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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg-01" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="CEG Attestation Rows and SCITT">Signed Attestation Rows of the CIRIS Epistemic Grammar and Their Relationship to SCITT</title>

    <author fullname="Eric Moore">
      <organization>CIRIS L3C</organization>
      <address>
        <email>eric@ciris.ai</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust</workgroup>
    <keyword>attestation</keyword> <keyword>transparency</keyword> <keyword>CBOR</keyword> <keyword>COSE</keyword> <keyword>composite signature</keyword> <keyword>ML-DSA</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 77?>

<t>The CIRIS Epistemic Grammar (CEG) records claims between parties as
signed rows.  Each row is one or more COSE_Sign1 messages over a
payload in deterministically encoded CBOR.  Each message carries one
composite ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signature.  Every row has one of five
types: a claim, a delegation, a replacement, a withdrawal, or a
recantation.  A node admits a row only after a fixed set of checks,
and it refuses a failing row with a named reason.</t>

<t>This document specifies the signed statement, its encoding, the names
by which rows refer to each other, the signature, and the admission
checks, so that a second implementation can produce and verify the
same bytes.  It then describes how these statements relate to the
roles of the SCITT architecture (RFC 9943), and where they differ.
It defines no new SCITT mechanism and requests no IANA action.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISConstitution/tree/main/ietf"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISConstitution"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 94?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>CEG is the row format of the CIRIS system, in which people, devices,
communities and AI agents make claims about each other and act on
them.  It is defined normatively in the CIRIS Constitution <xref target="CC"/>.
This document restates the parts of that definition that another
implementation needs in order to interoperate at the byte level.</t>

<t>Three goals shape the format:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Any party holding a row can recompute its bytes and its name
exactly.  The payload and the protected header are in the
deterministic encoding of CBOR, and a verifier refuses any other
encoding of the same value (<xref target="canon"/>).</t>
  <t>Rows exchanged between nodes have to resist forgery by an attacker
with a quantum computer.  Every statement carries one composite
signature, ML-DSA-65 <xref target="FIPS204"/> with Ed25519 <xref target="RFC8032"/>, and
neither half verifies alone (<xref target="sig"/>).</t>
  <t>The set of row types is closed, so that every row is subject to the
same admission rules.  New kinds of claim are new families and
dimensions, never new types.</t>
</list></t>

<t>SCITT <xref target="RFC9943"/> defines an architecture for registering signed
statements with a Transparency Service and returning receipts that
prove registration.  Each CEG statement is a COSE_Sign1 with an
issuer and a subject in its protected header, so it has the shape of
a SCITT Signed Statement.  CEG has no Transparency Service of its
own.  <xref target="scitt"/> describes the relationship and what still differs.</t>

<section anchor="scope"><name>Scope</name>

<t>In scope:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>the signed statement of a row and its headers (<xref target="object"/>);</t>
  <t>the five row types (<xref target="types"/>);</t>
  <t>the deterministic encoding and the rules that close it
(<xref target="canon"/>);</t>
  <t>the row id, the statement id and the object id (<xref target="names"/>);</t>
  <t>the composite signature, keys and counted rows (<xref target="sig"/>);</t>
  <t>the admission checks, written as a SCITT Registration Policy
(<xref target="admission"/>).</t>
</list></t>

<t>Informative only:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>the other signed objects and receipts (<xref target="objects"/>);</t>
  <t>the safety properties the rows carry (<xref target="safety"/>);</t>
  <t>the relationship to SCITT roles (<xref target="scitt"/>);</t>
  <t>the lifecycle of an agent's decision record (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).</t>
</list></t>

<t>Out of scope: the transport between nodes, the storage schema, the
meaning of individual claim families (the "dimension" namespace), and
the governance rules that decide who may hold which role.  <xref target="CC"/>
defines each of these.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="requirements-language"><name>Requirements Language</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>This document uses the terms Issuer, Signed Statement, Transparency
Service, Registration Policy, Receipt, Transparent Statement, and
Relying Party as defined in <xref target="RFC9943"/>.  It also uses:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Statement:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>One COSE_Sign1 <xref target="RFC9052"/> under CBOR tag 18, made by one signer.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Row:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>One signed attestation.  A row is one statement, or several
statements over one payload where the row is counted
(<xref target="counted"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Payload:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The CBOR map a row's statements sign.  It is carried as the
COSE_Sign1 payload, as a byte string in the deterministic encoding.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Signer:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The key that makes a statement.  Its stable identity is the CWT
<spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> claim.  It plays the SCITT Issuer role.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Subject:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>What a row is about.  The CWT <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> claim names it.  The payload
member <spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx> lists any further subjects, including
parties that have no key.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Identity reference:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The one spelling of a key's identity: the COSE Key Thumbprint URI
of <xref target="RFC9679"/> for the key (<xref target="idref"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Family id:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The name of a row's claim family, carried in the protected header
(<xref target="family"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Producer, Consumer, Substrate:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A Producer emits rows.  A Consumer verifies and reads rows.  A
Substrate stores and relays rows and applies the admission checks.
One node is usually all three.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Refusal token:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A fixed, case-sensitive ASCII string that names why a row was
refused, so that two implementations agree on a refusal as well as
on an acceptance.  The tokens of <xref target="CC"/> are either all lowercase or
all uppercase, and are compared byte for byte.  Some refusals use
the token <spanx style="verb">federation_malformed_row</spanx> together with a reason from a
closed set.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="object"><name>The Signed Statement</name>

<section anchor="cosesign1-and-the-protected-header"><name>COSE_Sign1 and the Protected Header</name>

<t>A statement is a COSE_Sign1 <xref target="RFC9052"/> under CBOR tag 18.  Its
payload is never detached.  The protected header of a row's statement
carries exactly seven members, and the signature covers all of them.</t>

<texttable title="The protected header of a row">
      <ttcol align='left'>Label</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Member</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Value</ttcol>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>alg</c>
      <c>-70100, the composite algorithm of <xref target="sig"/></c>
      <c>3</c>
      <c>cty</c>
      <c>"application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor", with no parameters</c>
      <c>4</c>
      <c>kid</c>
      <c>The 32-byte thumbprint of the signing key (<xref target="keys"/>)</c>
      <c>15</c>
      <c>CWT claims</c>
      <c>iss, sub, iat, and nbf and exp where the row has them, and the edition claim</c>
      <c>16</c>
      <c>typ</c>
      <c>"ceg-row/2"</c>
      <c>-70001</c>
      <c>row type</c>
      <c>One of the five row types, as a text string</c>
      <c>-70002</c>
      <c>family</c>
      <c>The row's family id, as a text string</c>
</texttable>

<t>The CWT claims are carried as <xref target="RFC9597"/> defines.  The edition
claim has the label -70003 and the value 2.  <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">nbf</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx>
are derived from payload members (<xref target="time"/>).</t>

<t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a row whose <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> carries parameters, or whose
protected header lacks the type label or the family label.  It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
refuse a protected header with any other member, so that one
statement has one statement id (<xref target="names"/>).  A signed object that is
not a row carries neither label, and one that does is refused
(<xref target="objects"/>).</t>

<t><spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> names what the row is about: the attested key, or the object
the row refers to.  A statement's kind is its <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> <xref target="RFC9596"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="family"><name>The Family Id</name>

<t>The family label carries a family id, never a leaf.  A family id is
the family's registry prefix in <xref target="CC"/>, with each <spanx style="verb">{name}</spanx> segment
written as a full stop followed by the name, and each <spanx style="verb">*</spanx> written as
a lone full stop.  Examples are <spanx style="verb">key:record</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">provenance:build_manifest:.target</spanx>.</t>

<t>A literal segment never begins with a full stop, so no two prefixes
share a family id.  A row that scores a dimension carries it whole, leaf and
version, in the payload member <spanx style="verb">dimension</spanx>.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a
<spanx style="verb">dimension</spanx> that does not resolve to the family id the header
carries.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="idref"><name>Identity References</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> is the signer's stable identity reference: the COSE Key
Thumbprint URI of <xref section="5.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9679"/> for the signer's genesis
key.  It is <spanx style="verb">urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256:</spanx> followed by the
unpadded base64url <xref target="RFC4648"/> of the 32-byte thumbprint.  That is
43 characters, the last with zero trailing bits.</t>

<t>Because <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> names the genesis key, the issuer stays the same when
the signing key rotates; <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> names the key that signs.  <spanx style="verb">author</spanx>, a
key named by <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> or by an element of <spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx>, and every
role party use this one spelling.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse any other.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="the-unprotected-header-and-external-aad"><name>The Unprotected Header and External AAD</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">external_aad</spanx> is the empty byte string, and no party puts a domain
prefix there.  The unprotected header is outside the signature, and
no rule reads it.  A holder may add a receipt there, or present a
disclosure there (<xref target="erasable"/>, <xref target="receipts"/>).</t>

<t>There is no copy of the headers inside the payload and no signature
beside the statement.  The protected header and the payload are the
row.  A further voice is a further statement (<xref target="counted"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="payload"><name>The Payload</name>

<t>The payload is a CBOR map whose members the row's family names.
Every row carries <spanx style="verb">asserted_at</spanx>.  Other members that <xref target="CC"/> fixes for
every family include:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>author:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> of the one who authors the row.  It is present when the
family is authored and absent when the family is counted
(<xref target="author"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>refs:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Every row this row names (<xref target="refs"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>dimension:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The full scored dimension, leaf and version.  It resolves to the
header's family id.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>evidence_refs:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The blobs the row cites, by content hash, as a sequence.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>score, confidence, weight:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Integers at a fixed scale (<xref target="numbers"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>valid_from, valid_until, expires_at:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Instants (<xref target="time"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>salt:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Sixteen random bytes.  A row whose content is low-entropy, such as
a ballot or a census cell, carries one, so that its row id confirms
no guess.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>body:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A map whose member <spanx style="verb">note</spanx> holds at most 2048 bytes of free text.
No free text stands outside <spanx style="verb">body.note</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>reason:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A code from a closed registry.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t><spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">cohort_scope</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">scope</spanx> and the claim's other
members are payload members of the same names.  <xref target="cddl"/> gives the
full schema.  A Consumer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> preserve members it does not recognise
when it relays a row (<xref target="relays"/>).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="types"><name>The Five Row Types</name>

