<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.39 (Ruby 3.4.10) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-morrison-acts-for-02" category="info" submissionType="independent" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.32.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Acts-For">Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-acts-for-02"/>
    <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
      <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>blake@truealter.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <abstract>
      

<t>Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they
already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website
on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an
account per site. A website joins by publishing
one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect
authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token
naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a
short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and
presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the
agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the
limits the person set. The site
checks it against a published key and calls nobody.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Most websites ask a person to register with a username, a password
and an email address to confirm. Single sign-on from a large
provider removes the password but ties the person to that provider and
gives every site the same identifier for them. An agent that has to
place an order or book a table for a person either holds the person's
password, which it should never be given, or stops and hands the task
back.</t>
      <t>Under Acts-For the person signs in with a ~handle they already hold
(<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 2). A website that wants to accept it publishes one
DNS record. That record proves the site controls its domain and
registers the site as a client in the same step. From then on:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a person clicks "Sign in with ~alter" and confirms with a passkey.
The site learns a number that identifies the person to that site
only. It learns the person's ~handle or email only if the person
shares them;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>an agent the person has authorised asks for a pass for that site
over MCP and presents it. The pass names the person by the same
per-site number and the agent by its ~handle and by a number and key
of its own for that site. The site then knows
who the person is to it and which agent is acting.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Out of scope are how a person obtains a ~handle, how the person grants
authority to an agent (only the grant's effect on the pass is
specified here), payment, and anything the site does after sign-in.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-terminology">
      <name>Conventions and Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

<dl>
        <dt>~handle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An identifier as defined in <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 2, with the grammar of
<tt>handle-name</tt> in <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.3, and the tiers of
<xref target="IDCOMMITS"/>, Section 3. The tier is read from the lexical form alone:
a trailing <tt>.bot</tt> is the Bot tier, a leading <tt>cc-</tt> is the Instrument
tier, and anything else is the Sovereign tier. Where this document
names a ~handle as a reference it is written as an <tt>alter:</tt> URI
<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> does.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Person:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A human who holds a Sovereign-tier ~handle. Where an Agent signs in
for a Person, the Person is the original principal in the sense of
<xref target="AGENTPROTO"/>, Section 6.2.1.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Software acting for a Person under scoped delegation, holding its own
signing key and its own Bot-tier ~handle (<xref target="IDCOMMITS"/>, Section 3).
An Instrument-tier ~handle is never an Agent under this document,
because it has no envelope of its own and is not an independent
principal (<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.4).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A website that accepts sign-in under this document. Its operator is
the Site owner.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site handle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The Sovereign-tier ~handle a Site receives when its record verifies
(<xref target="produces"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The service that authenticates the Person, issues tokens and passes,
and publishes the keys that verify them. In the deployment described
in <xref target="impl"/> this is ~alter.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site record:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The DNS TXT record of <xref target="record"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Per-site subject:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The identifier the Issuer gives a Person for one Site (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Acts-for pass:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The token an Agent presents to a Site (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Floor key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The Issuer's Ed25519 key that signs acts-for passes, published at the
Issuer's <tt>/.well-known/alter-keys.json</tt> (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Collective:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Site handle held by more than one Person (<xref target="produces"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <figure anchor="fig-overview">
        <name>Acts-For in one picture</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
 Site                DNS              Issuer             Person / Agent
     |                |                  |                     |
     | 1. publish _alter record          |                     |
     |--------------->|                  |                     |
     | 2. verify      |                  |                     |
     |---------------------------------->|                     |
     |                | 3. read record   |                     |
     |                |<-----------------|                     |
     |   4. Site registered as a client  |                     |
     |<----------------------------------|                     |
     |                                   |                     |
