| Internet-Draft | CEG Attestation Rows and SCITT | November 2026 |
| Moore | Expires 20 May 2027 | [Page] |
The CIRIS Epistemic Grammar (CEG) records claims between parties as signed rows. Each row is one or more COSE_Sign1 messages over a payload in deterministically encoded CBOR. Each message carries one composite ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signature. Every row has one of five types: a claim, a delegation, a replacement, a withdrawal, or a recantation. A node admits a row only after a fixed set of checks, and it refuses a failing row with a named reason.¶
This document specifies the signed statement, its encoding, the names by which rows refer to each other, the signature, and the admission checks, so that a second implementation can produce and verify the same bytes. It then describes how these statements relate to the roles of the SCITT architecture (RFC 9943), and where they differ. It defines no new SCITT mechanism and requests no IANA action.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISConstitution/tree/main/ietf. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISConstitution.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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CEG is the row format of the CIRIS system, in which people, devices, communities and AI agents make claims about each other and act on them. It is defined normatively in the CIRIS Constitution [CC]. This document restates the parts of that definition that another implementation needs in order to interoperate at the byte level.¶
Three goals shape the format:¶
Any party holding a row can recompute its bytes and its name exactly. The payload and the protected header are in the deterministic encoding of CBOR, and a verifier refuses any other encoding of the same value (Section 4).¶
Rows exchanged between nodes have to resist forgery by an attacker with a quantum computer. Every statement carries one composite signature, ML-DSA-65 [FIPS204] with Ed25519 [RFC8032], and neither half verifies alone (Section 6).¶
The set of row types is closed, so that every row is subject to the same admission rules. New kinds of claim are new families and dimensions, never new types.¶
SCITT [RFC9943] defines an architecture for registering signed statements with a Transparency Service and returning receipts that prove registration. Each CEG statement is a COSE_Sign1 with an issuer and a subject in its protected header, so it has the shape of a SCITT Signed Statement. CEG has no Transparency Service of its own. Section 10 describes the relationship and what still differs.¶
In scope:¶
the deterministic encoding and the rules that close it (Section 4);¶
the row id, the statement id and the object id (Section 5);¶
the composite signature, keys and counted rows (Section 6);¶
the admission checks, written as a SCITT Registration Policy (Section 8).¶
Informative only:¶
the relationship to SCITT roles (Section 10);¶
the lifecycle of an agent's decision record (Section 11).¶
Out of scope: the transport between nodes, the storage schema, the meaning of individual claim families (the "dimension" namespace), and the governance rules that decide who may hold which role. [CC] defines each of these.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms Issuer, Signed Statement, Transparency Service, Registration Policy, Receipt, Transparent Statement, and Relying Party as defined in [RFC9943]. It also uses:¶
One COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] under CBOR tag 18, made by one signer.¶
One signed attestation. A row is one statement, or several statements over one payload where the row is counted (Section 6.3).¶
The CBOR map a row's statements sign. It is carried as the COSE_Sign1 payload, as a byte string in the deterministic encoding.¶
The key that makes a statement. Its stable identity is the CWT
iss claim. It plays the SCITT Issuer role.¶
What a row is about. The CWT sub claim names it. The payload
member subject_key_ids lists any further subjects, including
parties that have no key.¶
The one spelling of a key's identity: the COSE Key Thumbprint URI of [RFC9679] for the key (Section 2.3).¶
The name of a row's claim family, carried in the protected header (Section 2.2).¶
A Producer emits rows. A Consumer verifies and reads rows. A Substrate stores and relays rows and applies the admission checks. One node is usually all three.¶
A fixed, case-sensitive ASCII string that names why a row was
refused, so that two implementations agree on a refusal as well as
on an acceptance. The tokens of [CC] are either all lowercase or
all uppercase, and are compared byte for byte. Some refusals use
the token federation_malformed_row together with a reason from a
closed set.¶
A statement is a COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] under CBOR tag 18. Its payload is never detached. The protected header of a row's statement carries exactly seven members, and the signature covers all of them.¶
| Label | Member | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | alg | -70100, the composite algorithm of Section 6 |
| 3 | cty | "application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor", with no parameters |
| 4 | kid | The 32-byte thumbprint of the signing key (Section 6.2) |
| 15 | CWT claims | iss, sub, iat, and nbf and exp where the row has them, and the edition claim |
| 16 | typ | "ceg-row/2" |
| -70001 | row type | One of the five row types, as a text string |
| -70002 | family | The row's family id, as a text string |
The CWT claims are carried as [RFC9597] defines. The edition
claim has the label -70003 and the value 2. iat, nbf and exp
are derived from payload members (Section 4.6).¶
A verifier MUST refuse a row whose cty carries parameters, or whose
protected header lacks the type label or the family label. It MUST
refuse a protected header with any other member, so that one
statement has one statement id (Section 5). A signed object that is
not a row carries neither label, and one that does is refused
(Section 7).¶
sub names what the row is about: the attested key, or the object
the row refers to. A statement's kind is its typ [RFC9596].¶
The family label carries a family id, never a leaf. A family id is
the family's registry prefix in [CC], with each {name} segment
written as a full stop followed by the name, and each * written as
a lone full stop. Examples are key:record and
provenance:build_manifest:.target.¶
A literal segment never begins with a full stop, so no two prefixes
share a family id. A row that scores a dimension carries it whole, leaf and
version, in the payload member dimension. A verifier MUST refuse a
dimension that does not resolve to the family id the header
carries.¶
iss is the signer's stable identity reference: the COSE Key
Thumbprint URI of Section 5.7 of [RFC9679] for the signer's genesis
key. It is urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256: followed by the
unpadded base64url [RFC4648] of the 32-byte thumbprint. That is
43 characters, the last with zero trailing bits.¶
Because iss names the genesis key, the issuer stays the same when
the signing key rotates; kid names the key that signs. author, a
key named by sub or by an element of subject_key_ids, and every
role party use this one spelling. A verifier MUST refuse any other.¶
external_aad is the empty byte string, and no party puts a domain
prefix there. The unprotected header is outside the signature, and
no rule reads it. A holder may add a receipt there, or present a
disclosure there (Section 4.8, Section 7.3).¶
There is no copy of the headers inside the payload and no signature beside the statement. The protected header and the payload are the row. A further voice is a further statement (Section 6.3).¶
The payload is a CBOR map whose members the row's family names.
