Internet-Draft OAuth Action Identifiers November 2026
Schrock Expires 15 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
I. Schrock
EMILIA Protocol, Inc.

Exact-Action Identifiers in OAuth Authorization Details

Abstract

This document defines an action_id member for OAuth Rich Authorization Requests authorization details types that explicitly adopt it. The member carries a scheme-qualified identifier of an action description. A resource server derives an identifier from the operation it is about to perform and compares it with the identifier in the granted authorization details.

The document requests a registry of exact-action identifier schemes and an initial entry for version 1 of the Canonical Action Identifier. It specifies authorization server processing, resource server comparison, and discovery metadata without choosing a universal action vocabulary or digest construction. Identifier equality is an additional condition on authorization; it does not establish permission, a single-use grant, execution, or the truth of externally supplied action data.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

An OAuth authorization can describe an operation more precisely than a scope string. Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) [RFC9396] supplies structured authorization details and permits each authorization details type to define its fields and processing rules.

Some deployments need a portable identifier for the particular action description approved by the authorization server (AS). For example, a payment request can change after approval, or an internal service can receive parameters different from those checked at an external boundary. Agentic AI authorization checkpoints also motivate authorization of a specific operation [I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements].

Existing action identifiers select and encode operation fields in different ways. The Canonical Action Identifier [I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier] and the OASNT identifier [I-D.thallapelly-oasnt-caid] are examples of distinct constructions. Using the word "digest" or "action identifier" does not make their values interchangeable. A receiver needs both the identifier's derivation rules and a locally accepted mapping from its actual operation to that scheme's input.

This document defines a reusable carrier, action_id, and requests a registry identifying the derivation schemes it can carry. It does not claim a new hashing or authorization mechanism. A registry is useful when implementations need to recognize more than one construction while keeping their semantics separate.

1.1. Scope and RAR compatibility

An authorization details type MUST explicitly adopt this specification before its objects use these members with the semantics defined here. This document does not add members automatically to existing types or change their interpretation. Existing types that use the same names for other purposes require a distinct profile or type identifier before adopting this specification.

Section 5 of [RFC9396] requires the AS to reject unknown types, unknown fields, wrong field types, and other violations of a type definition. An unsupported action_id member therefore cannot be assumed to be silently ignored. Discovery of scheme support alone does not establish support for a particular authorization details type.

The RAR identifier field names a resource available at an API. The action_id member defined here identifies a scheme-defined description of an operation involving a resource. It does not replace identifier, actions, locations, or the type's other authorization conditions.

This document does not define a payment API, a human approval ceremony, a replay store, a transaction coordinator, or a claim that an operation completed. It does not require human approval for every OAuth grant. It defines no new authorization_details type.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

OAuth and RAR terms have the meanings in [RFC6749] and [RFC9396].

Scheme:

A specified deterministic derivation of an identifier from an action description, together with syntax, validation, and comparison rules.

Action description:

The scheme-defined representation of the material properties of an operation. It identifies a particular occurrence only when the scheme and the type profile include the necessary occurrence information.

Exact-action object:

An authorization details object of an adopting type containing action_id. In a request it asks for authorization; in a grant it constrains authorization. Neither form grants authority by itself.

Type profile:

The adopting authorization details type's definition of permitted schemes, action descriptions, and their relationship to its other fields. It also specifies or identifies the mapping applicable to the protected API.

Derived identifier:

An identifier computed by the resource server (RS) from the actual operation under the locally configured scheme and mapping.

3. Identifier Schemes

An identifier consists of a registered prefix followed by a scheme-specific part. Prefixes identify derivation versions and MUST be prefix-free: no registered prefix may begin with another registered prefix. Prefix matching is case-sensitive.

A scheme specification MUST define:

  1. The action input, validation, canonical encoding, digest algorithm or other derivation, and result encoding. Equal accepted inputs MUST produce equal identifier strings.

  2. Identifier syntax, maximum length, canonical spelling, and malformed input handling. Identifiers use printable ASCII characters without whitespace. Noncanonical encodings MUST be rejected.

  3. Comparison as equality of the entire decoded JSON string. Since the identifier is ASCII, this is octet-for-octet equality of its ASCII representation. JSON escape spelling is not significant. Receivers MUST NOT apply URI normalization, percent decoding, case folding, or Unicode normalization to compare identifier values.

