that combination
for the Target: the Target's agent, the platform it runs on, and the human
principal behind it.</t>
          <t>"Agent" is used broadly on the Target side. On the initiating side it is a
program acting for a person. On the Target side it is whatever the initiator is
dealing with, which may be a website, an API, an MCP server, or another agent.
The <tt>tsi</tt> claim identifies the particular service offered under that Target
agent.</t>
          <t>The Token Issuer assigns both, and both are present in every token it creates,
so that it can account for the tokens it has issued. Their values are meaningful
to the issuer and to a Target that has onboarded to it; onboarding is what allows
a Target to interpret them, not what causes them to be set.</t>
          <t>The two sides differ in what stands behind them. The identities named in <tt>sub</tt>
are verified by the issuer. Those named in <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> are verified where the
Target has onboarded to the issuer; where the issuer has no means of confirming
the Target, they are its record of the Target that the initiator asserted it was
minting for, and <tt>tdm</tt> carries the domain the initiator supplied.</t>
          <t>A recipient reads these claims accordingly. They bind a token to one Target and
so limit where it can be presented, which holds in either case because the
binding narrows the token rather than granting anything. A recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
read <tt>tdm</tt> alone as the issuer confirming the Target's identity.</t>
          <t>The <tt>tdm</tt> claim identifies a Target reached over a URL-based interface, such as
a website or an HTTP API: at least its domain, and optionally its host and a
path. Unlike <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> it is not issuer-specific, so any recipient can
interpret it without a relationship with the issuer. It is present in addition
to <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> where such a Target is identified by a domain name.</t>
          <t>The value of <tt>tdm</tt> is a host name in lower case, optionally followed by a path,
with no scheme, port, query or fragment; for example <tt>example.com</tt>,
<tt>shop.example.com</tt> or <tt>shop.example.com/store</tt>. The Target's domain is the
registrable domain of that host, determined using the Public Suffix List <xref target="PSL"/>,
including its private section. A host on a shared hosting platform that the list
names is therefore a domain of its own, and a token minted for one such host
does not name the platform's other hosts.</t>
          <t><tt>tdm</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> are alternates rather than duplicates: they name the same
Target by different means, one publicly interpretable and one not. A recipient
validates whichever it is in a position to interpret. A Target that has onboarded
to the issuer checks <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt>. A recipient that has not, including a
security intermediary acting for many Targets, checks at least that <tt>tdm</tt> names
the domain it is protecting for that request.
The Authenticating the Counterparty section of
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/> describes that choice.</t>
          <t>A recipient that checks more than the domain checks that <tt>tdm</tt> names the Target
it is protecting for the request: the host in <tt>tdm</tt> is that Target's host, and
where that Target is identified by a path, the path in <tt>tdm</tt> is that path or one
below it. Paths are matched as cookie paths are (<xref section="5.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6265"/>),
after both are normalized as described in <xref section="6.2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/>. Ports
are not compared. For
example, for a Target at <tt>shop.example.com/store</tt>, a <tt>tdm</tt> of
<tt>shop.example.com/store</tt> or <tt>shop.example.com/store/cart</tt> passes, but
<tt>shop.example.com</tt>, <tt>shop.example.com/storefront</tt> and <tt>example.com/store</tt> do
not. A recipient that
checks only the domain does not enforce the host or the path. A Target whose
host serves several tenants, or that protects only some of its paths, therefore
checks the host and path itself, or <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> where it has onboarded to
the issuer.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-discovery">
        <name>Issuer Key Discovery</name>
        <t>The JWK Set used to verify a token signature is located at the well-known URI
<xref target="RFC8615"/> formed from the <tt>iss</tt> claim with the URI suffix <tt>jwks.json</tt>.
Because <tt>iss</tt> is an origin, this is the well-known URI construction described
in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8615"/> applied to that origin. For example, an <tt>iss</tt> value
of <tt>https://issuer.example.com</tt> yields
<tt>https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json</tt>.</t>
        <t>The <tt>jwks.json</tt> URI suffix is registered in <xref target="well-known-registration"/>.</t>
        <t>JWK Sets <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be cached and refreshed according to standard JWK Set practice.
Retrieval per request is neither required nor expected; because KYAPay tokens
are self-contained, signature verification is intended to be performed locally.</t>
        <t>A recipient retrieves this JWK Set only for an issuer it trusts
(<xref target="validating-tokens"/>).</t>
        <t>A future revision of this specification may additionally define an issuer
metadata document, giving an issuer somewhere to advertise capabilities beyond
the location of its keys, such as the identity verification methods it supports.
Such a document would supplement the mechanism described here rather than
replace it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-size">
        <name>Token Size</name>
        <t>This specification sets no maximum token size; the Token Size section of
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/> sets the minimum a recipient must accept.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> emit a token whose claims total more than 4096 octets of
JSON, counting all claims together, whichever specification defines them, and
measuring before encoding. Base64url encoding adds about a third, so 4096 octets
of claims, with a typical JOSE header and an ES256 signature, serializes to about
5670 octets, within that minimum. An issuer using a larger header or signature
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> check the complete serialized token against that minimum. Where a request
would carry both a KYA token and a PAY token, an issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> issue one KYA-PAY
token instead, because two tokens at this limit exceed a single header field at a
typical origin.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="kya-token">
        <name>KYA Token</name>
        <t>The following identity related claims are used within KYA and KYA-PAY tokens:</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>hid</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - A map of human identity claims (individual or organization).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>apd</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent Platform identity claims.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>aid</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent identity claims.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>scope</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - String with space-separated scope values, per <xref target="RFC8693"/></t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The following informative example displays a decoded KYA type token.</t>
        <figure anchor="example-decoded-kya-token">
          <name>A KYA type token</name>
          <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
{
  "kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "kya+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com", // Issuer URL
  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "bb713104-c14e-460f-9b7c-f8140fa9bea4", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
  "aud": "7434230d-0861-46f2-9c2c-a6ee33d07f17", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "production",
  "tsi": "bc3ff89f-069b-4383-82a9-8cfe53c55fc3", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "4f6cbd39-215c-4516-bf33-cab22862ee60", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "hid": {
    "id": "6d2f8a41-0c3e-4b9a-a7d5-1e8f3c6b2a90" // Human principal ID at this Target service
  },
  "apd": {
    "id": "d3306fc0-602b-47e6-9fe2-3d55d028fbd2",
    "name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
    "email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
    "phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
    "organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
    "verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
    "verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
  },
  "aid": {
    "id": "7d889702-7b6a-46cb-9bdd-10e83d17b18d", // Identifier of the agent instance
    "name": "Acme Agent Extraordinaire",
    "creation_ip": "192.0.2.10", // IP address the token was requested from
    "source_ips": ["192.0.2.10-192.0.2.12", "203.0.113.0/24",
      "2001:db8:abcd:12::/64", "agents.example.com"]
      // IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
  }
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <section anchor="hid-human-identity-sub-claims">
          <name><tt>hid</tt> - Human Identity Sub-Claims</name>
          <t>The Human Identity (<tt>hid</tt>) claim contains sub-claims identifying the human
principal (individual or organization) as follows.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt><tt>id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Human principal identifier. An opaque, pseudonymous
identifier for the human principal, assigned by the issuer. It <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> be, or reveal, an email address, telephone number or other
directly identifying attribute. An issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the same value for
the same principal acting through the same agent platform at the same
Target service (<tt>tsi</tt>), whatever the agent, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a different
value for each agent platform and for each other Target. Values for
different agent platforms or Targets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be linkable to one
another without the issuer's cooperation; an issuer can, for example,
assign each value at random or derive it using a key known only to
itself. The value is unique within a given issuer, so a recipient that compares <tt>hid.id</tt>
values from two tokens <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> first check that both carry the same <tt>iss</tt>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>email</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Email address associated with the human individual or organization.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>given_name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Given name(s) or first name(s) of the human principal if they
are an individual.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>middle_name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Middle name(s) of the human principal if they are an individual.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>family_name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Surname(s) or last name(s) of the human principal if they are an
individual.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>phone_number</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Phone number associated with the human individual or organization.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>organization_name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Name of the organization.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verifier</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - URL of the party that performed the identity verification</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verified</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Boolean verification status. When present, the value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>true</tt>.
