<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.31 (Ruby 2.6.10) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.31.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="WPT Message Binding">Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>snandaku@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fluffy@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Workload Identity in Multi System Environments</workgroup>
    <keyword>proof of possession</keyword>
    <keyword>WIMSE</keyword>
    <keyword>agent protocols</keyword>
    <keyword>MOQT</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 58?>

<t>The WIMSE Workload Proof Token (WPT) proves possession of a workload's
key for an HTTP request and binds the tokens that travel with it. Agent
protocols increasingly carry their messages over other transports,
such as Media over QUIC, WebSocket, or QUIC streams, often
through intermediaries that terminate TLS, such as relays, message
brokers, or gateways. There, a proof has no HTTP request to bind to,
and the intermediaries that forward a message do not verify it, so
freshness has to be established by the receiving verifier. This
document defines how a WPT is used with a message
that carries it, adds a claim that binds the proof to the content of
that message and a claim that echoes a nonce supplied by the verifier,
and defines a registry of message canonicalization profiles, with a
profile for JSON messages. The same
claims can be used in an SD-JWT Key Binding JWT.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Workload Identity in Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:wimse@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 75?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>A Workload Proof Token <xref target="WIMSE-WPT"/> is a short-lived JWT, signed with
the key confirmed by a Workload Identity Token (WIT) <xref target="WIMSE-CREDS"/>,
that a workload attaches to an HTTP request. It binds the request's
target through <tt>aud</tt>; the WIT through <tt>wth</tt>; a Transaction Token
<xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/> through <tt>tth</tt>; and other tokens that carry end-user
identity or authorization context through <tt>oth</tt>
(<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-WPT"/>). It does not bind the request content,
and it relies on <tt>jti</tt> and a short lifetime against replay. Bindings
for non-HTTP protocols are left to future specifications
(<xref section="1" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-WPT"/>).</t>
      <t>Agent protocols need such a binding for messages that are not HTTP
requests. An agent sends a control message, such as a request to open
a delegated dialog or a signed approval, on a stream or track, and the
message travels through intermediaries that terminate TLS, such as
the relays of Media over QUIC Transport <xref target="MOQT"/>. The receiver needs to know that the workload
holding the key sent this message, not a different one with the same
credentials attached, and that the proof is fresh. Agent
dialog binding <xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> meets the same need for HTTP with
the <tt>dth</tt> claim, which hashes the HTTP <tt>Dialog-Context</tt> field.</t>
      <t>This document generalizes that approach to any message:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="carrying"/> says how a WPT travels inside a message and what its
<tt>aud</tt> is when there is no HTTP target URI.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>mth</tt> (<xref target="mth"/>) is the hash of the message the WPT travels in,
computed under a named canonicalization profile.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>nonce</tt> (<xref target="nonce"/>) echoes a value the verifier supplied, so that a
verifier establishes freshness itself, without relying on the
intermediaries that forward the message.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="profiles"/> defines the registry of canonicalization profiles and
one generic profile for JSON messages. Other documents can define
profiles for other message formats.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A binding for a particular message format defines only a profile.
This document defines everything else a verifier needs: the claim, how
a WPT is carried and addressed outside HTTP, freshness, and the
registry that bindings use.</t>
      <t>The binding is generic: an HTTP request body is also a message. A WPT
on an HTTP request can carry <tt>mth</tt> over its body, binding the request
content as well as its target (<xref target="on-http"/>).</t>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>Message:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A unit of an application protocol that is sent and processed as a
whole, such as a JSON object on a stream or an object on a media
track.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Credential member:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The part of a message that carries the WIT, the WPT, and any other
tokens, such as a <tt>credentials</tt> member of a JSON message. The
application protocol names it. In a message with a header and a
payload, it can be a header field or a part of the payload. A
message carried with its
tokens outside it, such as an HTTP request body, has none.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Canonicalization profile:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A named rule that maps a message to the octets hashed into <tt>mth</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="carrying">
      <name>Carrying a WPT in a Message</name>
      <t>When a WPT accompanies a message rather than an HTTP request:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The WIT and the WPT travel in the message's credential member, as
the application protocol defines. This document does not define the
member.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>aud</tt> is the workload identifier <xref target="WIMSE-ARCH"/> of the intended
receiver of the message, or another value the application protocol
defines, such as an agent identifier. It is not a URI of a request.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The WPT <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain <tt>mth</tt> (<xref target="mth"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The WPT <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain <tt>nonce</tt> (<xref target="nonce"/>) when the verifier has
supplied one.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>wth</tt>, <tt>tth</tt>, and <tt>oth</tt> apply as in <xref target="WIMSE-WPT"/>, with "request"
read as "message"; <tt>oth</tt> keys are names that the application protocol