  4. A versioned prefix. A change that alters the derivation or the meaning of existing identifier values requires a new prefix.

  5. Covered operation properties, omitted properties, and whether identifiers distinguish occurrences. It MUST explain how schema, vocabulary, and validation versions are selected and kept consistent.

  6. The action description from which an AS or RS can recompute an identifier, including any external trusted inputs. A bare opaque handle with no specified deterministic derivation is out of scope.

  7. Cryptographic assumptions, collision and substitution risks, and confidentiality and correlation implications.

Matching the prefix selects a derivation; it does not establish trust. An AS or RS MUST use only schemes accepted by its local policy for the particular type and operation. It MUST validate the complete identifier under the selected scheme before using it. It MUST NOT retrieve code, keys, policy, or schemas from a URI merely because it appears as an identifier or scheme name.

Identifiers under different schemes are not directly comparable. Their inequality does not prove that the underlying operations differ. A mapping between schemes is outside this specification and MUST NOT be used as a substitute for matching under the granted scheme.

4. Authorization Details Members

An adopting type uses the following fields:

action_id:

REQUIRED for an exact-action object. A JSON string containing a well-formed identifier under an accepted scheme. It constrains the granted operation to a description whose derived identifier equals this value, subject to all other authorization checks.

action:

OPTIONAL. The scheme-defined action description used to derive action_id. Its presence, required fields, and reconciliation with other type-specific fields are defined by the type profile. It is not an alternative source of execution parameters at the RS.

This document defines no action_uses member and no default use count. The adopting type MUST state whether it requires occurrence identifiers and separate replay or use-count enforcement.

The type profile MUST identify accepted scheme versions and the trusted inputs that fix their meaning. For a scheme with separately versioned action definitions, it MUST specify how those definitions are pinned. The AS and RS MUST agree on those inputs; scheme-prefix agreement alone is insufficient. A client-supplied schema or mapping MUST NOT override that agreement.

Where a type includes both action and separate material operation fields, its definition MUST state how their consistency is checked. Conflicting descriptions MUST be rejected, not resolved by choosing whichever description would permit the operation.

The following uses an illustrative, unregistered type. A real deployment needs an actual type definition. The action and identifier are the payment example in Appendix C of version 05 of [I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier]. Long lines in examples may be folded using the convention in [RFC8792]; unfolding restores the JSON, with no embedded whitespace in identifier strings.

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{
  "type": "https://rs.example/authz/payment",
  "locations": ["https://rs.example/payments"],
  "actions": ["pay"],
  "action_id": "canactid:1:payment.release.1:jcs-sha256:\
                        liLG9pKgkLt3silrjf1wa0xIHz5YFrBB9HI-arxrO1Y",
  "action": {
    "action_type": "payment.release.1",
    "amount": "250.00",
    "currency": "EUR",
    "beneficiary_account": "sha256:\
   9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08",
    "payment_instruction_id": "pi-2026-000117",
    "memo": "invoice 4471"
  }
}

5. Authorization Server Processing

The AS first validates the authorization details against their type definition and applies its normal client, grant, and authorization policy. For each exact-action object it MUST then:

  1. Identify an accepted scheme from action_id and validate the identifier's syntax, encoding, and permitted scheme parameters.

  2. When action is present, validate it under the scheme and the type profile, derive its identifier, and require equality with action_id.

  3. Check all required relationships between action and the other fields in the authorization details object.

  4. When action is absent, obtain the exact description through a type-defined trusted mechanism if policy requires evaluating or displaying its fields. If the necessary description is unavailable, refuse the request. An identifier alone does not explain an action to a person.

Failure of these checks results in invalid_authorization_details. When an approval presentation is required, it MUST be produced from the verified description and other authenticated context required by the type profile. This requirement does not attest that the display was trustworthy or that the person understood it.

For an unchanged approved action, the AS MUST preserve action_id in the granted object. It MAY omit an object, or further restrict non-action authorization conditions where the type permits that restriction. It MUST NOT broaden the grant by dropping action_id from a retained object. It MUST NOT silently translate the identifier into another scheme.

5.1. Approved changes

A change to material action fields is a different authorization subject, not an automatic reduction of rights. If the type permits a person or policy to change those fields during authorization, the AS MUST validate and authorize the resulting description, derive its new action_id under the same scheme, and return the resulting granted authorization details to the client as specified by [RFC9396]. If the change is not permitted or cannot be authorized, the AS MUST refuse it.