Every row carries asserted_at. Other members that [CC] fixes for
every family include:¶
The iss of the one who authors the row. It is present when the
family is authored and absent when the family is counted
(Section 5.4).¶
Every row this row names (Section 5.3).¶
The full scored dimension, leaf and version. It resolves to the header's family id.¶
The blobs the row cites, by content hash, as a sequence.¶
Integers at a fixed scale (Section 4.5).¶
Instants (Section 4.6).¶
Sixteen random bytes. A row whose content is low-entropy, such as a ballot or a census cell, carries one, so that its row id confirms no guess.¶
A map whose member note holds at most 2048 bytes of free text.
No free text stands outside body.note.¶
A code from a closed registry.¶
subject_key_ids, cohort_scope, scope and the claim's other
members are payload members of the same names. Appendix A gives the
full schema. A Consumer MUST preserve members it does not recognise
when it relays a row (Section 4.2).¶
The row type label (-70001) takes exactly one of five values. A
Substrate MUST refuse any other value, compared byte for byte, with
attestation_type_unregistered. It MUST apply this check to rows it
emits and to rows it receives.¶
A claim about the subject on the named dimension. Every positive
or negative claim about a party is a scores row.¶
The signer authorises the subject to sign on its behalf within
scope, a set of strings. For the scopes that [CC] lists as
requiring a term, among them licensing, moderation and takedown,
the delegation's end is REQUIRED. It MUST be no more than 365 days
after its start. A Substrate refuses a row that breaks this with
delegation_term_required.¶
The signer replaces one of its own earlier rows, named by row id in
refs.¶
The signer retracts an earlier row, named by row id in refs,
without saying the row was false. Section 8.1 says who may
withdraw a row.¶
The signer says one of its own earlier rows was false when it was made. Only the original signer can recant a row.¶
A withdrawal and a recantation are different statements. A withdrawal says "I no longer assert this"; a recantation says "this was wrong". Consumers can weigh them differently. The subject of a row has authority over the first but not the second (Section 8.1).¶
A new kind of record is expressed as a new family or dimension on one of the five types, never as a sixth type.¶
The payload is encoded in CBOR's deterministic encoding, as the Common Deterministic Encoding [CDE] fixes it over [RFC8949]. A verifier MUST refuse a payload whose bytes differ from the deterministic re-encoding of the value they decode to. That covers a non-shortest integer, an indefinite length, an unsorted map key and a duplicate key.¶
The protected header is in the deterministic encoding too. A second encoding of one value would otherwise be a second row. A verifier verifies the bytes it received, never a re-encoding of members it decoded.¶
The bytes are the members the Producer signs. An optional member the Producer omits MUST NOT be written into the payload by any party. An optional member the Producer emits, even at its default value, MUST be kept by every party. Defaults documented in [CC] are applied when a row is read, never when it is encoded.¶
An optional member is unset by being absent, never by null. A
Substrate MUST refuse a payload with null for an optional member,
with federation_malformed_row and the reason envelope_member_null.
No value a family names, at any depth, is a float, a null, an
undefined value, a tag or a simple value. The one exception is the
redaction marks of Section 4.8.¶
A Substrate, relay or Consumer that stores or forwards a statement MUST forward the octets it received. It never strips an emitted default and never writes in an omitted one. Unknown members are kept the same way.¶
An array whose positions the schema names is a tuple, and its order is its definition. An array of one element type is a set or a sequence, as its definition states. Where no definition says, it is a set.¶
A set is sorted by the bytewise order of its elements'
deterministic encodings and holds no duplicate. A verifier refuses
any other with federation_set_semantics_unsorted, naming the
member. It never re-sorts the set, because that would change the
signed bytes.¶
A sequence keeps its authored order. The sequences are
evidence_refs, the redacted-key arrays of Section 4.8, and the
others [CC] lists.¶
Every array inside refs is a set (Section 5.3).¶
A byte member is a CBOR byte string. Hexadecimal and base64 do not stand in the payload for bytes.¶
subject_key_ids is the one member with two forms. An element
naming a registered key carries that key's identity reference
(Section 2.3). An element naming a party with no key is the tagged
text canonical:<hashalg>:<hex>. The tag is part of the signed
string, and the hex is lowercase.¶
No member of the payload is a float. A score, a confidence and a weight are integers at the fixed scale of 10^6: the value times 10^6. A score lies in [-10^6, 10^6], a confidence in [0, 10^6] and a weight in [0, 10^6], unless the family states a wider range.¶
A fold sums in signed 64-bit integers, and its arithmetic is checked: a fold that would overflow is refused, and never wraps. A derived value is computed in integers and checked by exact equality. It is rounded half away from zero unless its own rule states otherwise.¶
asserted_at, valid_from, valid_until, expires_at and every
other instant in a payload are unsigned integers of POSIX
milliseconds, never floats. The header's iat, nbf and exp are
the standard CWT claims in seconds. Each is the floor of its payload
member divided by 1000. A verifier MUST refuse a statement whose
header claim disagrees with its payload member.¶
Where an instant stands in signed text rather than in a payload, [CC] fixes a separate text form. No statement of this document carries one.¶
A payload's deterministic encoding MUST NOT exceed 1 MiB (1,048,576
bytes). The bound is on the bytes the signature covers. A Producer
MUST NOT emit a larger payload. A Substrate MUST refuse one at every
write path, with ENVELOPE_TOO_LARGE.¶
Every write path MUST also enforce a finite ceiling on the octets it buffers from an untrusted source. It refuses at that ceiling with the same token, without completing the decode. The ceiling is local, MUST NOT be below 1 MiB, and SHOULD be published.¶
Larger content travels outside the row and is named in
evidence_refs by its hash.¶
A family may mint some members blind, using the selective disclosure
of [SD-CWT]. A blinded member is absent from its map. Its
disclosure is the salted claim [salt, value, key], with a salt of
sixteen random bytes. Its digest stands in that map's
redacted_claim_keys array, keyed by the simple value 59, in mint
order.¶
A blinded array element is tag 60 over its disclosure's digest, and
its disclosure is [salt, value]. A digest is SHA-256 over the
disclosure's bytes. A disclosure travels beside its statement, in
the unprotected header's sd_claims (label 17), only to one who may
see it.¶
Erasure drops a disclosure and alters no signed byte. Which members are blind is fixed by the family in [CC]. No fold, verdict or admission reads a member that can be blinded.¶
A row is named by one digest, its row id. It is SHA-256 over the deterministic encoding of this array:¶
["CEG-row/2", type, family, sub, author, payload]¶
type and family are the text strings of labels -70001 and -70002.
