Agent Communication Protocols S. Nandakumar
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track C. Jennings
Expires: 20 May 2027 Cisco Systems
16 November 2026
PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval
draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00
Abstract
This document specifies the authority agents exercise in dialogs of
the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE): delegating work
with a credential bound to the delegated dialog, pausing to ask for
approval of a single action, and turning that approval into an
authorization for only that action. It also covers proof that a
principal approved, commitments between parties acting for different
principals, and facts attested by third parties. It reuses OAuth,
WIMSE, and agent-protocol mechanisms, defining only the glue to PACE
and the security properties every profile must provide.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-
authz/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Agent Communication
Protocols Working Group mailing list (mailto:agentproto@ietf.org),
which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/
agentproto/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/
agentproto/.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Properties of Every Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Properties of Agreements and Principal Confirmations . . 8
3. Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Binding to the Control Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Delegation Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Attenuation and the Originator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6. SD-Card Holders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Authorization Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Carrying Checkpoint Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Checkpoint Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1. Identification and Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.2. The Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.4. Relaying, Encryption, and Signature . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2.5. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3. Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4. Resource Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.5. Checkpoint Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
4.6. Deadlines and Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.7. Relaying a Checkpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.8. Mapping Native Approval Prompts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Approval Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. The agent_action Authorization Detail . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.1. Narrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Approver and Approval Issuer Parameters . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Issuance by the Approver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.4. Actor Proof Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5. Asking for an Actor Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.6. Redeeming a Resource Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.7. Resource Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Principal Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1. Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2. The pace_checkpoint Transaction Data Type . . . . . . . . 32
6.3. The Principal's Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.4. Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.5. What the Person Sees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.6. Checkpoints Addressed to the Principal . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Agreements Between Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1. Peer Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2. Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2.1. Confirming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3. Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.1. OAuth Extensions Error Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.2. PACE Dialog Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.3. PACE Authorization Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11.4. OpenID4VP Transaction Data Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix A. Survey of Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.1. What Existing Work Leaves Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix B. Requirements Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
1. Introduction
PACE [PACE] gives agents a common dialog: an identifier that spans
hops, intermediaries, and connections; a lifecycle controlled by one
participant; cancellation and termination that propagate along
delegation chains; and a binding to MOQT. It says little about
authority: who may act on whose behalf, and which actions need
explicit approval. "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements" [UCREQ]
draws the same line and leaves delegation, per-action authorization,
and revocation to OAuth and WIMSE (Section 5 of [UCREQ]).
That work exists or is in progress (Section 1.1), but none of it says
how an approval request travels between agents in a dialog, how a
delegation is bound to the dialog it authorizes, or how the pieces
compose in a chain of agents. This document:
* states the security properties every deployment provides
(Section 2);
* specifies delegation in PACE dialogs (Section 3);
* specifies authorization checkpoints, through which an agent asks
for approval of one action (Section 4);
* specifies approval tokens, which authorize only the approved
action (Section 5);
* specifies principal confirmations, which only the principal can
produce (Section 6);
* specifies what agents of different principals use with each other:
peer checkpoints, commitments that record terms each principal
confirms, and assertions that carry facts with their source
(Section 7); and
* lists what evidence of approvals and actions records (Section 8).
The use cases in [DIALOG-UC], such as a consumer's agent disputing a
charge with a brand's agent, or a tool that must reach the person
behind an agent, motivate the peer checkpoints, principal
confirmations, commitments, and assertions.
1.1. Building Blocks
This document reuses existing mechanisms and defines only the glue to
PACE. Figure 1 shows where each fits in the life of a delegated
task.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
1. Delegate 2. Ask 3. Approve 4. Act
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
| delegation |-->| checkpoint |-->| approval |->| request at |
| credential | | request | | token | | resource |
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
Actor Profile RAR Token Exchange DPoP
Txn-Tokens agent_action actor-bound mTLS
delegator-bound Txn Challenge, token exchange
chains AAuth CIBA, when a
WPT + message JWS + JCS person approves
binding OpenID4VP,
WebAuthn, SPC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout: revocation along the chain (Status List, token
revocation, delegation revocation events)
Figure 1: Building Blocks
1. Delegate (Section 3): delegation credentials of the Actor Profile
[ACTOR-PROFILE], Transaction Tokens [TXN-TOKENS], or delegator-
bound chains [AGENT-DELEGATION] over Delegation Tokens
[DELEGATION-TOKENS], presented with WIMSE credentials
[WIMSE-CREDS] bound to their control message [WPT-MSG].
2. Ask (Section 4): the action as a RAR [RFC9396] agent_action
detail, a resource challenge from Txn Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE]
or AAuth [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] [AAUTH-HARDT], a JWS [RFC7515] over
the JCS [RFC8785] form, and, when the principal must confirm,
OpenID4VP [OID4VP], WebAuthn [WEBAUTHN], or SPC [SPC].
3. Approve (Section 5): Token Exchange [RFC8693] with actor-bound
token exchange [ACTOR-BOUND], or CIBA [CIBA] when a person
approves.
4. Act (Section 5.7): the approval token, sender-constrained with
DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705].
Throughout, revocation reaches every holder along the chain
(Section 3.5) through Token Status List [STATUS-LIST], token
revocation [RFC7009], and delegation revocation events
[REVOCATION-EVENTS].
Appendix A surveys these and other related work, and what each leaves
to this document.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
1.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.3. Terminology
This document uses the terms dialog, dialog context, participant,
controller, delegated dialog, and control message from [PACE].
Delegating participant: The participant that opens a delegated
dialog to have work done on its behalf; the controller of that
dialog.
Performing agent: The participant that carries out the work,
including an action that needs approval.
Requester: The participant that sends a checkpoint request: usually
the performing agent; a relaying agent (Section 4.7); or, in a
peer checkpoint, the party that needs approval.
Approver: The participant that answers a checkpoint: in a delegated
dialog, the delegating participant or a participant it designates
(Section 5.2); in a peer checkpoint, the counterpart. It can
relay the decision to its principal or to its own approver.
Approval issuer: The authorization server, or OpenID Provider, from
which the approver obtains approval tokens (Section 5.2).
Checkpoint: A signed request to authorize one action, and the signed
response (Section 4).
Resource challenge: A signed statement from a protected resource
that refused an action, describing the action and the
authorization it needs, such as an OAuth Transaction Authorization
Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE].
Approval token: An authorization that covers only the action
approved at a checkpoint (Section 5).
Delegation credential: The credential a delegating participant
presents in OPEN to convey the authority it delegates (Section 3).
Peer checkpoint: A checkpoint whose approver acts for a different
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
principal than the requester, outside any delegation
(Section 7.1).
Principal confirmation: Proof, made with a key bound to the
principal and not to any agent, that the principal approved one
checkpoint request (Section 6).
Commitment: Signed terms that two or more parties agree to, with
each party's confirmation (Section 7.2).
Assertion: A signed statement of a fact, asserted by its sender or
attested by a named third party (Section 7.3).
Times in the JSON objects this document defines, such as deadline,
expires_at, and until, are date-time strings [RFC3339], as in [PACE].
JWT claims, such as iat and exp, remain NumericDate values.
2. Security Properties
Deployments use different credential formats, so this document states
the properties they provide instead of relying on any one format.
Every deployment of PACE authorization MUST provide P1 to P8,
whichever credential formats it uses. A deployment that uses
commitments (Section 7.2) MUST also provide P9, and one that requires
principal confirmations (Section 6) MUST also provide P10.
2.1. Properties of Every Deployment
P1 Delegation binding: A delegation credential is accepted only for
the delegated dialog it was presented in, by the participant it
names, with its parent dialog (Section 3.1).
P2 Attenuation: Authority conveyed by delegation never exceeds the
authority of the delegating participant (Section 3.3).
P3 Originator traceability: Every participant can determine that a
chain has one originator, and the party that authorized the chain
can identify it (Section 3.3).
P4 Signed checkpoints: A checkpoint request is signed by its
requester and a response by the approver, so no intermediate agent
or relay can forge or alter either (Section 4.3).
P5 Single-action approval: An approval covers only the checkpoint it
answers, identified by a hash of the request, and an approval
token covers only that action, once, for the performing agent's
key (Section 4.5, Section 5).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
P6 Resource authority: When a protected resource described the
action in a resource challenge, decisions and displays are based
on that challenge, not on agent-supplied text (Section 4.4).
P7 Freshness: Checkpoints expire at their deadline, and a request or
response is acted on at most once, even when the dialog log
redelivers it (Section 4.6).
P8 Revocation effect: When a delegation is revoked, the delegated
dialogs that depend on it are terminated (Section 3.5).
2.2. Properties of Agreements and Principal Confirmations
P9 Bound agreement: An agreement between parties acting for
different principals is complete only when each principal has
confirmed it, each confirmation bound to the same hash of the
terms, never on an agent's self-reported satisfaction or reported
scores (Section 7.2).
P10 Principal origin: A confirmation required from a principal is
verifiable as made with a key bound to that principal, so neither
the principal's agent nor a relaying agent can produce it
(Section 6).
3. Delegation
A receiver of delegated work needs to know that the authority was
meant for this dialog and for itself, is no broader than the
delegator's, and stops when revoked.
A delegating participant opens a delegated dialog as [PACE]
specifies: OPEN lists the parents in parent_dialog_ids, the
delegating participant is the controller, and the delegation
credential travels in the credentials member of OPEN.
3.1. Binding to the Control Message
Without this binding, a credential copied out of one OPEN could be
presented in another dialog. The presentation that accompanies a
delegation credential MUST include the mth claim of [WPT-MSG] with
the pace canonicalization profile, in whichever presentation form
[PACE] defines for the credential's mechanism: a Workload Proof
Token, a Key Binding JWT, or a PACE presentation JWT. In OPEN, which
is sent before the delegating participant has the delegatee's nonce,
the presentation has no nonce and the delegatee does not treat the
delegator as authenticated until the controller's later presentation,
bound to the delegatee's nonce, verifies; in later messages its nonce
is the verifier's nonce, as [PACE] requires.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
A credential bound to no key cannot be bound to the message, so a
receiver MUST NOT accept one as a delegation credential. The
exception is a Transaction Token [TXN-TOKENS] within the trust domain
that issued it, where the token service, not a key, establishes the
chain (Section 3.2).
