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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="PACE Authorization">PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>snandaku@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fluffy@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Agent Communication Protocols</workgroup>
    <keyword>agent-to-agent</keyword>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>authorization checkpoint</keyword>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword>
    <keyword>WIMSE</keyword>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 197?>

<t>This document specifies the authority agents exercise in dialogs of
the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE): delegating work
with a credential bound to the delegated dialog, pausing to ask for
approval of a single action, and turning that approval into an
authorization for only that action. It also covers proof that a
principal approved, commitments between parties acting for different
principals, and facts attested by third parties. It reuses OAuth,
WIMSE, and agent-protocol mechanisms, defining only the glue to PACE
and the security properties every profile must provide.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Agent Communication Protocols Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:agentproto@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/agentproto/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/agentproto/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 209?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>PACE <xref target="PACE"/> gives agents a common dialog: an identifier that spans
hops, intermediaries, and connections; a lifecycle controlled by one
participant; cancellation and termination that propagate along
delegation chains; and a binding to MOQT. It says little about
authority: who may act on whose behalf, and which actions need
explicit approval. "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements" <xref target="UCREQ"/>
draws the same line and leaves delegation, per-action authorization,
and revocation to OAuth and WIMSE (<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="UCREQ"/>).</t>
      <t>That work exists or is in progress (<xref target="building-blocks"/>), but none of
it says how an approval request travels between agents in a dialog,
how a delegation is bound to the dialog it authorizes, or how the
pieces compose in a chain of agents. This document:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>states the security properties every deployment provides
(<xref target="properties"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>specifies delegation in PACE dialogs (<xref target="delegation"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>specifies authorization checkpoints, through which an agent asks for
approval of one action (<xref target="checkpoints"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>specifies approval tokens, which authorize only the approved action
(<xref target="approval-tokens"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>specifies principal confirmations, which only the principal can
produce (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>specifies what agents of different principals use with each other:
peer checkpoints, commitments that record terms each principal
confirms, and assertions that carry facts with their source
(<xref target="between-principals"/>); and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>lists what evidence of approvals and actions records
(<xref target="evidence"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The use cases in <xref target="DIALOG-UC"/>, such as a consumer's agent disputing a
charge with a brand's agent, or a tool that must reach the person
behind an agent, motivate the peer checkpoints, principal
confirmations, commitments, and assertions.</t>
      <section anchor="building-blocks">
        <name>Building Blocks</name>
        <t>This document reuses existing mechanisms and defines only the glue to
PACE. <xref target="_figure-building-blocks"/> shows where each fits in the life of
a delegated task.</t>
        <figure anchor="_figure-building-blocks">
          <name>Building Blocks</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
  1. Delegate        2. Ask           3. Approve       4. Act
 +-------------+   +-------------+   +-------------+  +-------------+
 | delegation  |-->| checkpoint  |-->| approval    |->| request at  |
 | credential  |   | request     |   | token       |  | resource    |
 +-------------+   +-------------+   +-------------+  +-------------+
  Actor Profile     RAR               Token Exchange   DPoP
  Txn-Tokens        agent_action      actor-bound      mTLS
  delegator-bound   Txn Challenge,    token exchange
  chains            AAuth             CIBA, when a
  WPT + message     JWS + JCS         person approves
  binding           OpenID4VP,
                    WebAuthn, SPC
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
  Throughout: revocation along the chain (Status List, token
  revocation, delegation revocation events)
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Delegate (<xref target="delegation"/>): delegation credentials of the Actor
Profile <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>, Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>, or
delegator-bound chains <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/> over Delegation Tokens
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, presented with WIMSE credentials
<xref target="WIMSE-CREDS"/> bound to their control message <xref target="WPT-MSG"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Ask (<xref target="checkpoints"/>): the action as a RAR <xref target="RFC9396"/>
              <tt>agent_action</tt> detail, a resource challenge from Txn Challenge
<xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/> or AAuth <xref target="AAUTH-ROSENBERG"/> <xref target="AAUTH-HARDT"/>, a
JWS <xref target="RFC7515"/> over the JCS <xref target="RFC8785"/> form, and, when the
principal must confirm, OpenID4VP <xref target="OID4VP"/>, WebAuthn <xref target="WEBAUTHN"/>,
or SPC <xref target="SPC"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Approve (<xref target="approval-tokens"/>): Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> with
actor-bound token exchange <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>, or CIBA <xref target="CIBA"/> when a
person approves.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Act (<xref target="rs-processing"/>): the approval token, sender-constrained
with DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> or mTLS <xref target="RFC8705"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Throughout, revocation reaches every holder along the chain
(<xref target="revocation"/>) through Token Status List <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/>, token
revocation <xref target="RFC7009"/>, and delegation revocation events
<xref target="REVOCATION-EVENTS"/>.</t>
        <t><xref target="existing-work"/> surveys these and other related work, and what each
leaves to this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>This document uses the terms dialog, dialog context, participant,
controller, delegated dialog, and control message from <xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Delegating participant:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The participant that opens a delegated dialog to have work done on
its behalf; the controller of that dialog.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Performing agent:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The participant that carries out the work, including an action that
needs approval.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Requester:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The participant that sends a checkpoint request: usually the
performing agent; a relaying agent (<xref target="relaying"/>); or, in a peer
checkpoint, the party that needs approval.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Approver:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The participant that answers a checkpoint: in a delegated dialog,
the delegating participant or a participant it designates
(<xref target="approval-issuer"/>); in a peer checkpoint, the counterpart. It can
relay the decision to its principal or to its own approver.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Approval issuer:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The authorization server, or OpenID Provider, from which the approver
obtains approval tokens (<xref target="approval-issuer"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Checkpoint:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A signed request to authorize one action, and the signed response
(<xref target="checkpoints"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Resource challenge:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A signed statement from a protected resource that refused an action,
describing the action and the authorization it needs, such as an
OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge <xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Approval token:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An authorization that covers only the action approved at a
checkpoint (<xref target="approval-tokens"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Delegation credential:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The credential a delegating participant presents in OPEN to convey
the authority it delegates (<xref target="delegation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Peer checkpoint:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A checkpoint whose approver acts for a different principal than the
requester, outside any delegation (<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Principal confirmation:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Proof, made with a key bound to the principal and not to any agent,
that the principal approved one checkpoint request
(<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Commitment:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Signed terms that two or more parties agree to, with each party's
confirmation (<xref target="commitments"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Assertion:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A signed statement of a fact, asserted by its sender or attested by a
named third party (<xref target="assertions"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Times in the JSON objects this document defines, such as <tt>deadline</tt>,
<tt>expires_at</tt>, and <tt>until</tt>, are date-time strings <xref target="RFC3339"/>, as in
<xref target="PACE"/>. JWT claims, such as <tt>iat</tt> and <tt>exp</tt>, remain NumericDate
values.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="properties">
      <name>Security Properties</name>
      <t>Deployments use different credential formats, so this document states
the properties they provide instead of relying on any one format.</t>
      <t>Every deployment of PACE authorization <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide P1 to P8,
whichever credential formats it uses. A deployment that uses
commitments (<xref target="commitments"/>) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also provide P9, and one that
requires principal confirmations (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
also provide P10.</t>
      <section anchor="properties-all">
        <name>Properties of Every Deployment</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1 Delegation binding:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A delegation credential is accepted only for the delegated dialog it
was presented in, by the participant it names, with its parent
dialog (<xref target="msg-binding"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2 Attenuation:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Authority conveyed by delegation never exceeds the authority of the
delegating participant (<xref target="attenuation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3 Originator traceability:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Every participant can determine that a chain has one originator, and
the party that authorized the chain can identify it
(<xref target="attenuation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4 Signed checkpoints:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A checkpoint request is signed by its requester and a response by
the approver, so no intermediate agent or relay can forge or alter
either (<xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5 Single-action approval:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An approval covers only the checkpoint it answers, identified by a
hash of the request, and an approval token covers only that action,
once, for the performing agent's key (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>,
<xref target="approval-tokens"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6 Resource authority:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When a protected resource described the action in a resource
challenge, decisions and displays are based on that challenge, not
on agent-supplied text (<xref target="resource-challenges"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P7 Freshness:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Checkpoints expire at their deadline, and a request or response is
acted on at most once, even when the dialog log redelivers it
(<xref target="checkpoint-deadline"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P8 Revocation effect:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When a delegation is revoked, the delegated dialogs that depend on it
are terminated (<xref target="revocation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="properties-principal">
        <name>Properties of Agreements and Principal Confirmations</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P9 Bound agreement:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An agreement between parties acting for different principals is
complete only when each principal has confirmed it, each
confirmation bound to the same hash of the terms, never on an agent's
self-reported satisfaction or reported scores (<xref target="commitments"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P10 Principal origin:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A confirmation required from a principal is verifiable as made with a
key bound to that principal, so neither the principal's agent nor a
relaying agent can produce it (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="delegation">
      <name>Delegation</name>
      <t>A receiver of delegated work needs to know that the authority was
meant for this dialog and for itself, is no broader than the
delegator's, and stops when revoked.</t>
      <t>A delegating participant opens a delegated dialog as <xref target="PACE"/>
specifies: OPEN lists the parents in <tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt>, the
delegating participant is the controller, and the delegation
credential travels in the <tt>credentials</tt> member of OPEN.</t>
      <section anchor="msg-binding">
        <name>Binding to the Control Message</name>
        <t>Without this binding, a credential copied out of one OPEN could be
presented in another dialog. The presentation that accompanies a
delegation credential <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>mth</tt> claim of <xref target="WPT-MSG"/> with
the <tt>pace</tt> canonicalization profile, in whichever presentation form
<xref target="PACE"/> defines for the credential's mechanism: a Workload Proof
Token, a Key Binding JWT, or a PACE presentation JWT. In OPEN, which
is sent before the delegating participant has the delegatee's nonce,
the presentation has no <tt>nonce</tt> and the delegatee does not treat the
delegator as authenticated until the controller's later presentation,
bound to the delegatee's nonce, verifies; in later messages its
<tt>nonce</tt> is the verifier's nonce, as <xref target="PACE"/> requires.</t>
        <t>A credential bound to no key cannot be bound to the message, so a
receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept one as a delegation credential. The exception
is a Transaction Token <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/> within the trust domain that
issued it, where the token service, not a key, establishes the chain
(<xref target="profiles"/>).</t>
        <t>Because OPEN carries the dialog-id, <tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt>, and the
invited participants, the presentation is thereby bound to the
delegated dialog, its parent, and its audience (P1). A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
verify <tt>mth</tt> before acting on the credential. Credential formats need
not change.</t>
        <t>The presentation names who may accept it; the credential names where
the authority may be used. A delegating participant <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set the
credential's audience to the resources the delegated task needs, no
broader than its own, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a format in which a child's
audience cannot exceed its parent's, such as a delegator-bound chain
<xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>.</t>
        <t>When the credential format can carry it, the delegating participant
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also include the parent dialog-id in the credential, as the
<tt>ctx</tt> claim of type <tt>dialog</tt> <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>. Within one trust
domain, a Transaction Token issued for the delegated work <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry
the dialog-id in <tt>tctx.dlg</tt> <xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="profiles">
        <name>Delegation Profiles</name>
        <t>Who vouches for each hop of a delegation chain depends on the
deployment. Inside one trust domain, a token service issues each hop
and is trusted to have checked it. Across domains, either a server at
each boundary issues the next hop, or each delegator signs the hop it
grants, so that a receiver can verify the chain itself. Whoever
vouches for a hop also provides attenuation (P2) and originator
traceability (P3) for it (<xref target="attenuation"/>).</t>
        <table anchor="_table-profiles">
          <name>Delegation Profiles</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Deployment</th>
              <th align="left">Who vouches for each hop</th>
              <th align="left">Mechanisms</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">One trust domain</td>
              <td align="left">The domain's token service</td>
              <td align="left">Transaction Tokens with <tt>tctx.dlg</tt>; Token Exchange</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">A server at each domain boundary</td>
              <td align="left">The server at that boundary</td>
              <td align="left">Identity chaining; cross-domain Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-CHAINING"/>; Hardt AAuth call chaining</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Agents that delegate directly across domains</td>
              <td align="left">The delegator, by signing the hop</td>
              <td align="left">Delegation Tokens <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> with delegator binding <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>; Delegate SD-JWT under <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <dl>
          <dt>Mandatory to implement:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support delegation credentials that are:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>JWT access tokens with <tt>act</tt> claims (<xref target="RFC8693"/>), interpreted as
the OAuth Actor Profile <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/> defines;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>bound by a <tt>cnf</tt> claim to the delegatee's key; and</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>presented with a PACE presentation JWT carrying <tt>mth</tt>, the form
<xref target="PACE"/> defines for a token bound by <tt>cnf</tt> (<xref target="msg-binding"/>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Each hop obtains a new token for the next delegatee by token
exchange.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Delegation with no server in the path:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Implementations that accept delegation across administrative
domains without an authorization server in the path <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also
support Delegation Tokens <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> with delegator
binding <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>. A chain that only an issuing server
asserts does not show that each hop granted the next (<xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="UCREQ"/>, requirement B3-3).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="attenuation">
        <name>Attenuation and the Originator</name>
        <t>Delegation can only narrow authority: a delegatee can do no more than
its delegator (P2), and every chain leads back to one originator (P3).