sub is the CWT subject. author is the payload's author, or
null. payload enters as the byte string signed, never as the
decoded map. A digest is written as the array [-16, digest], where
-16 names SHA-256.¶
Signatures, kid, alg, receipts and disclosures are outside the
row id. So every voice of a counted row has the same row id. The
row id does not change when a voice, a receipt or a disclosure is
added. The row id commits to iat, nbf and exp, because they
are derived from payload members. It does not read cty.¶
A statement's own id is SHA-256 over the deterministic encoding of
["CEG-statement-id/2", protected, payload], written the same way.
protected and payload are the byte strings of the statement. It
names one voice; the row id names the row.¶
Every row a row names stands in one payload member, refs, by
reference. A reference is the array [2, digest]: the edition and
the row id. refs is a map with these members:¶
| Member | What it names |
|---|---|
| head | The head a count is over (Section 6.3) |
| further_heads | Further tips beside head
|
| prev | A predecessor |
| answers | The row this row answers |
| target | The target of a withdrawal, a supersession or a lifecycle row |
| trusted_through | On a key revocation, the last rows of the key held good |
| also | A map from a role, ack or cites, to a set of references |
A holder reads the set of named rows from refs alone, without
knowing the family. The roles of also are a closed registry of
two. ack names an acknowledgement. cites names a row the row
cites.¶
Every array inside refs is a set, and a set out of order is
refused. An empty refs is refused: absence is its one encoding.
No row names an object of the earlier form of Appendix C.¶
A statement's signature is the composite ML-DSA-65 with Ed25519 of
[COMPOSITE-JOSE], over [COMPOSITE-LAMPS], at the revisions cited.
It is computed over the Sig_structure of Section 4.4 of [RFC9052],
with an empty external_aad. That Sig_structure is the message M.¶
Both halves sign one message representative:¶
M' = "CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025"
|| "COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512"
|| 0x00 || SHA-512(M)
¶
The zero byte is the empty application context. ML-DSA-65 signs M' with the label bytes as its FIPS 204 context string, never the empty one. Ed25519 signs M' as it is. The representative binds both halves, so neither half verifies alone.¶
The encoding is the ML-DSA-65 signature (3309 bytes) followed by the Ed25519 signature (64 bytes), 3373 bytes in all. The algorithm identifier is -70100, a private-use value, until one is assigned. Only the identifier changes then. ML-DSA-65 alone is COSE algorithm -49 [RFC9964]; CEG does not use it alone.¶
A key is one composite COSE key of key type AKP (kty 7). Its pub
(label -1) is the ML-DSA-65 public key followed by the Ed25519 public
key, 1984 bytes. Its kid is its 32-byte SHA-256 thumbprint
[RFC9679], fixed for the key's life. A key's displayed identity is
that thumbprint.¶
A key record is a row of the family key:record. Its payload
carries key, identity_type, asserted_at and, where its end rule
requires, valid_until. A key renews by a supersedes of its own
record. A rotation is a record of another key that names the old
key's record and carries the old key's signature.¶
identity_type is a set of roles. A set that mixes a person's role
(user or accord_holder) with a machine's (node or agent) is
refused. A record whose set contains a person's role carries no
valid_until. One whose set contains node or agent carries one,
with stated exceptions. A record that breaks the rule is refused
key_record_out_of_window.¶
A key is live at an instant when one of its records covers that instant and its own revocation has not taken effect by then. Only the key's own revocation ends its liveness. The key's owner and the roster that seats it may also revoke it. That ends the owner's binding or the seat, not the key's liveness.¶
A counted row is several statements over one payload, one for each
voice, found by the row id. The head the row is counted over stands
in refs.head, inside what every voice signs. Further tips stand in
refs.further_heads, a set. A fold counts the statements by person,
as it counts votes.¶
Each statement is a SCITT Signed Statement with one signer. Adding a
voice changes neither the payload nor the row id. A delegation of a
scoped kind seats only with a second statement over the same payload,
signed by the delegate, the row's sub.¶
Verifying a statement gives one of three answers: Valid, Invalid with a reason, or Waiting on the keys it names as missing.¶
A bad signature under a held key is Invalid, and that answer is final. A structural fault is Invalid whatever keys are held.¶
A statement whose key record is Waiting is Waiting, naming the deepest missing key. A statement whose key record is Invalid is Invalid.¶
A key held in part is Waiting on the missing half. A key never verifies on one half.¶
Waiting never becomes Valid by default and is never counted. A waiting statement is held inert until the key it names is held.¶
A verifier proceeds in this order:¶
Decode strictly: tag 18, and the protected header and the payload in the deterministic encoding.¶
Check the header: typ on the closed list; alg -70100; edition
2; cty the constant; a row's type and family labels present, an
object's absent.¶
Check the payload against the schema: no float or null, the sets,
the ranges, and dimension resolving to the header's family.¶
Check iat, nbf and exp against the payload.¶
Run the family's static checks, the key record's end among them.¶
Read kid; resolve the key record, or answer Waiting on it.¶
Verify the composite signature over the bytes received.¶
Check iss against author, or against the party of a role the
family names (Section 5.4).¶
On Valid, apply the defaults of [CC] to absent members, at interpretation time only, and then the Consumer's own policy.¶
Store or forward the statement as received.¶
A failure at steps 1 to 5, 7 or 8 is Invalid. Step 6 alone answers Waiting.¶
This section is informative. [CC] is normative for each object.¶
Every other signed object is a COSE_Sign1 whose typ names its kind,
from one closed list: ceg-genesis-bundle/2,
ceg-revocation-snapshot/2 and ceg-boot-manifest/2. A verifier
MUST refuse any other typ. The protected header carries exactly
alg, kid, the CWT claims and typ, with no cty. Its CWT
claims are iss, the edition claim, and iat where the object
states an instant.¶
Such an object is named by its object id: SHA-256 over the
deterministic encoding of ["CEG-object/2", typ, author, payload].
author is the payload's author, or null where it has none. Like
a row id, it is the same for every voice of a counted object.¶
The genesis bundle seats the holders of a trust root and its serve
nodes. It is counted: one statement for each holder, over one
payload. Each statement carries iat, equal to the payload's
asserted_at divided by 1000 and rounded down.¶
The first bundle counts when every holder it lists has a valid
statement over it. A later bundle names its predecessor as
refs.prev. It counts when a strict majority of the predecessor's
holders have valid statements over it. Each holder it adds signs it
too.¶
A roster change is such a later bundle, with no proposal, window or separate vote. A holder's recovery is also a later bundle, with one statement under the holder's recovery key. That statement counts only where the predecessor's recovery commitment for the holder matches. Two later bundles that count on one predecessor are a fork, and a reader reports it.¶
Receipts over the provenance log and each stream's log are COSE Receipts [RFC9942] over the SHA-256 tree of [RFC9162]. Its hashing is that of [RFC6962], so roots already published stay valid. Each witness issues its own receipt over the same root, with its instant in the protected header. A stream's receipts cover batches, never single chunks.¶
A holder may add a receipt to a statement's unprotected header. The receipt is outside the signature and outside the row id.¶
[RFC9943] lets each Transparency Service define a Registration Policy: the checks a Signed Statement must pass before it is registered. The CEG admission checks are such a policy. A Substrate MUST apply them to every row before storing or relaying it. It MUST NOT truncate, repair or re-encode a row in order to admit it.¶
| Check | Refusal |
|---|---|
| Payload at most 1 MiB | ENVELOPE_TOO_LARGE |
| Deterministic encoding of payload and header | Invalid |
| Header members exactly as Section 2 | Invalid |
| Composite signature verifies | SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_FAILED |
| Type is one of the five | attestation_type_unregistered |
| No optional member is null | (R) envelope_member_null |
| Sets sorted and unique | federation_set_semantics_unsorted |
| Header instants equal the payload's | Invalid |
dimension resolves to the family |
Invalid |
iss is the author or a named role |
Invalid |
| Key record within its window | key_record_out_of_window |
| Termed delegation within 365 days | delegation_term_required |
| Withdrawal meets Section 8.1 | federation_withdraws_not_admitted |
"(R) r" means the token federation_malformed_row with reason r.
