<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
  <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.0.2) -->


<!DOCTYPE rfc  [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">

]>

<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="yes"?>

<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-openhttpa-protocol-02" category="exp" submissionType="independent" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OpenHTTPA">OpenHTTPA: Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation</title>

    <author initials="G." surname="King" fullname="Gordon King">
      <organization>OpenHTTPA Foundation</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United States</country>
        </postal>
        <email>gordon@openhttpa.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Wang" fullname="Hans Wang">
      <organization>OpenHTTPA Foundation</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United States</country>
        </postal>
        <email>hans@openhttpa.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    
    
    <keyword>http</keyword> <keyword>attestation</keyword> <keyword>tee</keyword> <keyword>post-quantum</keyword> <keyword>pqc</keyword> <keyword>sigma-i</keyword> <keyword>eat</keyword>

    <abstract>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> (Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation) defines a protocol for establishing
hardware-verified, end-to-end confidential and authenticated communication between a client
and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) over standard HTTP/2, HTTP/3, and gRPC transports.
Unlike traditional TLS which terminates at the network edge, <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> ensures that the
cryptographic session terminates inside the hardware-isolated enclave.
The protocol is based on the SIGMA-I model and incorporates post-quantum hybrid key exchange (ML-KEM), post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA), transcript-bound hardware attestation, and semantic binding of HTTP requests to the hardware-verified session state.
The handshake, its transcript, the hardware binding digest and the identity signatures are cloud- and hypervisor-agnostic; how evidence carries the binding is defined by pluggable Attestation Profiles, both for TEEs that expose the CPU's attestation interface directly and for TEEs mediated by an attested paravisor and vTPM.
This document supersedes draft-openhttpa-protocol-01.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>Modern web architectures rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS) <xref target="RFC9846"/> for data-in-transit
protection. However, TLS termination often occurs at the network edge (e.g., Load Balancers,
CDNs, or WAFs), leaving data exposed within internal cloud networks and vulnerable to
privileged insiders or compromised host software.</t>

<t>Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX/TDX <xref target="INTEL-TDX"/>, AMD SEV-SNP <xref target="AMD-SEV"/>, and Arm TrustZone,
provide hardware-level isolation. While TEEs can generate cryptographic "quotes" to prove
their identity and integrity, there is no standardized Application Layer (L7) protocol to
seamlessly bind these hardware proofs to HTTP sessions.</t>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> addresses this gap by providing an end-to-end trusted communication protocol. Building upon the foundational concepts of the earlier HTTPA/2 specification (see <xref target="I-D.sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2"/>), <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> introduces:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Enclave-to-Enclave Security</strong>: Cryptographic termination inside the TEE.</li>
  <li><strong>Mutual Attestation</strong>: Integration of TEE hardware quotes into the handshake via the
SIGMA-I model.</li>
  <li><strong>PQC Exclusivity</strong>: Enforced Post-Quantum Cryptography for identity and signatures using
ML-DSA <xref target="FIPS-204"/>, completely eliminating classical ECDSA/RSA dependencies for network identity. (Note: Hardware attestation quotes still rely on classical silicon roots of trust, such as TEE-ECDSA, depending on the hardware vendor). Key exchange utilizes a hybrid combiner of classical X25519 with ML-KEM <xref target="FIPS-203"/>.</li>
  <li><strong>Policy-as-Code (PaC)</strong>: Dynamic admission control during the Attestation Handshake (AtHS) powered by Open Policy Agent (OPA/Rego) to enforce context-aware rules on hardware provenance and claims.</li>
  <li><strong>Semantic Intent Binding</strong>: The Attested Header List (AHL) mechanism, which binds HTTP
semantic context (Method, Path, Query) to the hardware-verified session.</li>
  <li><strong>0-RTT Confidentiality</strong>: Sub-millisecond session resumption for latency-critical agentic and oracle workflows.</li></ol>

<section anchor="document-status-and-review"><name>Document Status and Review</name>

<t>This document is submitted to the Independent Submission Stream for publication as an
Experimental RFC. It is not the product of any IETF working group and has no IETF consensus.
Review is nonetheless welcome from the following communities:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>HTTPBIS</strong>: For extensions to the HTTP protocol, including the <tt>ATTEST</tt> method and SFV headers.</li>
  <li><strong>TEE</strong>: For the use of hardware attestation reports and Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT) <xref target="RFC9334"/>.</li>
  <li><strong>SECDISPATCH</strong>: For architectural review of the hybrid security model.</li></ul>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="design-goals"><name>Design Goals</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> is designed with the following core architectural goals:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Transport Independence</strong>: The protocol MUST be capable of operating over HTTP/2,
HTTP/3, and gRPC without modification to the underlying transport framing.</li>
  <li><strong>Cryptographic Agility</strong>: The hybrid KEM and AEAD selections MUST be negotiable to
allow for the adoption of future post-quantum algorithms.</li>
  <li><strong>Auditability</strong>: The handshake transcript MUST be deterministic and auditable to
allow for formal verification of security properties.</li>
  <li><strong>Hardware Heterogeneity</strong>: The protocol SHOULD support the simultaneous attestation
of multiple hardware providers (e.g., CPU + Accelerator) in a single unified session.</li>
  <li><strong>Formal Verifiability</strong>: The protocol state machine and cryptographic binding MUST be
amenable to machine-checked formal verification (e.g., ProVerif) to guarantee injective authentication and perfect forward secrecy.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-terminology"><name>Conventions and Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted
as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
as shown here.</t>

<t>The following terms are used throughout this document:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)</strong>: A secure area of a main processor that guarantees
confidentiality and integrity of code and data.</li>
  <li><strong>Attestation Quote</strong>: A hardware-signed report proving the state and identity of a TEE.</li>
  <li><strong>AtHS (Attestation Handshake)</strong>: The initial protocol phase to establish a session, based
on the SIGMA-I model.</li>
  <li><strong>TrR (Trusted Request)</strong>: An encrypted HTTP request sent over an established AtHS session.</li>
  <li><strong>AHL (Attested Header List)</strong>: A canonical representation of the request headers used for
semantic binding.</li>
  <li><strong>Hybrid KEM</strong>: A Key Encapsulation Mechanism that combines a classical and a
post-quantum primitive to achieve IND-CCA2 security.</li>
  <li><strong>Binding Digest (<tt>D</tt>)</strong>: The 64-octet value that ties hardware evidence to one session and one
identity key (<xref target="binding-digest"/>).</li>
  <li><strong>Attestation Profile</strong>: The rules by which a class of TEE carries <tt>D</tt> and proves its workload
(<xref target="attestation-profiles"/>).</li>
  <li><strong>Paravisor</strong>: Attested firmware that runs inside the TEE below the guest OS and mediates its
access to the hardware (for example OpenHCL on Azure).</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="protocol-overview"><name>Protocol Overview</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> operates in several distinct phases, integrated into the standard HTTP request-response
lifecycle.</t>

<section anchor="phase-1-preflight-capability-negotiation"><name>Phase 1: Preflight (Capability Negotiation)</name>

<t>A client MAY initiate a preflight request using the <tt>OPTIONS</tt> method to discover <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt>
support and available hardware providers.</t>

<t><tt>http
OPTIONS /api/resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Attest-Versions: openhttpa
</tt></t>

<t>The server responds with supported versions and hardware types using Structured Field Values
<xref target="RFC9651"/>.</t>

<t><tt>http
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Attest-Versions: openhttpa
Attest-TEE-Types: intel_tdx, nvidia_gpu
</tt></t>

</section>
<section anchor="phase-2-attestation-handshake-aths"><name>Phase 2: Attestation Handshake (AtHS)</name>

<t>The AtHS establishes a secure session between the client and the TEE. It uses the <tt>ATTEST</tt>
method (or a fallback <tt>POST</tt> with specific headers).</t>

<section anchor="aths-request"><name>AtHS Request</name>

<t>The client sends its preferred cipher suites, versions, nonces, and public key shares.</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>Attest-Versions</tt>: Supported versions. (Omitted if <tt>Attest-Encrypted-Hello</tt> is used).</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Cipher-Suites</tt>: Preferred hybrid suites (e.g., <tt>X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt>). (Omitted if <tt>Attest-Encrypted-Hello</tt> is used).</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Random</tt>: 32-byte client nonce.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Key-Shares</tt>: Structured list of ECDHE and ML-KEM public keys.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Encrypted-Hello</tt>: (Optional) ML-KEM HPKE-encapsulated metadata shielding cipher suites, protocol versions, and routing identifiers from network observers to provide cover-traffic metadata protection.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Policies</tt>: (Optional) A list of PaC (Policy-as-Code) constraints evaluated dynamically via Open Policy Agent (OPA) against the server's hardware provenance.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="aths-response"><name>AtHS Response</name>

<t>The server responds with the selected parameters and its own attestation evidence.</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>Attest-Version</tt>: Negotiated version.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Cipher-Suite</tt>: Negotiated suite.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Random</tt>: 32-byte server nonce.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Quotes</tt>: One or more TEE attestation quotes.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Server-Signatures</tt>: The server's ML-DSA-65 signature over the transcript (<xref target="identity-signatures"/>), optionally followed by hardware-backed signatures.</li>
  <li><tt>Attest-Base-ID</tt>: Unique session identifier (UUID).</li></ul>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="handshake-flow-visualization"><name>Handshake Flow Visualization</name>

<t>The following diagram illustrates the AtHS SIGMA-I handshake:</t>

<t>```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant Client
    participant Server</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
Client->>Server: ATTEST (Random_C, KeyShare_C, Suites, Versions)
Note over Server: Negotiate, KEM Encap, Bind Transcript
Server->>Client: 200 OK (Random_S, KeyShare_S, Atb-ID, Quotes)
Note over Client: Verify Quote, KEM Decap, Derive Keys
Note over Server: Derive Keys ```
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="normative-core-transcript-binding-digest-and-identity-signatures"><name>Normative Core: Transcript, Binding Digest and Identity Signatures</name>

<t>This section is independent of cloud provider, hypervisor and paravisor. Every Attestation Profile
(<xref target="attestation-profiles"/>) uses it unchanged; a profile only defines how the binding digest <tt>D</tt>
reaches the hardware and which evidence proves the workload. In this section <tt>||</tt> denotes
concatenation, all integers are big-endian, and <tt>lp(x) = u64(len(x)) || x</tt>.</t>

<section anchor="transcript-hash"><name>Transcript Hash</name>

<t>The transcript hash <tt>T</tt> (48 octets) commits to both sides' nonces and ephemeral key shares and to
the negotiated parameters:</t>

