<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.2.3) -->
<?rfc docmapping="yes"?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="ACME Workload Identity">Workload Identity Tokens in Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Orders</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rasmussen-acme-wif-01"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Rasmussen" fullname="Scott Rasmussen">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>scott@zaita.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>ACME Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>ACME</keyword>
    <keyword>workload identity</keyword>
    <keyword>federation</keyword>
    <keyword>OpenID Connect</keyword>
    <keyword>certificate issuance</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 79?>

<t>Enterprises hold large certificate inventories, yet few of their
certificates are managed through ACME. Many workloads, such as CI/CD jobs,
containers, virtual machines, cloud services and the automation that manages
appliances, cannot complete ACME's challenges. Certification Authorities
(CAs) and Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) systems that serve them fall
back to External Account Binding (EAB) with long-lived shared secrets,
or to proprietary APIs.</t>
      <t>OpenID Connect (OIDC) provides a short-lived cryptographically verified identity token 
to the workload. This document lets an ACME client send that token with each
newOrder request. The token can be bound to the request's nonce and
account key through its audience claim, so identity providers need no
changes. The CA/CLM verifies the token and, under its own policy, may pre-authorize the
identifier in the order, as RFC 8555 already allows. This replaces the EAB
secret with a fresh, per-order proof of workload identity. It does not change
how CAs validate control of identifiers.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 98?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="problem">
        <name>Problem</name>
        <t>ACME <xref target="RFC8555"/> automates issuance for web public facing web servers, 
but much of an enterprise's certificate inventory cannot respond
to either a DNS or HTTP challenge.</t>
        <t>The workloads involved include CI/CD pipelines, containers, cloud functions,
virtual machines, cloud services such as key management services, and
automation such as Ansible that obtains certificates for network devices,
databases and other appliances that cannot run ACME themselves. Many keep no
state between runs and are deliberately given no long-lived secrets. Many
need certificates that no challenge helps with, such as X.509 client
certificates for mutual TLS or for SSH authentication.</t>
        <t>For these workloads, each existing ACME mechanism has a cost:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>dns-01 requires the workload, or a service acting for it, to hold
credentials that can change DNS. Giving many workloads write access to DNS
is an operational risk, since a mistake can cause an outage; and a security
risk, since a compromised workload can alter DNS and move laterally.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>http-01 requires the CA to reach the workload over HTTP. That is often
impossible: the workload is not an HTTP server; inbound traffic is
restricted by IP allowlists, mutual TLS or geo-blocking; or the network
allows no ingress at all, as is common in regulated environments.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>dns-persist-01 <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-dns-persist"/> removes DNS changes at
issuance, but binds each authorization to a persistent ACME account. Each
workload must keep that account's key, which is a long-lived credential to
store, rotate and inventory.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Subscribers whose organization and domains a CA has already validated, such
as OV and EV customers, need no challenge at all. CAs link their accounts
using External Account Binding (EAB, <xref section="7.3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) and
pre-authorize the names the Subscriber is allowed
(<xref section="7.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The EAB MAC key is a long-lived shared secret. A Subscriber either holds many
of them, one per workload, each of which must be created, distributed,
stored, rotated and inventoried; or holds a few, each of which lets anyone who
obtains it get certificates for every name the Subscriber is allowed. The keys
tend to end up in configuration files and command lines.</t>
        <t>Where ACME does not fit, Subscribers integrate with each CA's or CLM's
proprietary API, separately for every combination of CA, CLM and workload
environment.</t>
        <t>These workloads already have a better credential. Their platform (GitHub
Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Kubernetes, SPIFFE, AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and
others) issues them a short-lived JSON Web Token <xref target="RFC7519"/>, signed with a
key the platform publishes. Accepting such a token is commonly called
workload identity federation (WIF). This document lets an ACME client use the
platform's token in place of a stored credential.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="this-document">
        <name>This Document</name>
        <t>This document defines:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a "wifToken" field in the newOrder request (<xref target="order"/>), carrying the
workload's platform token; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an audience binding (<xref target="audience"/>) that ties the token to the nonce and
account key of that one request, using only the token's existing "aud"
claim; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>) that a CA may permit, by policy,
for identity providers that cannot vary the audience per request.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The CA verifies the token and finds the policy entry it satisfies
(<xref target="policy"/>). That entry tells the CA which Subscriber the workload belongs to
and which identifiers it may have. The CA may then pre-authorize those
identifiers for this order. Identifiers it does not pre-authorize are
validated per normal process (HTTP, DNS).</t>
        <t>A workload therefore needs no secret. It creates an ephemeral account from a
freshly generated key, sends its platform token with each order, and the CA
checks its identity on every order rather than once when the account was
created.</t>
        <t>This document does not define a new way to validate control of an
identifier. Pre-authorization based on a token is CA policy, exactly as
pre-authorization based on EAB is today (<xref target="proves"/>). This document also does
not define a policy language.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

<dl>
          <dt>Workload:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Software that needs a certificate, such as a CI/CD job, a container or a
virtual machine.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Identity Provider (IdP):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The platform service that issues identity tokens to workloads. It has no
relationship with the CA and does not know ACME is in use.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>WIF Token:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/> that an IdP issues to a workload, signed with an
asymmetric algorithm and verifiable with a key the IdP publishes.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) system:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A service that manages certificates for a Subscriber and obtains them from
one or more CAs. A CLM can act as the ACME server. In this document, "CA"
and "server" include a CLM in that role.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Subscriber:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The organization that obtains certificates from the CA and configures the