Because OPEN carries the dialog-id, parent_dialog_ids, and the
invited participants, the presentation is thereby bound to the
delegated dialog, its parent, and its audience (P1). A receiver MUST
verify mth before acting on the credential. Credential formats need
not change.
The presentation names who may accept it; the credential names where
the authority may be used. A delegating participant SHOULD set the
credential's audience to the resources the delegated task needs, no
broader than its own, and SHOULD use a format in which a child's
audience cannot exceed its parent's, such as a delegator-bound chain
[AGENT-DELEGATION].
When the credential format can carry it, the delegating participant
SHOULD also include the parent dialog-id in the credential, as the
ctx claim of type dialog [AGENT-DELEGATION]. Within one trust
domain, a Transaction Token issued for the delegated work SHOULD
carry the dialog-id in tctx.dlg [DIALOG-BINDING].
3.2. Delegation Profiles
Who vouches for each hop of a delegation chain depends on the
deployment. Inside one trust domain, a token service issues each hop
and is trusted to have checked it. Across domains, either a server
at each boundary issues the next hop, or each delegator signs the hop
it grants, so that a receiver can verify the chain itself. Whoever
vouches for a hop also provides attenuation (P2) and originator
traceability (P3) for it (Section 3.3).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
+================+============+=================================+
| Deployment | Who | Mechanisms |
| | vouches | |
| | for each | |
| | hop | |
+================+============+=================================+
| One trust | The | Transaction Tokens with |
| domain | domain's | tctx.dlg; Token Exchange |
| | token | |
| | service | |
+----------------+------------+---------------------------------+
| A server at | The server | Identity chaining; cross-domain |
| each domain | at that | Transaction Tokens |
| boundary | boundary | [TXN-CHAINING]; Hardt AAuth |
| | | call chaining |
+----------------+------------+---------------------------------+
| Agents that | The | Delegation Tokens |
| delegate | delegator, | [DELEGATION-TOKENS] with |
| directly | by signing | delegator binding |
| across domains | the hop | [AGENT-DELEGATION]; Delegate |
| | | SD-JWT under [AGENT-DELEGATION] |
+----------------+------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1: Delegation Profiles
Mandatory to implement: Implementations MUST support delegation
credentials that are:
* JWT access tokens with act claims ([RFC8693]), interpreted as
the OAuth Actor Profile [ACTOR-PROFILE] defines;
* bound by a cnf claim to the delegatee's key; and
* presented with a PACE presentation JWT carrying mth, the form
[PACE] defines for a token bound by cnf (Section 3.1).
Each hop obtains a new token for the next delegatee by token
exchange.
Delegation with no server in the path: Implementations that accept
delegation across administrative domains without an authorization
server in the path MUST also support Delegation Tokens
[DELEGATION-TOKENS] with delegator binding [AGENT-DELEGATION]. A
chain that only an issuing server asserts does not show that each
hop granted the next (Section 4.4 of [UCREQ], requirement B3-3).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
3.3. Attenuation and the Originator
Delegation can only narrow authority: a delegatee can do no more than
its delegator (P2), and every chain leads back to one originator
(P3). This section says how a receiver checks both, and how a
participant that acts under its own authority is distinguished from
one that passes on delegated authority.
Checking each hop: When a receiver verifies a chain hop by hop, it
MUST reject the credential if any hop conveys more authority than
the hop before it (P2). It compares by the rules of the
credential mechanism, such as Section 4.3 of [DELEGATION-TOKENS].
Where authority is expressed as RAR authorization details
[RFC9396], the comparison is the relation of [RAR-NARROWING],
under which details that cannot be compared are not narrower. A
receiver that cannot compare the authority at some hop MUST reject
the credential.
Chains asserted by a server: When an authorization server asserts
the chain, as with nested act claims, the server's narrowing at
each exchange provides P2 (Section 3.6 of [ACTOR-PROFILE]).
More than one parent: A delegated dialog with several parents acts
under the authority of each parent separately. The delegating
participant presents one delegation credential per parent whose
authority the work uses, and each operation in the delegated
dialog MUST be authorized by one of them. Authority from
different parents is not combined.
When OPEN lists more than one parent, each delegation credential
MUST name the parent dialog it derives from, as the ctx claim of
type dialog [AGENT-DELEGATION] does; a format that cannot name it
cannot be used in such a dialog. When parent_dialog_ids is
present, a receiver MUST reject a credential that names a dialog
not in it, and MUST reject two credentials that name the same
parent.
A listed parent without a credential contributes no authority: an
operation that needs it fails authorization. A receiver MAY
refuse the OPEN with ERROR policy-rejected when its policy
requires every listed parent to be backed by a credential. When
parent_dialog_ids is withheld ([PACE]), the receiver relies on the
credentials' ctx alone, and the controller, which keeps the link,
applies revocation for each parent (Section 3.5).
Own or delegated authority: A participant can also act under
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
authority granted to it directly, such as a booking service that
calls a payment processor under its own contract. That is not a
delegation: the participant presents its own credentials, and a
delegation credential, if present, only shows whom it acts for
(Section 10.1 of [AAUTH-HARDT] reaches the same outcome). The
controller states which case applies with the dialog parameter
authority_basis in OPEN. Like the parameters in Section 5.2, it
is set by the controller and not negotiated; a participant that
disagrees sends REJECT.
* own: the participant acts under authority granted to it
directly. A delegation credential, if present, is evidence
only.
* delegated: the participant passes on authority it received,
conveyed by the delegation credential in OPEN, subject to P1 to
P3.
When authority_basis is absent, it is delegated if OPEN carries
parent_dialog_ids or a delegation credential, and own otherwise.
A receiver MUST NOT accept onward delegation of a principal's
authority from a participant that declared own. With either
value, the authority passed SHOULD cover only the one action and
parameters the delegated work needs, for example a single
agent_action detail (Section 5.1).
Hiding the originator: Where the originator's identity must not be
disclosed to every hop (P3), the chain carries a pseudonym that
only its issuer can resolve, such as the per-chain pseudonym sub
of [AGENT-DELEGATION]. An issuer MUST NOT copy an identifier that
another issuer directed to a specific audience into a delegation
credential.
3.4. Cycles
A receiver MUST reject OPEN with ERROR delegation-cycle ([PACE]) if:
* the delegation chain already names the receiver;
* the chain names any agent twice ([AGENT-DELEGATION]); or
* parent_dialog_ids contains the dialog's own dialog-id or repeats
an entry.
Depth limits, such as del_max_depth of [DELEGATION-TOKENS], bound
cycles that identifiers do not reveal, but do not replace this check.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
3.5. Revocation
Revoking a credential must stop the work done under it and under
every credential delegated from it (P8).
When a credential is revoked: A participant that learns that a
credential its participation depends on was revoked MUST stop
acting under it. If it controls a delegated dialog that depends
on the credential, it MUST terminate that dialog, and PACE
lifecycle propagation terminates the dialogs below it ([PACE]).
Otherwise, it MUST LEAVE the dialog.
How participants learn of it: The credential's own mechanism reports
the revocation: a Token Status List [STATUS-LIST] entry, token
revocation [RFC7009], or a Shared Signals event [AIMS]. To reach
holders further down the chain, including holders in domains the
revoking party does not know, the revoking party sends a
delegation revoked event [REVOCATION-EVENTS], and each delegator
relays it to the holders of the credentials it delegated, in the
credentials member of the REVOKE or TERMINATE it sends them.
When status cannot be checked: If a participant cannot check a
credential's status within the staleness bound its policy sets, it
MUST NOT act under the credential until it obtains a current
answer, and MUST reject operations that rely on it with ERROR
authorization-unavailable ([PACE]). This suspends the work
without ending it: the participant stays in its dialogs and
resumes once the credential is shown valid. If its policy limits
how long work can stay suspended, it MAY terminate or leave the
dependent dialogs when that limit passes.
When a participant is revoked: A controller that removes a
participant with REVOKE also revokes the participant's delegation
credential, if the controller issued it.
When the work ends: Credentials issued for a delegated dialog remain
valid after the dialog terminates, until they expire or their
issuer ends them. An authorization server that ties authority to
a unit of work [BOUNDED-WORK] can end them when the dialog ends.
3.6. SD-Card Holders
An agent that holds an SD-Card can obtain a delegation credential by
Token Exchange with its SD-Card as the actor token; the issued
token's act claim carries the SD-Card's sub and iss (Section 7.1 of
[SD-CARD]).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
4. Authorization Checkpoints
Some actions need approval first, because a resource refused the call
or the delegating participant's policy requires it, and the party
that can approve is often another agent several hops away. A
checkpoint carries the signed request to that party and the signed
decision back.
Figure 2 shows a checkpoint from start to finish.
Resource Performing Approver Approval
server agent issuer
| | | |
|<---- call ----| | |
|-- refused, -->| | |
| challenge(1) | | |
| | | |
| pause |-- checkpoint ------->| |
| operation | request (2) | |
| | signed; through | |
| | relays, if any | |
| | | |
| | decide; may ask |
| | the principal (3) |
| | | |
| | |-- token exchange->|
| | | + actor proof |
| | |<- approval token -|
| | | (4) |
| |<-- checkpoint -------| |
| | response (5) | |
| | | |
|<-- call with -| | |
| approval token| | |
| (6) | | |
Figure 2: A Checkpoint
1. The performing agent reaches an action that needs approval: a
resource refused the call, optionally with a resource challenge
(Section 4.4), or its delegator's policy requires approval.
2. It pauses the operation and publishes a signed checkpoint request
on its checkpoint flow (Section 4.1, Section 4.2, Section 4.3).