<t><tt>text
T = SHA-384( lp(client_random)            ; Attest-Random of the request, 32 octets
          || lp(challenge)                ; Attest-Challenge, zero-padded or truncated to 48 octets
                                          ;   (48 zero octets when absent)
          || lp(client_x25519_public)     ; 32 octets
          || lp(client_mlkem_public)      ; ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key, 1184 octets
          || lp(server_random)            ; first 32 octets of the response Attest-Random
          || lp(server_x25519_public)     ; 32 octets
          || lp(mlkem_ciphertext)         ; 1088 octets
          || lp(server_mlkem_public)      ; 1184 octets
          || u16(cipher_suite_id)
          || u8(version_id) )
</tt></t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Cipher suite</th>
          <th align="left">cipher_suite_id</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x0001</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>P384_ML_KEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x0002</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>X25519_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x0101</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>P256_AES256GCM_SHA256</tt> (deprecated)</td>
          <td><tt>0x0102</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x0103</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Version</th>
          <th align="left">version_id</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>httpa/1</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x01</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>openhttpa</tt></td>
          <td><tt>0x02</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>Field sizes above are those of <tt>X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt>; the length prefixes make the
construction unambiguous for every suite.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="handshake-binding-value"><name>Handshake Binding Value</name>

<t><tt>text
R = SHA-512("openhttpa hs server" || T)        ; 64 octets, server evidence
R_client = SHA-512("openhttpa hs client" || T) ; 64 octets, client evidence (mutual attestation)
</tt></t>

</section>
<section anchor="binding-digest"><name>Binding Digest</name>

<t>The 64-octet binding digest <tt>D</tt> is the value a profile places into hardware evidence. It binds the
session (through <tt>R</tt>) and the server's long-term ML-DSA-65 identity key <tt>id_pub</tt> (1952 octets):</t>

<t>```text
D = SHA-512("openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/session-nonce" || B || SHA-256(id_pub))</t>

