<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OAuth Action Identifiers">Exact-Action Identifiers in OAuth Authorization Details</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers-00"/>
    <author initials="I." surname="Schrock" fullname="Iman Schrock">
      <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>team@emiliaprotocol.ai</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="11"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Network Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword>
    <keyword>Rich Authorization Requests</keyword>
    <keyword>action identifiers</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines an action_id member for OAuth Rich Authorization
Requests authorization details types that explicitly adopt it. The member
carries a scheme-qualified identifier of an action description. A resource
server derives an identifier from the operation it is about to perform and
compares it with the identifier in the granted authorization details.</t>
      <t>The document requests a registry of exact-action identifier schemes and
an initial entry for version 1 of the Canonical Action Identifier. It
specifies authorization server processing, resource server comparison,
and discovery metadata without choosing a universal action vocabulary
or digest construction. Identifier equality is an additional condition
on authorization; it does not establish permission, a single-use grant,
execution, or the truth of externally supplied action data.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>An OAuth authorization can describe an operation more precisely than a
scope string. Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) <xref target="RFC9396"/> supplies
structured authorization details and permits each authorization details
type to define its fields and processing rules.</t>
      <t>Some deployments need a portable identifier for the particular action
description approved by the authorization server (AS). For example, a
payment request can change after approval, or an internal service can
receive parameters different from those checked at an external boundary.
Agentic AI authorization checkpoints also motivate authorization of a
specific operation <xref target="I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements"/>.</t>
      <t>Existing action identifiers select and encode operation fields in
different ways. The Canonical Action Identifier
<xref target="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier"/> and the OASNT identifier
<xref target="I-D.thallapelly-oasnt-caid"/> are examples of distinct constructions.
Using the word "digest" or "action identifier" does not make their values
interchangeable. A receiver needs both the identifier's derivation rules
and a locally accepted mapping from its actual operation to that scheme's
input.</t>
      <t>This document defines a reusable carrier, action_id, and requests a
registry identifying the derivation schemes it can carry. It does not
claim a new hashing or authorization mechanism. A registry is useful
when implementations need to recognize more than one construction while
keeping their semantics separate.</t>
      <section anchor="scope-and-rar-compatibility">
        <name>Scope and RAR compatibility</name>
        <t>An authorization details type <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> explicitly adopt this specification
before its objects use these members with the semantics defined here.
This document does not add members automatically to existing types or
change their interpretation. Existing types that use the same names for
other purposes require a distinct profile or type identifier before
adopting this specification.</t>
        <t>Section 5 of <xref target="RFC9396"/> requires the AS to reject unknown types, unknown
fields, wrong field types, and other violations of a type definition.
An unsupported action_id member therefore cannot be assumed to be
silently ignored. Discovery of scheme support alone does not establish
support for a particular authorization details type.</t>
        <t>The RAR identifier field names a resource available at an API. The
action_id member defined here identifies a scheme-defined description of
an operation involving a resource. It does not replace identifier,
actions, locations, or the type's other authorization conditions.</t>
        <t>This document does not define a payment API, a human approval ceremony,
a replay store, a transaction coordinator, or a claim that an operation
completed. It does not require human approval for every OAuth grant.