     |  Person: 5. click, passkey, consent (OIDC + PKCE)       |
     |<------------------------------------------------------->|
     |  6. ID token, sub = per-site subject                    |
     |                                                         |
     |  Agent: 7. ask for an acts-for pass over MCP            |
     |                                   |<--------------------|
     |  8. present pass, signed by the Agent's key             |
     |<--------------------------------------------------------|
     |  9. verify pass against the Issuer's published key      |
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>Steps 1 to 4 happen once per Site, done by the Site owner. Steps 5 and 6 are the Person
signing in. Steps 7 to 9 are an Agent signing in for the Person.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="record">
      <name>The Site Record</name>
      <section anchor="location-and-format">
        <name>Location and Format</name>
        <t>A Site joins by publishing one TXT record at the label <tt>_alter</tt>
prepended to its domain <xref target="RFC8552"/>, as the envelope record of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
_alter.riverbakery.example. IN TXT
  "v=alter1; h=~riverbakery.example; pk=ed25519:<key>; ilr=<digest>;
   ts=<unix-seconds>; rev=<digest>; sig=<signature>; code=<code>"
]]></artwork>
        <t>The fields <tt>v</tt>, <tt>h</tt>, <tt>pk</tt>, <tt>ilr</tt>, <tt>ts</tt>, <tt>rev</tt> and <tt>sig</tt> are the
envelope of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7, signed over the input of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>,
Section 7.4, with these values:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>h</tt> is the Site handle (<xref target="handle"/>), with its leading tilde as
<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.2 requires;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pk</tt> is an Ed25519 public key <xref target="RFC8032"/> generated on the Site owner's
device. The private key <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> leave that device;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>ilr</tt> is, as built, the base64url <xref target="RFC4648"/> SHA-256 of the JSON
canonical form <xref target="RFC8785"/> of the object with members <tt>h</tt>, <tt>domain</tt>
and <tt>ts</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>rev</tt> is the SHA-256 of a revocation pre-image held by the Site
owner.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The record also carries one field <xref target="MCPDNS"/> does not define, <tt>code</tt>, a
one-time code the Issuer hands the Site owner when the claim starts.
<tt>code</tt> sits outside the signed input. The same signed envelope can be
published again with a new code and no new signature. A resolver
that implements <xref target="MCPDNS"/> alone ignores it (<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.5).</t>
        <t><tt>ilr</tt> and <tt>code</tt> do not conform to <xref target="MCPDNS"/>. Its Section 7.3.4 defines
<tt>ilr</tt> as the digest of an IdentityLog root, and its Section 7.5 forbids
repurposing a required field and admits a new field only with a new
envelope version. Here <tt>ilr</tt> is a binding digest and <tt>code</tt> is a new
field under <tt>v=alter1</tt>. See <xref target="open"/>, item 3.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="handle">
        <name>The Site Handle</name>
        <t>The Site handle is <tt>~</tt> followed by the Site's domain, in lowercase, in
its A-label form <xref target="RFC5890"/>, with no trailing dot. The domain the record
proves is its zone, and the Site handle's dispatchable reference
carries that zone as its <tt>org-scope</tt>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
alter:~riverbakery.example@riverbakery.example
]]></artwork>
        <t>The spelling of a Site handle never establishes its zone. A party
that reads <tt>~riverbakery.example</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> resolve it against the
<tt>riverbakery.example</tt> zone on the strength of its characters
(<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 6.9; <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 12.3). Only the verified
record, or a reference that carries the zone, does.</t>
        <t>A domain whose Site handle would not be a Sovereign-tier
<tt>handle-name</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be enrolled. That excludes:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a domain whose first label begins with a digit, since <tt>handle-name</tt>
does not admit it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a domain whose first label begins with <tt>cc-</tt>, since its Site handle
reads as an Instrument-tier handle;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a domain under the <tt>bot</tt> top-level domain, since its Site handle
reads as a Bot-tier handle.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>See <xref target="open"/>, item 10.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify">
        <name>Verification</name>
        <t>The Issuer verifies a Site record when the Site owner asks it to, and
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check all of the following:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>the record parses as an envelope with every required field;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>sig</tt> verifies under <tt>pk</tt> over the envelope's canonical signing
input;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>h</tt> equals the ~handle being claimed;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>ts</tt> is within seven days of the start of the claim, with five
minutes allowed for clock skew;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>ilr</tt> equals the value computed from <tt>h</tt>, the domain and <tt>ts</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the digest of <tt>code</tt> equals the digest the Issuer stored when the
claim started. The Issuer stores only the digest.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The first record to verify wins and clears every other pending claim
on that domain. DNSSEC validation is reported but not required. This
conflicts with <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 8. That section requires a signed zone
for every record at this label, and requires an onboarding wizard or
recognition verifier to treat a record read over an unvalidated path
as unauthenticated TXT. A Site handle from an unsigned zone also fails
step 2 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 12.3 and step 3 of <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.4.