An issuer does not issue a token carrying unverified identity claims, so a token
never asserts <tt>false</tt>. The claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative signal
rather than requiring it to infer verification from other claims.
A recipient that receives <tt>false</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the claim as not asserting
verification, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the token as carrying a verified identity on
the strength of the claim's presence.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verification_id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Verification identifier.
This is the verifier's identifier for the identity verification performed.
This could be used during auditing and dispute resolution.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>ivm</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Identity Verification Methods <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>.
A JSON array of the methods by which the human principal's identity was verified.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>amr</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Authentication Methods References, as defined in Section 2 of <xref target="OpenID.Core"/>,
with values from <xref target="RFC8176"/> and <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/>.
A JSON array of the methods by which the human principal authenticated.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>auth_time</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Authentication time, as defined in Section 2 of <xref target="OpenID.Core"/>:
the time when the human principal authenticated, as a NumericDate <xref target="RFC7519"/>.
Where a token is issued for a specific action, <tt>amr</tt> and <tt>auth_time</tt> describe
the authentication by which the human principal confirmed that action.
<tt>iat</tt> gives the time the token was issued, which can be later.
An issuer that issues a token on the basis of an earlier authentication
carries that authentication's time, not the time of issuance.
A recipient that requires a recent confirmation compares <tt>auth_time</tt>,
not <tt>iat</tt>, with its limit.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>aml</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Anti-Money Laundering Methods <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>.
A JSON array of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods
applied to the human principal.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>The <tt>ivm</tt>, <tt>amr</tt>, and <tt>aml</tt> sub-claims use the syntax and values
of the claims of the same names defined in the cited specifications.
The absence of any of them does not indicate that a method was not used.</t>
          <t>The sub-claims <tt>email</tt>, <tt>given_name</tt>, <tt>middle_name</tt>, <tt>family_name</tt>,
<tt>phone_number</tt> and <tt>organization_name</tt> directly identify the human
principal, and <tt>verification_id</tt> is the same at every Target. An issuer <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> include any of them unless a Target requires it for the action at hand
and the principal has authorized its disclosure to that Target, whether to
the issuer or to the agent platform (<xref target="privacy-considerations"/>).</t>
          <t>Additional sub-claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be defined and used, including further identifiers for
the human principal where a Target requires them to recognize an account. An
issuer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assert an identifier of the human principal unless it has
verified that the principal controls it. This document does not prescribe how control is
verified.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="agent-platform-identity-apd-sub-claims">
          <name>Agent Platform Identity <tt>apd</tt> Sub-Claims</name>
          <t>The <tt>apd</tt> claim is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> in KYA and KYAPay tokens.
It contains the following sub-claims.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt><tt>id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent Platform identifier.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent Platform name.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>email</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Email associated with agent platform.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>phone_number</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Phone number associated with agent platform.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>organization_name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Legal name associated with agent platform.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verifier</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - URL of the party that verified the agent identity (KYA)</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verified</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Boolean verification status. When present, the value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>true</tt>.
An issuer does not issue a token carrying unverified Know Your Agent claims, so a
token never asserts <tt>false</tt>. The claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative
signal rather than requiring it to infer verification from other claims.
A recipient that receives <tt>false</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the claim as not asserting
verification, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the token as carrying a verified identity on
the strength of the claim's presence.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verification_id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Verification identifier.
This is the verifier's identifier for the KYA verification performed.
This could be used during auditing and dispute resolution.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>ivm</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Identity Verification Methods <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/>.
A JSON array of the methods by which the agent platform's identity was verified.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>aml</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Anti-Money Laundering Methods <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/>.
A JSON array of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods
applied to the agent platform.
An issuer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>The <tt>ivm</tt> and <tt>aml</tt> sub-claims use the syntax and values
of the claims of the same names defined in the cited specifications.
The absence of either does not indicate that a method was not used.</t>
          <t>In a KYAPay token, the <tt>ivm</tt>, <tt>amr</tt>, <tt>aml</tt>, and <tt>auth_time</tt> claims appear only as sub-claims of <tt>hid</tt> and <tt>apd</tt>, so that each describes the party whose claim contains it: in <tt>hid</tt>, how the human principal was vetted; in <tt>apd</tt>, how the agent platform was vetted.
<tt>amr</tt> and <tt>auth_time</tt> do not apply to the agent platform and are not used in <tt>apd</tt>.
Issuers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include <tt>ivm</tt>, <tt>amr</tt>, <tt>aml</tt>, or <tt>auth_time</tt> as top-level claims in a KYAPay token, and recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore them if they appear there.</t>
          <t>Additional sub-claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be defined and used.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="agent-identity-aid-sub-claims">
          <name>Agent Identity <tt>aid</tt> Sub-Claims</name>
          <t>The <tt>aid</tt> claim is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. It identifies the agent, not the human principal
on whose behalf the agent acts; claims about the human principal are carried
in <tt>hid</tt>. It contains the following sub-claims.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt><tt>id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent identifier. An issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the same value for the same
agent at the same Target service (<tt>tsi</tt>), and a different value at each
other Target. The value <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be, or reveal, a directly identifying
attribute, and values at different Targets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be linkable to
one another without the issuer's cooperation.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>name</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Agent name. The name should reflect the business purpose of the agent.
The name <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique among the agents of a given agent platform at a given
issuer, so that the issuer, the agent platform and the agent name together
identify the agent unambiguously.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>creation_ip</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - The public IP address of the system / agent that requested the token.
