Internet-Draft OpenHTTPA November 2026
King & Wang Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-openhttpa-protocol-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Authors:
G. King
OpenHTTPA Foundation
H. Wang
OpenHTTPA Foundation

OpenHTTPA: Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation

Abstract

OpenHTTPA (Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation) defines a protocol for establishing hardware-verified, end-to-end confidential and authenticated communication between a client and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) over standard HTTP/2, HTTP/3, and gRPC transports. Unlike traditional TLS which terminates at the network edge, OpenHTTPA ensures that the cryptographic session terminates inside the hardware-isolated enclave. The protocol is based on the SIGMA-I model and incorporates post-quantum hybrid key exchange (ML-KEM), post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA), transcript-bound hardware attestation, and semantic binding of HTTP requests to the hardware-verified session state. The handshake, its transcript, the hardware binding digest and the identity signatures are cloud- and hypervisor-agnostic; how evidence carries the binding is defined by pluggable Attestation Profiles, both for TEEs that expose the CPU's attestation interface directly and for TEEs mediated by an attested paravisor and vTPM. This document supersedes draft-openhttpa-protocol-01.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Modern web architectures rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC9846] for data-in-transit protection. However, TLS termination often occurs at the network edge (e.g., Load Balancers, CDNs, or WAFs), leaving data exposed within internal cloud networks and vulnerable to privileged insiders or compromised host software.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX/TDX [INTEL-TDX], AMD SEV-SNP [AMD-SEV], and Arm TrustZone, provide hardware-level isolation. While TEEs can generate cryptographic "quotes" to prove their identity and integrity, there is no standardized Application Layer (L7) protocol to seamlessly bind these hardware proofs to HTTP sessions.

OpenHTTPA addresses this gap by providing an end-to-end trusted communication protocol. Building upon the foundational concepts of the earlier HTTPA/2 specification (see [I-D.sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2]), OpenHTTPA introduces:

  1. Enclave-to-Enclave Security: Cryptographic termination inside the TEE.
  2. Mutual Attestation: Integration of TEE hardware quotes into the handshake via the SIGMA-I model.
  3. PQC Exclusivity: Enforced Post-Quantum Cryptography for identity and signatures using ML-DSA [FIPS-204], completely eliminating classical ECDSA/RSA dependencies for network identity. (Note: Hardware attestation quotes still rely on classical silicon roots of trust, such as TEE-ECDSA, depending on the hardware vendor). Key exchange utilizes a hybrid combiner of classical X25519 with ML-KEM [FIPS-203].
  4. Policy-as-Code (PaC): Dynamic admission control during the Attestation Handshake (AtHS) powered by Open Policy Agent (OPA/Rego) to enforce context-aware rules on hardware provenance and claims.
  5. Semantic Intent Binding: The Attested Header List (AHL) mechanism, which binds HTTP semantic context (Method, Path, Query) to the hardware-verified session.
  6. 0-RTT Confidentiality: Sub-millisecond session resumption for latency-critical agentic and oracle workflows.

1.1. Document Status and Review

This document is submitted to the Independent Submission Stream for publication as an Experimental RFC. It is not the product of any IETF working group and has no IETF consensus. Review is nonetheless welcome from the following communities:

  • HTTPBIS: For extensions to the HTTP protocol, including the ATTEST method and SFV headers.
  • TEE: For the use of hardware attestation reports and Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT) [RFC9334].
  • SECDISPATCH: For architectural review of the hybrid security model.

2. Design Goals

OpenHTTPA is designed with the following core architectural goals:

  1. Transport Independence: The protocol MUST be capable of operating over HTTP/2, HTTP/3, and gRPC without modification to the underlying transport framing.
  2. Cryptographic Agility: The hybrid KEM and AEAD selections MUST be negotiable to allow for the adoption of future post-quantum algorithms.
  3. Auditability: The handshake transcript MUST be deterministic and auditable to allow for formal verification of security properties.
  4. Hardware Heterogeneity: The protocol SHOULD support the simultaneous attestation of multiple hardware providers (e.g., CPU + Accelerator) in a single unified session.
  5. Formal Verifiability: The protocol state machine and cryptographic binding MUST be amenable to machine-checked formal verification (e.g., ProVerif) to guarantee injective authentication and perfect forward secrecy.

3. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The following terms are used throughout this document:

4. Protocol Overview

OpenHTTPA operates in several distinct phases, integrated into the standard HTTP request-response lifecycle.

4.1. Phase 1: Preflight (Capability Negotiation)

A client MAY initiate a preflight request using the OPTIONS method to discover OpenHTTPA support and available hardware providers.

http OPTIONS /api/resource HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Attest-Versions: openhttpa

The server responds with supported versions and hardware types using Structured Field Values [RFC9651].

http HTTP/1.1 204 No Content Attest-Versions: openhttpa Attest-TEE-Types: intel_tdx, nvidia_gpu

4.2. Phase 2: Attestation Handshake (AtHS)

The AtHS establishes a secure session between the client and the TEE. It uses the ATTEST method (or a fallback POST with specific headers).

4.2.1. AtHS Request

The client sends its preferred cipher suites, versions, nonces, and public key shares.

  • Attest-Versions: Supported versions. (Omitted if Attest-Encrypted-Hello is used).
  • Attest-Cipher-Suites: Preferred hybrid suites (e.g., X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384). (Omitted if Attest-Encrypted-Hello is used).
  • Attest-Random: 32-byte client nonce.
  • Attest-Key-Shares: Structured list of ECDHE and ML-KEM public keys.
  • Attest-Encrypted-Hello: (Optional) ML-KEM HPKE-encapsulated metadata shielding cipher suites, protocol versions, and routing identifiers from network observers to provide cover-traffic metadata protection.
  • Attest-Policies: (Optional) A list of PaC (Policy-as-Code) constraints evaluated dynamically via Open Policy Agent (OPA) against the server's hardware provenance.

4.2.2. AtHS Response

The server responds with the selected parameters and its own attestation evidence.

  • Attest-Version: Negotiated version.
  • Attest-Cipher-Suite: Negotiated suite.
  • Attest-Random: 32-byte server nonce.
  • Attest-Quotes: One or more TEE attestation quotes.
  • Attest-Server-Signatures: The server's ML-DSA-65 signature over the transcript (Section 5.4), optionally followed by hardware-backed signatures.
  • Attest-Base-ID: Unique session identifier (UUID).

