Agent Communication Protocols S. Nandakumar Internet-Draft Cisco Intended status: Standards Track C. Jennings Expires: 20 May 2027 Cisco Systems 16 November 2026 PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00 Abstract This document specifies the authority agents exercise in dialogs of the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE): delegating work with a credential bound to the delegated dialog, pausing to ask for approval of a single action, and turning that approval into an authorization for only that action. It also covers proof that a principal approved, commitments between parties acting for different principals, and facts attested by third parties. It reuses OAuth, WIMSE, and agent-protocol mechanisms, defining only the glue to PACE and the security properties every profile must provide. About This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace- authz/. Discussion of this document takes place on the Agent Communication Protocols Working Group mailing list (mailto:agentproto@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ agentproto/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ agentproto/. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 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Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Properties of Every Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Properties of Agreements and Principal Confirmations . . 8 3. Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Binding to the Control Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Delegation Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Attenuation and the Originator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4. Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.6. SD-Card Holders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Authorization Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Carrying Checkpoint Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. Checkpoint Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.1. Identification and Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.2. The Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.4. Relaying, Encryption, and Signature . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2.5. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3. Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.4. Resource Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.5. Checkpoint Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 4.6. Deadlines and Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.7. Relaying a Checkpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.8. Mapping Native Approval Prompts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5. Approval Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.1. The agent_action Authorization Detail . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.1.1. Narrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.2. Approver and Approval Issuer Parameters . . . . . . . . . 26 5.3. Issuance by the Approver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.4. Actor Proof Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.5. Asking for an Actor Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.6. Redeeming a Resource Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.7. Resource Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6. Principal Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.1. Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.2. The pace_checkpoint Transaction Data Type . . . . . . . . 32 6.3. The Principal's Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.4. Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.5. What the Person Sees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.6. Checkpoints Addressed to the Principal . . . . . . . . . 34 7. Agreements Between Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1. Peer Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2. Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.1. Confirming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.3. Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.1. OAuth Extensions Error Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.2. PACE Dialog Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.3. PACE Authorization Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.4. OpenID4VP Transaction Data Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A. Survey of Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 A.1. What Existing Work Leaves Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Appendix B. Requirements Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 1. Introduction PACE [PACE] gives agents a common dialog: an identifier that spans hops, intermediaries, and connections; a lifecycle controlled by one participant; cancellation and termination that propagate along delegation chains; and a binding to MOQT. It says little about authority: who may act on whose behalf, and which actions need explicit approval. "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements" [UCREQ] draws the same line and leaves delegation, per-action authorization, and revocation to OAuth and WIMSE (Section 5 of [UCREQ]). That work exists or is in progress (Section 1.1), but none of it says how an approval request travels between agents in a dialog, how a delegation is bound to the dialog it authorizes, or how the pieces compose in a chain of agents. This document: * states the security properties every deployment provides (Section 2); * specifies delegation in PACE dialogs (Section 3); * specifies authorization checkpoints, through which an agent asks for approval of one action (Section 4); * specifies approval tokens, which authorize only the approved action (Section 5); * specifies principal confirmations, which only the principal can produce (Section 6); * specifies what agents of different principals use with each other: peer checkpoints, commitments that record terms each principal confirms, and assertions that carry facts with their source (Section 7); and * lists what evidence of approvals and actions records (Section 8). The use cases in [DIALOG-UC], such as a consumer's agent disputing a charge with a brand's agent, or a tool that must reach the person behind an agent, motivate the peer checkpoints, principal confirmations, commitments, and assertions. 1.1. Building Blocks This document reuses existing mechanisms and defines only the glue to PACE. Figure 1 shows where each fits in the life of a delegated task. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 1. Delegate 2. Ask 3. Approve 4. Act +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ | delegation |-->| checkpoint |-->| approval |->| request at | | credential | | request | | token | | resource | +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ Actor Profile RAR Token Exchange DPoP Txn-Tokens agent_action actor-bound mTLS delegator-bound Txn Challenge, token exchange chains AAuth CIBA, when a WPT + message JWS + JCS person approves binding OpenID4VP, WebAuthn, SPC ------------------------------------------------------------------- Throughout: revocation along the chain (Status List, token revocation, delegation revocation events) Figure 1: Building Blocks 1. Delegate (Section 3): delegation credentials of the Actor Profile [ACTOR-PROFILE], Transaction Tokens [TXN-TOKENS], or delegator- bound chains [AGENT-DELEGATION] over Delegation Tokens [DELEGATION-TOKENS], presented with WIMSE credentials [WIMSE-CREDS] bound to their control message [WPT-MSG]. 2. Ask (Section 4): the action as a RAR [RFC9396] agent_action detail, a resource challenge from Txn Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE] or AAuth [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] [AAUTH-HARDT], a JWS [RFC7515] over the JCS [RFC8785] form, and, when the principal must confirm, OpenID4VP [OID4VP], WebAuthn [WEBAUTHN], or SPC [SPC]. 3. Approve (Section 5): Token Exchange [RFC8693] with actor-bound token exchange [ACTOR-BOUND], or CIBA [CIBA] when a person approves. 4. Act (Section 5.7): the approval token, sender-constrained with DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705]. Throughout, revocation reaches every holder along the chain (Section 3.5) through Token Status List [STATUS-LIST], token revocation [RFC7009], and delegation revocation events [REVOCATION-EVENTS]. Appendix A surveys these and other related work, and what each leaves to this document. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 1.2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.3. Terminology This document uses the terms dialog, dialog context, participant, controller, delegated dialog, and control message from [PACE]. Delegating participant: The participant that opens a delegated dialog to have work done on its behalf; the controller of that dialog. Performing agent: The participant that carries out the work, including an action that needs approval. Requester: The participant that sends a checkpoint request: usually the performing agent; a relaying agent (Section 4.7); or, in a peer checkpoint, the party that needs approval. Approver: The participant that answers a checkpoint: in a delegated dialog, the delegating participant or a participant it designates (Section 5.2); in a peer checkpoint, the counterpart. It can relay the decision to its principal or to its own approver. Approval issuer: The authorization server, or OpenID Provider, from which the approver obtains approval tokens (Section 5.2). Checkpoint: A signed request to authorize one action, and the signed response (Section 4). Resource challenge: A signed statement from a protected resource that refused an action, describing the action and the authorization it needs, such as an OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE]. Approval token: An authorization that covers only the action approved at a checkpoint (Section 5). Delegation credential: The credential a delegating participant presents in OPEN to convey the authority it delegates (Section 3). Peer checkpoint: A checkpoint whose approver acts for a different Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 principal than the requester, outside any delegation (Section 7.1). Principal confirmation: Proof, made with a key bound to the principal and not to any agent, that the principal approved one checkpoint request (Section 6). Commitment: Signed terms that two or more parties agree to, with each party's confirmation (Section 7.2). Assertion: A signed statement of a fact, asserted by its sender or attested by a named third party (Section 7.3). Times in the JSON objects this document defines, such as deadline, expires_at, and until, are date-time strings [RFC3339], as in [PACE]. JWT claims, such as iat and exp, remain NumericDate values. 2. Security Properties Deployments use different credential formats, so this document states the properties they provide instead of relying on any one format. Every deployment of PACE authorization MUST provide P1 to P8, whichever credential formats it uses. A deployment that uses commitments (Section 7.2) MUST also provide P9, and one that requires principal confirmations (Section 6) MUST also provide P10. 2.1. Properties of Every Deployment P1 Delegation binding: A delegation credential is accepted only for the delegated dialog it was presented in, by the participant it names, with its parent dialog (Section 3.1). P2 Attenuation: Authority conveyed by delegation never exceeds the authority of the delegating participant (Section 3.3). P3 Originator traceability: Every participant can determine that a chain has one originator, and the party that authorized the chain can identify it (Section 3.3). P4 Signed checkpoints: A checkpoint request is signed by its requester and a response by the approver, so no intermediate agent or relay can forge or alter either (Section 4.3). P5 Single-action approval: An approval covers only the checkpoint it answers, identified by a hash of the request, and an approval token covers only that action, once, for the performing agent's key (Section 4.5, Section 5). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 P6 Resource authority: When a protected resource described the action in a resource challenge, decisions and displays are based on that challenge, not on agent-supplied text (Section 4.4). P7 Freshness: Checkpoints expire at their deadline, and a request or response is acted on at most once, even when the dialog log redelivers it (Section 4.6). P8 Revocation effect: When a delegation is revoked, the delegated dialogs that depend on it are terminated (Section 3.5). 2.2. Properties of Agreements and Principal Confirmations P9 Bound agreement: An agreement between parties acting for different principals is complete only when each principal has confirmed it, each confirmation bound to the same hash of the terms, never on an agent's self-reported satisfaction or reported scores (Section 7.2). P10 Principal origin: A confirmation required from a principal is verifiable as made with a key bound to that principal, so neither the principal's agent nor a relaying agent can produce it (Section 6). 3. Delegation A receiver of delegated work needs to know that the authority was meant for this dialog and for itself, is no broader than the delegator's, and stops when revoked. A delegating participant opens a delegated dialog as [PACE] specifies: OPEN lists the parents in parent_dialog_ids, the delegating participant is the controller, and the delegation credential travels in the credentials member of OPEN. 3.1. Binding to the Control Message Without this binding, a credential copied out of one OPEN could be presented in another dialog. The presentation that accompanies a delegation credential MUST include the mth claim of [WPT-MSG] with the pace canonicalization profile, in whichever presentation form [PACE] defines for the credential's mechanism: a Workload Proof Token, a Key Binding JWT, or a PACE presentation JWT. In OPEN, which is sent before the delegating participant has the delegatee's nonce, the presentation has no nonce and the delegatee does not treat the delegator as authenticated until the controller's later presentation, bound to the delegatee's nonce, verifies; in later messages its nonce is the verifier's nonce, as [PACE] requires. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 A credential bound to no key cannot be bound to the message, so a receiver MUST NOT accept one as a delegation credential. The exception is a Transaction Token [TXN-TOKENS] within the trust domain that issued it, where the token service, not a key, establishes the chain (Section 3.2). Because OPEN carries the dialog-id, parent_dialog_ids, and the invited participants, the presentation is thereby bound to the delegated dialog, its parent, and its audience (P1). A receiver MUST verify mth before acting on the credential. Credential formats need not change. The presentation names who may accept it; the credential names where the authority may be used. A delegating participant SHOULD set the credential's audience to the resources the delegated task needs, no broader than its own, and SHOULD use a format in which a child's audience cannot exceed its parent's, such as a delegator-bound chain [AGENT-DELEGATION]. When the credential format can carry it, the delegating participant SHOULD also include the parent dialog-id in the credential, as the ctx claim of type dialog [AGENT-DELEGATION]. Within one trust domain, a Transaction Token issued for the delegated work SHOULD carry the dialog-id in tctx.dlg [DIALOG-BINDING]. 3.2. Delegation Profiles Who vouches for each hop of a delegation chain depends on the deployment. Inside one trust domain, a token service issues each hop and is trusted to have checked it. Across domains, either a server at each boundary issues the next hop, or each delegator signs the hop it grants, so that a receiver can verify the chain itself. Whoever vouches for a hop also provides attenuation (P2) and originator traceability (P3) for it (Section 3.3). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 +================+============+=================================+ | Deployment | Who | Mechanisms | | | vouches | | | | for each | | | | hop | | +================+============+=================================+ | One trust | The | Transaction Tokens with | | domain | domain's | tctx.dlg; Token Exchange | | | token | | | | service | | +----------------+------------+---------------------------------+ | A server at | The server | Identity chaining; cross-domain | | each domain | at that | Transaction Tokens | | boundary | boundary | [TXN-CHAINING]; Hardt AAuth | | | | call chaining | +----------------+------------+---------------------------------+ | Agents that | The | Delegation Tokens | | delegate | delegator, | [DELEGATION-TOKENS] with | | directly | by signing | delegator binding | | across domains | the hop | [AGENT-DELEGATION]; Delegate | | | | SD-JWT under [AGENT-DELEGATION] | +----------------+------------+---------------------------------+ Table 1: Delegation Profiles Mandatory to implement: Implementations MUST support delegation credentials that are: * JWT access tokens with act claims ([RFC8693]), interpreted as the OAuth Actor Profile [ACTOR-PROFILE] defines; * bound by a cnf claim to the delegatee's key; and * presented with a PACE presentation JWT carrying mth, the form [PACE] defines for a token bound by cnf (Section 3.1). Each hop obtains a new token for the next delegatee by token exchange. Delegation with no server in the path: Implementations that accept delegation across administrative domains without an authorization server in the path MUST also support Delegation Tokens [DELEGATION-TOKENS] with delegator binding [AGENT-DELEGATION]. A chain that only an issuing server asserts does not show that each hop granted the next (Section 4.4 of [UCREQ], requirement B3-3). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 3.3. Attenuation and the Originator Delegation can only narrow authority: a delegatee can do no more than its delegator (P2), and every chain leads back to one originator (P3). This section says how a receiver checks both, and how a participant that acts under its own authority is distinguished from one that passes on delegated authority. Checking each hop: When a receiver verifies a chain hop by hop, it MUST reject the credential if any hop conveys more authority than the hop before it (P2). It compares by the rules of the credential mechanism, such as Section 4.3 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS]. Where authority is expressed as RAR authorization details [RFC9396], the comparison is the relation of [RAR-NARROWING], under which details that cannot be compared are not narrower. A receiver that cannot compare the authority at some hop MUST reject the credential. Chains asserted by a server: When an authorization server asserts the chain, as with nested act claims, the server's narrowing at each exchange provides P2 (Section 3.6 of [ACTOR-PROFILE]). More than one parent: A delegated dialog with several parents acts under the authority of each parent separately. The delegating participant presents one delegation credential per parent whose authority the work uses, and each operation in the delegated dialog MUST be authorized by one of them. Authority from different parents is not combined. When OPEN lists more than one parent, each delegation credential MUST name the parent dialog it derives from, as the ctx claim of type dialog [AGENT-DELEGATION] does; a format that cannot name it cannot be used in such a dialog. When parent_dialog_ids is present, a receiver MUST reject a credential that names a dialog not in it, and MUST reject two credentials that name the same parent. A listed parent without a credential contributes no authority: an operation that needs it fails authorization. A receiver MAY refuse the OPEN with ERROR policy-rejected when its policy requires every listed parent to be backed by a credential. When parent_dialog_ids is withheld ([PACE]), the receiver relies on the credentials' ctx alone, and the controller, which keeps the link, applies revocation for each parent (Section 3.5). Own or delegated authority: A participant can also act under Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 authority granted to it directly, such as a booking service that calls a payment processor under its own contract. That is not a delegation: the participant presents its own credentials, and a delegation credential, if present, only shows whom it acts for (Section 10.1 of [AAUTH-HARDT] reaches the same outcome). The controller states which case applies with the dialog parameter authority_basis in OPEN. Like the parameters in Section 5.2, it is set by the controller and not negotiated; a participant that disagrees sends REJECT. * own: the participant acts under authority granted to it directly. A delegation credential, if present, is evidence only. * delegated: the participant passes on authority it received, conveyed by the delegation credential in OPEN, subject to P1 to P3. When authority_basis is absent, it is delegated if OPEN carries parent_dialog_ids or a delegation credential, and own otherwise. A receiver MUST NOT accept onward delegation of a principal's authority from a participant that declared own. With either value, the authority passed SHOULD cover only the one action and parameters the delegated work needs, for example a single agent_action detail (Section 5.1). Hiding the originator: Where the originator's identity must not be disclosed to every hop (P3), the chain carries a pseudonym that only its issuer can resolve, such as the per-chain pseudonym sub of [AGENT-DELEGATION]. An issuer MUST NOT copy an identifier that another issuer directed to a specific audience into a delegation credential. 3.4. Cycles A receiver MUST reject OPEN with ERROR delegation-cycle ([PACE]) if: * the delegation chain already names the receiver; * the chain names any agent twice ([AGENT-DELEGATION]); or * parent_dialog_ids contains the dialog's own dialog-id or repeats an entry. Depth limits, such as del_max_depth of [DELEGATION-TOKENS], bound cycles that identifiers do not reveal, but do not replace this check. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 3.5. Revocation Revoking a credential must stop the work done under it and under every credential delegated from it (P8). When a credential is revoked: A participant that learns that a credential its participation depends on was revoked MUST stop acting under it. If it controls a delegated dialog that depends on the credential, it MUST terminate that dialog, and PACE lifecycle propagation terminates the dialogs below it ([PACE]). Otherwise, it MUST LEAVE the dialog. How participants learn of it: The credential's own mechanism reports the revocation: a Token Status List [STATUS-LIST] entry, token revocation [RFC7009], or a Shared Signals event [AIMS]. To reach holders further down the chain, including holders in domains the revoking party does not know, the revoking party sends a delegation revoked event [REVOCATION-EVENTS], and each delegator relays it to the holders of the credentials it delegated, in the credentials member of the REVOKE or TERMINATE it sends them. When status cannot be checked: If a participant cannot check a credential's status within the staleness bound its policy sets, it MUST NOT act under the credential until it obtains a current answer, and MUST reject operations that rely on it with ERROR authorization-unavailable ([PACE]). This suspends the work without ending it: the participant stays in its dialogs and resumes once the credential is shown valid. If its policy limits how long work can stay suspended, it MAY terminate or leave the dependent dialogs when that limit passes. When a participant is revoked: A controller that removes a participant with REVOKE also revokes the participant's delegation credential, if the controller issued it. When the work ends: Credentials issued for a delegated dialog remain valid after the dialog terminates, until they expire or their issuer ends them. An authorization server that ties authority to a unit of work [BOUNDED-WORK] can end them when the dialog ends. 3.6. SD-Card Holders An agent that holds an SD-Card can obtain a delegation credential by Token Exchange with its SD-Card as the actor token; the issued token's act claim carries the SD-Card's sub and iss (Section 7.1 of [SD-CARD]). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 4. Authorization Checkpoints Some actions need approval first, because a resource refused the call or the delegating participant's policy requires it, and the party that can approve is often another agent several hops away. A checkpoint carries the signed request to that party and the signed decision back. Figure 2 shows a checkpoint from start to finish. Resource Performing Approver Approval server agent issuer | | | | |<---- call ----| | | |-- refused, -->| | | | challenge(1) | | | | | | | | pause |-- checkpoint ------->| | | operation | request (2) | | | | signed; through | | | | relays, if any | | | | | | | | decide; may ask | | | the principal (3) | | | | | | | |-- token exchange->| | | | + actor proof | | | |<- approval token -| | | | (4) | | |<-- checkpoint -------| | | | response (5) | | | | | | |<-- call with -| | | | approval token| | | | (6) | | | Figure 2: A Checkpoint 1. The performing agent reaches an action that needs approval: a resource refused the call, optionally with a resource challenge (Section 4.4), or its delegator's policy requires approval. 2. It pauses the operation and publishes a signed checkpoint request on its checkpoint flow (Section 4.1, Section 4.2, Section 4.3). Agents between it and the approver relay the request unmodified (Section 4.7). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 3. The approver decides, by its own policy or by asking its principal (Section 6). 4. To approve, the approver obtains an approval token for the one action, bound to the performing agent's key with the actor proof from the request (Section 5.3). 5. The approver publishes a signed checkpoint response carrying the outcome and the token (Section 4.5), before the request's deadline (Section 4.6). 6. The performing agent resumes the operation and presents the token to the resource, which checks it against the approved action (Section 5.7). A checkpoint does not change the dialog context. Checkpoints can also pass between peers acting for different principals (Section 7.1) and be addressed to a principal through its agent (Section 6.6). 4.1. Carrying Checkpoint Objects Each participant sends its checkpoint objects on its own checkpoint flow of the dialog: a reliable flow of the PACE dialog log [PACE] at the Urgent Signals priority tier. Each request, response, commitment (Section 7.2), and assertion (Section 7.3) is one object. Because the flow is reliable, the log's acceptance and replay rules apply: after a reconnection, an object its receiver had not accepted is made available again at the same position, and one it had accepted is discarded as a duplicate. An approver therefore does not ask its principal twice for the same request. In the MOQT binding of [PACE], the flow is a checkpoint track in the sender's dialog namespace, with each object in its own group, Subgroup Delivery Mode, and no finite delivery timeout: ("pace", "dialogs", {dialog-id}, {agent-id}) -- "checkpoint" Other bindings define how they carry the flow. 4.2. Checkpoint Request A checkpoint request asks one participant to approve one action, and carries what the approver needs to decide and to obtain an approval token. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 A request is a JSON object, published as one object of the sender's checkpoint flow (Section 4.1). Times are RFC 3339 date-time strings, binary values are base64url-encoded without padding, and the request is signed as Section 4.3 specifies. Its members are grouped below by purpose. 4.2.1. Identification and Freshness type: REQUIRED. The string request. checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4. dialog_id: REQUIRED. The dialog in which the request is published. requester: REQUIRED. The requester's participant identifier. approver: REQUIRED. The participant asked to approve: in a delegated dialog, the controller, or the participant named by the approver dialog parameter (Section 5.2); in a peer checkpoint, the counterpart (Section 7.1). deadline: REQUIRED. The time after which the checkpoint is unresolved (Section 4.6). nonce: REQUIRED. A fresh random value with at least 128 bits of entropy. 4.2.2. The Action action, parameters, effect: REQUIRED, except in an encrypted request (Section 6.6). The action, its arguments as a JSON object, and its effect, as the requester understands them. They are advisory when resource_challenge is present (Section 4.4). description: OPTIONAL. Free text describing the action. Unlike parameters, it is not enforced by an approval token. target: REQUIRED. The paused operation, in the form of the PACE CANCEL target. operation_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the object payload that started the paused operation. 4.2.3. Authorization authorization_details: OPTIONAL, and REQUIRED when actor_proof is present. The authorization requested, as RAR [RFC9396] details, for example one agent_action detail (Section 5.1). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 resource_challenge: OPTIONAL. A resource challenge, carried unmodified (Section 4.4). actor_proof: OPTIONAL. An actor proof [ACTOR-BOUND] made by the performing agent, which the approver forwards to obtain an approval token (Section 5.3). Its aud is the approval issuer named in approval_issuer (Section 5.2); a performing agent without an approval issuer omits the proof. The proof MUST include azh computed over this request's authorization_details. [ACTOR-BOUND] makes azh a SHOULD; this document requires it because the proof passes through the approver and relaying agents, any of whom could otherwise bind a token for another action to the performing agent's key. The proof normally carries no nonce (Section 5.4). actor_token: OPTIONAL. The performing agent's credential with a cnf claim, over whose value the proof's ath was computed. When absent, the approver uses the credential the performing agent presented in the dialog. The performing agent includes it when the request may be relayed to an approver outside its dialog (Section 4.7). required_assurance: OPTIONAL. The assurance the response must carry (Section 7.1), as an object with these members: * level: REQUIRED. The minimum assurance level of [PACE]: asserted, authenticated, or delegated. * acr_values: OPTIONAL. A space-separated list of Authentication Context Class References, in order of preference, as in [RFC9470]. * max_age: OPTIONAL. The maximum time, in seconds, since the principal last authenticated, as in [RFC9470]. * from: OPTIONAL. principal if the response MUST carry a principal confirmation (Section 6); participant (the default) if the approver's own key-bound credentials suffice. level, acr_values, and max_age have the form of the required_assurance member of a PACE ERROR with reason insufficient-assurance [PACE], so a participant that refused an operation with that ERROR can ask for what it requires without ending the dialog. 4.2.4. Relaying, Encryption, and Signature relayed_request: OPTIONAL. The signed checkpoint request from a dialog below that this request relays, unmodified (Section 4.7). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 encrypted_to, encrypted: OPTIONAL. Used together for a request that the relaying agents must not read (Section 6.6). signature: REQUIRED. See Section 4.3. 4.2.5. Example The following request asks a banking assistant to approve a transfer on behalf of the agent closing an account: { "type": "request", "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10", "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000", "requester": "closure-agent", "approver": "banking-assistant", "action": "transfer", "description": "Transfer the remaining balance", "parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR", "to": "DE89370400440532013000"}, "effect": "Moves funds out of the closing account; irreversible", "target": {"namespace": ["a2a", "task"], "track": "t1"}, "operation_hash": "pLk2...", "deadline": "2026-11-09T17:00:00Z", "nonce": "Tq8m0vB1kRj3zXc5aYp2Lw", "authorization_details": [{ "type": "agent_action", "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10", "action": "transfer", "parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR", "to": "DE89370400440532013000"}, "bounds": {"amount": "max"} }], "resource_challenge": {"format": "oauth-txn-challenge", "value": "eyJ..."}, "signature": "eyJ..." } 4.3. Signing Signing lets a receiver detect changes made by relays and agents on the way. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The signature member of a checkpoint request or response is a JWS [RFC7515] with detached payload, in Compact Serialization, over the JCS [RFC8785] form of the object without its signature member, made with the key bound to the signer's credential in the dialog. Commitments (Section 7.2) and assertions (Section 7.3) are signed the same way. The JWS alg MUST be an asymmetric digital signature algorithm, and MUST NOT be none or a MAC algorithm, because these objects are relayed and kept as evidence (Section 8) and verified by parties that share no key with the signer. A receiver MUST verify the signature before acting on the object (P4). It MUST also verify that the signer is the participant the object names: the requester of a request, the approver of a response, the proposer of a commitment, or the asserted_by of an assertion. An object that fails either check is rejected with ERROR unauthenticated ([PACE]). 4.4. Resource Challenges When a protected resource describes the action itself, that description, not the agent's, is the one to trust. When the action was refused by a protected resource that issued a resource challenge, the performing agent MUST include it in resource_challenge, unmodified, with format set to a value from the PACE Resource Challenge Formats registry (Section 11.3). This document defines: +=======================+=====================================+ | format | Challenge | +=======================+=====================================+ | oauth-txn-challenge | OAuth Transaction Authorization | | | Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE] | +-----------------------+-------------------------------------+ | aauth-scope-challenge | AAuth Scope Challenge | | | [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] | +-----------------------+-------------------------------------+ | aauth-resource-token | AAuth resource token [AAUTH-HARDT], | | | possibly referencing an R3 per-call | | | proposal [AAUTH-R3] | +-----------------------+-------------------------------------+ Table 2: Resource Challenge Formats Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The resource is then the authority on what the action is (P6). The approver MUST validate the challenge as its specification requires, MUST base its decision, and anything it displays to a person, on the validated challenge, and MUST treat description, parameters, and effect as advisory. The challenge is redeemed by the party its specification allows (Section 5.6). A Transaction Authorization Challenge can be redeemed by the approver. An AAuth Scope Challenge is redeemed only by the client it was issued to, so the approver returns only its outcome. An approver's approve does not authorize the action at the resource. An authorization server that takes part can refuse, or issue narrower authorization than approved, and the performing agent acts only within the issued token. 