Internet-Draft OAuth Subject-Proof Callers November 2026
Radusch Expires 21 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
I. Radusch
Fraunhofer FOKUS

OAuth 2.0 Subject-Proof Callers for Token Introspection and Revocation

Abstract

OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) and Token Revocation (RFC 7009) recognize two kinds of caller: the client a token was issued to, and (for introspection) a protected resource the authorization server chooses to trust. Neither covers a common case: a client that acts for the end user and wants to see, or end, a grant that the same user gave to a different client, for example a user disconnecting one AI agent from inside a web application. This document defines a third kind of caller, the subject-proof caller. The caller presents a token that the authorization server issued to that same caller for the same end user. If the proof is valid and names the same subject as the target grant, the authorization server discloses the grant's delegation metadata at the introspection endpoint, or revokes exactly that one grant at the revocation endpoint.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ilja-radusch/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

A user often connects several clients to the same protected resource. In agent deployments, a user signs in to a web application (client A) and also authorizes one or more AI agents (clients B, C, ...) to call the same resources on the user's behalf. The resulting access tokens carry an actor claim ([RFC8693], [ACTOR-PROFILE]) and are issued to the agents, not to client A.

Users expect client A to show "your connected agents" and to offer a "disconnect" button for each. That requires client A to:

  1. read metadata about another client's grant for this user (who acts, the delegation correlation identifier, a user-chosen label), and

  2. ask the authorization server (AS) to revoke that one grant.

Existing mechanisms do not allow this:

This document defines the subject-proof caller. The caller proves that it acts for the end user by presenting a token that the AS issued to the caller for that user. The AS then treats the caller as entitled to the user's own grants, and only to those.

The mechanism is not specific to AI agents. It applies to any case where one client manages, for the user, grants that the user gave to other clients (connected apps, devices, integrations).

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

This document uses the terms "access token", "authorization server", "client", "protected resource" and "resource owner" defined by [RFC6749], and "actor" as defined by [RFC8693].

Subject-proof caller:

An authenticated client that presents a subject proof token.

Subject proof token:

An access token issued by this AS to the subject-proof caller, used as evidence that the caller currently acts for the end user named in it.

Target token:

The token being introspected.

Grant:

The set of access and refresh tokens that descend from one authorization decision by the end user, including tokens obtained through refresh.

2. Subject Proof Verification

A subject proof token is presented in the subject_proof_token request parameter. The AS MUST verify it as follows and MUST treat a failure of any step as "no proof":

  1. The caller MUST have authenticated to the endpoint with client credentials (Section 2.3 of [RFC6749]). See Section 6.1.

  2. The subject proof token MUST be an access token that this AS issued and that is valid: for a JWT access token [RFC9068], a valid signature, iss equal to this AS's issuer identifier and an exp in the future.

  3. The subject proof token MUST have been issued to the authenticated caller: its client_id MUST equal the caller's client identifier.

  4. The subject proof token MUST NOT be revoked or replaced. The AS MUST check its own token state, not only the signature, because a JWT remains cryptographically valid after revocation.

  5. The subject proof token MUST identify a subject. The proven subject is that subject, as the AS identifies the end user internally.

  6. The subject proof token MUST NOT be a delegated token: it MUST NOT carry an act claim (Section 4.1 of [RFC8693]), and the AS MUST NOT have issued it under a grant that delegates the user's authority to an actor. See Section 6.5.

Step 3 is essential. Without it, any party that obtains a user's access token for some other client could use it as a proof.

When an AS issues different sub values for the same end user to different clients or resources (pairwise or resource-specific identifiers), the AS MUST compare subjects using its internal user identifier, not the sub strings as issued.

3. Introspection

3.1. Request

A subject-proof caller adds the subject_proof_token parameter to an introspection request (Section 2.1 of [RFC7662]):

POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic Y2xpZW50LWE6c2VjcmV0

token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...agent-token
&subject_proof_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...client-a-token

3.2. Processing

The AS processes the request as defined in [RFC7662]. In addition, if the proof verifies (Section 2) and the proven subject is the same end user as the subject of the target token, the AS MUST treat the caller as entitled to the full introspection response for the target token, including delegation metadata such as act [RFC8693] and any correlation identifiers or user-authored labels the AS holds for the grant.

If the proof is absent, fails verification, or names a different subject, the AS MUST respond exactly as it would have without the parameter. It MUST NOT return an error that reveals whether the proof was valid or whether the subjects matched.

A valid subject proof entitles the caller only to read. The AS MUST NOT use it as an input to any authorization decision about the target token itself, such as its scope or whether it is active.

4. Revocation

4.1. Request

A subject-proof caller sends a revocation request (Section 2.1 of [RFC7009]) with the subject_proof_token parameter and exactly one grant selector:

dlg_id:

The delegation correlation identifier of the grant, as issued in the grant's tokens and returned by introspection. This is the preferred selector.

act_sub:

The sub of the actor ([RFC8693] act claim) of the grant. Selects every grant of that actor for the proven subject. Use only when the grant has no dlg_id.

The token parameter, REQUIRED by [RFC7009], is not used in a subject-proof revocation request. An AS that supports this specification MUST NOT reject such a request for lacking token.

POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic Y2xpZW50LWE6c2VjcmV0

subject_proof_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...client-a-token
&dlg_id=Jx4sP0b5mQ9mZ0WbJm2T2w7m8V3X1R6Yk0fQe2H9a1c

If subject_proof_token is absent, the request is an ordinary [RFC7009] request.

4.2. Processing

The AS MUST:

  1. Verify the proof (Section 2).

  2. Select the grants owned by the proven subject that match the selector. Ownership MUST come from the AS's own records, never from the request. A selector that matches no grant of the proven subject selects nothing.