"Invalid" marks a check that [CC] makes a refusal without naming a
token for it.¶
Admission has a third outcome besides admit and refuse. A row signed by a key whose record is not yet held is Waiting (Section 6.4). It is held and retried, never counted, until the key is held.¶
The namespace rules that decide whether a dimension is registered, and their tokens, are defined in [CC] and are outside the scope of this document.¶
A withdraws row against a target row T is admitted when its signer
meets one of these rules:¶
If T is a counted row, rules 1 to 4 do not reach it. T is
withdrawn only by a withdraws counted under T's own rule. A
quorum's act is undone only by a quorum.¶
The signer signed T.¶
The signer is named in T's subject_key_ids, and T's family is not
on the kept list below.¶
The signer is a proxy for a party T names by canonical hash. It
holds a live delegates_to chain to that hash whose scope includes
consent_revocation. T's family is not on the kept list.¶
The signer holds a live delegates_to from a party of rules 1 to
3, and the kept list binds it as it binds them.¶
Where T names several parties, an admitted withdrawal from one retires T for all of them. A withdrawal reaches forward only: acts that have it among their ancestors still stand.¶
The kept list stops a named party from withdrawing a third party's adverse finding about itself, such as a detection, a licensing decision or a moderation record. [CC] lists the families it covers. The named party's route is to contest the row. A key revocation is never withdrawn.¶
Recantation is not covered by these rules. Only T's signer can recant T.¶
This section is informative. [CC] is normative for every rule it summarises, and the section numbers given are those of [CC].¶
CEG serves a network with no central operator. No party can enforce a safety rule for the others, so each rule has to be carried by the rows themselves and checked by each node on its own. This section says which member or check carries each property, and what is not claimed.¶
The network has a public plane and a private plane. The CIRIS documents call them the lightnet and the darknet.¶
The identity plane (lightnet) is public. Key records, announced transport destinations and trust roots are visible to every node, and the plane makes no anonymity claim. A node attributes every inbound message to a key before any handler sees it. A device that has not yet been bound to an owner can still open a connection, but only under its own self-signed key, so it is unowned but never anonymous (CC 3.2).¶
The group plane (darknet) is derived from the identity plane. Each member of a family or community computes the group's address from directory state it already holds, so the address is never announced. An outsider cannot map an address to a group or fetch its content (CC 5.2, CC 5.4.6). An observer of link traffic can still see which node opens links to some derived address, and the timing and size of that traffic. Members relay for members.¶
The rows apply the idea of contextual integrity: information flows
appropriately when the flow matches the norms of the context it came
from. Each row signs its own context. iss and author say who
sent it, sub and subject_key_ids say whom it is about, and
cohort_scope says who may see it. All of these are in the protected
header or the payload, so a relay cannot change them without breaking
the signature.¶
A Consumer accepts a row only if it trusts the signer's root or has
consented to receive from the signer, and a row reaches no one else
(CC 4.4.3.8). A row defaults to the smallest scope that fits its
purpose; federation scope, the public commons, is an explicit choice
(CC 1.13.3.4). Consent is itself a row, and a subject can withdraw a
row about itself (Section 8.1). Content in a private scope is
never scanned. Known abuse images are checked for only when content
is moved to federation scope or posted to a public room (CC
1.13.3.4).¶
Only delegation composes. A Consumer walks the delegates_to graph
with a depth cap and a cap on aggregate weight (CC 2.4.1.3, CC 4.1.1).
The walk visits each key once, so a cycle adds no reach. A row that
closes a cycle is not refused or discounted for it.¶
Some parties cannot accept obligations for themselves. The rows give each of them a named human:¶
An agent key MUST be bound to a human steward before it is
admitted to any community. A node key MUST be so bound before it
is admitted to any community other than an infrastructure community
(CC 3.2).¶
A minor has one or more guardians, each bound by a signed row of their own (CC 3.2, CC 3.4.13).¶
A community has at least one holder of its moderation duty at all times. A seat is two consents, the placer's and the holder's. If no duty holder is left, the community locks and its members elect one (CC 4.5.4).¶
A trust root names a set of human holders. Any one holder can pause the AI agents of the nodes that accepted that root. The halt is one row with one statement, the holder's own, and it fires on receipt with no window. A holder may sign one in advance and keep it sealed (CC 4.2.1.1).¶
A halt by one holder lapses a fixed time after each node received it:
halt_fuse_secs in the charter, 24 hours when absent. It stands
longer only if a strict majority of the standing roster confirms it. A strict majority may resume a halt at any time. The
confirmation and the resumption are counted rows (Section 6.3): one
statement from each holder, over one payload (CC 4.2.1.3).¶
There is no rate bound on a holder's lone halts. A missed halt is the one failure that cannot be recovered from, so the one-holder stop is never rationed. A rogue holder is answered by the fuse, by a strict majority's resumption, and by removal through a later genesis bundle. Roster changes and recoveries are later bundles, counted over the standing roster (Section 7, CC 4.2.6).¶
