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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof-02" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OAuth Subject-Proof Callers">OAuth 2.0 Subject-Proof Callers for Token Introspection and Revocation</title>

    <author fullname="Ilja Radusch">
      <organization>Fraunhofer FOKUS</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ilja.radusch@fokus.fraunhofer.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword> <keyword>token introspection</keyword> <keyword>token revocation</keyword> <keyword>delegation</keyword> <keyword>AI agents</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 58?>

<t>OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) and Token Revocation (RFC 7009)
recognize two kinds of caller: the client a token was issued to, and
(for introspection) a protected resource the authorization server chooses
to trust. Neither covers a common case: a client that acts for the end user
and wants to see, or end, a grant that the same user gave to a different
client, for example a user disconnecting one AI agent from inside a web
application. This document defines a third kind of caller, the
subject-proof caller. The caller presents a token that the authorization
server issued to that same caller for the same end user. If the proof is
valid and names the same subject as the target grant, the authorization
server discloses the grant's delegation metadata at the introspection
endpoint, or revokes exactly that one grant at the revocation endpoint.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ilja-radusch/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 73?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>A user often connects several clients to the same protected resource. In
agent deployments, a user signs in to a web application (client A) and also
authorizes one or more AI agents (clients B, C, ...) to call the same
resources on the user's behalf. The resulting access tokens carry an actor
claim (<xref target="RFC8693"/>, <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>) and are issued to the agents, not to
client A.</t>

<t>Users expect client A to show "your connected agents" and to offer a
"disconnect" button for each. That requires client A to:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>read metadata about another client's grant for this user (who acts, the
delegation correlation identifier, a user-chosen label), and</t>
  <t>ask the authorization server (AS) to revoke that one grant.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Existing mechanisms do not allow this:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><xref target="RFC7662"/> lets the AS vary its response by caller (<xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7662"/>) but names no caller of the form "acts for the token's subject"
and defines no way to prove it. Deployments either answer only the
token's own client, or trust every registered protected resource for all
users. The second option discloses every user's grants to the resource.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC7009"/> lets only the client the token was issued to revoke it.</t>
  <t>Grant Management <xref target="GRANT-MANAGEMENT"/> lets only the client that owns a
grant query or delete it.</t>
  <t>Global Token Revocation <xref target="GLOBAL-REVOCATION"/> is a privileged action that
revokes all of a subject's tokens. It is too broad for "disconnect this
one agent", and it authorizes the caller as an administrator, not as a
party acting for the user.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document defines the subject-proof caller. The caller proves that it
acts for the end user by presenting a token that the AS issued to the
caller for that user. The AS then treats the caller as entitled to the
user's own grants, and only to those.</t>

<t>The mechanism is not specific to AI agents. It applies to any case where
one client manages, for the user, grants that the user gave to other
clients (connected apps, devices, integrations).</t>

<section anchor="requirements-language"><name>Requirements Language</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>This document uses the terms "access token", "authorization server",
"client", "protected resource" and "resource owner" defined by
<xref target="RFC6749"/>, and "actor" as defined by <xref target="RFC8693"/>.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Subject-proof caller:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>An authenticated client that presents a subject proof token.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Subject proof token:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>An access token issued by this AS to the subject-proof caller, used as
evidence that the caller currently acts for the end user named in it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Target token:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The token being introspected.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Grant:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The set of access and refresh tokens that descend from one authorization
decision by the end user, including tokens obtained through refresh.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="verification"><name>Subject Proof Verification</name>

<t>A subject proof token is presented in the <spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> request
parameter. The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify it as follows and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat a failure of any
step as "no proof":</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>The caller <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have authenticated to the endpoint with client
credentials (<xref section="2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>). See <xref target="public-clients"/>.</t>
  <t>The subject proof token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an access token that this AS issued
and that is valid: for a JWT access token <xref target="RFC9068"/>, a valid signature,
<spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> equal to this AS's issuer identifier and an <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx> in the future.</t>
  <t>The subject proof token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have been issued to the authenticated
caller: its <spanx style="verb">client_id</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the caller's client identifier.</t>
  <t>The subject proof token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be revoked or replaced. The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
check its own token state, not only the signature, because a JWT
remains cryptographically valid after revocation.</t>
  <t>The subject proof token <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify a subject. The proven subject is
that subject, as the AS identifies the end user internally.</t>
  <t>The subject proof token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be a delegated token: it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
carry an <spanx style="verb">act</spanx> claim (<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>), and the AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
have issued it under a grant that delegates the user's authority to
an actor. See <xref target="delegated-proofs"/>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Step 3 is essential. Without it, any party that obtains a user's access
token for some other client could use it as a proof.</t>

<t>When an AS issues different <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> values for the same end user to
different clients or resources (pairwise or resource-specific
identifiers), the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare subjects using its internal user
identifier, not the <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> strings as issued.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="introspection"><name>Introspection</name>