<t>B = R                                  ; evidence produced for this session
B = E                                  ; reused epoch evidence (<xref target="epoch-binding"/>)
E = SHA-512("openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/epoch" || epoch_nonce || u64(issued_unix))
```</t>

<t><tt>epoch_nonce</tt> is 32 random octets and <tt>issued_unix</tt> the epoch's issue time in seconds. The two
domain strings are fixed octet strings. They keep the identifiers of the first implementation for
wire compatibility and carry no cloud-specific meaning: every profile uses them verbatim.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="identity-signatures"><name>Identity Signatures</name>

<t>The server's identity signatures are pure ML-DSA-65 (<xref target="FIPS-204"/> Algorithm 2, not HashML-DSA)
under role-specific, non-empty context strings, so that no signature made for one role can verify
for another:</t>

<t><tt>text
sigma_T = ML-DSA-65.Sign(sk_id, M = T,
                         ctx = "openhttpa/v1/hs-server-transcript")      ; 33-octet context
sigma_E = ML-DSA-65.Sign(sk_id, M = "openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/epoch-session-sig" || E || R,
                         ctx = "openhttpa/v1/epoch-session-binding")     ; 34-octet context
</tt></t>

<t><tt>sigma_T</tt> is carried as the first item of <tt>Attest-Server-Signatures</tt>. FIPS 204 builds the signed
string as <tt>M' = 0x00 || u8(len(ctx)) || ctx || M</tt>, so the two signatures, and any empty-context
signature over the same <tt>M</tt>, are distinct inputs to the signature scheme.</t>

<t>Implementations of draft-openhttpa-protocol-01 signed both messages with the empty context. A
verifier MUST first try the context defined here. It MAY then accept an empty-context signature
to keep earlier servers and recorded sessions verifiable, and MUST then report that the legacy
form was used. Accepting the legacy form gives an attacker nothing new: a key used by an
implementation of this document never signs with the empty context, so no signature from another
role of that key exists to be substituted.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="epoch-binding"><name>Epoch Binding</name>

<t>Producing fresh hardware evidence can take seconds (a vTPM quote) or contend for a single device.
A server MAY instead produce evidence over <tt>D</tt> with <tt>B = E</tt> once per epoch, and prove each
session with <tt>sigma_E</tt>. The server carries <tt>issued_unix</tt>, <tt>epoch_nonce</tt> and <tt>sigma_E</tt> with the
evidence. A verifier MUST verify <tt>sigma_E</tt> under <tt>id_pub</tt>, MUST reject an epoch issued more than
its configured maximum age before verification (RECOMMENDED: 60 seconds) or more than its clock
tolerance in the future (RECOMMENDED: 30 seconds), and then checks the evidence against
<tt>D</tt> computed with <tt>B = E</tt>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="verifier-obligations"><name>Verifier Obligations</name>

<t>A verifier MUST recompute <tt>T</tt> from the octets received, never from values reported by the peer.
It MUST establish that <tt>id_pub</tt> is bound to this session, either through evidence over <tt>D</tt> with
<tt>B = R</tt>, or through <tt>sigma_E</tt> and evidence over <tt>D</tt> with <tt>B = E</tt>. It SHOULD also verify <tt>sigma_T</tt>,
and MUST do so when it pins <tt>id_pub</tt>. When the identity key is pinned, the session's
authentication rests on ML-DSA-65 alone and survives a break of the classical attestation roots
(<xref target="hybrid-threat-model"/>).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="attestation-profiles"><name>Attestation Profiles</name>

<t>An Attestation Profile defines:</t>

<ol>
  <li>how the binding digest <tt>D</tt> enters hardware evidence;</li>
  <li>which evidence and vendor chain authenticate it;</li>
  <li>which measurements identify the workload;</li>
  <li>the <tt>Attest-Quotes</tt> TEE type token and <tt>format</tt> label of the evidence; and</li>
  <li>how the identity key <tt>id_pub</tt> is protected at rest.</li></ol>

<t>The profile identifier is also the value of the <tt>OpenHTTPA-Attestation-Type</tt> field. A verifier
MUST determine the profile from the <tt>(type, format)</tt> pair of <tt>Attest-Quotes</tt> before parsing the
evidence, MUST reject a profile it does not implement, and MUST NOT accept evidence of one profile
as another. A relying-party policy SHOULD name the profile it requires. Profiles fall into two
classes.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Profile</th>
          <th align="left">Class</th>
          <th align="left">format</th>
          <th align="left">D placement</th>
          <th align="left">Workload measurements</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>direct-sev-snp</tt></td>
          <td>A</td>
          <td><tt>direct_sev_snp_v1</tt></td>
          <td>SNP <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> (<tt>0x50..0x90</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>launch_measurement</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>direct-tdx</tt></td>
          <td>A</td>
          <td><tt>direct_tdx_v1</tt></td>
          <td>TD quote <tt>REPORTDATA</tt> (<tt>568..632</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>MRTD</tt>, <tt>RTMR[0..3]</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt></td>
          <td>B</td>
          <td><tt>az_cvm_snp_vtpm_v1</tt></td>
          <td>HCL runtime data <tt>user-data</tt></td>
          <td>vTPM PCRs 4, 7, 11 (+12, 14, 15)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt></td>
          <td>B</td>
          <td><tt>az_cvm_tdx_vtpm_v1</tt></td>
          <td>HCL runtime data <tt>user-data</tt></td>
          <td>vTPM PCRs 4, 7, 11 (+12, 14, 15)</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>The TEE type (<xref target="tee-type-registry"/>) is <tt>sev_snp</tt> for the <tt>-sev-snp</tt> and <tt>-snp</tt> profiles and <tt>tdx</tt>
for the <tt>-tdx</tt> profiles.</t>

<t>Offsets are half-open byte ranges. SNP offsets are relative to the <tt>ATTESTATION_REPORT</tt>
(<xref target="AMD-SNP-ABI"/>); TD quote offsets are relative to an Intel DCAP v4 quote (<xref target="INTEL-TDX-DCAP"/>).</t>

<section anchor="class-a-direct-silicon-profiles"><name>Class A: Direct Silicon Profiles</name>

<t>Class A profiles apply where the guest kernel exposes the CPU's attestation interface directly:
Google Cloud confidential VMs, bare-metal hosts, and other direct-boot CVMs, through
<tt>/dev/sev-guest</tt>, <tt>/dev/tdx_guest</tt> or the Linux <tt>configfs-tsm</tt> report interface (<xref target="LINUX-TSM"/>).
The 64-octet <tt>D</tt> is the <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> operand of the CPU's report instruction itself.</t>

<section anchor="direct-sev-snp"><name><tt>direct-sev-snp</tt></name>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Evidence</strong>: the 1184-octet SEV-SNP <tt>ATTESTATION_REPORT</tt> returned by <tt>SNP_GET_REPORT</tt>
(<tt>/dev/sev-guest</tt>, or <tt>configfs-tsm</tt> with <tt>inblob = D</tt>) at VMPL 0, the VCEK (or VLEK)
certificate, the ASK and ARK, and the ARK-signed CRL.</li>
  <li><strong>Binding</strong>: <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> (<tt>0x50..0x90</tt>) MUST equal <tt>D</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Authentication</strong>: ECDSA P-384 / SHA-384 under the VCEK over <tt>0x000..0x2A0</tt> (signature <tt>r</tt>,
<tt>s</tt> little-endian at <tt>0x2A0</tt>, <tt>0x2E8</tt>); ARK -&gt; ASK -&gt; VCEK RSASSA-PSS / SHA-384; the ARK pinned
to AMD's published root for the product; a current CRL that does not list the ASK or VCEK;
<tt>reported_tcb</tt> (<tt>0x180..0x188</tt>) equal to the VCEK's TCB extensions; <tt>chip_id</tt>
(<tt>0x1A0..0x1E0</tt>) equal to the VCEK <tt>hwID</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Guest policy</strong>: <tt>GUEST_POLICY</tt> (<tt>0x08..0x10</tt>) bit 19 (<tt>DEBUG</tt>) and bit 18 (<tt>MIGRATE_MA</tt>)
MUST be zero.</li>
  <li><strong>Workload</strong>: <tt>launch_measurement</tt> (<tt>0x90..0xC0</tt>) measures the initial guest image. With
measured direct boot it covers firmware, kernel, initrd and command line; verifiers pin it.
<tt>HOST_DATA</tt> and <tt>ID_KEY_DIGEST</tt> MAY additionally be pinned.</li>
  <li><strong>Identity key at rest</strong>: the key SHOULD be sealed under a key from <tt>MSG_KEY_REQ</tt>
(<tt>SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY</tt>, sent over the VMPCK-protected guest message channel), derived from
the chip's VCEK with <tt>GUEST_FIELD_SELECT</tt> including the measurement, so that only the same
measured image on the same chip can unseal it.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="direct-tdx"><name><tt>direct-tdx</tt></name>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Evidence</strong>: a TD quote produced from <tt>TDG.MR.REPORT</tt> (<tt>/dev/tdx_guest</tt>, or <tt>configfs-tsm</tt>
with <tt>inblob = D</tt>) by the quoting enclave, with its PCK chain and collateral (TCB info, QE
identity, CRLs).</li>
  <li><strong>Binding</strong>: <tt>REPORTDATA</tt> (TD quote <tt>568..632</tt>) MUST equal <tt>D</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Authentication</strong>: Intel DCAP: the quote signature under the attestation key, the QE report and
QE identity, the PCK chain to the pinned Intel SGX Root CA, current CRLs and TCB info.</li>
  <li><strong>Guest policy</strong>: <tt>TD_ATTRIBUTES</tt> (<tt>168..176</tt>) bit 0 (<tt>DEBUG</tt>) MUST be zero.</li>
  <li><strong>Workload</strong>: <tt>MRTD</tt> (<tt>184..232</tt>) measures the initial TD image (the virtual firmware);
<tt>RTMR[0..3]</tt> (<tt>376..568</tt>) measure firmware configuration, boot loader and kernel, and the OS.
Verifiers pin <tt>MRTD</tt> and the <tt>RTMR</tt>s, the latter by replaying the event log.</li>
  <li><strong>Identity key at rest</strong>: TDX has no sealing-key derivation. The identity key is generated per
boot (relying parties then pin measurements, not the key) or released by a key broker after
attestation.</li></ul>

<t>A host-provided vTPM, such as a Shielded VM vTPM, is outside the TEE. It MUST NOT be the only
protection of a Class A identity key.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="class-b-paravisor-mediated-profiles"><name>Class B: Paravisor-Mediated Profiles</name>

<t>On Azure confidential VMs an attested paravisor (OpenHCL) runs below the guest OS, at VMPL 0 on
SEV-SNP and as the L1 VMM of a partitioned TD on TDX. The guest has no <tt>/dev/sev-guest</tt> or
<tt>/dev/tdx_guest</tt>; the paravisor alone requests hardware reports and provides the guest with a vTPM.
Class B profiles therefore bind <tt>D</tt> through two signed links:</t>

<ol>
  <li>The paravisor's HCL report carries the hardware report whose <tt>REPORT_DATA[0..32]</tt> is
<tt>SHA-256(runtime data)</tt> (<tt>REPORT_DATA[32..64]</tt> is zero). The runtime data is a JSON document
holding the vTPM attestation key <tt>HCLAkPub</tt> (an RSA public key, 2048 bits or more) and
<tt>user-data</tt>, which MUST equal hex(<tt>D</tt>).</li>
  <li>The vTPM signs a <tt>TPM2_Quote</tt> with that key: a <tt>TPMS_ATTEST</tt> (<xref target="TPM2"/>) whose <tt>extraData</tt>
MUST equal <tt>SHA-256(D)</tt> and whose <tt>pcrDigest</tt> MUST equal SHA-256 over the selected PCR
values.</li></ol>

<t>Here <tt>launch_measurement</tt> (SNP) or <tt>MRTD</tt> (TDX) measures the paravisor, a Microsoft build that
varies with the Azure host. Verifiers keep a reviewed allow-list of builds. The guest workload is
measured in vTPM PCRs: PCR 4 (boot loader / UKI), PCR 7 (Secure Boot policy) and PCR 11 (UKI
sections), and optionally application PCRs (for example 12, and 14 / 15 holding single extends of
the server binary and configuration digests).</t>

<t>Azure HCL report layout (integers little-endian):</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Octets</th>
          <th align="left">Field</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>0x000..0x004</tt></td>
          <td><tt>"HCLA"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>0x020..0x4C0</tt></td>
          <td>hardware report (SEV-SNP <tt>ATTESTATION_REPORT</tt>, 1184 octets)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>0x4C0..0x4D4</tt></td>
          <td>IGVM request data: size, version, report type, hash type (1 = SHA-256), runtime data size</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>0x4D4..0x4D4 + size</tt></td>
          <td>runtime data (JSON)</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<ul>
  <li><strong><tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt></strong>: the SEV-SNP report at HCL <tt>0x20</tt> is authenticated as for <tt>direct-sev-snp</tt>,
except that <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> binds the runtime data as above.</li>
  <li><strong><tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt></strong>: the HCL report carries a TD report; the TD quote is obtained from the
paravisor's quote service and authenticated as for <tt>direct-tdx</tt>, with <tt>REPORTDATA[0..32]</tt>
binding the runtime data.</li>
  <li><strong>Identity key at rest</strong>: the key is sealed to the vTPM under a PCR policy (for example PCRs 4,
11, 14 and 15). The vTPM's state lives in the paravisor inside the TEE.</li></ul>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="message-formats"><name>Message Formats</name>

<t>To ensure cross-platform interoperability, <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> defines strict formats for all wire
elements.</t>

<section anchor="structured-field-values-sfv"><name>Structured Field Values (SFV)</name>

<t>All <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> headers MUST follow <xref target="RFC9651"/>.</t>

<section anchor="attest-versions"><name>Attest-Versions</name>