The Issuer accepted it and no third party can verify it. See <xref target="open"/>,
item 1.</t>
        <t>A Site record already published under the same <tt>pk</tt> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be accepted in
place of a new one, without a new <tt>code</tt>, when the claimant proves
possession of the matching private key. This lets a Site owner who has
set up once, on the same device, add a second domain or return without
editing DNS again.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="produces">
        <name>What Verification Produces</name>
        <t>A verified Site record produces, in one step:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the Site handle (<xref target="handle"/>), owned by the Site owner's own ~handle
as a sole-owned entity. An owner who does not already hold a
~handle claims one in the same flow, and the Site is paired to a
Person from the start. When a second Person joins, the Site handle
becomes a collective and is held under the collective's own rules.
Members of a collective need not all hold the same permissions. Only
the owner can change the Site's client;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an OAuth 2.0 client <xref target="RFC6749"/> for the Site. The client is public
(<tt>token_endpoint_auth_method</tt> is <tt>none</tt>), its scopes are <tt>openid</tt> and
<tt>profile</tt>, and its single redirect URI is one exact <tt>https</tt> address
on the proven domain or its <tt>www.</tt> name, with no wildcard, port,
user information or fragment.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The Site needs no separate client registration <xref target="RFC7591"/>.</t>
        <t>A Person who signs in to a Site, or for whom an Agent signs in, is the
Site's counterparty. Sign-in never makes a Person a member of the Site
handle.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="person">
      <name>Person Sign-In</name>
      <section anchor="on-the-page">
        <name>On the Page</name>
        <t>The Site embeds a button and a script:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
<div data-alter-sign-in></div>
<script src="https://issuer.example/sign-in/v1.js"
        integrity="sha384-<hash>" crossorigin="anonymous"
        data-client-id="<client_id>"
        data-return-page="https://riverbakery.example/callback"
        data-issuer="https://issuer.example"
        data-authorize="https://issuer.example/authorize"></script>
]]></artwork>
        <t>The script is pinned by its integrity hash. A changed script is
published at a new path.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-flow">
        <name>The Flow</name>
        <t>The flow is the OpenID Connect authorization code flow <xref target="OIDC"/> with
PKCE <xref target="RFC7636"/>, method <tt>S256</tt>, a one-time <tt>state</tt> and a <tt>nonce</tt>. The
Person confirms with a passkey at the Issuer, and the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
require user verification <xref target="WEBAUTHN"/>. That one gesture is two factors,
the device held and the fingerprint, face or PIN that unlocks it. The
Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ask for it on every sign-in to a Site, including when the
Person already has a session at the Issuer. At the consent step the
Person <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> switch on sharing their ~handle, their email, or both. These
travel as the scopes <tt>handle</tt> and <tt>email</tt>, and only the consent step can
add them. <tt>email</tt> is the scope of <xref target="OIDC"/>, Section 5.4. Neither scope
carries an <tt>alter:</tt> prefix, because a scope token with one would read
as an <tt>alter:</tt> URI <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, and a scope is not one.</t>
        <t>The Site receives:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>an ID token, signed RS256 <xref target="RFC7518"/> by the Issuer, with <tt>iss</tt> the Issuer,
<tt>aud</tt> the client identifier, a lifetime of one hour, <tt>sub</tt> the
per-site subject (<xref target="subject"/>), <tt>verified</tt> set to <tt>yes</tt>, the same
band the acts-for pass carries (<xref target="pass"/>), and <tt>handle</tt> and <tt>email</tt>
only where the Person switched them on. <tt>email</tt> and <tt>email_verified</tt>
are the claims of <xref target="OIDC"/>, Section 5.1. <tt>handle</tt> carries the Person's
~handle in the bare form of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.2. <tt>auth_time</tt> is
the time of the passkey confirmation for this sign-in, never the time
the token was minted, and <tt>amr</tt> <xref target="RFC8176"/> lists the methods that
confirmation used;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an opaque access token, valid for 600 seconds, accepted only at the
userinfo endpoint. No refresh token is issued. It suits one read of
userinfo at sign-in.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The Site <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the ID token's signature against the Issuer's
published JSON Web Key Set <xref target="RFC7517"/> before acting on it. Checking <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>,
<tt>exp</tt> and <tt>nonce</tt> in the browser is not enough.</t>
        <t>A <tt>sub</tt> the Site has seen before is a returning Person. A <tt>sub</tt> it has
not seen is a new Person, and the Site opens the account from this
sign-in with no registration form.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject">
        <name>The Per-Site Subject</name>