It defines no new authorization_details type.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-terminology">
      <name>Conventions and Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <t>OAuth and RAR terms have the meanings in <xref target="RFC6749"/> and <xref target="RFC9396"/>.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Scheme:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A specified deterministic derivation of an identifier from an action
description, together with syntax, validation, and comparison rules.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Action description:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The scheme-defined representation of the material properties of an
operation. It identifies a particular occurrence only when the scheme
and the type profile include the necessary occurrence information.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Exact-action object:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An authorization details object of an adopting type containing
action_id. In a request it asks for authorization; in a grant it
constrains authorization. Neither form grants authority by itself.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Type profile:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The adopting authorization details type's definition of permitted
schemes, action descriptions, and their relationship to its other
fields. It also specifies or identifies the mapping applicable to
the protected API.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Derived identifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An identifier computed by the resource server (RS) from the actual
operation under the locally configured scheme and mapping.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="schemes">
      <name>Identifier Schemes</name>
      <t>An identifier consists of a registered prefix followed by a
scheme-specific part. Prefixes identify derivation versions and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
be prefix-free: no registered prefix may begin with another registered
prefix. Prefix matching is case-sensitive.</t>
      <t>A scheme specification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The action input, validation, canonical encoding, digest algorithm
or other derivation, and result encoding. Equal accepted inputs
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> produce equal identifier strings.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Identifier syntax, maximum length, canonical spelling, and malformed
input handling. Identifiers use printable ASCII characters without
whitespace. Noncanonical encodings <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Comparison as equality of the entire decoded JSON string. Since the
identifier is ASCII, this is octet-for-octet equality of its ASCII
representation. JSON escape spelling is not significant. Receivers
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply URI normalization, percent decoding, case folding,
or Unicode normalization to compare identifier values.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A versioned prefix. A change that alters the derivation or the
meaning of existing identifier values requires a new prefix.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Covered operation properties, omitted properties, and whether
identifiers distinguish occurrences. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> explain how schema,
vocabulary, and validation versions are selected and kept consistent.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The action description from which an AS or RS can recompute an
identifier, including any external trusted inputs. A bare opaque
handle with no specified deterministic derivation is out of scope.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cryptographic assumptions, collision and substitution risks, and
confidentiality and correlation implications.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Matching the prefix selects a derivation; it does not establish trust.
An AS or RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use only schemes accepted by its local policy for the
particular type and operation. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the complete identifier
under the selected scheme before using it. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> retrieve code,
keys, policy, or schemas from a URI merely because it appears as an
identifier or scheme name.</t>
      <t>Identifiers under different schemes are not directly comparable. Their
inequality does not prove that the underlying operations differ. A
mapping between schemes is outside this specification and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
used as a substitute for matching under the granted scheme.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="members">
      <name>Authorization Details Members</name>
      <t>An adopting type uses the following fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt><tt>action_id</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> for an exact-action object. A JSON string containing a
well-formed identifier under an accepted scheme. It constrains the
granted operation to a description whose derived identifier equals
this value, subject to all other authorization checks.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>action</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The scheme-defined action description used to derive
action_id. Its presence, required fields, and reconciliation with
other type-specific fields are defined by the type profile. It is
not an alternative source of execution parameters at the RS.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>This document defines no action_uses member and no default use count.
The adopting type <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> state whether it requires occurrence identifiers
and separate replay or use-count enforcement.</t>
      <t>The type profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify accepted scheme versions and the trusted
inputs that fix their meaning. For a scheme with separately versioned
action definitions, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify how those definitions are pinned.
The AS and RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> agree on those inputs; scheme-prefix agreement alone
is insufficient. A client-supplied schema or mapping <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> override
that agreement.</t>
      <t>Where a type includes both action and separate material operation
fields, its definition <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> state how their consistency is checked.
Conflicting descriptions <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected, not resolved by choosing
whichever description would permit the operation.</t>
      <t>The following uses an illustrative, unregistered type. A real deployment
needs an actual type definition. The action and identifier are the
payment example in Appendix C of version 05 of
<xref target="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier"/>. Long lines in examples may
be folded using the convention in <xref target="RFC8792"/>; unfolding restores
the JSON, with no embedded whitespace in identifier strings.</t>
      <sourcecode type="json">=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{
  "type": "https://rs.example/authz/payment",
  "locations": ["https://rs.example/payments"],
  "actions": ["pay"],
  "action_id": "canactid:1:payment.release.1:jcs-sha256:\
                        liLG9pKgkLt3silrjf1wa0xIHz5YFrBB9HI-arxrO1Y",
  "action": {
    "action_type": "payment.release.1",
    "amount": "250.00",
    "currency": "EUR",
    "beneficiary_account": "sha256:\
   9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08",
    "payment_instruction_id": "pi-2026-000117",
    "memo": "invoice 4471"
  }
}
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="as">
      <name>Authorization Server Processing</name>
      <t>The AS first validates the authorization details against their type
definition and applies its normal client, grant, and authorization
policy. For each exact-action object it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> then:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Identify an accepted scheme from action_id and validate the
identifier's syntax, encoding, and permitted scheme parameters.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When action is present, validate it under the scheme and the type
profile, derive its identifier, and require equality with action_id.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Check all required relationships between action and the other fields
in the authorization details object.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When action is absent, obtain the exact description through a
type-defined trusted mechanism if policy requires evaluating or
displaying its fields. If the necessary description is unavailable,
refuse the request. An identifier alone does not explain an action
to a person.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Failure of these checks results in invalid_authorization_details.