A halt pauses the effectful acts of AI agents and does nothing else. It does not stop a node, and it does not touch stored data, messages or network service. An agent checks the latch before every effectful act. A halted agent may still raise a deferral to a human.¶
The halt is the condition of symmetry between people and the AI agents they make. Consent that cannot be withdrawn was never consent, and withdrawal needs a halt outside the system halted (CC 1.13.2). A root can tell a node to share less, never more. A node that never accepted the root is not affected. Any node can leave a root by withdrawing one row; a halt that has already reached it still binds it (CC 4.2.1).¶
Where [CC] speaks of anonymity, it means anonymity toward outsiders: a group's existence, and what its members do in it, are hidden from non-members. Beyond that:¶
The identity plane is not anonymous.¶
The base design does not resist a global passive observer of traffic. [CC] specifies an opt-in Anonymous Tier, using layered onion routing, for deployments that need that protection (CC 1.13.3.1, CC 5.4.6). This document does not describe it.¶
Members of a group can read, and keep, what the group shares. Ballots within a group are signed rows, accountable to its members. A community may instead hold a secret poll through the census (CC 6.1.9).¶
Nothing is detected inside private groups. The design declines client-side scanning.¶
[CC] also states limits that hold against an attacker (CC 2.7.9). Among them:¶
A relay can choose the order of delivery, and withhold a row until it is delivered.¶
A relay can withhold the row that would answer a window until one node's clock has closed it. That node's answer then differs for good from a node that held the row in time. The halt's fuse is one such window; a fresh halt is the remedy.¶
Whoever holds an ended key's private half can revive it. Only the key's own revocation makes its end final.¶
Keys that met a past count can fork on a past head. Whoever controls a new reader's first view can make a wrong head stick.¶
On aggregation, correlated sources are discounted, and fully correlated sources count as one. Sources that stay independent on every measured act and coordinate only on one decisive act show no correlation until that act. No measure over the past can see them (CC 6.1.2.3).¶
This section is informative.¶
| SCITT role () | CEG counterpart |
|---|---|
| Issuer | The signer, named by iss. |
| Signed Statement | A statement: one COSE_Sign1 by one signer. |
| Registration Policy | The admission checks of Section 8. |
| Transparency Service | No counterpart; see Section 10.2. |
| Receipt | A COSE Receipt [RFC9942] over a provenance or stream log (Section 7.3). |
| Transparent Statement | A statement with a receipt in its unprotected header. |
| Relying Party | A Consumer. |
A CEG statement is a COSE_Sign1 with iss and sub in the CWT
Claims header of [RFC9597], as [RFC9943] requires. It can be
presented to a SCITT Transparency Service as it stands. A counted
row is several Signed Statements over one payload. A Transparency
Service would register each one separately; CEG relates them by the
row id (Section 5).¶
The composite signature uses the private-use COSE algorithm identifier -70100. A Transparency Service or Relying Party must support that construction to verify a statement. Its parent drafts [COMPOSITE-JOSE] and [COMPOSITE-LAMPS] are not yet published as RFCs. The header labels -70001, -70002 and -70003 are also from the private-use range.¶
The content type application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor and the typ
values ceg-row/2 and the three object kinds are used without
registration. This document requests no IANA action for them.¶
CEG has no Transparency Service and no registrar. A node admits by its own checks, and what it serves is decided by trust the reader chose. No party stands in the middle.¶
[RFC9943] has the Transparency Service evaluate its policy and requires the policy itself to be registered, so that Auditors can reproduce the decision. The CEG checks read the payload as well as the headers. They are fixed by [CC] rather than registered as statements. Any party can reproduce an admission decision from the row and the checks, but the checks are not themselves on a log.¶
A SCITT Receipt is issued at registration by the service. A CEG receipt is issued by a witness over a log root, and each witness issues its own. Nothing requires a receipt when a row is admitted. A holder may add one to a statement's unprotected header.¶
[CC] defines witness cosignature of log heads and of trust-root lineages. A lineage that runs with witnessed mode off has a single signer. That signer can show different histories to different peers until a peer compares heads.¶
SCITT leaves the meaning of a statement to its issuer. CEG fixes the five row types and requires every claim to name a registered family, so a Consumer can interpret any admitted row without out-of-band agreement.¶
A CEG verifier can answer Waiting on a key it does not hold, and hold the statement inert (Section 6.4). A SCITT Registration Policy admits or refuses.¶
This section is informative.¶
Several individual SCITT drafts record AI agent actions as a sequence
of statements: an authorisation before the act, a record of the act,
and a refusal where the agent declined. In CEG the same events are
rows. The reasoning steps before an act are rows in the decision
families of [CC]. The act is recorded by one row whose dimension is
trace:complete:v1, ending in a terminal result. A completed action,