<section anchor="request"><name>Request</name>

<t>A subject-proof caller adds the <spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> parameter to an
introspection request (<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7662"/>):</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic Y2xpZW50LWE6c2VjcmV0

token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...agent-token
&subject_proof_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...client-a-token
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="processing"><name>Processing</name>

<t>The AS processes the request as defined in <xref target="RFC7662"/>. In addition, if
the proof verifies (<xref target="verification"/>) and the proven subject is the same
end user as the subject of the target token, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the caller
as entitled to the full introspection response for the target token,
including delegation metadata such as <spanx style="verb">act</spanx> <xref target="RFC8693"/> and any
correlation identifiers or user-authored labels the AS holds for the
grant.</t>

<t>If the proof is absent, fails verification, or names a different subject,
the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond exactly as it would have without the parameter. It
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return an error that reveals whether the proof was valid or
whether the subjects matched.</t>

<t>A valid subject proof entitles the caller only to read. The AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
use it as an input to any authorization decision about the target token
itself, such as its scope or whether it is active.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="revocation"><name>Revocation</name>

<section anchor="request-1"><name>Request</name>

<t>A subject-proof caller sends a revocation request (<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7009"/>) with the <spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> parameter and exactly one grant
selector:</t>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">dlg_id</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The delegation correlation identifier of the grant, as issued in the
grant's tokens and returned by introspection. This is the preferred
selector.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">act_sub</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> of the actor (<xref target="RFC8693"/> <spanx style="verb">act</spanx> claim) of the grant. Selects
every grant of that actor for the proven subject. Use only when the grant
has no <spanx style="verb">dlg_id</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">token</spanx> parameter, <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> by <xref target="RFC7009"/>, is not used in a
subject-proof revocation request. An AS that supports this specification
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject such a request for lacking <spanx style="verb">token</spanx>.</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic Y2xpZW50LWE6c2VjcmV0

subject_proof_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...client-a-token
&dlg_id=Jx4sP0b5mQ9mZ0WbJm2T2w7m8V3X1R6Yk0fQe2H9a1c
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>If <spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> is absent, the request is an ordinary
<xref target="RFC7009"/> request.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="processing-1"><name>Processing</name>

<t>The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Verify the proof (<xref target="verification"/>).</t>
  <t>Select the grants owned by the proven subject that match the selector.
Ownership <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> come from the AS's own records, never from the request.
A selector that matches no grant of the proven subject selects nothing.</t>
  <t>Revoke every access and refresh token of each selected grant, as
<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7009"/> describes for refresh tokens.</t>
  <t>Leave all other grants of the subject untouched, including the grant
the subject proof token belongs to.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with HTTP status 200 in every case: an invalid proof,
an unknown selector, a selector owned by another user, or a successful
revocation. This keeps the endpoint from revealing which grants exist.</t>

<t>An AS that publishes security events <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> emit a session-revoked event
<xref target="CAEP"/> for each revoked grant, so that other receivers stop accepting its
tokens before they expire.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="revocation-effect"><name>Effect of Revocation</name>

<t>Revocation takes effect at the AS before the AS sends the response. From
that point the AS:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue a new access or refresh token for a selected grant,
including through a refresh request that was in progress when the
revocation was processed;</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return <spanx style="verb">"active": false</spanx> when a token of a selected grant is
introspected (<xref target="RFC7662"/>).</t>
</list></t>

<t>A protected resource that validates self-contained access tokens
(<xref target="RFC9068"/>) locally can still accept a token of a revoked grant until
the token expires, until the resource introspects it, or until it
processes the session-revoked event. Short access token lifetimes limit
this window.</t>

<t>The session-revoked event notifies receivers that the grant was revoked.
It is not a receipt that every effect of the grant has stopped. This
document adds no delivery or ordering guarantee beyond those of the
delivery method in use, for example the at-least-once delivery of
<xref target="RFC8936"/>. A receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> infer, from the event or from its
absence, that no operation admitted under the grant can still complete.</t>

<t>Operations that a protected resource or the agent admitted or queued
before the revocation, and credentials derived from the grant's tokens
(for example through token exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/>), are out of scope.
Closing them is a matter for the party that holds them;
<xref target="REVOCATION-CLOSURE"/> describes one model for proving such closure.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="metadata"><name>Authorization Server Metadata</name>

<t>This document defines the following AS metadata parameters <xref target="RFC8414"/>:</t>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">introspection_subject_proof_token_supported</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Boolean. <spanx style="verb">true</spanx> if the introspection endpoint processes the
<spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> parameter as defined in <xref target="introspection"/>. If
omitted, the default is <spanx style="verb">false</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">revocation_subject_proof_token_supported</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Boolean. <spanx style="verb">true</spanx> if the revocation endpoint processes the
<spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx> parameter as defined in <xref target="revocation"/>. If
omitted, the default is <spanx style="verb">false</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="public-clients"><name>Public Clients</name>