This section says how a receiver checks both, and how a participant
that acts under its own authority is distinguished from one that
passes on delegated authority.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Checking each hop:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When a receiver verifies a chain hop by hop, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the
credential if any hop conveys more authority than the hop before it
(P2). It compares by the rules of the credential mechanism, such as
<xref section="4.3" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>. Where authority is expressed
as RAR authorization details <xref target="RFC9396"/>, the comparison is the
relation of <xref target="RAR-NARROWING"/>, under which details that cannot be
compared are not narrower. A receiver that cannot compare the
authority at some hop <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the credential.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Chains asserted by a server:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When an authorization server asserts the chain, as with nested
<tt>act</tt> claims, the server's narrowing at each exchange provides P2
(<xref section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>More than one parent:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A delegated dialog with several parents acts under the authority of
each parent separately. The delegating participant presents one
delegation credential per parent whose authority the work uses, and
each operation in the delegated dialog <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be authorized by one of
them. Authority from different parents is not combined.
</t>
            <t>When OPEN lists more than one parent, each delegation credential
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name the parent dialog it derives from, as the <tt>ctx</tt> claim of
type <tt>dialog</tt> <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/> does; a format that cannot name
it cannot be used in such a dialog. When <tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt> is
present, a receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a credential that names a dialog not
in it, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject two credentials that name the same parent.</t>
            <t>A listed parent without a credential contributes no authority: an
operation that needs it fails authorization. A receiver <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> refuse
the OPEN with ERROR <tt>policy-rejected</tt> when its policy requires every
listed parent to be backed by a credential. When <tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt>
is withheld (<xref target="PACE"/>), the receiver relies on the credentials'
<tt>ctx</tt> alone, and the controller, which keeps the link, applies
revocation for each parent (<xref target="revocation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Own or delegated authority:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A participant can also act under authority granted to it directly,
such as a booking service that calls a payment processor under its
own contract. That is not a delegation: the participant presents its
own credentials, and a delegation credential, if present, only shows
whom it acts for (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="AAUTH-HARDT"/> reaches the same
outcome). The controller states which case applies with the dialog
parameter <tt>authority_basis</tt> in OPEN. Like the parameters in
<xref target="approval-issuer"/>, it is set by the controller and not negotiated;
a participant that disagrees sends REJECT.
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>own</tt>: the participant acts under authority granted to it
directly. A delegation credential, if present, is evidence only.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>delegated</tt>: the participant passes on authority it received,
conveyed by the delegation credential in OPEN, subject to P1 to
P3.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>When <tt>authority_basis</tt> is absent, it is <tt>delegated</tt> if OPEN carries
<tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt> or a delegation credential, and <tt>own</tt> otherwise.
A receiver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept onward delegation of a principal's
authority from a participant that declared <tt>own</tt>. With either value,
the authority passed <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> cover only the one action and parameters
the delegated work needs, for example a single <tt>agent_action</tt> detail
(<xref target="agent-action"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Hiding the originator:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Where the originator's identity must not be disclosed to every hop
(P3), the chain carries a pseudonym that only its issuer can resolve,
such as the per-chain pseudonym <tt>sub</tt> of <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>. An
issuer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> copy an identifier that another issuer directed to a
specific audience into a delegation credential.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cycles">
        <name>Cycles</name>
        <t>A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject OPEN with ERROR <tt>delegation-cycle</tt> (<xref target="PACE"/>) if:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the delegation chain already names the receiver;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the chain names any agent twice (<xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>); or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt> contains the dialog's own dialog-id or repeats an
entry.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Depth limits, such as <tt>del_max_depth</tt> of <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, bound
cycles that identifiers do not reveal, but do not replace this check.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="revocation">
        <name>Revocation</name>
        <t>Revoking a credential must stop the work done under it and under every
credential delegated from it (P8).</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>When a credential is revoked:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A participant that learns that a credential its participation
depends on was revoked <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> stop acting under it. If it controls a
delegated dialog that depends on the credential, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> terminate
that dialog, and PACE lifecycle propagation terminates the dialogs
below it (<xref target="PACE"/>). Otherwise, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> LEAVE the dialog.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>How participants learn of it:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The credential's own mechanism reports the revocation: a Token
Status List <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/> entry, token revocation <xref target="RFC7009"/>, or
a Shared Signals event <xref target="AIMS"/>. To reach holders further down the
chain, including holders in domains the revoking party does not
know, the revoking party sends a delegation revoked event
<xref target="REVOCATION-EVENTS"/>, and each delegator relays it to the holders of
the credentials it delegated, in the <tt>credentials</tt> member of the
REVOKE or TERMINATE it sends them.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>When status cannot be checked:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>If a participant cannot check a credential's status within the
staleness bound its policy sets, it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> act under the credential
until it obtains a current answer, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject operations that
rely on it with ERROR <tt>authorization-unavailable</tt> (<xref target="PACE"/>). This
suspends the work without ending it: the participant stays in its
dialogs and resumes once the credential is shown valid. If its
policy limits how long work can stay suspended, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> terminate or
leave the dependent dialogs when that limit passes.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>When a participant is revoked:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A controller that removes a participant with REVOKE also revokes the
participant's delegation credential, if the controller issued it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>When the work ends:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Credentials issued for a delegated dialog remain valid after the
dialog terminates, until they expire or their issuer ends them. An
authorization server that ties authority to a unit of work
<xref target="BOUNDED-WORK"/> can end them when the dialog ends.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sd-card-holders">
        <name>SD-Card Holders</name>
        <t>An agent that holds an SD-Card can obtain a delegation credential by
Token Exchange with its SD-Card as the actor token; the issued token's
<tt>act</tt> claim carries the SD-Card's <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>iss</tt> (<xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="SD-CARD"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="checkpoints">
      <name>Authorization Checkpoints</name>
      <t>Some actions need approval first, because a resource refused the call
or the delegating participant's policy requires it, and the party that
can approve is often another agent several hops away. A checkpoint
carries the signed request to that party and the signed decision back.</t>
      <t><xref target="_figure-checkpoint"/> shows a checkpoint from start to finish.</t>
      <figure anchor="_figure-checkpoint">
        <name>A Checkpoint</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
 Resource       Performing             Approver            Approval
 server         agent                                      issuer
   |               |                      |                   |
   |<---- call ----|                      |                   |
   |-- refused, -->|                      |                   |
   |  challenge(1) |                      |                   |
   |               |                      |                   |
   |        pause  |-- checkpoint ------->|                   |
   |    operation  |   request (2)        |                   |
   |               |   signed; through    |                   |
   |               |   relays, if any     |                   |
   |               |                      |                   |
   |               |               decide; may ask            |
   |               |               the principal (3)          |
   |               |                      |                   |
   |               |                      |-- token exchange->|
   |               |                      |   + actor proof   |
   |               |                      |<- approval token -|
   |               |                      |   (4)             |
   |               |<-- checkpoint -------|                   |
   |               |    response (5)      |                   |
   |               |                      |                   |
   |<-- call with -|                      |                   |
   | approval token|                      |                   |
   |   (6)         |                      |                   |
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The performing agent reaches an action that needs approval: a
resource refused the call, optionally with a resource challenge
(<xref target="resource-challenges"/>), or its delegator's policy requires
approval.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It pauses the operation and publishes a signed checkpoint request
on its <tt>checkpoint</tt> flow (<xref target="checkpoint-flow"/>, <xref target="checkpoint-request"/>,
<xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>). Agents between it and the approver relay
the request unmodified (<xref target="relaying"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The approver decides, by its own policy or by asking its principal
(<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>To approve, the approver obtains an approval token for the one
action, bound to the performing agent's key with the actor proof
from the request (<xref target="issuance"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The approver publishes a signed checkpoint response carrying the
outcome and the token (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>), before the
request's deadline (<xref target="checkpoint-deadline"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The performing agent resumes the operation and presents the token
to the resource, which checks it against the approved action
(<xref target="rs-processing"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A checkpoint does not change the dialog context. Checkpoints can also
pass between peers acting for different principals
(<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>) and be addressed to a principal through its
agent (<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>).</t>
      <section anchor="checkpoint-flow">
        <name>Carrying Checkpoint Objects</name>
        <t>Each participant sends its checkpoint objects on its own <tt>checkpoint</tt>
flow of the dialog: a <tt>reliable</tt> flow of the PACE dialog log <xref target="PACE"/>
at the Urgent Signals priority tier. Each request, response,
commitment (<xref target="commitments"/>), and assertion (<xref target="assertions"/>) is one
object. Because the flow is reliable, the log's acceptance and replay
rules apply: after a reconnection, an object its receiver had not
accepted is made available again at the same position, and one it had
accepted is discarded as a duplicate. An approver therefore does not
ask its principal twice for the same request.</t>
        <t>In the MOQT binding of <xref target="PACE"/>, the flow is a <tt>checkpoint</tt> track in
the sender's dialog namespace, with each object in its own group,
Subgroup Delivery Mode, and no finite delivery timeout:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
("pace", "dialogs", {dialog-id}, {agent-id}) -- "checkpoint"
]]></artwork>
        <t>Other bindings define how they carry the flow.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="checkpoint-request">
        <name>Checkpoint Request</name>
        <t>A checkpoint request asks one participant to approve one action, and
carries what the approver needs to decide and to obtain an approval
token.</t>
        <t>A request is a JSON object, published as one object of the sender's
<tt>checkpoint</tt> flow (<xref target="checkpoint-flow"/>). Times are RFC 3339 date-time
strings, binary values are base64url-encoded without padding, and the
request is signed as <xref target="checkpoint-signing"/> specifies. Its members are
grouped below by purpose.</t>
        <section anchor="identification-and-freshness">
          <name>Identification and Freshness</name>
          <dl>
            <dt>type:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The string <tt>request</tt>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>checkpoint_id:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A UUID version 4.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>dialog_id:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The dialog in which the request is published.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>requester:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The requester's participant identifier.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>approver:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The participant asked to approve: in a delegated dialog,
the controller, or the participant named by the <tt>approver</tt> dialog
parameter (<xref target="approval-issuer"/>); in a peer checkpoint, the
counterpart (<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>deadline:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The time after which the checkpoint is unresolved
(<xref target="checkpoint-deadline"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>nonce:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A fresh random value with at least 128 bits of entropy.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-action">
          <name>The Action</name>
          <dl>
            <dt>action, parameters, effect:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>, except in an encrypted request (<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>).
The action, its arguments as a JSON object, and its effect, as the
requester understands them. They are advisory when
<tt>resource_challenge</tt> is present (<xref target="resource-challenges"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>description:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Free text describing the action. Unlike <tt>parameters</tt>, it
is not enforced by an approval token.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>target:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The paused operation, in the form of the PACE CANCEL
<tt>target</tt>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>operation_hash:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the object payload
that started the paused operation.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="authorization">
          <name>Authorization</name>
          <dl>
            <dt>authorization_details:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, and <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when <tt>actor_proof</tt> is present. The
authorization requested, as RAR <xref target="RFC9396"/> details, for example one
<tt>agent_action</tt> detail (<xref target="agent-action"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>resource_challenge:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A resource challenge, carried unmodified
(<xref target="resource-challenges"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>actor_proof:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. An actor proof <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/> made by the performing
agent, which the approver forwards to obtain an approval token
(<xref target="issuance"/>). Its <tt>aud</tt> is the approval issuer named in
<tt>approval_issuer</tt> (<xref target="approval-issuer"/>); a performing agent without
an approval issuer omits the proof. The proof <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>azh</tt>
computed over this request's <tt>authorization_details</tt>. <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>
makes <tt>azh</tt> a <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>; this document requires it because the proof
passes through the approver and relaying agents, any of whom could
otherwise bind a token for another action to the performing agent's
key. The proof normally carries no <tt>nonce</tt>
(<xref target="actor-proof-freshness"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>actor_token:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The performing agent's credential with a <tt>cnf</tt> claim, over
whose value the proof's <tt>ath</tt> was computed. When absent, the approver
uses the credential the performing agent presented in the dialog.