Agents between it and the approver relay the request unmodified
(Section 4.7).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
3. The approver decides, by its own policy or by asking its
principal (Section 6).
4. To approve, the approver obtains an approval token for the one
action, bound to the performing agent's key with the actor proof
from the request (Section 5.3).
5. The approver publishes a signed checkpoint response carrying the
outcome and the token (Section 4.5), before the request's
deadline (Section 4.6).
6. The performing agent resumes the operation and presents the token
to the resource, which checks it against the approved action
(Section 5.7).
A checkpoint does not change the dialog context. Checkpoints can
also pass between peers acting for different principals (Section 7.1)
and be addressed to a principal through its agent (Section 6.6).
4.1. Carrying Checkpoint Objects
Each participant sends its checkpoint objects on its own checkpoint
flow of the dialog: a reliable flow of the PACE dialog log [PACE] at
the Urgent Signals priority tier. Each request, response, commitment
(Section 7.2), and assertion (Section 7.3) is one object. Because
the flow is reliable, the log's acceptance and replay rules apply:
after a reconnection, an object its receiver had not accepted is made
available again at the same position, and one it had accepted is
discarded as a duplicate. An approver therefore does not ask its
principal twice for the same request.
In the MOQT binding of [PACE], the flow is a checkpoint track in the
sender's dialog namespace, with each object in its own group,
Subgroup Delivery Mode, and no finite delivery timeout:
("pace", "dialogs", {dialog-id}, {agent-id}) -- "checkpoint"
Other bindings define how they carry the flow.
4.2. Checkpoint Request
A checkpoint request asks one participant to approve one action, and
carries what the approver needs to decide and to obtain an approval
token.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
A request is a JSON object, published as one object of the sender's
checkpoint flow (Section 4.1). Times are RFC 3339 date-time strings,
binary values are base64url-encoded without padding, and the request
is signed as Section 4.3 specifies. Its members are grouped below by
purpose.
4.2.1. Identification and Freshness
type: REQUIRED. The string request.
checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4.
dialog_id: REQUIRED. The dialog in which the request is published.
requester: REQUIRED. The requester's participant identifier.
approver: REQUIRED. The participant asked to approve: in a
delegated dialog, the controller, or the participant named by the
approver dialog parameter (Section 5.2); in a peer checkpoint, the
counterpart (Section 7.1).
deadline: REQUIRED. The time after which the checkpoint is
unresolved (Section 4.6).
nonce: REQUIRED. A fresh random value with at least 128 bits of
entropy.
4.2.2. The Action
action, parameters, effect: REQUIRED, except in an encrypted request
(Section 6.6). The action, its arguments as a JSON object, and
its effect, as the requester understands them. They are advisory
when resource_challenge is present (Section 4.4).
description: OPTIONAL. Free text describing the action. Unlike
parameters, it is not enforced by an approval token.
target: REQUIRED. The paused operation, in the form of the PACE
CANCEL target.
operation_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the
object payload that started the paused operation.
4.2.3. Authorization
authorization_details: OPTIONAL, and REQUIRED when actor_proof is
present. The authorization requested, as RAR [RFC9396] details,
for example one agent_action detail (Section 5.1).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
resource_challenge: OPTIONAL. A resource challenge, carried
unmodified (Section 4.4).
actor_proof: OPTIONAL. An actor proof [ACTOR-BOUND] made by the
performing agent, which the approver forwards to obtain an
approval token (Section 5.3). Its aud is the approval issuer
named in approval_issuer (Section 5.2); a performing agent without
an approval issuer omits the proof. The proof MUST include azh
computed over this request's authorization_details. [ACTOR-BOUND]
makes azh a SHOULD; this document requires it because the proof
passes through the approver and relaying agents, any of whom could
otherwise bind a token for another action to the performing
agent's key. The proof normally carries no nonce (Section 5.4).
actor_token: OPTIONAL. The performing agent's credential with a cnf
claim, over whose value the proof's ath was computed. When
absent, the approver uses the credential the performing agent
presented in the dialog. The performing agent includes it when
the request may be relayed to an approver outside its dialog
(Section 4.7).
required_assurance: OPTIONAL. The assurance the response must carry
(Section 7.1), as an object with these members:
* level: REQUIRED. The minimum assurance level of [PACE]:
asserted, authenticated, or delegated.
* acr_values: OPTIONAL. A space-separated list of Authentication
Context Class References, in order of preference, as in
[RFC9470].
* max_age: OPTIONAL. The maximum time, in seconds, since the
principal last authenticated, as in [RFC9470].
* from: OPTIONAL. principal if the response MUST carry a
principal confirmation (Section 6); participant (the default)
if the approver's own key-bound credentials suffice.
level, acr_values, and max_age have the form of the
required_assurance member of a PACE ERROR with reason
insufficient-assurance [PACE], so a participant that refused an
operation with that ERROR can ask for what it requires without
ending the dialog.
4.2.4. Relaying, Encryption, and Signature
relayed_request: OPTIONAL. The signed checkpoint request from a
dialog below that this request relays, unmodified (Section 4.7).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
encrypted_to, encrypted: OPTIONAL. Used together for a request that
the relaying agents must not read (Section 6.6).
signature: REQUIRED. See Section 4.3.
4.2.5. Example
The following request asks a banking assistant to approve a transfer
on behalf of the agent closing an account:
{
"type": "request",
"checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
"dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"requester": "closure-agent",
"approver": "banking-assistant",
"action": "transfer",
"description": "Transfer the remaining balance",
"parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR",
"to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
"effect": "Moves funds out of the closing account; irreversible",
"target": {"namespace": ["a2a", "task"], "track": "t1"},
"operation_hash": "pLk2...",
"deadline": "2026-11-09T17:00:00Z",
"nonce": "Tq8m0vB1kRj3zXc5aYp2Lw",
"authorization_details": [{
"type": "agent_action",
"checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
"action": "transfer",
"parameters": {"amount": "1520.00", "currency": "EUR",
"to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
"bounds": {"amount": "max"}
}],
"resource_challenge": {"format": "oauth-txn-challenge",
"value": "eyJ..."},
"signature": "eyJ..."
}
4.3. Signing
Signing lets a receiver detect changes made by relays and agents on
the way.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The signature member of a checkpoint request or response is a JWS
[RFC7515] with detached payload, in Compact Serialization, over the
JCS [RFC8785] form of the object without its signature member, made
with the key bound to the signer's credential in the dialog.
Commitments (Section 7.2) and assertions (Section 7.3) are signed the
same way.
The JWS alg MUST be an asymmetric digital signature algorithm, and
MUST NOT be none or a MAC algorithm, because these objects are
relayed and kept as evidence (Section 8) and verified by parties that
share no key with the signer.
A receiver MUST verify the signature before acting on the object
(P4). It MUST also verify that the signer is the participant the
object names: the requester of a request, the approver of a response,
the proposer of a commitment, or the asserted_by of an assertion. An
object that fails either check is rejected with ERROR unauthenticated
([PACE]).
4.4. Resource Challenges
When a protected resource describes the action itself, that
description, not the agent's, is the one to trust.
When the action was refused by a protected resource that issued a
resource challenge, the performing agent MUST include it in
resource_challenge, unmodified, with format set to a value from the
PACE Resource Challenge Formats registry (Section 11.3). This
document defines:
+=======================+=====================================+
| format | Challenge |
+=======================+=====================================+
| oauth-txn-challenge | OAuth Transaction Authorization |
| | Challenge [TXN-CHALLENGE] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------+
| aauth-scope-challenge | AAuth Scope Challenge |
| | [AAUTH-ROSENBERG] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------+
| aauth-resource-token | AAuth resource token [AAUTH-HARDT], |
| | possibly referencing an R3 per-call |
| | proposal [AAUTH-R3] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------+
Table 2: Resource Challenge Formats
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The resource is then the authority on what the action is (P6). The
approver MUST validate the challenge as its specification requires,
MUST base its decision, and anything it displays to a person, on the
validated challenge, and MUST treat description, parameters, and
effect as advisory.
The challenge is redeemed by the party its specification allows
(Section 5.6). A Transaction Authorization Challenge can be redeemed
by the approver. An AAuth Scope Challenge is redeemed only by the
client it was issued to, so the approver returns only its outcome.
An approver's approve does not authorize the action at the resource.
An authorization server that takes part can refuse, or issue narrower
authorization than approved, and the performing agent acts only
within the issued token.
4.5. Checkpoint Response
A checkpoint response gives the approver's decision on one request,
bound to that request by its hash.
A response is a JSON object, published on the approver's checkpoint
flow (Section 4.1), encoded as a request is (Section 4.2) and signed
as Section 4.3 specifies. Its members are:
type: REQUIRED. The string response.
checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. The checkpoint_id of the request.
request_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the
JCS form of the signed request, including its signature, binding
the response to one request (P5).
approver: REQUIRED. The approver's participant identifier, equal to
the approver of the request.
outcome: REQUIRED. A value from the PACE Checkpoint Outcomes
registry (Section 11.3). This document defines:
* approve: perform the action as requested.
* approve-modified: perform the action with the response's
parameters, which replace the request's. The modified action
MUST be narrower than or equal to the requested one, as
Section 5.4 of [TXN-CHALLENGE] requires of authorization
servers; for an agent_action detail, as Section 5.1.1 defines,
applied to the request's detail with its parameters replaced.
A requester that cannot determine that the modification only
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
narrows the request MUST treat the response as deny. With
resource_challenge, this outcome is used only if the
challenge's specification allows the approved details to
differ.
* deny: do not perform the action. The performing agent ends the
paused operation with an explicit error in the application
protocol, such as a failed A2A task or an MCP error result.