<t>A List of tokens identifying supported protocol versions.</t>

<ul>
  <li>Example: <tt>Attest-Versions: openhttpa, httpa/3</tt></li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="attest-cipher-suites"><name>Attest-Cipher-Suites</name>

<t>A List of tokens identifying supported cipher suites in order of preference.</t>

<ul>
  <li>Example: <tt>Attest-Cipher-Suites: X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384, X25519_AES256GCM_SHA384</tt></li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="attest-random"><name>Attest-Random</name>

<t>An SFV Byte Sequence containing 32 random bytes.</t>

<ul>
  <li>Example: <tt>Attest-Random: :b3Blbmh0dHBhLXNlY3VyZS1yYW5kb20tbm9uY2UteHh4: </tt></li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="attest-quotes"><name>Attest-Quotes</name>

<t>A List of Inner Lists. Each inner list contains a TEE type token and an SFV Byte Sequence representing the quote. The byte sequence MAY include a <tt>format</tt> parameter (e.g., <tt>format=eat</tt>) to specify the encoding of the quote; if absent, <tt>format=raw</tt> is assumed.</t>

<ul>
  <li>Example: <tt>Attest-Quotes: (tdx :YmFzZTY0LXF1b3RlLWJ5dGVz:;format=raw), (nvidia_gpu :Z3B1LXF1b3RlOjpieXRlcw==:)</tt></li></ul>

<section anchor="entity-attestation-token-eat-considerations"><name>Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Considerations</name>

<t>While <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> explicitly prioritizes sub-millisecond setup performance utilizing <strong>raw hardware quotes</strong> (e.g., native Intel TDX <xref target="INTEL-TDX"/> or AMD SEV-SNP <xref target="AMD-SEV"/> binary formats) for latency-critical Agentic Swarms, it is imperative to support broader Internet interoperability.</t>

<t>Therefore, implementations MUST support an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) <xref target="RFC9334"/> fallback. The client and server can negotiate the EAT format via the <tt>format=eat</tt> parameter. When EAT is utilized, hardware evidence is encapsulated within CWT/JWT structures, allowing disparate verifiers to evaluate claims using standardized engines (e.g., Veraison).</t>

</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="json-key-shares"><name>JSON Key Shares</name>

<t>The <tt>Attest-Key-Shares</tt> and <tt>Attest-Key-Share</tt> headers contain a JSON-encoded object with
the following schema:</t>

<t><tt>json
{
  "ecdhe_public": [184, 123, 186, ...],
  "mlkem_public": [71, 162, 38, ...],
  "mlkem_ciphertext": [12, 7, 250, ...],
  "signature_alg": "ml-dsa-65"
}
</tt></t>

<t>Each key is a JSON array of octet values (integers 0..255). <tt>mlkem_ciphertext</tt> is present only in
the server's <tt>Attest-Key-Share</tt>. <tt>signature_alg</tt> is present when the server sends
<tt>Attest-Server-Signatures</tt>; its only defined value is <tt>ml-dsa-65</tt>, and the FIPS 204 context is a
parameter of that algorithm (<xref target="identity-signatures"/>), not a separate identifier. The whole JSON
document is carried as an SFV Byte Sequence.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="test-vectors"><name>Test Vectors</name>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t><strong>Note to RFC Editor:</strong> The following test vectors were generated from the OpenHTTPA reference implementation (<tt>openhttpa-rs</tt>).</t>
</li></ul>

<section anchor="hybrid-kem-key-exchange"><name>Hybrid KEM Key Exchange</name>

<t><strong>Client ECDHE Public Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
7837c04985b1737863fc4bb7e3e18a0ff55dc9815865877676977f69d0c8851a
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Client ML-KEM Public Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
47a226263994c1677422005a2345508546a4c1049e9af576b582a2
31db5a354a5b7290a4cacc22c18322fd45729527a0b8584bfe0b12
48634f6016ad6e39ad5d229869e9cd00ba06f755557df266f0a52f
393b6734ecc4ee696f4b761b3f6088eed895ebb81f0d66c97b8361
fad9cb5583ac02a9734286bc74e28e6484bc229332e0f00c5f471a
09648610daa11e48be1cf08cc4bc84902713432468816533a24433
786c20f0231b7eac413753a3ae3a19d0c817b79451a9817f787694
2d53b6ccec6a6784c7c2d84929039a67a0c26cbb5875ba0432686f
ee7227e95b14c6494c517c1214b59cbbbb06fe996447203e8fe27a
48996613674a826674564a4c11c5055e3679d686b30233a84c4ab4
6c07c764fcbc4a646972dc16c895bdde9c575d86bcd3d35baf3952
0e967d286c8af44763a856926e7534a4f488ca403e1bb7baff4c6d
41230f67a590453891fc6730d63bcac141954d32ae37ebca96b244
09922a234b3b486c3f9a602e13337ae9f1a4a8c2137ac6481f32bb
7e34cd3f97cd00d9ae92dc187fb00c78384b669443d2377e79b82f
5890037fcacd64952003b1b3589968b3725763f79f4618491bb274
26e96fac824dbe93828bea31572a8852139e46806121652c7673ce
1b659e8249bcc102ac39a768322a62f85b6b25c74a12126336d05d
a992c8a0729e7f97909591c816b0c98366600fa7053c29c530a546
c3c92b705144f153b949f6bf9a43cbb2141572c9251b43c3507769
78b8cdb19ba642695c3242207260934dd1707d12662a666790bb68
16292f67cc19a416c17a01828be46005dc6b1319b551899044b44c
8bc80b0ac329e61c60a00279ac87a5ff03697d501c9d79b6945a0b
04e95f8654ad8f5b72e431b339a909fb5cce6652991762cf377800
9fd53e0896b47c725b9ddbbc9ae63b6e1b8ff184880b156b4b3626
d6cb9ebd8b37ba5b63bada72fdd58adff49be0f736242bb219b643
0f700d99c5a87d8109ede8211c5bc5fb85762b843c9e6aa9750685
d5f4442b9ba0d3e07fa7f10628abaaefd0555d63cd437b3ea36894
bd21731763b194c0a1f9746838845bfaf8159278b255f14bdd00ac
82e05b2d90cd52f57388b8036c7ac0feccc0a3b975419756e8bb5d
e36ba25bf18dc1931663f3afaf08c9f4d7b533097723f1a3be260f
d34ac968795f82c51ebb5b081385546c82a41924ac7ac672b5ec61
78b3310661b9017a8f37823f1da3cf7c384e00389685ac584b0b33
9f96899b707d4928a5831972479750a39ac6852514a96b9f81f541
b6cba6aea7a23f911c939b050f9b239026c825b4b7b978cbb10951
a7d3bccd442641a184e5425a0224421d48c082acc8afc215e0aa20
1cca63bfd056678b311cbc0fcbb5144320a91a963952b227b3a8cf
a71c562cb5a844295c2e20520118943bc6bdf50392f8391f9d81ca
bf18c82c1ba194a27131b16b06952b80d4055e0a6767431cd0f61f
ba43698b590912c2b6463688bfd99e099a4519061ea4230e72b794
c9114fd91c59a5c8585ed65f622a42004c6e11b086db272bbcb4c5
3c7c8abcfa69d730bfe0b4857bd61c0f6a37be496e0063a5dc6145
e26a4f931b3e261a52233244a6028c34b2ccadea1c400df39ed0a8
f8c4047ed3ceeda48a6d7b29a0553d35706fde12858da5
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Server ECDHE Public Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
cfff07624272cf8303edd7d71ea3bea1b359008c321ae06f076ed52200047418
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Server ML-KEM Ciphertext:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
34b21199544efdba9cb4a0f832f61cf922983b52c7c3d042484986
26d1e0a17565e81581a1d0017f453cb3bb19acf5c2f6340b338114
e460a222bf0b1d339299820ab97e1b7645b0bf2b6ed917dc9c0093
5d3acf1a829155e1df2651785c8e91205b95f48d77198cd77854e2
92f84ee483d0ad97075d175e346c4a5c261746f2116b5b5b176401
cd37f7521a277705bb1574e0a6f8e9614d8691a78bef730f93e04c
b10f114cc217550f083ab6a51b7ef1388026af3ca9b9f191127ff3
dde9aa8f4e7ed8d30bd948fde3f8348a3506be7b1cee85f670379d
17af5b5ac797a4987356d500444c01f145c2ddbb3ecbb54ac08456
ee07ae8770156b0a303c4841ccc6f03e82d79dfb3b78a2d7f15c6f
c79af454e051a80cb7508474d2fdbdf400100fea583316854d28e5
faee57cd7ce15dbd3609d14d16f4b7944c43d35e2afc0d5c443c69
125a471405215fde928dd27b26bd641dce55e78d1d4c1ed12f9d09
f03ffc6698f1573659c72ace12ff8428d972db6381727b40097c4f
ae0a1b89faf7e0e8371dc451c2221120be73731cc5428cff83ee09
d212df32020af7677c24973796970480d647c24f5d88f4a33b4e6f
f77e3db809d9ae8684ed31a4075b536aeb8f789ce65075c7096cfe
de20377cc9b4ff47973c22a0d9aa429207d36fc0a3ea24ca3c0b92
c93af6a31f87cea8b20bdd81cb63db603bd3f012697194bb2f3068
592b331a81ecd589510902d0356ef88c107b154b52e5617e2859a0
1b3f40151c7067221328f53f2f84429f4ccd99eb4981f96fcaae5f
30f4caa1dd66eee2902714c35f4eacc0e7a32a382a36ca4ce532c4
89471d39b21ad1d9be3edc8dd5df16572fc93dbbd4f06cfab00bad
fd313e0b6b09c0dac2c491b70edf5eb3170cd65e6f72219496c986
637676d6c80a2f6197c60c854f297476c05ef4565d5b9ddd2b79ea
2e04ea0107d64a53fdb0d485f83983957b6985b36d1a6e24a062b5
fd15fb9c20a00a74f2a8146f0c2d0c611d272d5d65c0495d954349
542e94c5e23bd37ceaf5cc512a1c49ce84c08d7de7ff5015a1e42c
2c9ea65e0f9187b20c1576daaad1fe1203975bbd611d52ca71eb22
85e026c0f4cb166740f68158516d5e0484a7097c00bc8a8370b00f
3fa1673be7f27ef098f664dd0406dbcca7e11cae9ce27b0dd4cb31
4c098b65ab9f698c0ebd9ca23969a1bdb7e1cf9a15dcbfac5d935c
785d7b94fd77fe862d9c149666b8ea4bd75116fb4da8dd3510be5a
2b2cf2cd5f158bcdbcf567d8c2a4288120db5fa459f54f2c8188d9
61436219ac5d2da7dea94246f2aa6dc3a165cc6a8ceaa45a62b303
f4dd7d6dddfeb7f02beba9a41e22b60d006f6cb6ed2f9b17a3d4a1
2d200d1b432f9e08d629418a625f0f5dad3b6af69ca167d58aac86
88eb20ab4ea5e68d589aa89f6da920decf07d382a2ac4937df1f23
6da2316174ef70b145c211e1a002201079c507d4ca4d5867acfdd5
b32619e192928522cefc4f943e552f349000a3fb092274bb09de10
5b7905edff03f7ad
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Combined Hybrid Secret (IKM):</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
0f59c9666c406b1623a6759955670303871d1d7edd333596df998f8e2c5bef58
</tt></t>

<section anchor="derived-session-keys"><name>Derived Session Keys</name>

<t><em>Transcript Hash (All Zeros for Test Vector):</em></t>

<t><tt>text
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Master Secret:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
e4c42f6ce7dd16b5d7c0dbbe632df194df2c66c2c23684149915028d521f120c
aa4ba423f91a7c33e508c301ee828b58
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Client Write Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
00b0652de62e2ca2a59b9278c0394968fcf8f3c51201673f48b60aaa6025ce17
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Server Write Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
45682e8d7d91daae8ed44f309fb141e3f1feb3a7809139d86b818e7d42a58caa
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Client MAC Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
b027a1f5a0a45b5298bc3c97078d5914e8e924b426dcd5d2b96b47b0521a307e
</tt></t>

<t><strong>Server MAC Key:</strong></t>

<t><tt>text
f66f2e32e43af2be6775ebb2c5915f0c98fe1e5c54c68320447964d7a70ac80f
</tt></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="live-snp-vector"><name>Live SEV-SNP Session (<tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>)</name>

<t>The following values come from a full handshake captured on 2026-11-07 from a sealed server on an
Azure <tt>Standard_DC2as_v6</tt> (AMD Genoa) confidential VM. The raw record (<tt>openhttpa-audit-v1</tt>) is
published with the reference implementation as
<tt>crates/openhttpa-proxy/tests/fixtures/audit-real-snp.jsonl</tt> in <tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt>. It holds the
exact <tt>ATTEST</tt> request and response heads, the HCL report, the AMD certificates and CRL, and the
vTPM quote. Two independent verifiers reproduce every value from the raw octets: the Rust
<tt>audit-verify</tt> and a Python verifier built on a separate FIPS 204 implementation. The server
predates <xref target="identity-signatures"/>, so <tt>sigma_T</tt> and <tt>sigma_E</tt> use the empty context.</t>

<t><tt>text
cipher suite      X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384 (0x0001), version openhttpa (0x02)
T                 81afcdcfd70104103b2c1d6d2af4afe032d9dc5c6c60396a
                  540512b208635e1fa415e9baee5e95336610c91d3017565a
R                 c4a0116b6148c1010ff944789397518518e10714e21a6b7a0ad40c09dd11cefb
                  32c1b362b527653335a8f8e8edbeffab56bf9ade6f20abbe697bee92e0dc6cc6
SHA-256(id_pub)   8a37a18ca11a2c83a45a617ba6761a8aab4b4ca439f7a27e2bb0db0a88fe031e
issued_unix       1794078158
epoch_nonce       1c8afeedccb3596bf38608cea7944b492575dabe27b16d82825ef5209d6f7dff
E                 0fddd7b956d5ea4bdb70b1c7719caba6715c1af5f3e79c08b8ee3c7d3d492bee
                  75af895b7bf84db178b48dfd51649a74991de815ad259e1fc69bc96fd48be144
D (= user-data)   bf741b488801e0dab629405786c303dadd816cd30d9c75d85cfa1b97f1f9dc38
                  00a015389124496b08749f1f347a47d22156aa3e1b0785bade896dcec0b3827a
REPORT_DATA[0..32] = SHA-256(runtime data)
                  3ee66cf1b2857b24481a547a4c818e15666653e69f152f24c340d976920bd658
launch_measurement (paravisor)
                  6587d41e46995d71808f7d92d859e0ed093bea3c55a342c866a20cd1a213ae4e
                  20241bdbc44d5255222da65cce1c7f48
GUEST_POLICY      0x3001f (DEBUG = 0, MIGRATE_MA = 0); VMPL 0
reported_tcb      bootloader 12, TEE 0, SNP 28, microcode 88 (equal to the VCEK's)
ABI (GUEST_POLICY) 0.31
</tt></t>

<section anchor="tcb-across-hosts"><name>TCB Levels Across Hosts</name>

<t>A second capture, made on 2026-11-08 during a cross-silicon run of <xref target="OHMP"/>, carries the same
paravisor <tt>launch_measurement</tt> (<tt>6587d41e...7f48</tt>) but reports <tt>bootloader 10, TEE 0, SNP 23,
microcode 84, ABI 0.31</tt>. In that run three Intel TDX Root-MAs (2-of-3 quorum) and an Intel TDX
Delegate-MA in Azure <tt>westus3</tt> endorsed an AMD SEV-SNP workload in <tt>eastus2</tt>. The record is
published as <tt>crates/openhttpa-proxy/tests/fixtures/ohmp-real-silicon/</tt> in <tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt>
at commit <tt>2af53dc</tt>.</t>

<t>The two servers ran on different Genoa chips, with different VCEKs. A cloud provider updates PSP
firmware and microcode host by host, so <tt>reported_tcb</tt> differs between hosts, clusters and
regions even for an identical guest image. Two rules bind the value:</t>

<ul>
  <li>The VCEK is issued for one chip at one TCB. Its AMD KDS extensions <tt>1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.1.3.1</tt>
(bootloader), <tt>.3.2</tt> (TEE), <tt>.3.3</tt> (SNP) and <tt>.3.8</tt> (microcode), plus <tt>.3.9</tt> (FMC) on Turin,
carry those levels. A verifier MUST require <tt>reported_tcb</tt> to equal them, as in both captures;
otherwise a report could claim levels its chip key was never issued for.</li>
  <li>The minimum acceptable TCB is policy. Under <xref target="OHMP"/> the Delegate-MA appraises evidence against
per-component floors (<tt>min_bootloader</tt>, <tt>min_tee</tt>, <tt>min_snp</tt>, <tt>min_microcode_svn</tt>,