<t>A public client authenticates by its client identifier alone. For a
public client X, any leaked access token issued to X is also a valid
subject proof for X. The AS therefore <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a subject proof from
a caller that did not authenticate with a credential, unless a deployment
explicitly opts in for a specific client and accepts that risk.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-the-proof-shows"><name>What the Proof Shows</name>

<t>A valid proof shows that the caller currently holds a live token for the
end user. It does not show that the end user approved the specific
disclosure or revocation. The caller <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform these requests only on
the end user's instruction, for example after the user selects
"disconnect" in the caller's interface. Revocation through this mechanism
can only remove access, never add it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="scope-of-disclosure"><name>Scope of Disclosure</name>

<t>A subject-proof caller can read the delegation metadata of every grant of
the end user whose tokens it can obtain. Deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit the
metadata they return to what a user interface for managing connections
needs.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="proof-token-exposure"><name>Proof Token Exposure</name>

<t>The subject proof token is sent only to the AS that issued it, over TLS.
The AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> log its value. A sender-constrained subject proof token
(DPoP or mutual TLS) does not need to be presented with a proof of
possession at this endpoint, because the caller already authenticated as
the client the token was issued to.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="delegated-proofs"><name>Delegated Tokens Are Not Proofs</name>

<t>A subject proof stands for the end user acting through the caller. A
token that an AS issued to an actor, such as an AI agent, under a
delegated grant does not: the actor uses it without step-by-step
instruction from the user. If such a token were accepted, one delegated
actor could read the delegation metadata of the user's other grants, or
revoke the grants of other actors, using authority the user gave it for
a different purpose. Step 6 of <xref target="verification"/> therefore rejects
delegated tokens, whether the delegation is visible in the token (an
<spanx style="verb">act</spanx> claim) or only in the AS's records.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="correlation-identifiers-are-selectors-not-authorization"><name>Correlation Identifiers Are Selectors, Not Authorization</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">dlg_id</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">act_sub</spanx> only select which of the proven subject's grants to
revoke. Whether the caller may revoke is decided only by the proof. A
guessed or foreign selector selects nothing.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="privacy-considerations"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<t>The mechanism gives one client of the end user knowledge of the user's
other clients and grants. This is the purpose of the mechanism, but an AS
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> offer it only to clients that the deployment trusts to present
connection management to the user, for example through client
registration policy.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of
this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in
<xref target="RFC7942"/>.  The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in
progressing drafts to RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any
individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the
IETF.  Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the
information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a
catalog of available implementations or their features.  Readers
are advised to note that other implementations may exist.</t>

<t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"/>, "this will allow reviewers and working
groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the
benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented
protocols more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups
to use this information as they see fit".
<?line -20?></t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Organization: Fraunhofer FOKUS.</t>
  <t>Implementation: an OAuth 2.1 / OpenID Connect authorization server
(TypeScript, private repository), deployed in production for a document
signing application with AI agent access over MCP.</t>
  <t>Coverage: introspection (<xref target="introspection"/>) and revocation
(<xref target="revocation"/>) as described, including the public-client rule, the
internal-subject comparison and session-revoked events. Both are behind
configuration flags that are off by default. Both metadata parameters
(<xref target="metadata"/>) are published when the matching feature is enabled.
Session-revoked events are delivered by poll (<xref target="RFC8936"/>). Delegated
tokens are rejected as proofs (<xref target="delegated-proofs"/>). The rule in
<xref target="revocation-effect"/> for a refresh request in progress during the
revocation is being implemented.</t>
  <t>Level of maturity: production.</t>
  <t>Contact: Ilja Radusch.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="oauth-parameters-registration"><name>OAuth Parameters Registration</name>

<t>IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters"
registry:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Parameter Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Parameter Usage Location</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Change Controller</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c><spanx style="verb">subject_proof_token</spanx></c>
      <c>token introspection request, token revocation request</c>
      <c>IETF</c>
      <c><xref target="verification"/> of this document</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">dlg_id</spanx></c>
      <c>token revocation request</c>
      <c>IETF</c>
      <c><xref target="revocation"/> of this document</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">act_sub</spanx></c>
      <c>token revocation request</c>
      <c>IETF</c>
      <c><xref target="revocation"/> of this document</c>
</texttable>

</section>
<section anchor="oauth-authorization-server-metadata-registration"><name>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration</name>