CA's policy for its workloads.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Policy Entry:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>CA configuration, set up by a Subscriber, that names an accepted issuer, a
rule over that issuer's token claims, the identifiers a matching workload
may be pre-authorized for, and whether it accepts tokens in static audience
mode (<xref target="policy"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Audience Binding Value (ABV):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The value a workload places in the "aud" claim of its WIF Token
(<xref target="audience"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Terms from <xref target="RFC8555"/>, <xref target="RFC7515"/> and <xref target="RFC7519"/> are used as defined there.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <figure anchor="fig-flow">
        <name>Ordering a certificate with a WIF Token</name>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="304" width="536" viewBox="0 0 536 304" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 24,48 L 24,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 288,48 L 288,120" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 288,152 L 288,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 520,48 L 520,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 240,64 L 280,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 32,80 L 48,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 192,80 L 280,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 264,128 L 512,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 32,144 L 48,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 144,144 L 512,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 208,176 L 280,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 480,192 L 512,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 32,240 L 48,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 240,256 L 280,256" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 128,272 L 280,272" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="520,192 508,186.4 508,197.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,512,192)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="520,128 508,122.4 508,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,512,128)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="288,272 276,266.4 276,277.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,280,272)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="288,176 276,170.4 276,181.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,280,176)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="288,64 276,58.4 276,69.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,280,64)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,240 28,234.4 28,245.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,240)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,144 28,138.4 28,149.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,144)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="40,80 28,74.4 28,85.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,32,80)"/>
              <g class="text">
                <text x="28" y="36">Client</text>
                <text x="260" y="36">ACME</text>
                <text x="308" y="36">Server</text>
                <text x="520" y="36">IdP</text>
                <text x="36" y="68">--</text>
                <text x="92" y="68">newAccount</text>
                <text x="164" y="68">(fresh</text>
                <text x="212" y="68">key)</text>
                <text x="112" y="84">Replay-Nonce:</text>
                <text x="176" y="84">N</text>
                <text x="48" y="116">ABV</text>
                <text x="84" y="116">from</text>
                <text x="112" y="116">N</text>
                <text x="136" y="116">and</text>
                <text x="184" y="116">account</text>
                <text x="232" y="116">key</text>
                <text x="36" y="132">--</text>
                <text x="80" y="132">request</text>
                <text x="136" y="132">token</text>
                <text x="180" y="132">(aud</text>
                <text x="208" y="132">=</text>
                <text x="236" y="132">ABV)</text>
                <text x="72" y="148">WIF</text>
                <text x="112" y="148">Token</text>
                <text x="36" y="180">--</text>
                <text x="84" y="180">newOrder</text>
                <text x="148" y="180">(nonce</text>
                <text x="188" y="180">N)</text>
                <text x="104" y="196">{identifiers,</text>
                <text x="200" y="196">wifToken}</text>
                <text x="300" y="196">--</text>
                <text x="336" y="196">fetch</text>
                <text x="380" y="196">JWKS</text>
                <text x="436" y="196">(cached)</text>
                <text x="324" y="212">verify</text>
                <text x="396" y="212">signature,</text>
                <text x="472" y="212">expiry,</text>
                <text x="312" y="228">aud</text>
                <text x="336" y="228">=</text>
                <text x="364" y="228">ABV,</text>
                <text x="412" y="228">policy</text>
                <text x="464" y="228">entry</text>
                <text x="84" y="244">order,</text>
                <text x="140" y="244">authzs</text>
                <text x="188" y="244">pre-</text>
                <text x="100" y="260">authorized</text>
                <text x="160" y="260">per</text>
                <text x="204" y="260">policy</text>
                <text x="36" y="276">--</text>
                <text x="84" y="276">finalize</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
 Client                        ACME Server                      IdP
   |                                |                            |
   |-- newAccount (fresh key) ----->|                            |
   |<-- Replay-Nonce: N ------------|                            |
   |                                |                            |
   | ABV from N and account key     |                            |
   |-- request token (aud = ABV) ------------------------------->|
   |<-- WIF Token -----------------------------------------------|
   |                                |                            |
   |-- newOrder (nonce N) --------->|                            |
   |   {identifiers, wifToken}      |-- fetch JWKS (cached) ---->|
   |                                | verify signature, expiry,  |
   |                                | aud = ABV, policy entry    |
   |<-- order, authzs pre-          |                            |
   |    authorized per policy ------|                            |
   |-- finalize ------------------->|                            |
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
      </figure>
      <t>Before any of this, the Subscriber configures one or more Policy Entries at
the CA. Each says which workload tokens may be pre-authorized for which
identifiers.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="audience">
      <name>The Audience Binding Value</name>
      <t>The WIF Token must be usable only by the account that requested it, and only
once. Identity providers can let the workload choose the "aud" claim. This document therefore carries
the binding in the audience.</t>
      <t>The Audience Binding Value is:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
ABV = "urn:ietf:params:acme:wif:" ||
      base64url(SHA-256(ASCII(nonce || "." || thumbprint)))
]]></artwork>
      <t>where:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>nonce is the value of the "nonce" header parameter in the JWS protected
header of the newOrder request that carries the token
(<xref section="6.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>thumbprint is the base64url-encoded JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint <xref target="RFC7638"/> of
the account key that signs that request; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>base64url is without padding <xref target="RFC4648"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>ACME nonces are single-use, so the ABV is unique to one request. The