The client MUST use the granted description for a subsequent request to perform that action. It MUST NOT assume that the original request was approved. This is an explicit exception to preservation of the originally requested value; it is not permission to change an identifier without authorizing the changed action.

The AS MUST make the granted action_id available to the RS through the validated access token or authenticated introspection result. It MUST preserve the constraint through refresh or token exchange if those flows are supported. Such issuance does not itself establish a fresh right to repeat an operation. The type's authorization and replay policy governs that decision.

6. Resource Server Processing

The RS determines from its own policy whether an operation requires an exact-action identifier, and which adopting types, schemes, and mappings are accepted. The token cannot relax that requirement.

Before performing the operation, the RS MUST:

  1. Validate the access token using its applicable OAuth profile, including issuer, audience, expiry, and sender constraint where required. Obtain authorization details from that validated context.

  2. Select applicable exact-action objects of an accepted type. The object's locations, actions, and all other authorization restrictions MUST independently allow this operation. An identifier match MUST NOT make an otherwise inapplicable object applicable.

  3. For an applicable object, select the locally accepted scheme and mapping, and validate the complete granted identifier.

  4. Construct the scheme input from the actual operation: its parameters, method, target, authenticated tenant, and trusted state as required by the type profile. The RS MUST NOT substitute the token's action member or a client-supplied identifier for independently constructing this input.

  5. Derive the identifier and compare it with the granted action_id as specified in Section 3. If there is no applicable matching object, refuse the operation.

  6. Apply all remaining controls required by the type and deployment, including replay checks and atomic consumption where required. Passing step 5 is not permission to skip these controls.

  7. Invoke the operation using the same material values that were checked, through a path covered by these checks.

The mapping MUST reject material values it cannot represent rather than silently discard them. It MUST fix any allowed normalization before comparison and ensure that the provider receives semantically identical values. Normalization rules appropriate to one payment rail or API MUST NOT be assumed valid for another.

Material state or parameters MUST NOT change between comparison and invocation without re-evaluation. Implementations can enforce this by passing an immutable operation representation or by a suitable atomic state check. An identifier match does not solve this race by itself.

If several applicable objects match, the type profile MUST specify how they relate to authorization and use state. The RS MUST NOT combine partial permissions from different objects to invent a grant. Different identifiers or schemes do not establish independent rights to repeat the same business operation.

For Bearer-protected resources, a valid token whose permissions do not satisfy these requirements is refused with HTTP 403 and insufficient_scope under [RFC6750]. This draft introduces no new OAuth error names. Other token profiles use their corresponding authorization-failure response. Responses SHOULD avoid exposing confidential approved values.

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope"

6.1. Occurrences, replay, and uncertain outcomes

An action identifier is not a token identifier, an approval occurrence, a business-operation key, or a claim that the action has not happened. Two legitimate occurrences can have equal descriptions. Two identifiers can also describe the same business operation under different schemes.

A deployment requiring at-most-one invocation MUST enforce that property separately, at the covered execution boundary, using durable and atomic state shared by all paths that can admit that occurrence. Its occurrence key and authority scope MUST remain appropriate across token renewal, exchange, restarts, and accepted identifier schemes. A new token jti or an alternative representation MUST NOT reset consumed authority for that same occurrence.

If invocation has begun and its outcome is unknown, identifier equality or a freshly issued token does not justify a blind retry. Reconciliation and any subsequent authorization follow the deployment's execution policy. This specification neither defines that recovery protocol nor claims exactly-once execution.

7. Discovery Metadata

An AS supporting this specification MAY publish exact_action_schemes_supported in its metadata [RFC8414]. Its value is a nonempty JSON array of distinct registered prefixes supported for at least one adopting authorization details type.

An RS MAY publish the same member in its protected resource metadata [RFC9728], with prefixes accepted for at least one protected operation.

These are capability hints. They neither authorize a request nor advertise that every type, action definition, or suite is supported. The client also needs support for the adopting type and its profile. Absence of the metadata provides no discovery assurance; a deployment can use explicit prior configuration instead. Untrusted metadata MUST NOT override the AS or RS's configured policy.

