<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
  <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.0.2) -->


<!DOCTYPE rfc  [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">

<!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6648 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6648.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6838 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6838.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8174 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8615 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8615.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8785 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8785.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC8949 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8949.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC9110 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9110.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC9162 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9162.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC7942 SYSTEM "https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7942.xml">
]>


<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-openhttpa-ohmp-00" category="exp" submissionType="independent">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OHMP and OHMP-TL">OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP) and Transparency Log</title>

    <author initials="G." surname="King" fullname="Gordon King">
      <organization>OpenHTTPA Foundation</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United States</country>
        </postal>
        <email>gordon@openhttpa.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    
    
    

    <abstract>

<t>This document specifies the OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP), a distributed, zero-trust attestation protocol operating over the OpenHTTPA transport layer. OHMP replaces static, manually pinned measurement configurations with a hierarchy of hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Measurement Authorities. To ensure split-view resistance and cryptographic accountability, OHMP integrates OHMP-TL, an append-only binary Merkle Transparency Log requiring M-of-N multi-cloud threshold signatures.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>In confidential computing and zero-trust architectures, Relying Parties must verify the hardware cryptographic evidence (e.g., AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX quotes) presented by workloads. Pinning exact launch measurements locally does not scale with continuous integration, paravisor updates, or dynamic scaling. OHMP solves this by delegating policy appraisal to a hierarchy of TEE-hosted Measurement Authorities over OpenHTTPA.</t>

<section anchor="requirements-language"><name>Requirements Language</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="ohmp-trust-architecture"><name>OHMP Trust Architecture</name>

<t>OHMP establishes a 3-tier hierarchy:
1. <strong>Root-MA Quorum</strong>: A threshold (M-of-N) group of TEE-hosted Root Measurement Authorities spanning distinct cloud vendors (e.g., Azure OpenHCL, Google Cloud direct devices). This is the only trust anchor pinned by the client.
2. <strong>Delegate-MA</strong>: Regional or namespace-specific TEEs authorized by the Root-MA Quorum to appraise specific workload types.
3. <strong>Workload TEE</strong>: The target server executing the Relying Party's request.</t>

<t>A Delegate-MA is itself a TEE. It MAY be certified by the Root-MA Quorum in an offline ceremony, or by self-attestation: each Root-MA appraises the hardware evidence of the Delegate-MA's own confidential VM (<xref target="certify-delegate"/>). A Workload TEE MAY serve its own proof of endorsement to Relying Parties (<xref target="stapling"/>), so that verifying it needs no request to any Measurement Authority.</t>

<section anchor="endpoints"><name>Endpoints</name>

<t>All OHMP endpoints of Measurement Authorities are OpenHTTPA trusted requests. A Workload TEE MAY serve its stapled bundle as a trusted request or over plain HTTP, since the bundle is self-authenticating. Because a trusted request carries its ciphertext in the request body, a read resource MUST also be accepted as <tt>POST</tt> with an empty encrypted body; the OpenHTTPA request binding covers method, path and query either way.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Path</th>
          <th align="left">Served by</th>
          <th align="left">Purpose</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/sth</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>current Signed Tree Head</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/endorsements</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>current tokens of a workload (<xref target="endorsement-resolution"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>stapled bundle of one replica (<xref target="stapling"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt></td>
          <td>Workload TEE</td>
          <td>its own stapled bundle (<xref target="stapling"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/tl/entries</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>log entries for auditors (<xref target="auditing"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/appraise</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>appraisal (<xref target="appraisal"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/revoke</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>emergency revocation (<xref target="revocation"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/root-rotation</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>logs a quorum key rotation (<xref target="rotation"/>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/consistency</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>consistency proof</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/entries</tt></td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td>log entries (at most 1000)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/cosign-sth</tt></td>
          <td>Root-MA</td>
          <td>STH co-signing</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>/v1/ohmp/root/certify-delegate</tt></td>
          <td>Root-MA</td>
          <td>delegate certification (<xref target="certify-delegate"/>)</td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>Query parameters, all REQUIRED:</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/endorsements?workload_id=...</tt></li>
  <li><tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled?workload_id=...&amp;identity_pub_sha256=...</tt> (on a Delegate-MA; a Workload TEE takes none)</li>
  <li><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/consistency?first=...&amp;second=...</tt></li>
  <li><tt>/v1/ohmp/tl/entries?start=...&amp;end=...</tt> and <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/tl/entries?start=...&amp;end=...</tt> (the range <tt>[start, end)</tt>)</li></ul>

<t>Errors are <tt>{"error": {"code": ..., "message": ...}}</tt>. Besides the codes of the verification rules (<tt>malformed</tt>, <tt>bad-signature</tt>, <tt>quorum-not-met</tt>, <tt>proof-invalid</tt>, <tt>expired</tt>, <tt>namespace-violation</tt>, <tt>scope-violation</tt>, <tt>profile-refused</tt>, <tt>appraisal-failed</tt>, <tt>endorsement-conflict</tt>, <tt>equivocation-detected</tt>, <tt>not-found</tt>), this document uses <tt>revoked</tt> (<xref target="revocation"/>), <tt>validity-exceeded</tt> with the member <tt>max_ttl_seconds</tt> (<xref target="certify-delegate"/>), and <tt>need-entries</tt> with the member <tt>have_size</tt> (co-signing).</t>

<t>Every response carries the <tt>OpenHTTPA-OHMP-Authority</tt> field naming the authority (<tt>authority_id</tt> of a Root-MA, <tt>delegate_id</tt> of a Delegate-MA) that produced it; a Workload TEE serving a stapled bundle names the <tt>delegate_id</tt> that endorsed it.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="encodings"><name>Encodings</name>

<t>Every OHMP object is a tree of objects, arrays, text strings, booleans, <tt>null</tt> and integers; binary values are lowercase hexadecimal text and no floating-point value exists.</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong><tt>application/ohmp+json</tt></strong> is the canonical JSON form: the JSON Canonicalization Scheme <xref target="RFC8785"/> restricted to integer numbers, i.e. UTF-8, no insignificant whitespace, object members sorted by the UTF-16 code units of their names, strings escaped minimally, integers in shortest decimal form.</li>
  <li><strong><tt>application/ohmp+cbor</tt></strong> is a supported transport encoding of the same data model in deterministic CBOR (<xref target="RFC8949"/>, Section 4.2.1): definite lengths, shortest-form heads, text-string map keys sorted bytewise. A receiver MUST reject CBOR that is not already in this form, and MUST reject unknown object members in either encoding.</li></ul>

<t>Signatures and Merkle leaf hashes are always computed over the canonical JSON bytes of the object, whichever encoding transported it, so a signature verifies regardless of the transport encoding.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="fips-204-context-strings"><name>FIPS 204 Context Strings</name>

