<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.31 (Ruby 2.6.10) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.31.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains">Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>snandaku@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fluffy@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Workload Identity in Multi System Environments</workgroup>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>attenuation</keyword>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <keyword>WIMSE</keyword>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 59?>

<t>Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting
any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority
than the root granted. They do not show that each hop was granted by
the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the
verifier accepts. This document defines an extension that requires
each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token
confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no
authorization server in the path. The extension also defines a
per-chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in
which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience
within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the
dialog or transaction it was issued for. The extension builds on an
existing attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other
chained-token formats.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Workload Identity in Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:wimse@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 76?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>When an agent delegates part of a task to another agent, which
delegates further, the agent at the end of the chain receives a
credential and has to decide whether to act on it. It needs to know
that:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the authority comes, hop by hop, from a principal who granted it;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>no hop widened that authority;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each hop was granted by the agent before it, not asserted by a third
party; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the chain does not loop.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Where the agents are in different organizations and delegate directly
to each other, the receiver usually has to check this without an
authorization server in the path (see <xref target="CROSS-ORG"/> and <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="UCREQ"/>).</t>
      <t>Several designs address parts of this:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Delegation Tokens <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> define attenuation precisely:
a closed authorization detail with subsumption rules, a parent hash
that prevents splicing, a principal that stays the same at every
hop, and an offline verification algorithm. The verifier checks the
root token against a trusted key and checks the signature of every
other token, but the specification does not say which key must sign
a child token. A chain therefore shows that each hop is no broader
than its parent, not that the holder of the parent granted it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Delegate SD-JWT <xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/> chains key-binding JWTs so that
each hop is signed with the key the previous hop confirms. It
defines no rule for comparing authority between hops.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The OAuth Actor Chain <xref target="ACTOR-CHAIN"/> records an actor proof signed
by each new actor, accepted by an authorization server at every
step.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The OAuth Actor Profile <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/> makes nested <tt>act</tt> claims
the issuer's assertion of history and invites companion profiles
that carry independently verifiable evidence for each hop.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document is one such companion profile: it gives each hop of a
Delegation Token chain <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> verifiable evidence that
the hop before it granted it. It extends Delegation Tokens with five
things:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Delegator binding (<xref target="delegator-binding"/>): each child token is
signed with the key confirmed by its parent token, and names the
parent's acting agent as its issuer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Originator pseudonym (<xref target="pseudonym"/>): the principal can be a
per-chain pseudonym that only the root issuer can resolve.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cycle detection (<xref target="cycles"/>): a chain in which an acting agent
appears twice is rejected.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Audience attenuation (<xref target="audience"/>): a child token's audience is
limited to that of its parent.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Context binding (<xref target="context"/>): a chain can name the dialog or
transaction it was issued for.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t><xref target="example"/> walks through a three-hop chain before the rules.
<xref target="dsdjwt"/> maps the same rules onto Delegate SD-JWT
<xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>This document uses the terms Delegation Token, Delegation Chain,
Principal, Acting Agent, Authority, and Verifier from
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>. DT_0 is the root token and DT_i, for i &gt; 0, is