The performing agent includes it when the request may be relayed to
an approver outside its dialog (<xref target="relaying"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>required_assurance:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The assurance the response must carry
(<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>), as an object with these members:
</t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t><tt>level</tt>: <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The minimum assurance level of <xref target="PACE"/>:
<tt>asserted</tt>, <tt>authenticated</tt>, or <tt>delegated</tt>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>acr_values</tt>: <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A space-separated list of Authentication
Context Class References, in order of preference, as in
<xref target="RFC9470"/>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>max_age</tt>: <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The maximum time, in seconds, since the
principal last authenticated, as in <xref target="RFC9470"/>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>from</tt>: <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. <tt>principal</tt> if the response <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry a
principal confirmation (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>); <tt>participant</tt>
(the default) if the approver's own key-bound credentials suffice.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
              <t><tt>level</tt>, <tt>acr_values</tt>, and <tt>max_age</tt> have the form of the
<tt>required_assurance</tt> member of a PACE ERROR with reason
<tt>insufficient-assurance</tt> <xref target="PACE"/>, so a participant that refused an
operation with that ERROR can ask for what it requires without ending
the dialog.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="relaying-encryption-and-signature">
          <name>Relaying, Encryption, and Signature</name>
          <dl>
            <dt>relayed_request:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The signed checkpoint request from a dialog below that this
request relays, unmodified (<xref target="relaying"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>encrypted_to, encrypted:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Used together for a request that the relaying agents must
not read (<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>).</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>signature:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. See <xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="example">
          <name>Example</name>
          <t>The following request asks a banking assistant to approve a transfer
on behalf of the agent closing an account:</t>
          <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "request",
  "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
  "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "requester": "closure-agent",
  "approver": "banking-assistant",
  "action": "transfer",
  "description": "Transfer the remaining balance",
  "parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR",
                 "to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
  "effect": "Moves funds out of the closing account; irreversible",
  "target": {"namespace": ["a2a", "task"], "track": "t1"},
  "operation_hash": "pLk2...",
  "deadline": "2026-11-09T17:00:00Z",
  "nonce": "Tq8m0vB1kRj3zXc5aYp2Lw",
  "authorization_details": [{
    "type": "agent_action",
    "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
    "action": "transfer",
    "parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR",
                   "to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
    "bounds": {"amount": "max"}
  }],
  "resource_challenge": {"format": "oauth-txn-challenge",
                         "value": "eyJ..."},
  "signature": "eyJ..."
}
]]></sourcecode>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="checkpoint-signing">
        <name>Signing</name>
        <t>Signing lets a receiver detect changes made by relays and agents on
the way.</t>
        <t>The <tt>signature</tt> member of a checkpoint request or response is a JWS
<xref target="RFC7515"/> with detached payload, in Compact Serialization, over the
JCS <xref target="RFC8785"/> form of the object without its <tt>signature</tt> member,
made with the key bound to the signer's credential in the dialog.
Commitments (<xref target="commitments"/>) and assertions (<xref target="assertions"/>) are
signed the same way.</t>
        <t>The JWS <tt>alg</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an asymmetric digital signature algorithm, and
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be <tt>none</tt> or a MAC algorithm, because these objects are
relayed and kept as evidence (<xref target="evidence"/>) and verified by parties
that share no key with the signer.</t>
        <t>A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the signature before acting on the object (P4).
It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also verify that the signer is the participant the object
names: the <tt>requester</tt> of a request, the <tt>approver</tt> of a response, the
<tt>proposer</tt> of a commitment, or the <tt>asserted_by</tt> of an assertion. An
object that fails either check is rejected with ERROR
<tt>unauthenticated</tt> (<xref target="PACE"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-challenges">
        <name>Resource Challenges</name>
        <t>When a protected resource describes the action itself, that
description, not the agent's, is the one to trust.</t>
        <t>When the action was refused by a protected resource that issued a
resource challenge, the performing agent <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include it in
<tt>resource_challenge</tt>, unmodified, with <tt>format</tt> set to a value from the
PACE Resource Challenge Formats registry (<xref target="iana-registries"/>). This
document defines:</t>
        <table anchor="_table-challenges">
          <name>Resource Challenge Formats</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">format</th>
              <th align="left">Challenge</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>oauth-txn-challenge</tt></td>
              <td align="left">OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge <xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>aauth-scope-challenge</tt></td>
              <td align="left">AAuth Scope Challenge <xref target="AAUTH-ROSENBERG"/></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>aauth-resource-token</tt></td>
              <td align="left">AAuth resource token <xref target="AAUTH-HARDT"/>, possibly referencing an R3 per-call proposal <xref target="AAUTH-R3"/></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The resource is then the authority on what the action is (P6). The
approver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the challenge as its specification requires,
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> base its decision, and anything it displays to a person, on the
validated challenge, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat <tt>description</tt>, <tt>parameters</tt>, and
<tt>effect</tt> as advisory.</t>
        <t>The challenge is redeemed by the party its specification allows
(<xref target="redeeming"/>). A Transaction Authorization Challenge can be redeemed
by the approver. An AAuth Scope Challenge is redeemed only by the
client it was issued to, so the approver returns only its outcome.</t>
        <t>An approver's <tt>approve</tt> does not authorize the action at the resource.
An authorization server that takes part can refuse, or issue narrower
authorization than approved, and the performing agent acts only within
the issued token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="checkpoint-response">
        <name>Checkpoint Response</name>
        <t>A checkpoint response gives the approver's decision on one request,
bound to that request by its hash.</t>
        <t>A response is a JSON object, published on the approver's <tt>checkpoint</tt>
flow (<xref target="checkpoint-flow"/>), encoded as a request is
(<xref target="checkpoint-request"/>) and signed as <xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>
specifies. Its members are:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The string <tt>response</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>checkpoint_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The <tt>checkpoint_id</tt> of the request.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>request_hash:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS form of the
signed request, including its <tt>signature</tt>, binding the response to
one request (P5).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>approver:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The approver's participant identifier, equal to the
<tt>approver</tt> of the request.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>outcome:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A value from the PACE Checkpoint Outcomes registry
(<xref target="iana-registries"/>). This document defines:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>approve</tt>: perform the action as requested.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>approve-modified</tt>: perform the action with the response's
<tt>parameters</tt>, which replace the request's. The modified action
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be narrower than or equal to the requested one, as
<xref section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/> requires of authorization
servers; for an <tt>agent_action</tt> detail, as <xref target="agent-action-narrowing"/>
defines, applied to the request's detail with its <tt>parameters</tt>
replaced. A requester that cannot determine that the modification
only narrows the request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the response as <tt>deny</tt>. With
<tt>resource_challenge</tt>, this outcome is used only if the challenge's
specification allows the approved details to differ.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>deny</tt>: do not perform the action. The performing agent ends the
paused operation with an explicit error in the application
protocol, such as a failed A2A task or an MCP error result.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>actor-proof-required</tt>: the approver needs a usable actor proof
(<xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </dd>
          <dt>parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> with <tt>approve-modified</tt>, except in a response to an
encrypted request. The modified arguments, as a JSON object.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>encrypted:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>In a response to an encrypted request only, and <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> there with
<tt>approve-modified</tt>: the modified <tt>parameters</tt>, encrypted to the
requester (<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>reason:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> with <tt>deny</tt>: a reason from the ERROR reasons of <xref target="PACE"/>,
such as <tt>insufficient-assurance</tt>. <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> with
<tt>actor-proof-required</tt>: <tt>expired</tt>, <tt>invalid</tt>, or <tt>details-mismatch</tt>
(<xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>actor_proof_aud, actor_proof_nonce:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>With <tt>actor-proof-required</tt> only. <tt>actor_proof_aud</tt>, <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>, is the
issuer identifier to use as the proof's <tt>aud</tt>. <tt>actor_proof_nonce</tt>,
<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, is a nonce the approval issuer supplied.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>credentials:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. An approval token (<xref target="approval-tokens"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>principal_confirmation:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A principal confirmation of the request
(<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>). <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> with <tt>approve</tt> or
<tt>approve-modified</tt> when the request's <tt>required_assurance</tt> has
<tt>from</tt> set to <tt>principal</tt>. For <tt>approve-modified</tt>, it covers the
response's <tt>parameters</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The requester <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>request_hash</tt> matches a request it
sent and has not yet resolved, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply an approval to any
other action. An approver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> approve a checkpoint that it
requested.</t>
        <t>For example, the banking assistant approves the transfer requested in
<xref target="checkpoint-request"/> for a lower amount:</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "response",
  "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
  "request_hash": "x7Rb...",
  "approver": "banking-assistant",
  "outcome": "approve-modified",
  "parameters": {"amount": "1500.00", "currency": "EUR",
                 "to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
  "credentials": "eyJ...",
  "signature": "eyJ..."
}
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
      <section anchor="checkpoint-deadline">
        <name>Deadlines and Replay</name>
        <t>Each checkpoint has a deadline and is answered at most once, so that
it neither blocks work forever nor authorizes an action twice. The
requester sets the deadline in the <tt>deadline</tt> member of its request
(<xref target="checkpoint-request"/>), and identifies the checkpoint by the
request's <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>.</t>
        <t>If no valid response arrives by the deadline, the requester <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat
the checkpoint as unresolved, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> perform the action, and halts
the affected operation. A late response is ignored. A requester <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
accept at most one response per <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>. Neither requests nor
responses are sent in QUIC or TLS 0-RTT data (P7).</t>
        <t>Log replay <xref target="PACE"/> does not extend a deadline. A requester that
resumes after its deadline treats the checkpoint as unresolved, and to
ask again publishes a new request with a new <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>. A
participant that sends checkpoints in a dialog <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> propose, or
accept, a <tt>log_retention</tt> dialog parameter <xref target="PACE"/> no shorter than the
longest time it allows between a request and its <tt>deadline</tt>.</t>
        <t>An approver that waits for an authorization server bounds the wait by
the deadline: it passes the remaining time as the <tt>timeout</tt> of
<xref target="AAUTH-ROSENBERG"/> where that applies, and cancels a deferred token
request <xref target="DTR"/> when the deadline passes or the paused operation is
cancelled with PACE CANCEL.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relaying">
        <name>Relaying a Checkpoint</name>
        <t>An approver can resolve a checkpoint from policy, ask its principal,
or relay it to its own approver in the dialog above. To relay, it
publishes a new request in that dialog, with itself as <tt>requester</tt> and
the original signed request as <tt>relayed_request</tt>; a resource challenge
is carried in both, unmodified. It answers the original checkpoint
with the returned outcome or a stricter one. Each hop signs its own
request and response, so the decision path is verifiable end to end.</t>
        <t>The approver above <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the outer request, signed by the
relaying agent, as the request it answers, hashing it in its
response, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> answer the inner request directly or act on it
alone. It verifies the inner request and its resource challenge only
as evidence of what the performing agent asked for. The same rule
applies at every level of nesting.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="native-mapping">
        <name>Mapping Native Approval Prompts</name>
        <t>Agent protocols already have ways to pause for approval: an A2A
<xref target="A2A"/> task enters <tt>auth-required</tt> or <tt>input-required</tt>, an MCP
<xref target="MCP"/> server sends an elicitation request, and a Poppy <xref target="POPPY"/>
Company Agent sends an <tt>authorization</tt> event. These prompts are unsigned, each uses its own
vocabulary, and an agent that translates between protocols cannot
carry one into another without loss. A checkpoint gives them a common,
signed form, while the native prompt keeps working for participants
that understand only the application protocol.</t>
        <t>A performing agent that pauses an application operation with a native
prompt asking to approve an action also publishes a checkpoint request
for that action:</t>
        <table anchor="_table-native">
          <name>Native Approval Prompts</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Protocol</th>
              <th align="left">Native prompt</th>
              <th align="left">Checkpoint request</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">A2A</td>
              <td align="left">Task in <tt>auth-required</tt> or <tt>input-required</tt> that asks to authorize an action</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>target</tt> names the task; the task stays in that state until the response</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">MCP</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>elicitation/create</tt> that asks to confirm an action</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>target</tt> names the paused request; the elicitation result follows the response</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Poppy</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>authorization</tt> event that asks to authorize an action</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>target</tt> names the event</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The request's <tt>action</tt>, <tt>parameters</tt>, and <tt>effect</tt> describe the action
the prompt asks about, and <tt>operation_hash</tt> covers the object payload
that started the paused operation (<xref target="checkpoint-request"/>). A native
prompt that asks for something other than approval of an action, such
as a Poppy <tt>authorization</tt> event asking the Personal Agent to sign in,
is not mapped.</t>
        <t>When the response arrives, the native state is brought in line with
it: the performing agent, as A2A server, moves the task on, and the
participant that received an MCP elicitation answers it.</t>
        <table anchor="_table-native-outcomes">
          <name>Answering Native Prompts</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Outcome</th>
              <th align="left">A2A task</th>
              <th align="left">MCP elicitation result</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>approve</tt>, <tt>approve-modified</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Task returns to <tt>working</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>accept</tt>, with the approved parameters</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>deny</tt>, or unresolved at the deadline</td>
              <td align="left">Task ends <tt>failed</tt> or <tt>rejected</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>decline</tt>, or <tt>cancel</tt> at the deadline</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The checkpoint response, not the native answer, is authoritative: a
participant that receives both acts on the signed response. A mediator that
translates between application protocols relays the checkpoint
unmodified (<xref target="relaying"/>) and translates only the native prompt.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="approval-tokens">
      <name>Approval Tokens</name>
      <t>An approval token is an access token that authorizes one approved
action, for the performing agent only, and only once (P5). A
checkpoint response is a statement between agents, and a resource
server that never saw the checkpoint cannot rely on it. The approval
token carries the approval to where the action happens, in a form the
resource server already checks.</t>
      <t>The token describes the action as an <tt>agent_action</tt> detail
(<xref target="agent-action"/>). The approver obtains it from the approval issuer
named for the dialog (<xref target="approval-issuer"/>), bound to the performing
agent's key with the actor proof from the request (<xref target="issuance"/>,
<xref target="actor-proof-freshness"/>, <xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>). When a resource
challenged the action, redeeming the challenge yields the token
instead (<xref target="redeeming"/>). The resource server checks the token as
<xref target="rs-processing"/> specifies.</t>
      <section anchor="agent-action">
        <name>The agent_action Authorization Detail</name>
        <t>When no resource challenged the action, the approval token describes
it with the RAR <xref target="RFC9396"/> authorization details type <tt>agent_action</tt>.