<t>Every OHMP signature is a pure ML-DSA-65 signature <xref target="FIPS204"/> over the canonical JSON of the signed body, with a role-specific, non-empty context string. A signature MUST verify under its own context; there is no empty-context fallback.</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Signed object</th>
          <th align="left">Signer</th>
          <th align="left">Context string</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>Signed Tree Head body</td>
          <td>each Root-MA</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/sth"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Delegate Authority Certificate body</td>
          <td>each Root-MA</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-cert"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Workload Endorsement body</td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/workload-endorsement"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>cosign-sth</tt> request body</td>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/cosign-req"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Delegate certification request body</td>
          <td>Delegate-MA (proof of possession)</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-csr"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Revocation body</td>
          <td>Root-MA quorum, Delegate-MA, or the revoked replica key</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/revocation"</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Root-MA quorum key rotation body</td>
          <td>each Root-MA of the old quorum</td>
          <td><tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/root-rotation"</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

</section>
<section anchor="ohmp-tl-the-merkle-transparency-log"><name>OHMP-TL: The Merkle Transparency Log</name>

<t>To prevent a compromised Delegate-MA or Root-MA from issuing targeted, split-view endorsements, OHMP defines a SHA-256 Binary Merkle Tree (OHMP-TL). Each log is sequenced by one Delegate-MA and witnessed by the Root-MAs.</t>

<section anchor="domain-separation"><name>Domain Separation</name>
<ul>
  <li><strong>Empty Tree Hash</strong>: <tt>SHA256("")</tt></li>
  <li><strong>Leaf Node Hash</strong>: <tt>SHA256(0x00 || canonical_json_bytes)</tt>, where <tt>canonical_json_bytes</tt> is the canonical JSON (see Encodings) of the log entry <tt>{"leaf_index": i, "kind": {...}}</tt>, so a leaf commits to its own position.</li>
  <li><strong>Interior Node Hash</strong>: <tt>SHA256(0x01 || left_hash || right_hash)</tt></li></ul>

<t>The tree shape, inclusion audit paths and consistency proofs are those of <xref target="RFC9162"/>, Section 2.1, with one addition: when the first size <tt>m</tt> of a consistency proof is a power of two, RFC 9162 omits <tt>MTH(D[0:m])</tt> because the verifier holds it as the first root; an OHMP-TL proof MUST carry it as its first node. The proof then states which root the larger tree commits size <tt>m</tt> to, as it does for every other <tt>m</tt> (<xref target="split-view"/>). A verifier MUST accept both forms and tells them apart by length (the OHMP-TL form is one node longer). The leaf hash is never computed over the CBOR encoding.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signed-tree-head-sth"><name>Signed Tree Head (STH)</name>
<t>The STH is signed using FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 with the context string <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/sth"</tt>. A valid STH MUST contain at least <tt>quorum_m</tt> cryptographically valid signatures from distinct authorities defined in the Relying Party's trust anchor. The trust anchor MUST satisfy <tt>2 * quorum_m &gt; N</tt>, so any two quorums share an authority. Its <tt>epoch</tt> member (omitted when 0) counts the quorum key rotations applied to it (<xref target="rotation"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="log-entries-and-certificate-rules"><name>Log Entries and Certificate Rules</name>

<t>A log entry (member <tt>kind</tt>) is a Delegate Authority Certificate (<tt>delegate-cert</tt>), a signed Workload Endorsement (<tt>endorsement</tt>), a revocation (<tt>revocation</tt>, <xref target="revocation"/>) or a quorum key rotation (<tt>root-rotation</tt>, <xref target="rotation"/>). Every party that checks a log (Root-MAs before co-signing, auditors, Delegate-MAs at startup) applies these rules:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Log before use.</strong> An endorsement is valid in the log only if a certificate for its <tt>delegate_id</tt>, for this <tt>log_id</tt>, carrying a valid Root-MA quorum under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-cert"</tt>, appears at a lower leaf index.</li>
  <li><strong>Certificate selection.</strong> The certificate in force for an endorsement is the <em>latest</em> certificate for its <tt>delegate_id</tt> at a lower leaf index. The endorsement MUST verify under that certificate's key, lie within its <tt>namespace_constraints</tt>, <tt>profiles</tt> and <tt>endorsement_scope</tt>, and have <tt>issued_at</tt> within its validity window. A Workload Endorsement Token MUST carry that certificate.</li>
  <li><strong>Anti-replay.</strong> Logged entries are public and remain validly signed. A given Delegate Authority Certificate MUST appear in a log at most once, a given endorsement <tt>token_id</tt> MUST appear at most once, a given revocation body at most once, and one rotation per <tt>old_epoch</tt>. A Root-MA MUST refuse to co-sign a head whose new entries repeat an earlier entry, and a Delegate-MA MUST NOT be restarted on a certificate that a later certificate has superseded.</li>
  <li><strong>Revocation.</strong> An endorsement MUST NOT be logged after a revocation that covers it (<xref target="revocation"/>), and a certificate MUST NOT be logged for a revoked delegate key.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="co-signing-post-v1ohmptlcosign-sth"><name>Co-signing (<tt>POST /v1/ohmp/tl/cosign-sth</tt>)</name>

<t>A Delegate-MA obtains Root-MA signatures for a proposed tree head by sending a request whose body names the requester (<tt>signer_id</tt>), the proposed tree head, and the log entries from <tt>entries_from</tt> to the head's <tt>tree_size</tt>. The body is signed by the Delegate-MA under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/cosign-req"</tt>. A Root-MA MUST, before changing any state:</t>

<ol>
  <li>refuse a head for a log it does not witness, or whose <tt>timestamp</tt> is not near its own clock (this bounds how long a captured request can be used);</li>
  <li>answer <tt>need-entries</tt> with its mirror size if <tt>entries_from</tt> exceeds that size;</li>
  <li>find the latest certificate for <tt>signer_id</tt> in its mirror or among the new entries of the request, and verify that it is for this log, carries a valid Root-MA quorum, and is valid now;</li>
  <li>verify the request signature under that certificate's key and <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/cosign-req"</tt>;</li>
  <li>refuse the request if the key of that certificate is revoked by an entry it already holds;</li>
  <li>require every new endorsement, and every new revocation signed by a Delegate-MA, to be by <tt>signer_id</tt> and every new entry to satisfy the Log Entries and Certificate Rules; require entries it already holds to be byte-identical to its mirror; and recompute the root of the proposed size.</li></ol>

<t>Only then does the Root-MA durably append the new entries to its mirror and return its STH signature. Because the mirror is append-only and durable before a signature leaves, an honest Root-MA never signs two different roots for one tree size.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="split-view"><name>Split-View Detection by Relying Parties</name>

<t>A Relying Party keeps, per log, the largest STH whose quorum it verified (its checkpoint). On seeing another quorum-verified STH it MUST check that both heads belong to one append-only log, and MUST record the log as equivocating, permanently, only on cryptographic proof:</t>