8. Initial canactid Registration

The proposed prefix is canactid:1:. The underlying derivation is version 1 of the Canonical Action Identifier [I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier], specified in that document's version 05. The identifier contains an action type, a suite, and a digest:

canactid:1:<action-type>:<suite>:<digest>

The action description is the CAID action object. The complete CAID input-validation, action-type, suite, and encoding rules apply; a string that merely resembles this pattern is insufficient. In particular, base64url digest encoding must be canonical and the in-object action type must agree with the identifier's action type.

The canactid URI scheme is provisionally registered with IANA. That registration is separate from the new registry requested here. The CAID action-type and suite registries remain proposals in its individual Internet-Draft; this document does not represent them as established IANA registries.

The adopting type profile MUST pin the CAID specification revision, action-type definition including its definition digest, suites, and required external value-set snapshots. It MUST define the mapping from its API operations to the CAID object. Validation semantics cannot be inferred from the prefix alone. This document's example uses registry version 5 and the payment.release.1 definition digest from CAID-05:

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

sha256:\
     3a5ad4c0a3a8dbf7eb9ea5f4c3b2ceb07ba1972fac49acc6006dcac64726ff12

Before RFC publication, the normative CAID reference and this entry must be reconciled with that specification's status. Changes to derivation must not silently change the meaning of this registered prefix.

9. Relationship to Other Work

Transaction Tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens] preserve transaction context through a call chain. A separately defined profile could carry an exact-action identifier in that context. Such a profile would need to specify authenticated provenance, applicability to each internal operation, and where authority is consumed. A whole workflow's identifier does not automatically identify each of its sub-operations. This draft does not register a Transaction Token claim or require implementations to trust a bare tctx.action_id value.

Similarly, transaction authorization challenges [I-D.rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge] can convey authorization details originating at a protected resource. An adopting type can use the members here within those details. The challenge does not itself grant authority, and the eventual request still requires the checks in Section 6. This draft does not modify that challenge protocol.

OpenID for Verifiable Presentations [OpenID4VP] already supports binding transaction data to credential presentations. Its SD-JWT VC profile describes hashes of the encoded transaction_data strings. Those hashes have specific input and presentation semantics; they are not automatically interchangeable with identifiers derived from an API operation. This document does not change that profile or substitute an action_id match for verification of a credential presentation.

Broader effectuation-boundary proposals also discuss reconstructing an operation at execution time [I-D.das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation]. This document does not claim that comparison pattern is new. Its proposed contribution is the RAR member, processing rules, scheme registry, and discovery metadata.

These relationships are informative. The core carrier and registry do not depend on these other proposals or on OpenID4VP.

10. Security Considerations

10.1. Authority and applicability

Identifier equality is necessary only where local policy requires it, and is never sufficient for authorization. A valid identifier in an object for another type, resource, tenant, or permission set MUST NOT permit execution. Ordinary OAuth grant, token, and resource checks apply. Sender constraint such as DPoP [RFC9449] can limit token use by another party; it does not make an operation single-use.

10.2. Mapping and semantic agreement

An omitted destination, tenant, debit account, method, or other material field can permit substitution without changing an identifier. Scheme and type specifications must explain their coverage. A trusted mapping and consistent validation semantics are as important as digest comparison. Client-selected schemas, inconsistent parsers, duplicate JSON members, noncanonical encodings, or unvalidated numeric conversions can defeat that agreement. Implementations MUST reject ambiguous inputs in accordance with the adopted scheme and type profile.

10.3. Cryptographic and version confusion

Receivers MUST validate syntax and select the scheme solely by an accepted prefix, without guessing or falling back to another derivation. Digest-only comparison discards the scheme and other identifier context and is forbidden. Collision resistance and input-validation requirements come from the scheme. Registering a scheme is not a security endorsement; a deployment can refuse a registered scheme.

10.4. Trusted information and presentation

A signature or digest does not prove payee identity, bank ownership, physical state, human understanding, or the correctness of a business decision. If authorization depends on such facts, the deployment needs appropriate trusted evidence and freshness checks. Recomputing a client-supplied action is a consistency check, not independent validation of the facts it asserts.

10.5. Use state and execution

Implementations MUST NOT claim replay prevention from this identifier comparison alone. The requirements in Section 6.1 apply when a deployment claims at-most-one invocation. Any unmediated alternate execution route limits the claimed enforcement coverage. A record of a successful comparison does not establish that the provider performed the operation.