4.5. Checkpoint Response A checkpoint response gives the approver's decision on one request, bound to that request by its hash. A response is a JSON object, published on the approver's checkpoint flow (Section 4.1), encoded as a request is (Section 4.2) and signed as Section 4.3 specifies. Its members are: type: REQUIRED. The string response. checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. The checkpoint_id of the request. request_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS form of the signed request, including its signature, binding the response to one request (P5). approver: REQUIRED. The approver's participant identifier, equal to the approver of the request. outcome: REQUIRED. A value from the PACE Checkpoint Outcomes registry (Section 11.3). This document defines: * approve: perform the action as requested. * approve-modified: perform the action with the response's parameters, which replace the request's. The modified action MUST be narrower than or equal to the requested one, as Section 5.4 of [TXN-CHALLENGE] requires of authorization servers; for an agent_action detail, as Section 5.1.1 defines, applied to the request's detail with its parameters replaced. A requester that cannot determine that the modification only Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 narrows the request MUST treat the response as deny. With resource_challenge, this outcome is used only if the challenge's specification allows the approved details to differ. * deny: do not perform the action. The performing agent ends the paused operation with an explicit error in the application protocol, such as a failed A2A task or an MCP error result. * actor-proof-required: the approver needs a usable actor proof (Section 5.5). parameters: REQUIRED with approve-modified, except in a response to an encrypted request. The modified arguments, as a JSON object. encrypted: In a response to an encrypted request only, and REQUIRED there with approve-modified: the modified parameters, encrypted to the requester (Section 6.6). reason: REQUIRED with deny: a reason from the ERROR reasons of [PACE], such as insufficient-assurance. OPTIONAL with actor- proof-required: expired, invalid, or details-mismatch (Section 5.5). actor_proof_aud, actor_proof_nonce: With actor-proof-required only. actor_proof_aud, REQUIRED, is the issuer identifier to use as the proof's aud. actor_proof_nonce, OPTIONAL, is a nonce the approval issuer supplied. credentials: OPTIONAL. An approval token (Section 5). principal_confirmation: OPTIONAL. A principal confirmation of the request (Section 6). REQUIRED with approve or approve-modified when the request's required_assurance has from set to principal. For approve-modified, it covers the response's parameters. The requester MUST verify that request_hash matches a request it sent and has not yet resolved, and MUST NOT apply an approval to any other action. An approver MUST NOT approve a checkpoint that it requested. For example, the banking assistant approves the transfer requested in Section 4.2 for a lower amount: Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 { "type": "response", "checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10", "request_hash": "x7Rb...", "approver": "banking-assistant", "outcome": "approve-modified", "parameters": {"amount": "1500.00", "currency": "EUR", "to": "DE89370400440532013000"}, "credentials": "eyJ...", "signature": "eyJ..." } 4.6. Deadlines and Replay Each checkpoint has a deadline and is answered at most once, so that it neither blocks work forever nor authorizes an action twice. The requester sets the deadline in the deadline member of its request (Section 4.2), and identifies the checkpoint by the request's checkpoint_id. If no valid response arrives by the deadline, the requester MUST treat the checkpoint as unresolved, MUST NOT perform the action, and halts the affected operation. A late response is ignored. A requester MUST accept at most one response per checkpoint_id. Neither requests nor responses are sent in QUIC or TLS 0-RTT data (P7). Log replay [PACE] does not extend a deadline. A requester that resumes after its deadline treats the checkpoint as unresolved, and to ask again publishes a new request with a new checkpoint_id. A participant that sends checkpoints in a dialog SHOULD propose, or accept, a log_retention dialog parameter [PACE] no shorter than the longest time it allows between a request and its deadline. An approver that waits for an authorization server bounds the wait by the deadline: it passes the remaining time as the timeout of [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] where that applies, and cancels a deferred token request [DTR] when the deadline passes or the paused operation is cancelled with PACE CANCEL. 4.7. Relaying a Checkpoint An approver can resolve a checkpoint from policy, ask its principal, or relay it to its own approver in the dialog above. To relay, it publishes a new request in that dialog, with itself as requester and the original signed request as relayed_request; a resource challenge is carried in both, unmodified. It answers the original checkpoint with the returned outcome or a stricter one. Each hop signs its own Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 request and response, so the decision path is verifiable end to end. The approver above MUST treat the outer request, signed by the relaying agent, as the request it answers, hashing it in its response, and MUST NOT answer the inner request directly or act on it alone. It verifies the inner request and its resource challenge only as evidence of what the performing agent asked for. The same rule applies at every level of nesting. 4.8. Mapping Native Approval Prompts Agent protocols already have ways to pause for approval: an A2A [A2A] task enters auth-required or input-required, an MCP [MCP] server sends an elicitation request, and a Poppy [POPPY] Company Agent sends an authorization event. These prompts are unsigned, each uses its own vocabulary, and an agent that translates between protocols cannot carry one into another without loss. A checkpoint gives them a common, signed form, while the native prompt keeps working for participants that understand only the application protocol. A performing agent that pauses an application operation with a native prompt asking to approve an action also publishes a checkpoint request for that action: +==========+==========================+=============================+ | Protocol | Native prompt | Checkpoint request | +==========+==========================+=============================+ | A2A | Task in auth-required or | target names the task; | | | input-required that asks | the task stays in that | | | to authorize an action | state until the response | +----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+ | MCP | elicitation/create that | target names the paused | | | asks to confirm an | request; the elicitation | | | action | result follows the | | | | response | +----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+ | Poppy | authorization event that | target names the event | | | asks to authorize an | | | | action | | +----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+ Table 3: Native Approval Prompts Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The request's action, parameters, and effect describe the action the prompt asks about, and operation_hash covers the object payload that started the paused operation (Section 4.2). A native prompt that asks for something other than approval of an action, such as a Poppy authorization event asking the Personal Agent to sign in, is not mapped. When the response arrives, the native state is brought in line with it: the performing agent, as A2A server, moves the task on, and the participant that received an MCP elicitation answers it. +=====================+==================+========================+ | Outcome | A2A task | MCP elicitation result | +=====================+==================+========================+ | approve, approve- | Task returns to | accept, with the | | modified | working | approved parameters | +---------------------+------------------+------------------------+ | deny, or unresolved | Task ends failed | decline, or cancel at | | at the deadline | or rejected | the deadline | +---------------------+------------------+------------------------+ Table 4: Answering Native Prompts The checkpoint response, not the native answer, is authoritative: a participant that receives both acts on the signed response. A mediator that translates between application protocols relays the checkpoint unmodified (Section 4.7) and translates only the native prompt. 5. Approval Tokens An approval token is an access token that authorizes one approved action, for the performing agent only, and only once (P5). A checkpoint response is a statement between agents, and a resource server that never saw the checkpoint cannot rely on it. The approval token carries the approval to where the action happens, in a form the resource server already checks. The token describes the action as an agent_action detail (Section 5.1). The approver obtains it from the approval issuer named for the dialog (Section 5.2), bound to the performing agent's key with the actor proof from the request (Section 5.3, Section 5.4, Section 5.5). When a resource challenged the action, redeeming the challenge yields the token instead (Section 5.6). The resource server checks the token as Section 5.7 specifies. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 5.1. The agent_action Authorization Detail When no resource challenged the action, the approval token describes it with the RAR [RFC9396] authorization details type agent_action. Besides the common fields of RAR, it has: checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. The checkpoint the authorization answers. Absent in the terms of a commitment (Section 7.2), which has its own checkpoint_id. action: REQUIRED. The operation, as the resource server understands it. parameters: REQUIRED. The arguments the approval covers. bounds: OPTIONAL. A JSON object naming top-level members of parameters that an approver may change without changing the action (Section 5.1.1). Each value is one of: * max: an upper limit, as a decimal string; an approver may lower it. * min: a lower limit, as a decimal string; an approver may raise it. * subset: a set, as a JSON array; an approver may remove elements. A decimal string matches -?(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\.[0-9]+)? and is compared as an exact decimal, never as binary floating point. Only the performing agent sets bounds, in its checkpoint request. A performing agent MUST NOT name a parameter in bounds unless performing the action with any value the bound permits is within the authority it is requesting, and the action remains the same action to the resource server. dialog_id: OPTIONAL. The PACE dialog the action belongs to. A token MUST NOT contain more than one agent_action detail, and MUST NOT combine it with other details or scopes that authorize the same resource server to perform other actions. 5.1.1. Narrowing This is the comparison of the agent_action type, defined here as [RAR-NARROWING] allows a type to do. An agent_action detail B is equal to or narrower than a detail A if and only if: Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 1. type, checkpoint_id, and action are equal; dialog_id is equal or absent from both; and bounds is equal, in JCS form [RFC8785], or absent from both. 2. Each common data field of Section 2.2 of [RFC9396] is present in B exactly when it is present in A; identifier is equal; and for locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges, every element of B is an element of A. 3. parameters has the same member names in A and B, and each member compares as follows: * not named in bounds: B's value equals A's, in JCS form; * max: both are decimal strings, and B's is less than or equal to A's; * min: both are decimal strings, and B's is greater than or equal to A's; * subset: both are arrays, and every element of B's equals, in JCS form, some element of A's. 4. Every other member is equal, in JCS form. Anything else, such as an added or removed parameter, a bounded value of another type, or a malformed decimal string, means B is not narrower. A requester that finds an approve-modified response not narrower treats it as deny; an authorization server that finds the approved details not narrower than actor_authorization_details rejects the request as [ACTOR-BOUND] specifies. For example, with "bounds": {"amount": "max"} and a request for "amount": "1520.00", "1500.00" is narrower, "1520.000" is equal, and any change of to or currency is not narrower. 5.2. Approver and Approval Issuer Parameters A performing agent needs to know whom to ask, and for which issuer to make its actor proof. This document defines two dialog parameters for the parameters member of OPEN and UPDATE [PACE]: approver: The participant identifier of the participant that answers checkpoints in the dialog. When absent, it is the controller. approval_issuer: The issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the approval issuer, which performing agents use as the aud of actor proofs. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The controller sets both. Like purpose and basis in [PACE], they are not negotiated: a participant that disagrees sends REJECT. A new value applies to checkpoint requests sent after the UPDATE that carries it is committed. A controller that delegates with a credential from the authorization server it also uses for approval SHOULD set approval_issuer to that credential's iss. 5.3. Issuance by the Approver The approver holds the authority to grant the action, but only the performing agent may use the token. The approver therefore requests it with Token Exchange [RFC8693] and actor-bound token exchange [ACTOR-BOUND], sending: * subject_token: the approver's own token for the task; * actor_token: the request's actor_token when present, and otherwise the credential the performing agent presented in the dialog; its hash is the proof's ath; * actor_proof: the actor proof from the checkpoint request; * authorization_details: the single agent_action detail, as approved; * actor_authorization_details: for approve-modified, the request's authorization_details, over which azh was computed, so that the authorization server can verify the narrowing; and * requested_token_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token- type:access_token. The authorization server verifies that the subject token authorizes the approver to grant the action, and obtains the resource owner's approval when its policy requires it. It then issues a token that: * carries the detail as approved; * names the performing agent in act; * is bound to the performing agent's key, as [ACTOR-BOUND] specifies; and * has a jti and a short lifetime. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The token MAY be a Transactional Access Token [TXN-AT]. If the authorization server changes the detail, the token response returns the changed detail, which is authoritative. The approver then answers the checkpoint: * with a token: approve or approve-modified, carrying the token in credentials (Section 4.5); * when the authorization server denies the request with access_denied, as for the device authorization grant ([RFC8628]): deny; * when it rejects the actor proof with invalid_actor_proof or invalid_authorization_details ([ACTOR-BOUND]): actor-proof- required, with the matching reason (Section 5.5). When the approval must come from a person the approver cannot prompt directly, the approver sends the same authorization_details, actor_token, and actor_proof in a CIBA request [CIBA] instead, as [ACTOR-BOUND] describes. The performing agent never receives the approver's credentials. 5.4. Actor Proof Freshness An actor proof waits in a checkpoint for the approver's decision, and the performing agent never contacts the approval issuer. Its freshness therefore rests on exp and jti: * The performing agent sets exp as soon after iat as the flow allows [ACTOR-BOUND]; for a checkpoint, the latest useful exp is the deadline. The approval issuer can reject a lifetime beyond its policy. * The approval issuer accepts each jti once. Its record of accepted jti values MUST be shared by every instance that accepts actor proofs for it, keyed by issuer, audience, and jti, and kept until the proof's exp. An instance that cannot reach the record MUST reject the proof. * [ACTOR-BOUND] leaves nonce delivery to the actor out of scope. An approval issuer that accepts actor proofs relayed through a checkpoint SHOULD NOT require a nonce in them. If it does, the approver answers actor-proof-required with actor_proof_nonce (Section 5.5). Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 A participant or approval issuer whose clock it cannot trust, for example after a restart without a time source, MUST NOT accept actor proofs or checkpoint responses until it can, and treats the affected checkpoints as unresolved. A secure time source such as Roughtime [ROUGHTIME] can help. 5.5. Asking for an Actor Proof An approver answers actor-proof-required when the request carried no proof, when the proof's aud is not the approval issuer it will use, or when that issuer requires a nonce. When the approval issuer rejected the proof, the response also carries a reason: expired: The proof had expired, or its lifetime exceeded the issuer's policy. invalid: The proof failed another check, such as its signature or ath. details-mismatch: The details did not hash to azh, or the approved details are not equal to or narrower than those hashed. The performing agent MAY send a new checkpoint request with a new proof for that issuer, a new checkpoint_id, and the same deadline or an earlier one; otherwise it treats the response as deny. An approver sends actor-proof-required at most once per reason per paused operation, counting the absence of a reason as one value. A performing agent MUST NOT send a proof for an issuer unless the controller named that issuer in approval_issuer, or the performing agent trusts it by its own policy to receive its actor token. 5.6. Redeeming a Resource Challenge When a resource challenged the action, the challenge is redeemed as its specification defines: the transaction authorization grant of [TXN-CHALLENGE], the agent authorization grant of [AAUTH-ROSENBERG], or the auth token request of [AAUTH-HARDT]. The resulting token, already bound to the challenged operation, is the approval token. * When the approver, or the party it relays to, may redeem the challenge, the approver returns the token in the checkpoint response. * When only the performing agent may, as for an AAuth Scope Challenge, the response carries only the outcome, and the performing agent redeems the challenge. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 5.7. Resource Server Processing A resource server that receives a token with an agent_action detail MUST: 1. validate the token and its sender constraint; 2. verify that the request is the operation named by action, and that its arguments are within what the detail approves, compared as in Section 5.1.1: * equal to each member of parameters that bounds does not name; * less than or equal to a member named max; * greater than or equal to a member named min; and * a subset of a member named subset; and 3. accept the token for one request only, recording its jti until it expires. A request refused for another reason does not consume the token. If a check fails, it rejects the request with the error agent_action_not_authorized (Section 11). The error tells the performing agent, and through it the approver, that the request exceeded or contradicted the approved action, as distinct from invalid_token or insufficient_scope (Section 5.3.2 of [OAUTH-2.1]). 6. Principal Confirmation An agent's approval shows only that the agent agreed. A principal confirmation proves that the principal itself approved one checkpoint request: it is made with a key the principal holds, such as one in the person's wallet or authenticator, and the principal's agent does not (P10). The principal_confirmation member of a checkpoint response is an object with these members: format: REQUIRED. A value from the PACE Principal Confirmation Formats registry (Section 11.3). This document defines those in Table 5. value: REQUIRED. The confirmation, encoded as the format specifies. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 +============+==============================+=======================+ | format | Confirmation | Bound to the request | | | | by | +============+==============================+=======================+ | oid4vp | A Verifiable | request_hash in the | | | Presentation [OID4VP] | transaction data | | | whose Key Binding JWT | | | | covers a pace_checkpoint | | | | transaction data object | | +------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+ | webauthn | A WebAuthn assertion | The challenge | | | [WEBAUTHN] | | +------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+ | spc | A Secure Payment | The challenge | | | Confirmation assertion | | | | [SPC] | | +------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+ | ciba-token | An approval token issued | authorization_details | | | after the person | with checkpoint_id | | | approved through CIBA | (Section 5.1) | | | [CIBA] | | +------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+ Table 5: Principal Confirmation Formats 6.1. Binding The confirmation covers the request the response answers, identified by request_hash. For approve-modified, the principal confirms the modified action, and the binding value is instead the base64url- encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS form of the request with its parameters replaced by those of the response and its signature member removed. oid4vp: The requester, as verifier, sends a presentation request whose transaction_data contains one pace_checkpoint object (Section 6.2); it travels to the person's wallet with the checkpoint, through the approver. The Key Binding JWT carries the object's hash in transaction_data_hashes; its nonce is the checkpoint request's nonce; its iat is the time of approval; and its aud is the requester's participant identifier, because [OID4VP] requires the verifier's Client Identifier there and the requester uses its participant identifier as that value, with a Client Identifier prefix that its wallet ecosystem accepts. The value is the VP Token. webauthn, spc: The challenge is the binding value, decoded from Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 base64url. The value is a JSON object with these members, each base64url-encoded: credential_id, the WebAuthn credential ID; key, the credential's COSE public key [WEBAUTHN]; and authenticator_data, client_data_json, and signature, from the assertion. The User Verified flag MUST be set when required_assurance has level authenticated or higher. For spc, the payment instrument and amount displayed to the person MUST equal those in the request's parameters. ciba-token: The token's authorization_details contain the request's agent_action detail, with the same checkpoint_id; its acr and auth_time claims give the assurance of the person's authentication. It convinces only a requester that trusts the issuing OpenID Provider, so it suits one trust domain or a federation. 6.2. The pace_checkpoint Transaction Data Type This document defines the [OID4VP] transaction data type pace_checkpoint, with these members: type: REQUIRED. The string pace_checkpoint. credential_ids: REQUIRED. As [OID4VP] defines for every transaction data object. checkpoint_id, dialog_id: REQUIRED. Those of the checkpoint request. request_hash: REQUIRED. The binding value (Section 6). transaction_data_hashes_alg: OPTIONAL, as [OID4VP] defines. When present, it MUST include sha-256. A wallet that receives a pace_checkpoint object MUST display the action it describes and MUST NOT return a presentation covering it unless the person approved. The verifier, which is the requester, MUST, before accepting the presentation: 1. verify the presentation and its Key Binding JWT as [OID4VP] and the credential format require, with nonce equal to the checkpoint request's nonce and aud equal to the requester's participant identifier; 2. verify that transaction_data_hashes contains the hash, with the algorithm used, of the base64url-encoded pace_checkpoint object it sent, as [OID4VP] specifies; Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 3. verify that the object's checkpoint_id and dialog_id equal those of the checkpoint request, and that its request_hash equals the binding value it computes itself from the request it sent and the response it received; and 4. verify that the credential's confirmation key belongs to the principal (Section 6.3). A presentation that fails any check is treated as absent. 6.3. The Principal's Key The verifier MUST establish that the confirming key belongs to the principal, not to an agent. It accepts the key only when one of the following relates it to the principal, under its trust policy: * a credential issued to the person by an issuer the verifier trusts, whose cnf is the confirming key, such as one presented with oid4vp; * a public key credential that the principal registered with the verifier earlier, under the pairwise identifier by which the verifier knows the principal; or * for ciba-token, the OpenID Provider's assertion. A key that is presented only in the agent's own credentials, or in a credential whose subject is the agent, MUST NOT be accepted. A relaying agent can deliver the confirmation but cannot produce it. 6.4. Assurance The verifier checks max_age against the time of approval (iat for oid4vp, its receipt of a fresh assertion for webauthn and spc, and auth_time for ciba-token), and acr_values against the authentication context the format reports or its policy assigns. A confirmation that fails a check is treated as absent. 