<ul>
  <li>two quorum-verified STHs of the same size with different roots; or</li>
  <li>a consistency proof that reconstructs the larger quorum-verified root but commits the smaller size to a root other than that of the smaller quorum-verified STH. Because OHMP-TL proofs carry <tt>MTH(D[0:m])</tt> also when <tt>m</tt> is a power of two, this holds at every size: a quorum-signed head that conflicts with the log at a power-of-two size is latched as deterministically as at any other.</li></ul>

<t>A consistency proof that cannot be fetched, answers another size pair, or does not reconstruct the larger quorum-verified root proves nothing: the Relying Party MUST refuse the new STH for that request and MUST NOT change its checkpoint.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="appraisal"><name>Appraisal (<tt>POST /v1/ohmp/appraise</tt>)</name>

<t>A Delegate-MA appraises Class B evidence against its policy, which MUST be able to pin minimum TCB levels: for AMD SEV-SNP the PSP bootloader, PSP OS, SNP firmware and microcode SVNs and the firmware ABI version; for Intel TDX the <tt>TEE_TCB_SVN</tt>, compared component by component. The binding digest commits to the <tt>workload_id</tt> and to the workload's <tt>identity_key</tt>, so appraisals by distinct replicas of one workload never collide. Evidence over a given binding digest is appraised once. A repeated request with the same binding digest, the same <tt>profile</tt> and the same evidence, whose endorsement is logged and unexpired, MUST be answered with that endorsement, proven against the current STH, instead of an error; other evidence, or the same evidence under another <tt>profile</tt>, over the same binding digest MUST be refused as a replay.</t>

<t>A Delegate-MA policy MAY hold several rules for one namespace, at most one per <tt>profile</tt> (for example an <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt> rule and an <tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt> rule for <tt>*.prod.example</tt>). The first rule whose namespace matches the <tt>workload_id</tt> selects the namespace; the request MUST then be appraised against that namespace's rule for the requested <tt>profile</tt>, and refused if there is none.</t>

<t>A Delegate-MA MAY replace its rule table while running (for example to roll out new golden measurements from continuous integration). It MUST validate the new table as at startup (including refusing two rules for one <tt>(namespace, profile)</tt> and profiles its certificate does not cover), MUST keep the old table if validation fails, and MUST swap the table atomically, so that every appraisal uses either the old or the new table; the log, the current STH and the replay state of the binding digests are kept. A Delegate-MA MUST refuse to endorse a workload whose endorsement a logged revocation would cover.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="endorsement-resolution"><name>Endorsement Resolution and Client Verification</name>

<t>A logical <tt>workload_id</tt> MAY have several concurrently active Workload Endorsement Token leaves in OHMP-TL, each bound to the distinct hardware-sealed <tt>identity_key</tt> of one CVM replica. This supports horizontal scaling and failover pools behind one service identifier, including pools that mix AMD SEV-SNP (<tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>) and Intel TDX (<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>) replicas. An endorsement is therefore identified by the composite key <tt>(workload_id, identity_key)</tt>, where <tt>identity_key</tt> is carried as <tt>identity_pub_sha256</tt>.</t>

<t><tt>GET /.well-known/ohmp/endorsements?workload_id=...</tt> MUST return, each with an inclusion proof against the current STH, every unexpired endorsement of the workload that is not a renewal: of endorsements identical in <tt>identity_pub_sha256</tt>, <tt>profile</tt>, infrastructure claims and payload claims, only the one with the highest leaf index is returned. Endorsements of one <tt>identity_key</tt> that differ in any of these MUST all be returned, so that Relying Parties can detect the conflict. Endorsements that a logged revocation covers MUST NOT be returned; when every endorsement of the workload is revoked, the response is the error <tt>revoked</tt>.</t>

<t>A Relying Party verifies every token, then resolves the workload's replica set:</t>

<ol>
  <li>It groups the verified, unexpired endorsements by <tt>(workload_id, identity_key)</tt>. Distinct keys are distinct replicas, which MAY use different profiles.</li>
  <li>Endorsements of one <tt>(workload_id, identity_key)</tt> whose validity windows overlap MUST agree on <tt>profile</tt>, on the infrastructure claims (launch measurement or MRTD, PCRs 4, 7 and 11) where both carry them, and on every payload PCR both carry. An <tt>identity_key</tt> with conflicting bindings MUST be treated as compromised and refused; the other replicas of the workload are unaffected.</li>
  <li>Otherwise the renewals of a replica are deduplicated: for each claim kind, the endorsement with the highest leaf index is kept.</li></ol>

<t>When it connects, the Relying Party MUST match the <tt>identity_key</tt> the peer presents in the OpenHTTPA handshake against this replica set, and MUST appraise the peer only against the endorsements of that one replica. A key that is absent from the set, refused for a conflict, or covered by a revocation the Relying Party knows of (<xref target="auditing"/>), MUST NOT be accepted.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="stapling"><name>OHMP Stapling</name>

<t>A Relying Party on the Internet that connects to a Workload TEE needs the workload's endorsement, the delegate certificate behind it, and proof that both are in OHMP-TL. Fetching them from the Delegate-MA on every connection adds a round trip and makes the Delegate-MA an availability and privacy dependency of every connection. With stapling the Workload TEE fetches this material in the background and serves it itself, and the Relying Party verifies it offline against its <tt>root_trust_anchor.json</tt> alone.</t>

<section anchor="the-stapled-bundle"><name>The Stapled Bundle</name>

<t>An <tt>OhmpStapledBundle</tt> is an object with exactly these members, encoded as <tt>application/ohmp+json</tt> or <tt>application/ohmp+cbor</tt> (media type parameter <tt>profile="stapled-bundle"</tt>):</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Member</th>
          <th align="left">Content</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>sth</tt></td>
          <td>a Signed Tree Head</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>delegate_cert</tt></td>
          <td>the Delegate Authority Certificate of the endorsing Delegate-MA</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>delegate_inclusion</tt></td>
          <td>inclusion proof of the leaf <tt>{"leaf_index": i, "kind": {"delegate-cert": delegate_cert}}</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>endorsement</tt></td>
          <td>the delegate-signed Workload Endorsement (body and signature)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>endorsement_inclusion</tt></td>
          <td>inclusion proof of the leaf <tt>{"leaf_index": j, "kind": {"endorsement": endorsement}}</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>Each inclusion proof has the members <tt>leaf_index</tt>, <tt>audit_path</tt> and <tt>sth</tt>; the <tt>sth</tt> of both proofs MUST be byte-identical to the bundle's <tt>sth</tt>. A bundle is useful until the earlier of the endorsement's <tt>expires_at</tt> and the certificate's <tt>not_after</tt>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="obtaining-and-serving-a-bundle"><name>Obtaining and Serving a Bundle</name>

