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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Actor-Bound Token Exchange">OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>snandaku@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fluffy@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>token exchange</keyword>
    <keyword>DPoP</keyword>
    <keyword>sender-constrained</keyword>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 72?>

<t>In OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, the client that sends the request
receives the token, and with DPoP the token is bound to the key that
signed the client's proof. Agent systems often need one party to
obtain a token for another: an orchestrating agent that approves an
action obtains a token for the agent that will perform it. This
document lets a token exchange client request that the issued token be
bound to the key of the actor named in the request, and requires the
actor to prove possession of that key, so that the token is usable
only by the actor and only with its consent.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 84?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> lets a client present a subject
token, and optionally an actor token (<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>), and
receive a new token that can name the actor in its <tt>act</tt> claim
(<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>). With DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/>, the authorization
server binds the issued token to the public key in the DPoP proof of
the token request (<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9449"/>); with mutual TLS
<xref target="RFC8705"/>, to the client's certificate. In both cases the token is
bound to the requesting client.</t>
      <t>Some deployments need the token to be bound to the actor instead:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>An agent that delegated a task approves one action that the
performing agent asked for, and obtains a token for that action on
the performing agent's behalf. The performing agent
must be able to use the token; the approving agent should not.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An orchestrator provisions a token for a sub-agent that has no
relationship with the authorization server.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The approving party could send its own token to the actor, but then
the actor holds a token bound to someone else's key, which it cannot
use, or a bearer token, which anyone can use. Identity chaining
<xref target="ID-CHAINING"/> binds a token to another client's key with a
<tt>requested_cnf</tt> claim inside a JWT authorization grant, between
authorization servers. This document provides the equivalent for a
client of one authorization server, with proof from the actor.</t>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>Requesting client:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The OAuth client that sends the token exchange request.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Actor:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The party named by the actor token, to whose key the issued token is
bound.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Actor proof:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A JWT signed by the actor that proves possession of its key and
authorizes binding a token to it (<xref target="actor-proof"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="protocol">
      <name>Protocol</name>
      <section anchor="token-exchange-request">
        <name>Token Exchange Request</name>
        <t>The requesting client sends a token exchange request (<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>) with:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_token</tt> and <tt>actor_token_type</tt>: a token that identifies the
actor and contains a <tt>cnf</tt> claim <xref target="RFC7800"/> confirming the actor's
key, such as a DPoP-bound access token or a WIMSE Workload Identity
Token <xref target="WIMSE-CREDS"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_proof</tt>: an actor proof (<xref target="actor-proof"/>); and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>: <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The <tt>authorization_details</tt>
              <xref target="RFC9396"/> over which the actor computed <tt>azh</tt>, as a JSON array
serialized and encoded like <tt>authorization_details</tt>. The requesting
client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send it when the actor proof carries <tt>azh</tt> and the
request's <tt>authorization_details</tt> are not the ones the actor hashed,
for example because an approver narrowed them.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This document applies only to a request that carries <tt>actor_proof</tt>.
A token exchange request without it is processed as <xref target="RFC8693"/>
defines, even when it carries an actor token.</t>
        <t>The requesting client authenticates as usual and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send its own DPoP
proof. When the request carries <tt>actor_proof</tt>, the issued token is not
bound to the key of that DPoP proof.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ...(requesting client's proof)

grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
&subject_token=eyJ...(approver's token)
&subject_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token
&actor_token=eyJ...(performing agent's credential, with cnf)
&actor_token_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt
&actor_proof=eyJ...(signed by the performing agent's key)
&authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22...