Besides the common fields of RAR, it has:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>checkpoint_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The checkpoint the authorization answers. Absent in the
<tt>terms</tt> of a commitment (<xref target="commitments"/>), which has its own
<tt>checkpoint_id</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>action:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The operation, as the resource server understands it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The arguments the approval covers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>bounds:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A JSON object naming top-level members of <tt>parameters</tt>
that an approver may change without changing the action
(<xref target="agent-action-narrowing"/>). Each value is one of:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>max</tt>: an upper limit, as a decimal string; an approver may lower
it.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>min</tt>: a lower limit, as a decimal string; an approver may raise
it.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>subset</tt>: a set, as a JSON array; an approver may remove elements.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>A decimal string matches <tt>-?(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\.[0-9]+)?</tt> and is
compared as an exact decimal, never as binary floating point. Only
the performing agent sets <tt>bounds</tt>, in its checkpoint request. A
performing agent <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> name a parameter in <tt>bounds</tt> unless
performing the action with any value the bound permits is within the
authority it is requesting, and the action remains the same action to
the resource server.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>dialog_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The PACE dialog the action belongs to.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A token <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain more than one <tt>agent_action</tt> detail, and <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> combine it with other details or scopes that authorize the same
resource server to perform other actions.</t>
        <section anchor="agent-action-narrowing">
          <name>Narrowing</name>
          <t>This is the comparison of the <tt>agent_action</tt> type, defined here as
<xref target="RAR-NARROWING"/> allows a type to do. An <tt>agent_action</tt> detail B is
equal to or narrower than a detail A if and only if:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>type</tt>, <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>, and <tt>action</tt> are equal; <tt>dialog_id</tt> is
equal or absent from both; and <tt>bounds</tt> is equal, in JCS form
<xref target="RFC8785"/>, or absent from both.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Each common data field of <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/> is present in
B exactly when it is present in A; <tt>identifier</tt> is equal; and for
<tt>locations</tt>, <tt>actions</tt>, <tt>datatypes</tt>, and <tt>privileges</tt>, every element
of B is an element of A.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>parameters</tt> has the same member names in A and B, and each member
compares as follows:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>not named in <tt>bounds</tt>: B's value equals A's, in JCS form;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>max</tt>: both are decimal strings, and B's is less than or equal to
A's;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>min</tt>: both are decimal strings, and B's is greater than or equal
to A's;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>subset</tt>: both are arrays, and every element of B's equals, in JCS
form, some element of A's.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Every other member is equal, in JCS form.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>Anything else, such as an added or removed parameter, a bounded value
of another type, or a malformed decimal string, means B is not
narrower. A requester that finds an <tt>approve-modified</tt> response not
narrower treats it as <tt>deny</tt>; an authorization server that finds the
approved details not narrower than <tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>
rejects the request as <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/> specifies.</t>
          <t>For example, with <tt>"bounds": {"amount": "max"}</tt> and a request for
<tt>"amount": "1520.00"</tt>, <tt>"1500.00"</tt> is narrower, <tt>"1520.000"</tt> is equal,
and any change of <tt>to</tt> or <tt>currency</tt> is not narrower.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="approval-issuer">
        <name>Approver and Approval Issuer Parameters</name>
        <t>A performing agent needs to know whom to ask, and for which issuer to
make its actor proof. This document defines two dialog parameters for
the <tt>parameters</tt> member of OPEN and UPDATE <xref target="PACE"/>:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>approver:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The participant identifier of the participant that answers
checkpoints in the dialog. When absent, it is the controller.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>approval_issuer:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The issuer identifier <xref target="RFC8414"/> of the approval issuer, which
performing agents use as the <tt>aud</tt> of actor proofs.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The controller sets both. Like <tt>purpose</tt> and <tt>basis</tt> in <xref target="PACE"/>, they
are not negotiated: a participant that disagrees sends REJECT. A new
value applies to checkpoint requests sent after the UPDATE that
carries it is committed. A controller that delegates with a credential
from the authorization server it also uses for approval <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set
<tt>approval_issuer</tt> to that credential's <tt>iss</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="issuance">
        <name>Issuance by the Approver</name>
        <t>The approver holds the authority to grant the action, but only the
performing agent may use the token. The approver therefore requests it
with Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> and actor-bound token exchange
<xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>, sending:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>subject_token</tt>: the approver's own token for the task;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_token</tt>: the request's <tt>actor_token</tt> when present, and
otherwise the credential the performing agent presented in the
dialog; its hash is the proof's <tt>ath</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_proof</tt>: the actor proof from the checkpoint request;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>authorization_details</tt>: the single <tt>agent_action</tt> detail, as
approved;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>actor_authorization_details</tt>: for <tt>approve-modified</tt>, the request's
<tt>authorization_details</tt>, over which <tt>azh</tt> was computed, so that the
authorization server can verify the narrowing; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>requested_token_type</tt>:
<tt>urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The authorization server verifies that the subject token authorizes
the approver to grant the action, and obtains the resource owner's
approval when its policy requires it. It then issues a token that:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>carries the detail as approved;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>names the performing agent in <tt>act</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>is bound to the performing agent's key, as <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>
specifies; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>has a <tt>jti</tt> and a short lifetime.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The token <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be a Transactional Access Token <xref target="TXN-AT"/>. If the
authorization server changes the detail, the token response returns
the changed detail, which is authoritative. The approver then answers
the checkpoint:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>with a token: <tt>approve</tt> or <tt>approve-modified</tt>, carrying the token in
<tt>credentials</tt> (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>when the authorization server denies the request with
<tt>access_denied</tt>, as for the device authorization grant
(<xref target="RFC8628"/>): <tt>deny</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>when it rejects the actor proof with <tt>invalid_actor_proof</tt> or
<tt>invalid_authorization_details</tt> (<xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>):
<tt>actor-proof-required</tt>, with the matching <tt>reason</tt>
(<xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>When the approval must come from a person the approver cannot prompt
directly, the approver sends the same <tt>authorization_details</tt>,
<tt>actor_token</tt>, and <tt>actor_proof</tt> in a CIBA request <xref target="CIBA"/> instead,
as <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/> describes. The performing agent never receives the
approver's credentials.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="actor-proof-freshness">
        <name>Actor Proof Freshness</name>
        <t>An actor proof waits in a checkpoint for the approver's decision, and
the performing agent never contacts the approval issuer. Its freshness
therefore rests on <tt>exp</tt> and <tt>jti</tt>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The performing agent sets <tt>exp</tt> as soon after <tt>iat</tt> as the flow
allows <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/>; for a checkpoint, the latest useful <tt>exp</tt> is
the <tt>deadline</tt>. The approval issuer can reject a lifetime beyond its
policy.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The approval issuer accepts each <tt>jti</tt> once. Its record of accepted
<tt>jti</tt> values <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be shared by every instance that accepts actor
proofs for it, keyed by issuer, audience, and <tt>jti</tt>, and kept until
the proof's <tt>exp</tt>. An instance that cannot reach the record <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
reject the proof.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/> leaves nonce delivery to the actor out of scope. An
approval issuer that accepts actor proofs relayed through a
checkpoint <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> require a <tt>nonce</tt> in them. If it does, the
approver answers <tt>actor-proof-required</tt> with <tt>actor_proof_nonce</tt>
(<xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A participant or approval issuer whose clock it cannot trust, for
example after a restart without a time source, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept actor
proofs or checkpoint responses until it can, and treats the affected
checkpoints as unresolved. A secure time source such as Roughtime
<xref target="ROUGHTIME"/> can help.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="actor-proof-retry">
        <name>Asking for an Actor Proof</name>
        <t>An approver answers <tt>actor-proof-required</tt> when the request carried no
proof, when the proof's <tt>aud</tt> is not the approval issuer it will use,
or when that issuer requires a <tt>nonce</tt>. When the approval issuer
rejected the proof, the response also carries a <tt>reason</tt>:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>expired</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The proof had expired, or its lifetime exceeded the issuer's policy.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>invalid</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The proof failed another check, such as its signature or <tt>ath</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>details-mismatch</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The details did not hash to <tt>azh</tt>, or the approved details are not
equal to or narrower than those hashed.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The performing agent <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send a new checkpoint request with a new
proof for that issuer, a new <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>, and the same <tt>deadline</tt>
or an earlier one; otherwise it treats the response as <tt>deny</tt>. An
approver sends <tt>actor-proof-required</tt> at most once per <tt>reason</tt> per
paused operation, counting the absence of a <tt>reason</tt> as one value.</t>
        <t>A performing agent <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send a proof for an issuer unless the
controller named that issuer in <tt>approval_issuer</tt>, or the performing
agent trusts it by its own policy to receive its actor token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="redeeming">
        <name>Redeeming a Resource Challenge</name>
        <t>When a resource challenged the action, the challenge is redeemed as
its specification defines: the transaction authorization grant of
<xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/>, the agent authorization grant of
<xref target="AAUTH-ROSENBERG"/>, or the auth token request of <xref target="AAUTH-HARDT"/>. The
resulting token, already bound to the challenged operation, is the
approval token.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>When the approver, or the party it relays to, may redeem the
challenge, the approver returns the token in the checkpoint
response.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When only the performing agent may, as for an AAuth Scope Challenge,
the response carries only the outcome, and the performing agent
redeems the challenge.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="rs-processing">
        <name>Resource Server Processing</name>
        <t>A resource server that receives a token with an <tt>agent_action</tt> detail
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>validate the token and its sender constraint;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verify that the request is the operation named by <tt>action</tt>, and
that its arguments are within what the detail approves, compared as
in <xref target="agent-action-narrowing"/>:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>equal to each member of <tt>parameters</tt> that <tt>bounds</tt> does not name;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>less than or equal to a member named <tt>max</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>greater than or equal to a member named <tt>min</tt>; and</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>a subset of a member named <tt>subset</tt>; and</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>accept the token for one request only, recording its <tt>jti</tt> until it
expires. A request refused for another reason does not consume the
token.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>If a check fails, it rejects the request with the error
<tt>agent_action_not_authorized</tt> (<xref target="iana"/>). The error tells the
performing agent, and through it the approver, that the request
exceeded or contradicted the approved action, as distinct from
<tt>invalid_token</tt> or <tt>insufficient_scope</tt>
(<xref section="5.3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="OAUTH-2.1"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="principal-confirmation">
      <name>Principal Confirmation</name>
      <t>An agent's approval shows only that the agent agreed. A principal
confirmation proves that the principal itself approved one checkpoint
request: it is made with a key the principal holds, such as one in the
person's wallet or authenticator, and the principal's agent does not
(P10). The <tt>principal_confirmation</tt> member of a checkpoint response is
an object with these members:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>format:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A value from the PACE Principal Confirmation Formats
registry (<xref target="iana-registries"/>). This document defines those in