<t><tt>GET /.well-known/ohmp/stapled?workload_id=W&amp;identity_pub_sha256=K</tt> on a Delegate-MA returns the bundle of the replica of workload <tt>W</tt> whose identity key has SHA-256 <tt>K</tt> (lowercase hexadecimal): its most recent unexpired endorsement under the current STH, preferring one that carries infrastructure claims, the certificate in force for that endorsement (the Log Entries and Certificate Rules), and both inclusion proofs against the current STH. The Delegate-MA MUST answer <tt>not-found</tt> if there is none, and <tt>revoked</tt> if the replica's endorsements are revoked.</t>

<t>A Workload TEE that staples:</t>

<ol>
  <li>obtains fresh hardware evidence over the appraisal binding digest, which commits to its <tt>identity_key</tt> (<xref target="appraisal"/>), and calls <tt>POST /v1/ohmp/appraise</tt>;</li>
  <li>fetches its bundle from <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt> on the Delegate-MA;</li>
  <li>verifies the bundle as a Relying Party would (below) and MUST NOT serve a bundle that fails;</li>
  <li>serves the latest verified bundle at <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt> on its own origin, with <tt>OpenHTTPA-OHMP-Authority</tt> set to the bundle's <tt>delegate_id</tt>, and MUST NOT serve it after the earliest of the endorsement's <tt>expires_at</tt>, the certificate's <tt>not_after</tt> and <tt>sth.timestamp + max_sth_age_secs</tt>;</li>
  <li>renews before that time. Renewal SHOULD start once two thirds of the bundle's lifetime have passed, with random jitter of up to a tenth of the lifetime so that replicas do not renew in lockstep, and SHOULD back off exponentially after a failure.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="verifying-a-bundle"><name>Verifying a Bundle</name>

<t>A Relying Party that pins <tt>root_trust_anchor.json</tt> verifies a bundle for an expected <tt>workload_id</tt> and the identity key <tt>identity_key</tt> that the peer proved possession of in the OpenHTTPA handshake, at its current time <tt>now</tt>. It MUST perform every check below, MUST NOT contact any Measurement Authority to do so, and MUST refuse the peer if any check fails:</t>

<ol>
  <li><strong>Tree head.</strong> <tt>sth</tt> carries at least <tt>quorum_m</tt> valid signatures from distinct pinned authorities under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/sth"</tt>, and is fresh: <tt>now - sth.timestamp &lt;= max_sth_age_secs</tt>, a Relying Party setting (RECOMMENDED: at most one hour), and <tt>sth.timestamp</tt> is not in the future beyond clock skew.</li>
  <li><strong>Delegate certificate.</strong> <tt>delegate_cert</tt> carries a Root-MA quorum under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-cert"</tt>, <tt>not_before &lt;= now &lt; not_after</tt>, its <tt>log_id</tt> is that of <tt>sth</tt>, and one of its <tt>namespace_constraints</tt> admits <tt>workload_id</tt>. <tt>delegate_inclusion</tt> proves the certificate's leaf in <tt>sth</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Endorsement.</strong> <tt>endorsement</tt> verifies under the certificate's key and <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/workload-endorsement"</tt> and lies within the certificate's namespaces, profiles and scope; <tt>issued_at</tt> lies within the certificate's validity and not in the future beyond clock skew, and <tt>now &lt; expires_at</tt>; its <tt>workload_id</tt> equals the expected one; and its <tt>identity_pub_sha256</tt> equals SHA-256 of <tt>identity_key</tt>. <tt>endorsement_inclusion</tt> proves the endorsement's leaf in <tt>sth</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Log before use.</strong> <tt>delegate_inclusion.leaf_index &lt; endorsement_inclusion.leaf_index</tt>.</li>
  <li><strong>Revocation.</strong> No revocation the Relying Party knows of covers the replica key, the endorsed launch measurement or the certificate's key (error <tt>revoked</tt>).</li></ol>

<t>The checks may run in any order; an implementation that verifies <tt>delegate_inclusion</tt> last runs every other check even when that proof is missing.</t>

<t>The verified endorsement is then the one-endorsement replica set of <tt>(workload_id, identity_key)</tt> (<xref target="endorsement-resolution"/>), and the peer is appraised against it.</t>

<t>The bundle need not show that <tt>delegate_cert</tt> is the <em>latest</em> certificate of the delegate before the endorsement: the endorsement is in a quorum-signed head, so honest Root-MAs checked it against the certificate then in force before co-signing, and it verifies under <tt>delegate_cert</tt> too, which lies before it in the same log.</t>

<t>A Relying Party that keeps checkpoints (<xref target="split-view"/>) MUST also hold <tt>sth</tt> to the checkpoint of its log without fetching anything: it MUST refuse a log already recorded as equivocating; it MUST refuse an <tt>sth</tt> smaller than the checkpoint as stale; it MUST record the log as equivocating if <tt>sth</tt> has the checkpoint's size and another root (after re-verifying the checkpoint's quorum). It MAY accept a larger <tt>sth</tt> but MUST NOT advance the checkpoint without a verified consistency proof. A Relying Party without a checkpoint for the log MAY adopt <tt>sth</tt> as its checkpoint.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="certify-delegate"><name>Self-Attesting Delegate-MA Certification</name>

<t>A Delegate-MA that runs in a confidential VM can obtain its Delegate Authority Certificate from the Root-MA Quorum on the strength of its own hardware evidence, without an offline ceremony.</t>

<section anchor="certification-request"><name>Certification Request</name>

<t>The request body (media type parameter <tt>profile="delegate-csr"</tt>) has the members:</t>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Member</th>
          <th align="left">Content</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>version</tt></td>
          <td><tt>1</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>delegate_id</tt></td>
          <td>the delegate to certify</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>log_id</tt></td>
          <td>the log it will sequence</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>public_key</tt></td>
          <td>its ML-DSA-65 public key, generated in the confidential VM and sealed to its vTPM</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>namespace_constraints</tt></td>
          <td>requested namespace constraints</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>endorsement_scope</tt></td>
          <td>requested scope (<tt>full</tt>, <tt>infrastructure-only</tt> or <tt>payload-only</tt>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>profiles</tt></td>
          <td>attestation profiles it asks to appraise</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>profile</tt></td>
          <td>attestation profile of <tt>evidence</tt> (for example <tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt> or <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>not_before</tt></td>
          <td>the certificate's exact <tt>not_before</tt>, Unix seconds</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>not_after</tt></td>
          <td>the certificate's exact <tt>not_after</tt> (exclusive)</td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td><tt>evidence</tt></td>
          <td>hardware evidence of the Delegate-MA's own confidential VM over <tt>D</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>The request is <tt>{"body": ..., "signature": ...}</tt>, where <tt>signature</tt> is an ML-DSA-65 signature by <tt>public_key</tt> over the canonical JSON of <tt>body</tt> under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-csr"</tt> (proof of possession). The binding digest is</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
B = SHA-512("openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-csr-binding"
            || canonical_json(body without the member "evidence"))
D = SHA-512("openhttpa-az-cvm/v1/session-nonce" || B
            || SHA-256(public_key))
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>For Class B evidence, <tt>D</tt> is the HCL runtime-data <tt>user-data</tt> and the hardware <tt>REPORT_DATA[0..32]</tt> is SHA-256 of that runtime data, so the hardware report commits to the delegate identifier, its key, its log, its namespaces, scope and profiles, and the validity window of the certificate.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="root-ma-processing-post-v1ohmprootcertify-delegate"><name>Root-MA Processing (<tt>POST /v1/ohmp/root/certify-delegate</tt>)</name>