* actor-proof-required: the approver needs a usable actor proof
(Section 5.5).
parameters: REQUIRED with approve-modified, except in a response to
an encrypted request. The modified arguments, as a JSON object.
encrypted: In a response to an encrypted request only, and REQUIRED
there with approve-modified: the modified parameters, encrypted to
the requester (Section 6.6).
reason: REQUIRED with deny: a reason from the ERROR reasons of
[PACE], such as insufficient-assurance. OPTIONAL with actor-
proof-required: expired, invalid, or details-mismatch
(Section 5.5).
actor_proof_aud, actor_proof_nonce: With actor-proof-required only.
actor_proof_aud, REQUIRED, is the issuer identifier to use as the
proof's aud. actor_proof_nonce, OPTIONAL, is a nonce the approval
issuer supplied.
credentials: OPTIONAL. An approval token (Section 5).
principal_confirmation: OPTIONAL. A principal confirmation of the
request (Section 6). REQUIRED with approve or approve-modified
when the request's required_assurance has from set to principal.
For approve-modified, it covers the response's parameters.
The requester MUST verify that request_hash matches a request it sent
and has not yet resolved, and MUST NOT apply an approval to any other
action. An approver MUST NOT approve a checkpoint that it requested.
For example, the banking assistant approves the transfer requested in
Section 4.2 for a lower amount:
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
{
"type": "response",
"checkpoint_id": "6f1c0e9a-3c2d-4b7e-9a51-0d6c2f4e8b10",
"request_hash": "x7Rb...",
"approver": "banking-assistant",
"outcome": "approve-modified",
"parameters": {"amount": "1500.00", "currency": "EUR",
"to": "DE89370400440532013000"},
"credentials": "eyJ...",
"signature": "eyJ..."
}
4.6. Deadlines and Replay
Each checkpoint has a deadline and is answered at most once, so that
it neither blocks work forever nor authorizes an action twice. The
requester sets the deadline in the deadline member of its request
(Section 4.2), and identifies the checkpoint by the request's
checkpoint_id.
If no valid response arrives by the deadline, the requester MUST
treat the checkpoint as unresolved, MUST NOT perform the action, and
halts the affected operation. A late response is ignored. A
requester MUST accept at most one response per checkpoint_id.
Neither requests nor responses are sent in QUIC or TLS 0-RTT data
(P7).
Log replay [PACE] does not extend a deadline. A requester that
resumes after its deadline treats the checkpoint as unresolved, and
to ask again publishes a new request with a new checkpoint_id. A
participant that sends checkpoints in a dialog SHOULD propose, or
accept, a log_retention dialog parameter [PACE] no shorter than the
longest time it allows between a request and its deadline.
An approver that waits for an authorization server bounds the wait by
the deadline: it passes the remaining time as the timeout of
[AAUTH-ROSENBERG] where that applies, and cancels a deferred token
request [DTR] when the deadline passes or the paused operation is
cancelled with PACE CANCEL.
4.7. Relaying a Checkpoint
An approver can resolve a checkpoint from policy, ask its principal,
or relay it to its own approver in the dialog above. To relay, it
publishes a new request in that dialog, with itself as requester and
the original signed request as relayed_request; a resource challenge
is carried in both, unmodified. It answers the original checkpoint
with the returned outcome or a stricter one. Each hop signs its own
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
request and response, so the decision path is verifiable end to end.
The approver above MUST treat the outer request, signed by the
relaying agent, as the request it answers, hashing it in its
response, and MUST NOT answer the inner request directly or act on it
alone. It verifies the inner request and its resource challenge only
as evidence of what the performing agent asked for. The same rule
applies at every level of nesting.
4.8. Mapping Native Approval Prompts
Agent protocols already have ways to pause for approval: an A2A [A2A]
task enters auth-required or input-required, an MCP [MCP] server
sends an elicitation request, and a Poppy [POPPY] Company Agent sends
an authorization event. These prompts are unsigned, each uses its
own vocabulary, and an agent that translates between protocols cannot
carry one into another without loss. A checkpoint gives them a
common, signed form, while the native prompt keeps working for
participants that understand only the application protocol.
A performing agent that pauses an application operation with a native
prompt asking to approve an action also publishes a checkpoint
request for that action:
+==========+==========================+=============================+
| Protocol | Native prompt | Checkpoint request |
+==========+==========================+=============================+
| A2A | Task in auth-required or | target names the task; |
| | input-required that asks | the task stays in that |
| | to authorize an action | state until the response |
+----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+
| MCP | elicitation/create that | target names the paused |
| | asks to confirm an | request; the elicitation |
| | action | result follows the |
| | | response |
+----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+
| Poppy | authorization event that | target names the event |
| | asks to authorize an | |
| | action | |
+----------+--------------------------+-----------------------------+
Table 3: Native Approval Prompts
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The request's action, parameters, and effect describe the action the
prompt asks about, and operation_hash covers the object payload that
started the paused operation (Section 4.2). A native prompt that
asks for something other than approval of an action, such as a Poppy
authorization event asking the Personal Agent to sign in, is not
mapped.
When the response arrives, the native state is brought in line with
it: the performing agent, as A2A server, moves the task on, and the
participant that received an MCP elicitation answers it.
+=====================+==================+========================+
| Outcome | A2A task | MCP elicitation result |
+=====================+==================+========================+
| approve, approve- | Task returns to | accept, with the |
| modified | working | approved parameters |
+---------------------+------------------+------------------------+
| deny, or unresolved | Task ends failed | decline, or cancel at |
| at the deadline | or rejected | the deadline |
+---------------------+------------------+------------------------+
Table 4: Answering Native Prompts
The checkpoint response, not the native answer, is authoritative: a
participant that receives both acts on the signed response. A
mediator that translates between application protocols relays the
checkpoint unmodified (Section 4.7) and translates only the native
prompt.
5. Approval Tokens
An approval token is an access token that authorizes one approved
action, for the performing agent only, and only once (P5). A
checkpoint response is a statement between agents, and a resource
server that never saw the checkpoint cannot rely on it. The approval
token carries the approval to where the action happens, in a form the
resource server already checks.
The token describes the action as an agent_action detail
(Section 5.1). The approver obtains it from the approval issuer
named for the dialog (Section 5.2), bound to the performing agent's
key with the actor proof from the request (Section 5.3, Section 5.4,
Section 5.5). When a resource challenged the action, redeeming the
challenge yields the token instead (Section 5.6). The resource
server checks the token as Section 5.7 specifies.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
5.1. The agent_action Authorization Detail
When no resource challenged the action, the approval token describes
it with the RAR [RFC9396] authorization details type agent_action.
Besides the common fields of RAR, it has:
checkpoint_id: REQUIRED. The checkpoint the authorization answers.
Absent in the terms of a commitment (Section 7.2), which has its
own checkpoint_id.
action: REQUIRED. The operation, as the resource server understands
it.
parameters: REQUIRED. The arguments the approval covers.
bounds: OPTIONAL. A JSON object naming top-level members of
parameters that an approver may change without changing the action
(Section 5.1.1). Each value is one of:
* max: an upper limit, as a decimal string; an approver may lower
it.
* min: a lower limit, as a decimal string; an approver may raise
it.
* subset: a set, as a JSON array; an approver may remove
elements.
A decimal string matches -?(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(\.[0-9]+)? and is
compared as an exact decimal, never as binary floating point.
Only the performing agent sets bounds, in its checkpoint request.
A performing agent MUST NOT name a parameter in bounds unless
performing the action with any value the bound permits is within
the authority it is requesting, and the action remains the same
action to the resource server.
dialog_id: OPTIONAL. The PACE dialog the action belongs to.
A token MUST NOT contain more than one agent_action detail, and MUST
NOT combine it with other details or scopes that authorize the same
resource server to perform other actions.
5.1.1. Narrowing
This is the comparison of the agent_action type, defined here as
[RAR-NARROWING] allows a type to do. An agent_action detail B is
equal to or narrower than a detail A if and only if:
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
1. type, checkpoint_id, and action are equal; dialog_id is equal or
absent from both; and bounds is equal, in JCS form [RFC8785], or
absent from both.
2. Each common data field of Section 2.2 of [RFC9396] is present in
B exactly when it is present in A; identifier is equal; and for
locations, actions, datatypes, and privileges, every element of B
is an element of A.
3. parameters has the same member names in A and B, and each member
compares as follows:
* not named in bounds: B's value equals A's, in JCS form;
* max: both are decimal strings, and B's is less than or equal
to A's;
* min: both are decimal strings, and B's is greater than or
equal to A's;
* subset: both are arrays, and every element of B's equals, in
JCS form, some element of A's.
4. Every other member is equal, in JCS form.
Anything else, such as an added or removed parameter, a bounded value
of another type, or a malformed decimal string, means B is not
narrower. A requester that finds an approve-modified response not
narrower treats it as deny; an authorization server that finds the
approved details not narrower than actor_authorization_details
rejects the request as [ACTOR-BOUND] specifies.
For example, with "bounds": {"amount": "max"} and a request for
"amount": "1520.00", "1500.00" is narrower, "1520.000" is equal, and
any change of to or currency is not narrower.
5.2. Approver and Approval Issuer Parameters
A performing agent needs to know whom to ask, and for which issuer to
make its actor proof. This document defines two dialog parameters
for the parameters member of OPEN and UPDATE [PACE]:
approver: The participant identifier of the participant that answers
checkpoints in the dialog. When absent, it is the controller.
approval_issuer: The issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the approval
issuer, which performing agents use as the aud of actor proofs.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The controller sets both. Like purpose and basis in [PACE], they are
not negotiated: a participant that disagrees sends REJECT. A new
value applies to checkpoint requests sent after the UPDATE that
carries it is committed. A controller that delegates with a
credential from the authorization server it also uses for approval
SHOULD set approval_issuer to that credential's iss.