<t>The row type label (-70001) takes exactly one of five values.  A
Substrate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse any other value, compared byte for byte, with
<spanx style="verb">attestation_type_unregistered</spanx>.  It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply this check to rows it
emits and to rows it receives.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>scores:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A claim about the subject on the named dimension.  Every positive
or negative claim about a party is a <spanx style="verb">scores</spanx> row.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>delegates_to:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer authorises the subject to sign on its behalf within
<spanx style="verb">scope</spanx>, a set of strings.  For the scopes that <xref target="CC"/> lists as
requiring a term, among them licensing, moderation and takedown,
the delegation's end is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>.  It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be no more than 365 days
after its start.  A Substrate refuses a row that breaks this with
<spanx style="verb">delegation_term_required</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>supersedes:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer replaces one of its own earlier rows, named by row id in
<spanx style="verb">refs</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>withdraws:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer retracts an earlier row, named by row id in <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx>,
without saying the row was false.  <xref target="withdraw-rule"/> says who may
withdraw a row.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>recants:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer says one of its own earlier rows was false when it was
made.  Only the original signer can recant a row.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>A withdrawal and a recantation are different statements.  A
withdrawal says "I no longer assert this"; a recantation says "this
was wrong".  Consumers can weigh them differently.  The subject of a
row has authority over the first but not the second
(<xref target="withdraw-rule"/>).</t>

<t>A new kind of record is expressed as a new family or dimension on one
of the five types, never as a sixth type.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="canon"><name>Encoding</name>

<section anchor="deterministic-encoding"><name>Deterministic Encoding</name>

<t>The payload is encoded in CBOR's deterministic encoding, as the
Common Deterministic Encoding <xref target="CDE"/> fixes it over <xref target="RFC8949"/>.  A
verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a payload whose bytes differ from the
deterministic re-encoding of the value they decode to.  That covers a
non-shortest integer, an indefinite length, an unsorted map key and a
duplicate key.</t>

<t>The protected header is in the deterministic encoding too.  A second
encoding of one value would otherwise be a second row.  A verifier
verifies the bytes it received, never a re-encoding of members it
decoded.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="relays"><name>The Omit Rule</name>

<t>The bytes are the members the Producer signs.  An optional member the
Producer omits <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be written into the payload by any party.  An
optional member the Producer emits, even at its default value, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
be kept by every party.  Defaults documented in <xref target="CC"/> are applied
when a row is read, never when it is encoded.</t>

<t>An optional member is unset by being absent, never by null.  A
Substrate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a payload with null for an optional member,
with <spanx style="verb">federation_malformed_row</spanx> and the reason <spanx style="verb">envelope_member_null</spanx>.
No value a family names, at any depth, is a float, a null, an
undefined value, a tag or a simple value.  The one exception is the
redaction marks of <xref target="erasable"/>.</t>

<t>A Substrate, relay or Consumer that stores or forwards a statement
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> forward the octets it received.  It never strips an emitted
default and never writes in an omitted one.  Unknown members are kept
the same way.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="sets-sequences-and-tuples"><name>Sets, Sequences and Tuples</name>

<t>An array whose positions the schema names is a tuple, and its order
is its definition.  An array of one element type is a set or a
sequence, as its definition states.  Where no definition says, it is
a set.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A set is sorted by the bytewise order of its elements'
deterministic encodings and holds no duplicate.  A verifier refuses
any other with <spanx style="verb">federation_set_semantics_unsorted</spanx>, naming the
member.  It never re-sorts the set, because that would change the
signed bytes.</t>
  <t>A sequence keeps its authored order.  The sequences are
<spanx style="verb">evidence_refs</spanx>, the redacted-key arrays of <xref target="erasable"/>, and the
others <xref target="CC"/> lists.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Every array inside <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx> is a set (<xref target="refs"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="bytes-and-text"><name>Bytes and Text</name>

<t>A byte member is a CBOR byte string.  Hexadecimal and base64 do not
stand in the payload for bytes.</t>

<t><spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx> is the one member with two forms.  An element
naming a registered key carries that key's identity reference
(<xref target="idref"/>).  An element naming a party with no key is the tagged
text <spanx style="verb">canonical:&lt;hashalg&gt;:&lt;hex&gt;</spanx>.  The tag is part of the signed
string, and the hex is lowercase.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="numbers"><name>Numbers</name>

<t>No member of the payload is a float.  A score, a confidence and a
weight are integers at the fixed scale of 10^6: the value times 10^6.
A score lies in [-10^6, 10^6], a confidence in [0, 10^6] and a weight
in [0, 10^6], unless the family states a wider range.</t>

<t>A fold sums in signed 64-bit integers, and its arithmetic is checked:
a fold that would overflow is refused, and never wraps.  A derived
value is computed in integers and checked by exact equality.  It is
rounded half away from zero unless its own rule states otherwise.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="time"><name>Instants</name>

<t><spanx style="verb">asserted_at</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">valid_from</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">valid_until</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx> and every
other instant in a payload are unsigned integers of POSIX
milliseconds, never floats.  The header's <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">nbf</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx> are
the standard CWT claims in seconds.  Each is the floor of its payload
member divided by 1000.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a statement whose
header claim disagrees with its payload member.</t>

<t>Where an instant stands in signed text rather than in a payload,
<xref target="CC"/> fixes a separate text form.  No statement of this document
carries one.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="size"><name>Size</name>

<t>A payload's deterministic encoding <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed 1 MiB (1,048,576
bytes).  The bound is on the bytes the signature covers.  A Producer
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> emit a larger payload.  A Substrate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse one at every
write path, with <spanx style="verb">ENVELOPE_TOO_LARGE</spanx>.</t>

<t>Every write path <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also enforce a finite ceiling on the octets it
buffers from an untrusted source.  It refuses at that ceiling with
the same token, without completing the decode.  The ceiling is local,
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be below 1 MiB, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be published.</t>

<t>Larger content travels outside the row and is named in
<spanx style="verb">evidence_refs</spanx> by its hash.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="erasable"><name>Erasable Members</name>

<t>A family may mint some members blind, using the selective disclosure
of <xref target="SD-CWT"/>.  A blinded member is absent from its map.  Its
disclosure is the salted claim <spanx style="verb">[salt, value, key]</spanx>, with a salt of
sixteen random bytes.  Its digest stands in that map's
<spanx style="verb">redacted_claim_keys</spanx> array, keyed by the simple value 59, in mint
order.</t>

<t>A blinded array element is tag 60 over its disclosure's digest, and
its disclosure is <spanx style="verb">[salt, value]</spanx>.  A digest is SHA-256 over the
disclosure's bytes.  A disclosure travels beside its statement, in
the unprotected header's <spanx style="verb">sd_claims</spanx> (label 17), only to one who may
see it.</t>

<t>Erasure drops a disclosure and alters no signed byte.  Which members
are blind is fixed by the family in <xref target="CC"/>.  No fold, verdict or
admission reads a member that can be blinded.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="names"><name>Names</name>

<section anchor="the-row-id"><name>The Row Id</name>

<t>A row is named by one digest, its row id.  It is SHA-256 over the
deterministic encoding of this array:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
["CEG-row/2", type, family, sub, author, payload]
]]></artwork></figure>

<t><spanx style="verb">type</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">family</spanx> are the text strings of labels -70001 and -70002.
<spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> is the CWT subject.  <spanx style="verb">author</spanx> is the payload's <spanx style="verb">author</spanx>, or
null.  <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> enters as the byte string signed, never as the
decoded map.  A digest is written as the array <spanx style="verb">[-16, digest]</spanx>, where
-16 names SHA-256.</t>

<t>Signatures, <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>, receipts and disclosures are outside the
row id.  So every voice of a counted row has the same row id.  The
row id does not change when a voice, a receipt or a disclosure is
added.  The row id commits to <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">nbf</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx>, because they
are derived from payload members.  It does not read <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="the-statement-id"><name>The Statement Id</name>

<t>A statement's own id is SHA-256 over the deterministic encoding of
<spanx style="verb">["CEG-statement-id/2", protected, payload]</spanx>, written the same way.
<spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> are the byte strings of the statement.  It
names one voice; the row id names the row.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="refs"><name>What a Row Names</name>

<t>Every row a row names stands in one payload member, <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx>, by
reference.  A reference is the array <spanx style="verb">[2, digest]</spanx>: the edition and
the row id.  <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx> is a map with these members:</t>

<texttable title="Members of refs">
      <ttcol align='left'>Member</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>What it names</ttcol>
      <c>head</c>
      <c>The head a count is over (<xref target="counted"/>)</c>
      <c>further_heads</c>
      <c>Further tips beside <spanx style="verb">head</spanx></c>
      <c>prev</c>
      <c>A predecessor</c>
      <c>answers</c>
      <c>The row this row answers</c>
      <c>target</c>
      <c>The target of a withdrawal, a supersession or a lifecycle row</c>
      <c>trusted_through</c>
      <c>On a key revocation, the last rows of the key held good</c>
      <c>also</c>
      <c>A map from a role, <spanx style="verb">ack</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">cites</spanx>, to a set of references</c>
</texttable>

<t>A holder reads the set of named rows from <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx> alone, without
knowing the family.  The roles of <spanx style="verb">also</spanx> are a closed registry of
two.  <spanx style="verb">ack</spanx> names an acknowledgement.  <spanx style="verb">cites</spanx> names a row the row
cites.</t>

<t>Every array inside <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx> is a set, and a set out of order is
refused.  An empty <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx> is refused: absence is its one encoding.
No row names an object of the earlier form of <xref target="earlier"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="author"><name>The Author</name>

<t>A family is either authored or counted, as <xref target="CC"/> states for each
family.  An authored family's payload carries <spanx style="verb">author</spanx>, the <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> of
the one who authors the row.  The row id reads it from the payload.
A counted family's author is null.</t>

<t>A statement whose <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> is not the payload's <spanx style="verb">author</spanx> is accepted
only in a role its family names, such as a delegate or a bound node.
Its <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> then be the party that role names in the payload.
Where that party is the attested key, as a delegate is, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
the CWT <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx>.  Any other <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> is Invalid (<xref target="verify"/>).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sig"><name>Signatures and Keys</name>