Its value is a string containing the public IPv4 or IPv6 address from where the
token request originated. When present, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be captured directly from the
token request. It is a diagnostic aid, for example when investigating an
incident, and is not an access-control signal: a recipient <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use it as a weak
corroborating signal only and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat it as sufficient on its own
(<xref section="6.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/>). It is personal
data, subject to the privacy considerations in <xref target="privacy-considerations"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>source_ips</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Valid public IP address, or range of public IP addresses, from where
the system / agent's requests to merchants / services will originate. A JSON
array of IPv4 addresses or ranges, IPv6 addresses or ranges, or domain
names resolvable to an IP address via DNS. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can be a
single IPv4 or IPv6 address or a range of IPv4 or IPv6 addresses in CIDR notation
or start-and-end IP pairs.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>Additional sub-claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be defined and used.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pay-token">
        <name>PAY Token</name>
        <t>The following payment related claims are used within PAY and KYA-PAY type tokens:</t>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt><tt>tpr</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - JSON string representing target service price in currency units.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>tps</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Target pricing scheme, which represents a way for the target list
how it charges for its service or content. One of <tt>pay_per_use</tt>,
<tt>subscription</tt>, <tt>pay_per_mb</tt>, or <tt>custom</tt>.  Additional values may be defined
and used.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>amt</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - JSON string representing token amount in currency units.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>cur</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three letter code, such as "EUR".</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>val</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - JSON string representing token amount in settlement network's units.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>mnr</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - JSON number representing maximum number of requests when <tt>tps</tt> is <tt>pay_per_use</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>stp</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Settlement type (one of <tt>coin</tt> or <tt>card</tt>).  Additional values may be defined and used.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>sti</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - Meta information for payment settlement, depending on the <tt>stp</tt>
value.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <section anchor="sti">
          <name>Settlement Information <tt>sti</tt> Sub-Claims</name>
          <t>The <tt>sti</tt> claim is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> in Pay Tokens. It contains the following sub-claims,
with the requirement levels marked below.</t>
          <t>The <tt>sti</tt> claim carries the settlement instrument, and its contents depend on
the value of <tt>stp</tt>.</t>
          <t>When the <tt>stp</tt> value is <tt>card</tt>, the settlement instrument is an agentic payment credential
issued by a payment network under an agentic-commerce programme -- for example
Visa Intelligent Commerce (<tt>visa_vic</tt>) or Mastercard Agent Pay, using Secure Card
on File (<tt>mastercard_scof</tt>). Such a credential is a payment token issued by the
payment network (<xref target="card-settlement-scope"/>). It is used with a single-use token
cryptogram (<tt>token_security_code</tt>), and the network restricts its use to one
initiator, one target, and one amount. It is not a Primary Account Number (PAN),
and the underlying PAN cannot feasibly be recovered from it.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt><tt>type</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> - "type" is dependent on the "stp" value; for "coin" - "usdc";
for "card" - "visa_vic" or "mastercard_scof".  Additional values may be defined and used.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>payment_token</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when the <tt>stp</tt> value is <tt>card</tt>; otherwise <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - String containing the
network-issued agentic payment credential, formatted per ISO/IEC 7812,
12-19 characters. This value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a payment-network-issued agentic or
tokenized credential. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be a Primary Account Number (PAN).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>token_expiration_month</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when <tt>payment_token</tt> is present - String containing two-digit
Expiration Month Number.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>token_expiration_year</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when <tt>payment_token</tt> is present - String containing four-digit
Expiration Year.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>token_security_code</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when <tt>payment_token</tt> is present - String containing the single-use
token cryptogram accompanying the credential in <tt>payment_token</tt> -- a Dynamic
Token Verification Value (DTVV) or Token Authentication Verification Value
(TAVV), depending on the network. 3 or 4 digits. This value is generated per
transaction and is short-lived; its validity period is determined and enforced
by the payment network. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be a static Card Verification Value
(CVV, CVC2 or CVV2).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verifier</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - URL of the party that performed the payment method verification</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verified</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Boolean verification status. When present, the value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>true</tt>.
An issuer does not issue a token against an unverified payment method, so a token
never asserts <tt>false</tt>. The claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative signal
rather than requiring it to infer verification from other claims.
A recipient that receives <tt>false</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the claim as not asserting
verification, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the token as carrying a verified payment
method on the strength of the claim's presence.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt><tt>verification_id</tt>:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> - Verification identifier.
This is the verifier's identifier for the payment method verification performed.
This could be used during auditing and dispute resolution.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>Additional sub-claims <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be defined and used.
The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="card-settlement-scope">
          <name>Scope of Card Settlement</name>
          <t>This specification supports card settlement only through payment-network
agentic-commerce programmes whose credentials are Payment Tokens as defined by
the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification <xref target="EMVCo-PT"/>, used with a single-use
token cryptogram and restricted by the payment network to the transaction bound
in the token.</t>
          <t>A token defined in this specification, of any type, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain a Primary
Account Number, full magnetic-stripe or chip track data, a static card
verification value (CVV, CVC2 or CVV2), or a PIN or PIN block.</t>
          <t>Settlement instruments that fall within PCI DSS scope require mechanisms this
specification does not define -- including confidentiality protection of the
token contents and a defined cardholder-data-environment boundary. Support for
such instruments is left to future work, and implementers requiring it should
not attempt to carry them in the claims defined here.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="pay">
          <name>PAY Token Example</name>
          <t>The following informative example displays a decoded PAY type token.</t>
          <figure anchor="example-decoded-pay-token">
            <name>A PAY type token</name>
            <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
{
  "kid": "FgT4q8c5IqbBCCjcho5JdeGQvuK1keMDFc9IwCm8J7Y", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "pay+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://pay-issuer.example.net", // Issuer URL
  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "8b810549-7443-494f-b4ad-5bc65871e32b", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
  "aud": "37888095-2721-48d9-a2df-bfe4075f223a", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "sandbox",
  "tsi": "274efc47-024e-466f-b278-152d2ee73955", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "16c135ce-a99a-453d-a7b5-4958fd91de5f", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "tpr": "0.01",
  "tps": "pay_per_use",
  "amt": "15",
  "cur": "USD",
  "val": "15000000",
  "mnr": 1600,
  "stp": "card",
  "sti": {