the child of DT_{i-1}.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Delegator:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The Acting Agent of DT_{i-1} when it issues DT_i.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Delegator-bound chain:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A Delegation Chain whose root carries <tt>del_bind</tt> with the value
<tt>delegator</tt> (<xref target="delegator-binding"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="example">
      <name>An Example Chain</name>
      <t>A person asks a travel agent, agent-a, to book a trip. Agent-a
delegates the hotel booking to agent-b, which delegates the payment to
agent-c. Agent-c then pays at a payment service. <xref target="fig-example"/> shows
the three tokens of the chain and the claims of <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>
that matter at each hop. The values are illustrative:
<tt>authorization_details</tt> is shown as a summary of its one
<tt>agent_delegation</tt> object, and <tt>par_hash</tt> as the token it hashes.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-example">
        <name>A Delegator-Bound Chain</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
 +---------------------------------------+
 | DT_0                                  |
 |   iss:        as.example              |
 |   client_id:  agent-a                 |
 |   cnf:        key A ------------------+---+
 |   aud:        hotel, pay              |   |
 |   authorization_details:              |   |
 |     book a trip, up to 2000           |   |
 +---------------------------------------+   |
                                             | key A signs DT_1
 +---------------------------------------+   |
 | DT_1                                  |   |
 |   iss:        agent-a  <--------------+---+
 |   client_id:  agent-b                 |
 |   cnf:        key B ------------------+---+
 |   aud:        hotel, pay              |   |
 |   authorization_details:              |   |
 |     book a hotel, up to 900           |   |
 |   par_hash:   hash of DT_0            |   |
 +---------------------------------------+   |
                                             | key B signs DT_2
 +---------------------------------------+   |
 | DT_2                                  |   |
 |   iss:        agent-b  <--------------+---+
 |   client_id:  agent-c                 |
 |   cnf:        key C ------------------+---+
 |   aud:        pay                     |   |
 |   authorization_details:              |   |
 |     pay the hotel, up to 900          |   |
 |   par_hash:   hash of DT_1            |   |
 +---------------------------------------+   |
                                             | agent-c proves key C
                                             v
                                    Payment service (verifier)

 In every token: sub = pseudonym P, del_bind = delegator
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>What changes at each hop:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>iss</tt> is the agent that issued the token, and the key that signs it
is the key the previous token confirms in <tt>cnf</tt>. DT_1 is signed with
key A because DT_0 names agent-a and confirms key A.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>client_id</tt> and <tt>cnf</tt> name the next agent and its key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>authorization_details</tt> and <tt>aud</tt> can only narrow: the trip becomes
a hotel, then a payment for that hotel; <tt>aud</tt> drops <tt>hotel</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>ctx</tt> names the dialog each token was issued for; each delegation
here is a new dialog.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>What stays the same: <tt>sub</tt>, the per-chain pseudonym P of the person
(<xref target="pseudonym"/>), and <tt>del_bind</tt>, which makes every hop follow these
rules (<xref target="delegator-binding"/>).</t>
      <t>The payment service verifies DT_0 under the root issuer's key, then
for each later token:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>its signature, with the key the previous token confirms;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>that its <tt>iss</tt> equals the previous token's <tt>client_id</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>that its <tt>authorization_details</tt> and <tt>aud</tt> are within the previous
token's
(<xref target="audience"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>that <tt>sub</tt>, <tt>sub_kind</tt>, and <tt>del_bind</tt> are unchanged, and that no
<tt>client_id</tt> appears twice (<xref target="cycles"/>); and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>that its <tt>par_hash</tt> matches the previous token.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Finally, it checks that agent-c holds key C, the key DT_2 confirms. A
chain that passes shows that the person's issuer granted agent-a,
agent-a granted agent-b, and agent-b granted agent-c, each within the
authority it held, with no server in the path after the root.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="delegator-binding">
      <name>Delegator Binding</name>
      <section anchor="claims">
        <name>Claims</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>del_bind:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> in DT_0. When present with the value <tt>delegator</tt>, every
child in the chain <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> satisfy the rules of this section. A child
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>del_bind</tt> with the same value as its parent. A verifier
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a chain in which a child omits or changes <tt>del_bind</tt>.
<tt>delegator</tt> is the only value this document defines; a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
reject a chain whose <tt>del_bind</tt> has any other value.