defines for the tokens in its credential member.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Validation follows <xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-WPT"/>, except for the checks
specific to the HTTP Authorization field, with the additions in
<xref target="mth"/> and <xref target="nonce"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="on-http">
        <name>On an HTTP Request</name>
        <t>A WPT on an HTTP request <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also contain <tt>mth</tt>, computed over the
request content under a profile that fits its media type, such as
<tt>json-jcs</tt> for a JSON body. <tt>aud</tt> and the other claims stay as
<xref target="WIMSE-WPT"/> defines them for HTTP. The WPT then binds the request
content, which <xref target="WIMSE-WPT"/> alone does not (<xref section="1" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-WPT"/>), and the binding survives intermediaries that
re-serialize JSON. A verifier that finds <tt>mth</tt> in a WPT on an HTTP
request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify it, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request if it does not
match.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="mth">
      <name>The mth Claim</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>mth:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The message hash. A JSON object with two members:
</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>p</tt>: the name of a canonicalization profile from the registry in
<xref target="iana-profiles"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>h</tt>: the base64url encoding <xref target="RFC7515"/> of the SHA-256 hash
<xref target="RFC6234"/> of the octets that the profile produces for the
message.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
"mth": {"p": "json-jcs", "h": "pLk2tQ3m...Gv0"}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recognize the profile named in <tt>p</tt>, compute the hash
of the received message under it, and reject the message if the hash
differs from <tt>h</tt>. A verifier that does not recognize the profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
reject the message.</t>
      <t>Because <tt>mth</tt> covers the message content, a WPT cannot be moved to a
different message even within its lifetime, and an intermediary cannot
change the message without detection. The message's credential
member (<xref target="terminology"/>) is left out of the hash, because the WPT that
carries <tt>mth</tt> is itself in that member and cannot hash itself.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="nonce">
      <name>The nonce Claim</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>nonce:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A string that the verifier supplied to the signer earlier, for
example in a previous message of the same protocol exchange.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>A verifier that supplied a nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check that the WPT echoes it and
that it has not accepted that nonce before. The application protocol
defines how nonces are supplied and how long they are valid. A
verifier that relies on <tt>nonce</tt> for freshness does not need to keep
<tt>jti</tt> values beyond the nonce's validity, which suits protocols in
which a message can arrive through any of several intermediaries.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="profiles">
      <name>Canonicalization Profiles</name>
      <t>A profile fits the message's format. <tt>json-jcs</tt> (<xref target="json-jcs"/>) suits
JSON messages that intermediaries may re-serialize. A message that is
not JSON, such as a binary media payload, needs a profile
defined for its format. Such a profile hashes the message's octets as
delivered and, where a message's position matters, the fields that
identify it, so that a signed message cannot be replayed elsewhere.</t>
      <section anchor="json-jcs">
        <name>json-jcs</name>
        <t>The <tt>json-jcs</tt> profile applies to messages that are a single JSON
object. The application protocol names the credential member, if the
message has one. The profile produces the JSON Canonicalization Scheme
<xref target="RFC8785"/> serialization of the message with the credential member
removed. A JSON HTTP request body has no credential member, because
the WPT travels in a header field; the profile then covers the whole
body (<xref target="on-http"/>).</t>
        <t>An application protocol that uses <tt>json-jcs</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> state the name of the
credential member, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> register a profile of its own whose name
identifies the protocol and whose rule is <tt>json-jcs</tt> with that member.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="http-header-fields">
        <name>HTTP Header Fields</name>
        <t><tt>mth</tt> on an HTTP request (<xref target="on-http"/>) covers only the content. This
document defines no profile for HTTP header fields: the WIMSE HTTP
Message Signatures profile <xref target="WIMSE-HTTPSIG"/> <xref target="RFC9421"/> covers chosen
components, and <xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> covers the <tt>Dialog-Context</tt> field
with <tt>dth</tt>. A request signed that way that carries an
<tt>Idempotency-Key</tt> field <xref target="IDEMPOTENCY"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include that field among
the covered components, so that the key cannot be removed or replaced
in transit.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="use-in-sd-jwt-key-binding-jwts">
      <name>Use in SD-JWT Key Binding JWTs</name>
      <t>An SD-JWT Key Binding JWT <xref target="RFC9901"/> already carries <tt>nonce</tt> and
<tt>aud</tt>. A KB-JWT that accompanies a message <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include <tt>mth</tt>, with the
meaning defined here, when the SD-JWT is presented in the message's
credential member.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-other-work">
      <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
      <t>Dialog binding <xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> binds the HTTP <tt>Dialog-Context</tt> field
with <tt>dth</tt>. Where the dialog context is carried inside a message
rather than an HTTP field, <tt>mth</tt> serves the same purpose and covers
the rest of the message as well. The two can coexist: an HTTP request
uses <tt>dth</tt>; a message on another transport uses <tt>mth</tt>.</t>
      <t>Aggregate signatures for delegation chains <xref target="AGG-SIG"/> attribute
changes to request and response bodies at each hop of an HTTP chain.