thumbprint ties it to one account key, so a leaked token is useless to anyone
who does not hold that key. Hashing keeps the value at a fixed 68 characters,
which every surveyed IdP accepts, and keeps the nonce from the IdP.</t>
      <t>A server supporting this document <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate nonces containing at least
128 bits of entropy.</t>
      <t>Some IdPs cannot put a per-request value in "aud". A CA/CLM <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept their
tokens in static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>), which is weaker and is
available only where the CA/CLM policy enables it.</t>
      <section anchor="static-aud">
        <name>Static Audience Mode</name>
        <t>Some IdPs fix the audience when the token is issued or when the workload is
configured. Azure managed identities accept only a pre-registered
application ID URI. GitLab CI/CD issues ID tokens when a job starts, with the
audience written in the pipeline definition. Kubernetes projected token
volumes fix the audience when the pod starts (<xref target="profiles"/>). These tokens
cannot carry an ABV.</t>
        <t>A CA/CLM <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept such tokens, as a matter of its own policy, in static
audience mode. Static audience mode <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be disabled unless the CA/CLM
configuration enables it, and a CA/CLM <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> enable it per Policy Entry rather
than per issuer. In this mode:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The CA/CLM configures one or more static audience values for the issuer, for
example an application ID URI that the Subscriber registered for the CA.
The workload requests its token with one of them. A static audience <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
identify this CA/CLM alone, so that tokens a workload obtains for other services
are not accepted. The values are agreed out of band and are not listed in
the directory.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A token in this mode is accepted only by a Policy Entry that explicitly
permits static audience tokens (<xref target="policy"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept each such token at most once. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> record a
value that identifies the token until the token's "exp", and reject a token
it has already recorded with "wifTokenReplayed". The value is the "jti"
claim where the CA's configuration says the issuer guarantees "jti" to be
unique, and otherwise the SHA-256 hash of the whole token. A server with
several instances must share this record among them.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set a maximum token lifetime for the issuer that is no
longer than its workloads need.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A static audience token is not bound to an account key or a nonce. Anyone
who obtains it before it is used can present it with their own account, and
the first presentation succeeds (<xref target="static-aud-sec"/>). A CA/CLM that permits this
mode accepts that risk, for the Policy Entries it enables it on, in return
for supporting these IdPs. The choice can differ between Policy Entries. For
example, a CA/CLM might permit it for a private CA's short-lived client
certificates but not for names in publicly trusted certificates.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="order">
      <name>The "wifToken" Order Field</name>
      <section anchor="client-behaviour">
        <name>Client Behaviour</name>
        <t>A client <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send "wifToken" unless the server's directory contains
the "wif" metadata object (<xref target="metadata"/>). <xref target="RFC8555"/> does not require servers
to ignore unrecognized fields in a newOrder request, so a server that does not
support this document might reject the request.</t>
        <t>To place an order with a WIF Token, the client:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>obtains a fresh nonce, from a newNonce request or from the Replay-Nonce
header of an earlier response;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>computes the ABV (<xref target="audience"/>) from that nonce and its account key;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>requests a WIF Token from its IdP with the ABV as the audience
(<xref target="profiles"/>), asking for the shortest lifetime the platform allows; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>sends a newOrder request (<xref section="7.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) signed with the same
account key and using that nonce, with the token in a "wifToken" field.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <figure anchor="fig-order">
          <name>A newOrder request carrying a WIF Token</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: ca.example
Content-Type: application/jose+json

{
  "protected": base64url({
    "alg": "ES256",
    "kid": "https://ca.example/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
    "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
    "url": "https://ca.example/acme/new-order"
  }),
  "payload": base64url({
    "identifiers": [
      { "type": "dns", "value": "gateway.internal.example.com" }
    ],
    "wifToken": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjFGMkFCM..."
  }),
  "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>In static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>), the client instead requests its
token with the agreed static audience, which it may do before obtaining the
nonce, and omits step 2.</t>
        <t>If the server rejects the request with "badNonce", the client must start
again from step 1 with a new nonce and, unless it is in static audience mode,
a new token.</t>
        <t>The client needs a new token for every order. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> store a WIF Token
or write it to a log.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="validation">
        <name>Server Validation</name>
        <t>When a newOrder request contains "wifToken", the server performs these steps
before creating the order. If any step fails, the server rejects the request
with an error from <xref target="errors"/> and creates no order.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Parse "wifToken" as a JWS in Compact Serialization <xref target="RFC7515"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Check "alg". Reject "none" and all MAC algorithms. Accept only algorithms
configured for the issuer selected in step 3; never take the algorithm
from the token alone.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Check that "iss" exactly matches an issuer the server accepts, using
simple string comparison (<xref section="6.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/>). Prefix, suffix
and subdomain matches are not allowed.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Select the verification key from the issuer's key set (<xref target="jwks"/>) using
"kid". Reject the token if "kid" names no key in the set. A server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
reject a token without "kid".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verify the signature.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Check that "exp" is in the future and that "nbf" and "iat", if present,
are not, allowing at most 60 seconds of clock skew. Reject the token if its
remaining lifetime exceeds the server's maximum for the issuer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Compute the expected ABV from the nonce in this request's protected header
and the thumbprint of the key that signed it. Check that "aud" equals it
(if a string) or contains it (if an array), comparing octet for octet. If
it does not, and static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>) is enabled for this
issuer, check in the same way whether "aud" is one of the issuer's static
audience values. If it is, the token is in static audience mode.