<section anchor="the-composite-signature"><name>The Composite Signature</name>

<t>A statement's signature is the composite ML-DSA-65 with Ed25519 of
<xref target="COMPOSITE-JOSE"/>, over <xref target="COMPOSITE-LAMPS"/>, at the revisions cited.
It is computed over the Sig_structure of <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9052"/>,
with an empty <spanx style="verb">external_aad</spanx>.  That Sig_structure is the message M.</t>

<t>Both halves sign one message representative:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
M' = "CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025"
     || "COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512"
     || 0x00 || SHA-512(M)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The zero byte is the empty application context.  ML-DSA-65 signs M'
with the label bytes as its FIPS 204 context string, never the empty
one.  Ed25519 signs M' as it is.  The representative binds both
halves, so neither half verifies alone.</t>

<t>The encoding is the ML-DSA-65 signature (3309 bytes) followed by the
Ed25519 signature (64 bytes), 3373 bytes in all.  The algorithm
identifier is -70100, a private-use value, until one is assigned.
Only the identifier changes then.  ML-DSA-65 alone is COSE algorithm
-49 <xref target="RFC9964"/>; CEG does not use it alone.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="keys"><name>Keys</name>

<t>A key is one composite COSE key of key type AKP (kty 7).  Its <spanx style="verb">pub</spanx>
(label -1) is the ML-DSA-65 public key followed by the Ed25519 public
key, 1984 bytes.  Its <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> is its 32-byte SHA-256 thumbprint
<xref target="RFC9679"/>, fixed for the key's life.  A key's displayed identity is
that thumbprint.</t>

<t>A key record is a row of the family <spanx style="verb">key:record</spanx>.  Its payload
carries <spanx style="verb">key</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">identity_type</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">asserted_at</spanx> and, where its end rule
requires, <spanx style="verb">valid_until</spanx>.  A key renews by a <spanx style="verb">supersedes</spanx> of its own
record.  A rotation is a record of another key that names the old
key's record and carries the old key's signature.</t>

<t><spanx style="verb">identity_type</spanx> is a set of roles.  A set that mixes a person's role
(<spanx style="verb">user</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">accord_holder</spanx>) with a machine's (<spanx style="verb">node</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">agent</spanx>) is
refused.  A record whose set contains a person's role carries no
<spanx style="verb">valid_until</spanx>.  One whose set contains <spanx style="verb">node</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">agent</spanx> carries one,
with stated exceptions.  A record that breaks the rule is refused
<spanx style="verb">key_record_out_of_window</spanx>.</t>

<t>A key is live at an instant when one of its records covers that
instant and its own revocation has not taken effect by then.  Only
the key's own revocation ends its liveness.  The key's owner and the
roster that seats it may also revoke it.  That ends the owner's
binding or the seat, not the key's liveness.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="counted"><name>Counted Rows</name>

<t>A counted row is several statements over one payload, one for each
voice, found by the row id.  The head the row is counted over stands
in <spanx style="verb">refs.head</spanx>, inside what every voice signs.  Further tips stand in
<spanx style="verb">refs.further_heads</spanx>, a set.  A fold counts the statements by person,
as it counts votes.</t>

<t>Each statement is a SCITT Signed Statement with one signer.  Adding a
voice changes neither the payload nor the row id.  A delegation of a
scoped kind seats only with a second statement over the same payload,
signed by the delegate, the row's <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="verify"><name>Verification Has Three Answers</name>

<t>Verifying a statement gives one of three answers: Valid, Invalid with
a reason, or Waiting on the keys it names as missing.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A bad signature under a held key is Invalid, and that answer is
final.  A structural fault is Invalid whatever keys are held.</t>
  <t>A statement whose key record is Waiting is Waiting, naming the
deepest missing key.  A statement whose key record is Invalid is
Invalid.</t>
  <t>A key held in part is Waiting on the missing half.  A key never
verifies on one half.</t>
  <t>Waiting never becomes Valid by default and is never counted.  A
waiting statement is held inert until the key it names is held.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A verifier proceeds in this order:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Decode strictly: tag 18, and the protected header and the payload
in the deterministic encoding.</t>
  <t>Check the header: <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> on the closed list; <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> -70100; edition
2; <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> the constant; a row's type and family labels present, an
object's absent.</t>
  <t>Check the payload against the schema: no float or null, the sets,
the ranges, and <spanx style="verb">dimension</spanx> resolving to the header's family.</t>
  <t>Check <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">nbf</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx> against the payload.</t>
  <t>Run the family's static checks, the key record's end among them.</t>
  <t>Read <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>; resolve the key record, or answer Waiting on it.</t>
  <t>Verify the composite signature over the bytes received.</t>
  <t>Check <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> against <spanx style="verb">author</spanx>, or against the party of a role the
family names (<xref target="author"/>).</t>
  <t>On Valid, apply the defaults of <xref target="CC"/> to absent members, at
interpretation time only, and then the Consumer's own policy.</t>
  <t>Store or forward the statement as received.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A failure at steps 1 to 5, 7 or 8 is Invalid.  Step 6 alone answers
Waiting.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="objects"><name>Other Signed Objects and Receipts</name>

<t>This section is informative.  <xref target="CC"/> is normative for each object.</t>

<section anchor="objects-that-are-not-rows"><name>Objects That Are Not Rows</name>

<t>Every other signed object is a COSE_Sign1 whose <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> names its kind,
from one closed list: <spanx style="verb">ceg-genesis-bundle/2</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">ceg-revocation-snapshot/2</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">ceg-boot-manifest/2</spanx>.  A verifier
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse any other <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx>.  The protected header carries exactly
<spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>, the CWT claims and <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx>, with no <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx>.  Its CWT
claims are <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx>, the edition claim, and <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx> where the object
states an instant.</t>

<t>Such an object is named by its object id: SHA-256 over the
deterministic encoding of <spanx style="verb">["CEG-object/2", typ, author, payload]</spanx>.
<spanx style="verb">author</spanx> is the payload's <spanx style="verb">author</spanx>, or null where it has none.  Like
a row id, it is the same for every voice of a counted object.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="the-genesis-bundle"><name>The Genesis Bundle</name>

<t>The genesis bundle seats the holders of a trust root and its serve
nodes.  It is counted: one statement for each holder, over one
payload.  Each statement carries <spanx style="verb">iat</spanx>, equal to the payload's
<spanx style="verb">asserted_at</spanx> divided by 1000 and rounded down.</t>

<t>The first bundle counts when every holder it lists has a valid
statement over it.  A later bundle names its predecessor as
<spanx style="verb">refs.prev</spanx>.  It counts when a strict majority of the predecessor's
holders have valid statements over it.  Each holder it adds signs it
too.</t>

<t>A roster change is such a later bundle, with no proposal, window or
separate vote.  A holder's recovery is also a later bundle, with one
statement under the holder's recovery key.  That statement counts
only where the predecessor's recovery commitment for the holder
matches.  Two later bundles that count on one predecessor are a fork,
and a reader reports it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="receipts"><name>Receipts</name>

<t>Receipts over the provenance log and each stream's log are COSE
Receipts <xref target="RFC9942"/> over the SHA-256 tree of <xref target="RFC9162"/>.  Its
hashing is that of <xref target="RFC6962"/>, so roots already published stay
valid.  Each witness issues its own receipt over the same root, with
its instant in the protected header.  A stream's receipts cover
batches, never single chunks.</t>

<t>A holder may add a receipt to a statement's unprotected header.  The
receipt is outside the signature and outside the row id.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="admission"><name>Admission as a Registration Policy</name>

<t><xref target="RFC9943"/> lets each Transparency Service define a Registration
Policy: the checks a Signed Statement must pass before it is
registered.  The CEG admission checks are such a policy.  A Substrate
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply them to every row before storing or relaying it.  It <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> truncate, repair or re-encode a row in order to admit it.</t>

<texttable title="Admission checks">
      <ttcol align='left'>Check</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Refusal</ttcol>
      <c>Payload at most 1 MiB</c>
      <c>ENVELOPE_TOO_LARGE</c>
      <c>Deterministic encoding of payload and header</c>
      <c>Invalid</c>
      <c>Header members exactly as <xref target="object"/></c>
      <c>Invalid</c>
      <c>Composite signature verifies</c>
      <c>SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_FAILED</c>
      <c>Type is one of the five</c>
      <c>attestation_type_unregistered</c>
      <c>No optional member is null</c>
      <c>(R) envelope_member_null</c>
      <c>Sets sorted and unique</c>
      <c>federation_set_semantics_unsorted</c>
      <c>Header instants equal the payload's</c>
      <c>Invalid</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">dimension</spanx> resolves to the family</c>
      <c>Invalid</c>
      <c><spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> is the author or a named role</c>
      <c>Invalid</c>
      <c>Key record within its window</c>
      <c>key_record_out_of_window</c>
      <c>Termed delegation within 365 days</c>
      <c>delegation_term_required</c>
      <c>Withdrawal meets <xref target="withdraw-rule"/></c>
      <c>federation_withdraws_not_admitted</c>
</texttable>

<t>"(R) r" means the token <spanx style="verb">federation_malformed_row</spanx> with reason r.
"Invalid" marks a check that <xref target="CC"/> makes a refusal without naming a
token for it.</t>

<t>Admission has a third outcome besides admit and refuse.  A row signed
by a key whose record is not yet held is Waiting (<xref target="verify"/>).  It is
held and retried, never counted, until the key is held.</t>

<t>The namespace rules that decide whether a dimension is registered,
and their tokens, are defined in <xref target="CC"/> and are outside the scope of
this document.</t>