<t>A Root-MA certifies Delegate-MAs under a delegate appraisal policy: rules keyed by <tt>(delegate_id, profile)</tt>, each listing the namespace constraints and profiles the delegate may be granted, the widest endorsement scope, the longest validity window <tt>max_ttl_seconds</tt>, and the golden measurements and hardware TCB floors of the delegate's confidential VM (approved SEV-SNP launch measurements or TDX MRTDs, PCRs 4, 7 and 11, the SEV-SNP bootloader, TEE, SNP firmware and microcode SVNs and firmware ABI version, and the TDX <tt>TEE_TCB_SVN</tt>). A Root-MA MUST, in this order, and fail closed:</t>

<ol>
  <li>verify the proof-of-possession signature;</li>
  <li>find the rule for <tt>(delegate_id, profile)</tt>, and refuse with <tt>not-found</tt> for an unknown delegate or <tt>profile-refused</tt> for a profile without a rule;</li>
  <li>require <tt>log_id</tt> to be the log it witnesses, every requested namespace constraint and profile to be listed by the rule, the requested scope to be the rule's scope or the rule's scope to be <tt>full</tt>, <tt>not_before</tt> to be within 300 seconds of its clock, and <tt>not_before &lt; not_after</tt>; if <tt>not_after - not_before</tt> exceeds the rule's <tt>max_ttl_seconds</tt>, it MUST refuse with <tt>validity-exceeded</tt>, carrying its <tt>max_ttl_seconds</tt>, and MUST NOT shorten the window;</li>
  <li>appraise <tt>evidence</tt> over <tt>D</tt> against the rule's golden measurements and TCB floors exactly as a Delegate-MA appraises a workload (<xref target="appraisal"/>);</li>
  <li>sign, under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-cert"</tt>, the certificate body built from the request with <tt>not_before</tt> and <tt>not_after</tt> exactly as requested, and return it as a Delegate Authority Certificate carrying its one signature.</li></ol>

<t>The certificate body is a function of the request alone, so every Root-MA that accepts a request signs byte-identical canonical JSON, whatever its own <tt>max_ttl_seconds</tt> and however far its clock is from the others' within the skew window. Root-MAs need not agree on their ceilings: a request is certified by the Root-MAs whose ceiling admits its window, and a requester that gets <tt>validity-exceeded</tt> from too many of them retries with a window within the reported ceilings. The Delegate-MA merges the signatures of the Root-MAs that certified it into one certificate, MUST verify that it carries a quorum, and logs it as the next entry of its log before its first endorsement. The Root-MAs verify the certificate again when they co-sign the head that contains it, so the certificate enters OHMP-TL only through hardware attestation and the quorum.</t>

<t>A Root-MA without a delegate appraisal policy MUST refuse every certification request.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="revocation"><name>Emergency Revocation</name>

<t>Endorsement TTLs bound how long a compromised replica key, a vulnerable image or a rogue Delegate-MA stays trusted. A revocation ends it at once, through the log.</t>

<section anchor="revocation-entries"><name>Revocation Entries</name>

<t>A revocation entry is <tt>{"body": ..., "signatures": [...]}</tt>. Its body has the members <tt>version</tt> (<tt>1</tt>), <tt>log_id</tt>, <tt>target</tt>, <tt>revoked_at</tt> (Unix seconds) and <tt>reason</tt> (at most 256 octets), and <tt>target</tt> is one of:</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>{"delegate-key": {"delegate_id", "delegate_public_key_sha256"}}</tt> revokes every endorsement made under a certificate for that key, and every later use of the key. It is signed by a Root-MA quorum.</li>
  <li><tt>{"workload-replica": {"workload_id", "identity_pub_sha256"}}</tt> revokes every endorsement of that replica key of the workload. It is signed by a Delegate-MA certified for the workload.</li>
  <li><tt>{"launch-measurement": {"namespace", "profile", "launch_measurement"}}</tt> revokes every endorsement under <tt>profile</tt> that carries that launch measurement (SEV-SNP measurement or TDX MRTD) for a workload the namespace pattern admits. It is signed by a Delegate-MA certified for the namespace and the profile.</li></ul>

<t>All signatures are ML-DSA-65 over the canonical JSON of the body under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/revocation"</tt>. A <tt>delegate-key</tt> revocation carries at least <tt>quorum_m</tt> signatures of distinct pinned authorities. Any other revocation carries exactly one signature, whose <tt>authority_id</tt> is the <tt>delegate_id</tt> of the signing Delegate-MA; it MUST verify under the latest certificate of that delegate logged before it, and the target MUST lie within that certificate: <tt>workload_id</tt> admitted by one of its <tt>namespace_constraints</tt>, or <tt>namespace</tt> equal to one of them or (without a leading <tt>*.</tt>) admitted by one, and <tt>profile</tt> among its <tt>profiles</tt>. A revocation is permanent and independent of time: it covers matching endorsements whenever they were issued.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="logging-a-revocation-post-v1ohmprevoke"><name>Logging a Revocation (<tt>POST /v1/ohmp/revoke</tt>)</name>

<t>The request is <tt>{"body": ..., "authorization": ...}</tt>, where <tt>authorization</tt> is either <tt>{"root-quorum": [...]}</tt> (a Root-MA quorum of signatures over the body under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/revocation"</tt>) or, only for a <tt>workload-replica</tt> target, <tt>{"replica-key": {"identity_pub": ..., "signature": ...}}</tt>: the revoked identity key itself, signing the body under the same context (whoever holds a compromised key can only take it out of service). For a <tt>workload-replica</tt> or <tt>launch-measurement</tt> target, <tt>authorization</tt> MAY instead be <tt>{"delegate": signature}</tt>: the signature of the log's Delegate-MA (<tt>authority_id</tt> = its <tt>delegate_id</tt>) under the same context, by the key of its latest logged certificate, which MUST be valid and unrevoked, with the target inside that certificate's <tt>namespace_constraints</tt> and <tt>profiles</tt>; it never authorizes a <tt>delegate-key</tt> target, and it becomes the entry's signature. A Delegate-MA MUST verify the authorization, refuse a <tt>revoked_at</tt> in the future, and refuse a target outside its certificate. It then builds the entry (the quorum signatures for <tt>delegate-key</tt>, its own signature otherwise), logs it, has the head that contains it co-signed, and returns the entry with its inclusion proof. The same body logged again returns the logged entry.</t>