Otherwise, reject with "wifAudienceMismatch".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Find the Policy Entries whose issuer is this token's issuer and whose rule
the token's claims satisfy (<xref target="policy"/>). For a token in static audience
mode, consider only Policy Entries that permit that mode. If there are
none, reject with "wifPolicyDenied".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For a token in static audience mode, check that it has not been accepted
before, and record it (<xref target="static-aud"/>). If it has been, reject with
"wifTokenReplayed".</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The server never includes "wifToken" in the order object it returns or
stores.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="preauth">
        <name>Pre-authorization</name>
        <t>After validation, the server creates the order. For each identifier in the
order, the server either:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>pre-authorizes it, if a matching Policy Entry permits that identifier and
the CA's own validation requirements allow it (<xref section="7.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>).
The authorization is created with status "valid" and no challenges need to
be completed; or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>handles it exactly as it would without a token: by offering challenges, by
reusing an existing validation, or by rejecting it.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The token identifies the Subscriber. Anything a CA would do for accounts
linked to that Subscriber by EAB, such as reusing that Subscriber's earlier
domain validations within the period its rules allow, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> do here.</t>
        <t>An authorization pre-authorized on the basis of a WIF Token:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have an "expires" no later than the token's "exp", and the server <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> extend it; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to satisfy any order other than the one whose request
carried the token.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Together these mean a token authorizes one order and nothing after it. Each
new order needs a new token, so the workload's identity is checked every
time.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="why-the-token-is-sent-with-each-order">
        <name>Why the Token Is Sent with Each Order</name>
        <t>A WIF Token could instead be sent once, with the newAccount request, in place
of EAB. The account would then hold the Subscriber's authority until it was
deactivated, long after the token had expired and regardless of later changes
to the workload. Sending the token with each order keeps authority tied to a
fresh, short-lived proof of identity, leaves account registration unchanged,
and lets ephemeral workloads discard their accounts freely.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="jwks">
        <name>Issuer Keys</name>
        <t>The server obtains an issuer's JWK Set <xref target="RFC7517"/> from the "jwks_uri" in its
OpenID Provider Metadata <xref target="OIDC-DISCOVERY"/>, or from keys configured directly.
The metadata URL <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> come from the server's own configuration, never from a
token's "iss" claim (<xref target="ssrf"/>).</t>
        <t>Servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> cache key sets, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> refresh one when they see an
unknown "kid", rate-limiting those refreshes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="errors">
        <name>Errors</name>
        <table anchor="tbl-errors">
          <name>Error types</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Type</th>
              <th align="left">Meaning</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">badWifToken</td>
              <td align="left">The token is malformed, has a bad signature or algorithm, or is outside its validity period</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifIssuerNotAccepted</td>
              <td align="left">The token's issuer is not accepted</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifAudienceMismatch</td>
              <td align="left">"aud" does not contain the expected ABV</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifPolicyDenied</td>
              <td align="left">The token is valid, but no Policy Entry accepts it</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifTokenReplayed</td>
              <td align="left">A token in static audience mode has already been used</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>With "wifPolicyDenied", a server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> say which claims it evaluated and the
values the token carried, so operators can fix the problem. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
reveal the values the policy expected (<xref target="policy"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="accounts">
      <name>Accounts</name>
      <t>A workload creates an ordinary account from a freshly generated key, with no
"externalAccountBinding". The account carries no authority of its own; what a
workload may obtain is decided per order, from its token and the Policy
Entries. EAB is therefore not needed.</t>
      <t>A CA/CLM that requires EAB for other reasons, such as billing, can either set
"externalAccountRequired" to false or serve WIF Tokens from a separate
directory. See <xref target="open-issues"/>.</t>
      <t>Workloads often create a new account on every run. Servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> allow
this, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply rate limits by Policy Entry rather than by account, and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> discard accounts that have been idle for a long time.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="metadata">
      <name>Directory Metadata</name>
      <t>A server supporting this document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include a "wif" object in the "meta"
field of its directory, with these fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>issuers (required, array of string):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The issuers the server accepts.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>maxTokenLifetime (optional, number):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The longest remaining token lifetime, in seconds, that the server accepts.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>required (optional, boolean):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>If true, the server rejects any newOrder request without a "wifToken" with
the error type "unauthorized". Defaults to false.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"meta": {
  "wif": {
    "issuers": ["https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"],
    "maxTokenLifetime": 300,
    "required": true
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>Setting "required" to true turns away every client that does not implement
this document, as "externalAccountRequired" does for clients without EAB. A
CA that also serves other clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> give workload clients a separate