<xref target="_table-confirmation"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>value:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The confirmation, encoded as the format specifies.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <table anchor="_table-confirmation">
        <name>Principal Confirmation Formats</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">format</th>
            <th align="left">Confirmation</th>
            <th align="left">Bound to the request by</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>oid4vp</tt></td>
            <td align="left">A Verifiable Presentation <xref target="OID4VP"/> whose Key Binding JWT covers a <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> transaction data object</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>request_hash</tt> in the transaction data</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>webauthn</tt></td>
            <td align="left">A WebAuthn assertion <xref target="WEBAUTHN"/></td>
            <td align="left">The challenge</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>spc</tt></td>
            <td align="left">A Secure Payment Confirmation assertion <xref target="SPC"/></td>
            <td align="left">The challenge</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>ciba-token</tt></td>
            <td align="left">An approval token issued after the person approved through CIBA <xref target="CIBA"/></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authorization_details</tt> with <tt>checkpoint_id</tt> (<xref target="agent-action"/>)</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <section anchor="binding">
        <name>Binding</name>
        <t>The confirmation covers the request the response answers, identified
by <tt>request_hash</tt>. For <tt>approve-modified</tt>, the principal confirms the
modified action, and the binding value is instead the base64url-encoded
SHA-256 hash of the JCS form of the request with its <tt>parameters</tt>
replaced by those of the response and its <tt>signature</tt> member removed.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>oid4vp:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The requester, as verifier, sends a presentation request whose
<tt>transaction_data</tt> contains one <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> object
(<xref target="pace-checkpoint-td"/>); it travels to the person's wallet with the
checkpoint, through the approver. The Key Binding JWT carries the
object's hash in <tt>transaction_data_hashes</tt>; its <tt>nonce</tt> is the
checkpoint request's <tt>nonce</tt>; its <tt>iat</tt> is the time of approval; and
its <tt>aud</tt> is the requester's participant identifier, because
<xref target="OID4VP"/> requires the verifier's Client Identifier there and the
requester uses its participant identifier as that value, with a
Client Identifier prefix that its wallet ecosystem accepts. The
<tt>value</tt> is the VP Token.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>webauthn, spc:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The challenge is the binding value, decoded from base64url. The
<tt>value</tt> is a JSON object with these members, each base64url-encoded:
<tt>credential_id</tt>, the WebAuthn credential ID; <tt>key</tt>, the credential's
COSE public key <xref target="WEBAUTHN"/>; and <tt>authenticator_data</tt>,
<tt>client_data_json</tt>, and <tt>signature</tt>, from the assertion. The User
Verified flag <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set when <tt>required_assurance</tt> has <tt>level</tt>
              <tt>authenticated</tt> or higher. For <tt>spc</tt>, the payment instrument and
amount displayed to the person <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal those in the request's
<tt>parameters</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>ciba-token:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The token's <tt>authorization_details</tt> contain the request's
<tt>agent_action</tt> detail, with the same <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>; its <tt>acr</tt> and
<tt>auth_time</tt> claims give the assurance of the person's
authentication. It convinces only a requester that trusts the
issuing OpenID Provider, so it suits one trust domain or a
federation.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pace-checkpoint-td">
        <name>The pace_checkpoint Transaction Data Type</name>
        <t>This document defines the <xref target="OID4VP"/> transaction data type
<tt>pace_checkpoint</tt>, with these members:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The string <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>credential_ids:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. As <xref target="OID4VP"/> defines for every transaction data object.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>checkpoint_id, dialog_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. Those of the checkpoint request.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>request_hash:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The binding value (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>transaction_data_hashes_alg:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, as <xref target="OID4VP"/> defines. When present, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include
<tt>sha-256</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A wallet that receives a <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> display the
action it describes and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return a presentation covering it
unless the person approved. The verifier, which is the requester,
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>, before accepting the presentation:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>verify the presentation and its Key Binding JWT as <xref target="OID4VP"/> and
the credential format require, with <tt>nonce</tt> equal to the checkpoint
request's <tt>nonce</tt> and <tt>aud</tt> equal to the requester's participant
identifier;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verify that <tt>transaction_data_hashes</tt> contains the hash, with the
algorithm used, of the base64url-encoded <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> object it
sent, as <xref target="OID4VP"/> specifies;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verify that the object's <tt>checkpoint_id</tt> and <tt>dialog_id</tt> equal those
of the checkpoint request, and that its <tt>request_hash</tt> equals the
binding value it computes itself from the request it sent and the
response it received; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verify that the credential's confirmation key belongs to the
principal (<xref target="principal-key"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A presentation that fails any check is treated as absent.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="principal-key">
        <name>The Principal's Key</name>
        <t>The verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> establish that the confirming key belongs to the
principal, not to an agent. It accepts the key only when one of the
following relates it to the principal, under its trust policy:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a credential issued to the person by an issuer the verifier trusts,
whose <tt>cnf</tt> is the confirming key, such as one presented with
<tt>oid4vp</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a public key credential that the principal registered with the
verifier earlier, under the pairwise identifier by which the
verifier knows the principal; or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>for <tt>ciba-token</tt>, the OpenID Provider's assertion.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A key that is presented only in the agent's own credentials, or in a
credential whose subject is the agent, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be accepted. A
relaying agent can deliver the confirmation but cannot produce it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="assurance">
        <name>Assurance</name>
        <t>The verifier checks <tt>max_age</tt> against the time of approval (<tt>iat</tt> for
<tt>oid4vp</tt>, its receipt of a fresh assertion for <tt>webauthn</tt> and <tt>spc</tt>,
and <tt>auth_time</tt> for <tt>ciba-token</tt>), and <tt>acr_values</tt> against the
authentication context the format reports or its policy assigns. A
confirmation that fails a check is treated as absent.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="what-the-person-sees">
        <name>What the Person Sees</name>
        <t>The wallet, authenticator, or OpenID Provider shows the action from
the signed request: from <tt>resource_challenge</tt> when present (P6), and
otherwise from <tt>action</tt>, <tt>parameters</tt>, and <tt>effect</tt>, not <tt>description</tt>
alone. For <tt>oid4vp</tt>, a wallet that displays transaction data displays
the <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> object together with the checkpoint request.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="encrypted-checkpoints">
        <name>Checkpoints Addressed to the Principal</name>
        <t>Some requests are meant for the person behind an agent, such as a card
issuer's authentication challenge or a bank confirming a transfer, and
the agent should neither read nor answer them. The requester, which
can be a tool, then encrypts the request to the principal with these
members:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>encrypted_to:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An object with <tt>kid</tt>, <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>, the key identifier of the
principal's encryption key, and <tt>jwk</tt>, <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, the key itself,
obtained from a credential that relates it to the principal
(<xref target="principal-key"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>encrypted:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A JWE <xref target="RFC7516"/> in Compact Serialization, encrypted to that key,
whose plaintext is a JSON object with the members <tt>action</tt>,
<tt>parameters</tt>, <tt>effect</tt>, <tt>authorization_details</tt>, <tt>description</tt>, and
<tt>resource_challenge</tt> that would otherwise appear in the request, and
<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> <tt>response_key</tt>, the requester's public encryption key as a
JWK. These members are omitted from the outer object. The requester
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> leave a copy of <tt>action</tt> in the clear for routing.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>An encrypted request is for a principal confirmation, not for the
issuance of an approval token, so it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry <tt>actor_proof</tt> or
<tt>actor_token</tt>. The signature covers the outer object, including
<tt>encrypted</tt>. The <tt>approver</tt> is the principal's agent, or a participant
that represents the principal's device; the agent relays the request
to the device, which decrypts it. A request with <tt>encrypted_to</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
carry <tt>required_assurance</tt> with <tt>from</tt> set to <tt>principal</tt>, so an
<tt>approve</tt> or <tt>approve-modified</tt> response is valid only with a
principal confirmation from the key holder. An agent <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> answer <tt>deny</tt>
on its own, for example when it cannot reach the person before the
deadline.</t>
        <t>The principal can answer <tt>approve-modified</tt> only when the request
carries <tt>response_key</tt>. The response then carries the modified
<tt>parameters</tt> only in <tt>encrypted</tt>: a JWE in Compact Serialization,
encrypted to <tt>response_key</tt>, whose plaintext is an object with the
member <tt>parameters</tt>. Because <tt>response_key</tt> travels inside the
request's encryption, a relaying agent cannot substitute it. The
requester decrypts the parameters and checks that they only narrow the
request (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>). For an encrypted request, the
binding value of the principal confirmation is computed over the
request as decrypted: the outer object with <tt>encrypted_to</tt> and
<tt>encrypted</tt> replaced by the plaintext members.</t>
        <t>Only the approver initiates CIBA (<xref target="issuance"/>): when it cannot reach
the principal's device through the dialog, it can use CIBA through the
principal's OpenID Provider and answer with
<tt>ciba-token</tt>. A requester that can reach the principal without the
agent does not need a checkpoint; such contact is out of scope.</t>
        <t>A tool that sends a later result of the work publishes it, as a
participant authenticated by its own credentials, in the dialog in
which it was invoked or, once that has ended, in a follow-up dialog
<xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="between-principals">
      <name>Agreements Between Principals</name>
      <t>Agents acting for different principals, such as a consumer's agent
and a brand's agent, do not delegate to each other, but they still
need approvals from each other, a record of what their principals
agreed, and facts they can rely on. This section covers peer
checkpoints, commitments (P9), and assertions.</t>
      <section anchor="peer-checkpoints">
        <name>Peer Checkpoints</name>
        <t>Agents of different principals also need approvals from each other,
although no delegation links them.</t>
        <t>In such a dialog, either participant can publish a checkpoint request
naming the other as <tt>approver</tt>, for example when a brand's agent needs
the consumer to approve a refund's terms, or needs stronger or more
recent authentication of the consumer. The <tt>approver</tt> dialog parameter
does not restrict peer checkpoints, and the approver need not be the
controller.</t>
        <t>The requester is the party that will act, and the approval gives it no
authority over the approver's resources. The request therefore carries
no <tt>actor_proof</tt>, and the response no approval token, unless the
action is performed at a resource that the approver's authorization
server protects.</t>
        <t>The approver meets <tt>required_assurance</tt> within the dialog: when <tt>from</tt>
is <tt>participant</tt>, by presenting new credentials in its next control
message, such as DECLARE <xref target="PACE"/>, bound to the request's <tt>nonce</tt> as
<xref target="PACE"/> describes for <tt>credentials</tt>, before it responds; when <tt>from</tt>
is <tt>principal</tt>, with a principal confirmation. A requester that
receives a response that does not meet <tt>required_assurance</tt> treats it
as <tt>deny</tt>; it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish a new request without ending the dialog. An
approver that cannot or will not meet it answers <tt>deny</tt> with reason
<tt>insufficient-assurance</tt> <xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
        <t>The rules of <xref target="checkpoints"/> apply unchanged. Each side applies its
own policy, and a counterpart's <tt>cooperative</tt> posture <xref target="PACE"/>, or its
declaration of agreement or low risk, never replaces a
<tt>required_assurance</tt> or a principal confirmation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="commitments">
        <name>Commitments</name>
        <t>Parties of different principals need to know what was agreed and that
each confirmed the same terms; an agent's statement that it is
satisfied does not show this. A commitment records terms such as a
refund, a rebooking, a price, or an action item, with an identifier
that every party's records can share (P9).</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "commitment",
  "commitment_id": "2b9d4c7e-1f3a-4e8b-9c6d-5a0f7e2b8d14",
  "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "proposer": "brand-agent",
  "parties": ["consumer-agent", "brand-agent"],
  "terms": [{
    "type": "agent_action",
    "action": "refund",
    "parameters": {"amount": "84.00", "currency": "EUR",
                   "order": "A-1093"}
  }],
  "terms_hash": "Qm9s...",
  "cancel": {"until": "2026-11-14T09:00:00Z",
             "terms": "Full reversal before the refund is issued"},
  "expires_at": "2026-11-13T18:00:00Z",
  "status": "proposed",
  "confirmations": [],
  "signature": "eyJ..."