<tt>min_abi_major</tt>, <tt>min_abi_minor</tt>) and endorses only evidence that meets every one. A fleet
floor is the lowest TCB the operator accepts on any host. A floor copied from the first host,
here <tt>12/0/28/88</tt>, would refuse the <tt>10/0/23/84</tt> host, though it runs the same image.</li></ul>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="binary-trailer-layouts"><name>Binary Trailer Layouts</name>

<t>Trailers MUST use big-endian encoding for all numeric fields.</t>

<section anchor="attest-ticket-request-trailer"><name>Attest-Ticket (Request Trailer)</name>

<t>Used in TrR (Phase 4) to authenticate the request.</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>nonce</tt>: 8 bytes (big-endian u64).</li>
  <li><tt>mac</tt>: Variable length (based on cipher suite, e.g., 48 bytes for SHA-384).</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="attest-binder-response-trailer"><name>Attest-Binder (Response Trailer)</name>

<t>Used in TrR (Phase 4) to bind the response to the request.</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>request_nonce</tt>: 8 bytes (big-endian u64, echo of request nonce).</li>
  <li><tt>mac</tt>: Variable length.</li></ul>

</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="protocol-state-machine"><name>Protocol State Machine</name>

<t>Implementations MUST maintain a session state machine to ensure correct sequencing of
handshake and trusted request phases.</t>

<section anchor="client-state-machine"><name>Client State Machine</name>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Current State</th>
          <th align="left">Event</th>
          <th align="left">Next State</th>
          <th align="left">Action</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>START</td>
          <td>Send OPTIONS</td>
          <td>PREFLIGHT</td>
          <td>Wait for preflight response</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>PREFLIGHT</td>
          <td>Recv 204</td>
          <td>IDLE</td>
          <td>Parse supported versions/TEEs</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>IDLE</td>
          <td>Send ATTEST</td>
          <td>HANDSHAKE</td>
          <td>Generate KEM pair, send shares</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>HANDSHAKE</td>
          <td>Recv 200</td>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Verify quotes, derive keys</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Send TrR</td>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Encrypt body, add AHL binder</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="server-state-machine"><name>Server State Machine</name>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Current State</th>
          <th align="left">Event</th>
          <th align="left">Next State</th>
          <th align="left">Action</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>START</td>
          <td>Recv OPTIONS</td>
          <td>START</td>
          <td>Send supported capabilities</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>START</td>
          <td>Recv ATTEST</td>
          <td>HANDSHAKE</td>
          <td>Pick suite/version, generate KEM</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>HANDSHAKE</td>
          <td>Send 200</td>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Send quotes/shares, derive keys</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Recv TrR</td>
          <td>ESTABLISHED</td>
          <td>Verify AHL, decrypt body</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="cryptography"><name>Cryptography</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> mandates high-assurance primitives and constructions to protect against both classical
and future quantum adversaries. All signatures MUST use ML-DSA-65 or higher for post-quantum
identity assurance.</t>

<section anchor="hybrid-kem-combiner"><name>Hybrid KEM Combiner</name>

<t>To achieve IND-CCA2 security, <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> implements a hybrid combiner following
<xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design"/> Section 3.2.</t>

<section anchor="combiner-input-ikm"><name>Combiner Input (IKM)</name>

<t>The Input Key Material (IKM) binds all public material from the exchange. All length prefixes (<tt>u16</tt>) MUST be encoded as Big-Endian (network byte order):</t>

<t><tt>text
IKM = ECDHE_SS || ML-KEM_SS || u16(len(label)) || label
      || u16(len(ECDHE_PK_client)) || ECDHE_PK_client
      || u16(len(ECDHE_PK_server)) || ECDHE_PK_server
      || u16(len(ML-KEM_EK_client)) || ML-KEM_EK_client
      || u16(len(ML-KEM_CT)) || ML-KEM_CT
</tt></t>

<t>The <tt>label</tt> MUST be <tt>b"openhttpa hybrid kem v1"</tt>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="combined-secret-derivation"><name>Combined Secret Derivation</name>

<ol>
  <li><tt>PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt=[0;32], IKM)</tt></li>
  <li><tt>Secret = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info=b"combined", 32)</tt></li></ol>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="session-key-schedule"><name>Session Key Schedule</name>

<t>The key schedule follows <xref target="RFC5869"/> and is aligned with <xref target="RFC9846"/> Section 7.1.</t>

<section anchor="hkdf-extract"><name>HKDF-Extract</name>

<t><tt>text
Handshake_PRK = HKDF-Extract(Hash=SHA-384, salt=[0x00;48], IKM=combined_secret)
</tt></t>

</section>
<section anchor="hkdf-expand"><name>HKDF-Expand</name>

<t><tt>text
OKM = HKDF-Expand(Hash=SHA-384, PRK=Handshake_PRK,
                 info=b"openhttpa v2 " || label || transcript_hash, L=&lt;length&gt;)
</tt></t>

<t>The fixed 48-byte length of the <tt>transcript_hash</tt> (SHA-384 output) ensures unambiguous domain separation between the <tt>label</tt> and the <tt>transcript_hash</tt> without the need for a delimiter.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="key-schedule-visualization"><name>Key Schedule Visualization</name>

<t>The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical derivation of session keys:</t>

<t><tt>text
       Combined Hybrid Secret
                 |
          HKDF-Extract(salt=[0;48])
                 |
          Handshake_PRK
        /        |        \          \
HKDF-Expand  HKDF-Expand  HKDF-Expand  HKDF-Expand
(Label=Master) (Label=Write) (Label=MAC) (Label=Res Master)
      |          |           |            |
Master Secret  Write Keys    MAC Keys     Resumption
               (C-&gt;S, S-&gt;C)  (C-&gt;S, S-&gt;C) Master Secret
</tt></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="session-resumption-trr"><name>Session Resumption (TrR)</name>

<t>To avoid the computational overhead of hybrid KEM handshakes, <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> supports session
resumption using opaque tickets.</t>

<section anchor="ticket-format"><name>Ticket Format</name>

<t>The <tt>Attest-Ticket-Resumption</tt> header contains a server-encrypted blob (AtST) containing:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Protocol Version</strong>: 1 byte.</li>
  <li><strong>Cipher Suite</strong>: 2 bytes (big-endian).</li>
  <li><strong>Master Secret</strong>: 48 bytes (from the original session).</li>
  <li><strong>Session Expiry</strong>: 8 bytes (Unix timestamp).</li>
  <li><strong>Hardware Context</strong>: Opaque TEE measurement/policy record.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="rtt-confidentiality"><name>0-RTT Confidentiality</name>

<t>To achieve the required <tt>&lt; 5ms overhead</tt> SLA in distributed Agentic Swarms, clients MAY utilize 0-RTT session resumption. By reusing the Master Secret and TEE state from a previously established 1-RTT handshake (via the <tt>Attest-Ticket</tt>), the client can transmit encrypted Trusted Requests (TrR) within the first flight of a connection (e.g., within HTTP/3 QUIC early data).</t>

<section anchor="rtt-cryptographic-binding"><name>0-RTT Cryptographic Binding</name>

<ol>
  <li>The client derives an early <tt>Handshake_PRK</tt> using the decoupled <tt>Resumption Master Secret</tt> from the opaque ticket.</li>
  <li>Early session keys are expanded utilizing a specialized label: <tt>openhttpa_v2_0rtt</tt> and a newly generated 16-byte random salt.</li>
  <li>The server validates the ticket, enforces safe methods, and transparently decrypts the 0-RTT request.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="rtt-forward-secrecy-limitations"><name>0-RTT Forward Secrecy Limitations</name>

<t>Similar to TLS 1.3 early data (Section 8 of <xref target="RFC9846"/>), 0-RTT requests do not provide perfect forward secrecy against an attacker who compromises the <tt>Resumption Master Secret</tt> of the parent session. If the server's long-term hardware secrets or the specific session's resumption secret are compromised, the 0-RTT data sent on that connection could be decrypted. Clients SHOULD NOT send highly sensitive data (e.g., identity credentials or financial transactions) in 0-RTT payloads.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="rtt-replay-protection"><name>0-RTT Replay Protection</name>

<t>0-RTT resumption MUST ONLY be permitted for safe, idempotent HTTP methods (e.g., <tt>GET</tt>, <tt>HEAD</tt>, <tt>OPTIONS</tt>). If a client attempts to use 0-RTT with an unsafe method (e.g., <tt>POST</tt>, <tt>PUT</tt>, <tt>DELETE</tt>), the server MUST reject the request and return a <tt>425 Too Early</tt> status code.</t>

<t>Furthermore, because 0-RTT payloads are susceptible to network-level replays before the server can inject a fresh nonce, the server MUST maintain a sliding-window strike register (replay cache) of all nonces observed across all recently active resumed sessions within the ticket expiry window.</t>

</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="agentic-swarms-multi-hop-provenance"><name>Agentic Swarms &amp; Multi-Hop Provenance</name>

<t>Autonomous Agentic Swarms require mutually authenticated, hardware-verified communication channels to perform automated transactions without human oversight. <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> enables an Attested Agent Mesh (AAM) by maintaining cryptographic provenance across multi-hop agent delegations.</t>

<section anchor="attest-provenance"><name>Attest-Provenance</name>

<t>The <tt>Attest-Provenance</tt> header provides a chain of custody representing all participating agents in a multi-hop request. Each agent in the routing path MUST append its own hardware identity (derived from its TEE quote) to the provenance list before forwarding the request.</t>

<ul>
  <li>Example: <tt>Attest-Provenance: "agent-a-hash", "agent-b-hash"</tt></li></ul>

<t>This enables the final receiving service to mathematically verify not only the immediate sender, but the entire chain of trust, ensuring no unverified intermediary altered the request.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="confidential-oracle-extension"><name>Confidential Oracle Extension</name>

<t>The <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> Confidential Oracle Extension enables a TEE-based agent to act as a "Trustless Bridge"
between Web2 APIs and Web3 environments (e.g., Bitcoin, EVM). This extension ensures
that off-chain data is fetched, processed, and cryptographically bound to the hardware
evidence before being transmitted to an on-chain verifier.</t>

<section anchor="protocol-binding"><name>Protocol Binding</name>

<t>When an Oracle fetch is performed, the TEE MUST bind the resulting data to the current
AtHS session transcript. This is achieved by computing a SHA-512 digest over the full <tt>transcript_hash</tt> combined with a domain prefix, and placing it in the 64-byte hardware report data (e.g., the <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> field in Intel TDX or <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> in Intel SGX).</t>

<t>The 64-byte <tt>ReportData</tt> structure is defined as follows:</t>

<t><tt>text
ReportData = SHA-512(Domain_Prefix || Transcript_Hash)
</tt></t>

<t>The <tt>Domain_Prefix</tt> MUST be the ASCII string <tt>"openhttpa hs server"</tt> or <tt>"openhttpa hs client"</tt>; <tt>ReportData</tt> is the handshake binding value <tt>R</tt> of the normative core. The value placed in hardware evidence is the binding digest <tt>D</tt> derived from it (<xref target="binding-digest"/>), carried as the evidence's Attestation Profile defines (<xref target="attestation-profiles"/>). A full SHA-512 output fills the 64-octet <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> register without truncation (see Hash Strength in Security Considerations for its classical and quantum bounds).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="on-chain-verification"><name>On-Chain Verification</name>

<t>The Oracle response incorporates a hardware quote and, optionally, a ZK-STARK proof
(e.g., generated via RISC Zero) that proves the integrity of the data transformation.
Smart contracts verify:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Handshake Consistency</strong>: The <tt>transcript_hash</tt> in the quote matches the session.</li>
  <li><strong>Hardware Integrity</strong>: The quote was generated by a valid TEE (verified via DCAP/SNP).</li>
  <li><strong>Data Correctness</strong>: The ZK proof (if present) confirms that the Web2 payload
correctly corresponds to the claimed on-chain state.</li></ol>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="semantic-binding-via-ahl"><name>Semantic Binding via AHL</name>

<t>The Attested Header List (AHL) prevents semantic re-routing attacks.</t>

<section anchor="ahl-transcript-construction"><name>AHL Transcript Construction</name>

<t>The AHL transcript MUST use length-prefixed binary fields:</t>

<t><tt>text
AHL_Transcript = 7::method || len(method_val) || : || method_val
                 || 5::path || len(path_val) || : || path_val