<tt>mth</tt> binds one message to one sender; it does not by itself provide
provenance across hops.</t>
      <t>DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> identifies the HTTP request by method and target URI.
The CAT-4-MOQT profile of DPoP <xref target="MoQ-C4M"/> replaces these with the
MOQT action, Track Namespace, and Track Name, so that a relay can
check that a token's holder authorized that action. Such a proof covers
the action, not the objects published, and is verified by the relay.
<tt>mth</tt> complements it: the receiving workload verifies that the sender
holds the key and sent this message content, end to end through any
intermediaries.</t>
      <t>An agent protocol can register its own profile and use <tt>mth</tt> to bind
delegation credentials to the control message that opens a delegated
dialog.</t>
      <t>On an HTTP request (<xref target="on-http"/>), <tt>mth</tt> covers only the request content.
HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/>, as profiled for workloads in
<xref target="WIMSE-HTTPSIG"/>, also cover header fields, but cover the octets of
the content, which an intermediary that re-serializes it changes. A
deployment that must protect header fields uses HTTP Message
Signatures; one that needs only the content bound, across such
intermediaries, can use <tt>mth</tt>. JSON-RPC protocols over HTTP, such as
A2A and MCP, are an example.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Canonicalization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Signer and verifier must produce identical octets. Profiles <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
define canonicalization precisely; <tt>json-jcs</tt> relies on <xref target="RFC8785"/>.
A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a message whose JSON contains duplicate member
names.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Nonce handling:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A nonce that is predictable or reused allows replay. Nonces <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have
at least 128 bits of entropy and be accepted at most once.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay records:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>"Accepted at most once" holds only if every instance of a verifier
consults the same record. A verifier that runs as several instances
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> share its record of accepted nonces and <tt>jti</tt> values, keyed by
issuer, audience, and value, and keep each entry until the WPT's
<tt>exp</tt> or the nonce's validity ends. An instance that cannot reach the
record <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the message.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Repeated actions:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>mth</tt> binds a WPT to one message, but a signer can send the same
operation again as a new message with a new WPT. Detecting that is
the application's task. An application protocol whose messages
cause side effects <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry an idempotency key in the message,
where <tt>mth</tt> covers it, and a receiver <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> bind each key to the
first message accepted under it and reject a later message with the
same key and a different hash. This rule applies to HTTP requests
that carry <tt>Idempotency-Key</tt> <xref target="IDEMPOTENCY"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Clocks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>exp</tt> and <tt>iat</tt> checks assume a correct clock. A verifier that
cannot trust its clock, for example after a restart without a time
source, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept WPTs until it can; a secure time source such
as Roughtime <xref target="ROUGHTIME"/> can provide this.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Partial coverage:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>mth</tt> covers what its profile covers. <tt>json-jcs</tt> covers the message,
not the metadata that the transport carries around it, such as the
stream, channel, or topic it was sent on. An application protocol
that relies on such metadata <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include it in the message or use a
profile that covers it.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Intermediaries:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>mth</tt> makes modification of a message detectable but does not hide
its content from intermediaries. Confidentiality across them needs
end-to-end encryption of the message.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t><tt>mth</tt> reveals nothing beyond a hash of a message the verifier already
holds. <tt>nonce</tt> values <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be random rather than derived from
identifiers.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="json-web-token-claims">
        <name>JSON Web Token Claims</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Claim Name: <tt>mth</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Description: Hash of the message a proof of possession
accompanies, under a canonicalization profile</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="mth"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The <tt>nonce</tt> claim is already registered.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-profiles">
        <name>WIMSE Message Canonicalization Profiles</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create the "WIMSE Message Canonicalization
Profiles" registry, with the policy Specification Required. Each entry
has a Profile Name, a Description, and a Reference.</t>
        <t>Initial entries:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Profile Name: <tt>json-jcs</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Description: JCS of a JSON message with its credential member
removed</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="json-jcs"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6234">
          <front>
            <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9901">
          <front>
            <title>Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yasuda" initials="K." surname="Yasuda"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a mechanism for the selective disclosure
of individual elements of a JSON data structure used as the payload
of a JSON Web Signature (JWS). The primary use case is the selective
disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9901"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9901"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-WPT">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Proof Token</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from basic
   deployments to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   systems.  This document specifies the Workload Proof Token (WPT), a
   mechanism for workloads to prove possession of the private key
   associated with a Workload Identity Token (WIT).  The WPT is a signed
   JWT that binds the workload's authentication to a specific HTTP