6.5. What the Person Sees The wallet, authenticator, or OpenID Provider shows the action from the signed request: from resource_challenge when present (P6), and otherwise from action, parameters, and effect, not description alone. For oid4vp, a wallet that displays transaction data displays the pace_checkpoint object together with the checkpoint request. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 6.6. Checkpoints Addressed to the Principal Some requests are meant for the person behind an agent, such as a card issuer's authentication challenge or a bank confirming a transfer, and the agent should neither read nor answer them. The requester, which can be a tool, then encrypts the request to the principal with these members: encrypted_to: An object with kid, REQUIRED, the key identifier of the principal's encryption key, and jwk, OPTIONAL, the key itself, obtained from a credential that relates it to the principal (Section 6.3). encrypted: A JWE [RFC7516] in Compact Serialization, encrypted to that key, whose plaintext is a JSON object with the members action, parameters, effect, authorization_details, description, and resource_challenge that would otherwise appear in the request, and OPTIONAL response_key, the requester's public encryption key as a JWK. These members are omitted from the outer object. The requester MAY leave a copy of action in the clear for routing. An encrypted request is for a principal confirmation, not for the issuance of an approval token, so it MUST NOT carry actor_proof or actor_token. The signature covers the outer object, including encrypted. The approver is the principal's agent, or a participant that represents the principal's device; the agent relays the request to the device, which decrypts it. A request with encrypted_to MUST carry required_assurance with from set to principal, so an approve or approve-modified response is valid only with a principal confirmation from the key holder. An agent MAY answer deny on its own, for example when it cannot reach the person before the deadline. The principal can answer approve-modified only when the request carries response_key. The response then carries the modified parameters only in encrypted: a JWE in Compact Serialization, encrypted to response_key, whose plaintext is an object with the member parameters. Because response_key travels inside the request's encryption, a relaying agent cannot substitute it. The requester decrypts the parameters and checks that they only narrow the request (Section 4.5). For an encrypted request, the binding value of the principal confirmation is computed over the request as decrypted: the outer object with encrypted_to and encrypted replaced by the plaintext members. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 Only the approver initiates CIBA (Section 5.3): when it cannot reach the principal's device through the dialog, it can use CIBA through the principal's OpenID Provider and answer with ciba-token. A requester that can reach the principal without the agent does not need a checkpoint; such contact is out of scope. A tool that sends a later result of the work publishes it, as a participant authenticated by its own credentials, in the dialog in which it was invoked or, once that has ended, in a follow-up dialog [PACE]. 7. Agreements Between Principals Agents acting for different principals, such as a consumer's agent and a brand's agent, do not delegate to each other, but they still need approvals from each other, a record of what their principals agreed, and facts they can rely on. This section covers peer checkpoints, commitments (P9), and assertions. 7.1. Peer Checkpoints Agents of different principals also need approvals from each other, although no delegation links them. In such a dialog, either participant can publish a checkpoint request naming the other as approver, for example when a brand's agent needs the consumer to approve a refund's terms, or needs stronger or more recent authentication of the consumer. The approver dialog parameter does not restrict peer checkpoints, and the approver need not be the controller. The requester is the party that will act, and the approval gives it no authority over the approver's resources. The request therefore carries no actor_proof, and the response no approval token, unless the action is performed at a resource that the approver's authorization server protects. The approver meets required_assurance within the dialog: when from is participant, by presenting new credentials in its next control message, such as DECLARE [PACE], bound to the request's nonce as [PACE] describes for credentials, before it responds; when from is principal, with a principal confirmation. A requester that receives a response that does not meet required_assurance treats it as deny; it MAY publish a new request without ending the dialog. An approver that cannot or will not meet it answers deny with reason insufficient-assurance [PACE]. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 The rules of Section 4 apply unchanged. Each side applies its own policy, and a counterpart's cooperative posture [PACE], or its declaration of agreement or low risk, never replaces a required_assurance or a principal confirmation. 7.2. Commitments Parties of different principals need to know what was agreed and that each confirmed the same terms; an agent's statement that it is satisfied does not show this. A commitment records terms such as a refund, a rebooking, a price, or an action item, with an identifier that every party's records can share (P9). { "type": "commitment", "commitment_id": "2b9d4c7e-1f3a-4e8b-9c6d-5a0f7e2b8d14", "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000", "proposer": "brand-agent", "parties": ["consumer-agent", "brand-agent"], "terms": [{ "type": "agent_action", "action": "refund", "parameters": {"amount": "84.00", "currency": "EUR", "order": "A-1093"} }], "terms_hash": "Qm9s...", "cancel": {"until": "2026-11-14T09:00:00Z", "terms": "Full reversal before the refund is issued"}, "expires_at": "2026-11-13T18:00:00Z", "status": "proposed", "confirmations": [], "signature": "eyJ..." } type: REQUIRED. The string commitment. commitment_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4, chosen by the proposer, that identifies the commitment in every dialog and record, including the commitments member of a PACE result [PACE]. dialog_id, proposer, parties: REQUIRED. The dialog, the participant that published this object, and the participants bound by the terms, including the proposer. terms: REQUIRED. An array of RAR [RFC9396] authorization details, such as agent_action details (Section 5.1). terms_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [RFC8785] form of terms. checkpoint_id: OPTIONAL. The checkpoint the commitment arises from, if any. cancel: OPTIONAL. Until when (until), and on what terms, the party that performs the action can still cancel or reverse it. After until, a PACE CANCEL of the work can report only completed, partially-reversed, or irreversible [PACE]. expires_at: OPTIONAL. The time after which an unconfirmed commitment lapses, with status expired. status: REQUIRED. One of the values in Table 6. confirmations: REQUIRED. An array of the signed checkpoint responses that confirm the terms: empty when first proposed, and one or more per party once each has confirmed. signature: REQUIRED. As for checkpoints (Section 4.3), made by the proposer. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 +==========================+==================================+ | status | Meaning | +==========================+==================================+ | proposed | Published; not yet confirmed by | | | every party | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | pending-principal | Every party's agent confirmed, | | | but a confirmation required from | | | a principal is outstanding | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | confirmed | Every required confirmation is | | | present | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | rejected | A party denied it | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | unconfirmed-counterparty | Confirmed by the proposer's | | | side, but a party had assurance | | | level none [PACE] when it agreed | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | cancelled | Cancelled under cancel, or | | | withdrawn before confirmation | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ | expired | expires_at passed before every | | | required confirmation was | | | present | +--------------------------+----------------------------------+ Table 6: Commitment Status 7.2.1. Confirming The proposer obtains each confirmation with a checkpoint request to the party, with action commit and parameters {"commitment_id": ..., "terms_hash": ...}: a peer checkpoint (Section 7.1) for the other parties, and an ordinary one for its own approver. A party confirms by answering approve; approve-modified is not allowed, and a party that wants different terms denies and proposes a new commitment. At each change, the proposer republishes the commitment with the same commitment_id, a new status, and the confirmations so far. Every party verifies each confirmation against terms_hash before relying on the status. Which confirmations are required follows from each party's policy and the posture of the dialog [PACE]: Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 * When the parties act for different principals and the posture is adversarial, each checkpoint request MUST carry required_assurance with from set to principal, so the commitment becomes confirmed only with a principal confirmation from each principal, each bound to the same terms_hash (P9). * When the posture is cooperative, each party decides from its own policy whether its agent's confirmation suffices, for example for low-risk terms within the commit_scope that agent declared [PACE]. * An agent that confirms terms within its commit_scope but beyond what it may confirm alone answers with its own confirmation and leaves the status pending-principal. The principal's confirmation or denial follows later, referring to the same commitment_id, in the same dialog or in a follow-up dialog [PACE]. * A commitment with a party whose assurance level is none, such as a person on a telephone line without a credential, is unconfirmed- counterparty until that party confirms it in a later authenticated exchange. 7.3. Assertions Parties rely on facts they cannot check themselves, such as a carrier's proof of delivery or a payment provider's refund status. An assertion carries such a fact and says who stands behind it. { "type": "assertion", "assertion_id": "9e4a0c1b-6d2f-4a7e-8b3c-1f5d9e0a2c47", "dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000", "claim": {"delivered": true, "shipment": "1Z999", "at": "2026-11-10T14:02:00Z"}, "asserted_by": "brand-agent", "attested_by": "https://carrier.example", "evidence": {"format": "sd-jwt-vc", "value": "eyJ..."}, "signature": "eyJ..." } type: REQUIRED. The string assertion. assertion_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4, listed in the sources of a PACE result [PACE] that relies on it. dialog_id: REQUIRED. The dialog in which the assertion is published. claim: REQUIRED. The fact, as a JSON object. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 asserted_by: REQUIRED. The participant that publishes the assertion. attested_by, evidence: OPTIONAL, and present together. The issuer identifier of a third party that attests the claim, and its signed statement: with format jws, a JWS [RFC7515] by that issuer whose payload, in JCS form, equals claim; with format sd-jwt-vc, an SD- JWT VC [SD-JWT-VC] whose iss is attested_by and whose disclosed claims include every member of claim with the same values. signature: REQUIRED. As for checkpoints (Section 4.3), made by asserted_by. An assertion without attested_by is the sender's own statement, and receivers MUST treat it as such, as they would a statement in content. A receiver that relies on an attested assertion MUST verify the evidence with the issuer's key, obtained under its own trust policy, for example from the issuer's SD-JWT VC issuer metadata. It MUST treat an assertion whose evidence fails verification, or does not match claim, as the sender's own statement. A relaying participant relays an assertion unmodified, and can only add its own assertion citing it. A delegated party, such as a payment provider in a dialog opened by a brand, reports its outcome as an assertion, so the brand's outcome to the consumer can cite it. 8. Evidence A deployment that needs approvals and actions to be checkable by parties other than the operator adds an evidence mechanism; PACE authorization does not mandate one. Such a mechanism SHOULD record: * each OPEN of a delegated dialog, with its parent_dialog_ids and the hash of the delegation credential presented; * each checkpoint request and response, in its signed form; * each action performed under an approval, referencing the response that approved it; * each commitment (Section 7.2) at each change of status, with its confirmations; * each assertion (Section 7.3) that a result cites; * each SEGMENT start and end [PACE], without the segment's content; and Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 * each disclosure that a participant is an AI agent, such as the DECLARE of its kind [PACE] or the announcement a telephone gateway plays, with its time. TRAIL [TRAIL] is one such mechanism: its gate-request and approval records can carry checkpoints, and its record of the action cites the approval. For HTTP calls along a chain, aggregate signatures [AGG-SIG] attribute changes to each hop. 9. Security Considerations The considerations of [PACE] apply. The threats below are specific to delegation and approval. Confused deputy: A credential or approval token is used for a different dialog, resource, or action. Mitigated by message binding (P1), single-action tokens bound to the performing agent's key (P5), and resource-side parameter checks. Approval spoofing by an intermediate agent: A relaying agent forges an approval or alters the request. Mitigated by signatures, request_hash, and relaying the original signed request (P4, P5). Checkpoint substitution: An approval for one checkpoint is presented for another. Mitigated by request_hash, checkpoint_id, and the single-response rule (P5, P7). Prompt injection through descriptions: A crafted description misleads the approver. Mitigated by resource challenges (P6), and otherwise by presenting parameters and effect, which the approval token enforces. Self-approval: Forbidden (Section 4.5), and detectable because the response is signed by the approver named in the request. Approval fatigue: Approvers asked too often approve without reading. Approvers SHOULD resolve routine checkpoints by policy and reserve human approval for actions with significant effects. Issuer redirection: An approver could name, in actor-proof-required, an issuer of its choosing to collect actor proofs and tokens. The performing agent sends proofs only to issuers the controller named or it trusts (Section 5.5), and aud and azh bind each proof to one issuer and one action. Replay across instances: Instances that keep separate records of Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 accepted identifiers defeat single-use rules. The jti record is shared (Section 5.4), and resources apply the same rule to approval tokens. Stale authority: Work continues after revocation. Mitigated by terminating dependent dialogs (P8), short credential lifetimes, and enforcement points outside the agent, such as a TRAIL edge. An agent posing as its principal: Mitigated by principal confirmations with a key related to the principal (P10) and by encrypted requests (Section 6.6). A relaying agent can still withhold a request; the deadline bounds the delay. Misleading confirmation display: The confirmation is bound to the request, or the modified request, and the display comes from the signed request or resource challenge; for spc, the displayed amount and instrument must equal parameters. Assurance downgrade: A counterpart declares a cooperative posture or low risk to obtain weaker confirmation. Each party sets required_assurance from its own policy (Section 7.1). Commitment substitution and agreement by self-report: Every confirmation is bound to terms_hash, a change of terms is a new commitment, and only bound confirmations complete a commitment, never an agent's claimed satisfaction or reported scores (P9). Assertion laundering: An unverifiable or mismatched attestation is treated as the sender's own statement (Section 7.3). Onward delegation under own authority: A receiver does not accept onward delegation from a participant that declared authority_basis own (Section 3.3). 10. Privacy Considerations Delegation chains reveal intermediate agents to later hops, and checkpoints can carry personal data in parameters. Deployments SHOULD use pseudonymous originators (Section 3.3), protect checkpoint objects end to end as [PACE] describes for content, and include in a checkpoint only what the approver needs. A resource challenge that carries parameters by digest, as R3 does, hides them from intermediate agents. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 When a delegated dialog crosses into a domain whose agents should not learn which dialog it continues, the delegating participant MAY omit parent_dialog_ids from OPEN and keep the link locally, as [DIALOG-BINDING] does across trust boundaries. Lifecycle propagation still works, because the controller holds the link; the receiver then relies on the delegation chain alone for cycle detection. A principal confirmation identifies the principal to the verifier. A principal that should not be linked across counterparties uses per- verifier keys and credentials, such as pairwise passkeys or batch- issued credentials, and discloses only the claims the verifier needs. Encrypted requests (Section 6.6) hide their parameters from relaying agents. Every participant can read terms and claim. Parties include only what the counterpart needs, use SD-JWT VC selective disclosure for attested claims, and, where some participants must not see the terms, agree in a segment [PACE] limited to the parties. 11. IANA Considerations 11.1. OAuth Extensions Error Registry * Name: agent_action_not_authorized * Usage Location: resource access error response * Protocol Extension: this document * Change Controller: IETF * Reference: Section 5.7 11.2. PACE Dialog Parameters If [PACE] establishes a registry of dialog parameters, this document registers approver, approval_issuer (Section 5.2), and authority_basis (Section 3.3) in it. 11.3. PACE Authorization Registries This document asks IANA to create the following registries in the "Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE)" group that [PACE] creates, each with the Specification Required policy [RFC8126]. Each entry has a value, a description, and a reference. * PACE Checkpoint Outcomes (Section 4.5): approve, approve-modified, deny, and actor-proof-required. Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 * PACE Principal Confirmation Formats (Section 6): oid4vp, webauthn, spc, and ciba-token. * PACE Resource Challenge Formats (Section 4.4): oauth-txn- challenge, aauth-scope-challenge, and aauth-resource-token. The initial values reference this document. 11.4. OpenID4VP Transaction Data Type [OID4VP] identifies transaction data types by string and has no IANA registry. If the OpenID Foundation or IANA establishes one, pace_checkpoint (Section 6.2) is to be registered with: * Type: pace_checkpoint * Description: Approval of one PACE checkpoint request, bound by its request hash * Change Controller: IETF * Reference: Section 6.2 12. References 12.1. Normative References [ACTOR-BOUND] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange- 00, November 2026, . [ACTOR-PROFILE] McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor- profile-01, 8 October 2026, . [DIALOG-BINDING] Reddy.K, T. and Z. Sarker, "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00, 30 October 2026, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [OAUTH-2.1] Hardt, D., Parecki, A., and T. Lodderstedt, "The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-17, 30 October 2026, . [OID4VP] Terbu, O., Lodderstedt, T., Yasuda, K., Fett, D., and J. Heenan, "OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0", July 2025, . [PACE] Nandakumar, S. and C. F. Jennings, "PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01, 16 November 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, . [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414, DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, . [RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023, . [RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, September 2023, . [SPC] W3C, "Secure Payment Confirmation", 2025, . [WEBAUTHN] W3C, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 3", 2025, . [WPT-MSG] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00, November 2026, . 12.2. Informative References [A2A] Linux Foundation, "Agent-to-Agent Protocol Specification", Version 1.0, 2025, . [AAUTH-HARDT] Hardt, D., "AAuth Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11, 25 September 2026, . [AAUTH-R3] Hardt, D., "AAuth Rich Resource Requests (R3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-aauth-r3-00, 28 September 2026, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 46] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] Rosenberg, J. and P. White, "AAuth - Agentic Authorization OAuth 2.1 Extension", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rosenberg-oauth-aauth-02, 1 November 2026, . [AGENT-DELEGATION] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound- chains-00, November 2026, . [AGG-SIG] Reddy.K, T., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer, "Authenticated Provenance for WIMSE Delegation Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse- aggregate-signatures-01, 28 September 2026, . [AIMS] Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- wimse-aims-01, 2 November 2026, . [BOUNDED-WORK] Liu, D. and K. McGuinness, "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, 17 October 2026, . [CIBA] Fernandez, G., Walter, F., Nennker, A., Tonge, D., and B. Campbell, "OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication Flow - Core 1.0", September 2021, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 47] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [CROSS-ORG] Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross- org-delegation-02, 31 August 2026, . [DELEGATE-SD-JWT] Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd- jwt-00, 30 October 2026, . [DELEGATION-TOKENS] Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor- wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, 27 October 2026, . [DIALOG-UC] Siyavud, F., "Agentic Dialog Use Cases", November 2026. [DTR] de Oliveira Niero, G. and D. Liu, "Deferred Token Response", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- oauth-deferred-token-response-01, 31 October 2026, . [ID-CHAINING] Schwenkschuster, A., Kasselman, P., Burgin, K., Jenkins, M. J., Campbell, B., and A. Parecki, "OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, 19 July 2026, . [MCP] Linux Foundation, "Model Context Protocol Specification", Version 2026-07-28, July 2026, . [POPPY] Sierra and Meta, "Personal Agent Protocol (Poppy) Specification", Version Draft 0.3, 2026, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 48] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [RAR-NARROWING] Nandakumar, S., "Comparing OAuth Authorization Details", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth- rar-narrowing-00, November 2026, . [REVOCATION-EVENTS] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation- revocation-events-00, November 2026, . [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, . [RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628, DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019, . [RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, . [RFC9470] Bertocci, V. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Step Up Authentication Challenge Protocol", RFC 9470, DOI 10.17487/RFC9470, September 2023, . [RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901, DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025, . [ROUGHTIME] Ladd, W. and M. Dansarie, "Roughtime: A Protocol for Rough Time Synchronization", RFC 10049, DOI 10.17487/RFC10049, October 2026, . [SD-CARD] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Agent SD-Card: Selective Disclosure of Agent Metadata for Discovery and Authentication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 49] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 nandakumar-agent-sd-card-00, October 2026, . [SD-JWT-VC] Terbu, O., Fett, D., and B. Campbell, "SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-27, 16 November 2026, . [STATUS-LIST] Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026, . [TRAIL] Nassar, K., Nandakumar, S., and C. F. Jennings, "TRAIL: Tamper-evident Records for Agent Interactions and Liveness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nassar- agentproto-trail-00, 2 November 2026, . [TXN-AT] Tulshibagwale, A., "Transactional Access Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tulshi-oauth- transactional-access-tokens-00, 29 September 2026, . [TXN-CHAINING] Fletcher, G., Kasselman, P., and S. O'Dell, "Transaction Token JWT Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01, 26 October 2026, . [TXN-CHALLENGE] Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., McGuinness, K., and P. Kasselman, "OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rosomakho-oauth- txn-challenge-01, 2 November 2026, . Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 50] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 [TXN-TOKENS] Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman, "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026, . [UCREQ] Reddy.K, T., Sarker, Z., and K. Yao, "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07, 2 November 2026, . [WIMSE-CREDS] Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A., Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03, 30 October 2026, . [WIMSE-WPT] Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026, . Appendix A. Survey of Related Work This appendix lists related work, what each solves, and what it leaves to this document. Section 1.1 shows how the mechanisms this document uses fit together. +==========================+====================+==================+ | Work | Solves | Leaves to this | | | | document | +==========================+====================+==================+ | WIMSE credentials | Workload identity; | Use in | | [WIMSE-CREDS], WPT | proof of | delegation; the | | [WIMSE-WPT], message | possession for | profile for | | binding [WPT-MSG] | HTTP and for | control messages | | | messages | is in [PACE] | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Dialog binding | Binding HTTP | Dialog | | [DIALOG-BINDING] | requests and Txn- | lifecycle; | | | Tokens to an agent | delegation | | | dialog | across domains | Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 51] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | DPoP [RFC9449], mTLS | Sender-constrained | None | | [RFC8705] | tokens | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Token Exchange | A token for | Carrying the | | [RFC8693], actor-bound | another party, | request between | | token exchange | bound to its key | agents | | [ACTOR-BOUND] | | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Actor Profile | Meaning and | Binding to a | | [ACTOR-PROFILE] | validation of act | dialog | | | chains | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Transaction Tokens | Call context | Crossing domains | | [TXN-TOKENS] | within one trust | | | | domain | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Identity chaining | A new token per | Peer delegation | | [ID-CHAINING], Hardt | hop from a server | without a server | | AAuth [AAUTH-HARDT] | at each boundary | | | | or the person's | | | | server; missions | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Delegation Tokens | Offline-verifiable | Binding to a | | [DELEGATION-TOKENS], | attenuation, each | dialog | | delegator-bound chains | hop signed by its | | | [AGENT-DELEGATION], | delegator | | | Delegate SD-JWT | | | | [DELEGATE-SD-JWT] | | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | SD-Card [SD-CARD], SD- | Selective | None | | JWT [RFC9901] | disclosure of | | | | agent claims | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | RAR [RFC9396] | Fine-grained | None | | | authorization | | | | details | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Rosenberg AAuth | A resource-signed | Carrying it | | [AAUTH-ROSENBERG], Txn | challenge for one | between agents; | | Challenge | call, and a narrow | approval by a | | [TXN-CHALLENGE], R3 | token for it | delegating agent | | [AAUTH-R3], step-up | | | | [RFC9470] | | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Deferred Token Response | Waiting at the | A deadline set | | [DTR] | authorization | by the requester | | | server for an | | Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 52] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 | | approval, and | | | | cancelling it | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Transactional Access | Short-lived per- | Single use; | | Tokens [TXN-AT] | transaction tokens | issuance driven | | | | by the approver | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Token Status List | Credential status, | Effect on | | [STATUS-LIST], | and revocation | dialogs | | revocation [RFC7009], | pushed down a | | | Shared Signals ([AIMS]), | chain | | | revocation events | | | | [REVOCATION-EVENTS] | | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | Bounded Work | Authority that | Propagation | | [BOUNDED-WORK] | ends with the unit | along dialogs | | | of work it was | | | | approved for | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | A2A [A2A], MCP [MCP], | Native approval | A common, signed | | Poppy [POPPY] | prompts | form | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ | TRAIL [TRAIL], aggregate | Tamper-evident | None | | signatures [AGG-SIG] | records; per-hop | | | | provenance over | | | | HTTP | | +--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+ Table 7: Related Work A.1. What Existing Work Leaves Open Delegation mechanisms differ in who asserts the chain: an authorization server (Token Exchange, Transaction Tokens); a server at each boundary, or the person's server (identity chaining, Hardt AAuth, which does not require downstream authority to be a subset of upstream authority, Section 10.1 of [AAUTH-HARDT]); or each delegator, signing its narrowed delegation to the next agent's key (Delegation Tokens extended by delegator-bound chains, and Delegate SD-JWT). Delegation across organizations with no server in the path needs the third kind [CROSS-ORG]. Each fits a different deployment, so this document requires properties (Section 2) rather than one format (Section 3.2). Approval mechanisms (Rosenberg AAuth, Txn Challenge, R3) share a pattern: a resource refuses a risky call with a signed description of it, the call is approved, and an authorization server issues a narrow token for it. Each assumes that the agent receiving the challenge Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 53] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 can take it to the approver. In a PACE deployment the approver is often another agent, which may relay to its own principal. [TXN-CHALLENGE] asks for a protocol that carries the challenge unmodified between agents (Section 4.5 of [TXN-CHALLENGE]), and [AIMS] notes that confirmation in the middle of a task is not standardized and that a confirmation obtained outside OAuth must become an authorization event. Checkpoints (Section 4) and approval tokens (Section 5) fill that gap, and also cover actions that no resource challenged. Appendix B. Requirements Addressed +====================================+=============================+ | Requirement | Addressed by | +====================================+=============================+ | A1-9 delegation without the | Section 5, Section 3.2 | | client's primary credentials | | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B2-2 checkpoint request describing | Section 4.2, Section 4.4 | | the action and its effect | | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B2-3 approve, deny, approve with | Section 4.5 | | modification | | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B2-4 response timeout | Section 4.6 | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B2-5 approval covers only that | Section 4.5, Section 5 | | action | | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B2-6 per-operation authorization | Section 5 | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B3-1, B3-4, B3-8 narrowing at each | Section 3.3 | | hop | | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B3-2 originator identity | Section 3.3 | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B3-3 verifiable chain | Section 3.2 with | | | [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and | | | [AGENT-DELEGATION] | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B3-6 provenance | Section 8 | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | B3-7 cycles | Section 3.4 | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | CMN-4 scope violation error | scope-exceeded ([PACE]); | | | agent_action_not_authorized | +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ | CMN-10 revocation along a chain | Section 3.5 | Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 54] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 +------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ Table 8: Requirements Addressed The following requirements are from [DIALOG-UC]. +======================================+==========================+ | Requirement | Addressed by | +======================================+==========================+ | UC1-1 assurance and authentication | required_assurance | | age required mid-dialog | (Section 7.1) | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC1-2 approval verifiable as given | Section 6 (P10) | | by the human principal | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC1-5 identifier for each commitment | commitment_id | | | (Section 7.2) | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC1-6 cooperative path never lowers | Section 7.1, Section 7.2 | | assurance | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC4-2 authority limited to one | authority_basis | | action; own or onward delegation | (Section 3.3) | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC4-3 outcomes keep the source of | Section 7.3 | | each fact | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC6-1 cancellation window and terms | cancel (Section 7.2) | | before commit | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC8-4 commitment unconfirmed by an | unconfirmed-counterparty | | unauthenticated counterparty | (Section 7.2) | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC10-2 commitment pending the | pending-principal | | principal's confirmation | (Section 7.2) | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC12-1 request to the principal that | Section 6.6 | | the agent cannot read or answer | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC12-2 later result from a tool, | Section 6.6 | | authenticated as the tool | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC12-3 answer verifiable as from the | Section 6 | | person | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC14-2 asserted versus attested | Section 7.3 | | claims | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 55] Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026 | UC14-3 agreement completed by both | Section 7.2 (P9) | | principals' approvals | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ | UC14-4 no selection from self- | Section 7.2 (P9) | | reported scores | | +--------------------------------------+--------------------------+ Table 9: Dialog Use Case Requirements Addressed Acknowledgments This document builds on the OAuth, WIMSE, and agent protocol work it references, and on the requirements in [UCREQ]. Authors' Addresses Suhas Nandakumar Cisco Email: snandaku@cisco.com Cullen Jennings Cisco Systems Email: fluffy@cisco.com Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 56]