    "type": "visa_vic",
    "payment_token": "0000000000000000", // Example only: a network-issued payment token, not a PAN
    "token_expiration_month": "03",
    "token_expiration_year": "2030",
    "token_security_code": "000", // Example only: a single-use cryptogram (DTVV or TAVV), not a CVV
    "verifier": "https://verifier.example.info", // URL of payment method verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's payment method verification
    "verification_id": "3a6e1b76-8f78-4c24-b1bd-dc78a8cc3711" // Verifier's ID for the payment method verification performed
  }
}

]]></artwork>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="kya-pay-token">
        <name>KYA-PAY Token Example</name>
        <t>The following informative example displays a decoded KYA-PAY type token.</t>
        <figure anchor="example-decoded-kya-pay-token">
          <name>A KYA-PAY type token</name>
          <artwork align="left"><![CDATA[
{
  "kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "kya-pay+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://kya-pay.example.org", // Issuer URL
  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "f24a431d-108c-46e6-9357-b428c528210e", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
  "aud": "5e00177d-ff7f-424b-8c83-2756e15efbed", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "production",
  "tsi": "3e6d33a1-438e-482e-bba5-6aa69544727d", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "c52e0ef2-e27d-4e95-862e-475a904ae7b2", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "hid": {
    "id": "a4c19e07-5b2d-4f86-9e3a-7d0b8c1f5e62", // Human principal ID at this Target service
    // The following are present because the Target requires them for checkout
    "email": "maryjane@initiator.example.com",
    "given_name": "Mary",
    "middle_name": "Jane",
    "family_name": "Doe",
    "phone_number": "+1-425-555-1212",
    "verified": true // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
  },
  "apd": {
    "id": "4b087db2-b6e5-48b8-8737-1aa8ddf4c4fe", // Agent platform ID
    "name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
    "email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
    "phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
    "organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
    "verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
    "verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
  },
  "aid": {
    "id": "4607fa56-368d-4fde-90e9-baad4e9f4439", // Identifier of the agent instance
    "name": "Agentic Excellence Я Us",
    "creation_ip": "198.51.100.20", // IP address the token was requested from
    "source_ips": ["192.0.2.10-192.0.2.12", "203.0.113.0/24",
      "2001:db8:abcd:12::/64", "agents.example.com"]
      // IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
  },

  "tpr": "0.01",
  "tps": "pay_per_use",
  "amt": "15",
  "cur": "USD",
  "val": "15000000",
  "mnr": 1600,
  "stp": "card",
  "sti": {
    "type": "visa_vic",
    "payment_token": "0000000000000000", // Example only: a network-issued payment token, not a PAN
    "token_expiration_month": "03",
    "token_expiration_year": "2030",
    "token_security_code": "000" // Example only: a single-use cryptogram (DTVV or TAVV), not a CVV
  }
}

]]></artwork>
        </figure>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="token-validation">
      <name>Token Validation</name>
      <section anchor="validating-tokens">
        <name>Validating KYA and PAY Tokens</name>
        <t>A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the <tt>iss</tt> claim names an issuer it trusts before
it performs any step below that retrieves key material or otherwise depends on
the issuer. A recipient <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> retrieve key material for an issuer that is not
in its configured set of trusted issuers. The set of trusted issuers is
configured out of band and is not derived from the token.</t>
        <section anchor="jwt-header-validation">
          <name>JWT Header Validation</name>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>alg</tt> - The <tt>alg</tt> header parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present. Recipients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support
<tt>ES256</tt> <xref target="RFC7518"/>, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept it from any issuer they trust whose JWK
Set publishes an <tt>ES256</tt> key. Issuers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use <tt>ES256</tt>, or an algorithm that
they know every recipient of the token accepts.  </t>
              <t>
A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> determine the set of algorithms it will accept for a given
issuer, limited
to those for which the issuer's JWK Set publishes a suitable key.
The set
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be derived from the token. A token whose <tt>alg</tt> value is absent from,
or outside, that set <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected, including the value <tt>none</tt> <xref target="RFC7515"/>
and any symmetric (MAC) algorithm, since an issuer's JWK Set publishes only
public keys. Verification is then performed using the algorithm named in the
token and the key obtained from the issuer's JWK Set, or the token is
rejected.  </t>
              <t>
Together, these guarantee that any conforming recipient can verify a token
whose recipients the issuer does not know in advance, without constraining
which algorithm a deployment uses. Implementations remain free to support and use others,
including post-quantum algorithms as they are standardized; this requirement
is a floor for interoperability, not a ceiling on agility.  </t>
              <t>
Where the key retrieved from the issuer's JWK Set carries an <tt>alg</tt> or <tt>use</tt>
parameter, the recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm it is consistent with
the parameters of the issued token, and reject the token otherwise.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>kid</tt> - The <tt>kid</tt> claim <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, and set to a valid Key ID present in
the issuer's JWK Set, located as described in <xref target="key-discovery"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>typ</tt> - The <tt>typ</tt> header parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, and its value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of:
<tt>kya+jwt</tt>, <tt>pay+jwt</tt>, or <tt>kya-pay+jwt</tt>. As specified in <xref section="4.1.9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7515"/>,
values are compared case-insensitively, and a value with the <tt>application/</tt> prefix,
such as <tt>application/kya+jwt</tt>, is the same type. A token whose <tt>typ</tt> is absent or has
any other value fails validation.
A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> determine which of these types it accepts for a given request
before validating a token. A token of one of these types that the recipient does not
accept for that request is set aside: the recipient does not use it for that request,
and does not treat it as having failed validation.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="jwt-payload-validation">
          <name>JWT Payload Validation</name>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><strong>Validate <tt>iss</tt> Claim</strong> - Ensure that the token's issuer is one the
  recipient trusts (<xref target="validating-tokens"/>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Verify JWT Signature</strong> - Valid JWTs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be signed with a valid key belonging
  to the token's issuer (<tt>iss</tt> claim).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Validate the <tt>exp</tt> Claim</strong> - The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate that the token has
  not expired, within the clock skew tolerance described in <xref target="clock-skew"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Validate the <tt>iat</tt> Claim</strong> - The recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate that the token was
  issued in the past, within the clock skew tolerance described in <xref target="clock-skew"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Validate the <tt>jti</tt> Claim</strong> - Ensure that the <tt>jti</tt> claim is present, and is
  a UUID.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Validate the Audience</strong> - A recipient that has onboarded to the issuer
  ensures that <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>tsi</tt> identify it as the intended audience. A recipient
  that has not ensures at least that <tt>tdm</tt> names the domain it is protecting for
  the request (<xref target="identifying-target"/>).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Validate the <tt>env</tt> Claim</strong> - Ensure that the Environment claim is set to
  an expected and use case appropriate value (such as <tt>production</tt> or <tt>sandbox</tt>)</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="clock-skew">
          <name>Clock Skew</name>
          <t>The <tt>iat</tt> and <tt>exp</tt> claims are set from the issuer's clock and evaluated against
the recipient's. These are never precisely synchronized, so a recipient applies a
tolerance when evaluating them.</t>
          <t>A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept a token whose <tt>iat</tt> is up to the tolerance in the future,
and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept a token up to the tolerance beyond its <tt>exp</tt>.</t>
          <t>A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support a tolerance of at least 5 seconds.
A recipient <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> apply a tolerance greater than 60 seconds;
30 seconds is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.