  3. Revoke every access and refresh token of each selected grant, as Section 2.1 of [RFC7009] describes for refresh tokens.

  4. Leave all other grants of the subject untouched, including the grant the subject proof token belongs to.

The AS MUST respond with HTTP status 200 in every case: an invalid proof, an unknown selector, a selector owned by another user, or a successful revocation. This keeps the endpoint from revealing which grants exist.

An AS that publishes security events SHOULD emit a session-revoked event [CAEP] for each revoked grant, so that other receivers stop accepting its tokens before they expire.

4.3. Effect of Revocation

Revocation takes effect at the AS before the AS sends the response. From that point the AS:

  • MUST NOT issue a new access or refresh token for a selected grant, including through a refresh request that was in progress when the revocation was processed;

  • MUST return "active": false when a token of a selected grant is introspected ([RFC7662]).

A protected resource that validates self-contained access tokens ([RFC9068]) locally can still accept a token of a revoked grant until the token expires, until the resource introspects it, or until it processes the session-revoked event. Short access token lifetimes limit this window.

The session-revoked event notifies receivers that the grant was revoked. It is not a receipt that every effect of the grant has stopped. This document adds no delivery or ordering guarantee beyond those of the delivery method in use, for example the at-least-once delivery of [RFC8936]. A receiver MUST NOT infer, from the event or from its absence, that no operation admitted under the grant can still complete.

Operations that a protected resource or the agent admitted or queued before the revocation, and credentials derived from the grant's tokens (for example through token exchange [RFC8693]), are out of scope. Closing them is a matter for the party that holds them; [REVOCATION-CLOSURE] describes one model for proving such closure.

5. Authorization Server Metadata

This document defines the following AS metadata parameters [RFC8414]:

introspection_subject_proof_token_supported:

OPTIONAL. Boolean. true if the introspection endpoint processes the subject_proof_token parameter as defined in Section 3. If omitted, the default is false.

revocation_subject_proof_token_supported:

OPTIONAL. Boolean. true if the revocation endpoint processes the subject_proof_token parameter as defined in Section 4. If omitted, the default is false.

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Public Clients

A public client authenticates by its client identifier alone. For a public client X, any leaked access token issued to X is also a valid subject proof for X. The AS therefore MUST NOT accept a subject proof from a caller that did not authenticate with a credential, unless a deployment explicitly opts in for a specific client and accepts that risk.

6.2. What the Proof Shows

A valid proof shows that the caller currently holds a live token for the end user. It does not show that the end user approved the specific disclosure or revocation. The caller MUST perform these requests only on the end user's instruction, for example after the user selects "disconnect" in the caller's interface. Revocation through this mechanism can only remove access, never add it.

6.3. Scope of Disclosure

A subject-proof caller can read the delegation metadata of every grant of the end user whose tokens it can obtain. Deployments SHOULD limit the metadata they return to what a user interface for managing connections needs.

6.4. Proof Token Exposure

The subject proof token is sent only to the AS that issued it, over TLS. The AS MUST NOT log its value. A sender-constrained subject proof token (DPoP or mutual TLS) does not need to be presented with a proof of possession at this endpoint, because the caller already authenticated as the client the token was issued to.

6.5. Delegated Tokens Are Not Proofs

A subject proof stands for the end user acting through the caller. A token that an AS issued to an actor, such as an AI agent, under a delegated grant does not: the actor uses it without step-by-step instruction from the user. If such a token were accepted, one delegated actor could read the delegation metadata of the user's other grants, or revoke the grants of other actors, using authority the user gave it for a different purpose. Step 6 of Section 2 therefore rejects delegated tokens, whether the delegation is visible in the token (an act claim) or only in the AS's records.

6.6. Correlation Identifiers Are Selectors, Not Authorization

dlg_id and act_sub only select which of the proven subject's grants to revoke. Whether the caller may revoke is decided only by the proof. A guessed or foreign selector selects nothing.

7. Privacy Considerations

The mechanism gives one client of the end user knowledge of the user's other clients and grants. This is the purpose of the mechanism, but an AS SHOULD offer it only to clients that the deployment trusts to present connection management to the user, for example through client registration policy.

8. Implementation Status

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. OAuth Parameters Registration

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "OAuth Parameters" registry:

Table 1
Parameter Name Parameter Usage Location Change Controller Reference
subject_proof_token token introspection request, token revocation request IETF Section 2 of this document
dlg_id token revocation request IETF Section 4 of this document
act_sub token revocation request IETF Section 4 of this document

9.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry:

  • Metadata Name: introspection_subject_proof_token_supported

  • Metadata Description: Whether the introspection endpoint supports subject-proof callers

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 5 of this document

  • Metadata Name: revocation_subject_proof_token_supported

  • Metadata Description: Whether the revocation endpoint supports subject-proof callers

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): Section 5 of this document

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC7009]
Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009>.
[RFC7662]
Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414]
Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC9068]
Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.

10.2. Informative References

[ACTOR-PROFILE]
McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01>.
[CAEP]
"OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html>.
[GLOBAL-REVOCATION]
Parecki, A., "Global Token Revocation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation-06, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-parecki-oauth-global-token-revocation-06>.
[GRANT-MANAGEMENT]
Lodderstedt, T., Low, S., and D. Postnikov, "Grant Management for OAuth 2.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/fapi-grant-management.html>.
[REVOCATION-CLOSURE]
Watts, D., "Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-04>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8936]
Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8936, DOI 10.17487/RFC8936, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8936>.

Open Issues

Acknowledgments

The problem was first raised on the issue tracker of [ACTOR-PROFILE], as part of the discussion of where user-authored metadata about a delegated connection should live.

Author's Address

Ilja Radusch
Fraunhofer FOKUS