Because the claim is in DT_0 and in every child, a delegator cannot
remove the requirement for later hops.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="issuing-a-child">
        <name>Issuing a Child</name>
        <t>A delegator that issues DT_i in a delegator-bound chain:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> sign DT_i with the private key that corresponds to the <tt>cnf</tt>
claim <xref target="RFC7800"/> of DT_{i-1}, using an asymmetric digital signature
algorithm;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set <tt>iss</tt> of DT_i to the <tt>client_id</tt> of DT_{i-1};</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include in the JWS protected header the public key used to sign
DT_i as a <tt>jwk</tt> header parameter <xref target="RFC7515"/> when the <tt>cnf</tt> of
DT_{i-1} carries only a thumbprint (<tt>jkt</tt>); and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>follows every other rule of <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, including
attenuation, the parent hash, and the principal invariant.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Issuing a child therefore requires only the delegator's own key. No
authorization server takes part.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verifying-a-chain">
        <name>Verifying a Chain</name>
        <t>A verifier of a delegator-bound chain performs the algorithm of
<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> and, as part of its step 1, the
following for each DT_i with i &gt; 0:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Determine the public key confirmed by DT_{i-1}: the <tt>jwk</tt> member of
its <tt>cnf</tt>; or, if its <tt>cnf</tt> has a <tt>jkt</tt> member, the <tt>jwk</tt> header
parameter of DT_i, whose JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint <xref target="RFC7638"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
equal that <tt>jkt</tt>. Deny if the <tt>cnf</tt> has neither member, or confirms
a symmetric key.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verify the signature of DT_i with that key, under an asymmetric
algorithm. Deny on failure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verify that <tt>iss</tt> of DT_i equals <tt>client_id</tt> of DT_{i-1}. Deny on
failure.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>DT_0 is verified under a trusted root key, as in <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="what-this-establishes">
        <name>What This Establishes</name>
        <t>For a delegator-bound chain that verifies, a verifier knows, in
addition to what <xref section="6.1" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> establishes, that
each child was issued by the holder of the key that its parent
confirmed, and therefore by the Acting Agent that the parent named.
Only the root rests on a trust anchor; every later hop rests on the
previous hop. This is the property that <xref target="UCREQ"/> asks for when it
requires that the credential presented to an agent was issued by the agent
that delegated to it, and the chain traces back to the original
authorization.</t>
        <t>The key that signs DT_i is also the key that DT_{i-1} binds for proof
of possession (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>). A deployment that
wants separate keys for signing children and for presenting tokens
uses a separate delegation key and does not use this extension.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="pseudonym">
      <name>Originator Pseudonym</name>
      <t><xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> carries the Principal in <tt>sub</tt>, identical at
every hop. Every agent in the chain, and every enforcement point, then
learns the Principal's identifier. When that is not acceptable, the
issuer of DT_0 sets <tt>sub</tt> to a pseudonym and marks it:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>sub_kind:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> in DT_0; when present, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present with the same
value in every child, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a chain in which a
child omits or changes it. The value <tt>pseudonym</tt> means that <tt>sub</tt> is
a pseudonym computed as below. The value <tt>identifier</tt>, or absence,
means that <tt>sub</tt> identifies the Principal directly.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The pseudonym is</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
sub = BASE64URL(HMAC-SHA-256(K, principal-id || 0x00 || jti_0))
]]></artwork>
      <t>where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in <xref target="RFC2104"/> and <xref target="RFC6234"/>, K is a
secret key held by the issuer of DT_0, <tt>principal-id</tt> is the UTF-8
encoding of the issuer's identifier for the Principal, <tt>jti_0</tt> is the
UTF-8 encoding of the <tt>jti</tt> of DT_0, <tt>||</tt> is concatenation, and
BASE64URL is base64url encoding without padding. The
pseudonym differs for every chain, so chains for the same Principal
cannot be linked by <tt>sub</tt>, and the principal invariant of
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> still holds within a chain. The issuer of DT_0
can resolve the pseudonym, for example for audit or revocation.</t>
      <t>An issuer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> place in <tt>sub</tt> an identifier that another issuer
directed to a specific audience, such as a pairwise subject
identifier, because the identifier would then reach parties it was not
directed to.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="cycles">
      <name>Cycle Detection</name>
      <t><xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> bounds the length of a chain with
<tt>del_max_depth</tt>. A bound limits the damage of a loop but does not
detect one. In a delegator-bound chain:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A delegator <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue a child whose <tt>client_id</tt> equals the
<tt>client_id</tt> of any token already in the chain.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> deny a chain in which two tokens carry the same
<tt>client_id</tt>. An agent that receives a chain to act under is such a