When an approval presentation is required, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be produced from the
verified description and other authenticated context required by the
type profile. This requirement does not attest that the display was
trustworthy or that the person understood it.</t>
      <t>For an unchanged approved action, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> preserve action_id in the
granted object. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> omit an object, or further restrict non-action
authorization conditions where the type permits that restriction. It
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> broaden the grant by dropping action_id from a retained object.
It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> silently translate the identifier into another scheme.</t>
      <section anchor="changes">
        <name>Approved changes</name>
        <t>A change to material action fields is a different authorization subject,
not an automatic reduction of rights. If the type permits a person or
policy to change those fields during authorization, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate
and authorize the resulting description, derive its new action_id under
the same scheme, and return the resulting granted authorization details
to the client as specified by <xref target="RFC9396"/>. If the change is not permitted
or cannot be authorized, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse it.</t>
        <t>The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the granted description for a subsequent request
to perform that action.
It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that the original request was approved. This is an
explicit exception to preservation of the originally requested value;
it is not permission to change an identifier without authorizing the
changed action.</t>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> make the granted action_id available to the RS through the
validated access token or authenticated introspection result. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
preserve the constraint through refresh or token exchange if those flows
are supported. Such issuance does not itself establish a fresh right to
repeat an operation. The type's authorization and replay policy governs
that decision.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="rs">
      <name>Resource Server Processing</name>
      <t>The RS determines from its own policy whether an operation requires
an exact-action identifier, and which adopting types, schemes, and
mappings are accepted. The token cannot relax that requirement.</t>
      <t>Before performing the operation, the RS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Validate the access token using its applicable OAuth profile,
including issuer, audience, expiry, and sender constraint where
required. Obtain authorization details from that validated context.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Select applicable exact-action objects of an accepted type. The
object's locations, actions, and all other authorization restrictions
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> independently allow this operation. An identifier match <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
make an otherwise inapplicable object applicable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For an applicable object, select the locally accepted scheme and
mapping, and validate the complete granted identifier.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Construct the scheme input from the actual operation: its parameters,
method, target, authenticated tenant, and trusted state as required by
the type profile. The RS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> substitute the token's action
member or a client-supplied identifier for independently constructing this input.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Derive the identifier and compare it with the granted action_id as
specified in <xref target="schemes"/>. If there is no applicable matching object,
refuse the operation.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Apply all remaining controls required by the type and deployment,
including replay checks and atomic consumption where required.
Passing step 5 is not permission to skip these controls.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Invoke the operation using the same material values that were
checked, through a path covered by these checks.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>The mapping <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject material values it cannot represent rather than
silently discard them. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fix any allowed normalization before
comparison and ensure that the provider receives semantically identical
values. Normalization rules appropriate to one payment rail or API <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> be assumed valid for another.</t>
      <t>Material state or parameters <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> change between comparison and
invocation without re-evaluation. Implementations can enforce this by
passing an immutable operation representation or by a suitable atomic
state check. An identifier match does not solve this race by itself.</t>
      <t>If several applicable objects match, the type profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify how
they relate to authorization and use state. The RS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> combine
partial permissions from different objects to invent a grant. Different
identifiers or schemes do not establish independent rights to repeat
the same business operation.</t>
      <t>For Bearer-protected resources, a valid token whose permissions do not
satisfy these requirements is refused with HTTP 403 and insufficient_scope
under <xref target="RFC6750"/>. This draft introduces no new OAuth error names.