5.3. Issuance by the Approver
The approver holds the authority to grant the action, but only the
performing agent may use the token. The approver therefore requests
it with Token Exchange [RFC8693] and actor-bound token exchange
[ACTOR-BOUND], sending:
* subject_token: the approver's own token for the task;
* actor_token: the request's actor_token when present, and otherwise
the credential the performing agent presented in the dialog; its
hash is the proof's ath;
* actor_proof: the actor proof from the checkpoint request;
* authorization_details: the single agent_action detail, as
approved;
* actor_authorization_details: for approve-modified, the request's
authorization_details, over which azh was computed, so that the
authorization server can verify the narrowing; and
* requested_token_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-
type:access_token.
The authorization server verifies that the subject token authorizes
the approver to grant the action, and obtains the resource owner's
approval when its policy requires it. It then issues a token that:
* carries the detail as approved;
* names the performing agent in act;
* is bound to the performing agent's key, as [ACTOR-BOUND]
specifies; and
* has a jti and a short lifetime.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The token MAY be a Transactional Access Token [TXN-AT]. If the
authorization server changes the detail, the token response returns
the changed detail, which is authoritative. The approver then
answers the checkpoint:
* with a token: approve or approve-modified, carrying the token in
credentials (Section 4.5);
* when the authorization server denies the request with
access_denied, as for the device authorization grant ([RFC8628]):
deny;
* when it rejects the actor proof with invalid_actor_proof or
invalid_authorization_details ([ACTOR-BOUND]): actor-proof-
required, with the matching reason (Section 5.5).
When the approval must come from a person the approver cannot prompt
directly, the approver sends the same authorization_details,
actor_token, and actor_proof in a CIBA request [CIBA] instead, as
[ACTOR-BOUND] describes. The performing agent never receives the
approver's credentials.
5.4. Actor Proof Freshness
An actor proof waits in a checkpoint for the approver's decision, and
the performing agent never contacts the approval issuer. Its
freshness therefore rests on exp and jti:
* The performing agent sets exp as soon after iat as the flow allows
[ACTOR-BOUND]; for a checkpoint, the latest useful exp is the
deadline. The approval issuer can reject a lifetime beyond its
policy.
* The approval issuer accepts each jti once. Its record of accepted
jti values MUST be shared by every instance that accepts actor
proofs for it, keyed by issuer, audience, and jti, and kept until
the proof's exp. An instance that cannot reach the record MUST
reject the proof.
* [ACTOR-BOUND] leaves nonce delivery to the actor out of scope. An
approval issuer that accepts actor proofs relayed through a
checkpoint SHOULD NOT require a nonce in them. If it does, the
approver answers actor-proof-required with actor_proof_nonce
(Section 5.5).
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
A participant or approval issuer whose clock it cannot trust, for
example after a restart without a time source, MUST NOT accept actor
proofs or checkpoint responses until it can, and treats the affected
checkpoints as unresolved. A secure time source such as Roughtime
[ROUGHTIME] can help.
5.5. Asking for an Actor Proof
An approver answers actor-proof-required when the request carried no
proof, when the proof's aud is not the approval issuer it will use,
or when that issuer requires a nonce. When the approval issuer
rejected the proof, the response also carries a reason:
expired: The proof had expired, or its lifetime exceeded the
issuer's policy.
invalid: The proof failed another check, such as its signature or
ath.
details-mismatch: The details did not hash to azh, or the approved
details are not equal to or narrower than those hashed.
The performing agent MAY send a new checkpoint request with a new
proof for that issuer, a new checkpoint_id, and the same deadline or
an earlier one; otherwise it treats the response as deny. An
approver sends actor-proof-required at most once per reason per
paused operation, counting the absence of a reason as one value.
A performing agent MUST NOT send a proof for an issuer unless the
controller named that issuer in approval_issuer, or the performing
agent trusts it by its own policy to receive its actor token.
5.6. Redeeming a Resource Challenge
When a resource challenged the action, the challenge is redeemed as
its specification defines: the transaction authorization grant of
[TXN-CHALLENGE], the agent authorization grant of [AAUTH-ROSENBERG],
or the auth token request of [AAUTH-HARDT]. The resulting token,
already bound to the challenged operation, is the approval token.
* When the approver, or the party it relays to, may redeem the
challenge, the approver returns the token in the checkpoint
response.
* When only the performing agent may, as for an AAuth Scope
Challenge, the response carries only the outcome, and the
performing agent redeems the challenge.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
5.7. Resource Server Processing
A resource server that receives a token with an agent_action detail
MUST:
1. validate the token and its sender constraint;
2. verify that the request is the operation named by action, and
that its arguments are within what the detail approves, compared
as in Section 5.1.1:
* equal to each member of parameters that bounds does not name;
* less than or equal to a member named max;
* greater than or equal to a member named min; and
* a subset of a member named subset; and
3. accept the token for one request only, recording its jti until it
expires. A request refused for another reason does not consume
the token.
If a check fails, it rejects the request with the error
agent_action_not_authorized (Section 11). The error tells the
performing agent, and through it the approver, that the request
exceeded or contradicted the approved action, as distinct from
invalid_token or insufficient_scope (Section 5.3.2 of [OAUTH-2.1]).
6. Principal Confirmation
An agent's approval shows only that the agent agreed. A principal
confirmation proves that the principal itself approved one checkpoint
request: it is made with a key the principal holds, such as one in
the person's wallet or authenticator, and the principal's agent does
not (P10). The principal_confirmation member of a checkpoint
response is an object with these members:
format: REQUIRED. A value from the PACE Principal Confirmation
Formats registry (Section 11.3). This document defines those in
Table 5.
value: REQUIRED. The confirmation, encoded as the format specifies.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
+============+==============================+=======================+
| format | Confirmation | Bound to the request |
| | | by |
+============+==============================+=======================+
| oid4vp | A Verifiable | request_hash in the |
| | Presentation [OID4VP] | transaction data |
| | whose Key Binding JWT | |
| | covers a pace_checkpoint | |
| | transaction data object | |
+------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
| webauthn | A WebAuthn assertion | The challenge |
| | [WEBAUTHN] | |
+------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
| spc | A Secure Payment | The challenge |
| | Confirmation assertion | |
| | [SPC] | |
+------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
| ciba-token | An approval token issued | authorization_details |
| | after the person | with checkpoint_id |
| | approved through CIBA | (Section 5.1) |
| | [CIBA] | |
+------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
Table 5: Principal Confirmation Formats
6.1. Binding
The confirmation covers the request the response answers, identified
by request_hash. For approve-modified, the principal confirms the
modified action, and the binding value is instead the base64url-
encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS form of the request with its
parameters replaced by those of the response and its signature member
removed.
oid4vp: The requester, as verifier, sends a presentation request
whose transaction_data contains one pace_checkpoint object
(Section 6.2); it travels to the person's wallet with the
checkpoint, through the approver. The Key Binding JWT carries the
object's hash in transaction_data_hashes; its nonce is the
checkpoint request's nonce; its iat is the time of approval; and
its aud is the requester's participant identifier, because
[OID4VP] requires the verifier's Client Identifier there and the
requester uses its participant identifier as that value, with a
Client Identifier prefix that its wallet ecosystem accepts. The
value is the VP Token.
webauthn, spc: The challenge is the binding value, decoded from
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
base64url. The value is a JSON object with these members, each
base64url-encoded: credential_id, the WebAuthn credential ID; key,
the credential's COSE public key [WEBAUTHN]; and
authenticator_data, client_data_json, and signature, from the
assertion. The User Verified flag MUST be set when
required_assurance has level authenticated or higher. For spc,
the payment instrument and amount displayed to the person MUST
equal those in the request's parameters.
ciba-token: The token's authorization_details contain the request's
agent_action detail, with the same checkpoint_id; its acr and
auth_time claims give the assurance of the person's
authentication. It convinces only a requester that trusts the
issuing OpenID Provider, so it suits one trust domain or a
federation.
6.2. The pace_checkpoint Transaction Data Type
This document defines the [OID4VP] transaction data type
pace_checkpoint, with these members:
type: REQUIRED. The string pace_checkpoint.
credential_ids: REQUIRED. As [OID4VP] defines for every transaction
data object.
checkpoint_id, dialog_id: REQUIRED. Those of the checkpoint
request.
request_hash: REQUIRED. The binding value (Section 6).
transaction_data_hashes_alg: OPTIONAL, as [OID4VP] defines. When
present, it MUST include sha-256.
A wallet that receives a pace_checkpoint object MUST display the
action it describes and MUST NOT return a presentation covering it
unless the person approved. The verifier, which is the requester,
MUST, before accepting the presentation:
1. verify the presentation and its Key Binding JWT as [OID4VP] and
the credential format require, with nonce equal to the checkpoint
request's nonce and aud equal to the requester's participant
identifier;
2. verify that transaction_data_hashes contains the hash, with the
algorithm used, of the base64url-encoded pace_checkpoint object
it sent, as [OID4VP] specifies;
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
3. verify that the object's checkpoint_id and dialog_id equal those
of the checkpoint request, and that its request_hash equals the
binding value it computes itself from the request it sent and the
response it received; and
4. verify that the credential's confirmation key belongs to the
principal (Section 6.3).
A presentation that fails any check is treated as absent.
6.3. The Principal's Key
The verifier MUST establish that the confirming key belongs to the
principal, not to an agent. It accepts the key only when one of the
following relates it to the principal, under its trust policy:
* a credential issued to the person by an issuer the verifier
trusts, whose cnf is the confirming key, such as one presented
with oid4vp;
* a public key credential that the principal registered with the
verifier earlier, under the pairwise identifier by which the
verifier knows the principal; or
* for ciba-token, the OpenID Provider's assertion.
A key that is presented only in the agent's own credentials, or in a
credential whose subject is the agent, MUST NOT be accepted. A
relaying agent can deliver the confirmation but cannot produce it.
6.4. Assurance
The verifier checks max_age against the time of approval (iat for
oid4vp, its receipt of a fresh assertion for webauthn and spc, and
auth_time for ciba-token), and acr_values against the authentication
context the format reports or its policy assigns. A confirmation
that fails a check is treated as absent.