verifier: it refuses a chain in which its own identifier appears as
the <tt>client_id</tt> of any token other than the last.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The rule detects cycles only among identifiers that are the same
string. An agent that uses a different <tt>client_id</tt> per chain can take
part in a cycle without detection; the depth bound then still applies.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="audience">
      <name>Audience Attenuation</name>
      <t><xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> requires <tt>aud</tt> in every token of a chain, but the
Enforcement Point checks it only in DT_n, and nothing relates the
audience of a child to that of its parent. A delegator could therefore
issue a child usable at a resource that its own grant did not name.</t>
      <t>In a delegator-bound chain, the audience attenuates like the rest of
the authority:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A delegator <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue DT_i whose <tt>aud</tt> contains a value that is
not in the <tt>aud</tt> of DT_{i-1}.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> deny a chain in which the <tt>aud</tt> of any DT_i, i &gt; 0,
contains a value that is not in the <tt>aud</tt> of DT_{i-1}.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>With this rule, the audience check applied to DT_n also holds for
every earlier token: a chain is usable only where every delegator in
it allowed it to be used. Values are compared as strings, as
<xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/> specifies. A chain that crosses a trust
domain boundary through an authorization server is re-issued there
with the audience that server sets, and this rule applies to the new
chain from that point.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="context">
      <name>Context Binding</name>
      <t>A chain is often issued for one dialog or transaction: an agent dialog
<xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> or a Transaction Token's <tt>txn</tt> <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>. Binding the chain to it lets a receiver
reject a chain presented in a different one.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>ctx:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A JSON object with members <tt>type</tt>, a string naming the
kind of context, and <tt>id</tt>, its identifier. A delegator <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> add <tt>ctx</tt>
to a child, or change it, because a child is often issued for a new
dialog that continues the parent's; the parent's <tt>ctx</tt> remains in the
chain for audit.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>This document defines two values of <tt>type</tt>:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>dialog:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>id</tt> is an agent dialog identifier, such as the <tt>dlg</tt> of
<xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> or the dialog identifier of another agent dialog
protocol.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>txn:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><tt>id</tt> is the <tt>txn</tt> of a Transaction Token <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>A receiver that knows the context in which a chain is presented, and
finds a different <tt>ctx</tt> in the last token, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the chain. A
receiver that does not know its context, or does not recognize the
<tt>type</tt>, ignores <tt>ctx</tt>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="dsdjwt">
      <name>Applying the Rules to Delegate SD-JWT</name>
      <t>Delegate SD-JWT <xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/> already signs each hop with the key
confirmed by the previous hop, so it provides delegator binding by
construction. To apply the remaining rules of this document, a
deployment:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>carries the authority of each hop as one <tt>agent_delegation</tt>
authorization detail of <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> in the hop's
<tt>delegate_payload</tt>, and applies its subsumption rules between hops;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>carries <tt>sub</tt>, <tt>sub_kind</tt>, <tt>client_id</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, and <tt>ctx</tt> in each
<tt>delegate_payload</tt>, with the meaning defined here; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>applies <xref target="pseudonym"/>, <xref target="cycles"/>, <xref target="audience"/>, and <xref target="context"/> to
those claims.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A verifier rejects a Delegate SD-JWT chain under this profile if any
hop's <tt>delegate_payload</tt> lacks these claims or fails these rules.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-other-work">
      <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
      <t>The OAuth Actor Profile <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/> defines <tt>act</tt> as the
issuer's assertion: inner actors are history, not inputs to access
control. A delegator-bound chain is evidence that each hop made: it can
accompany an access token whose <tt>act</tt> describes the same chain, in its
own claims, as that profile's companion-profile provision allows.</t>
      <t>The OAuth Actor Chain <xref target="ACTOR-CHAIN"/> records a proof by each new actor
and an authorization server's acceptance at every step. A
delegator-bound chain records the grant by each delegator and needs no
server after the root. The two answer different questions, which actor
took part and who granted whom, and can be combined.</t>
      <t>Identity chaining <xref target="ID-CHAINING"/> and cross-domain Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-CHAINING"/>
remain the right choice where every domain boundary has an
authorization server. This extension is for agents that delegate
directly to each other.</t>
      <t>An agent dialog protocol can use delegator-bound chains for dialogs
that cross administrative domains without an authorization server,
with <tt>ctx</tt> of type <tt>dialog</tt> naming the parent dialog.</t>