A tolerance approaching the token's own lifetime defeats the purpose of <tt>exp</tt>:
the effective window in which a captured token is accepted is its lifetime plus
twice the tolerance.</t>
          <t>Where a party generating these timestamps can observe the <tt>Date</tt> header field
(<xref section="6.6.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9110"/>) of a response from the intended recipient, it
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use that value to correct subsequent timestamps rather than relying on
the recipient's tolerance. Correcting at the sender resolves skew at the only
party positioned to detect it.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="validating-pay-tokens">
        <name>Validating PAY Tokens</name>
        <t>For tokens of type <tt>pay+jwt</tt> or <tt>kya-pay+jwt</tt>, perform the steps described in
the Validating KYA and PAY Tokens section.</t>
        <t>In addition, perform the following steps.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The <tt>val</tt> claim is greater than 0.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>amt</tt> claim is greater than 0.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>cur</tt> claim is set to a currency the target supports (such as <tt>USD</tt>)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>tps</tt> claim, if present, matches the pricing scheme that you configured in
  the target's service</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>tpr</tt> claim, if present, matches the price that you configured in the
  target's service</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="issuer-records">
      <name>Issuer Records</name>
      <t>An issuer vouches for the identities it has verified for the initiator of each
token it issues. To stand behind that after the fact, an issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep the
following records.</t>
      <dl newline="true">
        <dt>Verification Records:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>For each verification whose result a token asserts, of the human principal,
the agent platform, the agent or a payment method: the methods used, the time
of each step and who performed it, and references to the evidence examined.
The <tt>verifier</tt> and <tt>verification_id</tt> sub-claims, where present, together
identify this record. Where a
separate verifier performed the verification, the issuer keeps the verifier's
identity, the <tt>verification_id</tt> and the result, and the verifier keeps the
rest of the record.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Authorization Records:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>For each disclosure that requires the principal's authorization, such as a
directly identifying sub-claim or <tt>verification_id</tt>: which sub-claims were
authorized, for which Target, who authorized them, when, and how
(<xref target="privacy-considerations"/>). Where the agent platform collected
the authorization, the record identifies the platform and when it asserted
that the authorization was given.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuance Records:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>For each token issued: its <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, <tt>iat</tt> and <tt>exp</tt>; its <tt>sub</tt>, <tt>aud</tt> and
<tt>tsi</tt>; the <tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>apd.id</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> it carries; and the verification and
authorization records it relied on.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Together, these records let an issuer resolve a token, given its <tt>iss</tt> and
<tt>jti</tt>, to the verifications and authorizations behind it, and find a
verification given its verifier and <tt>verification_id</tt>.
They support audit, dispute resolution, and the issuer's response to reports
about a token (see the Feedback to the Token Issuer section of
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/>). This specification does not define an
interface for querying them.</t>
      <t>The records contain personal data. An issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> protect them against
unauthorized access.</t>
      <t>This specification does not set how long an issuer keeps these records, or when
it discloses them to third parties such as courts or regulators. Both are set by
the law and regulation that apply to the issuer, which differ by jurisdiction
and sector: anti-money-laundering record-keeping rules, for example, set minimum
retention periods, while data protection law limits retention to what is
necessary. Neither affects how tokens are issued, presented or validated, so
recipients need only know that the records exist and how to refer to them.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="general-jwt-practices">
        <name>General JWT Practices</name>
        <t>When validating the JWTs described in this specification, implementers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
follow the JSON Web Token Best Current Practices, BCP 225 <xref target="RFC8725"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="confidentiality-of-token-contents">
        <name>Confidentiality of Token Contents</name>
        <t>The tokens defined in this specification are signed using JWS Compact
Serialization. Signing provides integrity protection, not confidentiality. The
claims in a token are encoded, not encrypted, and are readable by any party that
obtains the token.</t>
        <t>Tokens defined in this specification carry identity claims about a human
principal and, in the case of PAY and KYA-PAY tokens, payment settlement
information. Accordingly:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Tokens <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be transmitted over a channel providing confidentiality, integrity
and server authentication, such as TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tokens <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be written to logs, traces, analytics pipelines, or other
persistent stores that are not required to process the transaction or to meet
audit, dispute-resolution, or legal retention obligations. Retained tokens <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
be protected against unauthorized access. An agent
that obtains a token through a tool whose result is returned to a language
model may be unable to keep the token out of that model's context or out of a
transcript retained from it; the Token Exposure in the Agent Runtime section
of <xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/> describes how such a deployment
treats the token.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tokens <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be forwarded to parties other than those necessary to complete
the interaction for which they were issued.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include only those claims necessary for the interaction for
which the token is issued. Confidentiality risk is reduced most reliably by not
carrying a claim at all.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This specification does not define encryption of the token itself. Tokens are
intended to be read by multiple independent parties along a single request path
-- bot management and fraud systems at the edge, identity providers, and the
target service -- none of which is known to the issuer at the time the token is
minted, and between which no key-distribution relationship is assumed.
Encrypting the token to a single recipient would both require pre-established
key exchange with that recipient and withhold the token's contents from the
intermediaries that are its intended consumers. Confidentiality is therefore
provided at the transport layer and by minimising token contents, not at the
token layer.</t>
        <t>The settlement information carried in a PAY or KYA-PAY token is additionally
protected by its own construction rather than by encryption: the network
restricts the credential to the transaction bound in the token, and its
accompanying cryptogram is single-use, so a captured token yields no reusable
payment instrument.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="settlement-credential-handling">
        <name>Settlement Credential Handling</name>
        <t>The <tt>sti</tt> claim of a PAY or KYA-PAY token carries a settlement instrument. When
<tt>stp</tt> is <tt>card</tt>, that instrument is a payment token issued by a payment network
and accompanied by a single-use token cryptogram (<xref target="sti"/>).</t>
        <t>For entities other than Token Service Providers, a Payment Token that is defined
and used in accordance with the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification and that
exists outside the Token Service Provider's token data environment is not
Account Data and is not in scope for PCI DSS <xref target="PCI-FAQ-1326"/>. Receiving,
inspecting, or forwarding a token defined in this specification therefore does
not of itself bring a recipient within that scope. That determination concerns
the payment token, not the recipient's wider environment: a system that also
stores, processes, or transmits Account Data, or is connected to one that does,
remains in scope.</t>
        <t><xref target="card-settlement-scope"/> prohibits Account Data in any token. A token that
carried it would bring every system that processes it within PCI DSS scope, for
which this specification provides no confidentiality mechanism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-lifetime">
        <name>Token Lifetime</name>
        <t>The <tt>exp</tt> claim of a token carrying a settlement instrument <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> extend
beyond the validity period of that instrument. The token cryptograms that
accompany agentic payment credentials are single-use and short-lived; their
validity period is determined and enforced by the payment network. Issuing a
long-lived token around a short-lived credential provides no benefit and widens
the window in which a captured token can be replayed.</t>
        <t>More generally, issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set <tt>exp</tt> to the shortest value compatible with
the intended interaction.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="bearer-semantics">
        <name>Bearer Semantics and Proof of Possession</name>
        <t>Tokens defined in this specification are bearer tokens unless they carry a
confirmation method: any party in possession of such a token can present it. For
bearer tokens, the protections above -- transport confidentiality, restricted
forwarding, short lifetimes, and audience restriction via the <tt>aud</tt> claim -- are
the primary defences against capture and replay.</t>
        <t>A token <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry a <tt>cnf</tt> claim <xref target="RFC7800"/> binding it to a public key held by
the agent. A token carrying <tt>cnf</tt> is sender-constrained rather than bearer:
possession of the token alone is insufficient, and a recipient requires the
presenter to demonstrate possession of the confirmation key on each request.</t>
        <t>Recipient behaviour for tokens carrying <tt>cnf</tt> -- including the requirement to
verify an HTTP Message Signature <xref target="RFC9421"/> over the confirmation key, and to
reject requests where that signature is absent or invalid -- is specified in
<xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/>.</t>
        <t>Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include <tt>cnf</tt> where the agent holds a suitable key and the target
is expected to enforce it. Issuers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on <tt>cnf</tt> as a substitute for
the bearer-token protections above, since a token carrying <tt>cnf</tt> may still be
presented to a recipient that does not enforce it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identity-binding">
        <name>Identity Binding</name>
        <t>The subject binds the human principal, the agent platform and the agent
together, and the issuer's signature covers all of them. A recipient can
therefore verify that the issuer associated the parties named by the token
(see <xref target="bearer-semantics"/>). Modifying any of those claims within a token
invalidates its signature. Combining claims taken from two separately signed
tokens does not invalidate either signature, so a recipient that correlates
tokens <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check that both carry the same <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>sub</tt> values before
treating them as referring to the same initiator. Because the subject is
stable at a Target service while the bound identities are unchanged,
a recipient at that service <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use <tt>sub</tt> as a stable key for that combination, for example to
rate-limit or isolate a particular agent without affecting other agents acting
for the same principal.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>By default, a KYA token identifies the human principal only by
<tt>hid.id</tt>. Directly identifying sub-claims such as <tt>email</tt>,
<tt>phone_number</tt> or names are disclosed only when a Target requires
them for the action at hand, as stated in its decline response or
discovery document, and the principal has authorized the disclosure.