6.5. What the Person Sees
The wallet, authenticator, or OpenID Provider shows the action from
the signed request: from resource_challenge when present (P6), and
otherwise from action, parameters, and effect, not description alone.
For oid4vp, a wallet that displays transaction data displays the
pace_checkpoint object together with the checkpoint request.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
6.6. Checkpoints Addressed to the Principal
Some requests are meant for the person behind an agent, such as a
card issuer's authentication challenge or a bank confirming a
transfer, and the agent should neither read nor answer them. The
requester, which can be a tool, then encrypts the request to the
principal with these members:
encrypted_to: An object with kid, REQUIRED, the key identifier of
the principal's encryption key, and jwk, OPTIONAL, the key itself,
obtained from a credential that relates it to the principal
(Section 6.3).
encrypted: A JWE [RFC7516] in Compact Serialization, encrypted to
that key, whose plaintext is a JSON object with the members
action, parameters, effect, authorization_details, description,
and resource_challenge that would otherwise appear in the request,
and OPTIONAL response_key, the requester's public encryption key
as a JWK. These members are omitted from the outer object. The
requester MAY leave a copy of action in the clear for routing.
An encrypted request is for a principal confirmation, not for the
issuance of an approval token, so it MUST NOT carry actor_proof or
actor_token. The signature covers the outer object, including
encrypted. The approver is the principal's agent, or a participant
that represents the principal's device; the agent relays the request
to the device, which decrypts it. A request with encrypted_to MUST
carry required_assurance with from set to principal, so an approve or
approve-modified response is valid only with a principal confirmation
from the key holder. An agent MAY answer deny on its own, for
example when it cannot reach the person before the deadline.
The principal can answer approve-modified only when the request
carries response_key. The response then carries the modified
parameters only in encrypted: a JWE in Compact Serialization,
encrypted to response_key, whose plaintext is an object with the
member parameters. Because response_key travels inside the request's
encryption, a relaying agent cannot substitute it. The requester
decrypts the parameters and checks that they only narrow the request
(Section 4.5). For an encrypted request, the binding value of the
principal confirmation is computed over the request as decrypted: the
outer object with encrypted_to and encrypted replaced by the
plaintext members.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
Only the approver initiates CIBA (Section 5.3): when it cannot reach
the principal's device through the dialog, it can use CIBA through
the principal's OpenID Provider and answer with ciba-token. A
requester that can reach the principal without the agent does not
need a checkpoint; such contact is out of scope.
A tool that sends a later result of the work publishes it, as a
participant authenticated by its own credentials, in the dialog in
which it was invoked or, once that has ended, in a follow-up dialog
[PACE].
7. Agreements Between Principals
Agents acting for different principals, such as a consumer's agent
and a brand's agent, do not delegate to each other, but they still
need approvals from each other, a record of what their principals
agreed, and facts they can rely on. This section covers peer
checkpoints, commitments (P9), and assertions.
7.1. Peer Checkpoints
Agents of different principals also need approvals from each other,
although no delegation links them.
In such a dialog, either participant can publish a checkpoint request
naming the other as approver, for example when a brand's agent needs
the consumer to approve a refund's terms, or needs stronger or more
recent authentication of the consumer. The approver dialog parameter
does not restrict peer checkpoints, and the approver need not be the
controller.
The requester is the party that will act, and the approval gives it
no authority over the approver's resources. The request therefore
carries no actor_proof, and the response no approval token, unless
the action is performed at a resource that the approver's
authorization server protects.
The approver meets required_assurance within the dialog: when from is
participant, by presenting new credentials in its next control
message, such as DECLARE [PACE], bound to the request's nonce as
[PACE] describes for credentials, before it responds; when from is
principal, with a principal confirmation. A requester that receives
a response that does not meet required_assurance treats it as deny;
it MAY publish a new request without ending the dialog. An approver
that cannot or will not meet it answers deny with reason
insufficient-assurance [PACE].
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
The rules of Section 4 apply unchanged. Each side applies its own
policy, and a counterpart's cooperative posture [PACE], or its
declaration of agreement or low risk, never replaces a
required_assurance or a principal confirmation.
7.2. Commitments
Parties of different principals need to know what was agreed and that
each confirmed the same terms; an agent's statement that it is
satisfied does not show this. A commitment records terms such as a
refund, a rebooking, a price, or an action item, with an identifier
that every party's records can share (P9).
{
"type": "commitment",
"commitment_id": "2b9d4c7e-1f3a-4e8b-9c6d-5a0f7e2b8d14",
"dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"proposer": "brand-agent",
"parties": ["consumer-agent", "brand-agent"],
"terms": [{
"type": "agent_action",
"action": "refund",
"parameters": {"amount": "84.00", "currency": "EUR",
"order": "A-1093"}
}],
"terms_hash": "Qm9s...",
"cancel": {"until": "2026-11-14T09:00:00Z",
"terms": "Full reversal before the refund is issued"},
"expires_at": "2026-11-13T18:00:00Z",
"status": "proposed",
"confirmations": [],
"signature": "eyJ..."
}
type: REQUIRED. The string commitment.
commitment_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4, chosen by the proposer,
that identifies the commitment in every dialog and record,
including the commitments member of a PACE result [PACE].
dialog_id, proposer, parties: REQUIRED. The dialog, the participant
that published this object, and the participants bound by the
terms, including the proposer.
terms: REQUIRED. An array of RAR [RFC9396] authorization details,
such as agent_action details (Section 5.1).
terms_hash: REQUIRED. The base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the JCS
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[RFC8785] form of terms.
checkpoint_id: OPTIONAL. The checkpoint the commitment arises from,
if any.
cancel: OPTIONAL. Until when (until), and on what terms, the party
that performs the action can still cancel or reverse it. After
until, a PACE CANCEL of the work can report only completed,
partially-reversed, or irreversible [PACE].
expires_at: OPTIONAL. The time after which an unconfirmed
commitment lapses, with status expired.
status: REQUIRED. One of the values in Table 6.
confirmations: REQUIRED. An array of the signed checkpoint
responses that confirm the terms: empty when first proposed, and
one or more per party once each has confirmed.
signature: REQUIRED. As for checkpoints (Section 4.3), made by the
proposer.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
+==========================+==================================+
| status | Meaning |
+==========================+==================================+
| proposed | Published; not yet confirmed by |
| | every party |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| pending-principal | Every party's agent confirmed, |
| | but a confirmation required from |
| | a principal is outstanding |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| confirmed | Every required confirmation is |
| | present |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| rejected | A party denied it |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| unconfirmed-counterparty | Confirmed by the proposer's |
| | side, but a party had assurance |
| | level none [PACE] when it agreed |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| cancelled | Cancelled under cancel, or |
| | withdrawn before confirmation |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
| expired | expires_at passed before every |
| | required confirmation was |
| | present |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------+
Table 6: Commitment Status
7.2.1. Confirming
The proposer obtains each confirmation with a checkpoint request to
the party, with action commit and parameters {"commitment_id": ...,
"terms_hash": ...}: a peer checkpoint (Section 7.1) for the other
parties, and an ordinary one for its own approver. A party confirms
by answering approve; approve-modified is not allowed, and a party
that wants different terms denies and proposes a new commitment. At
each change, the proposer republishes the commitment with the same
commitment_id, a new status, and the confirmations so far. Every
party verifies each confirmation against terms_hash before relying on
the status.
Which confirmations are required follows from each party's policy and
the posture of the dialog [PACE]:
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
* When the parties act for different principals and the posture is
adversarial, each checkpoint request MUST carry required_assurance
with from set to principal, so the commitment becomes confirmed
only with a principal confirmation from each principal, each bound
to the same terms_hash (P9).
* When the posture is cooperative, each party decides from its own
policy whether its agent's confirmation suffices, for example for
low-risk terms within the commit_scope that agent declared [PACE].
* An agent that confirms terms within its commit_scope but beyond
what it may confirm alone answers with its own confirmation and
leaves the status pending-principal. The principal's confirmation
or denial follows later, referring to the same commitment_id, in
the same dialog or in a follow-up dialog [PACE].
* A commitment with a party whose assurance level is none, such as a
person on a telephone line without a credential, is unconfirmed-
counterparty until that party confirms it in a later authenticated
exchange.
7.3. Assertions
Parties rely on facts they cannot check themselves, such as a
carrier's proof of delivery or a payment provider's refund status.
An assertion carries such a fact and says who stands behind it.
{
"type": "assertion",
"assertion_id": "9e4a0c1b-6d2f-4a7e-8b3c-1f5d9e0a2c47",
"dialog_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"claim": {"delivered": true, "shipment": "1Z999",
"at": "2026-11-10T14:02:00Z"},
"asserted_by": "brand-agent",
"attested_by": "https://carrier.example",
"evidence": {"format": "sd-jwt-vc", "value": "eyJ..."},
"signature": "eyJ..."
}
type: REQUIRED. The string assertion.
assertion_id: REQUIRED. A UUID version 4, listed in the sources of
a PACE result [PACE] that relies on it.
dialog_id: REQUIRED. The dialog in which the assertion is
published.
claim: REQUIRED. The fact, as a JSON object.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
asserted_by: REQUIRED. The participant that publishes the
assertion.
attested_by, evidence: OPTIONAL, and present together. The issuer
identifier of a third party that attests the claim, and its signed
statement: with format jws, a JWS [RFC7515] by that issuer whose
payload, in JCS form, equals claim; with format sd-jwt-vc, an SD-
JWT VC [SD-JWT-VC] whose iss is attested_by and whose disclosed
claims include every member of claim with the same values.
signature: REQUIRED. As for checkpoints (Section 4.3), made by
asserted_by.