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The string <tt>commitment</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>commitment_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A UUID version 4, chosen by the proposer, that identifies
the commitment in every dialog and record, including the
<tt>commitments</tt> member of a PACE <tt>result</tt> <xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>dialog_id, proposer, parties:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The dialog, the participant that published this object,
and the participants bound by the terms, including the proposer.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>terms:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. An array of RAR <xref target="RFC9396"/> authorization details, such as
<tt>agent_action</tt> details (<xref target="agent-action"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>terms_hash:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS <xref target="RFC8785"/>
form of <tt>terms</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>checkpoint_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The checkpoint the commitment arises from, if any.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>cancel:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Until when (<tt>until</tt>), and on what terms, the party that
performs the action can still cancel or reverse it. After <tt>until</tt>, a
PACE CANCEL of the work can report only <tt>completed</tt>,
<tt>partially-reversed</tt>, or <tt>irreversible</tt> <xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>expires_at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The time after which an unconfirmed commitment lapses,
with status <tt>expired</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>status:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. One of the values in <xref target="_table-commitment-status"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>confirmations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. An array of the signed checkpoint responses that confirm
the terms: empty when first proposed, and one or more per party once
each has confirmed.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>signature:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. As for checkpoints (<xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>), made by the
proposer.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <table anchor="_table-commitment-status">
          <name>Commitment Status</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">status</th>
              <th align="left">Meaning</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>proposed</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Published; not yet confirmed by every party</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>pending-principal</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Every party's agent confirmed, but a confirmation required from a principal is outstanding</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>confirmed</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Every required confirmation is present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>rejected</tt></td>
              <td align="left">A party denied it</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>unconfirmed-counterparty</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Confirmed by the proposer's side, but a party had assurance level <tt>none</tt> <xref target="PACE"/> when it agreed</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>cancelled</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Cancelled under <tt>cancel</tt>, or withdrawn before confirmation</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>expired</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>expires_at</tt> passed before every required confirmation was present</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <section anchor="confirming">
          <name>Confirming</name>
          <t>The proposer obtains each confirmation with a checkpoint request to the
party, with <tt>action</tt> <tt>commit</tt> and <tt>parameters</tt>
            <tt>{"commitment_id": ..., "terms_hash": ...}</tt>: a peer checkpoint
(<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>) for the other parties, and an ordinary one for
its own approver. A party confirms by answering <tt>approve</tt>;
<tt>approve-modified</tt> is not allowed, and a party that wants different
terms denies and proposes a new commitment. At each change, the
proposer republishes the commitment with the same <tt>commitment_id</tt>, a
new <tt>status</tt>, and the confirmations so far. Every party verifies each
confirmation against <tt>terms_hash</tt> before relying on the status.</t>
          <t>Which confirmations are required follows from each party's policy and
the posture of the dialog <xref target="PACE"/>:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>When the parties act for different principals and the posture is
<tt>adversarial</tt>, each checkpoint request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry
<tt>required_assurance</tt> with <tt>from</tt> set to <tt>principal</tt>, so the
commitment becomes <tt>confirmed</tt> only with a principal confirmation
from each principal, each bound to the same <tt>terms_hash</tt> (P9).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>When the posture is <tt>cooperative</tt>, each party decides from its own
policy whether its agent's confirmation suffices, for example for
low-risk terms within the <tt>commit_scope</tt> that agent declared
<xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>An agent that confirms terms within its <tt>commit_scope</tt> but beyond
what it may confirm alone answers with its own confirmation and
leaves the status <tt>pending-principal</tt>. The principal's confirmation
or denial follows later, referring to the same <tt>commitment_id</tt>, in
the same dialog or in a <tt>follow-up</tt> dialog <xref target="PACE"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>A commitment with a party whose assurance level is <tt>none</tt>, such as a
person on a telephone line without a credential, is
<tt>unconfirmed-counterparty</tt> until that party confirms it in a later
authenticated exchange.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="assertions">
        <name>Assertions</name>
        <t>Parties rely on facts they cannot check themselves, such as a
carrier's proof of delivery or a payment provider's refund status. An
assertion carries such a fact and says who stands behind it.</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "type": "assertion",
  "assertion_id": "9e4a0c1b-6d2f-4a7e-8b3c-1f5d9e0a2c47",
  "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "claim": {"delivered": true, "shipment": "1Z999",
            "at": "2026-11-10T14:02:00Z"},
  "asserted_by": "brand-agent",
  "attested_by": "https://carrier.example",
  "evidence": {"format": "sd-jwt-vc", "value": "eyJ..."},
  "signature": "eyJ..."
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The string <tt>assertion</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>assertion_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A UUID version 4, listed in the <tt>sources</tt> of a PACE
<tt>result</tt> <xref target="PACE"/> that relies on it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>dialog_id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The dialog in which the assertion is published.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>claim:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The fact, as a JSON object.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>asserted_by:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The participant that publishes the assertion.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>attested_by, evidence:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>, and present together. The issuer identifier of a third
party that attests the claim, and its signed statement: with
<tt>format</tt> <tt>jws</tt>, a JWS <xref target="RFC7515"/> by that issuer whose payload, in
JCS form, equals <tt>claim</tt>; with <tt>format</tt> <tt>sd-jwt-vc</tt>, an SD-JWT VC
<xref target="SD-JWT-VC"/> whose <tt>iss</tt> is <tt>attested_by</tt> and whose disclosed
claims include every member of <tt>claim</tt> with the same values.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>signature:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. As for checkpoints (<xref target="checkpoint-signing"/>), made by
<tt>asserted_by</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>An assertion without <tt>attested_by</tt> is the sender's own statement, and
receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat it as such, as they would a statement in content.
A receiver that relies on an attested assertion <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the
evidence with the issuer's key, obtained under its own trust policy,
for example from the issuer's SD-JWT VC issuer metadata. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat
an assertion whose evidence fails verification, or does not match
<tt>claim</tt>, as the sender's own statement. A relaying participant relays
an assertion unmodified, and can only add its own assertion citing it.
A delegated party, such as a payment provider in a dialog opened by a
brand, reports its outcome as an assertion, so the brand's outcome to
the consumer can cite it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="evidence">
      <name>Evidence</name>
      <t>A deployment that needs approvals and actions to be checkable by
parties other than the operator adds an evidence mechanism; PACE
authorization does not mandate one. Such a mechanism <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>each OPEN of a delegated dialog, with its <tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt> and the
hash of the delegation credential presented;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each checkpoint request and response, in its signed form;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each action performed under an approval, referencing the response
that approved it;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each commitment (<xref target="commitments"/>) at each change of status, with its
confirmations;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each assertion (<xref target="assertions"/>) that a result cites;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each SEGMENT start and end <xref target="PACE"/>, without the segment's content;
and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>each disclosure that a participant is an AI agent, such as the
DECLARE of its <tt>kind</tt> <xref target="PACE"/> or the announcement a telephone
gateway plays, with its time.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>TRAIL <xref target="TRAIL"/> is one such mechanism: its gate-request and approval
records can carry checkpoints, and its record of the action cites the
approval. For HTTP calls along a chain, aggregate signatures
<xref target="AGG-SIG"/> attribute changes to each hop.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The considerations of <xref target="PACE"/> apply. The threats below are specific to
delegation and approval.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Confused deputy:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A credential or approval token is used for a different dialog,
resource, or action. Mitigated by message binding (P1),
single-action tokens bound to the performing agent's key (P5), and
resource-side parameter checks.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Approval spoofing by an intermediate agent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A relaying agent forges an approval or alters the request. Mitigated
by signatures, <tt>request_hash</tt>, and relaying the original signed
request (P4, P5).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Checkpoint substitution:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An approval for one checkpoint is presented for another. Mitigated by
<tt>request_hash</tt>, <tt>checkpoint_id</tt>, and the single-response rule (P5,
P7).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Prompt injection through descriptions:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A crafted <tt>description</tt> misleads the approver. Mitigated by resource
challenges (P6), and otherwise by presenting <tt>parameters</tt> and
<tt>effect</tt>, which the approval token enforces.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Self-approval:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Forbidden (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>), and detectable because the
response is signed by the approver named in the request.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Approval fatigue:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Approvers asked too often approve without reading. Approvers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
resolve routine checkpoints by policy and reserve human approval for
actions with significant effects.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer redirection:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An approver could name, in <tt>actor-proof-required</tt>, an issuer of its
choosing to collect actor proofs and tokens. The performing agent
sends proofs only to issuers the controller named or it trusts
(<xref target="actor-proof-retry"/>), and <tt>aud</tt> and <tt>azh</tt> bind each proof to one
issuer and one action.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay across instances:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Instances that keep separate records of accepted identifiers defeat
single-use rules. The <tt>jti</tt> record is shared
(<xref target="actor-proof-freshness"/>), and resources apply the same rule to
approval tokens.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Stale authority:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Work continues after revocation. Mitigated by terminating dependent
dialogs (P8), short credential lifetimes, and enforcement points
outside the agent, such as a TRAIL edge.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>An agent posing as its principal:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Mitigated by principal confirmations with a key related to the
principal (P10) and by encrypted requests
(<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>). A relaying agent can still withhold a
request; the deadline bounds the delay.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Misleading confirmation display:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The confirmation is bound to the request, or the modified request,
and the display comes from the signed request or resource challenge;
for <tt>spc</tt>, the displayed amount and instrument must equal
<tt>parameters</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Assurance downgrade:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A counterpart declares a cooperative posture or low risk to obtain
weaker confirmation. Each party sets <tt>required_assurance</tt> from its
own policy (<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Commitment substitution and agreement by self-report:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Every confirmation is bound to <tt>terms_hash</tt>, a change of terms is a
new commitment, and only bound confirmations complete a commitment,
never an agent's claimed satisfaction or reported scores (P9).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Assertion laundering:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An unverifiable or mismatched attestation is treated as the sender's
own statement (<xref target="assertions"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Onward delegation under own authority:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A receiver does not accept onward delegation from a participant that
declared <tt>authority_basis</tt> <tt>own</tt> (<xref target="attenuation"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Delegation chains reveal intermediate agents to later hops, and
checkpoints can carry personal data in <tt>parameters</tt>. Deployments
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use pseudonymous originators (<xref target="attenuation"/>), protect
<tt>checkpoint</tt> objects end to end as <xref target="PACE"/> describes for content, and
include in a checkpoint only what the approver needs. A resource
challenge that carries parameters by digest, as R3 does, hides them
from intermediate agents.</t>
      <t>When a delegated dialog crosses into a domain whose agents should not
learn which dialog it continues, the delegating participant <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> omit
<tt>parent_dialog_ids</tt> from OPEN and keep the link locally, as
<xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/> does across trust boundaries. Lifecycle propagation
still works, because the controller holds the link; the receiver then
relies on the delegation chain alone for cycle detection.</t>
      <t>A principal confirmation identifies the principal to the verifier. A
principal that should not be linked across counterparties uses
per-verifier keys and credentials, such as pairwise passkeys or
batch-issued credentials, and discloses only the claims the verifier
needs. Encrypted requests (<xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/>) hide their
parameters from relaying agents.</t>
      <t>Every participant can read <tt>terms</tt> and <tt>claim</tt>. Parties include only
what the counterpart needs, use SD-JWT VC selective disclosure for
attested claims, and, where some participants must not see the terms,
agree in a segment <xref target="PACE"/> limited to the parties.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="oauth-extensions-error-registry">
        <name>OAuth Extensions Error Registry</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Name: <tt>agent_action_not_authorized</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Usage Location: resource access error response</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Protocol Extension: this document</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="rs-processing"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pace-dialog-parameters">
        <name>PACE Dialog Parameters</name>
        <t>If <xref target="PACE"/> establishes a registry of dialog parameters, this document
registers <tt>approver</tt>, <tt>approval_issuer</tt> (<xref target="approval-issuer"/>), and
<tt>authority_basis</tt> (<xref target="attenuation"/>) in it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-registries">
        <name>PACE Authorization Registries</name>
        <t>This document asks IANA to create the following registries in the
"Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE)" group that <xref target="PACE"/>
creates, each with the Specification Required policy <xref target="RFC8126"/>.
Each entry has a value, a description, and a reference.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>PACE Checkpoint Outcomes (<xref target="checkpoint-response"/>): <tt>approve</tt>,
<tt>approve-modified</tt>, <tt>deny</tt>, and <tt>actor-proof-required</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PACE Principal Confirmation Formats (<xref target="principal-confirmation"/>):
<tt>oid4vp</tt>, <tt>webauthn</tt>, <tt>spc</tt>, and <tt>ciba-token</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PACE Resource Challenge Formats (<xref target="resource-challenges"/>):
<tt>oauth-txn-challenge</tt>, <tt>aauth-scope-challenge</tt>, and
<tt>aauth-resource-token</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The initial values reference this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="openid4vp-transaction-data-type">
        <name>OpenID4VP Transaction Data Type</name>
        <t><xref target="OID4VP"/> identifies transaction data types by string and has no IANA
registry. If the OpenID Foundation or IANA establishes one,
<tt>pace_checkpoint</tt> (<xref target="pace-checkpoint-td"/>) is to be registered with:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Type: <tt>pace_checkpoint</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Description: Approval of one PACE checkpoint request, bound by its
request hash</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reference: <xref target="pace-checkpoint-td"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="DIALOG-BINDING">
          <front>
            <title>Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents and tools that take part in a dialog carry a dialog context
   with each request and response.  This document specifies how the
   dialog context is bound to WIMSE and OAuth credentials.  It extends
   the WIMSE profile of HTTP Message Signatures, for requests and
   responses, and the WIMSE Proof Token, for requests, to cover the
   dialog context, records the dialog identifier in OAuth transaction
   tokens, and describes how a new dialog at a trust boundary aligns
   with OAuth identity chaining.  A receiver can then verify who sent a
   request or response, which dialog it belongs to, and, for a request,
   what it may do, and that the answers agree.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OAUTH-2.1">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt">
              <organization>Hellō</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Torsten Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables an application to
   obtain limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
   resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the
   resource owner and an authorization service, or by allowing the
   application to obtain access on its own behalf.  This specification
   replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
   described in RFC 6749 and the Bearer Token Usage in RFC 6750.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7516">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hildebrand" initials="J." surname="Hildebrand"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Encryption (JWE) represents encrypted content using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries defined by that specification. Related digital signature and Message Authentication Code (MAC) capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7516"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7516"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8414">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <date month="June" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9396">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="May" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a new parameter authorization_details that is used to carry fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9396"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9396"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACE">
          <front>
            <title>PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cullen Fluffy Jennings" initials="C. F." surname="Jennings">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange
   (PACE), an agentic dialog management protocol with a binding to Media
   over QUIC Transport (MOQT).  A dialog is the correlated sequence of
   interactions between two or more participants over the course of a
   task.  PACE defines a transport-independent dialog context and
   control operations to establish, modify, and terminate dialogs and to
   revoke propagation relationships.  It specifies how that context
   stays coherent across intermediaries, trust boundaries, modality
   changes, and interruptions, and how it is carried over MOQT.  PACE
   does not interpret or define dialog content.  Over MOQT, a dialog can
   combine text, audio, video, and request/response exchanges in point-
   to-point, point-to-multipoint, and multi-party topologies.