Other token profiles use their corresponding authorization-failure
response. Responses <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> avoid exposing confidential approved values.</t>
      <artwork>
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope"
</artwork>
      <section anchor="replay">
        <name>Occurrences, replay, and uncertain outcomes</name>
        <t>An action identifier is not a token identifier, an approval occurrence,
a business-operation key, or a claim that the action has not happened.
Two legitimate occurrences can have equal descriptions. Two identifiers
can also describe the same business operation under different schemes.</t>
        <t>A deployment requiring at-most-one invocation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> enforce that property
separately, at the covered execution boundary, using durable and atomic
state shared by all paths that can admit that occurrence. Its occurrence
key and authority scope <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> remain appropriate across token renewal,
exchange, restarts, and accepted identifier schemes. A new token jti or
an alternative representation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reset consumed authority for that
same occurrence.</t>
        <t>If invocation has begun and its outcome is unknown, identifier equality
or a freshly issued token does not justify a blind retry. Reconciliation
and any subsequent authorization follow the deployment's execution
policy. This specification neither defines that recovery protocol nor
claims exactly-once execution.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="metadata">
      <name>Discovery Metadata</name>
      <t>An AS supporting this specification <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish
exact_action_schemes_supported in its metadata <xref target="RFC8414"/>. Its value
is a nonempty JSON array of distinct registered prefixes supported for
at least one adopting authorization details type.</t>
      <t>An RS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish the same member in its protected resource metadata
<xref target="RFC9728"/>, with prefixes accepted for at least one protected operation.</t>
      <t>These are capability hints. They neither authorize a request nor
advertise that every type, action definition, or suite is supported.
The client also needs support for the adopting type and its profile.
Absence of the metadata provides no discovery assurance; a deployment
can use explicit prior configuration instead. Untrusted metadata <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> override the AS or RS's configured policy.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="caid">
      <name>Initial canactid Registration</name>
      <t>The proposed prefix is canactid:1:. The underlying derivation is version
1 of the Canonical Action Identifier
<xref target="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier"/>, specified in that document's
version 05. The identifier contains an action type, a suite, and a digest:</t>
      <artwork>
canactid:1:&lt;action-type&gt;:&lt;suite&gt;:&lt;digest&gt;
</artwork>
      <t>The action description is the CAID action object. The complete CAID
input-validation, action-type, suite, and encoding rules apply; a string
that merely resembles this pattern is insufficient. In particular,
base64url digest encoding must be canonical and the in-object action
type must agree with the identifier's action type.</t>
      <t>The canactid URI scheme is provisionally registered with IANA. That
registration is separate from the new registry requested here. The CAID
action-type and suite registries remain proposals in its individual
Internet-Draft; this document does not represent them as established
IANA registries.</t>
      <t>The adopting type profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> pin the CAID specification revision,
action-type definition including its definition digest, suites, and
required external value-set snapshots. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define the mapping from
its API operations to the CAID object. Validation semantics cannot be
inferred from the prefix alone. This document's example uses registry
version 5 and the payment.release.1 definition digest from CAID-05:</t>
      <sourcecode type="text">=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

sha256:\
     3a5ad4c0a3a8dbf7eb9ea5f4c3b2ceb07ba1972fac49acc6006dcac64726ff12
</sourcecode>
      <t>Before RFC publication, the normative CAID reference and this entry must
be reconciled with that specification's status. Changes to derivation
must not silently change the meaning of this registered prefix.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="carriers">
      <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
      <t>Transaction Tokens <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens"/> preserve
transaction context through a call chain. A separately defined profile
could carry an exact-action identifier in that context. Such a profile
would need to specify authenticated provenance, applicability to each
internal operation, and where authority is consumed. A whole workflow's
identifier does not automatically identify each of its sub-operations.