4.3. Handshake Flow Visualization

The following diagram illustrates the AtHS SIGMA-I handshake:

```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant Client participant Server

Client->>Server: ATTEST (Random_C, KeyShare_C, Suites, Versions)
Note over Server: Negotiate, KEM Encap, Bind Transcript
Server->>Client: 200 OK (Random_S, KeyShare_S, Atb-ID, Quotes)
Note over Client: Verify Quote, KEM Decap, Derive Keys
Note over Server: Derive Keys ```

5. Normative Core: Transcript, Binding Digest and Identity Signatures

This section is independent of cloud provider, hypervisor and paravisor. Every Attestation Profile (Section 6) uses it unchanged; a profile only defines how the binding digest D reaches the hardware and which evidence proves the workload. In this section || denotes concatenation, all integers are big-endian, and lp(x) = u64(len(x)) || x.

5.1. Transcript Hash

The transcript hash T (48 octets) commits to both sides' nonces and ephemeral key shares and to the negotiated parameters:

text T = SHA-384( lp(client_random) ; Attest-Random of the request, 32 octets || lp(challenge) ; Attest-Challenge, zero-padded or truncated to 48 octets ; (48 zero octets when absent) || lp(client_x25519_public) ; 32 octets || lp(client_mlkem_public) ; ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key, 1184 octets || lp(server_random) ; first 32 octets of the response Attest-Random || lp(server_x25519_public) ; 32 octets || lp(mlkem_ciphertext) ; 1088 octets || lp(server_mlkem_public) ; 1184 octets || u16(cipher_suite_id) || u8(version_id) )

Table 1
Cipher suite cipher_suite_id
X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384 0x0001
P384_ML_KEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA384 0x0002
X25519_AES256GCM_SHA384 0x0101
P256_AES256GCM_SHA256 (deprecated) 0x0102
X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 0x0103
Table 2
Version version_id
httpa/1 0x01
openhttpa 0x02

Field sizes above are those of X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384; the length prefixes make the construction unambiguous for every suite.

5.2. Handshake Binding Value

text R = SHA-512("openhttpa hs server" || T) ; 64 octets, server evidence R_client = SHA-512("openhttpa hs client" || T) ; 64 octets, client evidence (mutual attestation)

5.3. Binding Digest

The 64-octet binding digest D is the value a profile places into hardware evidence. It binds the session (through R) and the server's long-term ML-DSA-65 identity key id_pub (1952 octets):

```text D = SHA-512("openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/session-nonce" || B || SHA-256(id_pub))

B = R ; evidence produced for this session B = E ; reused epoch evidence (Section 5.5) E = SHA-512("openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/epoch" || epoch_nonce || u64(issued_unix)) ```

epoch_nonce is 32 random octets and issued_unix the epoch's issue time in seconds. The two domain strings are fixed octet strings. They keep the identifiers of the first implementation for wire compatibility and carry no cloud-specific meaning: every profile uses them verbatim.

5.4. Identity Signatures

The server's identity signatures are pure ML-DSA-65 ([FIPS-204] Algorithm 2, not HashML-DSA) under role-specific, non-empty context strings, so that no signature made for one role can verify for another:

text sigma_T = ML-DSA-65.Sign(sk_id, M = T, ctx = "openhttpa/v1/hs-server-transcript") ; 33-octet context sigma_E = ML-DSA-65.Sign(sk_id, M = "openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/epoch-session-sig" || E || R, ctx = "openhttpa/v1/epoch-session-binding") ; 34-octet context

sigma_T is carried as the first item of Attest-Server-Signatures. FIPS 204 builds the signed string as M' = 0x00 || u8(len(ctx)) || ctx || M, so the two signatures, and any empty-context signature over the same M, are distinct inputs to the signature scheme.

Implementations of draft-openhttpa-protocol-01 signed both messages with the empty context. A verifier MUST first try the context defined here. It MAY then accept an empty-context signature to keep earlier servers and recorded sessions verifiable, and MUST then report that the legacy form was used. Accepting the legacy form gives an attacker nothing new: a key used by an implementation of this document never signs with the empty context, so no signature from another role of that key exists to be substituted.

5.5. Epoch Binding

Producing fresh hardware evidence can take seconds (a vTPM quote) or contend for a single device. A server MAY instead produce evidence over D with B = E once per epoch, and prove each session with sigma_E. The server carries issued_unix, epoch_nonce and sigma_E with the evidence. A verifier MUST verify sigma_E under id_pub, MUST reject an epoch issued more than its configured maximum age before verification (RECOMMENDED: 60 seconds) or more than its clock tolerance in the future (RECOMMENDED: 30 seconds), and then checks the evidence against D computed with B = E.

5.6. Verifier Obligations

A verifier MUST recompute T from the octets received, never from values reported by the peer. It MUST establish that id_pub is bound to this session, either through evidence over D with B = R, or through sigma_E and evidence over D with B = E. It SHOULD also verify sigma_T, and MUST do so when it pins id_pub. When the identity key is pinned, the session's authentication rests on ML-DSA-65 alone and survives a break of the classical attestation roots (Section 17.5).

6. Attestation Profiles

An Attestation Profile defines:

  1. how the binding digest D enters hardware evidence;
  2. which evidence and vendor chain authenticate it;
  3. which measurements identify the workload;
  4. the Attest-Quotes TEE type token and format label of the evidence; and
  5. how the identity key id_pub is protected at rest.

The profile identifier is also the value of the OpenHTTPA-Attestation-Type field. A verifier MUST determine the profile from the (type, format) pair of Attest-Quotes before parsing the evidence, MUST reject a profile it does not implement, and MUST NOT accept evidence of one profile as another. A relying-party policy SHOULD name the profile it requires. Profiles fall into two classes.

Table 3
Profile Class format D placement Workload measurements
direct-sev-snp A direct_sev_snp_v1 SNP REPORT_DATA (0x50..0x90) launch_measurement
direct-tdx A direct_tdx_v1 TD quote REPORTDATA (568..632) MRTD, RTMR[0..3]
azure-cvm-snp B az_cvm_snp_vtpm_v1 HCL runtime data user-data vTPM PCRs 4, 7, 11 (+12, 14, 15)
azure-cvm-tdx B az_cvm_tdx_vtpm_v1 HCL runtime data user-data vTPM PCRs 4, 7, 11 (+12, 14, 15)

The TEE type (Section 22.8) is sev_snp for the -sev-snp and -snp profiles and tdx for the -tdx profiles.

Offsets are half-open byte ranges. SNP offsets are relative to the ATTESTATION_REPORT ([AMD-SNP-ABI]); TD quote offsets are relative to an Intel DCAP v4 quote ([INTEL-TDX-DCAP]).

6.1. Class A: Direct Silicon Profiles

Class A profiles apply where the guest kernel exposes the CPU's attestation interface directly: Google Cloud confidential VMs, bare-metal hosts, and other direct-boot CVMs, through /dev/sev-guest, /dev/tdx_guest or the Linux configfs-tsm report interface ([LINUX-TSM]). The 64-octet D is the REPORT_DATA operand of the CPU's report instruction itself.

6.1.1. direct-sev-snp

  • Evidence: the 1184-octet SEV-SNP ATTESTATION_REPORT returned by SNP_GET_REPORT (/dev/sev-guest, or configfs-tsm with inblob = D) at VMPL 0, the VCEK (or VLEK) certificate, the ASK and ARK, and the ARK-signed CRL.
  • Binding: REPORT_DATA (0x50..0x90) MUST equal D.
  • Authentication: ECDSA P-384 / SHA-384 under the VCEK over 0x000..0x2A0 (signature r, s little-endian at 0x2A0, 0x2E8); ARK -> ASK -> VCEK RSASSA-PSS / SHA-384; the ARK pinned to AMD's published root for the product; a current CRL that does not list the ASK or VCEK; reported_tcb (0x180..0x188) equal to the VCEK's TCB extensions; chip_id (0x1A0..0x1E0) equal to the VCEK hwID.
  • Guest policy: GUEST_POLICY (0x08..0x10) bit 19 (DEBUG) and bit 18 (MIGRATE_MA) MUST be zero.
  • Workload: launch_measurement (0x90..0xC0) measures the initial guest image. With measured direct boot it covers firmware, kernel, initrd and command line; verifiers pin it. HOST_DATA and ID_KEY_DIGEST MAY additionally be pinned.
  • Identity key at rest: the key SHOULD be sealed under a key from MSG_KEY_REQ (SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY, sent over the VMPCK-protected guest message channel), derived from the chip's VCEK with GUEST_FIELD_SELECT including the measurement, so that only the same measured image on the same chip can unseal it.