An assertion without attested_by is the sender's own statement, and
receivers MUST treat it as such, as they would a statement in
content. A receiver that relies on an attested assertion MUST verify
the evidence with the issuer's key, obtained under its own trust
policy, for example from the issuer's SD-JWT VC issuer metadata. It
MUST treat an assertion whose evidence fails verification, or does
not match claim, as the sender's own statement. A relaying
participant relays an assertion unmodified, and can only add its own
assertion citing it. A delegated party, such as a payment provider
in a dialog opened by a brand, reports its outcome as an assertion,
so the brand's outcome to the consumer can cite it.
8. Evidence
A deployment that needs approvals and actions to be checkable by
parties other than the operator adds an evidence mechanism; PACE
authorization does not mandate one. Such a mechanism SHOULD record:
* each OPEN of a delegated dialog, with its parent_dialog_ids and
the hash of the delegation credential presented;
* each checkpoint request and response, in its signed form;
* each action performed under an approval, referencing the response
that approved it;
* each commitment (Section 7.2) at each change of status, with its
confirmations;
* each assertion (Section 7.3) that a result cites;
* each SEGMENT start and end [PACE], without the segment's content;
and
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
* each disclosure that a participant is an AI agent, such as the
DECLARE of its kind [PACE] or the announcement a telephone gateway
plays, with its time.
TRAIL [TRAIL] is one such mechanism: its gate-request and approval
records can carry checkpoints, and its record of the action cites the
approval. For HTTP calls along a chain, aggregate signatures
[AGG-SIG] attribute changes to each hop.
9. Security Considerations
The considerations of [PACE] apply. The threats below are specific
to delegation and approval.
Confused deputy: A credential or approval token is used for a
different dialog, resource, or action. Mitigated by message
binding (P1), single-action tokens bound to the performing agent's
key (P5), and resource-side parameter checks.
Approval spoofing by an intermediate agent: A relaying agent forges
an approval or alters the request. Mitigated by signatures,
request_hash, and relaying the original signed request (P4, P5).
Checkpoint substitution: An approval for one checkpoint is presented
for another. Mitigated by request_hash, checkpoint_id, and the
single-response rule (P5, P7).
Prompt injection through descriptions: A crafted description
misleads the approver. Mitigated by resource challenges (P6), and
otherwise by presenting parameters and effect, which the approval
token enforces.
Self-approval: Forbidden (Section 4.5), and detectable because the
response is signed by the approver named in the request.
Approval fatigue: Approvers asked too often approve without reading.
Approvers SHOULD resolve routine checkpoints by policy and reserve
human approval for actions with significant effects.
Issuer redirection: An approver could name, in actor-proof-required,
an issuer of its choosing to collect actor proofs and tokens. The
performing agent sends proofs only to issuers the controller named
or it trusts (Section 5.5), and aud and azh bind each proof to one
issuer and one action.
Replay across instances: Instances that keep separate records of
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
accepted identifiers defeat single-use rules. The jti record is
shared (Section 5.4), and resources apply the same rule to
approval tokens.
Stale authority: Work continues after revocation. Mitigated by
terminating dependent dialogs (P8), short credential lifetimes,
and enforcement points outside the agent, such as a TRAIL edge.
An agent posing as its principal: Mitigated by principal
confirmations with a key related to the principal (P10) and by
encrypted requests (Section 6.6). A relaying agent can still
withhold a request; the deadline bounds the delay.
Misleading confirmation display: The confirmation is bound to the
request, or the modified request, and the display comes from the
signed request or resource challenge; for spc, the displayed
amount and instrument must equal parameters.
Assurance downgrade: A counterpart declares a cooperative posture or
low risk to obtain weaker confirmation. Each party sets
required_assurance from its own policy (Section 7.1).
Commitment substitution and agreement by self-report: Every
confirmation is bound to terms_hash, a change of terms is a new
commitment, and only bound confirmations complete a commitment,
never an agent's claimed satisfaction or reported scores (P9).
Assertion laundering: An unverifiable or mismatched attestation is
treated as the sender's own statement (Section 7.3).
Onward delegation under own authority: A receiver does not accept
onward delegation from a participant that declared authority_basis
own (Section 3.3).
10. Privacy Considerations
Delegation chains reveal intermediate agents to later hops, and
checkpoints can carry personal data in parameters. Deployments
SHOULD use pseudonymous originators (Section 3.3), protect checkpoint
objects end to end as [PACE] describes for content, and include in a
checkpoint only what the approver needs. A resource challenge that
carries parameters by digest, as R3 does, hides them from
intermediate agents.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
When a delegated dialog crosses into a domain whose agents should not
learn which dialog it continues, the delegating participant MAY omit
parent_dialog_ids from OPEN and keep the link locally, as
[DIALOG-BINDING] does across trust boundaries. Lifecycle propagation
still works, because the controller holds the link; the receiver then
relies on the delegation chain alone for cycle detection.
A principal confirmation identifies the principal to the verifier. A
principal that should not be linked across counterparties uses per-
verifier keys and credentials, such as pairwise passkeys or batch-
issued credentials, and discloses only the claims the verifier needs.
Encrypted requests (Section 6.6) hide their parameters from relaying
agents.
Every participant can read terms and claim. Parties include only
what the counterpart needs, use SD-JWT VC selective disclosure for
attested claims, and, where some participants must not see the terms,
agree in a segment [PACE] limited to the parties.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. OAuth Extensions Error Registry
* Name: agent_action_not_authorized
* Usage Location: resource access error response
* Protocol Extension: this document
* Change Controller: IETF
* Reference: Section 5.7
11.2. PACE Dialog Parameters
If [PACE] establishes a registry of dialog parameters, this document
registers approver, approval_issuer (Section 5.2), and
authority_basis (Section 3.3) in it.
11.3. PACE Authorization Registries
This document asks IANA to create the following registries in the
"Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE)" group that [PACE]
creates, each with the Specification Required policy [RFC8126]. Each
entry has a value, a description, and a reference.
* PACE Checkpoint Outcomes (Section 4.5): approve, approve-modified,
deny, and actor-proof-required.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
* PACE Principal Confirmation Formats (Section 6): oid4vp, webauthn,
spc, and ciba-token.
* PACE Resource Challenge Formats (Section 4.4): oauth-txn-
challenge, aauth-scope-challenge, and aauth-resource-token.
The initial values reference this document.
11.4. OpenID4VP Transaction Data Type
[OID4VP] identifies transaction data types by string and has no IANA
registry. If the OpenID Foundation or IANA establishes one,
pace_checkpoint (Section 6.2) is to be registered with:
* Type: pace_checkpoint
* Description: Approval of one PACE checkpoint request, bound by its
request hash
* Change Controller: IETF
* Reference: Section 6.2
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[ACTOR-BOUND]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange
with Actor-Bound Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-
00, November 2026, .
[ACTOR-PROFILE]
McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-
profile-01, 8 October 2026,
.
[DIALOG-BINDING]
Reddy.K, T. and Z. Sarker, "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE
and OAuth Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00, 30 October
2026, .
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[OAUTH-2.1]
Hardt, D., Parecki, A., and T. Lodderstedt, "The OAuth 2.1
Authorization Framework", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-17, 30 October 2026,
.
[OID4VP] Terbu, O., Lodderstedt, T., Yasuda, K., Fett, D., and J.
Heenan, "OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0", July
2025, .
[PACE] Nandakumar, S. and C. F. Jennings, "PACE: Protocol for
Agent Communication Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01, 16 November
2026, .
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, .
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
.
[RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0
Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023,
.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, .
[SPC] W3C, "Secure Payment Confirmation", 2025,
.
[WEBAUTHN] W3C, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key
Credentials Level 3", 2025,
.
[WPT-MSG] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Message Binding for
Workload Proof Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00, November
2026, .
12.2. Informative References
[A2A] Linux Foundation, "Agent-to-Agent Protocol Specification",
Version 1.0, 2025, .
[AAUTH-HARDT]
Hardt, D., "AAuth Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11, 25 September
2026, .
[AAUTH-R3] Hardt, D., "AAuth Rich Resource Requests (R3)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-aauth-r3-00, 28
September 2026, .
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[AAUTH-ROSENBERG]
Rosenberg, J. and P. White, "AAuth - Agentic Authorization
OAuth 2.1 Extension", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-rosenberg-oauth-aauth-02, 1 November 2026,
.
[AGENT-DELEGATION]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Delegator-Bound
Delegation Chains for AI Agents", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-
chains-00, November 2026,
.
[AGG-SIG] Reddy.K, T., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer,
"Authenticated Provenance for WIMSE Delegation Chains",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse-
aggregate-signatures-01, 28 September 2026,
.
[AIMS] Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management
System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
wimse-aims-01, 2 November 2026,
.
[BOUNDED-WORK]
Liu, D. and K. McGuinness, "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work
Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, 17 October 2026,
.
[CIBA] Fernandez, G., Walter, F., Nennker, A., Tonge, D., and B.
Campbell, "OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel
Authentication Flow - Core 1.0", September 2021,
.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[CROSS-ORG]
Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload
and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-
org-delegation-02, 31 August 2026,
.
[DELEGATE-SD-JWT]
Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-
jwt-00, 30 October 2026,
.
[DELEGATION-TOKENS]
Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent
Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-
wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, 27 October 2026,
.
[DIALOG-UC]
Siyavud, F., "Agentic Dialog Use Cases", November 2026.
[DTR] de Oliveira Niero, G. and D. Liu, "Deferred Token
Response", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-deferred-token-response-01, 31 October 2026,
.
[ID-CHAINING]
Schwenkschuster, A., Kasselman, P., Burgin, K., Jenkins,
M. J., Campbell, B., and A. Parecki, "OAuth Identity and
Authorization Chaining Across Domains", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, 19
July 2026, .
[MCP] Linux Foundation, "Model Context Protocol Specification",
Version 2026-07-28, July 2026,
.
[POPPY] Sierra and Meta, "Personal Agent Protocol (Poppy)
Specification", Version Draft 0.3, 2026,
.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[RAR-NARROWING]
Nandakumar, S., "Comparing OAuth Authorization Details",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-
rar-narrowing-00, November 2026,
.