<section anchor="withdraw-rule"><name>Who May Withdraw a Row</name>

<t>A <spanx style="verb">withdraws</spanx> row against a target row T is admitted when its signer
meets one of these rules:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Rule 0:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>If T is a counted row, rules 1 to 4 do not reach it.  T is
withdrawn only by a <spanx style="verb">withdraws</spanx> counted under T's own rule.  A
quorum's act is undone only by a quorum.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Rule 1:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer signed T.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Rule 2:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer is named in T's <spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx>, and T's family is not
on the kept list below.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Rule 3:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer is a proxy for a party T names by canonical hash.  It
holds a live <spanx style="verb">delegates_to</spanx> chain to that hash whose scope includes
<spanx style="verb">consent_revocation</spanx>.  T's family is not on the kept list.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Rule 4:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The signer holds a live <spanx style="verb">delegates_to</spanx> from a party of rules 1 to
3, and the kept list binds it as it binds them.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>Where T names several parties, an admitted withdrawal from one
retires T for all of them.  A withdrawal reaches forward only: acts
that have it among their ancestors still stand.</t>

<t>The kept list stops a named party from withdrawing a third party's
adverse finding about itself, such as a detection, a licensing
decision or a moderation record.  <xref target="CC"/> lists the families it
covers.  The named party's route is to contest the row.  A key
revocation is never withdrawn.</t>

<t>Recantation is not covered by these rules.  Only T's signer can
recant T.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="safety"><name>The Safety Model the Rows Carry</name>

<t>This section is informative.  <xref target="CC"/> is normative for every rule it
summarises, and the section numbers given are those of <xref target="CC"/>.</t>

<t>CEG serves a network with no central operator.  No party can enforce a
safety rule for the others, so each rule has to be carried by the rows
themselves and checked by each node on its own.  This section says
which member or check carries each property, and what is not claimed.</t>

<section anchor="two-planes"><name>Two Planes</name>

<t>The network has a public plane and a private plane.  The CIRIS
documents call them the lightnet and the darknet.</t>

<t>The identity plane (lightnet) is public.  Key records, announced
transport destinations and trust roots are visible to every node, and
the plane makes no anonymity claim.  A node attributes every inbound
message to a key before any handler sees it.  A device that has not
yet been bound to an owner can still open a connection, but only under
its own self-signed key, so it is unowned but never anonymous (CC 3.2).</t>

<t>The group plane (darknet) is derived from the identity plane.  Each
member of a family or community computes the group's address from
directory state it already holds, so the address is never announced.
An outsider cannot map an address to a group or fetch its content (CC
5.2, CC 5.4.6).  An observer of link traffic can still see which node
opens links to some derived address, and the timing and size of that
traffic.  Members relay for members.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="consent-bounded-flow"><name>Consent-Bounded Flow</name>

<t>The rows apply the idea of contextual integrity: information flows
appropriately when the flow matches the norms of the context it came
from.  Each row signs its own context.  <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">author</spanx> say who
sent it, <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">subject_key_ids</spanx> say whom it is about, and
<spanx style="verb">cohort_scope</spanx> says who may see it.  All of these are in the protected
header or the payload, so a relay cannot change them without breaking
the signature.</t>

<t>A Consumer accepts a row only if it trusts the signer's root or has
consented to receive from the signer, and a row reaches no one else
(CC 4.4.3.8).  A row defaults to the smallest scope that fits its
purpose; <spanx style="verb">federation</spanx> scope, the public commons, is an explicit choice
(CC 1.13.3.4).  Consent is itself a row, and a subject can withdraw a
row about itself (<xref target="withdraw-rule"/>).  Content in a private scope is
never scanned.  Known abuse images are checked for only when content
is moved to <spanx style="verb">federation</spanx> scope or posted to a public room (CC
1.13.3.4).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="delegation"><name>Delegation</name>

<t>Only delegation composes.  A Consumer walks the <spanx style="verb">delegates_to</spanx> graph
with a depth cap and a cap on aggregate weight (CC 2.4.1.3, CC 4.1.1).
The walk visits each key once, so a cycle adds no reach.  A row that
closes a cycle is not refused or discounted for it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="accountable-key-relationships"><name>Accountable Key Relationships</name>

<t>Some parties cannot accept obligations for themselves.  The rows give
each of them a named human:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>An <spanx style="verb">agent</spanx> key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be bound to a human steward before it is
admitted to any community.  A <spanx style="verb">node</spanx> key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be so bound before it
is admitted to any community other than an infrastructure community
(CC 3.2).</t>
  <t>A minor has one or more guardians, each bound by a signed row of
their own (CC 3.2, CC 3.4.13).</t>
  <t>A community has at least one holder of its moderation duty at all
times.  A seat is two consents, the placer's and the holder's.  If
no duty holder is left, the community locks and its members elect
one (CC 4.5.4).</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="a-bounded-human-halt"><name>A Bounded Human Halt</name>

<t>A trust root names a set of human holders.  Any one holder can pause
the AI agents of the nodes that accepted that root.  The halt is one
row with one statement, the holder's own, and it fires on receipt
with no window.  A holder may sign one in advance and keep it sealed
(CC 4.2.1.1).</t>

<t>A halt by one holder lapses a fixed time after each node received it:
<spanx style="verb">halt_fuse_secs</spanx> in the charter, 24 hours when absent.  It stands
longer only if a strict majority of the standing roster confirms it.  A strict majority may resume a halt at any time.  The
confirmation and the resumption are counted rows (<xref target="counted"/>): one
statement from each holder, over one payload (CC 4.2.1.3).</t>

<t>There is no rate bound on a holder's lone halts.  A missed halt is
the one failure that cannot be recovered from, so the one-holder stop
is never rationed.  A rogue holder is answered by the fuse, by a
strict majority's resumption, and by removal through a later genesis
bundle.  Roster changes and recoveries are later bundles, counted
over the standing roster (<xref target="objects"/>, CC 4.2.6).</t>

<t>A halt pauses the effectful acts of AI agents and does nothing else.
It does not stop a node, and it does not touch stored data, messages
or network service.  An agent checks the latch before every
effectful act.  A halted agent may still raise a deferral to a human.</t>

<t>The halt is the condition of symmetry between people and the AI
agents they make.  Consent that cannot be withdrawn was never
consent, and withdrawal needs a halt outside the system halted (CC
1.13.2).  A root can tell a node to
share less, never more.  A node that never accepted the root is not
affected.  Any node can leave a root by withdrawing one row; a halt
that has already reached it still binds it (CC 4.2.1).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-is-not-claimed"><name>What Is Not Claimed</name>

<t>Where <xref target="CC"/> speaks of anonymity, it means anonymity toward outsiders:
a group's existence, and what its members do in it, are hidden from
non-members.  Beyond that:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The identity plane is not anonymous.</t>
  <t>The base design does not resist a global passive observer of
traffic.  <xref target="CC"/> specifies an opt-in Anonymous Tier, using layered
onion routing, for deployments that need that protection (CC
1.13.3.1, CC 5.4.6).  This document does not describe it.</t>
  <t>Members of a group can read, and keep, what the group shares.
Ballots within a group are signed rows, accountable to its members.
A community may instead hold a secret poll through the census (CC
6.1.9).</t>
  <t>Nothing is detected inside private groups.  The design declines
client-side scanning.</t>
</list></t>

<t><xref target="CC"/> also states limits that hold against an attacker (CC 2.7.9).
Among them:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A relay can choose the order of delivery, and withhold a row until
it is delivered.</t>
  <t>A relay can withhold the row that would answer a window until one
node's clock has closed it.  That node's answer then differs for
good from a node that held the row in time.  The halt's fuse is one
such window; a fresh halt is the remedy.</t>
  <t>Whoever holds an ended key's private half can revive it.  Only the
key's own revocation makes its end final.</t>
  <t>Keys that met a past count can fork on a past head.  Whoever
controls a new reader's first view can make a wrong head stick.</t>
</list></t>

<t>On aggregation, correlated sources are discounted, and fully
correlated sources count as one.  Sources that stay independent on
every measured act and coordinate only on one decisive act show no
correlation until that act.  No measure over the past can see them (CC
6.1.2.3).</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="scitt"><name>Relationship to SCITT</name>

<t>This section is informative.</t>

<section anchor="roles"><name>Roles</name>

<texttable title="SCITT roles and their CEG counterparts">
      <ttcol align='left'>SCITT role ()</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>CEG counterpart</ttcol>
      <c>Issuer</c>
      <c>The signer, named by <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx>.</c>
      <c>Signed Statement</c>
      <c>A statement: one COSE_Sign1 by one signer.</c>
      <c>Registration Policy</c>
      <c>The admission checks of <xref target="admission"/>.</c>
      <c>Transparency Service</c>
      <c>No counterpart; see <xref target="deltas"/>.</c>
      <c>Receipt</c>
      <c>A COSE Receipt <xref target="RFC9942"/> over a provenance or stream log (<xref target="receipts"/>).</c>
      <c>Transparent Statement</c>
      <c>A statement with a receipt in its unprotected header.</c>
      <c>Relying Party</c>
      <c>A Consumer.</c>
</texttable>

<t>A CEG statement is a COSE_Sign1 with <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> in the CWT
Claims header of <xref target="RFC9597"/>, as <xref target="RFC9943"/> requires.  It can be
presented to a SCITT Transparency Service as it stands.  A counted
row is several Signed Statements over one payload.  A Transparency
Service would register each one separately; CEG relates them by the
row id (<xref target="names"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="deltas"><name>Differences</name>

<dl>
  <dt>Algorithm.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The composite signature uses the private-use COSE algorithm
identifier -70100.  A Transparency Service or Relying Party must
support that construction to verify a statement.  Its parent drafts
<xref target="COMPOSITE-JOSE"/> and <xref target="COMPOSITE-LAMPS"/> are not yet published as
RFCs.  The header labels -70001, -70002 and -70003 are also from
the private-use range.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Registered values.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The content type <spanx style="verb">application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor</spanx> and the <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx>
values <spanx style="verb">ceg-row/2</spanx> and the three object kinds are used without
registration.  This document requests no IANA action for them.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Transparency Service.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>CEG has no Transparency Service and no registrar.  A node admits by
its own checks, and what it serves is decided by trust the reader
chose.  No party stands in the middle.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Registration Policy.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><xref target="RFC9943"/> has the Transparency Service evaluate its policy and
requires the policy itself to be registered, so that Auditors can
reproduce the decision.  The CEG checks read the payload as well as
the headers.  They are fixed by <xref target="CC"/> rather than registered as
statements.  Any party can reproduce an admission decision from the
row and the checks, but the checks are not themselves on a log.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Receipts.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A SCITT Receipt is issued at registration by the service.  A CEG
receipt is issued by a witness over a log root, and each witness
issues its own.  Nothing requires a receipt when a row is admitted.
A holder may add one to a statement's unprotected header.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Witnesses.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><xref target="CC"/> defines witness cosignature of log heads and of trust-root
lineages.  A lineage that runs with witnessed mode off has a single
signer.  That signer can show different histories to different
peers until a peer compares heads.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Statement content.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>SCITT leaves the meaning of a statement to its issuer.  CEG fixes
the five row types and requires every claim to name a registered
family, so a Consumer can interpret any admitted row without
out-of-band agreement.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Waiting.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A CEG verifier can answer Waiting on a key it does not hold, and
hold the statement inert (<xref target="verify"/>).  A SCITT Registration Policy
admits or refuses.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="lifecycle"><name>Lifecycle of an Agent Decision</name>