6.1.2. direct-tdx

  • Evidence: a TD quote produced from TDG.MR.REPORT (/dev/tdx_guest, or configfs-tsm with inblob = D) by the quoting enclave, with its PCK chain and collateral (TCB info, QE identity, CRLs).
  • Binding: REPORTDATA (TD quote 568..632) MUST equal D.
  • Authentication: Intel DCAP: the quote signature under the attestation key, the QE report and QE identity, the PCK chain to the pinned Intel SGX Root CA, current CRLs and TCB info.
  • Guest policy: TD_ATTRIBUTES (168..176) bit 0 (DEBUG) MUST be zero.
  • Workload: MRTD (184..232) measures the initial TD image (the virtual firmware); RTMR[0..3] (376..568) measure firmware configuration, boot loader and kernel, and the OS. Verifiers pin MRTD and the RTMRs, the latter by replaying the event log.
  • Identity key at rest: TDX has no sealing-key derivation. The identity key is generated per boot (relying parties then pin measurements, not the key) or released by a key broker after attestation.

A host-provided vTPM, such as a Shielded VM vTPM, is outside the TEE. It MUST NOT be the only protection of a Class A identity key.

6.2. Class B: Paravisor-Mediated Profiles

On Azure confidential VMs an attested paravisor (OpenHCL) runs below the guest OS, at VMPL 0 on SEV-SNP and as the L1 VMM of a partitioned TD on TDX. The guest has no /dev/sev-guest or /dev/tdx_guest; the paravisor alone requests hardware reports and provides the guest with a vTPM. Class B profiles therefore bind D through two signed links:

  1. The paravisor's HCL report carries the hardware report whose REPORT_DATA[0..32] is SHA-256(runtime data) (REPORT_DATA[32..64] is zero). The runtime data is a JSON document holding the vTPM attestation key HCLAkPub (an RSA public key, 2048 bits or more) and user-data, which MUST equal hex(D).
  2. The vTPM signs a TPM2_Quote with that key: a TPMS_ATTEST ([TPM2]) whose extraData MUST equal SHA-256(D) and whose pcrDigest MUST equal SHA-256 over the selected PCR values.

Here launch_measurement (SNP) or MRTD (TDX) measures the paravisor, a Microsoft build that varies with the Azure host. Verifiers keep a reviewed allow-list of builds. The guest workload is measured in vTPM PCRs: PCR 4 (boot loader / UKI), PCR 7 (Secure Boot policy) and PCR 11 (UKI sections), and optionally application PCRs (for example 12, and 14 / 15 holding single extends of the server binary and configuration digests).

Azure HCL report layout (integers little-endian):

Table 4
Octets Field
0x000..0x004 "HCLA"
0x020..0x4C0 hardware report (SEV-SNP ATTESTATION_REPORT, 1184 octets)
0x4C0..0x4D4 IGVM request data: size, version, report type, hash type (1 = SHA-256), runtime data size
0x4D4..0x4D4 + size runtime data (JSON)
  • azure-cvm-snp: the SEV-SNP report at HCL 0x20 is authenticated as for direct-sev-snp, except that REPORT_DATA binds the runtime data as above.
  • azure-cvm-tdx: the HCL report carries a TD report; the TD quote is obtained from the paravisor's quote service and authenticated as for direct-tdx, with REPORTDATA[0..32] binding the runtime data.
  • Identity key at rest: the key is sealed to the vTPM under a PCR policy (for example PCRs 4, 11, 14 and 15). The vTPM's state lives in the paravisor inside the TEE.

7. Message Formats

To ensure cross-platform interoperability, OpenHTTPA defines strict formats for all wire elements.

7.1. Structured Field Values (SFV)

All OpenHTTPA headers MUST follow [RFC9651].

7.1.1. Attest-Versions

A List of tokens identifying supported protocol versions.

  • Example: Attest-Versions: openhttpa, httpa/3

7.1.2. Attest-Cipher-Suites

A List of tokens identifying supported cipher suites in order of preference.

  • Example: Attest-Cipher-Suites: X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384, X25519_AES256GCM_SHA384

7.1.3. Attest-Random

An SFV Byte Sequence containing 32 random bytes.

  • Example: Attest-Random: :b3Blbmh0dHBhLXNlY3VyZS1yYW5kb20tbm9uY2UteHh4:

7.1.4. Attest-Quotes

A List of Inner Lists. Each inner list contains a TEE type token and an SFV Byte Sequence representing the quote. The byte sequence MAY include a format parameter (e.g., format=eat) to specify the encoding of the quote; if absent, format=raw is assumed.

  • Example: Attest-Quotes: (tdx :YmFzZTY0LXF1b3RlLWJ5dGVz:;format=raw), (nvidia_gpu :Z3B1LXF1b3RlOjpieXRlcw==:)
7.1.4.1. Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Considerations

While OpenHTTPA explicitly prioritizes sub-millisecond setup performance utilizing raw hardware quotes (e.g., native Intel TDX [INTEL-TDX] or AMD SEV-SNP [AMD-SEV] binary formats) for latency-critical Agentic Swarms, it is imperative to support broader Internet interoperability.

Therefore, implementations MUST support an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [RFC9334] fallback. The client and server can negotiate the EAT format via the format=eat parameter. When EAT is utilized, hardware evidence is encapsulated within CWT/JWT structures, allowing disparate verifiers to evaluate claims using standardized engines (e.g., Veraison).

7.2. JSON Key Shares

The Attest-Key-Shares and Attest-Key-Share headers contain a JSON-encoded object with the following schema:

json { "ecdhe_public": [184, 123, 186, ...], "mlkem_public": [71, 162, 38, ...], "mlkem_ciphertext": [12, 7, 250, ...], "signature_alg": "ml-dsa-65" }

Each key is a JSON array of octet values (integers 0..255). mlkem_ciphertext is present only in the server's Attest-Key-Share. signature_alg is present when the server sends Attest-Server-Signatures; its only defined value is ml-dsa-65, and the FIPS 204 context is a parameter of that algorithm (Section 5.4), not a separate identifier. The whole JSON document is carried as an SFV Byte Sequence.

8. Test Vectors

8.1. Hybrid KEM Key Exchange

Client ECDHE Public Key:

text 7837c04985b1737863fc4bb7e3e18a0ff55dc9815865877676977f69d0c8851a

Client ML-KEM Public Key:

text 47a226263994c1677422005a2345508546a4c1049e9af576b582a2 31db5a354a5b7290a4cacc22c18322fd45729527a0b8584bfe0b12 48634f6016ad6e39ad5d229869e9cd00ba06f755557df266f0a52f 393b6734ecc4ee696f4b761b3f6088eed895ebb81f0d66c97b8361 fad9cb5583ac02a9734286bc74e28e6484bc229332e0f00c5f471a 09648610daa11e48be1cf08cc4bc84902713432468816533a24433 786c20f0231b7eac413753a3ae3a19d0c817b79451a9817f787694 2d53b6ccec6a6784c7c2d84929039a67a0c26cbb5875ba0432686f ee7227e95b14c6494c517c1214b59cbbbb06fe996447203e8fe27a 48996613674a826674564a4c11c5055e3679d686b30233a84c4ab4 6c07c764fcbc4a646972dc16c895bdde9c575d86bcd3d35baf3952 0e967d286c8af44763a856926e7534a4f488ca403e1bb7baff4c6d 41230f67a590453891fc6730d63bcac141954d32ae37ebca96b244 09922a234b3b486c3f9a602e13337ae9f1a4a8c2137ac6481f32bb 7e34cd3f97cd00d9ae92dc187fb00c78384b669443d2377e79b82f 5890037fcacd64952003b1b3589968b3725763f79f4618491bb274 26e96fac824dbe93828bea31572a8852139e46806121652c7673ce 1b659e8249bcc102ac39a768322a62f85b6b25c74a12126336d05d a992c8a0729e7f97909591c816b0c98366600fa7053c29c530a546 c3c92b705144f153b949f6bf9a43cbb2141572c9251b43c3507769 78b8cdb19ba642695c3242207260934dd1707d12662a666790bb68 16292f67cc19a416c17a01828be46005dc6b1319b551899044b44c 8bc80b0ac329e61c60a00279ac87a5ff03697d501c9d79b6945a0b 04e95f8654ad8f5b72e431b339a909fb5cce6652991762cf377800 9fd53e0896b47c725b9ddbbc9ae63b6e1b8ff184880b156b4b3626 d6cb9ebd8b37ba5b63bada72fdd58adff49be0f736242bb219b643 0f700d99c5a87d8109ede8211c5bc5fb85762b843c9e6aa9750685 d5f4442b9ba0d3e07fa7f10628abaaefd0555d63cd437b3ea36894 bd21731763b194c0a1f9746838845bfaf8159278b255f14bdd00ac 82e05b2d90cd52f57388b8036c7ac0feccc0a3b975419756e8bb5d e36ba25bf18dc1931663f3afaf08c9f4d7b533097723f1a3be260f d34ac968795f82c51ebb5b081385546c82a41924ac7ac672b5ec61 78b3310661b9017a8f37823f1da3cf7c384e00389685ac584b0b33 9f96899b707d4928a5831972479750a39ac6852514a96b9f81f541 b6cba6aea7a23f911c939b050f9b239026c825b4b7b978cbb10951 a7d3bccd442641a184e5425a0224421d48c082acc8afc215e0aa20 1cca63bfd056678b311cbc0fcbb5144320a91a963952b227b3a8cf a71c562cb5a844295c2e20520118943bc6bdf50392f8391f9d81ca bf18c82c1ba194a27131b16b06952b80d4055e0a6767431cd0f61f ba43698b590912c2b6463688bfd99e099a4519061ea4230e72b794 c9114fd91c59a5c8585ed65f622a42004c6e11b086db272bbcb4c5 3c7c8abcfa69d730bfe0b4857bd61c0f6a37be496e0063a5dc6145 e26a4f931b3e261a52233244a6028c34b2ccadea1c400df39ed0a8 f8c4047ed3ceeda48a6d7b29a0553d35706fde12858da5

Server ECDHE Public Key:

text cfff07624272cf8303edd7d71ea3bea1b359008c321ae06f076ed52200047418

Server ML-KEM Ciphertext:

text 34b21199544efdba9cb4a0f832f61cf922983b52c7c3d042484986 26d1e0a17565e81581a1d0017f453cb3bb19acf5c2f6340b338114 e460a222bf0b1d339299820ab97e1b7645b0bf2b6ed917dc9c0093 5d3acf1a829155e1df2651785c8e91205b95f48d77198cd77854e2 92f84ee483d0ad97075d175e346c4a5c261746f2116b5b5b176401 cd37f7521a277705bb1574e0a6f8e9614d8691a78bef730f93e04c b10f114cc217550f083ab6a51b7ef1388026af3ca9b9f191127ff3 dde9aa8f4e7ed8d30bd948fde3f8348a3506be7b1cee85f670379d 17af5b5ac797a4987356d500444c01f145c2ddbb3ecbb54ac08456 ee07ae8770156b0a303c4841ccc6f03e82d79dfb3b78a2d7f15c6f c79af454e051a80cb7508474d2fdbdf400100fea583316854d28e5 faee57cd7ce15dbd3609d14d16f4b7944c43d35e2afc0d5c443c69 125a471405215fde928dd27b26bd641dce55e78d1d4c1ed12f9d09 f03ffc6698f1573659c72ace12ff8428d972db6381727b40097c4f ae0a1b89faf7e0e8371dc451c2221120be73731cc5428cff83ee09 d212df32020af7677c24973796970480d647c24f5d88f4a33b4e6f f77e3db809d9ae8684ed31a4075b536aeb8f789ce65075c7096cfe de20377cc9b4ff47973c22a0d9aa429207d36fc0a3ea24ca3c0b92 c93af6a31f87cea8b20bdd81cb63db603bd3f012697194bb2f3068 592b331a81ecd589510902d0356ef88c107b154b52e5617e2859a0 1b3f40151c7067221328f53f2f84429f4ccd99eb4981f96fcaae5f 30f4caa1dd66eee2902714c35f4eacc0e7a32a382a36ca4ce532c4 89471d39b21ad1d9be3edc8dd5df16572fc93dbbd4f06cfab00bad fd313e0b6b09c0dac2c491b70edf5eb3170cd65e6f72219496c986 637676d6c80a2f6197c60c854f297476c05ef4565d5b9ddd2b79ea 2e04ea0107d64a53fdb0d485f83983957b6985b36d1a6e24a062b5 fd15fb9c20a00a74f2a8146f0c2d0c611d272d5d65c0495d954349 542e94c5e23bd37ceaf5cc512a1c49ce84c08d7de7ff5015a1e42c 2c9ea65e0f9187b20c1576daaad1fe1203975bbd611d52ca71eb22 85e026c0f4cb166740f68158516d5e0484a7097c00bc8a8370b00f 3fa1673be7f27ef098f664dd0406dbcca7e11cae9ce27b0dd4cb31 4c098b65ab9f698c0ebd9ca23969a1bdb7e1cf9a15dcbfac5d935c 785d7b94fd77fe862d9c149666b8ea4bd75116fb4da8dd3510be5a 2b2cf2cd5f158bcdbcf567d8c2a4288120db5fa459f54f2c8188d9 61436219ac5d2da7dea94246f2aa6dc3a165cc6a8ceaa45a62b303 f4dd7d6dddfeb7f02beba9a41e22b60d006f6cb6ed2f9b17a3d4a1 2d200d1b432f9e08d629418a625f0f5dad3b6af69ca167d58aac86 88eb20ab4ea5e68d589aa89f6da920decf07d382a2ac4937df1f23 6da2316174ef70b145c211e1a002201079c507d4ca4d5867acfdd5 b32619e192928522cefc4f943e552f349000a3fb092274bb09de10 5b7905edff03f7ad

Combined Hybrid Secret (IKM):

text 0f59c9666c406b1623a6759955670303871d1d7edd333596df998f8e2c5bef58

8.1.1. Derived Session Keys

Transcript Hash (All Zeros for Test Vector):

text 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000

Master Secret:

text e4c42f6ce7dd16b5d7c0dbbe632df194df2c66c2c23684149915028d521f120c aa4ba423f91a7c33e508c301ee828b58