directory.</t>
      <t>Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore members of the "wif" object they do not recognize. A CA
that does not want to reveal which platforms its Subscribers use may give an
empty "issuers" array.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="policy">
      <name>Authorization Policy</name>
      <t>A Policy Entry associates:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>an accepted issuer;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a rule over that issuer's token claims;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the identifiers a matching workload may be pre-authorized for; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>whether it accepts tokens in static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>), which
is off unless set explicitly.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>For example:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
require:
  repository_owner_id = 1234567
  repository_id = 89012345
  ref = refs/heads/main
permit: dns:gateway.internal.example.com
]]></artwork>
      <t>A Subscriber configures its Policy Entries out of band, before any request
arrives. The CA is responsible for checking that the Subscriber is entitled
to the identifiers it lists, as it is when it sets up EAB pre-authorization
today.</t>
      <t>This document does not define a policy language, but every policy:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name an explicit issuer and an explicit rule over claims. "Any token
from this issuer" <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be expressible, because shared platforms such as
GitHub issue tokens to every tenant from one issuer (<xref target="issuer-confusion"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match claims that are not reassigned, such as numeric IDs, rather
than names (<xref target="mutable-claims"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>, for important identifiers, constrain where the workload ran, such
as the branch, environment or namespace; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> list identifiers exactly. A pattern that matches more names than
intended grants all of them. Where names are generated at run time, as in
an ephemeral test environment, a Policy Entry can instead permit names
under a subdomain reserved for that workload.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The server does not tell clients which claim values a policy expects. Clients
cannot choose their claims anyway, and the values describe the Subscriber's
internal structure. The values are not secret, though. Security rests on the
IdP issuing tokens for a subject only to that subject, and on the audience
binding. It does not rest on anyone not knowing the policy.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="idp-req">
      <name>Identity Provider Requirements</name>
      <t>A CA operator <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> accept an IdP only if it:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>signs tokens with an asymmetric algorithm from <xref target="RFC7518"/>, or a successor,
of at least 128-bit strength;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>publishes its keys through OpenID Connect Discovery <xref target="OIDC-DISCOVERY"/>, or
lets the CA obtain them through another trustworthy channel;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>lets the workload set "aud" to an arbitrary string on each request. An IdP
that cannot do this can be accepted only in static audience mode
(<xref target="static-aud"/>), and only where the CA's policy permits it;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>includes "exp" and supports short token lifetimes; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>issues claims that identify the workload precisely and stably, and never
issues a token for a subject to anyone but that subject.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="acme-order-object-fields">
        <name>ACME Order Object Fields</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to add this entry to the "ACME Order Object Fields"
registry:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Field Name</th>
              <th align="left">Field Type</th>
              <th align="left">Configurable</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifToken</td>
              <td align="left">string</td>
              <td align="left">true</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The field appears only in newOrder requests. Servers never return it in an
order object (<xref target="validation"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="acme-error-types">
        <name>ACME Error Types</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to add these entries to the "ACME Error Types" registry,
each with the prefix "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:":</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Type</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">badWifToken</td>
              <td align="left">The WIF Token is malformed, unverifiable or not currently valid</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifIssuerNotAccepted</td>
              <td align="left">The token issuer is not accepted</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifAudienceMismatch</td>
              <td align="left">The token audience does not contain the expected binding value</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifPolicyDenied</td>
              <td align="left">No policy accepts this workload</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wifTokenReplayed</td>
              <td align="left">A static audience token has already been used</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="acme-directory-metadata-fields">
        <name>ACME Directory Metadata Fields</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to add this entry to the "ACME Directory Metadata Fields"
registry:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Field Name</th>
              <th align="left">Field Type</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">wif</td>
              <td align="left">object</td>
              <td align="left">This document</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="urn-label">
        <name>URN Label</name>
        <t>The ABV uses the prefix "urn:ietf:params:acme:wif:" within the namespace
registered by <xref section="9.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>. No registry exists for labels in
that namespace, so no IANA action is requested. See <xref target="open-issues"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="proves">
        <name>What a WIF Token Proves</name>
        <t>A valid "wifToken" shows that the requester held the account key and a fresh
token, issued by an accepted IdP, whose claims satisfy a Policy Entry. It
identifies the workload, and through the Policy Entry, the Subscriber.</t>
        <t>It proves nothing about control of any identifier. Pre-authorization on the
basis of a token is a CA policy decision, with the same standing as
pre-authorization on the basis of EAB. A CA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply its own validation
requirements before pre-authorizing an identifier. In particular, a publicly
trusted CA pre-authorizes a name only where its rules already allow it, for