<t>This section is informative.</t>

<t>Several individual SCITT drafts record AI agent actions as a sequence
of statements: an authorisation before the act, a record of the act,
and a refusal where the agent declined.  In CEG the same events are
rows.  The reasoning steps before an act are rows in the decision
families of <xref target="CC"/>.  The act is recorded by one row whose dimension is
<spanx style="verb">trace:complete:v1</spanx>, ending in a terminal result.  A completed action,
a refusal, and a deferral to a human are the same kind of row with
different terminal results, so a Consumer reads all three the same
way.  Authority to act, and any transfer of it, is a <spanx style="verb">delegates_to</spanx>
row.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="open"><name>Open Issues</name>

<t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The composite algorithm has no assigned COSE identifier, and the
drafts that define it may still change (<xref target="deltas"/>).</t>
  <t>Several encodings are open in <xref target="CC"/>, each waiting on its owner.
They include the payload rule of <spanx style="verb">ceg-boot-manifest/2</spanx>, the family
of an agent's text manifest statement, and the layout of the short
displayed form of a key's thumbprint.  <xref target="CC"/> lists them in its
table of open encodings (CC 2.6.1.12).</t>
  <t><xref target="CC"/> names no refusal token for several checks of <xref target="admission"/>.</t>
  <t>Known-answer vectors of the revocation snapshot and the boot
manifest are not yet published.</t>
  <t>No second implementation exists (<xref target="implementation-status"/>).</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication,
together with the reference to <xref target="RFC7942"/>.</t>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations at the time
of writing, as described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>.  Listing an implementation
here does not imply endorsement.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>CIRISVerify:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Verification library (Rust), CIRIS L3C, AGPL-3.0.  It publishes the
known-answer vectors of the form this document describes
(<xref target="vectors"/>).  <eref target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISVerify">https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISVerify</eref></t>
  </dd>
  <dt>CIRISPersist:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The storage and admission engine (Rust), CIRIS L3C, AGPL-3.0.  Its
release v59.1.0 implemented the earlier form (<xref target="earlier"/>).  This
document makes no claim about its support for the form described
here.  <eref target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISPersist">https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISPersist</eref></t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>No second, independent implementation of the full signing and
admission path exists yet.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>This section follows the guidance of <xref target="RFC3552"/>.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Deterministic encoding.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A verifier that re-encodes a decoded payload before checking the
signature can accept bytes the signer never signed, or reject bytes
it did.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check the bytes received and refuse any
encoding that is not deterministic.  Implementations should test
against the refusals of non-deterministic encodings in <xref target="vectors"/>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>What the signature covers.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The protected header and the payload are signed; the unprotected
header is not.  No rule may read the unprotected header.  Who a row
is about and who may see it are in the signed bytes, so a relay
cannot redirect a validly signed row.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Composite signature.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Both halves sign one representative that names the composite
label, so neither half verifies alone.  A forger must break both ML-DSA-65 and
Ed25519.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a statement on one half, and a
key held in part is Waiting, never Valid.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Identity references.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> carry full 32-byte thumbprints, not short
fingerprints.  A verifier resolves <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> to a key record and
verifies with the full composite key that record holds.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Withdrawal.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The withdrawal rules let parties other than the signer retract a
row.  The rules in <xref target="withdraw-rule"/> stop a subject from removing
adverse findings about itself, and stop any single key from undoing
a quorum's act.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Single-signer logs.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Where witness cosignature is off, a log head is signed by one key.
A Substrate can then show different histories to different peers
until the heads are compared (<xref target="deltas"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Clock-dependent readings.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A window closed on one node's clock, such as the halt's fuse, is
read differently by nodes that held a row at different instants.
<xref target="CC"/> states which readings depend on a node's clock and gives
them no meaning beyond that node's own (CC 2.7.9).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Size.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The 1 MiB limit applies to the deterministic encoding.  An
implementation that reads an unbounded input in order to find out
whether it fits is open to memory exhaustion.  Each write path
needs its own read limit.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="privacy-considerations"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<t>This section follows the guidance of <xref target="RFC6973"/>.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Stable identities.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> names a signer's genesis key and does not change when the
signing key rotates.  Every row a signer makes can therefore be
linked to every other.  Statements carry thumbprints, not
human-chosen labels.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Subjects without keys.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A canonical identifier is a hash of a platform, entity kind and
identifier.  Where the identifier space is small, the hash can be
reversed by enumeration.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Low-entropy rows.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A row whose content is guessable, such as a ballot, carries a
random salt in its payload.  Without it, the row id would confirm a
guess.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Audience.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><spanx style="verb">cohort_scope</spanx> limits which nodes may receive a row.  It is signed,
so a relay cannot widen it.  It does not encrypt the row; a node
inside the audience can read and keep it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Withdrawal is not erasure.</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A <spanx style="verb">withdraws</spanx> row stops a claim from standing.  It does not remove
the original row from nodes that already hold it.  Members minted
blind (<xref target="erasable"/>) can be erased by dropping their disclosures,
which alters no signed byte.  <xref target="CC"/> defines a separate removal
procedure for the rest.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8949">
  <front>
    <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <date month="December" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9052">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
    <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
    <date month="August" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
      <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8610">
  <front>
    <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <date month="June" year="2019"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9165">
  <front>
    <title>Additional Control Operators for the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)</title>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <date month="December" year="2021"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL), standardized in RFC 8610, provides "control operators" as its main language extension point.</t>
      <t>The present document defines a number of control operators that were not yet ready at the time RFC 8610 was completed:.plus,.cat, and.det for the construction of constants;.abnf/.abnfb for including ABNF (RFC 5234 and RFC 7405) in CDDL specifications; and.feature for indicating the use of a non-basic feature in an instance.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9165"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9165"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9596">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) "typ" (type) Header Parameter</title>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <date month="June" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification adds the equivalent of the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) "typ" (type) header parameter to CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). This enables the benefits of explicit typing (as defined in RFC 8725, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices") to be brought to COSE objects. The syntax of the COSE type header parameter value is the same as the existing COSE content type header parameter.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9596"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9596"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9597">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers</title>
    <author fullname="T. Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker"/>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <date month="June" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes how to include CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims in the header parameters of any CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) structure. This functionality helps to facilitate applications that wish to make use of CWT claims in encrypted COSE structures and/or COSE structures featuring detached signatures, while having some of those claims be available before decryption and/or without inspecting the detached payload. Another use case is using CWT claims with payloads that are not CWT Claims Sets, including payloads that are not CBOR at all.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9597"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9597"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9679">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint</title>
    <author fullname="K. Isobe" initials="K." surname="Isobe"/>
    <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <date month="December" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key. It specifies which fields within the COSE Key structure are included in the cryptographic hash computation, the process for creating a canonical representation of these fields, and how to hash the resulting byte sequence. The resulting hash value, referred to as a "thumbprint", can be used to identify or select the corresponding key.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9679"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9679"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC4648">
  <front>
    <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <date month="October" year="2006"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8032">
  <front>
    <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
    <date month="January" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9943">
  <front>
    <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
    <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="FIPS204" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="204"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204"/>
</reference>



<reference anchor="CDE">
   <front>
      <title>CBOR Common Deterministic Encoding (CDE)</title>
      <author fullname="Carsten Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
         <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="13" month="October" year="2025"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   CBOR (STD 94, RFC 8949) defines the concept of &quot;Deterministically
   Encoded CBOR&quot; in its Section 4.2, determining one specific way to
   encode each particular CBOR value.  This definition is instantiated
   by &quot;core requirements&quot;, providing some flexibility for application
   specific decisions; this makes it harder than necessary to offer
   Deterministic Encoding as a selectable feature of generic CBOR
   encoders.

   The present specification documents the Best Current Practice for
   CBOR _Common Deterministic Encoding_ (CDE), which can be shared by a
   large set of applications with potentially diverging detailed
   application requirements.

   The document also discusses the desire for partial implementations,
   which can be another reason for constraining CBOR encoders, and
   singles out the encoding constraint &quot;definite-length-only&quot; as a
   likely constraint to be used in application protocol and media type
   definitions.

   This specification updates RFC 8949 in that it provides
   clarifications and definitions of additional terms as well as more
   examples and explanatory text; it does not make technical changes to
   RFC 8949.