Client Write Key:

text 00b0652de62e2ca2a59b9278c0394968fcf8f3c51201673f48b60aaa6025ce17

Server Write Key:

text 45682e8d7d91daae8ed44f309fb141e3f1feb3a7809139d86b818e7d42a58caa

Client MAC Key:

text b027a1f5a0a45b5298bc3c97078d5914e8e924b426dcd5d2b96b47b0521a307e

Server MAC Key:

text f66f2e32e43af2be6775ebb2c5915f0c98fe1e5c54c68320447964d7a70ac80f

8.2. Live SEV-SNP Session (azure-cvm-snp)

The following values come from a full handshake captured on 2026-11-07 from a sealed server on an Azure Standard_DC2as_v6 (AMD Genoa) confidential VM. The raw record (openhttpa-audit-v1) is published with the reference implementation as crates/openhttpa-proxy/tests/fixtures/audit-real-snp.jsonl in openhttpa-proxy-rs. It holds the exact ATTEST request and response heads, the HCL report, the AMD certificates and CRL, and the vTPM quote. Two independent verifiers reproduce every value from the raw octets: the Rust audit-verify and a Python verifier built on a separate FIPS 204 implementation. The server predates Section 5.4, so sigma_T and sigma_E use the empty context.

text cipher suite X25519_ML_KEM768_AES256GCM_SHA384 (0x0001), version openhttpa (0x02) T 81afcdcfd70104103b2c1d6d2af4afe032d9dc5c6c60396a 540512b208635e1fa415e9baee5e95336610c91d3017565a R c4a0116b6148c1010ff944789397518518e10714e21a6b7a0ad40c09dd11cefb 32c1b362b527653335a8f8e8edbeffab56bf9ade6f20abbe697bee92e0dc6cc6 SHA-256(id_pub) 8a37a18ca11a2c83a45a617ba6761a8aab4b4ca439f7a27e2bb0db0a88fe031e issued_unix 1794078158 epoch_nonce 1c8afeedccb3596bf38608cea7944b492575dabe27b16d82825ef5209d6f7dff E 0fddd7b956d5ea4bdb70b1c7719caba6715c1af5f3e79c08b8ee3c7d3d492bee 75af895b7bf84db178b48dfd51649a74991de815ad259e1fc69bc96fd48be144 D (= user-data) bf741b488801e0dab629405786c303dadd816cd30d9c75d85cfa1b97f1f9dc38 00a015389124496b08749f1f347a47d22156aa3e1b0785bade896dcec0b3827a REPORT_DATA[0..32] = SHA-256(runtime data) 3ee66cf1b2857b24481a547a4c818e15666653e69f152f24c340d976920bd658 launch_measurement (paravisor) 6587d41e46995d71808f7d92d859e0ed093bea3c55a342c866a20cd1a213ae4e 20241bdbc44d5255222da65cce1c7f48 GUEST_POLICY 0x3001f (DEBUG = 0, MIGRATE_MA = 0); VMPL 0 reported_tcb bootloader 12, TEE 0, SNP 28, microcode 88 (equal to the VCEK's) ABI (GUEST_POLICY) 0.31

8.2.1. TCB Levels Across Hosts

A second capture, made on 2026-11-08 during a cross-silicon run of [OHMP], carries the same paravisor launch_measurement (6587d41e...7f48) but reports bootloader 10, TEE 0, SNP 23, microcode 84, ABI 0.31. In that run three Intel TDX Root-MAs (2-of-3 quorum) and an Intel TDX Delegate-MA in Azure westus3 endorsed an AMD SEV-SNP workload in eastus2. The record is published as crates/openhttpa-proxy/tests/fixtures/ohmp-real-silicon/ in openhttpa-proxy-rs at commit 2af53dc.

The two servers ran on different Genoa chips, with different VCEKs. A cloud provider updates PSP firmware and microcode host by host, so reported_tcb differs between hosts, clusters and regions even for an identical guest image. Two rules bind the value:

  • The VCEK is issued for one chip at one TCB. Its AMD KDS extensions 1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.1.3.1 (bootloader), .3.2 (TEE), .3.3 (SNP) and .3.8 (microcode), plus .3.9 (FMC) on Turin, carry those levels. A verifier MUST require reported_tcb to equal them, as in both captures; otherwise a report could claim levels its chip key was never issued for.
  • The minimum acceptable TCB is policy. Under [OHMP] the Delegate-MA appraises evidence against per-component floors (min_bootloader, min_tee, min_snp, min_microcode_svn, min_abi_major, min_abi_minor) and endorses only evidence that meets every one. A fleet floor is the lowest TCB the operator accepts on any host. A floor copied from the first host, here 12/0/28/88, would refuse the 10/0/23/84 host, though it runs the same image.

8.3. Binary Trailer Layouts

Trailers MUST use big-endian encoding for all numeric fields.

8.3.1. Attest-Ticket (Request Trailer)

Used in TrR (Phase 4) to authenticate the request.

  • nonce: 8 bytes (big-endian u64).
  • mac: Variable length (based on cipher suite, e.g., 48 bytes for SHA-384).

8.3.2. Attest-Binder (Response Trailer)

Used in TrR (Phase 4) to bind the response to the request.

  • request_nonce: 8 bytes (big-endian u64, echo of request nonce).
  • mac: Variable length.

9. Protocol State Machine

Implementations MUST maintain a session state machine to ensure correct sequencing of handshake and trusted request phases.

9.1. Client State Machine

Table 5
Current State Event Next State Action
START Send OPTIONS PREFLIGHT Wait for preflight response
PREFLIGHT Recv 204 IDLE Parse supported versions/TEEs
IDLE Send ATTEST HANDSHAKE Generate KEM pair, send shares
HANDSHAKE Recv 200 ESTABLISHED Verify quotes, derive keys
ESTABLISHED Send TrR ESTABLISHED Encrypt body, add AHL binder

9.2. Server State Machine

Table 6
Current State Event Next State Action
START Recv OPTIONS START Send supported capabilities
START Recv ATTEST HANDSHAKE Pick suite/version, generate KEM
HANDSHAKE Send 200 ESTABLISHED Send quotes/shares, derive keys
ESTABLISHED Recv TrR ESTABLISHED Verify AHL, decrypt body

10. Cryptography

OpenHTTPA mandates high-assurance primitives and constructions to protect against both classical and future quantum adversaries. All signatures MUST use ML-DSA-65 or higher for post-quantum identity assurance.

10.1. Hybrid KEM Combiner

To achieve IND-CCA2 security, OpenHTTPA implements a hybrid combiner following [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design] Section 3.2.

10.1.1. Combiner Input (IKM)

The Input Key Material (IKM) binds all public material from the exchange. All length prefixes (u16) MUST be encoded as Big-Endian (network byte order):

text IKM = ECDHE_SS || ML-KEM_SS || u16(len(label)) || label || u16(len(ECDHE_PK_client)) || ECDHE_PK_client || u16(len(ECDHE_PK_server)) || ECDHE_PK_server || u16(len(ML-KEM_EK_client)) || ML-KEM_EK_client || u16(len(ML-KEM_CT)) || ML-KEM_CT

The label MUST be b"openhttpa hybrid kem v1".

10.1.2. Combined Secret Derivation

  1. PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt=[0;32], IKM)
  2. Secret = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info=b"combined", 32)

10.2. Session Key Schedule

The key schedule follows [RFC5869] and is aligned with [RFC9846] Section 7.1.

10.2.1. HKDF-Extract

text Handshake_PRK = HKDF-Extract(Hash=SHA-384, salt=[0x00;48], IKM=combined_secret)

10.2.2. HKDF-Expand

text OKM = HKDF-Expand(Hash=SHA-384, PRK=Handshake_PRK, info=b"openhttpa v2 " || label || transcript_hash, L=<length>)

The fixed 48-byte length of the transcript_hash (SHA-384 output) ensures unambiguous domain separation between the label and the transcript_hash without the need for a delimiter.

