Internet-Draft Witness Answers November 2026
Oga Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-oga-audit-witness-answer-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
T. Oga
The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.

Witness Answers: Signed Recomputation of a Published Record, Filed Beside It

Abstract

This document defines a witness answer: a signed statement by a party other than the operator that it recomputed a published record from public endpoints, naming the digests it obtained, the steps it recomputed, and the limits of what it checked. It defines how the answer is filed beside the record it witnesses and anchored in time. An informative section describes version 0.1 of the answer, which adds a kind for records published by others. A verified answer does not show that the content of the record is right.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Operators publish records and anchor them in time, but a reader who did not run the operator's process has only the operator's word for what the record contains. There is no common form in which a party that is not the operator can recompute a published record, sign what it obtained, and have that signed answer stored beside the record so that any later reader can check it offline. This document fixes that form: the record being witnessed (Section 3), the answer (Section 4), the witness key (Section 5), and filing (Section 6). The normative part covers version 0 of the answer (schema "witness-answer-v0"); version 0.1 is described for information in Section 9. It defines no new hash, signature, Merkle tree or timestamp mechanism.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Operator:

The party that publishes the record being witnessed and runs the intake.

Witness:

A party other than the operator that recomputes a record and signs an answer with an Ed25519 key it serves at its key URL. Its identity is the identity of the key URL (Section 5.2).

Answer:

A JSON object of the closed shape in Section 4, signed by a witness.

Day record:

A record the operator publishes for one UTC day (Section 3).

Leaf:

One entry of a furui-day day record, included under its root by an audit path as in [RFC9162], Section 2.1.

Intake:

The operator's endpoint that accepts signed records and bundles them into a ledger entry (Section 6).

3. The Record Being Witnessed

A witness answer names its record by kind and by the SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] of the record's bytes. "furui-day": a day record listing n leaves under a Merkle root (the tree of [RFC9162], which replaces [RFC6962]); its digest is the SHA-256 of the record's canonical bytes as the ledger serves them. "tooshi-day": the canonical day view of a set of daily checks, computed by a published script; its digest is the SHA-256 of that view, which the witness rebuilds by running the script after 03:47 UTC on the day. Version 0.1 adds a kind for records published by others; it is described in Section 9 and is not part of the normative definition.

4. The Witness Answer

4.1. Members

An answer is a JSON object [RFC8259] with exactly the members in the table below and no others; a verifier MUST reject an answer with a missing or an additional member.

Table 1: Members of an answer
Member furui-day tooshi-day
schema "witness-answer-v0" "witness-answer-v0"
kind "furui-day" "tooshi-day"
day YYYY-MM-DD (UTC) YYYY-MM-DD (UTC)
day_sha256 SHA-256 of the day record's canonical bytes as served SHA-256 of the canonical day view
n integer, number of leaves, at least 1 null
root 64 lower-case hex, the root the day record names null
leaf_index leaves checked, strictly increasing, each below n []
recomputed see Section 4.2 see Section 4.2
tool one line, at most 200 characters same
observed_at YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ (an RFC 3339 date-time in UTC [RFC3339]), not before day same
limits see Section 4.3 same
witness {name, key_id, key_url} same
signature {alg: "ed25519", key_id, sig} same

4.2. recomputed

recomputed lists only what the witness recomputed itself, without duplicates, and is never empty. For furui-day it holds the step names that were ok for every listed leaf, in this order: envelope_shape, leaf_sha256, audit_path, signature, runner_key, bitcoin_anchor; a step not yet possible (for example the Bitcoin anchor) is left out, and a second answer MAY be signed later. For tooshi-day it holds "day_view" first, then the ids of the checks the run made (state ok, red or notice), sorted.

4.3. limits and tool

limits holds 1 to 20 lines, each at most 500 characters, written by the witness in its own words, saying what the answer does not establish; they are signed and travel with the answer. tool is one line naming the tool and its version or the SHA-256 of the script that was run. Every line is non-empty, has no control characters and no leading or trailing space.

4.4. Canonical Form and Signature

The canonical form is JCS [RFC8785]; an answer carries no floating point numbers, integers only within plus or minus 2^53 - 1, printable ASCII member names and no lone surrogates, and a verifier MUST reject other values. The preimage is the UTF-8 bytes of "witness-answer-v0" and one line feed (0x0A), followed by the canonical form of the answer without "signature"; "sig" is the base64 [RFC4648] of the 64-byte Ed25519 [RFC8032] signature over the preimage. A verifier checks shape, the key served at key_url, key_id, and signature, in that order, and reports the first step that fails.