                 || 10::authority || len(authority_val) || : || authority_val
                 || [ len(HEADER_NAME_N) || HEADER_NAME_N
                    || len(HEADER_VALUE_N) || : || HEADER_VALUE_N ... ]
</tt></t>

<t>Header names MUST be converted to lowercase ASCII and then sorted lexicographically before encoding, similar to the canonicalization rules in HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="binder-calculation"><name>Binder Calculation</name>

<t><tt>Binder = HMAC-SHA-384(mac_key, AHL_Transcript)</tt></t>

<t>The <tt>mac_key</tt> used depends on the sender: the client MUST use the <tt>client_mac_key</tt>, and the server MUST use the <tt>server_mac_key</tt>.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="error-handling"><name>Error Handling</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> implementations MUST use appropriate HTTP status codes and extended error headers.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Error Condition</th>
          <th align="left">Status Code</th>
          <th align="left">Extended Error Code</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>No Mutually Supported Suite</td>
          <td>406</td>
          <td><tt>negotiation_failed</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Attestation Verification Fail</td>
          <td>403</td>
          <td><tt>handshake_integrity_failed</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Key Derivation Failure</td>
          <td>500</td>
          <td><tt>key_derivation_failed</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Policy Violation (e.g. SVN)</td>
          <td>403</td>
          <td><tt>policy_violation</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="formal-verification-and-implementation-considerations"><name>Formal Verification and Implementation Considerations</name>

<t>To guarantee the high-assurance required for Confidential AI and Web3 Oracles, implementations of <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> SHOULD adhere to the following strict guidelines:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Formal Modeling</strong>: Core protocol models MUST maintain ongoing machine-checked formal verification (using frameworks like ProVerif <xref target="ProVerif"/> or Tamarin <xref target="Tamarin"/>) proving perfect forward secrecy and injective authentication against both classical and post-quantum Dolev-Yao adversaries.</li>
  <li><strong>Memory Safety</strong>: Implementations SHOULD be authored in memory-safe languages (e.g., Rust) to eliminate classes of vulnerabilities related to buffer manipulation during parsing of untrusted network inputs.</li>
  <li><strong>FIPS 140-3 Readiness</strong>: Underlying cryptographic primitives and random number generators MUST be sourced from validated or validateable modules (e.g., <tt>aws-lc-rs</tt> or <tt>BoringSSL</tt>) to ensure enterprise compliance.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="transcript-integrity"><name>Transcript Integrity</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> relies on the integrity of the handshake transcript. Every field in the transcript,
including nonces, public keys, and negotiated parameters, MUST be length-prefixed to prevent
canonicalization attacks.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="hardware-splitting-attacks"><name>Hardware Splitting Attacks</name>

<t>Implementations MUST verify that the same transcript hash is bound to all hardware quotes
provided in the <tt>Attest-Quotes</tt> header (e.g., both Host CPU and GPU quotes).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="tee-vulnerabilities-and-revocation"><name>TEE Vulnerabilities and Revocation</name>

<t>The protocol supports Attestation Revocation Lists (ARL) and Secure Version Number (SVN)
enforcement to mitigate TEE-specific vulnerabilities.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replay-protection"><name>Replay Protection</name>

<t>To prevent replay attacks during the Trusted Request (TrR) phase, servers MUST mandate strict replay protection for the <tt>nonce</tt> provided in the <tt>Attest-Ticket</tt> request trailer. The server MUST either enforce a strictly increasing monotonic counter for nonces within a session, or maintain a sliding-window strike register (replay cache) of recently seen nonces.</t>

<t>In large-scale distributed deployments where global state synchronization is impractical within latency bounds, servers MAY utilize clustered strike registers combined with strictly bounded time-windows, or issue single-use session tickets for 0-RTT to mitigate the complexity of distributed replay detection.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="hybrid-threat-model"><name>Hybrid Threat Model: Post-Quantum Session, Classical Silicon Roots</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> protects the session with post-quantum primitives, but the hardware evidence beneath it
is signed with classical ones:</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Layer</th>
          <th align="left">Primitive</th>
          <th align="left">Quantum status</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>Key exchange</td>
          <td>X25519 + ML-KEM-768 (or P-384 + ML-KEM-1024), hybrid</td>
          <td>post-quantum</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Server identity</td>
          <td>ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204 contexts (<xref target="identity-signatures"/>)</td>
          <td>post-quantum</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>AMD roots</td>
          <td>ARK / ASK RSA-4096 (PSS), VCEK ECDSA P-384</td>
          <td>classical</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Intel roots</td>
          <td>PCK chain and attestation key, ECDSA P-256</td>
          <td>classical</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Azure vTPM (Class B)</td>
          <td>AK RSA 2048 bits or more (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)</td>
          <td>classical</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>The consequences:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Recorded traffic stays confidential</strong> against a future quantum adversary while either
component of the hybrid KEM holds. The attestation signatures do not protect confidentiality.</li>
  <li><strong>Attestation authenticity is classical.</strong> An adversary able to forge a vendor signature can
present evidence for a TEE that does not exist and impersonate a server to clients that have not
pinned its identity key. No post-quantum attestation root is offered by AMD, Intel or Microsoft
today. A 2048-bit RSA AK offers roughly 112-bit classical security.</li>
  <li><strong>Pinning <tt>id_pub</tt> makes later sessions post-quantum authenticated.</strong> A client that verified
the identity key once, while the classical roots were trustworthy, and then pins it relies only
on ML-DSA-65 for authentication.</li>
  <li>Short epochs (<xref target="epoch-binding"/>) limit how long one set of evidence stands for many sessions.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="hash-strength"><name>Hash Strength</name>

<t><tt>R</tt>, <tt>E</tt> and <tt>D</tt> are SHA-512 outputs. Their collision resistance is 256 bits classically and about
2^171 operations against the Brassard-Hoyer-Tapp algorithm; their preimage resistance against
Grover's algorithm is about 2^256. Draft -01 overstated the quantum collision bound as 256 bits.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signature-domain-separation"><name>Signature Domain Separation</name>

<t>Every ML-DSA-65 signature made with an identity key carries a role-specific FIPS 204 context
(<xref target="identity-signatures"/>). The separation therefore rests on the signature scheme rather than on
message shape, and new roles MUST define new contexts.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="profile-confusion"><name>Profile Confusion</name>

<t>A verifier MUST dispatch on the profile before parsing (<xref target="attestation-profiles"/>). Class B evidence
read as Class A would be checked for <tt>REPORT_DATA = D</tt> while it holds <tt>SHA-256(runtime data)</tt>, and
the reverse would skip the vTPM links. Policies SHOULD name the profile they require.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="identity-keys-at-rest"><name>Identity Keys at Rest</name>

<t>The identity key is only as protected as its sealing. On Class B profiles it is sealed to the
vTPM inside the TEE under a PCR policy. On <tt>direct-sev-snp</tt> it is sealed under a <tt>MSG_KEY_REQ</tt>
derived key bound to the launch measurement. <tt>direct-tdx</tt> has no hardware sealing, so the key is
per boot or broker-released. A key sealed only to a host-provided vTPM is exposed to the host. The
wire never shows how a key is sealed; that follows from the measured image the policy pins.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="raw-wire-auditability"><name>Raw Wire Auditability</name>

<t>A client MAY record each handshake as an <tt>openhttpa-audit-v1</tt> record: the exact <tt>ATTEST</tt> request
and response heads, the evidence they carry, and the AEAD framing (AAD, ticket counter, length and
tag, never plaintext) of the first encrypted exchanges. Anyone can then re-verify the record
offline from its octets alone: the transcript, <tt>D</tt>, both signatures and every vendor link. The
recorder's capture time is not authenticated, but <tt>issued_unix</tt> is covered by <tt>E</tt>, which the
hardware evidence binds.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="field-spoofing"><name>Field Spoofing</name>

<t>The <tt>OpenHTTPA-*</tt> fields (<xref target="field-names"/>) are set only by an <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> proxy for its local
consumer or for the origin it serves. A proxy MUST remove every field in the namespace, under both
the <tt>OpenHTTPA-</tt> and <tt>X-OpenHTTPA-</tt> spellings and in any letter case, from requests and responses
it relays before it adds its own. A consumer MUST NOT trust these fields on traffic that did not
pass through its own proxy.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="privacy-considerations"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<section anchor="attestation-fingerprinting"><name>Attestation Fingerprinting</name>

<t>Hardware attestation quotes MAY contain unique identifiers (e.g., CPU serial numbers,
unique entity IDs) that allow for the tracking and fingerprinting of TEE instances.
Implementations SHOULD use privacy-preserving attestation technologies, such as
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) or Intel SGX Quote Verification Enclaves, to minimize the exposure
of stable hardware identifiers.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="provenance-tracking"><name>Provenance Tracking</name>

<t>The <tt>Attest-Provenance</tt> header provides a chain of custody for multi-hop agent delegation.
While essential for security auditing, this chain reveals the topology of the agent mesh.
Implementations MUST ensure that provenance data is only transmitted within established
<tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> sessions to prevent leakage to unauthorized observers.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t><strong>Note to RFC Editor:</strong> Please remove this section before publication.</t>
</li></ul>

<t>This section records the implementation status as of November 2026.</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Reference implementation</strong> (<tt>openhttpa-rs</tt>): the normative core (<xref target="transcript-hash"/>,
<xref target="binding-digest"/>, <xref target="identity-signatures"/>), including FIPS 204 context strings (ADR-005), and
direct-device TEE providers for Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP. Those providers place <tt>R</tt>, the
draft -01 binding, in <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt>. Moving them to the Class A binding <tt>D</tt> is open work.</li>
  <li><strong>Class B, verified on production silicon</strong> (<tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt>): <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt> and
<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt> evidence, with a verifier that checks every link of <xref target="attestation-profiles"/>.
For <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>, a full live session was captured and is published with byte-offset tables
(<xref target="live-snp-vector"/>). <tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt> evidence has been verified on Azure TDX silicon; no
<tt>openhttpa-audit-v1</tt> wire capture of a TDX session is published yet.</li>
  <li><strong>Cross-silicon OHMP run</strong> (<tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt> <tt>2af53dc</tt>, <tt>ohmp-rs</tt> <tt>2478f75</tt>): five Azure
CVMs. Three Intel TDX Root-MAs (2-of-3) and one Intel TDX Delegate-MA in <tt>westus3</tt>, with
ML-DSA-65 keys sealed to the vTPM under PCRs 4 and 11, endorsed an AMD SEV-SNP workload in
<tt>eastus2</tt> (<xref target="OHMP"/>). The Relying Party verified the workload's OpenHTTPA session and its OHMP
endorsement, inclusion proof and STH quorum. Signatures under all six context strings verify,
including <tt>openhttpa/v1/hs-server-transcript</tt> and <tt>openhttpa/v1/epoch-session-binding</tt>. The
workload host's TCB differs from that of <xref target="live-snp-vector"/>; see <xref target="tcb-across-hosts"/>. All
three Root-MAs ran on one provider, so a multi-provider quorum has not been run live.</li>
  <li><strong>Class A, specified</strong> (<tt>direct-sev-snp</tt>, <tt>direct-tdx</tt>): this document gives the wire
specification for Google Cloud and bare-metal deployments. The verifier in <tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt>