This draft does not register a Transaction Token claim or require
implementations to trust a bare tctx.action_id value.</t>
      <t>Similarly, transaction authorization challenges
<xref target="I-D.rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge"/> can convey authorization details
originating at a protected resource. An adopting type can use the members
here within those details. The challenge does not itself grant authority,
and the eventual request still requires the checks in <xref target="rs"/>. This draft
does not modify that challenge protocol.</t>
      <t>OpenID for Verifiable Presentations <xref target="OpenID4VP"/> already supports
binding transaction data to credential presentations. Its SD-JWT VC
profile describes hashes of the encoded transaction_data strings.
Those hashes have specific input and presentation semantics; they are
not automatically interchangeable with identifiers derived from an API
operation. This document does not change that profile or substitute an
action_id match for verification of a credential presentation.</t>
      <t>Broader effectuation-boundary proposals also discuss reconstructing an
operation at execution time
<xref target="I-D.das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation"/>. This document does not
claim that comparison pattern is new. Its proposed contribution is the
RAR member, processing rules, scheme registry, and discovery metadata.</t>
      <t>These relationships are informative. The core carrier and registry do
not depend on these other proposals or on OpenID4VP.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="authority-and-applicability">
        <name>Authority and applicability</name>
        <t>Identifier equality is necessary only where local policy requires it,
and is never sufficient for authorization. A valid identifier in an
object for another type, resource, tenant, or permission set <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
permit execution. Ordinary OAuth grant, token, and resource checks apply.
Sender constraint such as DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> can limit token use by another
party; it does not make an operation single-use.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mapping-and-semantic-agreement">
        <name>Mapping and semantic agreement</name>
        <t>An omitted destination, tenant, debit account, method, or other material
field can permit substitution without changing an identifier. Scheme and
type specifications must explain their coverage. A trusted mapping and
consistent validation semantics are as important as digest comparison.
Client-selected schemas, inconsistent parsers, duplicate JSON members,
noncanonical encodings, or unvalidated numeric conversions can defeat
that agreement. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject ambiguous inputs in accordance
with the adopted scheme and type profile.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cryptographic-and-version-confusion">
        <name>Cryptographic and version confusion</name>
        <t>Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate syntax and select the scheme solely by an
accepted prefix, without guessing or falling back to another derivation.
Digest-only comparison discards the scheme and other identifier context
and is forbidden. Collision resistance and input-validation requirements
come from the scheme. Registering a scheme is not a security endorsement;
a deployment can refuse a registered scheme.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trusted-information-and-presentation">
        <name>Trusted information and presentation</name>
        <t>A signature or digest does not prove payee identity, bank ownership,
physical state, human understanding, or the correctness of a business
decision. If authorization depends on such facts, the deployment needs
appropriate trusted evidence and freshness checks. Recomputing a
client-supplied action is a consistency check, not independent validation
of the facts it asserts.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="use-state-and-execution">
        <name>Use state and execution</name>
        <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> claim replay prevention from this identifier
comparison alone. The requirements in <xref target="replay"/> apply when a deployment
claims at-most-one invocation. Any unmediated alternate execution route
limits the claimed enforcement coverage. A record of a successful
comparison does not establish that the provider performed the operation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Deterministic action identifiers can enable correlation across tokens,
services, and logs. Unsalted digests over predictable fields can be
attacked by guessing candidate actions; hashing account details does not
make them anonymous. Authorization details can themselves contain
sensitive information. Deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> minimize disclosure, restrict
access to identifiers and action descriptions, and apply appropriate
retention policies. Public logging is not required by this specification.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="registry">
        <name>OAuth Exact-Action Identifier Schemes</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to establish the "OAuth Exact-Action Identifier
Schemes" registry in the "OAuth Parameters" registry group, using
Specification Required <xref target="RFC8126"/>.</t>
        <t>The registration template is:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Prefix: a case-sensitive printable ASCII string of 1 to 128 characters,
without whitespace, ending in a colon and containing a derivation
version discriminator.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Description: a short description of the scheme.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Action Description: the input form and where it is specified.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: the party responsible for maintaining the entry.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: a stable public specification and the relevant sections.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Designated experts <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the requirements in <xref target="schemes"/>, a
prefix-free assignment, and sufficient detail for independent
implementations. They <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> check for unnecessary duplication and
unaddressed ambiguity, encoding, collision, and privacy issues. They
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> approve an update that changes existing identifier derivation
or meaning under an assigned prefix. Editorial references and contact
information may be updated after review. Assigned prefixes <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
be reused, including after deprecation.</t>
        <t>The initial requested entry is:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Prefix: canactid:1:</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Description: Canonical Action Identifier, syntax version 1.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Action Description: CAID action object, as specified in
<xref target="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="caid"/> of this document and
<xref target="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This is a requested registration. Publication of an individual
Internet-Draft does not establish the registry or allocate its entries.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-authorization-server-metadata">
        <name>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization
Server Metadata" registry:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Name: exact_action_schemes_supported</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Description: Exact-action identifier scheme prefixes supported
for at least one adopting authorization details type.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="metadata"/> of this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-protected-resource-metadata">
        <name>OAuth Protected Resource Metadata</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Protected
Resource Metadata" registry:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Name: exact_action_schemes_supported</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Description: Exact-action identifier scheme prefixes accepted
for at least one protected operation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="metadata"/> of this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>RAR establishes no registry of authorization details object members.