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="actor-proof">
        <name>Actor Proof</name>
        <t>An actor proof is a JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/>, signed with JWS <xref target="RFC7515"/> by the
private key confirmed by the actor token's <tt>cnf</tt>.</t>
        <t>Its JOSE header contains:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>typ:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. <tt>actor-proof+jwt</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>alg:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. An asymmetric digital signature algorithm. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
<tt>none</tt> or a MAC algorithm.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>jwk or x5c:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The public key, as a JWK, when the actor token's <tt>cnf</tt> carries a
thumbprint (<tt>jkt</tt>) rather than the key itself; or the certificate
chain, when <tt>cnf</tt> carries a certificate thumbprint (<tt>x5t#S256</tt>)
<xref target="RFC8705"/>. Omitted when <tt>cnf</tt> carries the key (<tt>jwk</tt>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Its claims are:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>aud:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The authorization server's issuer identifier <xref target="RFC8414"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>iat, exp, jti:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. <tt>jti</tt> is a unique identifier for the proof. The actor sets
<tt>exp</tt> as soon after <tt>iat</tt> as the flow allows: a proof that waits for
a person's approval needs longer than one used at once. An
authorization server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> reject a proof whose lifetime exceeds its
policy.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>ath:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash <xref target="RFC6234"/> of the ASCII
encoding of the actor token's value, binding the proof to it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>azh:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JSON
Canonicalization Scheme <xref target="RFC8785"/> form of the
<tt>authorization_details</tt> <xref target="RFC9396"/> the actor asks for. When present,
the issued token's authorization details <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be equal to, or
narrower than, those hashed. A hash shows only equality; to issue
narrower details the authorization server needs the hashed details
themselves, which the requesting client sends in
<tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>nonce:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A nonce the authorization server supplied, as for DPoP
(<xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9449"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The actor creates the proof and gives it to the requesting client, for
example inside the message in which it asks for approval. The actor
need not contact the authorization server. An actor <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include
<tt>azh</tt>: without it, the requesting client can use the proof to bind any
token it can obtain to the actor's key until the proof expires
(<xref target="security"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorization-server-processing">
        <name>Authorization Server Processing</name>
        <t>The authorization server:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>processes the request as <xref target="RFC8693"/> requires, including its policy
on whether the subject may be acted for by the actor;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>validates the actor token and extracts its <tt>cnf</tt>, rejecting the
request with <tt>invalid_request</tt> if the actor token has none;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>validates the actor proof: <tt>typ</tt> and <tt>alg</tt>; the signature, under
the key that the actor token's <tt>cnf</tt> confirms, taken from <tt>cnf</tt> or
from the proof's <tt>jwk</tt> or <tt>x5c</tt> after checking it against the
thumbprint in <tt>cnf</tt>; <tt>aud</tt>; <tt>exp</tt>; <tt>ath</tt>; <tt>nonce</tt>, if it requires
one; and that it has not accepted the same <tt>jti</tt> before. It keeps
each accepted <tt>jti</tt> until that proof's <tt>exp</tt> passes;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>if <tt>azh</tt> is present, takes the details the actor asked for from
<tt>actor_authorization_details</tt> when present, and from the request's
<tt>authorization_details</tt> otherwise, and checks that the hash of
their JCS form equals <tt>azh</tt>. The details it issues <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be equal to,
or narrower than, those details. It determines "narrower" by the
rules of each authorization details type, which a type can declare
as <xref target="RAR-NARROWING"/> defines. For a type whose rules it does not
know, or where it cannot determine that the details only narrow, it
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request with <tt>invalid_authorization_details</tt>
(<xref target="RFC9396"/>); and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>issues a token whose <tt>cnf</tt> confirms the actor's key, as the actor
token's <tt>cnf</tt> does, and whose <tt>act</tt> claim (<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>) identifies the actor by the <tt>sub</tt>, and <tt>iss</tt> where
needed, of the actor token. A deployment can use the richer <tt>act</tt>
claim of <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>When <tt>requested_token_type</tt> identifies an access token, the token
response has <tt>token_type</tt> <tt>DPoP</tt> for a key confirmed by <tt>jwk</tt> or
<tt>jkt</tt>, or <tt>Bearer</tt> for a certificate-bound key (<xref target="RFC8705"/>). When it
identifies an assertion that the actor will itself present as an
authorization grant, such as an Identity Assertion JWT Authorization
Grant <xref target="ID-JAG"/>, the <tt>cnf</tt> and <tt>act</tt> claims are placed in that
assertion, <tt>token_type</tt> is the one the assertion's specification
defines (<tt>N_A</tt> for ID-JAG), and the party that accepts the grant
requires proof of possession of the key confirmed by <tt>cnf</tt>. In either
case the response includes:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>actor_bound:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>true</tt>, telling the requesting client that it cannot use the token
and must give it to the actor.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>If the actor proof is invalid, or the hash checked in step 4 does not
equal <tt>azh</tt>, the authorization server returns the error
<tt>invalid_actor_proof</tt> in a token error response
(<xref section="3.2.4" sectionFormat="of" target="OAUTH-2.1"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorization-server-metadata">
        <name>Authorization Server Metadata</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>actor_bound_token_exchange_supported:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Boolean. Whether the authorization server supports this
document. Absent means <tt>false</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>When the authorization server requires DPoP-bound tokens
<xref target="DPOP-REQUIRED"/>, actor-bound tokens satisfy that requirement through
the actor's key.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="using-the-token">
      <name>Using the Token</name>
      <t>The requesting client gives the token to the actor. The actor presents
it to the resource server with a DPoP proof made with its own key, or
over mutual TLS with its own certificate. A resource server processes
the token as any sender-constrained token; it needs no change.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-other-work">
      <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
      <t>Transaction-bound tokens, such as those issued after an OAuth