The issuer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> collect the principal's authorization itself or
delegate its collection to the agent platform. Whichever of them
collected it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to demonstrate that it was given. What
counts as sufficient evidence may depend on applicable law and
regulation. Targets <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> require directly identifying
sub-claims for actions that do not need them, such as browsing a
catalog.</t>
      <t>A token carrying only <tt>hid.id</tt> is pseudonymous, not anonymous.
<tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> are each different at every other
Target; whether the services of one Target share a value is left to
the issuer. At a given
service, <tt>hid.id</tt> is stable for a principal returning through a given
agent platform, whatever the agent, while <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> are
stable for one agent of that principal and change with the agent.
Two Targets, or a party that sees the traffic of both, cannot link
the principal from these values. <tt>apd</tt> identifies the agent platform
and is the same at every Target. <tt>aid.name</tt> is also the same at every
Target, so where an agent acts for a single principal, its name can
link that principal's activity across Targets. Directly identifying
sub-claims link wherever they are disclosed.</t>
      <t>KYAPay tokens are designed to convey the information that
an agent is acting on behalf of a principal - a person or organization.
To do this, they will necessarily contain information about that principal
that can be verified and utilized by participants in the system.
Participants should therefore only share these tokens with other legitimate
participants and not make their contents public or disclose them to
unknown or untrustworthy parties.</t>
      <t>Consent of the principal represented to participate in the interactions is vital.
If I authorize an agent to shop for a widget at given price,
it's legitimate for the agent to carry enough information about me
to the merchant to be able to do this for me.
Whereas, if an agent claims to be shopping for me but does not have my authorization
to do so, my privacy and possibly also my financial integrity are being violated.</t>
      <t>The principle of minimal disclosure should be employed.
Only the information needed to facilitate the intended interactions
should be placed in the tokens and conveyed to participants.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="json-web-token-claims-registration">
        <name>JSON Web Token Claims Registration</name>
        <t>This specification registers the following Claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.JWT.Claims"/>
established by <xref target="RFC7519"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="tdm-claim">
          <name>"tdm" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: tdm</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Target domain the token is intended for</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="common-claims"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="tsi-claim">
          <name>"tsi" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: tsi</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Target Service ID that this token was created for</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="common-claims"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ori-claim">
          <name>"ori" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: ori</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: URL of the token's originator</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="common-claims"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="env-claim">
          <name>"env" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: env</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Issuer environment (such as "production" or "sandbox")</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="common-claims"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="itg-claim">
          <name>"itg" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: itg</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Initiator tag, an opaque reference ID internal to the initiator</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="common-claims"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="hid-claim">
          <name>"hid" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: hid</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON structure containing human identity claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="kya-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="apd-claim">
          <name>"apd" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: apd</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent platform identity claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="kya-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="aid-claim">
          <name>"aid" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: aid</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent identity claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="kya-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="tpr-claim">
          <name>"tpr" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: tpr</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON string representing target service price in currency units</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="tps-claim">
          <name>"tps" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: tps</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Target pricing scheme, which represents a way for the target list how it charges for its service or content</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="amt-claim">
          <name>"amt" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: amt</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in currency units</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cur-claim">
          <name>"cur" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: cur</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three letter code, such as "EUR"</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="val-claim">
          <name>"val" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: val</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in settlement network's units</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="mnr-claim">
          <name>"mnr" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: mnr</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: JSON number representing maximum number of requests</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="stp-claim">
          <name>"stp" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: stp</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Settlement type</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sti-claim">
          <name>"sti" Claim</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Claim Name: sti</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Claim Description: Meta information for payment settlement, depending on settlement</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Reference: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="media-types-registration">
        <name>Media Types Registration</name>
        <t>This section registers the following media types <xref target="RFC2046"/>
in the IANA "Media Types" registry <xref target="IANA.MediaTypes"/>
in the manner described in <xref target="RFC6838"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="kya-jwt-media-type">
          <name>application/kya+jwt</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type name: <tt>application</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Subtype name: <tt>kya+jwt</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Required parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Optional parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined in <xref target="RFC7515"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Security considerations: See Security Considerations in <xref target="RFC7519"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Interoperability considerations: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Published specification: <xref target="kya-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Applications that use this media type: Applications using Know Your Agent tokens</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Additional information:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Magic number(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>File extension(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Macintosh file type code(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information: TBD</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Intended usage: COMMON</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Restrictions on usage: none</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="pay-jwt-media-type">
          <name>application/pay+jwt</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type name: <tt>application</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Subtype name: <tt>pay+jwt</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Required parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Optional parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined in <xref target="RFC7515"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Security considerations: See Security Considerations in <xref target="RFC7519"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Interoperability considerations: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Published specification: <xref target="pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Applications that use this media type: Applications using Pay tokens</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Additional information:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Magic number(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>File extension(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Macintosh file type code(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information: TBD</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Intended usage: COMMON</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Restrictions on usage: none</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="kya-pay-jwt-media-type">
          <name>application/kya-pay+jwt</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Type name: <tt>application</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Subtype name: <tt>kya-pay+jwt</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Required parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Optional parameters: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined in <xref target="RFC7515"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Security considerations: See Security Considerations in <xref target="RFC7519"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Interoperability considerations: n/a</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Published specification: <xref target="kya-pay-token"/> of this specification</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Applications that use this media type: Applications using KYA-Pay tokens</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Additional information:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Magic number(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>File extension(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Macintosh file type code(s): n/a</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information: TBD</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Intended usage: COMMON</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Restrictions on usage: none</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="well-known-registration">