a refusal, and a deferral to a human are the same kind of row with
different terminal results, so a Consumer reads all three the same
way. Authority to act, and any transfer of it, is a delegates_to
row.¶
Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.¶
The composite algorithm has no assigned COSE identifier, and the drafts that define it may still change (Section 10.2).¶
Several encodings are open in [CC], each waiting on its owner.
They include the payload rule of ceg-boot-manifest/2, the family
of an agent's text manifest statement, and the layout of the short
displayed form of a key's thumbprint. [CC] lists them in its
table of open encodings (CC 2.6.1.12).¶
[CC] names no refusal token for several checks of Section 8.¶
Known-answer vectors of the revocation snapshot and the boot manifest are not yet published.¶
No second implementation exists (Section 13).¶
Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, together with the reference to [RFC7942].¶
This section records the status of known implementations at the time of writing, as described in [RFC7942]. Listing an implementation here does not imply endorsement.¶
Verification library (Rust), CIRIS L3C, AGPL-3.0. It publishes the known-answer vectors of the form this document describes (Appendix B). https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISVerify¶
The storage and admission engine (Rust), CIRIS L3C, AGPL-3.0. Its release v59.1.0 implemented the earlier form (Appendix C). This document makes no claim about its support for the form described here. https://github.com/CIRISAI/CIRISPersist¶
No second, independent implementation of the full signing and admission path exists yet.¶
This section follows the guidance of [RFC3552].¶
A verifier that re-encodes a decoded payload before checking the signature can accept bytes the signer never signed, or reject bytes it did. A verifier MUST check the bytes received and refuse any encoding that is not deterministic. Implementations should test against the refusals of non-deterministic encodings in Appendix B.¶
The protected header and the payload are signed; the unprotected header is not. No rule may read the unprotected header. Who a row is about and who may see it are in the signed bytes, so a relay cannot redirect a validly signed row.¶
Both halves sign one representative that names the composite label, so neither half verifies alone. A forger must break both ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519. A verifier MUST NOT accept a statement on one half, and a key held in part is Waiting, never Valid.¶
kid and iss carry full 32-byte thumbprints, not short
fingerprints. A verifier resolves kid to a key record and
verifies with the full composite key that record holds.¶
The withdrawal rules let parties other than the signer retract a row. The rules in Section 8.1 stop a subject from removing adverse findings about itself, and stop any single key from undoing a quorum's act.¶
Where witness cosignature is off, a log head is signed by one key. A Substrate can then show different histories to different peers until the heads are compared (Section 10.2).¶
A window closed on one node's clock, such as the halt's fuse, is read differently by nodes that held a row at different instants. [CC] states which readings depend on a node's clock and gives them no meaning beyond that node's own (CC 2.7.9).¶
The 1 MiB limit applies to the deterministic encoding. An implementation that reads an unbounded input in order to find out whether it fits is open to memory exhaustion. Each write path needs its own read limit.¶
This section follows the guidance of [RFC6973].¶
iss names a signer's genesis key and does not change when the
signing key rotates. Every row a signer makes can therefore be
linked to every other. Statements carry thumbprints, not
human-chosen labels.¶
A canonical identifier is a hash of a platform, entity kind and identifier. Where the identifier space is small, the hash can be reversed by enumeration.¶
A row whose content is guessable, such as a ballot, carries a random salt in its payload. Without it, the row id would confirm a guess.¶
cohort_scope limits which nodes may receive a row. It is signed,
so a relay cannot widen it. It does not encrypt the row; a node
inside the audience can read and keep it.¶
A withdraws row stops a claim from standing. It does not remove
the original row from nodes that already hold it. Members minted
blind (Section 4.8) can be erased by dropping their disclosures,
which alters no signed byte. [CC] defines a separate removal
procedure for the rest.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
The following CDDL [RFC8610] describes the statement, the protected
header, the payload, the names of Section 5, the composite key, the
key record, the other signed objects and the accord's rows. It is
the schema of [CC], wrapped to fit this document. Where a string
was too long for one line, it is split with the .cat control
operator of [RFC9165].¶
; CC 2.6.1 - the signed object: deterministically encoded CBOR signed
; with COSE, aligned with SCITT (RFC 9943). The normative schema of
; this edition; hand-written. RFC 8610 CDDL over CBOR with CBOR
; Common Deterministic Encoding (draft-ietf-cbor-cde-13, updating RFC
; 8949). The members table of CC 2.6.1 is generated from
; constitution/signed_object_v2.tsv, and
; tools/build_cc_signed_object_v2.py checks that the table and this
; file name the same members. The earlier JSON object is CC 8.11,
; read by no node of this edition. The known-answer vectors are the
; verifier's; this file mints none. Every constant the text of CC 2.6
; fixes is pinned here, so a validator admits one encoding only.