5. Keys

5.1. key_id

key_id is "ed25519:" followed by the first 16 lower-case hex characters of the SHA-256 of the raw 32-byte public key; witness.key_id and signature.key_id MUST be equal. A verifier MUST reject a public key that is not the canonical encoding of a point of the prime-order subgroup.

5.2. key_url and Identity

The witness serves its key from its own domain at key_url, an https URL answered directly with status 200 and no redirect [RFC9110]; the intake fetches it on every submission and never answers from a cached key. The identity is the host of key_url; for raw.githubusercontent.com it is "github.com/" plus the owner, the path MUST name a branch or tag (optionally as refs/heads/ or refs/tags/), and a commit hash as the ref is refused. A host where many unrelated people publish files is refused as an identity; the intake keeps the list and states it.

5.3. Refusing self_witness

The intake refuses, as self_witness, a key served from a host the record walked (its base or endpoint), from the intake's own host, or from the operator's own GitHub account, whatever the record is about. The intake also refuses an answer about the operator's own records whose key is served by the operator: a key served from horizonshield.dev, the-horizons-innovation.com, ogasurfproject-jpg.github.io or oga-surf-project.workers.dev, or from any name under them, is refused as self_witness when the record's base or endpoint is under one of those names or is the intake's own host, before the key is fetched, and nothing is stored or counted. An answer the operator signs with such a key about someone else's record is kept and batched, but it is stored with counted false and count_reason "operator": it is not counted as an outside witness and does not take the place of an outside witness of the same endpoint on the same day. It refuses a record whose signing key differs from the key served at key_url (key_url_mismatch), and a key_url on a record without a signature. Because the base of a tooshi-day record is on raw.githubusercontent.com, a key served there is refused for every tooshi-day record; a tooshi-day record signed with a key on the operator's domains is kept uncounted ("operator"), and the helper refuses to build it.

5.4. The Key Document

The document at key_url is either the JSON object {"public_key_ed25519_b64": B}, B being the exact base64 of the 32 key bytes, or one OpenSSH line "ssh-ed25519 BASE64 [comment]" with at most one final line ending. In the OpenSSH form BASE64 decodes to the SSH wire form ([RFC4253], Section 6.6; [RFC8709], Section 4): a 4-byte length 11, "ssh-ed25519", a 4-byte length 32, the 32 key bytes, and nothing after; any other content is rejected.

6. Filing

A witness MAY file its answer at the intake inside a commitment record whose commitment is day_sha256, whose base is the URL of the day record, and which carries the answer; the record bytes are signed with the same key. Per witness identity, base and UTC day, the first accepted record is counted and later ones are stored but not counted; daily caps per identity and in total are stated at the intake. Accepted records are bundled into a ledger entry daily at 00:30 UTC, and that entry is timestamped in Bitcoin [OPENTIMESTAMPS], which fixes a time by which the answer existed.

7. What an Answer Does and Does Not Establish

A verified answer shows that the holder of the key served at key_url signed these digests, this list of recomputed steps and these limits, and a filed answer shows that it existed by the time of its anchor. It does not show that the holder ran the steps, that the content checked is right, that the record is complete, what the record's URL served to anyone else, or who the holder is beyond the domain that serves the key.

9. Version 0.1 of the Answer (Informative)

This section is informative. Version 0.1 uses the schema "witness-answer-v0.1" and the preimage prefix "witness-answer-v0.1" followed by one line feed; otherwise the canonical form and signature are those of Section 4.4. The different prefix keeps a version 0 signature from being read as a version 0.1 signature and the other way round. A version 0 verifier rejects a version 0.1 answer, because its schema value and its members are outside the closed shape of Section 4.1.

9.1. The outside-record Kind

An answer of kind "outside-record" names a record published by a party other than the witness by subject_domain, record_url, record_sha256 and record_kind (for example "bytes", any published byte string), lists the steps recomputed, and carries anchor, the Bitcoin block checked, or null. A reference tool exists [WITNESS-ANSWER-V01].

10. Security Considerations

Identity rests on control of the host serving key_url; a party that controls the host can sign as the witness. The intake fetches key_url on every submission, so a rotated key takes effect at once and a removed key stops being accepted. The reference Ed25519 code is not constant time; a witness can sign the preimage with its own tool and attach the signature.

11. Privacy Considerations

An answer carries the witness's handle, key URL and free-text limits, and a filed record adds a free-text vantage; these are published, timestamped and cannot be withdrawn [RFC6973].

12. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[FIPS180-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339]
Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC4253]
Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8709]
Harris, B. and L. Velvindron, "Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 8709, DOI 10.17487/RFC8709, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8709>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[RFC9162]
Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.

13.2. Informative References

[I-D.gruszka-audit-decision-receipts]
Gruszka, K., "Decision Receipts for Approvals, Declined Actions and Executed Actions in Agent Audit Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-05>.
[I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts]
Izmaylov, P., "Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02>.
[I-D.pidlisnyi-aps]
Pidlisnyi, T., "Agent Passport System (APS): Verifiable Authority, Lifecycle, Enforcement, and Evidence for AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-pidlisnyi-aps-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pidlisnyi-aps-04>.
[I-D.wright-verdict-record]
Wright, D., "Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wright-verdict-record-02>.
[NOTARIZED-AGENTS]
Figuera, J., "Notarized Agents: Receiver-Attested Confidential Receipts for AI Agent Actions", arXiv 2606.04193, , <https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.04193>.
[OPENTIMESTAMPS]
Todd, P., "OpenTimestamps: Scalable, Trust-Minimized, Distributed Timestamping with Bitcoin", , <https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-announcement>.
[RFC6962]
Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.
[RFC6973]
Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8792]
Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC9110]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9943]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.
[WITNESS-ANSWER-V0]
Oga, T., "Signed witness answers for a TOOSHI day and a FURUI day record (PROCEDURE.md, witness_answer_v0.py, vectors.json)", , <https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield/tree/e41715d75704e92455400707df895efd82bf4ecf/workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/witness-answer-v0>.
[WITNESS-ANSWER-V01]
Oga, T., "Outward witness answers (witness-answer-v0.1, outside-record)", , <https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield/tree/e41715d75704e92455400707df895efd82bf4ecf/tools/outward>.
[WITNESS-ENROLL-V0]
Oga, T., "The pool of day witnesses and the daily draw (PROCEDURE.md, witness_enroll_v0.py)", , <https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield/tree/e41715d75704e92455400707df895efd82bf4ecf/workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/witness-enroll-v0>.

Appendix A. Examples

A.1. Test Vector

Vectors are published with the reference helper [WITNESS-ANSWER-V0], signed with the public test key of [RFC8032], Section 7.1, TEST 1 (key_id ed25519:21fe31dfa154a261). The case furui_day_ok, whose preimage has SHA-256 b65826e8b091f646f1c6c8d2ffa81e7b243d8a2454f70d4940108bc4ece84b70, shown with long lines folded as in [RFC8792]:

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{
  "day": "2026-11-03",
  "day_sha256": "cb41b38387d6fca01272be03380f63568fccbd724c299ae58e8\
d548d91b67a58",
  "kind": "furui-day",
  "leaf_index": [0, 1],
  "limits": [
    "digest and inclusion checks only; not the correctness of the co\
ntent",
    "not the completeness of the day's log",
    "the runner key was taken from the key list the ledger serves; i\
ts history was not authenticated separately"
  ],
  "n": 2,
  "observed_at": "2026-11-04T02:36:00Z",
  "recomputed": ["envelope_shape", "leaf_sha256", "audit_path", "sig\
nature", "runner_key"],
  "root": "4813494d137e1631bba301d5acab6e7bb7aa74ce1185d456565ef51d7\
37677b2",
  "schema": "witness-answer-v0",
  "signature": {
    "alg": "ed25519",
    "key_id": "ed25519:21fe31dfa154a261",
    "sig": "zyIyKbpxFynB5CJz7THEH9mCBOlTCNcaLTPM/iZJsi6JsqMmzk1GWTvh\
NLD4lIDCqICJX0DbwBH/l1KYMr4PAg=="
  },
  "tool": "nenrin-verify 0.8.1 furui-day",
  "witness": {
    "key_id": "ed25519:21fe31dfa154a261",
    "key_url": "https://witness.example/keys/witness.json",
    "name": "pipavlo82"
  }
}

Appendix B. Implementation Status

A reference helper in Python (standard library only) builds, signs and verifies answers, with tests that block every socket [WITNESS-ANSWER-V0]; the outside-record kind of version 0.1 has its own tool [WITNESS-ANSWER-V01]; a pool and daily draw that name a witness and leaves are described in [WITNESS-ENROLL-V0]. This section follows [RFC7942] and is to be removed before publication.

Two answers filed by parties other than the operator are cited here with their permission:

Acknowledgments

The operators of invinoveritas.dev and pipavlo82.github.io filed the answers cited in Appendix B.

Author's Address

Toshikatsu Oga
The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.
Japan