      <t>An earlier proposal by the authors defined a separate delegation
assertion format with similar properties. This document replaces it by
extending <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, so that attenuation is defined once.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Key compromise:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An attacker who obtains the key confirmed by DT_i can issue children
within DT_i's authority. Delegator binding does not change this,
which holds for any proof-of-possession token; it does attribute
such children to DT_i's acting agent. Short lifetimes and status
lists <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/> limit the exposure.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Root trust:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Delegator binding moves trust from every hop to the root. How the
verifier obtains and trusts the root key is outside this document,
as it is for <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Pseudonym key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Anyone who holds K can link pseudonyms to Principals. The issuer of
DT_0 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> protect K as it protects its signing keys and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> rotate
it.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Audience widening:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Without <xref target="audience"/>, any delegator in a chain could make it usable
at resources the principal never named; the audience check of DT_n
alone would not detect this.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Revocation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Revoking DT_i invalidates every chain through it. A verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
deny a chain when it cannot obtain current status for a token that
carries a <tt>status</tt> claim within its configured staleness bound.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>A delegation chain discloses the <tt>client_id</tt> of every hop to each later
hop and to the enforcement point. When agents in one organization must
not be visible to another, the delegator at the boundary can obtain a
new root from an authorization server, ending the chain, as
<xref target="TXN-CHAINING"/> does. Within a chain, per-chain <tt>client_id</tt> values
reduce linkability at the cost of cycle detection (<xref target="cycles"/>). The
originator pseudonym (<xref target="pseudonym"/>) prevents the Principal from being
linked across chains.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document registers the following claims in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Claim Name: <tt>del_bind</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Claim Description: Delegation binding mode of a delegation chain</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reference: <xref target="delegator-binding"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Claim Name: <tt>sub_kind</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Claim Description: Whether <tt>sub</tt> is an identifier or a per-chain
pseudonym</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reference: <xref target="pseudonym"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Claim Name: <tt>ctx</tt></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Claim Description: Dialog or transaction a delegation was issued for</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reference: <xref target="context"/></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
            <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
            <date month="February" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6234">
          <front>
            <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7800">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7800"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7800"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATION-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Rafael Asor" initials="R." surname="Asor">
              <organization>Attenu</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested "act" claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATE-SD-JWT">
          <front>
            <title>Delegate SD-JWT</title>
            <author fullname="Gareth Oliver" initials="G." surname="Oliver">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies an extension to Selective Disclosure JSON Web
   Tokens [RFC9901] to support further delegation from the Holder to a
   Delegate Holder.  This is done by allowing the Key Binding JWT to
   also be an SD-JWT, optionally with its own Key Binding.  This has
   particular applicability to Agentic systems.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-PROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a common representation of delegated actors in
   OAuth JSON Web Token (JWT) assertion grants, JWT access tokens, and
   Transaction Tokens.  It profiles the act claim defined by OAuth 2.0
   Token Exchange, requires issuer-scoped actor identifiers, and uses
   the sub_profile claim to classify actor entity types.  It specifies
   token processing, delegation-chain propagation, sender-constraint
   handling, and discovery metadata, so that issuers and resource
   servers in different trust domains interpret delegated actors
   consistently.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-CHAIN">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and Interoperability</title>
            <author fullname="A Prasad" initials="A." surname="Prasad">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Ramki Krishnan" initials="R." surname="Krishnan">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Diego Lopez" initials="D." surname="Lopez">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa Addepalli" initials="S." surname="Addepalli">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Suresh Krishnan" initials="S." surname="Krishnan">
         </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the protocol and interoperability requirements
   for OAuth Actor Chain.  Six profiles combine Authorization Server