10.3. Key Schedule Visualization

The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical derivation of session keys:

text Combined Hybrid Secret | HKDF-Extract(salt=[0;48]) | Handshake_PRK / | \ \ HKDF-Expand HKDF-Expand HKDF-Expand HKDF-Expand (Label=Master) (Label=Write) (Label=MAC) (Label=Res Master) | | | | Master Secret Write Keys MAC Keys Resumption (C->S, S->C) (C->S, S->C) Master Secret

11. Session Resumption (TrR)

To avoid the computational overhead of hybrid KEM handshakes, OpenHTTPA supports session resumption using opaque tickets.

11.1. Ticket Format

The Attest-Ticket-Resumption header contains a server-encrypted blob (AtST) containing:

  • Protocol Version: 1 byte.
  • Cipher Suite: 2 bytes (big-endian).
  • Master Secret: 48 bytes (from the original session).
  • Session Expiry: 8 bytes (Unix timestamp).
  • Hardware Context: Opaque TEE measurement/policy record.

11.2. 0-RTT Confidentiality

To achieve the required < 5ms overhead SLA in distributed Agentic Swarms, clients MAY utilize 0-RTT session resumption. By reusing the Master Secret and TEE state from a previously established 1-RTT handshake (via the Attest-Ticket), the client can transmit encrypted Trusted Requests (TrR) within the first flight of a connection (e.g., within HTTP/3 QUIC early data).

11.2.1. 0-RTT Cryptographic Binding

  1. The client derives an early Handshake_PRK using the decoupled Resumption Master Secret from the opaque ticket.
  2. Early session keys are expanded utilizing a specialized label: openhttpa_v2_0rtt and a newly generated 16-byte random salt.
  3. The server validates the ticket, enforces safe methods, and transparently decrypts the 0-RTT request.

11.2.2. 0-RTT Forward Secrecy Limitations

Similar to TLS 1.3 early data (Section 8 of [RFC9846]), 0-RTT requests do not provide perfect forward secrecy against an attacker who compromises the Resumption Master Secret of the parent session. If the server's long-term hardware secrets or the specific session's resumption secret are compromised, the 0-RTT data sent on that connection could be decrypted. Clients SHOULD NOT send highly sensitive data (e.g., identity credentials or financial transactions) in 0-RTT payloads.

11.2.3. 0-RTT Replay Protection

0-RTT resumption MUST ONLY be permitted for safe, idempotent HTTP methods (e.g., GET, HEAD, OPTIONS). If a client attempts to use 0-RTT with an unsafe method (e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE), the server MUST reject the request and return a 425 Too Early status code.

Furthermore, because 0-RTT payloads are susceptible to network-level replays before the server can inject a fresh nonce, the server MUST maintain a sliding-window strike register (replay cache) of all nonces observed across all recently active resumed sessions within the ticket expiry window.

12. Agentic Swarms & Multi-Hop Provenance

Autonomous Agentic Swarms require mutually authenticated, hardware-verified communication channels to perform automated transactions without human oversight. OpenHTTPA enables an Attested Agent Mesh (AAM) by maintaining cryptographic provenance across multi-hop agent delegations.

12.1. Attest-Provenance

The Attest-Provenance header provides a chain of custody representing all participating agents in a multi-hop request. Each agent in the routing path MUST append its own hardware identity (derived from its TEE quote) to the provenance list before forwarding the request.

  • Example: Attest-Provenance: "agent-a-hash", "agent-b-hash"

This enables the final receiving service to mathematically verify not only the immediate sender, but the entire chain of trust, ensuring no unverified intermediary altered the request.

13. Confidential Oracle Extension

The OpenHTTPA Confidential Oracle Extension enables a TEE-based agent to act as a "Trustless Bridge" between Web2 APIs and Web3 environments (e.g., Bitcoin, EVM). This extension ensures that off-chain data is fetched, processed, and cryptographically bound to the hardware evidence before being transmitted to an on-chain verifier.

13.1. Protocol Binding

When an Oracle fetch is performed, the TEE MUST bind the resulting data to the current AtHS session transcript. This is achieved by computing a SHA-512 digest over the full transcript_hash combined with a domain prefix, and placing it in the 64-byte hardware report data (e.g., the REPORT_DATA field in Intel TDX or REPORT_DATA in Intel SGX).

The 64-byte ReportData structure is defined as follows:

text ReportData = SHA-512(Domain_Prefix || Transcript_Hash)

The Domain_Prefix MUST be the ASCII string "openhttpa hs server" or "openhttpa hs client"; ReportData is the handshake binding value R of the normative core. The value placed in hardware evidence is the binding digest D derived from it (Section 5.3), carried as the evidence's Attestation Profile defines (Section 6). A full SHA-512 output fills the 64-octet REPORT_DATA register without truncation (see Hash Strength in Security Considerations for its classical and quantum bounds).

13.2. On-Chain Verification

The Oracle response incorporates a hardware quote and, optionally, a ZK-STARK proof (e.g., generated via RISC Zero) that proves the integrity of the data transformation. Smart contracts verify:

  1. Handshake Consistency: The transcript_hash in the quote matches the session.
  2. Hardware Integrity: The quote was generated by a valid TEE (verified via DCAP/SNP).
  3. Data Correctness: The ZK proof (if present) confirms that the Web2 payload correctly corresponds to the claimed on-chain state.

14. Semantic Binding via AHL

The Attested Header List (AHL) prevents semantic re-routing attacks.

14.1. AHL Transcript Construction

The AHL transcript MUST use length-prefixed binary fields:

text AHL_Transcript = 7::method || len(method_val) || : || method_val || 5::path || len(path_val) || : || path_val || 10::authority || len(authority_val) || : || authority_val || [ len(HEADER_NAME_N) || HEADER_NAME_N || len(HEADER_VALUE_N) || : || HEADER_VALUE_N ... ]

Header names MUST be converted to lowercase ASCII and then sorted lexicographically before encoding, similar to the canonicalization rules in HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421).

14.2. Binder Calculation

Binder = HMAC-SHA-384(mac_key, AHL_Transcript)

The mac_key used depends on the sender: the client MUST use the client_mac_key, and the server MUST use the server_mac_key.

15. Error Handling

OpenHTTPA implementations MUST use appropriate HTTP status codes and extended error headers.

Table 7
Error Condition Status Code Extended Error Code
No Mutually Supported Suite 406 negotiation_failed
Attestation Verification Fail 403 handshake_integrity_failed
Key Derivation Failure 500 key_derivation_failed
Policy Violation (e.g. SVN) 403 policy_violation

16. Formal Verification and Implementation Considerations

To guarantee the high-assurance required for Confidential AI and Web3 Oracles, implementations of OpenHTTPA SHOULD adhere to the following strict guidelines:

  1. Formal Modeling: Core protocol models MUST maintain ongoing machine-checked formal verification (using frameworks like ProVerif [ProVerif] or Tamarin [Tamarin]) proving perfect forward secrecy and injective authentication against both classical and post-quantum Dolev-Yao adversaries.
  2. Memory Safety: Implementations SHOULD be authored in memory-safe languages (e.g., Rust) to eliminate classes of vulnerabilities related to buffer manipulation during parsing of untrusted network inputs.
  3. FIPS 140-3 Readiness: Underlying cryptographic primitives and random number generators MUST be sourced from validated or validateable modules (e.g., aws-lc-rs or BoringSSL) to ensure enterprise compliance.

17. Security Considerations

17.1. Transcript Integrity

OpenHTTPA relies on the integrity of the handshake transcript. Every field in the transcript, including nonces, public keys, and negotiated parameters, MUST be length-prefixed to prevent canonicalization attacks.