; Every top-level rule, so a generator exercises them all.
ceg-anything = ceg-statement / ceg-object-statement / second-consent
/ row-id-input / row-id
/ statement-id-input / statement-id / object-id-input / ceg-key /
key-record-members
/ revocation-snapshot / ceg-genesis-bundle /
recovery-commitment-input / seat-commitment-input
/ hpke-info / ceg-typ / accord-invocation / accord-lifecycle /
transport-destination-binding
; A signed statement is one COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052 Section 4.2), as RFC
; 9943 Section 6 requires: ONE signer. A counted row is N statements
; over one payload, one per voice, found by the row id (below). Each
; voice signs the whole payload, and so the `refs.head` the row is
; counted over. external_aad is the empty bstr for every statement.
ceg-statement = #6.18(COSE_Sign1)
COSE_Sign1 = [
; in the deterministic encoding, exactly these members: one
; statement id
protected: bstr .cbor statement-protected,
unprotected: unprotected-header,
; never nil: a detached payload is refused
payload: bstr .cbor attestation-envelope,
signature: composite-signature,
]
unprotected-header = {
; sd_claims (SD-CWT): blinded members as PRESENTED beside the
; statement to one who may see them; a disclosure set is held and
; travels as bytes under the object's consent edge
? 17: [+ bstr .cbor sd-disclosure],
; a receipt (RFC 9942) may be added by a holder, never signed and
; never read by a rule
* int => any,
}
; The composite ML-DSA-65-Ed25519 signature of
; draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs-06 (over
; draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19): the ML-DSA-65 signature
; (3309 bytes) then the Ed25519 signature (64 bytes). Both sign M' =
; "CompositeAlgorithmSignatures2025" ||
; "COMPSIG-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512" || 0x00 || SHA-512(M). ML-DSA-65
; signs M' with the label bytes as its FIPS 204 ctx (never empty);
; Ed25519 signs M' as it is. The 0x00 is the empty application
; context.
composite-signature = bstr .size 3373
statement-protected = {
; alg: the composite ML-DSA-65-Ed25519; private-use until IANA
; assigns, the construction exactly the draft's
1: composite-alg,
; cty: the constant, with no parameters
3: row-cty,
; kid: the RFC 9679 thumbprint of the signer's AKP composite key
; (below)
4: kid,
; RFC 9597: iss and sub as RFC 9943 requires
15: cwt-claims,
; typ (RFC 9596): a row's typ is fixed
16: "ceg-row/2",
; the row's type, one of the five; the row id reads it
-70001: row-type,
; the row's family id, never a leaf; the row id reads it
-70002: family-id,
}
composite-alg = -70100
kid = bstr .size 32 ; the RFC 9679 SHA-256 thumbprint
; cty is one constant with no parameters; a verifier refuses any
; other. The type and the family ride their own labels, -70001 and
; -70002, required on a row and refused on any other object. `family`
; is a family id, never a leaf: the registry prefix with each {name}
; written .name and each * written . (so
; `evidence:.suite:.kind:.cell:.prefix`, `accord:.`).
row-cty = "application/vnd.ciris.row+cbor"
row-type = "scores" / "delegates_to" / "supersedes" / "withdraws" /
"recants"
family-id = tstr .regexp
"[a-z0-9_.][a-z0-9_.-]*(:[a-z0-9_.][a-z0-9_.-]*)*"
cwt-claims = {
; iss: the signer's stable identity reference (its genesis key's
; thumbprint URI), never the rotating kid; under a room key, iss is
; the room key's own identity reference, never its person's genesis
; key
1: identity-ref,
; sub: what the row is about; a key subject is an identity-ref
2: tstr,
; iat: floor(asserted_at / 1000), seconds, derived; a verifier
; refuses disagreement
6: uint,
; nbf: floor(valid_from / 1000) where the row has one
? 5: uint,
; exp: floor(valid_until / 1000) where the row has one
? 4: uint,
-70003: 2, ; edition: the constant 2
}
; One spelling for every identity reference: iss, author, a key
; subject in sub or subject_key_ids, and every role party. The COSE
; Key Thumbprint URI of RFC 9679 Section 5.7 with the hash name
; sha-256 and the 32-byte thumbprint in unpadded base64url (43
; characters, the last carrying zero trailing bits).