        <name>Well-Known URI Registration</name>
        <t>This specification registers the following URI suffix in the IANA
"Well-Known URIs" registry <xref target="IANA.WellKnownURIs"/> established by <xref target="RFC8615"/>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>URI Suffix: jwks.json</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document: <xref target="key-discovery"/> of this specification</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Status: permanent</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Related Information: The resource is a JWK Set <xref target="RFC7517"/> containing the
keys with which the origin signs KYAPay tokens.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6265">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
            <author fullname="A. Barth" initials="A." surname="Barth"/>
            <date month="April" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields. These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol. Although cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used on the Internet. This document obsoletes RFC 2965. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6265"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6265"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6454">
          <front>
            <title>The Web Origin Concept</title>
            <author fullname="A. Barth" initials="A." surname="Barth"/>
            <date month="December" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the concept of an "origin", which is often used as the scope of authority or privilege by user agents. Typically, user agents isolate content retrieved from different origins to prevent malicious web site operators from interfering with the operation of benign web sites. In addition to outlining the principles that underlie the concept of origin, this document details how to determine the origin of a URI and how to serialize an origin into a string. It also defines an HTTP header field, named "Origin", that indicates which origins are associated with an HTTP request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6454"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6454"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7518">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7800">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7800"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7800"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8615">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <date month="May" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8725">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token Best Current Practices</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in the area of digital identity and in other application areas. This Best Current Practices document updates RFC 7519 to provide actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="225"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8725"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8725"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8176">
          <front>
            <title>Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim is defined and registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry, but no standard Authentication Method Reference values are currently defined. This specification establishes a registry for Authentication Method Reference values and defines an initial set of Authentication Method Reference values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8176"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8176"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OpenID.Core" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="Nat Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M. B." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B. de" surname="Medeiros" fullname="Breno de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Mortimore" fullname="Chuck Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="15"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values">
          <front>
            <title>Additional Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The JWT "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim contains
   values conveying authentication methods used in the authentication.
   This specification defines additional Authentication Method Reference
   values beyond those already registered to represent additional
   authentication methods in use today.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification">
          <front>
            <title>Identity Verification Methods Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Knowing how a person's identity was verified can be important when
   making trust decisions.  This specification defines a claim and
   values for declaring how the person's identity was verified.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods">
          <front>
            <title>Anti-Money Laundering Methods Values</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nash Ali" initials="N." surname="Ali">
              <organization>Experian</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Financial regulations require application of Anti-Money Laundering
   (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) methods in many
   jurisdictions worldwide.  This specification defines a claim and
   values for declaring what AML/CFT methods were employed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-aml-methods-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2046">
          <front>
            <title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types</title>
            <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
            <author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein"/>
            <date month="November" year="1996"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This second document defines the general structure of the MIME media typing system and defines an initial set of media types. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2046"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2046"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6838">
          <front>
            <title>Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures</title>
            <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines procedures for the specification and registration of media types for use in HTTP, MIME, and other Internet protocols. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6838"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6838"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9421">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PSL" target="https://publicsuffix.org/">
          <front>
            <title>Public Suffix List</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Mozilla Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.JWT.Claims" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.MediaTypes" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types">
          <front>
            <title>Media Types</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.WellKnownURIs" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known URIs</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens">
          <front>
            <title>Using KYAPay Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The KYAPay Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that carries verified
   identity ("Know Your Agent", KYA) and payment (PAY) information for
   requests made by software agents on behalf of human principals.  This
   document describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud
   managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer
   identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay
   tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot:
   "did a verified human authorize this agent?", rather than "is this a
   human?".  It specifies how KYAPay tokens are carried in HTTP
   requests, how they are validated (including in combination with
   request-signing layers such as HTTP Message Signatures), and how the
   verified, layered identity in a token is used to make access,
   routing, fraud detection, account-lifecycle, and step-up decisions.
   It defines the token-consuming "recipient" role that the KYAPay Token
   leaves unspecified.  It is intentionally non-prescriptive about how
   tokens are created, because agent architectures, agent-identity
   technologies, and agent-communication protocols are diverse and still
   emerging; the token itself is the interoperability contract.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Abhishek Hingnikar" initials="A." surname="Hingnikar">
              <organization>WorkOS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeffrey Hickman" initials="J." surname="Hickman">
              <organization>Ory</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes how KYAPay tokens can be exchanged for
   OAuth access tokens to dynamically grant agents access to resources
   they need to accomplish their mission.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EMVCo-PT" target="https://www.emvco.com/emv-technologies/payment-tokenisation/">
          <front>
            <title>EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification - Technical Framework</title>
            <author>
              <organization>EMVCo</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July" day="09"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="2.4"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PCI-FAQ-1326" target="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1326">
          <front>
            <title>How does PCI DSS apply to EMVCo Payment Tokens?</title>
            <author>
              <organization>PCI Security Standards Council</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FAQ" value="1326"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1659?>

<section anchor="related-specifications">
      <name>Related Specifications</name>
      <t>The following specifications are related to and designed to be used with this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"/> describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot: "Did a verified human authorize this agent?".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange"/> describes how KYAPay tokens can be exchanged for OAuth access tokens to dynamically grant agents access to resources they need to accomplish their mission.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values"/> defines additional "amr" (Authentication Method Reference) values to represent additional authentication methods in use today.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification"/> defines the "ivm" (Identity Verification Methods) claim and values for declaring how the person's identity was verified.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods"/> defines the "aml" (Anti-Money Laundering Methods) claim and values for declaring what AML/CFT methods were employed.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>We would like to thank
Bhasker Allam,
Ludovic Dépinoy,
Jean Diaconu,
Carlos Martínez
and
Rob Zagarella
for their contributions to the specification.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <t>[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]</t>