Transaction Authorization Challenge <xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/> or Transactional
Access Tokens <xref target="TXN-AT"/>, can be issued actor-bound: the authorization
server applies this document when the request carries an actor proof.</t>
      <t><xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/> binds the issued token to a <tt>cnf</tt> asserted by the
resource server in its challenge. This document instead binds to a key
the actor proves, which suits approvals that no resource challenged.</t>
      <t>Client instance identifiers <xref target="CLIENT-INSTANCE"/> require authorization
for any change of presenter or key during an exchange. An actor proof
is that authorization from the new presenter.</t>
      <t>In an agent approval flow, the agent that asks for approval of an
action includes an actor proof in its request, and the approving party
forwards the proof in its token exchange; the token it obtains is
usable only by the agent that asked. Because the actor creates the
proof without contacting the authorization server, such a proof
carries no server-supplied <tt>nonce</tt>, and the authorization server
relies on <tt>exp</tt> and <tt>jti</tt> against replay. How an authorization server
that requires a nonce delivers it to the actor is outside the scope of
this document.</t>
      <t>The same parameters, <tt>actor_token</tt>, <tt>actor_token_type</tt>, and
<tt>actor_proof</tt>, can be carried in a Client-Initiated Backchannel
Authentication request <xref target="CIBA"/>. The OpenID Provider then validates the
proof when it receives the authentication request, with <tt>aud</tt> set to
its issuer identifier, and binds the token it issues after the person
approves to the actor's key. A token exchange that issues an ID-JAG
<xref target="ID-JAG"/> can likewise bind it to the agent that will redeem it.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Token theft by the requesting client:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The requesting client receives the token but cannot use it, because
it does not hold the actor's key.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Binding without consent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Without an actor proof, a requesting client could bind a token to a
key whose holder never asked for it, attributing actions to the
actor in <tt>act</tt>. The actor proof prevents this.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay of actor proofs:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Mitigated by <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>exp</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, and <tt>nonce</tt>. An authorization
server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept an actor proof twice.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Reuse of a proof by the requesting client:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An actor proof is not bound to the subject token or to the rest of
the request. Until the proof is used or expires, the requesting
client that holds it can choose the request it is used in. With
<tt>azh</tt>, the actor limits that request to the details it asked for;
without <tt>azh</tt>, the client can bind any token it can obtain to the
actor's key. Actors therefore <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include <tt>azh</tt>, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set
short lifetimes.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Disclosure of the actor token:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The requesting client learns the actor token. Because the actor
token is itself bound to the actor's key, the client cannot present
it as the actor.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Inflated originals:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The requesting client supplies <tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>, but
cannot inflate it: it must hash to the <tt>azh</tt> the actor signed. An
authorization server that compared issued details only with the
request's <tt>authorization_details</tt>, which the requesting client
chooses, would let that client widen the action.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Scope:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The actor gains no authority of its own. The issued token's
authority comes from the subject token and the authorization
server's policy; <tt>azh</tt> lets the actor limit it further.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The requesting client learns the actor token. Deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use
actor tokens that disclose only what the authorization server needs,
for example a selectively disclosed credential.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="oauth-parameters">
        <name>OAuth Parameters</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Parameter Name: <tt>actor_proof</tt>; Parameter Usage Location: token
request; Change Controller: IETF; Reference: this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Parameter Name: <tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>; Parameter Usage
Location: token request; Change Controller: IETF; Reference: this
document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Parameter Name: <tt>actor_bound</tt>; Parameter Usage Location: token
response; Change Controller: IETF; Reference: this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-extensions-error">
        <name>OAuth Extensions Error</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Name: <tt>invalid_actor_proof</tt>; Usage Location: token error response;
Protocol Extension: this document; Change Controller: IETF;
Reference: this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-authorization-server-metadata">
        <name>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Name: <tt>actor_bound_token_exchange_supported</tt>; Metadata
Description: Whether the authorization server supports actor-bound
token exchange; Change Controller: IETF; Reference: this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="json-web-token-claims">
        <name>JSON Web Token Claims</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Claim Name: <tt>azh</tt>; Claim Description: Hash of requested authorization
details; Change Controller: IETF; Reference: <xref target="actor-proof"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The <tt>ath</tt> claim is already registered by <xref target="RFC9449"/>, with the same
meaning: the hash of an associated token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="media-type">
        <name>Media Type</name>
        <t>This document registers <tt>application/actor-proof+jwt</tt> in the "Media
Types" registry, for the <tt>typ</tt> header of actor proofs:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Type name: application</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Subtype name: actor-proof+jwt</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Required parameters: n/a</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Optional parameters: n/a</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Encoding considerations: binary; an actor proof is a JWT, a sequence
of base64url-encoded values separated by period characters</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Security considerations: <xref target="security"/> of this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Interoperability considerations: n/a</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Published specification: this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Applications that use this media type: OAuth 2.0 authorization
servers and clients that implement this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Fragment identifier considerations: n/a</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a; File extension(s): n/a;