   Application-layer agent protocols such as A2A, MCP, and AutoGen keep
   their own message formats and carry the dialog context through their
   own extension points.  Delegation between agents and approval of
   individual agent actions are specified in a companion document.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WPT-MSG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding/">
          <front>
            <title>Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-BOUND" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange/">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-PROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a common representation of delegated actors in
   OAuth JSON Web Token (JWT) assertion grants, JWT access tokens, and
   Transaction Tokens.  It profiles the act claim defined by OAuth 2.0
   Token Exchange, requires issuer-scoped actor identifiers, and uses
   the sub_profile claim to classify actor entity types.  It specifies
   token processing, delegation-chain propagation, sender-constraint
   handling, and discovery metadata, so that issuers and resource
   servers in different trust domains interpret delegated actors
   consistently.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3339">
          <front>
            <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
            <author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>
            <author fullname="C. Newman" initials="C." surname="Newman"/>
            <date month="July" year="2002"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a date and time format for use in Internet protocols that is a profile of the ISO 8601 standard for representation of dates and times using the Gregorian calendar.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OID4VP" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0</title>
            <author initials="O." surname="Terbu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="K." surname="Yasuda">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Fett">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Heenan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="July"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WEBAUTHN" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/">
          <front>
            <title>Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 3</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPC" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/secure-payment-confirmation/">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Payment Confirmation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RAR-NARROWING" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-rar-narrowing/">
          <front>
            <title>Comparing OAuth Authorization Details</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-rar-narrowing-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="UCREQ">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker" initials="Z." surname="Sarker">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kehan Yao" initials="K." surname="Yao">
              <organization>China Mobile</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes use cases for agentic AI communication
   systems and derives protocol requirements from those use cases.  The
   requirements are intended to guide IETF standardization work on
   protocols in the context of agent-to-agent communication, agent-to-
   tool communication, with focus on dialog management, transport,
   multimodal communication, communication security, agent identity and
   authentication.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DIALOG-UC">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic Dialog Use Cases</title>
            <author initials="F." surname="Siyavud">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CIBA" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-client-initiated-backchannel-authentication-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication Flow - Core 1.0</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Fernandez">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="F." surname="Walter">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Nennker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Tonge">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SD-JWT-VC">
          <front>
            <title>SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)</title>
            <author fullname="Oliver Terbu" initials="O." surname="Terbu">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Daniel Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett">
              <organization>Authlete Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes data formats as well as validation and
   processing rules to express Verifiable Digital Credentials with JSON
   payloads with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT
   format.

   Furthermore, this specification updates RFC7800 to allow for the
   Confirmation Claim (cnf) to be used regardless of the presence or
   absence of other claims.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-27"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7009">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="S. Dronia" initials="S." surname="Dronia"/>
            <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
            <date month="August" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes an additional endpoint for OAuth authorization servers, which allows clients to notify the authorization server that a previously obtained refresh or access token is no longer needed. This allows the authorization server to clean up security credentials. A revocation request will invalidate the actual token and, if applicable, other tokens based on the same authorization grant.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7009"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7009"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8705">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8705"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8705"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9470">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Step Up Authentication Challenge Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>It is not uncommon for resource servers to require different authentication strengths or recentness according to the characteristics of a request. This document introduces a mechanism that resource servers can use to signal to a client that the authentication event associated with the access token of the current request does not meet its authentication requirements and, further, how to meet them. This document also codifies a mechanism for a client to request that an authorization server achieve a specific authentication strength or recentness when processing an authorization request.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9470"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9470"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9901">
          <front>
            <title>Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yasuda" initials="K." surname="Yasuda"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a mechanism for the selective disclosure
of individual elements of a JSON data structure used as the payload
of a JSON Web Signature (JWS). The primary use case is the selective
disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9901"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9901"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STATUS-LIST">
          <front>
            <title>Token Status List (TSL)</title>
            <author fullname="Tobias Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Bastian" initials="P." surname="Bastian">
              <organization>Bundesdruckerei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="21" month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a status mechanism called Token Status
   List (TSL), data structures and processing rules for representing the
   status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
   or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), such as JWT, SD-JWT,
   CBOR Web Token, and ISO mdoc.  It also defines an extension point and
   a registry for future status mechanisms.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="REVOCATION-EVENTS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-events/">
          <front>
            <title>Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-events-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-CHALLENGE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge</title>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines an OAuth mechanism for transaction-specific
   authorization challenges.  A protected resource can require
   additional authorization for a particular operation by returning a
   transaction authorization challenge.  This is useful when requests
   are mediated by agents, automated workflows, or delegated services
   and the protected resource requires confirmation from a human user,
   resource owner, or organizational authority.  The client presents the
   challenge to an authorization server, which validates the challenge,
   obtains any required approval, and issues an OAuth 2.0 access token
   whose granted authorization details, expressed using Rich
   Authorization Requests, describe the approved operation.  The access
   token is then presented to the protected resource as evidence that
   the challenged operation was authorized.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AAUTH-ROSENBERG">
          <front>
            <title>AAuth - Agentic Authorization OAuth 2.1 Extension</title>
            <author fullname="Jonathan Rosenberg" initials="J." surname="Rosenberg">
              <organization>jdrosen.net</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pat White" initials="P." surname="White">
              <organization>Bitwave</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI Agents are increasingly accessing web resources on behalf of the
   users they serve.  Traditionally these agents are granted normal
   OAuth access tokens through existing OAuth grant flows.  However,
   these flows were designed in the era of traditional software, and
   when applied to AI Agents, multiple problems have arisen.  This
   document outlines some of the problems, and then proposes a simple
   OAuth2.1 extension that enables AI Agents to obtain access tokens at
   time of resource access using Human-In-the-Loop or other approval
   flows.  We call this the Agent Authorization Grant (aauth) grant
   flow.  This document also compares the proposed solution with
   another, non-backwards compatible aauth solution.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rosenberg-oauth-aauth-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AAUTH-HARDT">
          <front>
            <title>AAuth Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt">
              <organization>Hellō</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="25" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the AAuth authorization protocol for agent-to-
   resource authorization and identity claim retrieval.  The protocol
   supports five resource access modes — agent identity, resource-
   managed (two-party), person identity, PS authorization (three-party),
   and federated authorization (four-party) — with agent governance as
   an orthogonal layer.  It builds on the HTTP Signature Keys
   specification ([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) for HTTP Message
   Signatures and key discovery.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AAUTH-R3">
          <front>
            <title>AAuth Rich Resource Requests (R3)</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt" initials="D." surname="Hardt">
              <organization>Hellō</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines AAuth Rich Resource Requests (R3), an extension
   to the AAuth Protocol ([I-D.hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol]) that enables
   structured, vocabulary-based authorization for resource access.
   Resources publish R3 documents (content-addressed authorization
   definitions) and advertise vocabularies describing their operations.
   Agents request access using those vocabularies.  Auth tokens carry
   granted operations in the same vocabulary format, enabling resources
   to enforce authorization directly from the token.  Resources annotate
   individual operations in their vocabulary with the credential each
   requires, so an agent can plan before its first call.  R3 provides
   human-displayable context for consent decisions and content-addressed
   audit provenance via the r3_s256 hash in auth tokens.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-aauth-r3-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-CREDS">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-WPT">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Proof Token</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from basic
   deployments to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   systems.  This document specifies the Workload Proof Token (WPT), a
   mechanism for workloads to prove possession of the private key
   associated with a Workload Identity Token (WIT).  The WPT is a signed
   JWT that binds the workload's authentication to a specific HTTP
   request, providing application-layer proof of possession for
   workload-to-workload communication.  This specification is designed
   to work alongside the WIT credential format defined in draft-ietf-
   wimse-workload-creds and can be combined with other WIMSE protocols
   in multi-hop call chains.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TRAIL">
          <front>
            <title>TRAIL: Tamper-evident Records for Agent Interactions and Liveness</title>
            <author fullname="Kareem Nassar" initials="K." surname="Nassar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cullen Fluffy Jennings" initials="C. F." surname="Jennings">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents call other agents and tools across organizational
   boundaries, but the records of what they did are kept by the
   operators whose conduct the records describe, and the parties
   overseeing them learn of problems only afterwards.  TRAIL makes this
   communication auditable and revocable by parties other than the
   operator.  An enforcement point outside the agent and its sandbox,
   the edge, signs each call as a COSE Action Record, which the receiver
   keeps, and appends it to a tamper-evident trail that witnesses
   countersign.  Authorities read the trails and publish rules that the
   edge enforces on every call: require approval, refuse an action, stop
   an agent, or cap how many agents run across machines.  The edge lets
   traffic through only while it holds current state from each authority
   and a recent witness countersignature, so an authority that goes
   silent, or a trail that nobody is witnessing, stops the agent.  TRAIL
   defines bindings to HTTP and to Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) that
   produce the same evidence; over MOQT, holds reach edges as soon as
   they are published.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nassar-agentproto-trail-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8628">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant</title>
            <author fullname="W. Denniss" initials="W." surname="Denniss"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="August" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant is designed for Internet- connected devices that either lack a browser to perform a user-agent- based authorization or are input constrained to the extent that requiring the user to input text in order to authenticate during the authorization flow is impractical. It enables OAuth clients on such devices (like smart TVs, media consoles, digital picture frames, and printers) to obtain user authorization to access protected resources by using a user agent on a separate device.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8628"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8628"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATION-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Rafael Asor" initials="R." surname="Asor">
              <organization>Attenu</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested "act" claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATE-SD-JWT">
          <front>
            <title>Delegate SD-JWT</title>
            <author fullname="Gareth Oliver" initials="G." surname="Oliver">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies an extension to Selective Disclosure JSON Web
   Tokens [RFC9901] to support further delegation from the Holder to a
   Delegate Holder.  This is done by allowing the Key Binding JWT to
   also be an SD-JWT, optionally with its own Key Binding.  This has
   particular applicability to Agentic systems.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DTR">
          <front>
            <title>Deferred Token Response</title>
            <author fullname="Guilherme de Oliveira Niero" initials="G." surname="de Oliveira Niero">
              <organization>Itaú</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dapeng Liu" initials="D." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Alibaba Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the Deferred Token Response (DTR) extension for
   OAuth 2.1.  In existing OAuth grants, the token endpoint either
   issues an access token or returns an error.  DTR establishes a
   generic asynchronous token request mechanism that any OAuth grant may
   plug into.  In DTR-aware flows, the authorization server returns a
   deferral_code and a polling interval, indicating that the final token
   response will be available at a later time.  The client retrieves the
   eventual response by polling the token endpoint, or by receiving a
   callback from the authorization server when one is configured.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-deferred-token-response-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ROUGHTIME">
          <front>
            <title>Roughtime: A Protocol for Rough Time Synchronization</title>
            <author fullname="W. Ladd" initials="W." surname="Ladd"/>
            <author fullname="M. Dansarie" initials="M." surname="Dansarie"/>
            <date month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes Roughtime, an experimental protocol that aims to achieve two things: secure, rough time synchronization (even for clients without any idea of what time it is) and a format for clients to report any inconsistencies they observe between timeservers. This document specifies the on-wire protocol required for these goals and discusses aspects of the ecosystem needed for it to work.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10049"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC10049"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-AT">
          <front>
            <title>Transactional Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="29" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   OAuth 2.0 access tokens are typically scoped to a session rather than
   to a transaction.  They carry no transaction identifier and no
   context beyond scope.  This document defines Transactional Access
   Tokens: a profile of JSON Web Token (JWT) access tokens that carries
   a transaction identifier and authorization server-asserted
   transaction context, has a very short lifetime, and is audienced to a
   single resource server.  Transactional Access Tokens align with the
   claims and semantics of OAuth Transaction Tokens, so that transaction
   context can flow from the authorization server to a resource server
   and onward into that resource server's trust domain.  A primary use
   case is task-scoped authorization of AI agents, where the
   authorization server makes a fresh policy decision for each
   transaction.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Token JWT Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining</title>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sean O'Dell" initials="S." surname="O'Dell">
              <organization>CVS Health</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a profile of the OAuth Identity and
   Authorization Chaining Across Domains
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] mechanism that uses a Transaction
   Token (Txn-Token) [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens] as the subject
   token in a Token Exchange [RFC8693] request to obtain a JWT
   Authorization Grant for crossing a trust boundary.