      <t>-04</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Added an Issuer Records section: the verification, authorization and issuance
records an issuer keeps, how a token is resolved to them, and why retention
periods and disclosure are left to applicable law.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required <tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> to differ at each other Target rather
than at each other Target service, leaving to the issuer whether the
services of one Target share a value.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Marked the <tt>apd</tt> claim <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> in the KYA Token claim list and in the description of <tt>sub</tt>, matching the <tt>apd</tt> section.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Allowed retaining tokens where needed for audit, dispute resolution, or legal retention obligations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that the <tt>aid</tt> claim identifies the agent, not the human principal,
and that claims about the human principal are carried in <tt>hid</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added the optional <tt>auth_time</tt> sub-claim to the <tt>hid</tt> claim: when the human
principal authenticated, kept when a token is issued on the basis of an
earlier authentication.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-03</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Added the optional <tt>ivm</tt>, <tt>amr</tt>, and <tt>aml</tt> sub-claims to the <tt>hid</tt> claim, and the optional <tt>ivm</tt> and <tt>aml</tt> sub-claims to the <tt>apd</tt> claim.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that the subject identifies the combination of identities the issuer
has verified for the initiator, that it is stable while those identities are
unchanged, and that a change to any of them gives a new subject. The
identities are carried as claims in KYA and KYA-PAY tokens and not in PAY
tokens, but the subject identifies the same combination in all three.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated in the Privacy Considerations that <tt>hid.id</tt>, <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>aid.id</tt> are
specific to one Target service, and that directly identifying sub-claims are
disclosed only when a Target requires them and the principal has authorized
it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Removed the qualifier on <tt>hid</tt>, which read as though the claim were required
only for some use cases.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that a Payment Token Issuer verifies the Initiator, which the role
definition had left to the KYA Token Issuer alone.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that a <tt>verified</tt> claim is only ever <tt>true</tt>, and corrected a KYA-PAY
example that asserted <tt>false</tt>. This is a compatibility change: the previous
definition admitted <tt>false</tt>, so a token carrying that value conformed to -02
and does not conform here. Recipient behaviour on receiving <tt>false</tt> is
specified alongside each claim.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required a recipient correlating a PAY token with a KYA token to check that
both carry the same <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>sub</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made <tt>sub</tt> pairwise: a different value at each Target service, stable at
that service.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that an agent name is unique within an agent platform at a given
issuer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added Identity Binding to the Security Considerations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Corrected the example comments on <tt>sub</tt>, which described the subject as an
agent account identifier.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added "id" as a required sub-claim within "aid".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made the "apd" claim <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> in KYA and KYAPay tokens.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a Token Size section: no maximum token size, aggregate size guidance for issuers that fits the minimum recipients are required to accept, and a preference for one KYA-PAY token over separate KYA and PAY tokens.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stated that <tt>jti</tt> identifies the token, not the request, so a repeated <tt>jti</tt>
is not by itself evidence of replay.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made <tt>creation_ip</tt> <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> and described its use.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Replaced the example IP addresses with documentation addresses.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required a recipient to confirm that it trusts the issuer before retrieving
key material, and moved the issuer check ahead of signature verification.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added traces to the logging prohibition, and pointed to the Using document for
tokens that reach a language model's context.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Allowed further identifiers for the human principal in <tt>hid</tt>, only where the
issuer has verified that the principal controls them.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Prohibited Account Data in tokens of every type, described card credentials as
EMV Payment Tokens, and cited PCI SSC FAQ 1326 for their PCI DSS scope.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Replaced the example payment credential values with values that cannot be
mistaken for real ones.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added an Identifying the Target section relating <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>tsi</tt> and <tt>tdm</tt>, made
<tt>tsi</tt> <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> and <tt>tdm</tt> <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> where the Target is identified by a domain
name, defined the form of <tt>tdm</tt>, and let a recipient that has not onboarded to
the issuer validate the audience using <tt>tdm</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added <tt>hid.id</tt>, a pseudonymous identifier for the human principal, specific
to one agent platform and one Target service, and made <tt>aid.id</tt> specific to
one Target service.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made <tt>email</tt> <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, and included <tt>email</tt>, <tt>phone_number</tt>,
<tt>organization_name</tt>, <tt>verification_id</tt> and the name sub-claims only when a
Target requires them for the action at hand and the principal has authorized
their disclosure.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required recipients to support <tt>ES256</tt> and to accept it from trusted issuers
that publish an <tt>ES256</tt> key, and issuers to use it or an algorithm every
recipient of the token accepts; limited the accepted algorithms to those the
recipient's configuration allows and the issuer's JWK Set has keys for; and
rejected <tt>none</tt> and symmetric algorithms.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required a recipient to determine the <tt>typ</tt> values it accepts before
validating a token, set aside a token of a defined type it does not accept,
and reject a token whose <tt>typ</tt> is missing or not a defined type.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Changed "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> follow" BCP 225 to "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-02</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Corrected the <tt>sti</tt> sub-claim names in the PAY and KYA-PAY examples to match
the normative names in the Settlement Information section (<tt>payment_token</tt>,
<tt>token_expiration_month</tt>, <tt>token_expiration_year</tt>, <tt>token_security_code</tt>).
The examples had retained the pre-rename camelCase forms.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Clarified that the card settlement instrument is a network-issued agentic
payment credential and that <tt>token_security_code</tt> carries a single-use token
cryptogram, not a static CVV.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Made the <tt>aid</tt> and <tt>sti</tt> claims <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>, and marked the <tt>sti</tt> sub-claim
requirement levels individually.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added the <tt>cnf</tt> (confirmation) claim, binding a token to a key held by the
agent, and described the resulting sender-constrained semantics.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a Scope of Card Settlement section prohibiting Primary Account Numbers
and static card verification values.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Expanded Security Considerations to cover confidentiality of token contents,
settlement credential handling, token lifetime, and bearer versus
sender-constrained semantics.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Tightened JWT header validation: an <tt>alg</tt> value of <tt>none</tt> and algorithm
substitution are rejected.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Corrected a missing comma in the KYA token example, and shortened the example
token lifetimes, which had exceeded a year.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Required the <tt>iss</tt> claim to be an origin, with no path, query or fragment
component, and corrected the example <tt>iss</tt> values accordingly; one had lacked
a scheme.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added an Issuer Key Discovery section specifying that the issuer's JWK Set is
located at the <tt>jwks.json</tt> well-known URI formed from <tt>iss</tt>, and registered
that URI suffix with IANA.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a Clock Skew section bounding the tolerance applied to the "iat" and
"exp" claims, and requiring senders to correct skew they can observe.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Addressed review comments by Jean Diaconu.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Clarified the meaning of Verifier and differentiated from Recipient.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-01</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Added appendix referencing related specifications.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-00</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Renamed draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile to draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-02</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Changed terms buyer and seller to initiator and target to generalize applicability.
These claim names were changed: "sdm" to "tdm", "ssi" to "tsi", "btg" to "itg",
"spr" to "tpr", and "sps" to "tps".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Updated Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Changed specification type from Informative to Proposed Standard.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-01</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Removed "srl" (Seller Resource Locator) claim.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-00</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Initial Internet Draft.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <contact initials="A." surname="Stitt" fullname="Andrew Stitt">
        <organization/>
        <address>
      </address>
      </contact>
      <contact initials="D." surname="Zagidulin" fullname="Dmitri Zagidulin">
        <organization/>
        <address>
      </address>
      </contact>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