17.2. Hardware Splitting Attacks

Implementations MUST verify that the same transcript hash is bound to all hardware quotes provided in the Attest-Quotes header (e.g., both Host CPU and GPU quotes).

17.3. TEE Vulnerabilities and Revocation

The protocol supports Attestation Revocation Lists (ARL) and Secure Version Number (SVN) enforcement to mitigate TEE-specific vulnerabilities.

17.4. Replay Protection

To prevent replay attacks during the Trusted Request (TrR) phase, servers MUST mandate strict replay protection for the nonce provided in the Attest-Ticket request trailer. The server MUST either enforce a strictly increasing monotonic counter for nonces within a session, or maintain a sliding-window strike register (replay cache) of recently seen nonces.

In large-scale distributed deployments where global state synchronization is impractical within latency bounds, servers MAY utilize clustered strike registers combined with strictly bounded time-windows, or issue single-use session tickets for 0-RTT to mitigate the complexity of distributed replay detection.

17.5. Hybrid Threat Model: Post-Quantum Session, Classical Silicon Roots

OpenHTTPA protects the session with post-quantum primitives, but the hardware evidence beneath it is signed with classical ones:

Table 8
Layer Primitive Quantum status
Key exchange X25519 + ML-KEM-768 (or P-384 + ML-KEM-1024), hybrid post-quantum
Server identity ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204 contexts (Section 5.4) post-quantum
AMD roots ARK / ASK RSA-4096 (PSS), VCEK ECDSA P-384 classical
Intel roots PCK chain and attestation key, ECDSA P-256 classical
Azure vTPM (Class B) AK RSA 2048 bits or more (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) classical

The consequences:

  • Recorded traffic stays confidential against a future quantum adversary while either component of the hybrid KEM holds. The attestation signatures do not protect confidentiality.
  • Attestation authenticity is classical. An adversary able to forge a vendor signature can present evidence for a TEE that does not exist and impersonate a server to clients that have not pinned its identity key. No post-quantum attestation root is offered by AMD, Intel or Microsoft today. A 2048-bit RSA AK offers roughly 112-bit classical security.
  • Pinning id_pub makes later sessions post-quantum authenticated. A client that verified the identity key once, while the classical roots were trustworthy, and then pins it relies only on ML-DSA-65 for authentication.
  • Short epochs (Section 5.5) limit how long one set of evidence stands for many sessions.

17.6. Hash Strength

R, E and D are SHA-512 outputs. Their collision resistance is 256 bits classically and about 2^171 operations against the Brassard-Hoyer-Tapp algorithm; their preimage resistance against Grover's algorithm is about 2^256. Draft -01 overstated the quantum collision bound as 256 bits.

17.7. Signature Domain Separation

Every ML-DSA-65 signature made with an identity key carries a role-specific FIPS 204 context (Section 5.4). The separation therefore rests on the signature scheme rather than on message shape, and new roles MUST define new contexts.

17.8. Profile Confusion

A verifier MUST dispatch on the profile before parsing (Section 6). Class B evidence read as Class A would be checked for REPORT_DATA = D while it holds SHA-256(runtime data), and the reverse would skip the vTPM links. Policies SHOULD name the profile they require.

17.9. Identity Keys at Rest

The identity key is only as protected as its sealing. On Class B profiles it is sealed to the vTPM inside the TEE under a PCR policy. On direct-sev-snp it is sealed under a MSG_KEY_REQ derived key bound to the launch measurement. direct-tdx has no hardware sealing, so the key is per boot or broker-released. A key sealed only to a host-provided vTPM is exposed to the host. The wire never shows how a key is sealed; that follows from the measured image the policy pins.

17.10. Raw Wire Auditability

A client MAY record each handshake as an openhttpa-audit-v1 record: the exact ATTEST request and response heads, the evidence they carry, and the AEAD framing (AAD, ticket counter, length and tag, never plaintext) of the first encrypted exchanges. Anyone can then re-verify the record offline from its octets alone: the transcript, D, both signatures and every vendor link. The recorder's capture time is not authenticated, but issued_unix is covered by E, which the hardware evidence binds.

17.11. Field Spoofing

The OpenHTTPA-* fields (Section 22.3) are set only by an OpenHTTPA proxy for its local consumer or for the origin it serves. A proxy MUST remove every field in the namespace, under both the OpenHTTPA- and X-OpenHTTPA- spellings and in any letter case, from requests and responses it relays before it adds its own. A consumer MUST NOT trust these fields on traffic that did not pass through its own proxy.

18. Privacy Considerations

18.1. Attestation Fingerprinting

Hardware attestation quotes MAY contain unique identifiers (e.g., CPU serial numbers, unique entity IDs) that allow for the tracking and fingerprinting of TEE instances. Implementations SHOULD use privacy-preserving attestation technologies, such as Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) or Intel SGX Quote Verification Enclaves, to minimize the exposure of stable hardware identifiers.

18.2. Provenance Tracking

The Attest-Provenance header provides a chain of custody for multi-hop agent delegation. While essential for security auditing, this chain reveals the topology of the agent mesh. Implementations MUST ensure that provenance data is only transmitted within established OpenHTTPA sessions to prevent leakage to unauthorized observers.

19. Implementation Status

This section records the implementation status as of November 2026.

20. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the contributors to the OpenHTTPA Foundation and the IETF Security area for their feedback on early iterations of this protocol.

21. Contributors

The following individuals have contributed to the design and implementation of OpenHTTPA and its predecessor HTTPA/2:

22. IANA Considerations

This document is published on the Independent Submission Stream. In line with [RFC8726], it requests assignments only from existing registries whose policy is not IETF Review or Standards Action, and it does not ask IANA to create any new registry. The identifier namespaces it defines (attestation profiles, HKDF labels, TEE types and extended error codes) are specified by this document alone and are listed below for reference only. A future IETF-stream specification may request IANA registries for them.

22.1. HTTP Method ATTEST

The "HTTP Method Registry" requires IETF Review ([RFC9110], Section 16.1.1), which is not available to Independent Stream documents. This document therefore makes no IANA request for the ATTEST method. ATTEST is used experimentally and is unregistered; its registration is left to a future IETF-stream specification. Its properties are:

Table 9
Method Safe Idempotent Reference
ATTEST No No This document

22.2. HTTP Field Name Registry

This document requests the registration of the following headers in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry":

Table 10
Field Name Template Reference
Attest-Cipher-Suites SFV This document
Attest-Supported-Cipher-Suites SFV This document
Attest-Cipher-Suite SFV This document
Attest-Supported-Groups SFV This document
Attest-Key-Shares SFV This document
Attest-Key-Share SFV This document
Attest-Random SFV This document
Attest-Encrypted-Hello SFV This document
Attest-Policies SFV This document
Attest-Base-Creation SFV This document
Attest-Blocklist SFV This document
Attest-Versions SFV This document
Attest-Supported-Versions SFV This document
Attest-Date SFV This document
Attest-Signatures SFV This document
Attest-Server-Signatures SFV This document
Attest-Transport SFV This document
Attest-Quotes SFV This document
Attest-Base-ID SFV This document
Attest-Version SFV This document
Attest-Expires SFV This document
Attest-Secrets SFV This document
Attest-Cargo SFV This document
Attest-Ticket SFV This document
Attest-Binder SFV This document
Attest-Base-Termination SFV This document
Attest-Challenge SFV This document
Attest-Provenance SFV This document
Attest-Ticket-Resumption SFV This document
Attest-Zk-Proof SFV This document
Attest-Ai-Provenance-Proof SFV This document

22.3. HTTP Field Name Registry: OpenHTTPA Fields

This document requests registration of the following fields in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" ([RFC9110], Section 16.3.1). In line with [RFC6648], the names carry no X- prefix. Deployed implementations also send each field under the alias X-OpenHTTPA-<name> with the same value during a transition period. Recipients SHOULD prefer the unprefixed field, and proxies MUST treat both spellings as reserved (see Field Spoofing). The aliases are not registered.