        <t>The per-site subject is a pairwise identifier in the sense of <xref target="OIDC"/>,
Section 8.1. It is the lowercase base32 <xref target="RFC4648"/> encoding of the
first 20 bytes of an HMAC-SHA256 <xref target="RFC2104"/>, keyed by an Issuer secret,
over a fixed label, the Person's internal identifier and the Site's
domain, each prefixed by its length as a four-byte big-endian integer.</t>
        <t>The domain is normalised once before use, and the same normalised
form is the pass's <tt>aud</tt>. It is lowercased, one trailing dot is
removed, it is taken in its A-label form <xref target="RFC5890"/>, and then one
leading <tt>www.</tt> is removed. The fold is applied exactly once, because it
is not idempotent: <tt>www.www.example</tt> names the Site <tt>www.example</tt>.</t>
        <t>The per-site subject never begins with <tt>~</tt> and can never be read as a
~handle.</t>
        <t>A Person has the same subject at a Site whether they sign in
themselves or an Agent signs in for them. At different Sites they have
different subjects, and two Sites cannot join their records by
subject.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="agent">
      <name>Agent Sign-In</name>
      <section anchor="asking-for-a-pass">
        <name>Asking for a Pass</name>
        <t>An Agent that holds a grant from its Person calls the MCP <xref target="MCP"/> tool
<tt>alter_sign_in</tt> at the Issuer, naming the Site's domain. The Issuer
checks that the grant exists, is in force and covers that Site, then
returns an acts-for pass. The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse an Agent whose ~handle
is not Bot-tier.</t>
        <t>The Agent signs this call with the one long-lived key it holds at the
Issuer. A Site never receives that key. The call names a separate
public key for the Site. The pass confirms that key. The Agent
signs its requests to that Site with it. An Agent <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a
different key at each Site, for the reason <xref target="POPPY"/> gives for its
delegated keys.</t>
        <t><tt>alter_sign_in</tt> is a tool surface name in the sense of <xref target="TOOLNAMES"/>;
see <xref target="iana"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pass">
        <name>The Acts-For Pass</name>
        <t>The pass is a CBOR Web Token <xref target="RFC8392"/> in a COSE_Sign1 structure
<xref target="RFC9052"/>, algorithm EdDSA <xref target="RFC8032"/>, signed by the Issuer's floor
key. It carries the registered claims <tt>iss</tt> (1), <tt>sub</tt> (2), <tt>aud</tt> (3),
<tt>exp</tt> (4), <tt>iat</tt> (6) and <tt>cti</tt> (7), and <tt>nbf</tt> (5) where present, and
the following claims under Private Use keys, below -65536 as
<xref target="RFC8392"/>, Section 9.1 allows:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>profile</tt> (-65537):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the text <tt>alter-site-pass-v0</tt>. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a pass whose
profile it does not know.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>grant</tt> (-65538):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the 32-byte content address of the grant the pass was issued under.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>bands</tt> (-65539):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>a map of band name to text label. A pass carries
<tt>{"verified": "yes"}</tt>. No number is ever a band value.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>acting</tt> (-65540):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>a map naming the Agent: <tt>kid</tt> (its key for this Site), <tt>sub</tt> (a
number for the Agent at this Site, computed as in <xref target="subject"/> under a
different fixed label over the Agent's internal identifier and the
Site's domain), <tt>handle</tt> (its Bot-tier
~handle, in the bare form of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.2), <tt>may_tools</tt>
(an array of tool surface names), <tt>valid_until</tt> (Unix seconds), and
optionally <tt>max_value</tt> (a map of <tt>amount</tt>, a decimal string, and
<tt>currency</tt>, a code).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>cnf_jkt</tt> (-65541):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the JWK thumbprint <xref target="RFC7638"/> of the Agent's key for this Site.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The claims have these values:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>iss</tt> is the text <tt>alter</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>sub</tt> is the per-site subject of the Person at this Site, and is
never a ~handle;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>aud</tt> is the Site's domain, normalised as in <xref target="subject"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>exp</tt> is at most 300 seconds after <tt>iat</tt> and never later than
<tt>acting.valid_until</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>acting</tt> and <tt>cnf_jkt</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear together. A pass presented without
both <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be refused. The pass <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry the Person's ~handle or
email; those reach a Site only through the ID token of <xref target="person"/>.</t>
        <t>Private Use keys are not interoperable between issuers. Whether these
claims should be registered, and whether <tt>cnf_jkt</tt> should instead be
the <tt>cnf</tt> claim of <xref target="RFC8747"/> carrying a COSE Key thumbprint