11. Privacy Considerations

Deterministic action identifiers can enable correlation across tokens, services, and logs. Unsalted digests over predictable fields can be attacked by guessing candidate actions; hashing account details does not make them anonymous. Authorization details can themselves contain sensitive information. Deployments SHOULD minimize disclosure, restrict access to identifiers and action descriptions, and apply appropriate retention policies. Public logging is not required by this specification.

12. IANA Considerations

12.1. OAuth Exact-Action Identifier Schemes

IANA is requested to establish the "OAuth Exact-Action Identifier Schemes" registry in the "OAuth Parameters" registry group, using Specification Required [RFC8126].

The registration template is:

  • Prefix: a case-sensitive printable ASCII string of 1 to 128 characters, without whitespace, ending in a colon and containing a derivation version discriminator.

  • Description: a short description of the scheme.

  • Action Description: the input form and where it is specified.

  • Change Controller: the party responsible for maintaining the entry.

  • Reference: a stable public specification and the relevant sections.

Designated experts MUST verify the requirements in Section 3, a prefix-free assignment, and sufficient detail for independent implementations. They SHOULD check for unnecessary duplication and unaddressed ambiguity, encoding, collision, and privacy issues. They MUST NOT approve an update that changes existing identifier derivation or meaning under an assigned prefix. Editorial references and contact information may be updated after review. Assigned prefixes MUST NOT be reused, including after deprecation.

The initial requested entry is:

This is a requested registration. Publication of an individual Internet-Draft does not establish the registry or allocate its entries.

12.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry:

  • Metadata Name: exact_action_schemes_supported

  • Metadata Description: Exact-action identifier scheme prefixes supported for at least one adopting authorization details type.

  • Change Controller: IETF.

  • Reference: Section 7 of this document.

12.3. OAuth Protected Resource Metadata

IANA is requested to register the following in the "OAuth Protected Resource Metadata" registry:

  • Metadata Name: exact_action_schemes_supported

  • Metadata Description: Exact-action identifier scheme prefixes accepted for at least one protected operation.

  • Change Controller: IETF.

  • Reference: Section 7 of this document.

RAR establishes no registry of authorization details object members. The action_id and action members are adopted through type definitions; this document does not register them as top-level OAuth parameters.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[I-D.schrock-canonical-action-identifier]
Schrock, I., "The Canonical Action Identifier (CAID)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-canonical-action-identifier-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schrock-canonical-action-identifier-05>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750>.
[RFC8126]
Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.
[RFC9728]
Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728, DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>.

13.2. Informative References

[I-D.agentic-ai-usecases-requirements]
Reddy.K, T., Sarker, Z., and K. Yao, "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07>.
[I-D.das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation]
Das, S., "AI Safety and Accountability at the Effectuation Boundary: Protocol Requirements for Autonomous Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation-01>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman, "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11>.
[I-D.rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge]
Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., McGuinness, K., and P. Kasselman, "OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge-01>.
[I-D.thallapelly-oasnt-caid]
Thallapelly, A., "OASNT-CAID: Canonical Action Identifier Derivation and the Named-Human Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thallapelly-oasnt-caid-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-thallapelly-oasnt-caid-01>.
[OpenID4VP]
Terbu, O., Lodderstedt, T., Yasuda, K., Fett, D., and J. Heenan, "OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[RFC8792]
Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

Appendix A. Implementation and Evaluation Status

This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.

A local JavaScript reference check accompanies this draft. It exercises the adopting-type rules, identifier comparison, and errors using one payment fixture and a limited implementation of the CAID jcs-sha256 suite, using the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785]. It reproduces the published CAID-05 Appendix C payment identifier. It is not a complete CAID implementation or an OAuth authorization or resource server. It does not validate access-token signatures, implement a trusted display, move money, or supply durable replay state.

A second prefix, example:rawjcs:1:, is used only in the local test fixture to exercise recognition of a different derivation. It is not proposed for registration and MUST NOT be treated as a registered scheme.

The checks distinguish identifier matching from authority consumption: repeated comparison can succeed without establishing permission to invoke again. Passing the checks is not evidence of production deployment, independent interoperability, fraud prevention, or replay safety.

Appendix B. Open Issues

This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.

Author's Address

Iman Schrock
EMILIA Protocol, Inc.
United States of America