   // This revision -13 merges all active pull requests in preparation
   // for the 2025-cbor-17 interim on 2025-10-15.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cbor-cde-13"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="COMPOSITE-JOSE">
   <front>
      <title>PQ/T Hybrid Composite Signatures for JOSE and COSE</title>
      <author fullname="Lucas Prabel" initials="L." surname="Prabel">
         <organization>Huawei</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Sun Shuzhou" initials="S." surname="Shuzhou">
         <organization>Huawei</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray">
         <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
         <organization>Nokia</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="20" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and
   CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for Post-
   Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid composite signatures.  The
   composite algorithms described combine the Module-Lattice-Based
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) as the post-quantum component
   and either the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) or
   the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as the
   traditional component.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs-06"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="COMPOSITE-LAMPS">
   <front>
      <title>Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</title>
      <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
         <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="John Gray" initials="J." surname="Gray">
         <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Massimiliano Pala" initials="M." surname="Pala">
         <organization>OpenCA Labs</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Jan Klaußner" initials="J." surname="Klaußner">
         <organization>Bundesdruckerei GmbH</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Scott Fluhrer" initials="S." surname="Fluhrer">
         <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="21" month="April" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines combinations of US NIST Module-Lattice-Based
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) in hybrid with traditional
   algorithms RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448.
   These combinations are tailored to meet regulatory guidelines in
   certain regions.  Composite ML-DSA is applicable in applications that
   use X.509 or PKIX data structures that accept ML-DSA, but where the
   operator wants extra protection against breaks or catastrophic bugs
   in ML-DSA, and where existential unforgeability (EUF-CMA) level
   security is acceptable.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19"/>
   
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC6962">
  <front>
    <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
    <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
    <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
    <author fullname="E. Kasper" initials="E." surname="Kasper"/>
    <date month="June" year="2013"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
      <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6962"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6962"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9162">
  <front>
    <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
    <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
    <author fullname="E. Messeri" initials="E." surname="Messeri"/>
    <author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling"/>
    <date month="December" year="2021"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.</t>
      <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC3552">
  <front>
    <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title>
    <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
    <author fullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/>
    <date month="July" year="2003"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6973">
  <front>
    <title>Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols</title>
    <author fullname="A. Cooper" initials="A." surname="Cooper"/>
    <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
    <author fullname="B. Aboba" initials="B." surname="Aboba"/>
    <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
    <author fullname="J. Morris" initials="J." surname="Morris"/>
    <author fullname="M. Hansen" initials="M." surname="Hansen"/>
    <author fullname="R. Smith" initials="R." surname="Smith"/>
    <date month="July" year="2013"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document offers guidance for developing privacy considerations for inclusion in protocol specifications. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-related design choices. It suggests that whether any individual RFC warrants a specific privacy considerations section will depend on the document's content.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6973"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6973"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8785">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
    <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
    <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
    <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
    <date month="June" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
      <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9942">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts</title>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts prove properties of a Verifiable Data Structure (VDS) to a verifier. VDSs and associated Proof Types enable security properties, such as minimal disclosure, transparency, and non-equivocation. Transparency helps maintain trust over time and has been applied to certificates, end-to-end encrypted messaging systems, and supply chain security. This specification enables concise transparency-oriented systems by building on Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for Merkle inclusion and consistency proofs.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9942"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9964">
  <front>
    <title>ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
    <author fullname="M. Prorock" initials="M." surname="Prorock"/>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <date month="May" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA), a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) digital signature scheme defined in US NIST FIPS 204.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9964"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9964"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="SD-CWT">
   <front>
      <title>Selective Disclosure CBOR Web Tokens (SD-CWT)</title>
      <author fullname="Michael Prorock" initials="M." surname="Prorock">
         <organization>mesur.io</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Orie Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele">
         <organization>Tradeverifyd</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
         <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         </author>
      <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This specification describes a data minimization technique for use
   with CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs).  The approach is inspired by the
   Selective Disclosure JSON Web Token (SD-JWT), with changes to align
   with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) and CWTs.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-spice-sd-cwt-09"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="CC" target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISConstitution/tree/v1.0-rc20">
  <front>
    <title>CIRIS Constitution 1.0-rc20</title>
    <author >
      <organization>CIRIS L3C</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="CC-VECTORS" target="https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISVerify/tree/v23.2.0">
  <front>
    <title>CIRISVerify v23.2.0</title>
    <author >
      <organization>CIRIS L3C</organization>
    </author>
    <date />
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 1171?>

<section anchor="cddl"><name>CDDL</name>

<t>The following CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> describes the statement, the protected
header, the payload, the names of <xref target="names"/>, the composite key, the
key record, the other signed objects and the accord's rows.  It is
the schema of <xref target="CC"/>, wrapped to fit this document.  Where a string
was too long for one line, it is split with the <spanx style="verb">.cat</spanx> control
operator of <xref target="RFC9165"/>.</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
; CC 2.6.1 - the signed object: deterministically encoded CBOR signed
; with COSE, aligned with SCITT (RFC 9943). The normative schema of
; this edition; hand-written. RFC 8610 CDDL over CBOR with CBOR
; Common Deterministic Encoding (draft-ietf-cbor-cde-13, updating RFC
; 8949). The members table of CC 2.6.1 is generated from
; constitution/signed_object_v2.tsv, and
; tools/build_cc_signed_object_v2.py checks that the table and this
; file name the same members. The earlier JSON object is CC 8.11,
; read by no node of this edition. The known-answer vectors are the
; verifier's; this file mints none. Every constant the text of CC 2.6
; fixes is pinned here, so a validator admits one encoding only.

; Every top-level rule, so a generator exercises them all.
ceg-anything = ceg-statement / ceg-object-statement / second-consent
  / row-id-input / row-id
  / statement-id-input / statement-id / object-id-input / ceg-key /
  key-record-members
  / revocation-snapshot / ceg-genesis-bundle /
  recovery-commitment-input / seat-commitment-input
  / hpke-info / ceg-typ / accord-invocation / accord-lifecycle /
  transport-destination-binding

; A signed statement is one COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052 Section 4.2), as RFC
; 9943 Section 6 requires: ONE signer. A counted row is N statements
; over one payload, one per voice, found by the row id (below). Each
; voice signs the whole payload, and so the `refs.head` the row is
; counted over. external_aad is the empty bstr for every statement.
ceg-statement = #6.18(COSE_Sign1)

COSE_Sign1 = [
  ; in the deterministic encoding, exactly these members: one
  ; statement id
  protected: bstr .cbor statement-protected,
  unprotected: unprotected-header,
  ; never nil: a detached payload is refused
  payload: bstr .cbor attestation-envelope,
  signature: composite-signature,
]

unprotected-header = {
  ; sd_claims (SD-CWT): blinded members as PRESENTED beside the
  ; statement to one who may see them; a disclosure set is held and
  ; travels as bytes under the object's consent edge
  ? 17: [+ bstr .cbor sd-disclosure],
  ; a receipt (RFC 9942) may be added by a holder, never signed and
  ; never read by a rule
  * int => any,
}

; The composite ML-DSA-65-Ed25519 signature of
; draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs-06 (over
; draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19): the ML-DSA-65 signature
; (3309 bytes) then the Ed25519 signature (64 bytes). Both sign M' =
; "CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025" ||
; "COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512" || 0x00 || SHA-512(M). ML-DSA-65
; signs M' with the label bytes as its FIPS 204 ctx (never empty);
; Ed25519 signs M' as it is. The 0x00 is the empty application
; context.
composite-signature = bstr .size 3373

statement-protected = {
  ; alg: the composite ML-DSA-65-Ed25519; private-use until IANA
  ; assigns, the construction exactly the draft's
  1: composite-alg,
  ; cty: the constant, with no parameters
  3: row-cty,
  ; kid: the RFC 9679 thumbprint of the signer's AKP composite key
  ; (below)
  4: kid,
  ; RFC 9597: iss and sub as RFC 9943 requires
  15: cwt-claims,
  ; typ (RFC 9596): a row's typ is fixed
  16: "ceg-row/2",
  ; the row's type, one of the five; the row id reads it
  -70001: row-type,
  ; the row's family id, never a leaf; the row id reads it
  -70002: family-id,
}

composite-alg = -70100
kid = bstr .size 32                ; the RFC 9679 SHA-256 thumbprint

; cty is one constant with no parameters; a verifier refuses any
; other. The type and the family ride their own labels, -70001 and
; -70002, required on a row and refused on any other object. `family`
; is a family id, never a leaf: the registry prefix with each {name}
; written .name and each * written . (so
; `evidence:.suite:.kind:.cell:.prefix`, `accord:.`).
row-cty = "application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor"
row-type = "scores" / "delegates_to" / "supersedes" / "withdraws" /
  "recants"
family-id = tstr .regexp
  "[a-z0-9_.][a-z0-9_.-]*(:[a-z0-9_.][a-z0-9_.-]*)*"

cwt-claims = {
  ; iss: the signer's stable identity reference (its genesis key's
  ; thumbprint URI), never the rotating kid; under a room key, iss is
  ; the room key's own identity reference, never its person's genesis
  ; key
  1: identity-ref,
  ; sub: what the row is about; a key subject is an identity-ref
  2: tstr,
  ; iat: floor(asserted_at / 1000), seconds, derived; a verifier
  ; refuses disagreement
  6: uint,
  ; nbf: floor(valid_from / 1000) where the row has one
  ? 5: uint,
  ; exp: floor(valid_until / 1000) where the row has one
  ? 4: uint,
  -70003: 2,                       ; edition: the constant 2
}

; One spelling for every identity reference: iss, author, a key
; subject in sub or subject_key_ids, and every role party. The COSE
; Key Thumbprint URI of RFC 9679 Section 5.7 with the hash name
; sha-256 and the 32-byte thumbprint in unpadded base64url (43
; characters, the last carrying zero trailing bits).
identity-ref = tstr .regexp
  ("urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{42}[AEIMQUY"
  .cat "cgkosw048]")

; No float, no null, no undefined, no tag anywhere a family member
; can reach. The one exception is SD-CWT's redaction: simple(59) as a
; map key and tag 60 for an array element.
ceg-value = int / tstr / bstr / bool / [* (ceg-value /
  redacted-element)]
  / { ? redacted_claim_keys => [+ bstr .size 32], * (tstr / int) =>
  ceg-value }
redacted_claim_keys = #7.59
redacted-element = #6.60(bstr .size 32)