   request, providing application-layer proof of possession for
   workload-to-workload communication.  This specification is designed
   to work alongside the WIT credential format defined in draft-ietf-
   wimse-workload-creds and can be combined with other WIMSE protocols
   in multi-hop call chains.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-CREDS">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="TXN-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MOQT">
          <front>
            <title>Media over QUIC Transport</title>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Victor Vasiliev" initials="V." surname="Vasiliev">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ian Swett" initials="I." surname="Swett">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Alan Frindell" initials="A." surname="Frindell">
              <organization>Meta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT), a publish/
   subscribe protocol that runs over QUIC and WebTransport.  MOQT
   leverages the features of these transports, such as streams,
   datagrams, priorities, and partial reliability.  MOQT operates both
   point-to-point and through intermediate relays, enabling scalable
   low-latency delivery.  Despite its name, MOQT is media agnostic and
   can be used for a wide range of use cases.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-moq-transport-23"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9421">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDEMPOTENCY">
          <front>
            <title>The Idempotency-Key HTTP Header Field</title>
            <author fullname="Jayadeba Jena" initials="J." surname="Jena">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Sanjay Dalal" initials="S." surname="Dalal">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Dmitrii Tishkin" initials="D." surname="Tishkin">
         </author>
            <date day="22" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The HTTP Idempotency-Key request header field can be used to make
   non-idempotent HTTP methods such as POST or PATCH fault-tolerant.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpapi-idempotency-key-header-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ROUGHTIME">
          <front>
            <title>Roughtime: A Protocol for Rough Time Synchronization</title>
            <author fullname="W. Ladd" initials="W." surname="Ladd"/>
            <author fullname="M. Dansarie" initials="M." surname="Dansarie"/>
            <date month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes Roughtime, an experimental protocol that aims to achieve two things: secure, rough time synchronization (even for clients without any idea of what time it is) and a format for clients to report any inconsistencies they observe between timeservers. This document specifies the on-wire protocol required for these goals and discusses aspects of the ecosystem needed for it to work.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10049"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC10049"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-ARCH">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service
   architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being
   built and deployed as workloads, where a workload is defined as
   software executing for a specific purpose, potentially comprising one
   or more running instances.  This document discusses an architecture
   for designing and standardizing protocols and payloads for conveying
   workload identity and security context information.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-arch-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-HTTPSIG">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="20" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   deployments.  This document defines one of the mechanisms to provide
   workload authentication, using HTTP Signatures.  While only
   applicable to HTTP traffic, the protocol provides end-to-end
   protection of requests (and optionally, responses), even when service
   traffic is not end-to-end encrypted, that is, when TLS proxies and
   load balancers are used.  Authentication is based on the Workload
   Identity Token (WIT).

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DIALOG-BINDING">
          <front>
            <title>Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents and tools that take part in a dialog carry a dialog context
   with each request and response.  This document specifies how the
   dialog context is bound to WIMSE and OAuth credentials.  It extends
   the WIMSE profile of HTTP Message Signatures, for requests and
   responses, and the WIMSE Proof Token, for requests, to cover the
   dialog context, records the dialog identifier in OAuth transaction
   tokens, and describes how a new dialog at a trust boundary aligns
   with OAuth identity chaining.  A receiver can then verify who sent a
   request or response, which dialog it belongs to, and, for a request,
   what it may do, and that the answers agree.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGG-SIG">
          <front>
            <title>Authenticated Provenance for WIMSE Delegation Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   A request and its response, passing through a chain of workloads, may
   need authenticated provenance: proof of which workloads participated
   and whether each changed the message.  The base WIMSE HTTP Message
   Signatures mechanism ([I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature]) authenticates
   one workload's message to its immediate recipient and does not
   provide this across a chain.  This document establishes authenticated
   provenance using per-hop digests of what each hop received and
   forwarded; this alone detects an omitted hop that changed the
   message.  An aggregate signature closes the remaining gap, a hop that
   forwards the message unchanged, and keeps the signature close to the
   size of one signature regardless of chain length.  The mechanism
   works with any aggregate signature scheme.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-aggregate-signatures-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MoQ-C4M">
          <front>
            <title>Authorization scheme for MOQT using Common Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Chris Lemmons" initials="C." surname="Lemmons">
              <organization>Comcast</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Gwendal Simon" initials="G." surname="Simon">
              <organization>Synamedia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Will Law" initials="W." surname="Law">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   A token-based authorization scheme for use with Media Over QUIC
   Transport.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-moq-c4m-02"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 390?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document builds on the WIMSE Workload Proof Token and on the
<tt>dth</tt> claim of agent dialog binding.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