   A Txn-Token is scoped to a single trust domain and represents the
   full authorization context of an in-progress transaction, regardless
   of whether that transaction was initiated by a human user calling an
   external API, by an internal system event, or by an automated
   workload.  This profile specifies how a service operating within that
   trust domain can present its Txn-Token to obtain a JWT Authorization
   Grant that carries the necessary context across a trust boundary,
   enabling an access token to be issued for a partner service, without
   exposing internal trust-domain credentials or token formats beyond
   the trust boundary.

   Agentic systems are one class of deployment that depends on this
   capability.  The AI Identity Management System [I-D.ietf-wimse-aims]
   describes AI agents as workloads that use Transaction Tokens to carry
   authorization context between the services implementing a task, and
   that frequently need to reach resources protected by an authorization
   server in another trust domain.  Its treatment of cross-domain access
   directs such an agent to use [I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] or a
   profile of it as defined in this document.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BOUNDED-WORK">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization</title>
            <author fullname="Dapeng Liu" initials="D." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Alibaba</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   OAuth 2.0 provides mechanisms for requesting and granting access,
   constraining access tokens, and managing their lifecycle.  It does
   not define a common way to identify the work a user approved and to
   associate that work's bounds and termination with the credentials
   issued for it.  When an AI agent acts on a user's behalf, that work
   is what most needs governing: the agent's authority should come from
   the approval of a bounded piece of work, should stay within the
   bounds the user approved, and should end when the work is done or the
   user withdraws it.

   This document presents a use case in which a user withdraws an
   agent's approved work and the agent's further operations are denied,
   and identifies the semantics that independently implemented clients,
   Authorization Servers, and Resource Servers need to share to deliver
   that outcome.  It then describes a framework for approved bounded
   work, built on three objects: a bounded work proposal, the governing
   authorization established when it is approved, and approval evidence,
   a durable record of the authorization decision and the approved
   bounds.  Credentials issued for the work are associated with the
   governing authorization, and ending the authorization has defined
   consequences for further issuance and, within a stated acceptance
   window, for resource access.

   This version specifies no wire formats and requests no IANA actions.
   It is a direction-setting document: its goal is agreement on the
   problem and the conceptual model, with details left to subsequent
   revisions and working group discussion.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AIMS">
          <front>
            <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeff Lombardo" initials="J." surname="Lombardo">
              <organization>AWS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Steele" initials="N." surname="Steele">
              <organization>OpenAI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document proposes best practices for authentication and
   authorization of AI agent interactions.  It leverages existing
   standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications.  Rather
   than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and
   widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish
   agent authentication and authorization.  By doing so, it aims to
   provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify
   gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent
   authentication and authorization.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CROSS-ORG">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Morgan Reece" initials="M." surname="Reece">
              <organization>TowerGuardian Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous software agents increasingly act on behalf of human
   principals by invoking tools, services, and other agents, frequently
   across organizational boundaries.  Existing workload and token-based
   authorization mechanisms were designed for a single trust domain and
   a small number of delegation hops.  They do not adequately express,
   constrain, or verify authority that is delegated recursively among
   agents and that crosses the boundary between independently
   administered organizations.  This document describes the problem of
   cross-organizational agent delegation, identifies the gaps in current
   mechanisms, and enumerates requirements that any solution within the
   scope of the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE)
   working group should satisfy.  It does not specify a solution.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGG-SIG">
          <front>
            <title>Authenticated Provenance for WIMSE Delegation Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   A request and its response, passing through a chain of workloads, may
   need authenticated provenance: proof of which workloads participated
   and whether each changed the message.  The base WIMSE HTTP Message
   Signatures mechanism ([I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature]) authenticates
   one workload's message to its immediate recipient and does not
   provide this across a chain.  This document establishes authenticated
   provenance using per-hop digests of what each hop received and
   forwarded; this alone detects an omitted hop that changed the
   message.  An aggregate signature closes the remaining gap, a hop that
   forwards the message unchanged, and keeps the signature close to the
   size of one signature regardless of chain length.  The mechanism
   works with any aggregate signature scheme.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-aggregate-signatures-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENT-DELEGATION" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/">
          <front>
            <title>Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SD-CARD" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agent-sd-card/">
          <front>
            <title>Agent SD-Card: Selective Disclosure of Agent Metadata for Discovery and Authentication</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agent-sd-card-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="A2A" target="https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/">
          <front>
            <title>Agent-to-Agent Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Linux Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="1.0"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCP" target="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28">
          <front>
            <title>Model Context Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Linux Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="2026-07-28"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="POPPY" target="https://personalagentprotocol.org/docs/0.3/spec">
          <front>
            <title>Personal Agent Protocol (Poppy) Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Sierra</organization>
            </author>
            <author>
              <organization>Meta</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="Draft 0.3"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 2031?>

<section anchor="existing-work">
      <name>Survey of Related Work</name>
      <t>This appendix lists related work, what each solves, and what it leaves
to this document. <xref target="building-blocks"/> shows how the mechanisms this
document uses fit together.</t>
      <table anchor="_table-existing">
        <name>Related Work</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Work</th>
            <th align="left">Solves</th>
            <th align="left">Leaves to this document</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">WIMSE credentials <xref target="WIMSE-CREDS"/>, WPT <xref target="WIMSE-WPT"/>, message binding <xref target="WPT-MSG"/></td>
            <td align="left">Workload identity; proof of possession for HTTP and for messages</td>
            <td align="left">Use in delegation; the profile for control messages is in <xref target="PACE"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Dialog binding <xref target="DIALOG-BINDING"/></td>
            <td align="left">Binding HTTP requests and Txn-Tokens to an agent dialog</td>
            <td align="left">Dialog lifecycle; delegation across domains</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/>, mTLS <xref target="RFC8705"/></td>
            <td align="left">Sender-constrained tokens</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/>, actor-bound token exchange <xref target="ACTOR-BOUND"/></td>
            <td align="left">A token for another party, bound to its key</td>
            <td align="left">Carrying the request between agents</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Actor Profile <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/></td>
            <td align="left">Meaning and validation of <tt>act</tt> chains</td>
            <td align="left">Binding to a dialog</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/></td>
            <td align="left">Call context within one trust domain</td>
            <td align="left">Crossing domains</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Identity chaining <xref target="ID-CHAINING"/>, Hardt AAuth <xref target="AAUTH-HARDT"/></td>
            <td align="left">A new token per hop from a server at each boundary or the person's server; missions</td>
            <td align="left">Peer delegation without a server</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Delegation Tokens <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, delegator-bound chains <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>, Delegate SD-JWT <xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/></td>
            <td align="left">Offline-verifiable attenuation, each hop signed by its delegator</td>
            <td align="left">Binding to a dialog</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">SD-Card <xref target="SD-CARD"/>, SD-JWT <xref target="RFC9901"/></td>
            <td align="left">Selective disclosure of agent claims</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">RAR <xref target="RFC9396"/></td>
            <td align="left">Fine-grained authorization details</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Rosenberg AAuth <xref target="AAUTH-ROSENBERG"/>, Txn Challenge <xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/>, R3 <xref target="AAUTH-R3"/>, step-up <xref target="RFC9470"/></td>
            <td align="left">A resource-signed challenge for one call, and a narrow token for it</td>
            <td align="left">Carrying it between agents; approval by a delegating agent</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Deferred Token Response <xref target="DTR"/></td>
            <td align="left">Waiting at the authorization server for an approval, and cancelling it</td>
            <td align="left">A deadline set by the requester</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Transactional Access Tokens <xref target="TXN-AT"/></td>
            <td align="left">Short-lived per-transaction tokens</td>
            <td align="left">Single use; issuance driven by the approver</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Token Status List <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/>, revocation <xref target="RFC7009"/>, Shared Signals (<xref target="AIMS"/>), revocation events <xref target="REVOCATION-EVENTS"/></td>
            <td align="left">Credential status, and revocation pushed down a chain</td>
            <td align="left">Effect on dialogs</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Bounded Work <xref target="BOUNDED-WORK"/></td>
            <td align="left">Authority that ends with the unit of work it was approved for</td>
            <td align="left">Propagation along dialogs</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">A2A <xref target="A2A"/>, MCP <xref target="MCP"/>, Poppy <xref target="POPPY"/></td>
            <td align="left">Native approval prompts</td>
            <td align="left">A common, signed form</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TRAIL <xref target="TRAIL"/>, aggregate signatures <xref target="AGG-SIG"/></td>
            <td align="left">Tamper-evident records; per-hop provenance over HTTP</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <section anchor="ew-delegation">
        <name>What Existing Work Leaves Open</name>
        <t>Delegation mechanisms differ in who asserts the chain: an
authorization server (Token Exchange, Transaction Tokens); a server at
each boundary, or the person's server (identity chaining, Hardt
AAuth, which does not require downstream authority to be a subset of
upstream authority, <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="AAUTH-HARDT"/>); or each
delegator, signing its narrowed delegation to the next agent's key
(Delegation Tokens extended by delegator-bound chains, and Delegate
SD-JWT). Delegation across organizations with no server in the path
needs the third kind <xref target="CROSS-ORG"/>. Each fits a different deployment,
so this document requires properties (<xref target="properties"/>) rather than one
format (<xref target="profiles"/>).</t>
        <t>Approval mechanisms (Rosenberg AAuth, Txn Challenge, R3) share a
pattern: a resource refuses a risky call with a signed description of
it, the call is approved, and an authorization server issues a narrow
token for it. Each assumes that the agent receiving the challenge can
take it to the approver. In a PACE deployment the approver is often
another agent, which may relay to its own principal. <xref target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/>
asks for a protocol that carries the challenge unmodified between
agents (<xref section="4.5" sectionFormat="of" target="TXN-CHALLENGE"/>), and <xref target="AIMS"/> notes that
confirmation in the middle of a task is not standardized and that a
confirmation obtained outside OAuth must become an authorization
event. Checkpoints (<xref target="checkpoints"/>) and approval tokens
(<xref target="approval-tokens"/>) fill that gap, and also cover actions that no
resource challenged.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="requirements">
      <name>Requirements Addressed</name>
      <table>
        <name>Requirements Addressed</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Requirement</th>
            <th align="left">Addressed by</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">A1-9 delegation without the client's primary credentials</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="approval-tokens"/>, <xref target="profiles"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B2-2 checkpoint request describing the action and its effect</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="checkpoint-request"/>, <xref target="resource-challenges"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B2-3 approve, deny, approve with modification</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="checkpoint-response"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B2-4 response timeout</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="checkpoint-deadline"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B2-5 approval covers only that action</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="checkpoint-response"/>, <xref target="approval-tokens"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B2-6 per-operation authorization</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="approval-tokens"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B3-1, B3-4, B3-8 narrowing at each hop</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="attenuation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B3-2 originator identity</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="attenuation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B3-3 verifiable chain</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="profiles"/> with <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> and <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B3-6 provenance</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="evidence"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">B3-7 cycles</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="cycles"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CMN-4 scope violation error</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>scope-exceeded</tt> (<xref target="PACE"/>); <tt>agent_action_not_authorized</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CMN-10 revocation along a chain</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="revocation"/></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>The following requirements are from <xref target="DIALOG-UC"/>.</t>
      <table>
        <name>Dialog Use Case Requirements Addressed</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Requirement</th>
            <th align="left">Addressed by</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC1-1 assurance and authentication age required mid-dialog</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>required_assurance</tt> (<xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC1-2 approval verifiable as given by the human principal</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="principal-confirmation"/> (P10)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC1-5 identifier for each commitment</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>commitment_id</tt> (<xref target="commitments"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC1-6 cooperative path never lowers assurance</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="peer-checkpoints"/>, <xref target="commitments"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC4-2 authority limited to one action; own or onward delegation</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authority_basis</tt> (<xref target="attenuation"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC4-3 outcomes keep the source of each fact</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="assertions"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC6-1 cancellation window and terms before commit</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>cancel</tt> (<xref target="commitments"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC8-4 commitment unconfirmed by an unauthenticated counterparty</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>unconfirmed-counterparty</tt> (<xref target="commitments"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC10-2 commitment pending the principal's confirmation</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>pending-principal</tt> (<xref target="commitments"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC12-1 request to the principal that the agent cannot read or answer</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC12-2 later result from a tool, authenticated as the tool</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="encrypted-checkpoints"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC12-3 answer verifiable as from the person</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="principal-confirmation"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC14-2 asserted versus attested claims</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="assertions"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC14-3 agreement completed by both principals' approvals</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="commitments"/> (P9)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">UC14-4 no selection from self-reported scores</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="commitments"/> (P9)</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document builds on the OAuth, WIMSE, and agent protocol work it
references, and on the requirements in <xref target="UCREQ"/>.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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