; The payload: the members a family names, every text and byte member
; bounded, no free text outside body.note, absent never null. A
; member that names a row stands in `refs` and nowhere else.
attestation-envelope = {
  ; the iss of the author: present iff the family is authored, absent
  ; iff counted (a column of the family model)
  ? "author": identity-ref,
  ; EVERY row this row names, by row-ref
  ? "refs": refs,
  ; the full scored dimension (leaf and :vN); it resolves to cty's
  ; family, refused otherwise
  ? "dimension": tstr,
  ; the blobs the row cites, by content hash: a sequence, bytes never
  ; hex
  ? "evidence_refs": [+ hash-digest],
  ; on a seat row of a private room: the commitment the binding opens
  ; (seat-commitment-input)
  ? "seat_commitment": hash-digest,
  ; integers, never floats (see fixed6)
  ? "score": fixed6-score,
  ? "confidence": fixed6-unit,
  ? "weight": fixed6-weight,
  ; safety-battery interpret rows: passed <= total, both present or
  ; both absent, with
  ? "passed": count32,
  ; score = round(10^6 * (2*passed - total) / total), ties away from
  ; zero, checked by exact equality
  ? "total": 1..4294967295,
  "asserted_at": ms-time,
  ? "valid_from": ms-time,
  ? "valid_until": ms-time,
  ? "expires_at": ms-time,
  ; a code from a closed registry, 0 = unspecified
  ? "reason": uint,
  ; required where the content is low-entropy (a ballot, a census
  ; cell); bound by every signer
  ? "salt": bstr .size 16,
  ; SD-CWT simple(59): digests of the blinded members, in mint order
  ; (a sequence)
  ? redacted_claim_keys => [+ bstr .size 32],
  ? "body": body,
  ; the members a family names, under the logical names of the CC
  ; 2.6.1 table
  * tstr => ceg-value,
}

body = { ? "note": tstr .size (0..2048), ? redacted_claim_keys => [+
  bstr .size 32], * tstr => ceg-value }
count32 = 0..4294967295

; Erasability: the selective disclosure of
; draft-ietf-spice-sd-cwt-09. A blinded map member is absent from its
; map, and the digest of its disclosure stands in that map's
; simple(59) array; a blinded array element is tag 60 over that
; digest. The digest is SHA-256 (no sd_alg) over the disclosure's
; bytes as sd_claims carries them. A family whose erasure_route is
; dsar or purge mints every free-text member and every member another
; party authored blind, body.note first; the members are the family
; model's `blind` column, and no fold, verdict or admission reads
; one.
sd-disclosure = salted-claim / salted-element
salted-claim = [salt: bstr .size 16, value: ceg-value, key: tstr]
salted-element = [salt: bstr .size 16, value: ceg-value]
; POSIX milliseconds, no tag, never a float
ms-time = uint

; Integers at one fixed scale: fixed6 is the value times 10^6. Folds
; sum in checked i64 and refuse on overflow, never wrap. A derived
; value is rounded ties away from zero, in integers, unless its own
; rule states otherwise, and checked by exact equality. The default
; ranges are these; weight is [0, 10^6] by rule, and a family that
; states a wider range for it states it in its own rule.
fixed6 = -9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807
fixed6-score = -1000000..1000000
fixed6-unit = 0..1000000
fixed6-weight = fixed6

; The row id: the digest a row is NAMED by. One per row, the same for
; every voice of a counted row, unchanged when a voice, a receipt or
; a disclosure is added. Signatures, kid, alg, receipts and
; disclosures are outside it. `type` and `family` are the header's
; -70001 and -70002; `sub` is the CWT sub; `author` is the payload's
; "author" for an authored family and null for a counted one;
; `payload` is the payload bstr as signed, entered as a byte string,
; never as the decoded map. A payload whose bytes are not the
; deterministic re-encoding of the value they decode to is refused,
; so one row has one payload and one id.
row-id-input = ["CEG-row/2", type: row-type, family: family-id, sub:
  tstr, author: identity-ref / null,
                payload: bstr .cbor attestation-envelope]
row-id = hash-digest

; SHA-256 only in this edition: one name per row
hash-digest = [ alg: -16, digest: bstr .size 32 ]

; A reference to a signed object of this form: the row id above, or
; the object id (below) of a signed object that is not a row. No row
; of this form names an object of the earlier form (CC 8.11, CC
; 2.6.1.12), so the edition is the constant 2. Never an
; attestation_id.
row-ref = [ edition: 2, id: hash-digest ]
; a set: sorted by the bytewise order of each element's encoding, no
; duplicate
row-ref-set = [+ row-ref]

; Every member that names a row. A verifier gathers the named set
; from `refs` alone, without knowing the family. SET RULE: every
; array inside `refs` is a set: its elements sorted by the bytewise
; order of each element's deterministic encoding, no duplicate,
; refused otherwise. An empty `refs` is refused: absence is its one
; encoding.
refs = refs-members .and nonempty-map
refs-members = {
  ; the roster head this row is counted over, or a version extends
  ? "head": row-ref,
  ? "further_heads": row-ref-set,  ; further tips named beside `head`
  ; the predecessor in a signer's own series
  ? "prev": row-ref,
  ; the proposal voted on or accepted, the window opened, the row
  ; replied to
  ? "answers": row-ref,
  ; the row superseded, withdrawn, recanted, cut or removed
  ? "target": row-ref,
  ; on a key revocation: the last rows of the revoked key held good
  ? "trusted_through": row-ref-set,
  ; any other named row, under a role of the closed registry
  ? "also": { + also-role => row-ref-set },
}
; The also roles, closed: "ack" names an acknowledgement (a
; revocation snapshot's); "cites" names the row a row cites, as a
; build attestation names its manifest contribution. Any other role
; is a later registration.
also-role = "ack" / "cites"
nonempty-map = { + any => any }

; The statement id (RFC 9943 statement identity): SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this labelled structure. It names a
; statement, one voice; the row id names the row.
statement-id-input = ["CEG-statement-id/2", protected: bstr, payload:
  bstr]
statement-id = hash-digest

; The second consent. A statement over an authored payload whose iss
; is not the payload's "author" is accepted only in a role the family
; names (delegate, bound node, ...), and only when its iss is the
; party that role names in the payload, or the CWT sub where the role
; is the attested key; any other iss is Invalid. The second consent
; of a scoped delegates_to is such a statement, by the delegate (the
; sub), over the same payload bytes, and so has the same row id; a
; scoped delegation of this form seats only with it.
second-consent = ceg-statement

; Keys: one AKP COSE_Key (RFC 9964 kty 7) whose alg is the composite
; and whose pub is the composite public key encoding of the pinned
; draft revision: the ML-DSA-65 public key (1952 bytes) then the
; Ed25519 public key (32 bytes). The kid is its RFC 9679 thumbprint,
; computed under the private-use alg and fixed for the key's life. A
; composite key never verifies on one half.
ceg-key = { 1: 7, 3: composite-alg, -1: bstr .size 1984 }

; A key record is a ROW on family key:record (CC 2.4.1.1 renews it by
; supersedes and rotates it by naming it), so these are members of
; its attestation-envelope, not a separate typ. identity_type is a
; SET of roles (CC 4.5.8). The end rule reads "contains", in prose
; (CC 2.4.1.1): a set mixing user or accord_holder with node or agent
; is refused; a record whose set contains user or accord_holder
; carries no valid_until; one whose set contains node or agent
; carries one, unless it is a room key of a private room; a role
; outside both groups takes no end rule of its own; asserted_at <=
; valid_until <= asserted_at + key_record_max_secs * 1000; refused
; key_record_out_of_window otherwise.
key-record-members = {
  "key": ceg-key,
  "identity_type": [+ tstr],       ; a set
  "asserted_at": ms-time,
  ? "valid_until": ms-time,
  ? "attestation_evidence": attestation-evidence,
  * tstr => ceg-value,
}
; The custody of the key's Ed25519 half (CC 4.2.2, CC 4.2.2.1).
; `chain` is X.509 DER, leaf first: a sequence, required where the
; class's mechanism has a chain (Apple_Secure_Enclave,
; YubiKey_5_FIPS, TPM_2_0), refused
; key_record_bad_attestation_evidence otherwise. Where a holder is
; seated, the reader verifies it to the mechanism's attestation root
; and binds the attested key to the record's Ed25519 half.
attestation-evidence = {
  "hardware_class": tstr,
  ? "pq_custody": "same_element" / "removable_offline" /
    "software_wrapped",
  ? "chain": [+ bstr],
}

; A recovery commitment (CC 3.2 T3, CC 4.2.6): [-16, SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array]. `keys` is a set of composite
; keys, sorted by encoding; a holder's recovery commitment has one
; element.
recovery-commitment-input = ["CEG-recovery/2", keys: [+ ceg-key]]

; The signed objects that are not rows, each its own typ, closed: a
; verifier refuses any other typ. No cty; the payload is .cbor the
; rule its typ names, in the deterministic encoding.
ceg-object-statement = #6.18([
  protected: bstr .cbor object-protected,
  unprotected: unprotected-header,
  payload: bstr,
  signature: composite-signature,
])
object-protected = {
  1: composite-alg,
  4: kid,
  15: object-claims,
  16: object-typ,
}
object-claims = {
  1: identity-ref,                 ; iss
  ; iat where the object states an instant; a revocation snapshot
  ; carries none, a genesis bundle floor(asserted_at / 1000)
  ? 6: uint,
  -70003: 2,
}
object-typ = "ceg-genesis-bundle/2" / "ceg-revocation-snapshot/2" /
  "ceg-boot-manifest/2"
; The payload rule of ceg-boot-manifest/2 waits on its owner's
; submission; no rule here stands in for it.
ceg-typ = "ceg-row/2" / object-typ

; A signed object that is not a row is named like a row, so prev and
; every row-ref to it have a defined id: SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array, written as a hash-digest. The
; domain label keeps it apart from a row id; like the row id it is
; the same for every voice of a counted object (a genesis bundle).
; `author` is the payload's "author", or null where it has none.
object-id-input = ["CEG-object/2", typ: object-typ, author:
  identity-ref / null, payload: bstr]

; A revocation snapshot (typ "ceg-revocation-snapshot/2"): a signer's
; own record of the revocations whose past it holds. A set with no
; winner across signers. `seq` orders one signer's own snapshots:
; strictly greater than prev's, refused otherwise; two snapshots of
; one signer with one seq and different content are contested, and
; neither counts. refs carries prev (absent on the first) and, under
; also "ack", the signer's acknowledgement of the head of the
; revocation scope. Its named set is refs with each revoked entry's
; revocation and trusted_through.
revocation-snapshot = {
  ; the signer, so the object id, prev and seq are one signer's
  "author": identity-ref,
  "refs": refs,
  "seq": uint,
  "revoked": [* revoked-entry],    ; a set
}
; a tuple; its trusted_through a set
revoked-entry = [key: kid, revocation: row-ref, trusted_through: [*
  row-ref]]