example by reusing a recent validation of that name for the same Subscriber.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-audience-binding">
        <name>The Audience Binding</name>
        <t>WIF Tokens leak in practice, for example into build logs. A leaked token is
harmless only because its audience commits to one account key and one
single-use nonce, which the server recomputes (<xref target="audience"/>). A token whose
audience is a fixed value would be a usable bearer credential for its whole
lifetime. That is why the bound audience is the default, and why static
audience mode is off unless a CA enables it.</t>
        <t>Because the audience changes on every request, an IdP or tenant administrator
cannot restrict which audiences a workload may request. That control must
come instead from the IdP's controls over which workloads get tokens, and
from Policy Entries. The "urn:ietf:params:acme:wif:" prefix only makes the
value recognizable; it carries no security weight.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="static-aud-sec">
        <name>Static Audience Tokens</name>
        <t>A token in static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>) is a bearer credential until
it is used or expires. Single-use enforcement stops a leaked token from being
used after the workload has used it, but not before. An attacker who reads the
token, for example from a log while the job is still running, can race the
workload. Short token lifetimes, never logging tokens, and narrow Policy
Entries limit the risk. A CA deciding whether to permit this mode should
weigh the value of the identifiers involved. The mode suits short-lived
certificates from a private CA better than names in publicly trusted
certificates.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="issuer-confusion">
        <name>Issuer Allowlisting Is Not Authorization</name>
        <t>Every GitHub repository gets tokens from the same issuer. A policy that
accepts any token from that issuer accepts a token from any GitHub user,
including an attacker who signed up minutes earlier. Policy Entries therefore
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> constrain claims that identify the Subscriber's own workloads
(<xref target="policy"/>), and implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> refuse to load a rule that does not
constrain the subject.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mutable-claims">
        <name>Mutable and Reassignable Claims</name>
        <t>Some claims look stable but are not. A renamed or transferred GitHub
repository frees its name for someone else, but its "repository_id" is never
reused. A Kubernetes service account can be deleted and recreated with the
same name, and an AWS IAM role can be recreated with the same ARN. Some
platforms also let administrators change the format of "sub". Policies <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
match numeric or unique identifiers and individual claims, rather than names
or patterns over "sub".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="execution-context">
        <name>Execution Context</name>
        <t>A token shows which workload identity ran, not which code ran. Anyone who can
change a workflow, for example by pushing to a branch or through a compromised
dependency, can obtain a token for that identity. Policies for important
identifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> require a specific branch, environment or namespace, and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use platform approval gates where available.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ssrf">
        <name>Server-Side Request Forgery</name>
        <t>Fetching issuer metadata from a URL taken from a token would let attackers
make the CA send requests to arbitrary hosts. Servers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> build these URLs
from configuration (<xref target="jwks"/>). They <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also refuse non-public addresses
unless configured for a private issuer, limit response size and redirects,
and time out quickly.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="dos">
        <name>Denial of Service</name>
        <t>Verifying a token costs more than processing an ordinary newOrder request.
Servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject malformed or oversized tokens before verifying them,
and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> rate-limit newOrder requests carrying tokens by account and by
Policy Entry. Servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep using cached keys for a bounded period when
an IdP is unreachable.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="algorithm-confusion">
        <name>Algorithm Confusion</name>
        <t>Servers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep a list of accepted algorithms per issuer and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> let
the token's header choose the verification algorithm (step 2 of
<xref target="validation"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>A WIF Token reveals internal details to the CA, such as repository,
organization, cluster, namespace and branch names, and cloud account numbers.
CAs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep only the claims their policy and audit duties need, and
<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> keep tokens.</t>
      <t>Servers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> copy token claims into certificates. Claims routinely contain
internal names, and publicly trusted certificates are logged in Certificate
Transparency <xref target="RFC6962"/>.</t>
      <t>The directory's "issuers" list shows which platforms a CA's Subscribers use
(<xref target="metadata"/>). The IdP learns only that a workload asked for a token with an
ACME audience, not which CA, account or identifier was involved.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Names. Is "wifToken" the right field name, and "wif" the right metadata
and URN label?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Static audience mode (<xref target="static-aud"/>) lets a CA accept tokens from IdPs that
cannot vary the audience per request, such as Azure managed identities and
GitLab CI/CD, at the cost of a token that is a bearer credential until it
is used. Should this document define the mode, or leave it entirely to CA
policy? Should the directory say which issuers permit it? Should the
working group instead ask IdPs to support a per-request audience?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Some relying parties, such as mTLS gateways, may want the certificate to
name the workload itself. A later extension could define an identifier
type derived from the token's "iss" and "sub". Client-authentication
certificates for mutual TLS and SSH, a main use case, depend on it. Should
it be in this document?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>CAs that need EAB for billing still need a pre-shared secret. Could a WIF
Token be exchanged for EAB credentials, for example using OAuth 2.0 Token
Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/>, and should that be specified here or elsewhere?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The "urn:ietf:params:acme:wif:" prefix has no registry to record it.