   (AS) declarations or actor-signed evidence with Full, Subset, or
   Actor-Only disclosure.  Verified profiles create one actor proof and
   one AS acceptance at every actor step, with optional current-actor,
   disclosed-actor, or full-path evidence delivered inline or through
   introspection.  This specification defines the wire formats,
   validation, replay and retry behavior, cross-domain preservation,
   resource limits, and IANA registration requests.  A separate
   Informational overview provides additional design discussion.  This
   revision continues the existing OAuth Actor Chain draft series, with
   Internet-Draft lineage beginning in SPICE in February 2026.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CROSS-ORG">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Morgan Reece" initials="M." surname="Reece">
              <organization>TowerGuardian Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous software agents increasingly act on behalf of human
   principals by invoking tools, services, and other agents, frequently
   across organizational boundaries.  Existing workload and token-based
   authorization mechanisms were designed for a single trust domain and
   a small number of delegation hops.  They do not adequately express,
   constrain, or verify authority that is delegated recursively among
   agents and that crosses the boundary between independently
   administered organizations.  This document describes the problem of
   cross-organizational agent delegation, identifies the gaps in current
   mechanisms, and enumerates requirements that any solution within the
   scope of the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE)
   working group should satisfy.  It does not specify a solution.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DIALOG-BINDING">
          <front>
            <title>Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents and tools that take part in a dialog carry a dialog context
   with each request and response.  This document specifies how the
   dialog context is bound to WIMSE and OAuth credentials.  It extends
   the WIMSE profile of HTTP Message Signatures, for requests and
   responses, and the WIMSE Proof Token, for requests, to cover the
   dialog context, records the dialog identifier in OAuth transaction
   tokens, and describes how a new dialog at a trust boundary aligns
   with OAuth identity chaining.  A receiver can then verify who sent a
   request or response, which dialog it belongs to, and, for a request,
   what it may do, and that the answers agree.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Token JWT Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining</title>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sean O'Dell" initials="S." surname="O'Dell">
              <organization>CVS Health</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a profile of the OAuth Identity and
   Authorization Chaining Across Domains
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] mechanism that uses a Transaction
   Token (Txn-Token) [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens] as the subject
   token in a Token Exchange [RFC8693] request to obtain a JWT
   Authorization Grant for crossing a trust boundary.

   A Txn-Token is scoped to a single trust domain and represents the
   full authorization context of an in-progress transaction, regardless
   of whether that transaction was initiated by a human user calling an
   external API, by an internal system event, or by an automated
   workload.  This profile specifies how a service operating within that
   trust domain can present its Txn-Token to obtain a JWT Authorization
   Grant that carries the necessary context across a trust boundary,
   enabling an access token to be issued for a partner service, without
   exposing internal trust-domain credentials or token formats beyond
   the trust boundary.

   Agentic systems are one class of deployment that depends on this
   capability.  The AI Identity Management System [I-D.ietf-wimse-aims]
   describes AI agents as workloads that use Transaction Tokens to carry
   authorization context between the services implementing a task, and
   that frequently need to reach resources protected by an authorization
   server in another trust domain.  Its treatment of cross-domain access
   directs such an agent to use [I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] or a
   profile of it as defined in this document.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STATUS-LIST">
          <front>
            <title>Token Status List (TSL)</title>
            <author fullname="Tobias Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Bastian" initials="P." surname="Bastian">
              <organization>Bundesdruckerei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="21" month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a status mechanism called Token Status
   List (TSL), data structures and processing rules for representing the
   status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
   or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), such as JWT, SD-JWT,
   CBOR Web Token, and ISO mdoc.  It also defines an extension point and
   a registry for future status mechanisms.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="UCREQ">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kehan Yao" initials="K." surname="Yao">
              <organization>China Mobile</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes use cases for agentic AI communication
   systems and derives protocol requirements from those use cases.  The
   requirements are intended to guide IETF standardization work on
   protocols in the context of agent-to-agent communication, agent-to-
   tool communication, with focus on dialog management, transport,
   multimodal communication, communication security, agent identity and
   authentication.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 530?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document extends the Delegation Token design of
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> and draws on the requirements of <xref target="CROSS-ORG"/>.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
