| Internet-Draft | SIP-1 Zero-Egress Isolation | November 2026 |
| Shuliak | Expires 19 May 2027 | [Page] |
Autonomous AI agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers frequently execute over local standard input/output (stdio) pipes outside enterprise network inspection perimeters. Naive redaction of sensitive credentials with static placeholders invalidates downstream Luhn payment card and ISO-7064 IBAN schema validators, while raw payload forwarding exposes regulated data. This document specifies the Shuliak Isolation Protocol (SIP-1), a deterministic, zero-egress security layer combining stateless Format-Preserving Encryption (FF1), Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) JSON-RPC payload quarantine, and detached cryptographic schema locks.¶
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Local agentic tool transports exchange JSON-RPC 2.0 messages directly between host applications and subprocesses over stdio. Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) gateways cannot inspect these local pipes without breaking zero-egress confidentiality requirements.¶
SIP-1 defines an inline, client-side cryptographic isolation boundary grounded in [NIST-FF1] and documented in the reference architecture [SIP1-ZENODO]. Sensitive tokens are bijectively mapped to format-valid synthetic twins in volatile memory before crossing tool or model boundaries.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
Before forwarding any JSON-RPC 2.0 request or tool output, a compliant SIP-1 interceptor MUST enforce two sequential local gates:¶
Gate 1 (AST Quarantine): Reject payloads containing Plane-14 Unicode tag characters (U+E0000..U+E007F), unauthorized path traversal sequences targeting host credentials, or unpinned tool schema mutations.¶
Gate 2 (Checksum-Invariant FF1 Bijection): Transform payment card numbers (PAN), bank accounts (IBAN), and API secrets using AES-256 in FF1 mode [NIST-FF1] with domain-separated tweaks, preserving Luhn and ISO-7064 MOD-97 check digits without persistent plaintext vaults.¶
Implementations MUST NOT use the withdrawn FF3 or FF3-1 modes due to known small-domain cryptanalytic weaknesses.¶
To prevent post-approval tool definition tampering (Rug Pull attacks) and support tamper-evident compliance telemetry, tool schemas and audit records MUST be canonicalized using JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) [RFC8785] prior to SHA-256 hashing and signed using Ed25519 [RFC8032].¶
{
"sip_version": "1.0",
"mode": "FF1-AES256-ZERO-EGRESS",
"schema_jcs_sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924",
"merkle_prev": "8f434346648f6b96df89dda901c5176b",
"ed25519_sig": "base64url_detached_64byte_signature"
}
¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
Ephemeral FF1 keys MUST be generated via an operating system cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) of at least 256 bits. When long-term tamper-evident audit chains are maintained alongside regulatory erasure obligations, per-identifier random keys SHOULD be isolated so that cryptographic key destruction renders synthetic twins irreversible against dictionary enumeration while preserving outer hash-chain integrity.¶