Should one be created?</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="related-work">
      <name>Related Work</name>
      <t>External Account Binding (<xref section="7.3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8555"/>) links an account to a
Subscriber using a shared secret, once, at account creation. This document
links each order to a Subscriber using a platform-issued token. The two can
coexist.</t>
      <t>ACME Authority Token <xref target="RFC9447"/> validates identifiers using a JWT. It
requires the token to carry an "atc" claim containing the ACME account key's
fingerprint, which only a token issuer built for ACME can do. General-purpose
platform IdPs cannot, which is why this document carries the binding in
"aud" instead.</t>
      <t>ACME Remote Attestation <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-rats"/> conveys evidence about a
platform's state. A CA could require both that and a WIF Token.</t>
      <t>ACME with OpenID Federation <xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation"/> establishes
trust through OpenID Federation trust chains. This document uses no
federation metadata; the CA trusts each IdP's keys directly.</t>
      <t>WIMSE Workload Credentials <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds"/> defines
workload credential formats but leaves out how to obtain them. This document
is one way for a workload to obtain a certificate.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7518">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8555">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews" initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews"/>
            <author fullname="D. McCarney" initials="D." surname="McCarney"/>
            <author fullname="J. Kasten" initials="J." surname="Kasten"/>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates are used for a number of purposes, the most significant of which is the authentication of domain names. Thus, certification authorities (CAs) in the Web PKI are trusted to verify that an applicant for a certificate legitimately represents the domain name(s) in the certificate. As of this writing, this verification is done through a collection of ad hoc mechanisms. This document describes a protocol that a CA and an applicant can use to automate the process of verification and certificate issuance. The protocol also provides facilities for other certificate management functions, such as certificate revocation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8555"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8555"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OIDC-DISCOVERY" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="E." surname="Jay">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="15"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6962">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
            <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="E. Kasper" initials="E." surname="Kasper"/>
            <date month="June" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
              <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6962"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6962"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9447">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Challenges Using an Authority Token</title>
            <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
            <author fullname="M. Barnes" initials="M." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="D. Hancock" initials="D." surname="Hancock"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wendt" initials="C." surname="Wendt"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Some proposed extensions to the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) rely on proving eligibility for certificates through consulting an external authority that issues a token according to a particular policy. This document specifies a generic Authority Token Challenge for ACME that supports subtype claims for different identifiers or namespaces that can be defined separately for specific applications.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9447"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9447"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-rats">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Remote Attestation Identifier and Challenge Type</title>
            <author fullname="Peter Chunchi Liu" initials="P. C." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Cryptic Forest Software, Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson">
              <organization>Sandelman Software Works Inc</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ganesh Mallaya" initials="G." surname="Mallaya">
              <organization>AppViewX, Inc</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sven Rajala" initials="S." surname="Rajala">
              <organization>Keyfactor</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes an approach where an ACME Server can
   challenge an ACME Client to provide Evidence, Endorsements, or
   Attestation Result according to the Remote ATtestation procedureS
   (RATS) framework in any format supported by the Conceptual Message
   Wrapper (CMW).

   The ACME Server can optionally challenge the Client for specific
   claims that it wishes attestation for.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-rats-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-dns-persist">
          <front>
            <title>Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Challenge for Persistent DNS TXT Record Validation</title>
            <author fullname="Shiloh Heurich" initials="S." surname="Heurich">
              <organization>Fastly</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henry Birge-Lee" initials="H." surname="Birge-Lee">
              <organization>Crosslayer Labs, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael Slaughter" initials="M." surname="Slaughter">
              <organization>Amazon Trust Services</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies "dns-persist-01", an Automated Certificate
   Management Environment (ACME) challenge that verifies domain or IP
   address control using a persistent DNS TXT record.  The record
   identifies a certification authority (CA) and binds validation to an
   ACME account.  It can be published before certificate requests and
   reused without per-request DNS changes, including when different
   parties perform DNS publication and ACME operation.  Use under a
   certificate policy or trust program remains subject to that policy's
   requirements.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation">
          <front>
            <title>Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) with OpenID Federation 1.0</title>
            <author fullname="Giuseppe De Marco" initials="G." surname="De Marco">
              <organization>independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brandon Pitman" initials="B." surname="Pitman">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Tim Geoghegan" initials="T." surname="Geoghegan">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="David Cook" initials="D." surname="Cook">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J.C. Jones" initials="J." surname="Jones">
              <organization>ISRG</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol
   allows server operators to obtain TLS certificates for their
   websites, based on a demonstration of control over the website's
   domain via a fully-automated challenge/response protocol.

   OpenID Federation 1.0 defines how to build a trust infrastructure
   using a trusted third-party model.  It uses a trust evaluation
   mechanism to attest to the possession of private keys, protocol
   specific metadata and miscellaneous administrative and technical
   information related to a specific entity.