recognises Class A quotes and policies and refuses them by name, because no Class A verifier has
been validated against live evidence yet.</li>
  <li><strong>Formal models</strong>: ProVerif and Tamarin models of the handshake are maintained with the
reference implementation. The Tamarin model tags each role's signature as in
<xref target="identity-signatures"/>; it was not re-run for this revision.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="acknowledgements"><name>Acknowledgements</name>

<t>The authors would like to thank the contributors to the <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> Foundation and the IETF
Security area for their feedback on early iterations of this protocol.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="contributors"><name>Contributors</name>

<t>The following individuals have contributed to the design and implementation of <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> and its predecessor HTTPA/2:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Shih-han Wang</strong>: Original HTTPA/2 Co-Author</li>
  <li><strong>Nick Li</strong>: Original HTTPA/2 Co-Author</li>
  <li><strong>Ned Smith</strong>: Original HTTPA/2 Co-Author</li>
  <li><strong>Krzysztof Sandowicz</strong>: Original HTTPA/2 Co-Author</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document is published on the Independent Submission Stream. In line with <xref target="RFC8726"/>, it
requests assignments only from existing registries whose policy is not IETF Review or Standards
Action, and it does not ask IANA to create any new registry. The identifier namespaces it defines
(attestation profiles, HKDF labels, TEE types and extended error codes) are specified by this
document alone and are listed below for reference only. A future IETF-stream specification may
request IANA registries for them.</t>

<section anchor="http-method-attest"><name>HTTP Method <tt>ATTEST</tt></name>

<t>The "HTTP Method Registry" requires IETF Review (<xref target="RFC9110"/>, Section 16.1.1), which is not
available to Independent Stream documents. This document therefore makes no IANA request for the
<tt>ATTEST</tt> method. <tt>ATTEST</tt> is used experimentally and is unregistered; its registration is left to
a future IETF-stream specification. Its properties are:</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Method</th>
          <th align="left">Safe</th>
          <th align="left">Idempotent</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>ATTEST</td>
          <td>No</td>
          <td>No</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="http-field-name-registry"><name>HTTP Field Name Registry</name>

<t>This document requests the registration of the following headers in the "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry":</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Field Name</th>
          <th align="left">Template</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Cipher-Suites</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Supported-Cipher-Suites</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Cipher-Suite</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Supported-Groups</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Key-Shares</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Key-Share</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Random</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Encrypted-Hello</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Policies</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Base-Creation</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Blocklist</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Versions</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Supported-Versions</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Date</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Signatures</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Server-Signatures</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Transport</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Quotes</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Base-ID</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Version</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Expires</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Secrets</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Cargo</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Ticket</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Binder</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Base-Termination</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Challenge</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Provenance</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Ticket-Resumption</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Zk-Proof</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>Attest-Ai-Provenance-Proof</tt></td>
          <td>SFV</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="field-names"><name>HTTP Field Name Registry: OpenHTTPA Fields</name>

<t>This document requests registration of the following fields in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) Field Name Registry" (<xref target="RFC9110"/>, Section 16.3.1). In line with <xref target="RFC6648"/>, the names
carry no <tt>X-</tt> prefix. Deployed implementations also send each field under the alias
<tt>X-OpenHTTPA-&lt;name&gt;</tt> with the same value during a transition period. Recipients SHOULD prefer the
unprefixed field, and proxies MUST treat both spellings as reserved (see Field Spoofing). The
aliases are not registered.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Field Name</th>
          <th align="left">Status</th>
          <th align="left">Structured Type</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
          <th align="left">Comments</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Verified</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td><tt>true</tt> when the response came through a verified session; <tt>false</tt> on an unattested path</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Attestation-Type</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td>Attestation profile identifier of the verified peer, or <tt>none</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Measurement</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td>JSON object of the verified measurements</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Sealed-Key-Fingerprint</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td>Hex SHA-256 of the peer's identity public key <tt>id_pub</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Upstream-Endpoint</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td><tt>host:port</tt> of the attested server that served the response</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>OpenHTTPA-Error</tt></td>
          <td>provisional</td>
          <td>&#160;</td>
          <td>This document</td>
          <td>Token naming why a request was refused (for example <tt>NoRoute</tt>)</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>The values predate Structured Fields and are not defined as such.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="the-httpa-uri-scheme"><name>The <tt>httpa</tt> URI Scheme</name>

<t>This document requests provisional registration of the <tt>httpa</tt> URI scheme per <xref target="RFC7595"/>,
Section 7.4:</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Scheme name</strong>: <tt>httpa</tt></li>
  <li><strong>Status</strong>: Provisional</li>
  <li><strong>Applications/protocols that use this scheme name</strong>: <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> (this document). An <tt>httpa</tt>
URI identifies a resource that MUST be retrieved over an <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> session. A client MUST
complete an AtHS with the authority, and verify its evidence under an Attestation Profile,
before sending any request for the resource. The syntax is that of <tt>https</tt> (<xref target="RFC9110"/>,
Section 4.2.2); the default port is 443.</li>
  <li><strong>Contact</strong>: Gordon King <eref target="mailto:gordon@openhttpa.org">gordon@openhttpa.org</eref></li>
  <li><strong>Change controller</strong>: The <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> Foundation</li>
  <li><strong>References</strong>: This document</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="alpn-protocol-id"><name>ALPN Protocol ID</name>

<t>This document requests registration of the following value in the "TLS Application-Layer
Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry (<xref target="RFC7301"/>):</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Protocol</strong>: <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> version 1</li>
  <li><strong>Identification Sequence</strong>: 0x68 0x74 0x74 0x70 0x61 0x2F 0x31 ("httpa/1")</li>
  <li><strong>Reference</strong>: This document</li></ul>

<t>A server that negotiates <tt>httpa/1</tt> requires an AtHS before it processes any request on the
connection.</t>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t><strong>Open issue</strong>: neither the <tt>httpa</tt> scheme nor the <tt>httpa/1</tt> ALPN ID is used by the reference
implementation yet. <tt>httpa/1</tt> is also the <tt>Attest-Versions</tt> token of protocol version 1, whereas
the current version is <tt>openhttpa</tt>. A future revision will decide whether the ALPN ID tracks
the version token.</t>
</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="openhttpa-attestation-profile-identifiers"><name>OpenHTTPA Attestation Profile Identifiers</name>

<t>This document defines the following Attestation Profile identifiers. No IANA registry is
requested. A new profile MUST specify all five elements of <xref target="attestation-profiles"/>. An entry records the
identifier, class, TEE type token, <tt>format</tt> label, a description and a reference. Identifiers are
lowercase ASCII letters, digits and hyphens.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Identifier</th>
          <th align="left">Class</th>
          <th align="left">TEE Type</th>
          <th align="left">Format</th>
          <th align="left">Description</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>direct-sev-snp</tt></td>
          <td>A</td>
          <td><tt>sev_snp</tt></td>
          <td><tt>direct_sev_snp_v1</tt></td>
          <td>AMD SEV-SNP via <tt>/dev/sev-guest</tt> or <tt>configfs-tsm</tt>; <tt>REPORT_DATA = D</tt></td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>direct-tdx</tt></td>
          <td>A</td>
          <td><tt>tdx</tt></td>
          <td><tt>direct_tdx_v1</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX via <tt>/dev/tdx_guest</tt> or <tt>configfs-tsm</tt>; <tt>REPORTDATA = D</tt></td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt></td>
          <td>B</td>
          <td><tt>sev_snp</tt></td>
          <td><tt>az_cvm_snp_vtpm_v1</tt></td>
          <td>AMD SEV-SNP behind Azure OpenHCL with a vTPM</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt></td>
          <td>B</td>
          <td><tt>tdx</tt></td>
          <td><tt>az_cvm_tdx_vtpm_v1</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX behind Azure OpenHCL with a vTPM</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="openhttpa-hkdf-labels"><name>OpenHTTPA HKDF Labels</name>

<t>To prevent namespace collisions with TLS, this document defines the following labels for HKDF
expansion in <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt>. No IANA registry is requested.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Label</th>
          <th align="left">DTLS-OK</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>openhttpa_v2</tt></td>
          <td>Y</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>openhttpa_v2_0rtt</tt></td>
          <td>Y</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>Furthermore, the following specific key slots are logically prefixed by the protocol label:</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>master secret</tt></li>
  <li><tt>res master</tt></li>
  <li><tt>client write key</tt></li>
  <li><tt>server write key</tt></li>
  <li><tt>client write iv</tt></li>
  <li><tt>server write iv</tt></li>
  <li><tt>client mac key</tt></li>
  <li><tt>server mac key</tt></li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="tee-type-registry"><name>TEE Types</name>

<t>This document defines the following <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> TEE type tokens. No IANA registry is requested.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">TEE Type Token</th>
          <th align="left">Description</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>sgx</tt></td>
          <td>Intel SGX (Software Guard Ext)</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>tdx</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX (Trust Domain Ext)</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>sev_snp</tt></td>
          <td>AMD SEV-SNP</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>trustzone</tt></td>
          <td>Arm TrustZone</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>nvidia_gpu</tt></td>
          <td>NVIDIA Hopper/Blackwell GPU</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>tpm</tt></td>
          <td>Trusted Platform Module 2.0</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="openhttpa-extended-error-codes"><name>OpenHTTPA Extended Error Codes</name>

<t>This document defines the following <tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> extended error codes. No IANA registry is
requested.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Error Code</th>
          <th align="left">Description</th>