The action_id and action members are adopted through type definitions;
this document does not register them as top-level OAuth parameters.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6750">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6750"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6750"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8414">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <date month="June" year="2018"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9396">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="May" year="2023"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9396"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9396"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9728">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata</title>
            <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="A. Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki"/>
            <date month="April" year="2025"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9728"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9728"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier">
          <front>
            <title>The Canonical Action Identifier (CAID)</title>
            <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
              <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="October" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-canonical-action-identifier-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8792">
          <front>
            <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
            <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge</title>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kehan Yao" initials="K." surname="Yao">
              <organization>China Mobile</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.thallapelly-oasnt-caid">
          <front>
            <title>OASNT-CAID: Canonical Action Identifier Derivation and the Named-Human Binding</title>
            <author fullname="Arun Thallapelly" initials="A." surname="Thallapelly">
              <organization>OmniArx</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="4" month="August" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-thallapelly-oasnt-caid-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation">
          <front>
            <title>AI Safety and Accountability at the Effectuation Boundary: Protocol Requirements for Autonomous Actions</title>
            <author fullname="Sangam Das" initials="S." surname="Das">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="September" year="2026"/>
            </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OpenID4VP" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0</title>
            <author initials="O." surname="Terbu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="K." surname="Yasuda">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Fett">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Heenan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="July" day="09"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="implementation-and-evaluation-status">
      <name>Implementation and Evaluation Status</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.</t>
      <t>A local JavaScript reference check accompanies this draft. It exercises
the adopting-type rules, identifier comparison, and errors using one
payment fixture and a limited implementation of the CAID jcs-sha256
suite, using the JSON Canonicalization Scheme <xref target="RFC8785"/>. It reproduces the published CAID-05 Appendix C payment identifier.
It is not a complete CAID implementation or an OAuth authorization or
resource server. It does not validate access-token signatures, implement
a trusted display, move money, or supply durable replay state.</t>
      <t>A second prefix, example:rawjcs:1:, is used only in the local test fixture
to exercise recognition of a different derivation. It is not proposed
for registration and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as a registered scheme.</t>
      <t>The checks distinguish identifier matching from authority consumption:
repeated comparison can succeed without establishing permission to invoke
again. Passing the checks is not evidence of production deployment,
independent interoperability, fraud prevention, or replay safety.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Working-group feedback is needed on whether a shared member and a
separate scheme registry are useful beyond individual type profiles.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A second independently implemented scheme and adopting type would
provide stronger interoperability evidence than the local fixture.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The CAID dependency is an individual Internet-Draft. Its normative
status and registration references need resolution before RFC
publication.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Discovery here advertises schemes in aggregate. Per-type and
per-operation discovery is left to the adopting profiles.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Transaction Token and challenge-specific profiles may be developed
separately; their inclusion is not a condition of this draft.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
  

</rfc>