   This document defines how X.509 certificates associated with a given
   OpenID Federation Entity can be issued by an X.509 Certification
   Authority through the ACME protocol to the organizations which are
   part of a federation built on top of OpenID Federation 1.0.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-acme-openid-federation-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPIFFE-ID" target="https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/JWT-SVID.md">
          <front>
            <title>SPIFFE ID and JWT-SVID specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GITHUB-OIDC" target="https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/openid-connect-reference">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect reference (GitHub Actions)</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GITLAB-OIDC" target="https://docs.gitlab.com/ci/secrets/id_token_authentication/">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect (OIDC) Authentication Using ID Tokens (GitLab CI/CD)</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AWS-GWIT" target="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetWebIdentityToken.html">
          <front>
            <title>GetWebIdentityToken, AWS Security Token Service API Reference</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AZURE-IMDS" target="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/managed-identities-azure-resources/how-to-use-vm-token">
          <front>
            <title>Azure Instance Metadata Service token acquisition</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="K8S-TOKENREQUEST" target="https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/">
          <front>
            <title>Managing Service Accounts: bound service account tokens</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 826?>

<section anchor="profiles">
      <name>Provider Profiles</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative. Platform details change, so check current
documentation.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>GitHub Actions <xref target="GITHUB-OIDC"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com". The job needs the
"id-token: write" permission. The audience is chosen per request, for
example with "core.getIDToken(audience)". Match "repository_owner_id" and
"repository_id" rather than names, and constrain "ref" or "environment".</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Kubernetes <xref target="K8S-TOKENREQUEST"/>, including EKS and AKS:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The issuer is per cluster. Use the TokenRequest API, which takes the
audience per request. Projected token volumes fix the audience when the pod
starts, so their tokens can be used only in static audience mode
(<xref target="static-aud"/>). "sub" is
"system:serviceaccount:NAMESPACE:NAME". Match the service account UID where
available.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>SPIFFE:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The JWT-SVID API takes the audience per request <xref target="SPIFFE-ID"/>. "sub" is the
SPIFFE ID.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>GitLab CI/CD <xref target="GITLAB-OIDC"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The issuer is the GitLab instance URL. ID tokens are declared with
"id_tokens" in the pipeline definition and issued when the job starts, so
their audience cannot include a nonce. They can be used only in static
audience mode. A job gets one token per declared ID token, so it can place
only that many orders. Match "project_id" and "namespace_id" rather than
paths, and constrain "ref" and "ref_protected".</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>AWS <xref target="AWS-GWIT"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The STS "GetWebIdentityToken" action, on a regional endpoint, takes up to
ten audiences and a lifetime of 60 to 3600 seconds (default 300). "sub" is
the caller's IAM principal ARN. Caller-supplied tags <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be trusted by
policy.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Azure <xref target="AZURE-IMDS"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>AKS workload identity works as Kubernetes. Managed identity tokens, such as
those from the Instance Metadata Service, carry a pre-registered
application ID URI as their audience, which cannot vary per request. They
can be used only in static audience mode, with an application ID URI the
Subscriber registers for the CA. These tokens may lack "jti", so the server
keys replay detection on a hash of the token. The platform caches tokens
and may return the same one to repeated requests, which the server then
rejects as replayed, so a workload may be limited to about one order per
token lifetime.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Google Cloud:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Identity tokens from the metadata server take the audience per request.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="example">
      <name>Example</name>
      <t>Example Corp runs a private CA. Its GitHub Actions deployment job for
repository "example-corp/gateway" needs a certificate for
"gateway.internal.example.com". Example Corp configured this Policy Entry
once:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
require:
  repository_owner_id = 1234567
  repository_id = 89012345
  ref = refs/heads/main
permit: dns:gateway.internal.example.com
]]></artwork>
      <t>The job holds no credential for the CA. It:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>generates an account key and creates an account with no EAB, keeping the
Replay-Nonce from the response;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>computes the ABV from that nonce and its account key, and requests a
GitHub token with that audience;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>sends newOrder for "gateway.internal.example.com" with the token in
"wifToken", using that nonce; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>finalizes the order.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>The CA verifies the token against GitHub's keys, checks its lifetime,
recomputes the ABV from the request's nonce and key, and finds that
"repository_owner_id", "repository_id" and "ref" match the entry. The entry
permits the name, so the CA returns the order with its authorization already
valid, expiring with the token. The job finalizes immediately.</t>
      <t>A job from a fork, a different branch or another repository presents a valid
token whose claims do not match, and is refused with "wifPolicyDenied".</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-00">
      <name>Changes Since -00</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Replaced the "wif-01" challenge with a "wifToken" field in the newOrder
request. List feedback pointed out that a challenge on a "dns" or "ip"
authorization would act as an alternative proof of control, which a
platform token cannot provide. The token now supports pre-authorization by
CA policy, as EAB does, and the document says plainly that it is not proof
of control.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The audience binding now uses the request's nonce in place of the challenge
token.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A token authorizes only the order it was sent with.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added the "required" directory metadata field.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Removed the challenge object and the per-challenge "issuers" field.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added static audience mode, off by default and enabled by CA policy per
Policy Entry, for IdPs that cannot vary the audience, such as Azure managed
identities and GitLab CI/CD. Tokens in this mode are single use, and the
"wifTokenReplayed" error applies only to them.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Expanded the problem statement: why dns-01, http-01, dns-persist-01 and EAB
do not serve many enterprise workloads; certificates that name a workload;
and CLM systems acting as ACME servers.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Rewrote the whole document to be shorter and plainer.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>Thanks to Aaron Gable, Mike Ounsworth, Geng Feng, Seo Suchan, Mike Kushner and Sven Rajala
for their review of -00 on the ACME list. The authors of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-acme-openid-federation"/> advised keeping this work within ACME's
existing extension points.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="use-of-generative-ai">
      <name>Use of Generative AI</name>
      <t>Parts of this document were drafted with the
help of a large language model (Claude, from Anthropic). The author has
reviewed all of the text and is responsible for it.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
