| Internet-Draft | OAuth Subject-Proof Callers | November 2026 |
| Radusch | Expires 21 May 2027 | [Page] |
OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) and Token Revocation (RFC 7009) recognize two kinds of caller: the client a token was issued to, and (for introspection) a protected resource the authorization server chooses to trust. Neither covers a common case: a client that acts for the end user and wants to see, or end, a grant that the same user gave to a different client, for example a user disconnecting one AI agent from inside a web application. This document defines a third kind of caller, the subject-proof caller. The caller presents a token that the authorization server issued to that same caller for the same end user. If the proof is valid and names the same subject as the target grant, the authorization server discloses the grant's delegation metadata at the introspection endpoint, or revokes exactly that one grant at the revocation endpoint.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ilja-radusch/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof.¶
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A user often connects several clients to the same protected resource. In agent deployments, a user signs in to a web application (client A) and also authorizes one or more AI agents (clients B, C, ...) to call the same resources on the user's behalf. The resulting access tokens carry an actor claim ([RFC8693], [ACTOR-PROFILE]) and are issued to the agents, not to client A.¶
Users expect client A to show "your connected agents" and to offer a "disconnect" button for each. That requires client A to:¶
read metadata about another client's grant for this user (who acts, the delegation correlation identifier, a user-chosen label), and¶
ask the authorization server (AS) to revoke that one grant.¶
Existing mechanisms do not allow this:¶
[RFC7662] lets the AS vary its response by caller (Section 2.2 of [RFC7662]) but names no caller of the form "acts for the token's subject" and defines no way to prove it. Deployments either answer only the token's own client, or trust every registered protected resource for all users. The second option discloses every user's grants to the resource.¶
[RFC7009] lets only the client the token was issued to revoke it.¶
Grant Management [GRANT-MANAGEMENT] lets only the client that owns a grant query or delete it.¶
Global Token Revocation [GLOBAL-REVOCATION] is a privileged action that revokes all of a subject's tokens. It is too broad for "disconnect this one agent", and it authorizes the caller as an administrator, not as a party acting for the user.¶
This document defines the subject-proof caller. The caller proves that it acts for the end user by presenting a token that the AS issued to the caller for that user. The AS then treats the caller as entitled to the user's own grants, and only to those.¶
The mechanism is not specific to AI agents. It applies to any case where one client manages, for the user, grants that the user gave to other clients (connected apps, devices, integrations).¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms "access token", "authorization server", "client", "protected resource" and "resource owner" defined by [RFC6749], and "actor" as defined by [RFC8693].¶
An authenticated client that presents a subject proof token.¶
An access token issued by this AS to the subject-proof caller, used as evidence that the caller currently acts for the end user named in it.¶
The token being introspected.¶
The set of access and refresh tokens that descend from one authorization decision by the end user, including tokens obtained through refresh.¶
A subject proof token is presented in the subject_proof_token request
parameter. The AS MUST verify it as follows and MUST treat a failure of any
step as "no proof":¶
The caller MUST have authenticated to the endpoint with client credentials (Section 2.3 of [RFC6749]). See Section 6.1.¶
The subject proof token MUST be an access token that this AS issued
and that is valid: for a JWT access token [RFC9068], a valid signature,
iss equal to this AS's issuer identifier and an exp in the future.¶
The subject proof token MUST have been issued to the authenticated
caller: its client_id MUST equal the caller's client identifier.¶
The subject proof token MUST NOT be revoked or replaced. The AS MUST check its own token state, not only the signature, because a JWT remains cryptographically valid after revocation.¶
The subject proof token MUST identify a subject. The proven subject is that subject, as the AS identifies the end user internally.¶
The subject proof token MUST NOT be a delegated token: it MUST NOT
carry an act claim (Section 4.1 of [RFC8693]), and the AS MUST NOT
have issued it under a grant that delegates the user's authority to
an actor. See Section 6.5.¶
Step 3 is essential. Without it, any party that obtains a user's access token for some other client could use it as a proof.¶
When an AS issues different sub values for the same end user to
different clients or resources (pairwise or resource-specific
identifiers), the AS MUST compare subjects using its internal user
identifier, not the sub strings as issued.¶
A subject-proof caller adds the subject_proof_token parameter to an
introspection request (Section 2.1 of [RFC7662]):¶
The AS processes the request as defined in [RFC7662]. In addition, if
the proof verifies (Section 2) and the proven subject is the same
end user as the subject of the target token, the AS MUST treat the caller
as entitled to the full introspection response for the target token,
including delegation metadata such as act [RFC8693] and any
correlation identifiers or user-authored labels the AS holds for the
grant.¶
If the proof is absent, fails verification, or names a different subject, the AS MUST respond exactly as it would have without the parameter. It MUST NOT return an error that reveals whether the proof was valid or whether the subjects matched.¶
A valid subject proof entitles the caller only to read. The AS MUST NOT use it as an input to any authorization decision about the target token itself, such as its scope or whether it is active.¶
A subject-proof caller sends a revocation request (Section 2.1 of [RFC7009]) with the subject_proof_token parameter and exactly one grant
selector:¶
dlg_id:The delegation correlation identifier of the grant, as issued in the grant's tokens and returned by introspection. This is the preferred selector.¶
act_sub:The sub of the actor ([RFC8693] act claim) of the grant. Selects
every grant of that actor for the proven subject. Use only when the grant
has no dlg_id.¶
The token parameter, REQUIRED by [RFC7009], is not used in a
subject-proof revocation request. An AS that supports this specification
MUST NOT reject such a request for lacking token.¶
If subject_proof_token is absent, the request is an ordinary
[RFC7009] request.¶
The AS MUST:¶