<xref target="RFC9679"/>, is <xref target="open"/>, item 2.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="presenting-and-checking-the-pass">
        <name>Presenting and Checking the Pass</name>
        <t>The Agent presents the pass to the Site with a request signed by its
own key. This document does not yet say how the pass travels or how
the request is signed (see <xref target="open"/>, item 11). The Site <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>verify the pass under the Issuer's Ed25519 floor key, published at
the Issuer's <tt>/.well-known/alter-keys.json</tt> <xref target="RFC8615"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>check <tt>profile</tt>, check that <tt>aud</tt> is its own domain normalised as
in <xref target="subject"/>, and refuse the pass at or past <tt>exp</tt>, as <xref target="RFC8392"/>,
Section 3.1.4 and <xref target="RFC7519"/>, Section 4.1.4 require;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verify the request signature under the Agent key whose thumbprint
is <tt>cnf_jkt</tt>, and check that the key's identifier equals
<tt>acting.kid</tt>. A pass presented without that signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
refused, since the pass alone is a bearer token;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>hold the Agent to <tt>acting.may_tools</tt> and <tt>acting.max_value</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The Site then treats <tt>sub</tt> as it would after a Person sign-in. A
subject it has seen before is a returning Person. A new one is a
Person the Agent has just registered.</t>
        <t>No token exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> happens at sign-in. The Site does not call
the Issuer.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="returning-and-recovery">
      <name>Returning and Recovery</name>
      <t>A Site owner who loses the device holding the Site key proves the
domain again by publishing a new record. Proving a domain again signs
its owner straight back in only where the business account has no
confirmed email; otherwise the way back is a link sent to that email.
Proving a domain never signs anyone in to an account holding a
personal ~handle, because proving a domain proves the business and not
the Person.</t>
      <t>A Site handle whose owner leaves without handing it over becomes
dormant. Proving its domain again revives it only after a wait in
which the former owner, or any member, can object. Revival is never
immediate, because control of a domain's DNS does not show who ran the
Site.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="impl">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication,
per <xref target="RFC7942"/>.</t>
      <t>~alter has implemented most of this document in a test deployment.
As of 19 October 2026:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A small business site, on its own domain at a public host, published
its Site record, was verified, and minted its client.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A Person signed in to that site with a passkey through the embedded
button; consent, code issue and token exchange each succeeded.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Domain control is the only thing the Site record proves. Whoever
controls a domain's DNS can enrol it, including a former agency, a new
registrant of a lapsed domain, or an attacker holding the DNS host
login. A published record counts for as long as it stays published,
with no time limit, while the device that made it still holds its
key. A seller who never finished setup and still holds that key can
therefore claim a domain whose buyer leaves the old record in place.
This is accepted. A record left up is still being published by
whoever controls the zone, and any age bound would refuse every older
record. A domain that was deleted and registered again is a different
case. <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 13.1.2 already gives the signal for it, a
changed registry creation date. See <xref target="open"/>, item 5.</t>
      <t>The Site handle spelled like a domain is a Handle-Domain Confusion
surface (<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 6.9). A surface that shows a Site handle
to a person <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep its leading tilde.</t>
      <t>A session at the Issuer is never enough to sign a Person in to a
Site. A browser left signed in at the Issuer, on a shared or stolen
machine, would otherwise let whoever holds it sign in as the Person at
every Site. Each sign-in therefore asks for a fresh user-verified
passkey (<xref target="person"/>), and <tt>auth_time</tt> reports when that happened. A
Site that sends <tt>max_age</tt> or <tt>prompt=login</tt> <xref target="OIDC"/> is always met,
because every sign-in is already fresh. A Site can read <tt>amr</tt> to see
how the Person confirmed.</t>
      <t>A Site should act only on the ID token and only after checking its
signature. The browser script does not check the
signature and is not a substitute.</t>
      <t>The acts-for pass is short-lived and bound to one audience. It is
useless without a request signed by the Agent key it names. A Site that skips
the signature check turns the pass into a bearer token valid for up
to five minutes.</t>
      <t>The one-time code is stored only as a digest. A claimant can satisfy
only their own pending code and cannot replace another claimant's.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The per-site subject stops Sites joining their records by identifier.