Table 11
Field Name Status Structured Type Reference Comments
OpenHTTPA-Verified provisional   This document true when the response came through a verified session; false on an unattested path
OpenHTTPA-Attestation-Type provisional   This document Attestation profile identifier of the verified peer, or none
OpenHTTPA-Measurement provisional   This document JSON object of the verified measurements
OpenHTTPA-Sealed-Key-Fingerprint provisional   This document Hex SHA-256 of the peer's identity public key id_pub
OpenHTTPA-Upstream-Endpoint provisional   This document host:port of the attested server that served the response
OpenHTTPA-Error provisional   This document Token naming why a request was refused (for example NoRoute)

The values predate Structured Fields and are not defined as such.

22.4. The httpa URI Scheme

This document requests provisional registration of the httpa URI scheme per [RFC7595], Section 7.4:

  • Scheme name: httpa
  • Status: Provisional
  • Applications/protocols that use this scheme name: OpenHTTPA (this document). An httpa URI identifies a resource that MUST be retrieved over an OpenHTTPA session. A client MUST complete an AtHS with the authority, and verify its evidence under an Attestation Profile, before sending any request for the resource. The syntax is that of https ([RFC9110], Section 4.2.2); the default port is 443.
  • Contact: Gordon King gordon@openhttpa.org
  • Change controller: The OpenHTTPA Foundation
  • References: This document

22.5. ALPN Protocol ID

This document requests registration of the following value in the "TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry ([RFC7301]):

  • Protocol: OpenHTTPA version 1
  • Identification Sequence: 0x68 0x74 0x74 0x70 0x61 0x2F 0x31 ("httpa/1")
  • Reference: This document

A server that negotiates httpa/1 requires an AtHS before it processes any request on the connection.

  • Open issue: neither the httpa scheme nor the httpa/1 ALPN ID is used by the reference implementation yet. httpa/1 is also the Attest-Versions token of protocol version 1, whereas the current version is openhttpa. A future revision will decide whether the ALPN ID tracks the version token.

22.6. OpenHTTPA Attestation Profile Identifiers

This document defines the following Attestation Profile identifiers. No IANA registry is requested. A new profile MUST specify all five elements of Section 6. An entry records the identifier, class, TEE type token, format label, a description and a reference. Identifiers are lowercase ASCII letters, digits and hyphens.

Table 12
Identifier Class TEE Type Format Description Reference
direct-sev-snp A sev_snp direct_sev_snp_v1 AMD SEV-SNP via /dev/sev-guest or configfs-tsm; REPORT_DATA = D This document
direct-tdx A tdx direct_tdx_v1 Intel TDX via /dev/tdx_guest or configfs-tsm; REPORTDATA = D This document
azure-cvm-snp B sev_snp az_cvm_snp_vtpm_v1 AMD SEV-SNP behind Azure OpenHCL with a vTPM This document
azure-cvm-tdx B tdx az_cvm_tdx_vtpm_v1 Intel TDX behind Azure OpenHCL with a vTPM This document

22.7. OpenHTTPA HKDF Labels

To prevent namespace collisions with TLS, this document defines the following labels for HKDF expansion in OpenHTTPA. No IANA registry is requested.

Table 13
Label DTLS-OK Reference
openhttpa_v2 Y This document
openhttpa_v2_0rtt Y This document

Furthermore, the following specific key slots are logically prefixed by the protocol label:

  • master secret
  • res master
  • client write key
  • server write key
  • client write iv
  • server write iv
  • client mac key
  • server mac key

22.8. TEE Types

This document defines the following OpenHTTPA TEE type tokens. No IANA registry is requested.

Table 14
TEE Type Token Description Reference
sgx Intel SGX (Software Guard Ext) This document
tdx Intel TDX (Trust Domain Ext) This document
sev_snp AMD SEV-SNP This document
trustzone Arm TrustZone This document
nvidia_gpu NVIDIA Hopper/Blackwell GPU This document
tpm Trusted Platform Module 2.0 This document

22.9. OpenHTTPA Extended Error Codes

This document defines the following OpenHTTPA extended error codes. No IANA registry is requested.

Table 15
Error Code Description Reference
negotiation_failed No mutually supported cipher suite or version. This document
handshake_integrity_failed Quote verification or transcript MAC failed. This document
key_derivation_failed Failed to derive hybrid key schedule. This document
policy_violation Client/Server policy rejected the hardware. This document

23. Strategic Future

23.1. HTTPA/3 (QUIC)

OpenHTTPA is designed for transport-independence, with HTTP/3 (QUIC) being the primary high-performance target. Future iterations of the protocol will leverage QUIC's stream-level isolation and connection migration to support massive-scale agentic meshes.

24. References

24.1. Normative References

[FIPS-203]
NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", .
[FIPS-204]
NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", .
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5869]
Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.
[RFC6648]
Saint-Andre, P., Crocker, D., and M. Nottingham, "Deprecating the "X-" Prefix and Similar Constructs in Application Protocols", BCP 178, RFC 6648, DOI 10.17487/RFC6648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6648>.
[RFC7301]
Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7301>.
[RFC7595]
Thaler, D., Ed., Hansen, T., and T. Hardie, "Guidelines and Registration Procedures for URI Schemes", BCP 35, RFC 7595, DOI 10.17487/RFC7595, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7595>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9110]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
[RFC9651]
Nottingham, M. and P. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for HTTP", RFC 9651, DOI 10.17487/RFC9651, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9651>.
[RFC9846]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.

24.2. Informative References

[AMD-SEV]
AMD, "AMD SEV-SNP: Strengthening VM Isolation with Integrity Protection and More", n.d..
[AMD-SNP-ABI]
AMD, "SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification", n.d..
[I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16>.
[I-D.sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2]
Wang, H., King, G., Li, N., Smith, N., and K. Sandowicz, "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Attestable (HTTPA) Version 2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sandowicz-httpbis-httpa2-03>.
[INTEL-TDX]
Intel, "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)", n.d..
[INTEL-TDX-DCAP]
Intel, "Intel TDX DCAP Quoting Library API", n.d..
[LINUX-TSM]
The Linux Kernel Organization, "Linux configfs-tsm: Trusted Security Module report interface", n.d..
[OHMP]
King, G., "OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP) and Transparency Log", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-openhttpa-ohmp-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-openhttpa-ohmp-00>.
[ProVerif]
Blanchet, B., "ProVerif: Cryptographic Protocol Verifier in the Formal Model", n.d..
[RFC8726]
Farrel, A., "How Requests for IANA Action Will Be Handled on the Independent Stream", RFC 8726, DOI 10.17487/RFC8726, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8726>.
[Tamarin]
Tamarin Team, "The Tamarin Prover for symbolic analysis of security protocols", n.d..
[TPM2]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library, Part 2: Structures", n.d..

Appendix A. Changes Since draft-openhttpa-protocol-01

Authors' Addresses

Gordon King
OpenHTTPA Foundation
United States
Hans Wang
OpenHTTPA Foundation
United States