Select the grants owned by the proven subject that match the selector. Ownership MUST come from the AS's own records, never from the request. A selector that matches no grant of the proven subject selects nothing.¶
Revoke every access and refresh token of each selected grant, as Section 2.1 of [RFC7009] describes for refresh tokens.¶
Leave all other grants of the subject untouched, including the grant the subject proof token belongs to.¶
The AS MUST respond with HTTP status 200 in every case: an invalid proof, an unknown selector, a selector owned by another user, or a successful revocation. This keeps the endpoint from revealing which grants exist.¶
An AS that publishes security events SHOULD emit a session-revoked event [CAEP] for each revoked grant, so that other receivers stop accepting its tokens before they expire.¶
Revocation takes effect at the AS before the AS sends the response. From that point the AS:¶
MUST NOT issue a new access or refresh token for a selected grant, including through a refresh request that was in progress when the revocation was processed;¶
MUST return "active": false when a token of a selected grant is
introspected ([RFC7662]).¶
A protected resource that validates self-contained access tokens ([RFC9068]) locally can still accept a token of a revoked grant until the token expires, until the resource introspects it, or until it processes the session-revoked event. Short access token lifetimes limit this window.¶
The session-revoked event notifies receivers that the grant was revoked. It is not a receipt that every effect of the grant has stopped. This document adds no delivery or ordering guarantee beyond those of the delivery method in use, for example the at-least-once delivery of [RFC8936]. A receiver MUST NOT infer, from the event or from its absence, that no operation admitted under the grant can still complete.¶
Operations that a protected resource or the agent admitted or queued before the revocation, and credentials derived from the grant's tokens (for example through token exchange [RFC8693]), are out of scope. Closing them is a matter for the party that holds them; [REVOCATION-CLOSURE] describes one model for proving such closure.¶
This document defines the following AS metadata parameters [RFC8414]:¶
introspection_subject_proof_token_supported:OPTIONAL. Boolean. true if the introspection endpoint processes the
subject_proof_token parameter as defined in Section 3. If
omitted, the default is false.¶
revocation_subject_proof_token_supported:OPTIONAL. Boolean. true if the revocation endpoint processes the
subject_proof_token parameter as defined in Section 4. If
omitted, the default is false.¶
A public client authenticates by its client identifier alone. For a public client X, any leaked access token issued to X is also a valid subject proof for X. The AS therefore MUST NOT accept a subject proof from a caller that did not authenticate with a credential, unless a deployment explicitly opts in for a specific client and accepts that risk.¶
A valid proof shows that the caller currently holds a live token for the end user. It does not show that the end user approved the specific disclosure or revocation. The caller MUST perform these requests only on the end user's instruction, for example after the user selects "disconnect" in the caller's interface. Revocation through this mechanism can only remove access, never add it.¶
A subject-proof caller can read the delegation metadata of every grant of the end user whose tokens it can obtain. Deployments SHOULD limit the metadata they return to what a user interface for managing connections needs.¶
The subject proof token is sent only to the AS that issued it, over TLS. The AS MUST NOT log its value. A sender-constrained subject proof token (DPoP or mutual TLS) does not need to be presented with a proof of possession at this endpoint, because the caller already authenticated as the client the token was issued to.¶
A subject proof stands for the end user acting through the caller. A
token that an AS issued to an actor, such as an AI agent, under a
delegated grant does not: the actor uses it without step-by-step
instruction from the user. If such a token were accepted, one delegated
actor could read the delegation metadata of the user's other grants, or
revoke the grants of other actors, using authority the user gave it for
a different purpose. Step 6 of Section 2 therefore rejects
delegated tokens, whether the delegation is visible in the token (an
act claim) or only in the AS's records.¶
The mechanism gives one client of the end user knowledge of the user's other clients and grants. This is the purpose of the mechanism, but an AS SHOULD offer it only to clients that the deployment trusts to present connection management to the user, for example through client registration policy.¶
This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.¶
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".¶
Organization: Fraunhofer FOKUS.¶
Implementation: an OAuth 2.1 / OpenID Connect authorization server (TypeScript, private repository), deployed in production for a document signing application with AI agent access over MCP.¶
Coverage: introspection (Section 3) and revocation (Section 4) as described, including the public-client rule, the internal-subject comparison and session-revoked events. Both are behind configuration flags that are off by default. Both metadata parameters (Section 5) are published when the matching feature is enabled. Session-revoked events are delivered by poll ([RFC8936]). Delegated tokens are rejected as proofs (Section 6.5). The rule in Section 4.3 for a refresh request in progress during the revocation is being implemented.¶
Level of maturity: production.¶
Contact: Ilja Radusch.¶
IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters" registry:¶
| Parameter Name | Parameter Usage Location | Change Controller | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
subject_proof_token
|
token introspection request, token revocation request | IETF | Section 2 of this document |
dlg_id
|
token revocation request | IETF | Section 4 of this document |
act_sub
|
token revocation request | IETF | Section 4 of this document |
RFC 8693 already defines subject_token and subject_token_type.
Should this document reuse that pair? A separate name is used here
because the proof is restricted to an access token that this AS issued
to the caller, while an RFC 8693 subject token may be any token type,
including one from another issuer.¶
dlg_id is being defined in [ACTOR-PROFILE]. If it is not adopted
there, this document needs another way to name one grant, for example a
token of the grant in the token parameter.¶
Should the revocation endpoint return a distinct error for a caller that is not allowed to use subject proofs at all, as opposed to an invalid proof?¶
The problem was first raised on the issue tracker of [ACTOR-PROFILE], as part of the discussion of where user-authored metadata about a delegated connection should live.¶