The Person's ~handle and email reach a Site only when the Person
switches them on, and never through an acts-for pass. The Issuer sees
every sign-in it issues for, and this protocol gives a Person no way to
keep a sign-in from it.</t>
      <t><tt>acting.sub</tt> differs at each Site whatever key the Agent uses. An
Agent that uses a different key at each Site also gives Sites
different values of <tt>acting.kid</tt> and <tt>cnf_jkt</tt>. They cannot join
their records by those. An Agent that reuses a key at two Sites lets
them join by it.</t>
      <t>The per-site subject does not stop Sites joining their records by the
Agent's ~handle. <tt>acting.handle</tt> is the same at every Site the same
Agent signs in to. Two Sites that compare it learn that their two
per-site subjects are one Person.</t>
      <t>A grant covering several Sites gives each of them the same <tt>grant</tt>
value. A Person who wants no two Sites to join by <tt>grant</tt> gives a
separate grant for each Site.</t>
      <t>An Agent using a different key at each Site has no key directory of
the kind <xref target="WBA"/> describes. A Site relying on a directory cannot check
it that way; see <xref target="open"/>, item 11. None of this stops Sites joining
their records by behaviour, network address or timing.</t>
      <t>The Issuer holds the key the per-site subject is computed from and can
compute any Person's subject at any Site.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This revision makes no IANA request. The <tt>_alter</tt> label is requested
in <xref target="MCPDNS"/>. A revision meant for publication would need to request:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the well-known URI suffix <tt>alter-keys.json</tt> <xref target="RFC8615"/>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the CWT claims of <xref target="pass"/>, unless they stay under Private Use keys;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the ID token claim <tt>handle</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the tool surface name <tt>alter_sign_in</tt> <xref target="TOOLNAMES"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="related-work">
      <name>Related Work</name>
      <t>Each part of Acts-For has been published elsewhere. None of the
documents below takes one DNS record carrying the Site owner's own key
and turns it into the domain proof, a public ~handle for the business
and the relying-party registration at once.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>AAuth <xref target="AAUTH"/> already makes the first call to a resource its
registration, gives a pairwise subject per resource, and treats
registration and login as one flow. Resources identify themselves by
HTTPS metadata, with no DNS and no direct human sign-in.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The Personal Agent Protocol <xref target="POPPY"/> has a person's agent reach a
company through a file at <tt>/.well-known/poppy.json</tt>, sign in by OAuth,
and hold a delegated key and a pairwise user identifier for each
company. The agent assigns that identifier. It uses no DNS record.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PACE <xref target="PACE"/>, Section 8.4.2, has a personal agent use a different
identifier at each company.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PACT <xref target="PACT"/> profiles OAuth for private agent delegation, with limits
on grants and pairwise agent identifiers. The authorization server
is the issuer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>KYA-OS <xref target="KYAOS"/> has a service authorise a request from a signed proof
and a delegation chain carrying scopes, time bounds and budget caps.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The approval-act record <xref target="APPROVALREC"/> carries evidence of how a
standing grant's approval was performed, bound to the grant it
approves and carried with it, for a verifier who checks the grant
later with no person present. Acts-For leaves the grant out of
scope (<xref target="open"/>, item 12).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>auth.md <xref target="AUTHMD"/> publishes a file at the domain root telling agents
how to register, including a path where a trusted platform vouches
for the user. It matches users by issuer, subject and email with no
pairwise subject, and it covers agents only.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>OpenID Connect pairwise subjects <xref target="OIDC"/> are the per-site subject's
mechanism. Dynamic registration <xref target="RFC7591"/> and client ID metadata
documents <xref target="CIMD"/> remove per-provider registration over HTTPS; neither
uses DNS or a key made by the site owner.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Web Bot Auth <xref target="WBA"/> puts a bot operator's keys in a directory at a
well-known URL. The keys are the operator's and there is no sign-in
for a person.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Token exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> already names the agent in <tt>act</tt> with the
person in <tt>sub</tt>; see <xref target="open"/>, item 2.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>AT Protocol handles <xref target="ATPROTO"/> make a domain a handle with one
<tt>_atproto</tt> TXT record, holding only an identifier, and are not used
to sign in elsewhere. DNS domain verification guidance <xref target="DOMVERIFY"/>
recommends a separate, removable challenge label with the token
first. The Site record does not follow it; see <xref target="open"/>, item 3.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>For review before -03:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><xref target="MCPDNS"/> requires DNSSEC at <tt>_alter</tt>, and this document reports it
without requiring it, because most domains are not signed, large
ones included. A Site handle from an unsigned zone is then one that only
the Issuer accepts (<xref target="verify"/>). Either this document defines its
own label, or <xref target="MCPDNS"/> relaxes the requirement for business
records, or Sites must sign their zones. The <tt>_org-alter</tt> record of
<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 6 requires the organisation's registered legal
name and, per <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 8, only recommends DNSSEC.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should the acts-for pass carry the Agent in an <tt>act</tt> claim of
<xref target="RFC8693"/> and the key in the <tt>cnf</tt> claim of <xref target="RFC8747"/>, where existing
verifiers can read them, in place of <tt>acting</tt> and <tt>cnf_jkt</tt>? The
other choice is to register the claims of <xref target="pass"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should the one-time <tt>code</tt> move to a separate, removable challenge
label and leave <tt>_alter</tt> holding only the long-lived envelope? That
would also let <tt>ilr</tt> return to the meaning <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.4
gives it, and both changes are needed for the record to conform to
<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.5.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should a Site be able to enrol by publishing a file at its own
<tt>https</tt> origin instead of a DNS record, for owners who cannot edit
DNS?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should the Issuer apply the change-of-control signals of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>,