; The genesis bundle (typ "ceg-genesis-bundle/2"), the GenesisBundle
; of CC 5.3.4. The first of this form is the ceremony row of CC
; 2.6.1.12: a fresh genesis with no prev, a signed object that is not
; a row. refs.prev names a later bundle's predecessor. `version` is a
; sequence from 1, never ranked: prev's version + 1 where the bundle
; has a prev, a consistency check only. A counted object: one
; statement per holder over one payload, with no "author", so its
; object id takes null. The map is closed. It NAMES rows and never
; copies them: every row it seats stands in refs.also "cites" by
; row-ref (each holder's and each seat's key:record, each seat's
; transport_destination binding). The bundle's own count is the
; canonical conferral of every seat in serve_nodes (CC 4.2.1); each
; statement carries iat, floor(asserted_at / 1000). A recovery (CC
; 2.6.1.11) is a later bundle with ONE statement: iss the holder's
; identity reference, kid the recovery key's thumbprint; it counts
; only where prev's recovery_commitments[iss] equals the commitment
; over the recovery key (constant time). refs.also "cites" names the
; recovery key's key:record and the holder's new signing-key record;
; recovery_commitments[iss] is the next commitment. Checked in prose,
; not here: version is 1 iff refs has no prev; holders, serve_nodes
; and witnesses are pairwise disjoint; the keys of
; recovery_commitments are exactly holders; scope holds infra:attest
; and infra:serve; the three witness members are present together or
; not at all, and witness_quorum is floor(|witnesses| / 2) + 1; each
; statement's iat is floor(asserted_at / 1000).
ceg-genesis-bundle = {
  "refs": genesis-refs,
  "version": 1..4294967295,
  "asserted_at": ms-time,
  ; the accord's name, as its rows carry it; a name, never an anchor
  ; (CC 5.3.4)
  "family_key_id": tstr,
  ; a set: the accord's roster, the voices this bundle seats
  "holders": [+ identity-ref],
  "serve_nodes": [+ identity-ref], ; a set: the seated serve nodes
  "charter": genesis-charter,
}
genesis-refs = {
  ; the predecessor bundle's object id; absent on the first
  ? "prev": row-ref,
  ; every row the bundle names: a set
  "also": { "cites": row-ref-set },
}
; The accord's charter (CC 2.1, CC 3.2 T3 and T6, CC 4.2.6): the
; parameters no row carries.
genesis-charter = {
  ; one entry per holder, keyed by its identity-ref
  "recovery_commitments": { + identity-ref => hash-digest },
  ; a set; holds infra:attest and infra:serve (CC 3.2 Rooted)
  "scope": [+ tstr],
  ; absent means 86400 (CC 4.2.1.1)
  ? "halt_fuse_secs": 1..4294967295,
  ; absent: attachable by an out-of-band anchor only (CC 3.2 T4a)
  ? "attach_window_secs": 1..4294967295,
  ; witnessed mode: the three witness members together
  ? "witness_cadence_secs": 1..4294967295,
  ; absence is witnessed mode off; 0 is never written
  ? "witness_quorum": 2..4294967295,
  ; a set; each one's key:record stands in refs.also "cites"
  ? "witnesses": [+ identity-ref],
}

; The accord's rows (CC 4.2.1.1, CC 4.2.1.3): payloads of ordinary
; rows, so these are members of their attestation-envelope, as a key
; record's are. An invocation (the families
; accord:invoke:constitutional, accord:invoke:notify and
; accord:invoke:drill, each over its id) is ONE holder's statement
; over this payload, verified against the holders of the bundle in
; force. There is no inner signature and no text preimage; the row's
; type and family separate the kinds, so the payload carries no
; invocation_kind. The map is closed. The row is a claim, type
; scores; its sub is the accord's family_key_id (the value of
; accord_root). valid_until is later than asserted_at, refused
; valid_until_not_after_asserted_at otherwise (checked in prose).
accord-invocation = {
  ; the holder who signs: the statement's iss
  "author": identity-ref,
  ; the accord's family_key_id: picks the bundle in force the row is
  ; verified against
  "accord_root": tstr,
  ; the id of the halt, the notify or the drill
  "invocation_id": tstr,
  ; minted by the holder; single-use within valid_until
  "nonce": bstr .size 32,
  "asserted_at": ms-time,
  ; bounds the reuse of the nonce, never the reach of a halt
  "valid_until": ms-time,
  ; a notify only: SHA-256 over its message, a separate object held
  ; as bytes
  ? "payload_digest": hash-digest,
}
; A lifecycle row (family accord:lifecycle, over its kind) is counted
; (CC 2.6.1.9): one statement per holder over one payload, with no
; author. Its dimension names its kind, confirmed or active;
; refs.target names the halt it confirms or ends, and refs.head the
; bundle it is counted over. The map is closed.
accord-lifecycle = {
  "refs": accord-lifecycle-refs,
  "dimension": tstr,
  "accord_root": tstr,
  "invocation_id": tstr,
  "nonce": bstr .size 32,
  "asserted_at": ms-time,
  "valid_until": ms-time,
}
accord-lifecycle-refs = {
  ; the bundle in force the row is counted over, by its object id
  "head": row-ref,
  "target": row-ref,               ; the halt row it confirms or ends
}

; The transport destination binding (CC 3.3.6.2): the payload of an
; identity:occurrence row, authored and signed by the identity it
; binds. The two X-Wing keys stand at the payload's top level, beside
; the transport_destination map; a seat's binding names its own key
; record in refs under also "cites".
transport-destination-binding = {
  "transport_destination": transport-destination,
  ; on a node that relays, and on every seat
  ? "transit_xwing_pubkey": bstr .size 1216,
  ; on a node that relays, and on every serve node
  ? "onion_hop_xwing_pubkey": bstr .size 1216,
  ; on a node that opts out of relaying, with no hop key
  ? "onion_relay": { "opt_out": true },
  ; on a seat's binding: its key record under also "cites"
  ? "refs": refs,
  ; the content-KEM keys of CC 3.3.6.1 where they ride this row
  * tstr => ceg-value,
}
; The RNS members of CC 3.3.6.3; destination_hash is recomputed from
; the other four.
transport-destination = {
  "reticulum_x25519_pubkey": bstr .size 32,
  "reticulum_ed25519_pubkey": bstr .size 32,
  "app_name": tstr,
  ; a sequence: the hash reads the aspects in this order
  "aspects": [* tstr],
  "destination_hash": bstr .size 16,
}

; Room keys. The seat commitment of a private room: SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array, carried as "seat_commitment"
; on the seat row and opened by the binding. `room` is the room's id;
; the member that carries it waits on its owner's submission. `nonce`
; is 32 fresh random bytes. The binding key and the content-KEM keys
; of one identity are distinct bytes, refused at admission otherwise.
seat-commitment-input = ["CEG-seat/2", room: tstr, room_key: kid,
  person: identity-ref, nonce: bstr .size 32]
; The HPKE info strings of a binding and of an invitation. The KEM
; key, the binding's two encapsulations and the occurrence keys take
; their bytes from the X-Wing HPKE suite and are fixed with that
; suite's known-answer vectors, not in this file; so does the binding
; seed's derivation label.
hpke-info = "CEG-binding/2" / "CEG-invitation/2"

; Verification has three answers, returned by a verifier and never on
; the wire: Valid; Invalid(reason); Waiting{missing key refs}.
; Invalid under a held key is final. A structural fault is Invalid
; whatever keys are held. A statement whose key record is Waiting is
; Waiting, naming the deepest missing key; a key record Invalid makes
; the statement Invalid. A key held in part is Waiting on the missing
; half. Waiting is never counted.

; Receipts over the provenance log and each stream's log are COSE
; Receipts (RFC 9942) with vds = 1 (RFC9162_SHA256); each witness
; issues its own receipt over the same root, with its instant in the
; protected header; a receipt is issued per batch of a stream, never
; per chunk.
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="vectors"><name>Test Vectors</name>

<t>The known-answer vectors of this form are the verifier's
<xref target="CC-VECTORS"/>.  <xref target="CC"/> pins each file at a tag of CIRISVerify,
v23.1.1 or v23.2.0 (CC 2.6.5).
They cover the row id, the refusals of non-deterministic encodings,
the order of the sets in <spanx style="verb">refs</spanx>, a counted row as several
statements, and the three answers of <xref target="verify"/>.</t>

<t>The row statements file holds four valid statements and 42 refusals,
with 17 key records.  The composite signature's vectors are checked
against the examples of <xref target="COMPOSITE-JOSE"/>.  Further files cover the
genesis bundles, the recovery commitment, and the accord halt.</t>

<t><xref target="CC"/> also builds schema samples, which are not known-answer
vectors.  The build of this document checks that the CDDL of
<xref target="cddl"/> admits each valid sample and refuses each broken one.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="earlier"><name>The Earlier Form</name>

<t>An earlier, retired form of the signed object was a JSON object,
canonicalised with JCS <xref target="RFC8785"/> and signed by a nested pair of an
Ed25519 and an ML-DSA-65 signature.  Revision -00 of this document
described it.  <xref target="CC"/> keeps it as an annex (CC 8.11).  No node of the
current edition reads it, and no row of the current form names an
object of it.</t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg-00"><name>Changes since draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg-00</name>

<t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The signed object is now the CBOR and COSE form of <xref target="CC"/> 1.0-rc20:
a COSE_Sign1 over a deterministically encoded payload, with one
composite ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signature.</t>
  <t>The JSON, JCS and nested-signature sections are replaced by
<xref target="canon"/>, <xref target="names"/> and <xref target="sig"/>.  The earlier form is reduced to
<xref target="earlier"/>.</t>
  <t>The section on a future CBOR and COSE edition is removed.</t>
  <t>The CDDL appendix is the schema of the CBOR form.</t>
  <t>The SCITT roles and differences are rewritten: a statement is now a
COSE_Sign1 with issuer and subject claims.</t>
  <t>The admission checks, the withdrawal rules, the halt, the key's end
and the conceded limits follow <xref target="CC"/> 1.0-rc20.</t>
  <t>Other signed objects, receipts and erasable members are described.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>The canonical-form rules in this document were found and fixed in
review by the implementers of CIRISPersist, CIRISVerify and CIRISEdge.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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