[REVOCATION-EVENTS]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Security Events for
Revocation of Agent Delegations", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-
revocation-events-00, November 2026,
.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, .
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
.
[RFC9470] Bertocci, V. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Step Up
Authentication Challenge Protocol", RFC 9470,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9470, September 2023,
.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
.
[ROUGHTIME]
Ladd, W. and M. Dansarie, "Roughtime: A Protocol for Rough
Time Synchronization", RFC 10049, DOI 10.17487/RFC10049,
October 2026, .
[SD-CARD] Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Agent SD-Card: Selective
Disclosure of Agent Metadata for Discovery and
Authentication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
nandakumar-agent-sd-card-00, October 2026,
.
[SD-JWT-VC]
Terbu, O., Fett, D., and B. Campbell, "SD-JWT-based
Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-27,
16 November 2026, .
[STATUS-LIST]
Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
.
[TRAIL] Nassar, K., Nandakumar, S., and C. F. Jennings, "TRAIL:
Tamper-evident Records for Agent Interactions and
Liveness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nassar-
agentproto-trail-00, 2 November 2026,
.
[TXN-AT] Tulshibagwale, A., "Transactional Access Tokens", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tulshi-oauth-
transactional-access-tokens-00, 29 September 2026,
.
[TXN-CHAINING]
Fletcher, G., Kasselman, P., and S. O'Dell, "Transaction
Token JWT Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity
and Authorization Chaining", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-fletcher-oauth-txn-token-chaining-profile-01,
26 October 2026, .
[TXN-CHALLENGE]
Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., McGuinness, K., and P.
Kasselman, "OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rosomakho-oauth-
txn-challenge-01, 2 November 2026,
.
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
[TXN-TOKENS]
Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
"Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
.
[UCREQ] Reddy.K, T., Sarker, Z., and K. Yao, "Agentic AI Use Cases
and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07, 2 November
2026, .
[WIMSE-CREDS]
Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A.,
Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload
Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03, 30 October 2026,
.
[WIMSE-WPT]
Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof
Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026,
.
Appendix A. Survey of Related Work
This appendix lists related work, what each solves, and what it
leaves to this document. Section 1.1 shows how the mechanisms this
document uses fit together.
+==========================+====================+==================+
| Work | Solves | Leaves to this |
| | | document |
+==========================+====================+==================+
| WIMSE credentials | Workload identity; | Use in |
| [WIMSE-CREDS], WPT | proof of | delegation; the |
| [WIMSE-WPT], message | possession for | profile for |
| binding [WPT-MSG] | HTTP and for | control messages |
| | messages | is in [PACE] |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Dialog binding | Binding HTTP | Dialog |
| [DIALOG-BINDING] | requests and Txn- | lifecycle; |
| | Tokens to an agent | delegation |
| | dialog | across domains |
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| DPoP [RFC9449], mTLS | Sender-constrained | None |
| [RFC8705] | tokens | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Token Exchange | A token for | Carrying the |
| [RFC8693], actor-bound | another party, | request between |
| token exchange | bound to its key | agents |
| [ACTOR-BOUND] | | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Actor Profile | Meaning and | Binding to a |
| [ACTOR-PROFILE] | validation of act | dialog |
| | chains | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Transaction Tokens | Call context | Crossing domains |
| [TXN-TOKENS] | within one trust | |
| | domain | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Identity chaining | A new token per | Peer delegation |
| [ID-CHAINING], Hardt | hop from a server | without a server |
| AAuth [AAUTH-HARDT] | at each boundary | |
| | or the person's | |
| | server; missions | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Delegation Tokens | Offline-verifiable | Binding to a |
| [DELEGATION-TOKENS], | attenuation, each | dialog |
| delegator-bound chains | hop signed by its | |
| [AGENT-DELEGATION], | delegator | |
| Delegate SD-JWT | | |
| [DELEGATE-SD-JWT] | | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| SD-Card [SD-CARD], SD- | Selective | None |
| JWT [RFC9901] | disclosure of | |
| | agent claims | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| RAR [RFC9396] | Fine-grained | None |
| | authorization | |
| | details | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Rosenberg AAuth | A resource-signed | Carrying it |
| [AAUTH-ROSENBERG], Txn | challenge for one | between agents; |
| Challenge | call, and a narrow | approval by a |
| [TXN-CHALLENGE], R3 | token for it | delegating agent |
| [AAUTH-R3], step-up | | |
| [RFC9470] | | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Deferred Token Response | Waiting at the | A deadline set |
| [DTR] | authorization | by the requester |
| | server for an | |
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
| | approval, and | |
| | cancelling it | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Transactional Access | Short-lived per- | Single use; |
| Tokens [TXN-AT] | transaction tokens | issuance driven |
| | | by the approver |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Token Status List | Credential status, | Effect on |
| [STATUS-LIST], | and revocation | dialogs |
| revocation [RFC7009], | pushed down a | |
| Shared Signals ([AIMS]), | chain | |
| revocation events | | |
| [REVOCATION-EVENTS] | | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| Bounded Work | Authority that | Propagation |
| [BOUNDED-WORK] | ends with the unit | along dialogs |
| | of work it was | |
| | approved for | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| A2A [A2A], MCP [MCP], | Native approval | A common, signed |
| Poppy [POPPY] | prompts | form |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
| TRAIL [TRAIL], aggregate | Tamper-evident | None |
| signatures [AGG-SIG] | records; per-hop | |
| | provenance over | |
| | HTTP | |
+--------------------------+--------------------+------------------+
Table 7: Related Work
A.1. What Existing Work Leaves Open
Delegation mechanisms differ in who asserts the chain: an
authorization server (Token Exchange, Transaction Tokens); a server
at each boundary, or the person's server (identity chaining, Hardt
AAuth, which does not require downstream authority to be a subset of
upstream authority, Section 10.1 of [AAUTH-HARDT]); or each
delegator, signing its narrowed delegation to the next agent's key
(Delegation Tokens extended by delegator-bound chains, and Delegate
SD-JWT). Delegation across organizations with no server in the path
needs the third kind [CROSS-ORG]. Each fits a different deployment,
so this document requires properties (Section 2) rather than one
format (Section 3.2).
Approval mechanisms (Rosenberg AAuth, Txn Challenge, R3) share a
pattern: a resource refuses a risky call with a signed description of
it, the call is approved, and an authorization server issues a narrow
token for it. Each assumes that the agent receiving the challenge
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
can take it to the approver. In a PACE deployment the approver is
often another agent, which may relay to its own principal.
[TXN-CHALLENGE] asks for a protocol that carries the challenge
unmodified between agents (Section 4.5 of [TXN-CHALLENGE]), and
[AIMS] notes that confirmation in the middle of a task is not
standardized and that a confirmation obtained outside OAuth must
become an authorization event. Checkpoints (Section 4) and approval
tokens (Section 5) fill that gap, and also cover actions that no
resource challenged.
Appendix B. Requirements Addressed
+====================================+=============================+
| Requirement | Addressed by |
+====================================+=============================+
| A1-9 delegation without the | Section 5, Section 3.2 |
| client's primary credentials | |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2-2 checkpoint request describing | Section 4.2, Section 4.4 |
| the action and its effect | |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2-3 approve, deny, approve with | Section 4.5 |
| modification | |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2-4 response timeout | Section 4.6 |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2-5 approval covers only that | Section 4.5, Section 5 |
| action | |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B2-6 per-operation authorization | Section 5 |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3-1, B3-4, B3-8 narrowing at each | Section 3.3 |
| hop | |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3-2 originator identity | Section 3.3 |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3-3 verifiable chain | Section 3.2 with |
| | [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and |
| | [AGENT-DELEGATION] |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3-6 provenance | Section 8 |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| B3-7 cycles | Section 3.4 |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| CMN-4 scope violation error | scope-exceeded ([PACE]); |
| | agent_action_not_authorized |
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| CMN-10 revocation along a chain | Section 3.5 |
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
+------------------------------------+-----------------------------+
Table 8: Requirements Addressed
The following requirements are from [DIALOG-UC].
+======================================+==========================+
| Requirement | Addressed by |
+======================================+==========================+
| UC1-1 assurance and authentication | required_assurance |
| age required mid-dialog | (Section 7.1) |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC1-2 approval verifiable as given | Section 6 (P10) |
| by the human principal | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC1-5 identifier for each commitment | commitment_id |
| | (Section 7.2) |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC1-6 cooperative path never lowers | Section 7.1, Section 7.2 |
| assurance | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC4-2 authority limited to one | authority_basis |
| action; own or onward delegation | (Section 3.3) |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC4-3 outcomes keep the source of | Section 7.3 |
| each fact | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC6-1 cancellation window and terms | cancel (Section 7.2) |
| before commit | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC8-4 commitment unconfirmed by an | unconfirmed-counterparty |
| unauthenticated counterparty | (Section 7.2) |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC10-2 commitment pending the | pending-principal |
| principal's confirmation | (Section 7.2) |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC12-1 request to the principal that | Section 6.6 |
| the agent cannot read or answer | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC12-2 later result from a tool, | Section 6.6 |
| authenticated as the tool | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC12-3 answer verifiable as from the | Section 6 |
| person | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC14-2 asserted versus attested | Section 7.3 |
| claims | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft PACE Authorization November 2026
| UC14-3 agreement completed by both | Section 7.2 (P9) |
| principals' approvals | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
| UC14-4 no selection from self- | Section 7.2 (P9) |
| reported scores | |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 9: Dialog Use Case Requirements Addressed
Acknowledgments
This document builds on the OAuth, WIMSE, and agent protocol work it
references, and on the requirements in [UCREQ].
Authors' Addresses
Suhas Nandakumar
Cisco
Email: snandaku@cisco.com
Cullen Jennings
Cisco Systems
Email: fluffy@cisco.com
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 56]