Section 13.1.2 to a Site record? A domain deleted and registered
again could then not be claimed under a record its former owner left
up. That checks the registry's creation date and sets no age bound.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Can a seller with no domain of its own accept sign-in?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A Site publishing its own client metadata document, beside the one
exact return page.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An agency setting up many client domains from one account, and
handing each over.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The ID token is RS256 under a key in the Issuer's JSON Web Key Set
and the pass is EdDSA under the separate floor key, and the ID token's <tt>iss</tt> is the
Issuer's URL while the pass's is the text <tt>alter</tt>. Should the two
converge?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Which domains can become a Site handle. <xref target="handle"/> refuses those
   beginning with a digit, since <tt>handle-name</tt> does not admit them, and
   those beginning with <tt>cc-</tt> or under <tt>bot</tt>, since they read as
   another tier. Digit-led domains are common and <xref target="ALTERURI"/> may need
   to admit them. A proven <tt>www.</tt> name is folded by the per-site subject and not
   by the Site handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>How the pass travels to the Site and how the Agent signs the
   request. HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/>, as Web Bot Auth <xref target="WBA"/>
   uses, is one candidate.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The grant is out of scope here. Should it be a consent grant of
   <xref target="CONSENT"/>, Section 5.2, with <tt>grant</tt> as the <tt>grant_ref</tt> of its
   Section 5.3?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>One-tap record writing at the DNS host (Domain Connect <xref target="DOMAINCONNECT"/>), where the
   Site owner never sees the record.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Who in a collective can act for its Site handle, change its client,
   or sign in to other Sites as it. Members need not all hold the same
   permissions. This revision does not cover an Agent acting for a
   collective.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
            <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
            <date month="February" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5890" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6749.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7517.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7518.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7519.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7636" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7636.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients</title>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." role="editor" surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Agarwal" initials="N." surname="Agarwal"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE, pronounced "pixy").</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7636"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7636"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7638.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8032.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8176" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8176" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8176.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim is defined and registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry, but no standard Authentication Method Reference values are currently defined. This specification establishes a registry for Authentication Method Reference values and defines an initial set of Authentication Method Reference values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8176"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8176"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8392" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8552" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8552.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves</title>
            <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker"/>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Formally, any DNS Resource Record (RR) may occur under any domain name. However, some services use an operational convention for defining specific interpretations of an RRset by locating the records in a DNS branch under the parent domain to which the RRset actually applies. The top of this subordinate branch is defined by a naming convention that uses a reserved node name, which begins with the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). The underscored naming construct defines a semantic scope for DNS record types that are associated with the parent domain above the underscored branch. This specification explores the nature of this DNS usage and defines the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA. The purpose of this registry is to avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored name for different services.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="222"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8552"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8552"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8615" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8615.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <date month="May" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8785.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ALTERURI" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-05">
          <front>
            <title>The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDCOMMITS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-04">
          <front>
            <title>Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OIDC" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="M. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author surname="de Medeiros" fullname="B. de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WEBAUTHN" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/">
          <front>
            <title>Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 3</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCPDNS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-09">
          <front>
            <title>Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-09"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7591" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7591.xml">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="M. Machulak" initials="M." surname="Machulak"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <date month="July" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization server. The resulting registration responses return a client identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata values registered for the client. The client can then use this registration information to communicate with the authorization server using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during registration.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7591"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7591"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8693.xml">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8747" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8747.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/>