<t>IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "OAuth
Authorization Server Metadata" registry:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Metadata Name: <spanx style="verb">introspection_subject_proof_token_supported</spanx></t>
  <t>Metadata Description: Whether the introspection endpoint supports
subject-proof callers</t>
  <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
  <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="metadata"/> of this document</t>
  <t>Metadata Name: <spanx style="verb">revocation_subject_proof_token_supported</spanx></t>
  <t>Metadata Description: Whether the revocation endpoint supports
subject-proof callers</t>
  <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
  <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="metadata"/> of this document</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC6749">
  <front>
    <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
    <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
    <date month="October" year="2012"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7009">
  <front>
    <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation</title>
    <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Lodderstedt"/>
    <author fullname="S. Dronia" initials="S." surname="Dronia"/>
    <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
    <date month="August" year="2013"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document proposes an additional endpoint for OAuth authorization servers, which allows clients to notify the authorization server that a previously obtained refresh or access token is no longer needed. This allows the authorization server to clean up security credentials. A revocation request will invalidate the actual token and, if applicable, other tokens based on the same authorization grant.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7009"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7009"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7662">
  <front>
    <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection</title>
    <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
    <date month="October" year="2015"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines a method for a protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to determine the active state of an OAuth 2.0 token and to determine meta-information about this token. OAuth 2.0 deployments can use this method to convey information about the authorization context of the token from the authorization server to the protected resource.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7662"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7662"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8414">
  <front>
    <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
    <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
    <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
    <date month="June" year="2018"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8693">
  <front>
    <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
    <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
    <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
    <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
    <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
    <date month="January" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9068">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens</title>
    <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
    <date month="October" year="2021"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9068"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9068"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>



    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">




<reference anchor="ACTOR-PROFILE">
   <front>
      <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
      <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
         <organization>Independent</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="8" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a common representation of delegated actors in
   OAuth JSON Web Token (JWT) assertion grants, JWT access tokens, and
   Transaction Tokens.  It profiles the act claim defined by OAuth 2.0
   Token Exchange, requires issuer-scoped actor identifiers, and uses
   the sub_profile claim to classify actor entity types.  It specifies
   token processing, delegation-chain propagation, sender-constraint
   handling, and discovery metadata, so that issuers and resource
   servers in different trust domains interpret delegated actors
   consistently.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="GLOBAL-REVOCATION">
   <front>
      <title>Global Token Revocation</title>
      <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
         <organization>Okta</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="24" month="February" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Global Token Revocation enables parties such as a security incident
   management tool or an external Identity Provider to send a request to
   an Authorization Server to indicate that it should revoke all of a
   user&#x27;s existing tokens and require that the user re-authenticates
   before issuing new tokens.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation-06"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="REVOCATION-CLOSURE">
   <front>
      <title>Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation</title>
      <author fullname="Deonté Watts" initials="D." surname="Watts">
         <organization>GoodShyt Group Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Automated agents can exercise OAuth-derived authority through
   delegated credentials, child agents, asynchronous work, and
   operations spanning multiple administrative domains.  Invalidating an
   individual token does not necessarily establish that the authority
   represented by that token can no longer cause a new consequential
   operation.

   This document defines authority epochs, delegation-lineage
   requirements, admission fencing, and revocation-closure states for
   OAuth-based agent delegation.  It distinguishes token invalidation
   from authority closure and specifies that unresolved in-scope state
   produces UNKNOWN or PARTIAL rather than CLOSED.  The profile composes
   with OAuth Token Revocation, Token Exchange, Token Introspection,
   proof-of-possession mechanisms, Transaction Tokens, and workload-
   identity systems such as WIMSE.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-04"/>
   
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8936">
  <front>
    <title>Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</title>
    <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
    <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
    <author fullname="M. Ansari" initials="M." surname="Ansari"/>
    <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
    <date month="November" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's need for assurance.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8936"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8936"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="GRANT-MANAGEMENT" target="https://openid.net/specs/fapi-grant-management.html">
  <front>
    <title>Grant Management for OAuth 2.0</title>
    <author initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt" fullname="T. Lodderstedt">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Low" fullname="S. Low">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="Postnikov" fullname="D. Postnikov">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2021"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="CAEP" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html">
  <front>
    <title>OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2025"/>
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>



    </references>

</references>


<?line 454?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="open-issues"><name>Open Issues</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>RFC 8693 already defines <spanx style="verb">subject_token</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">subject_token_type</spanx>.
Should this document reuse that pair? A separate name is used here
because the proof is restricted to an access token that this AS issued
to the caller, while an RFC 8693 subject token may be any token type,
including one from another issuer.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">dlg_id</spanx> is being defined in <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>. If it is not adopted
there, this document needs another way to name one grant, for example a
token of the grant in the <spanx style="verb">token</spanx> parameter.</t>
  <t>Should the revocation endpoint return a distinct error for a caller that
is not allowed to use subject proofs at all, as opposed to an invalid
proof?</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>The problem was first raised on the issue tracker of
<xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>, as part of the discussion of where user-authored
metadata about a delegated connection should live.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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