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Person and email address to contact for further information: Suhas
Nandakumar, snandaku@cisco.com</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Intended usage: COMMON</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Restrictions on usage: none</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Author: Suhas Nandakumar, snandaku@cisco.com</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9396">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="May" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a new parameter authorization_details that is used to carry fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9396"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9396"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6234">
          <front>
            <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7800">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7800"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7800"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8414">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <date month="June" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8705">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8705"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8705"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OAUTH-2.1">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt">
              <organization>Hellō</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Torsten Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables an application to
   obtain limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
   resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the
   resource owner and an authorization service, or by allowing the
   application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This specification
   replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
   described in RFC 6749 and the Bearer Token Usage in RFC 6750.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="ID-JAG">
          <front>
            <title>Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant</title>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification provides a mechanism for an application to use an
   identity assertion to obtain an access token for a third-party API by
   coordinating through an identity provider that the downstream
   Resource Authorization Server already trusts for single sign-on
   (SSO), using OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) and the JWT Profile
   for OAuth 2.0 Authorization Grants (RFC 7523).  This pattern is
   informally referred to as Cross-App Access (XAA).

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CIBA" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-client-initiated-backchannel-authentication-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication Flow - Core 1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OpenID Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-PROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a common representation of delegated actors in
   OAuth JSON Web Token (JWT) assertion grants, JWT access tokens, and
   Transaction Tokens.  It profiles the act claim defined by OAuth 2.0
   Token Exchange, requires issuer-scoped actor identifiers, and uses
   the sub_profile claim to classify actor entity types.  It specifies
   token processing, delegation-chain propagation, sender-constraint
   handling, and discovery metadata, so that issuers and resource
   servers in different trust domains interpret delegated actors
   consistently.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-CHALLENGE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge</title>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines an OAuth mechanism for transaction-specific
   authorization challenges.  A protected resource can require
   additional authorization for a particular operation by returning a
   transaction authorization challenge.  This is useful when requests
   are mediated by agents, automated workflows, or delegated services
   and the protected resource requires confirmation from a human user,
   resource owner, or organizational authority.  The client presents the
   challenge to an authorization server, which validates the challenge,
   obtains any required approval, and issues an OAuth 2.0 access token
   whose granted authorization details, expressed using Rich
   Authorization Requests, describe the approved operation.  The access
   token is then presented to the protected resource as evidence that
   the challenged operation was authorized.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-AT">
          <front>
            <title>Transactional Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="29" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   OAuth 2.0 access tokens are typically scoped to a session rather than
   to a transaction.  They carry no transaction identifier and no
   context beyond scope.  This document defines Transactional Access
   Tokens: a profile of JSON Web Token (JWT) access tokens that carries
   a transaction identifier and authorization server-asserted
   transaction context, has a very short lifetime, and is audienced to a
   single resource server.  Transactional Access Tokens align with the
   claims and semantics of OAuth Transaction Tokens, so that transaction
   context can flow from the authorization server to a resource server
   and onward into that resource server's trust domain.  A primary use
   case is task-scoped authorization of AI agents, where the
   authorization server makes a fresh policy decision for each
   transaction.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CLIENT-INSTANCE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Client Instance Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines an optional claims profile of OAuth 2.0
   Attestation-Based Client Authentication.  When selected, the profile
   requires an attester-assigned client instance identifier, scoped by
   default to the server that validates it, that remains stable across
   verified key changes, and adds continuity and privacy rules for that
   identifier.  Conveying instance context in tokens and introspection
   responses remains optional within the profile.  Authentication and
   proof methods follow the base specification.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-client-instance-id-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-CREDS">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DPOP-REQUIRED">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Parameter for Requiring DPoP</title>
            <author fullname="Emelia Smith" initials="E." surname="Smith">
         </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a new OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
   Metadata parameter, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required, which allows
   an authorization server to indicate that it always issues DPoP-bound
   access tokens and requires DPoP for all requests made to it to obtain
   access tokens, including pushed authorization requests.

   This complements the metadata parameter of the same name defined in
   OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-emelia-oauth-as-metadata-dpop-required-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RAR-NARROWING" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-rar-narrowing/">
          <front>
            <title>Comparing OAuth Authorization Details</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-rar-narrowing-00"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 453?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document generalizes the <tt>requested_cnf</tt> approach of identity
chaining to a single authorization server with proof from the actor.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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