            <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="March" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) (which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8747"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8747"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7942.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9421" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9421.xml">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9679" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9679" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9679.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="K. Isobe" initials="K." surname="Isobe"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
            <date month="December" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key. It specifies which fields within the COSE Key structure are included in the cryptographic hash computation, the process for creating a canonical representation of these fields, and how to hash the resulting byte sequence. The resulting hash value, referred to as a "thumbprint", can be used to identify or select the corresponding key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9679"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9679"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CONSENT">
          <front>
            <title>Consent-Bound Identity Disclosure with Subject Settlement for HTTP-Native Agent Payments</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-consent-settlement-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TOOLNAMES">
          <front>
            <title>An IANA Registry for Model Context Protocol Tool Surface Names</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-tool-surface-names-registry-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AAUTH">
          <front>
            <title>AAuth Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="25"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="POPPY" target="https://personalagentprotocol.org/docs/0.3/spec">
          <front>
            <title>Personal Agent Protocol, draft 0.3</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Personal Agent Protocol project</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACE">
          <front>
            <title>PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="S. Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="01"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENTPROTO">
          <front>
            <title>Architecture for AI Agent Communications on the Internet</title>
            <author fullname="J. Rosenberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Z. Sarker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Reddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. Yao">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="D. Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Krishnan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="30"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-manyfolks-agentproto-arch-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACT">
          <front>
            <title>PACT: Private Agent Consent and Trust Profile for OAuth 2.1 and CIBA</title>
            <author fullname="G. Valverde">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="April" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-valverde-oauth-pact-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="APPROVALREC">
          <front>
            <title>An Approval-Act Record for Standing Authorization Grants</title>
            <author fullname="J. Ashcroft">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="N. Mathews">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ashcroft-approval-record-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAOS" target="https://github.com/decentralized-identity/kya-os-mcp">
          <front>
            <title>KYA-OS Protocol Specification, version 1.0.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>KYA-OS Working Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUTHMD" target="https://github.com/workos/auth.md">
          <front>
            <title>auth.md</title>
            <author>
              <organization>WorkOS</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="May"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CIMD">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Client ID Metadata Document</title>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Emelia Smith">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WBA">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures for Automated Traffic</title>
            <author fullname="T. Meunier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Major">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="29"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ATPROTO" target="https://atproto.com/specs/handle">
          <front>
            <title>AT Protocol Handle Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Bluesky Social PBC</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOMVERIFY">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Control Validation using DNS</title>
            <author fullname="S. Sahib">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Huque">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. Wouters">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="E. Nygren">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Wicinski">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June" day="22"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques-13"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOMAINCONNECT" target="https://www.domainconnect.org/">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Connect</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Domain Connect</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCP" target="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28">
          <front>
            <title>Model Context Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Model Context Protocol</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July" day="28"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    

<section anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-02 (2026-11-15): an Agent names a key and a
number of its own for each Site (<xref target="agent"/>, <xref target="privacy"/>), after <xref target="POPPY"/>,
<xref target="PACE"/> and <xref target="PACT"/>. A pass is refused at or past <tt>exp</tt>. The Person is
named as the original principal of <xref target="AGENTPROTO"/>. Related Work adds
<xref target="PACE"/> and <xref target="APPROVALREC"/>. The <xref target="POPPY"/> reference carries no date, as its
page gives none.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-01 (2026-11-03): a new Person's first sign-in
opens the account. Related Work adds <xref target="POPPY"/>, <xref target="PACT"/> and <xref target="KYAOS"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-00 (2026-10-19): first version.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>None yet.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