<t>From the moment a revocation is logged, the Delegate-MA MUST NOT return covered endorsements from <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/endorsements</tt> or <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt>, and MUST refuse covered appraisals with <tt>revoked</tt>. Root-MAs MUST refuse to co-sign heads with new entries that a logged revocation covers, and MUST refuse co-signing requests made with a revoked delegate key; a revoked Delegate-MA's log is therefore frozen until it is re-certified with a new key.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="enforcement-by-relying-parties"><name>Enforcement by Relying Parties</name>

<t>A Relying Party learns revocations by auditing the log (<xref target="auditing"/>) and MUST then refuse every covered endorsement, in endorsement sets and in stapled bundles alike, with <tt>revoked</tt>. A Relying Party that verifies stapled bundles offline without auditing relies on the STH freshness window: a bundle whose replica was revoked cannot be renewed, so it is refused once its STH is older than <tt>max_sth_age_secs</tt>.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="rotation"><name>Root-MA Quorum Key Rotation</name>

<t>A rotation replaces the pinned Root-MA quorum (new keys, new authorities or a new threshold) through the log, so Relying Parties move to the new anchor without re-provisioning <tt>root_trust_anchor.json</tt>.</t>

<section anchor="rotation-entries"><name>Rotation Entries</name>

<t>A rotation entry is <tt>{"body": ..., "signatures": [...]}</tt>. Its body has the members <tt>version</tt> (<tt>1</tt>), <tt>log_id</tt>, <tt>old_epoch</tt>, <tt>new_epoch</tt> (<tt>old_epoch + 1</tt>), <tt>new_quorum_threshold</tt>, <tt>new_root_keys</tt> (authority entries as in the trust anchor) and <tt>effective_at</tt> (Unix seconds). It MUST carry at least <tt>quorum_m</tt> signatures of the anchor of epoch <tt>old_epoch</tt> under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/root-rotation"</tt>, and the anchor it establishes (<tt>epoch = new_epoch</tt>, <tt>quorum_m = new_quorum_threshold</tt>, <tt>authorities = new_root_keys</tt>) MUST be valid, including <tt>2 * new_quorum_threshold &gt; N</tt>.</t>

<t><tt>POST /v1/ohmp/tl/root-rotation</tt> asks a Delegate-MA to log a rotation; the signatures are its authorization. The Delegate-MA and every Root-MA that co-signs the head containing it verify the rotation against their anchor.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="applying-a-rotation"><name>Applying a Rotation</name>

<t>A Relying Party applies a rotation given its entry, an inclusion proof and the STH it is proven against: it MUST verify the STH's quorum, the inclusion of the leaf <tt>{"leaf_index": i, "kind": {"root-rotation": ...}}</tt>, that <tt>old_epoch</tt> is the epoch of its latest anchor, the old quorum's signatures and the validity of the new anchor, and then MUST add the new anchor, in force from <tt>effective_at</tt>. It keeps the old anchors: a tree head is verified under the anchor in force at its <tt>timestamp</tt>, and a Delegate Authority Certificate under the anchor in force at the time of verification, so a rotation away from compromised keys also retires the certificates they signed, and delegates are re-certified by the new quorum. Root-MAs and Delegate-MAs of the new epoch are configured with the new anchor and start from a copy of the log.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="auditing"><name>Log Auditing</name>

<t><tt>GET /.well-known/ohmp/tl/entries?start=...&amp;end=...</tt> returns the published log entries <tt>[start, end)</tt>, at most 1000 per response, so that monitors and Relying Parties can audit the log. An auditor fetches entries <tt>0</tt> to <tt>tree_size</tt> of a quorum-verified STH (checked against its checkpoint, <xref target="split-view"/>) and MUST verify that they are leaves <tt>0, 1, ...</tt> in order, that their leaf hashes <tt>SHA-256(0x00 || canonical_json(entry))</tt> rebuild the STH's <tt>root_hash</tt>, and that every revocation and rotation is validly signed. It then enforces every revocation it found and applies every rotation that follows its latest anchor. A full audit is stronger than an inclusion proof of each entry.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t><strong>Note to RFC Editor:</strong> Please remove this section and the reference to <xref target="RFC7942"/> before publication.</t>
</li></ul>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations as of November 2026, following <xref target="RFC7942"/>.</t>

<ul>
  <li><strong><tt>ohmp-rs</tt></strong> (<tt>main</tt>, November 2026): the OHMP-TL Merkle engine (<xref target="RFC9162"/> tree shape and proofs, domain-separated hashing), the canonical JSON and deterministic CBOR codecs, the five context strings, M-of-N STH verification, authenticated <tt>cosign-sth</tt> with anti-replay, split-view latching on proof only, appraisal against full Class B TCB floors, multi-replica resolution per <tt>(workload_id, identity_key)</tt>, OHMP stapling (the Delegate-MA endpoint, a background workload agent and an offline verifier), and self-attesting Delegate-MA certification. It also implements requester-proposed certificate windows, emergency revocation, quorum key rotation, log auditing, rule hot-reload, the power-of-two consistency-proof form, and crash-safe log storage: an append changes no in-memory state until its write and <tt>fdatasync</tt> succeed, and a torn last line is truncated at startup. Its tests exercise SEV-SNP and TDX replicas of one workload, certification and its refusals, Root-MAs with different ceilings and skewed clocks signing one certificate body, revocation of each target kind, rotation and auditing, and stapled verification and its refusals, against software Class B evidence that omits only the vendor signature over the hardware report. Stapled-bundle verification is also run against the captured artifacts of the live run (<xref target="cross-silicon-vv"/>): the quorum on the Intel TDX Root-MAs' STH of size 4 (root <tt>3f3b1c57...358b</tt>), the TDX Delegate-MA's certificate, the AMD SEV-SNP endorsement and its inclusion at leaf 3, freshness and revocation all verify from the captured octets. The capture does not contain log leaves 1 and 2, so the inclusion proof of the certificate at leaf 0 cannot be formed from it, and the verifier refuses the bundle at that check, as it must.</li>
  <li><strong><tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt></strong> (commit <tt>2af53dc</tt>): Root-MA and Delegate-MA services in Azure confidential VMs, with ML-DSA-65 authority keys generated in the guest and sealed to the vTPM; Relying Party verification in the proxy client; and an offline verifier (<tt>verify-artifacts</tt>).</li>
  <li><strong>Live verification</strong>: a five-CVM run with Intel TDX Measurement Authorities endorsing an AMD SEV-SNP workload. Every OHMP object was verified from the captured octets (<xref target="cross-silicon-vv"/>).</li>
  <li><strong>Not yet covered</strong>: a Root-MA quorum spanning distinct cloud providers (all three Root-MAs of the live run were Azure CVMs in one region); Class A direct-silicon and AWS Nitro Measurement Authorities.</li></ul>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="media-types"><name>Media Types</name>
<t>IANA is requested to register <tt>application/ohmp+json</tt> and <tt>application/ohmp+cbor</tt> in the Standards Tree per <xref target="RFC6838"/>.
* Contact: Gordon King <eref target="mailto:garyw@apache.org">garyw@apache.org</eref>, VALSEE LLC
* Optional parameter: <tt>profile</tt> (e.g., <tt>"appraisal-request"</tt>, <tt>"endorsement-token"</tt>, <tt>"sth"</tt>, <tt>"stapled-bundle"</tt>, <tt>"delegate-csr"</tt>, <tt>"revocation"</tt>, <tt>"root-rotation"</tt>)</t>