          <th align="left">Reference</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>negotiation_failed</tt></td>
          <td>No mutually supported cipher suite or version.</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>handshake_integrity_failed</tt></td>
          <td>Quote verification or transcript MAC failed.</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>key_derivation_failed</tt></td>
          <td>Failed to derive hybrid key schedule.</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>policy_violation</tt></td>
          <td>Client/Server policy rejected the hardware.</td>
          <td>This document</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="strategic-future"><name>Strategic Future</name>

<section anchor="httpa3-quic"><name>HTTPA/3 (QUIC)</name>

<t><tt>OpenHTTPA</tt> is designed for transport-independence, with HTTP/3 (QUIC) being the primary high-performance target. Future iterations of the protocol will leverage QUIC's stream-level isolation and connection migration to support massive-scale agentic meshes.</t>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references anchor="sec-combined-references">
<name>References</name>

    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
<name>Normative References</name>



<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6648">
  <front>
    <title>Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in Application Protocols</title>
    <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
    <date month="June" year="2012"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Historically, designers and implementers of application protocols have often distinguished between standardized and unstandardized parameters by prefixing the names of unstandardized parameters with the string "X-" or similar constructs. In practice, that convention causes more problems than it solves. Therefore, this document deprecates the convention for newly defined parameters with textual (as opposed to numerical) names in application protocols. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="178"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6648"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6648"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7301">
  <front>
    <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension</title>
    <author fullname="S. Friedl" initials="S." surname="Friedl"/>
    <author fullname="A. Popov" initials="A." surname="Popov"/>
    <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
    <author fullname="E. Stephan" initials="E." surname="Stephan"/>
    <date month="July" year="2014"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7301"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7301"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7595">
  <front>
    <title>Guidelines and Registration Procedures for URI Schemes</title>
    <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Thaler"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hardie" initials="T." surname="Hardie"/>
    <date month="June" year="2015"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document updates the guidelines and recommendations, as well as the IANA registration processes, for the definition of Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. It obsoletes RFC 4395.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="35"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7595"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7595"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9110">
  <front>
    <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
    <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
    <date month="June" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
      <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9846">
  <front>
    <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
    <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
    <date month="July" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC5869">
  <front>
    <title>HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)</title>
    <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
    <author fullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/>
    <date month="May" year="2010"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5869"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5869"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9651">
  <front>
    <title>Structured Field Values for HTTP</title>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="P-H. Kamp" surname="P-H. Kamp"/>
    <date month="September" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a set of data types and associated algorithms that are intended to make it easier and safer to define and handle HTTP header and trailer fields, known as "Structured Fields", "Structured Headers", or "Structured Trailers". It is intended for use by specifications of new HTTP fields.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8941.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9651"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9651"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9334">
  <front>
    <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
    <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
    <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
    <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
    <date month="January" year="2023"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="FIPS-203" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPS-204" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
<name>Informative References</name>



<reference anchor="RFC8726">
  <front>
    <title>How Requests for IANA Action Will Be Handled on the Independent Stream</title>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="November" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) maintains registries to track code points used by protocols such as those defined by the IETF and documented in RFCs developed on the IETF Stream.</t>
      <t>The Independent Submission Stream is another source of documents that can be published as RFCs. This stream is under the care of the Independent Submissions Editor (ISE).</t>
      <t>This document complements RFC 4846 by providing a description of how the ISE currently handles documents in the Independent Submission Stream that request actions from IANA. Nothing in this document changes existing IANA registries or their allocation policies, nor does it change any previously documented processes.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8726"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8726"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="OHMP" >
  <front>
    <title>OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP) and Transparency Log</title>
    <author initials="G." surname="King" fullname="G. King">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-openhttpa-ohmp-00"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="AMD-SNP-ABI" >
  <front>
    <title>SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification</title>
    <author >
      <organization>AMD</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="INTEL-TDX-DCAP" >
  <front>
    <title>Intel TDX DCAP Quoting Library API</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Intel</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="TPM2" >
  <front>
    <title>Trusted Platform Module Library, Part 2: Structures</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="LINUX-TSM" >
  <front>
    <title>Linux configfs-tsm: Trusted Security Module report interface</title>
    <author >
      <organization>The Linux Kernel Organization</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>



<reference anchor="I-D.sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2">
   <front>
      <title>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Attestable (HTTPA) Version 2</title>
      <author fullname="Hans Wang" initials="H." surname="Wang">
         <organization>Intel</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Gordon King" initials="G." surname="King">
         <organization>Intel</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Nick Li" initials="N." surname="Li">
         <organization>Intel</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
         <organization>Intel</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Krzysztof Sandowicz" initials="K." surname="Sandowicz">
         <organization>Intel</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="4" month="November" year="2023"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Attestable version 2 (HTTPA/2) is an
   HTTP extension.  It is a transaction-based protocol agnostic to
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) in which the Trusted Execution
   Environment (TEE) is considered a new type of requested resource over
   the Internet.  The original Hypertext Transfer Protocol Attestable
   (HTTPA) (referred to as HTTPA/1 in the rest of the document) includes
   remote attestation (RA) process onto the HTTPS protocol in the
   assumption of using Transport Layer Security (TLS) across the
   Internet.  In contrast, the design of HTTPA/2 could establish a
   trusted (attested) and more secure communication without dependence
   on TLS.

   The definition of Attestation for the purposes of this draft:

   The process of vouching for the accuracy of TEE based services,
   configuration, and data where the TEE conveys Evidence about its
   environment, roots of trust and protected functions.  The Evidence is
   a digital expression of TEE trustworthiness.


	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2-03"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design">
   <front>
      <title>Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3</title>
      <author fullname="Douglas Stebila" initials="D." surname="Stebila">
         <organization>University of Waterloo</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Scott Fluhrer" initials="S." surname="Fluhrer">
         <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Shay Gueron" initials="S." surname="Gueron">
         <organization>University of Haifa and Meta</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="7" month="September" year="2025"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Hybrid key exchange refers to using multiple key exchange algorithms
   simultaneously and combining the result with the goal of providing
   security even if a way is found to defeat the encryption for all but
   one of the component algorithms.  It is motivated by transition to
   post-quantum cryptography.  This document provides a construction for
   hybrid key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
   version 1.3.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="AMD-SEV" >
  <front>
    <title>AMD SEV-SNP: Strengthening VM Isolation with Integrity Protection and More</title>
    <author >
      <organization>AMD</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="INTEL-TDX" >
  <front>
    <title>Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Intel</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ProVerif" >
  <front>
    <title>ProVerif: Cryptographic Protocol Verifier in the Formal Model</title>
    <author initials="B." surname="Blanchet">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Tamarin" >
  <front>
    <title>The Tamarin Prover for symbolic analysis of security protocols</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Tamarin Team</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>

<section anchor="changes-since-draft-openhttpa-protocol-01"><name>Changes Since draft-openhttpa-protocol-01</name>

<ul>
  <li>Separated the cloud-agnostic normative core from the new Attestation Profiles. The core covers
the transcript hash <tt>T</tt> (now specified octet by octet), the handshake binding <tt>R</tt>, the binding
digest <tt>D</tt>, the identity signatures and epoch binding. The profiles are Class A direct silicon
(<tt>direct-sev-snp</tt>, <tt>direct-tdx</tt>) and Class B paravisor-mediated (<tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>,
<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>), with byte-offset tables.</li>
  <li>The identity signatures use FIPS 204 context strings (<tt>openhttpa/v1/hs-server-transcript</tt>,
<tt>openhttpa/v1/epoch-session-binding</tt>). Empty-context signatures from -01 implementations may be
accepted and must be reported.</li>
  <li>Corrected the JSON key-share encoding: keys are arrays of octet values, not base64 strings.</li>
  <li>Corrected the quantum collision bound of SHA-512 (about 2^171, not 256 bits).</li>
  <li>Security Considerations: hybrid threat model (post-quantum session, classical silicon roots),
profile confusion, identity keys at rest, raw wire auditability, field spoofing.</li>
  <li>IANA: <tt>OpenHTTPA-*</tt> field names (RFC 6648, with <tt>X-OpenHTTPA-*</tt> transition aliases), the <tt>httpa</tt>
URI scheme (provisional), the <tt>httpa/1</tt> ALPN ID, and the OpenHTTPA Attestation Profile
Identifiers.</li>
  <li>Retargeted to the Independent Submission Stream as an Experimental RFC. Following <xref target="RFC8726"/>,
the <tt>ATTEST</tt> method is no longer requested from the IETF Review "HTTP Method Registry", and the
profile, HKDF label, TEE type and error code namespaces are document-defined rather than new
IANA registries.</li>
  <li>Test vector: a live <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt> session captured on production silicon, and a second
host's TCB from a cross-silicon OHMP run, explaining why TCB levels differ between hosts.</li></ul>

</section>


  </back>

<!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>