</section>
<section anchor="well-known-uri"><name>Well-Known URI</name>
<t>IANA is requested to register the <tt>ohmp</tt> URI suffix per <xref target="RFC8615"/>. The one registration covers every path below <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/</tt> that this document defines: <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/sth</tt>, <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/endorsements</tt>, <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/stapled</tt> and <tt>/.well-known/ohmp/tl/entries</tt>. This document creates no new registry.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="http-field-name"><name>HTTP Field Name</name>
<t>IANA is requested to register <tt>OpenHTTPA-OHMP-Authority</tt> (Dictionary, provisional) per <xref target="RFC9110"/> Section 16.3. (Legacy implementations MAY emit <tt>X-OpenHTTPA-OHMP-Authority</tt>; new deployments SHOULD NOT, per <xref target="RFC6648"/>.)</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="quantum-security-bounds"><name>Quantum Security Bounds</name>
<t>OHMP relies on FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 for authentication. While OHMP-TL uses classical SHA-256, the Brassard-Hoyer-Tapp (BHT) quantum collision bound for an N-bit hash is $\mathcal{O}(2^{N/3})$. For SHA-256, this yields $\approx 2^{85.3}$ quantum operations, which remains infeasible for transparency log collision attacks given that leaf indices and FIPS 204 STH bindings strongly constrain the attacker's search space.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="co-signing-authentication-and-replay"><name>Co-signing Authentication and Replay</name>

<t><tt>cosign-sth</tt> is reachable by any OpenHTTPA peer. Without the request signature and the anti-replay rule, a peer could propose an already public, validly signed entry at the next index; once in a Root-MA's durable mirror, the honest log would look like a fork to that Root-MA forever, halting the log without any key compromise. Signing requests under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/cosign-req"</tt> with the key of a logged, currently valid certificate restricts co-signing to the log's Delegate-MA, and the anti-replay rule keeps even that Delegate-MA from repeating entries.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="stapled-bundles"><name>Stapled Bundles</name>

<t>A stapled bundle is public and can be replayed by anyone, but it only vouches for the <tt>identity_key</tt> in its endorsement; a Relying Party accepts it only from a peer that proved possession of that key in the OpenHTTPA handshake. Freshness is bounded by the endorsement TTL, the certificate validity and <tt>max_sth_age_secs</tt>: a Relying Party that verifies offline cannot learn of a newer log state, so a replica revoked after its bundle was captured remains acceptable until the bundle's STH is older than <tt>max_sth_age_secs</tt> or its endorsement expires, whichever is first, unless the Relying Party audits the log. Deployments SHOULD therefore keep endorsement TTLs and <tt>max_sth_age_secs</tt> short (minutes); stapling makes this cheap because renewal is off the connection path. The checkpoint rules of <xref target="stapling"/> keep a Relying Party that also audits the log from accepting a head that contradicts what it has verified.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="self-attesting-delegates"><name>Self-Attesting Delegates</name>

<t>A Root-MA that certifies a Delegate-MA on hardware evidence delegates its trust in that Delegate-MA to the silicon vendor's roots and to the reviewed golden measurements of the Delegate-MA image; the TCB floors MUST be kept current. The binding digest commits the hardware report to the whole request except the evidence, so evidence captured from one request cannot certify another key, namespace or lifetime, and the proof of possession shows that the requester holds the key. The <tt>not_before</tt> skew window bounds the reuse of a captured request; reusing one within the window only reproduces the same certificate body. Because Root-MAs never change the requested window, an attacker cannot make honest Root-MAs sign different bodies, and a Root-MA with a lower ceiling only withholds its signature.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="revocation-and-rotation"><name>Revocation and Rotation</name>

<t>A revocation authorized by a replica key can only remove that key from service, and every other revocation needs either the Root-MA quorum or the Delegate-MA that could have endorsed the target in the first place; no party can revoke outside its authority, so revocation does not add a denial-of-service lever beyond the existing ones. A rotation needs the old quorum, so it cannot be forged by fewer than <tt>quorum_m</tt> old authorities; a Relying Party that keeps the old anchors for heads before <tt>effective_at</tt> can still check consistency across the rotation.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="classical-silicon-roots"><name>Classical Silicon Roots</name>
<t>While the OHMP session layer achieves post-quantum forward secrecy, the underlying hardware roots (AMD ARK, Intel DCAP) remain classical (RSA/ECDSA). Relying Parties MUST evaluate this hybrid threat model.</t>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references anchor="sec-combined-references">
<name>References</name>

    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
<name>Normative References</name>

&RFC2119;
&RFC6648;
&RFC6838;
&RFC8174;
&RFC8615;
&RFC8785;
&RFC8949;
&RFC9110;
&RFC9162;
<reference anchor="FIPS204" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
<name>Informative References</name>

&RFC7942;


    </references>

</references>

<section anchor="cross-silicon-vv"><name>Cross-Silicon Live Verification</name>

<t>This appendix documents a live run of the full OHMP ceremony across two silicon vendors and two cloud regions. The capture is published as <tt>crates/openhttpa-proxy/tests/fixtures/ohmp-real-silicon/</tt> in <tt>openhttpa-proxy-rs</tt> at commit <tt>2af53dc</tt>, and the regression test <tt>verify_artifacts_ohmp_real_silicon</tt> re-verifies it. The values below are copied from that capture.</t>

<section anchor="topology"><name>Topology</name>

<table>
      <thead>
        <tr>
          <th align="left">Role</th>
          <th align="left">Identifier</th>
          <th align="left">TEE (profile)</th>
          <th align="left">Azure VM size</th>
          <th align="left">Region</th>
        </tr>
      </thead>
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <td>Root-MA</td>
          <td><tt>root-r1</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX (<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>Standard_DC2es_v6</tt></td>
          <td><tt>westus3</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Root-MA</td>
          <td><tt>root-r2</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX (<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>Standard_DC2es_v6</tt></td>
          <td><tt>westus3</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Root-MA</td>
          <td><tt>root-r3</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX (<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>Standard_DC2es_v6</tt></td>
          <td><tt>westus3</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Delegate-MA</td>
          <td><tt>delegate-eu</tt></td>
          <td>Intel TDX (<tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>Standard_DC2es_v6</tt></td>
          <td><tt>westus3</tt></td>
        </tr>
        <tr>
          <td>Workload</td>
          <td><tt>api.prod.example</tt></td>
          <td>AMD SEV-SNP, Genoa (<tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt>)</td>
          <td><tt>Standard_DC2as_v6</tt></td>
          <td><tt>eastus2</tt></td>
        </tr>
      </tbody>
    </table>

<t>Each Measurement Authority ran on its own CVM. Its ML-DSA-65 key was generated inside the guest and sealed to the vTPM (<tt>/dev/tpmrm0</tt>) under PCRs 4 and 11; only the public key left the VM. The identifier <tt>delegate-eu</tt> is a label and does not name the region.</t>

<t>The run exercised every step of this document:</t>

<ol>
  <li>The Root-MAs formed a 2-of-3 trust anchor and signed the Delegate Authority Certificate.</li>
  <li>The workload presented its <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt> evidence to the Delegate-MA. The Delegate-MA appraised it against a policy that pins the full SEV-SNP TCB floor (<xref target="appraisal"/>).</li>
  <li>The Delegate-MA signed the Workload Endorsement and submitted the log entry through <tt>cosign-sth</tt>, signing each request under <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/cosign-req"</tt>. The Root-MAs co-sign only signed requests, so the STH quorum in the capture also attests that path.</li>
  <li>A Relying Party fetched through the workload over OpenHTTPA and verified the endorsement, the inclusion proof and the STH quorum against the pinned anchor.</li></ol>

</section>
<section anchor="captured-values"><name>Captured Values</name>

<figure><sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
Root trust anchor
  version             1
  quorum_m            2  (of 3)
  authority_id        root-r1, root-r2, root-r3

Delegate Authority Certificate
  delegate_id         delegate-eu
  log_id              log.ohmp.example
  namespace           *.prod.example
  endorsement_scope   full
  profiles            azure-cvm-snp
  not_before          1794117050
  not_after           1796709350
  signatures          root-r1, root-r2, root-r3

Workload Endorsement
  token_id            76a71e7814e704d26e787b815018b311
  workload_id         api.prod.example
  profile             azure-cvm-snp
  issued_at           1794117670
  expires_at          1794117970  (TTL 300 s)
  identity_pub_sha256 98339ea35decaeefb9295f982dbbe142
                      f4ffbbae0a8273f57b97a4827b9e83aa
  launch_measurement  6587d41e46995d71808f7d92d859e0ed
                      093bea3c55a342c866a20cd1a213ae4e
                      20241bdbc44d5255222da65cce1c7f48
  pcr4                b863cc12451d109d0339c3ece3cbf4ba
                      06d52eb04f5a0939f9a85455c13478a5
  pcr7                f014e5cbfa297ee787a976abc51bc1d6
                      7e23e1b9e4a60128a1106dd0adef0c5b
  pcr11               63016abdb71b86cacf01e814c3e7afaf
                      d1b1e334a5cbf98fd97770fe39b4ad3e

Inclusion proof
  leaf_index          3
  audit_path          2 nodes

Signed Tree Head
  version             1
  log_id              log.ohmp.example
  tree_size           4
  root_hash (SHA-256) 3f3b1c5743309d7440eeb7f0d81c8f19
                      e6b04d194c1942cfcdff1a3c65e6358b
  timestamp           1794117670
  signatures          root-r1, root-r2, root-r3  (quorum 2)

Workload SEV-SNP TCB floor (policy = host reported_tcb)
  bootloader 10, tee 0, snp 23, microcode 84
  abi 0.31  (GUEST_POLICY 0x3001f: ABI_MAJOR 0, ABI_MINOR 31)
  reported_tcb equal to the VCEK's KDS TCB extensions

Measurement Authority golden image (TDX)
  MRTD                efef2fafedab1cecacab0acbb3ec70ab
                      6638b474a4469022745c1c8ba0470be4
                      cfa1170ad5c82f57bff4833acde55e4c
  pcr4, pcr7, pcr11   as for the workload above
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="verification"><name>Verification</name>

<t>Two verifiers reproduce the values above from the captured octets:</t>

<ul>
  <li><tt>verify-artifacts</tt> (Rust) checks the anchor; the <tt>azure-cvm-tdx</tt> evidence of the four Measurement Authorities; the certificate quorum; the endorsement signature; the <xref target="RFC9162"/> inclusion proof and the STH quorum; the workload's <tt>azure-cvm-snp</tt> evidence against the endorsed policy; and the OpenHTTPA wire record.</li>
  <li>An independent Python verifier, written from the specifications on a separate FIPS 204 implementation, checks every ML-DSA-65 signature under its context string, the inclusion proof, and the SEV-SNP chain (ARK, ASK, VCEK, report signature, vTPM quote). It does not check the Measurement Authorities' TDX quotes; the Rust verifier does.</li></ul>

<t>Signatures under six context strings verify: the four of this document that the run used (it did not exercise <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/delegate-csr"</tt>, <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/revocation"</tt> or <tt>"openhttpa-ohmp/v1/root-rotation"</tt>) and the OpenHTTPA identity contexts <tt>"openhttpa/v1/hs-server-transcript"</tt> and <tt>"openhttpa/v1/epoch-session-binding"</tt>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="why-tcb-floors-differ-between-hosts"><name>Why TCB Floors Differ Between Hosts</name>

<t>The floor in this run is the workload host's own reported TCB. It is not a fleet minimum. An earlier capture of the same paravisor launch measurement (<tt>6587d41e...7f48</tt>) on another Azure Genoa host, with a different VCEK, reported <tt>bootloader 12, tee 0, snp 28, microcode 88</tt>. Hosts within one cloud update PSP firmware and microcode at different times, so the reported TCB varies from host to host and region to region. The VCEK is derived for one chip at one TCB, and its KDS TCB extension OIDs carry the levels it was issued for. Both captures show <tt>reported_tcb</tt> equal to those extensions. A Delegate-MA policy therefore sets each floor at the lowest level the operator accepts across the fleet: a floor taken from the newer host would have refused the <tt>eastus2</tt> workload.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="limits-of-this-run"><name>Limits of This Run</name>

<t>All three Root-MAs were Azure CVMs in one region. The run validates the protocol and cross-silicon appraisal; it does not exercise the cloud-provider independence that <xref target="ohmp-trust-architecture"/> requires of a production quorum. In the published fixture, endpoint addresses are replaced with role names; the raw frames, quotes, PCRs, proofs and signatures are unchanged.</t>

</section>
</section>


  </back>

<!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>