identity-ref = tstr .regexp
("urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{42}[AEIMQUY"
.cat "cgkosw048]")
; No float, no null, no undefined, no tag anywhere a family member
; can reach. The one exception is SD-CWT's redaction: simple(59) as a
; map key and tag 60 for an array element.
ceg-value = int / tstr / bstr / bool / [* (ceg-value /
redacted-element)]
/ { ? redacted_claim_keys => [+ bstr .size 32], * (tstr / int) =>
ceg-value }
redacted_claim_keys = #7.59
redacted-element = #6.60(bstr .size 32)
; The payload: the members a family names, every text and byte member
; bounded, no free text outside body.note, absent never null. A
; member that names a row stands in `refs` and nowhere else.
attestation-envelope = {
; the iss of the author: present iff the family is authored, absent
; iff counted (a column of the family model)
? "author": identity-ref,
; EVERY row this row names, by row-ref
? "refs": refs,
; the full scored dimension (leaf and :vN); it resolves to cty's
; family, refused otherwise
? "dimension": tstr,
; the blobs the row cites, by content hash: a sequence, bytes never
; hex
? "evidence_refs": [+ hash-digest],
; on a seat row of a private room: the commitment the binding opens
; (seat-commitment-input)
? "seat_commitment": hash-digest,
; integers, never floats (see fixed6)
? "score": fixed6-score,
? "confidence": fixed6-unit,
? "weight": fixed6-weight,
; safety-battery interpret rows: passed <= total, both present or
; both absent, with
? "passed": count32,
; score = round(10^6 * (2*passed - total) / total), ties away from
; zero, checked by exact equality
? "total": 1..4294967295,
"asserted_at": ms-time,
? "valid_from": ms-time,
? "valid_until": ms-time,
? "expires_at": ms-time,
; a code from a closed registry, 0 = unspecified
? "reason": uint,
; required where the content is low-entropy (a ballot, a census
; cell); bound by every signer
? "salt": bstr .size 16,
; SD-CWT simple(59): digests of the blinded members, in mint order
; (a sequence)
? redacted_claim_keys => [+ bstr .size 32],
? "body": body,
; the members a family names, under the logical names of the CC
; 2.6.1 table
* tstr => ceg-value,
}
body = { ? "note": tstr .size (0..2048), ? redacted_claim_keys => [+
bstr .size 32], * tstr => ceg-value }
count32 = 0..4294967295
; Erasability: the selective disclosure of
; draft-ietf-spice-sd-cwt-09. A blinded map member is absent from its
; map, and the digest of its disclosure stands in that map's
; simple(59) array; a blinded array element is tag 60 over that
; digest. The digest is SHA-256 (no sd_alg) over the disclosure's
; bytes as sd_claims carries them. A family whose erasure_route is
; dsar or purge mints every free-text member and every member another
; party authored blind, body.note first; the members are the family
; model's `blind` column, and no fold, verdict or admission reads
; one.
sd-disclosure = salted-claim / salted-element
salted-claim = [salt: bstr .size 16, value: ceg-value, key: tstr]
salted-element = [salt: bstr .size 16, value: ceg-value]
; POSIX milliseconds, no tag, never a float
ms-time = uint
; Integers at one fixed scale: fixed6 is the value times 10^6. Folds
; sum in checked i64 and refuse on overflow, never wrap. A derived
; value is rounded ties away from zero, in integers, unless its own
; rule states otherwise, and checked by exact equality. The default
; ranges are these; weight is [0, 10^6] by rule, and a family that
; states a wider range for it states it in its own rule.
fixed6 = -9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807
fixed6-score = -1000000..1000000
fixed6-unit = 0..1000000
fixed6-weight = fixed6
; The row id: the digest a row is NAMED by. One per row, the same for
; every voice of a counted row, unchanged when a voice, a receipt or
; a disclosure is added. Signatures, kid, alg, receipts and
; disclosures are outside it. `type` and `family` are the header's
; -70001 and -70002; `sub` is the CWT sub; `author` is the payload's
; "author" for an authored family and null for a counted one;
; `payload` is the payload bstr as signed, entered as a byte string,
; never as the decoded map. A payload whose bytes are not the
; deterministic re-encoding of the value they decode to is refused,
; so one row has one payload and one id.
row-id-input = ["CEG-row/2", type: row-type, family: family-id, sub:
tstr, author: identity-ref / null,
payload: bstr .cbor attestation-envelope]
row-id = hash-digest
; SHA-256 only in this edition: one name per row
hash-digest = [ alg: -16, digest: bstr .size 32 ]
; A reference to a signed object of this form: the row id above, or
; the object id (below) of a signed object that is not a row. No row
; of this form names an object of the earlier form (CC 8.11, CC
; 2.6.1.12), so the edition is the constant 2. Never an
; attestation_id.
row-ref = [ edition: 2, id: hash-digest ]
; a set: sorted by the bytewise order of each element's encoding, no
; duplicate
row-ref-set = [+ row-ref]
; Every member that names a row. A verifier gathers the named set
; from `refs` alone, without knowing the family. SET RULE: every
; array inside `refs` is a set: its elements sorted by the bytewise
; order of each element's deterministic encoding, no duplicate,
; refused otherwise. An empty `refs` is refused: absence is its one
; encoding.
refs = refs-members .and nonempty-map
refs-members = {
; the roster head this row is counted over, or a version extends
? "head": row-ref,
? "further_heads": row-ref-set, ; further tips named beside `head`
; the predecessor in a signer's own series
? "prev": row-ref,
; the proposal voted on or accepted, the window opened, the row
; replied to
? "answers": row-ref,
; the row superseded, withdrawn, recanted, cut or removed
? "target": row-ref,
; on a key revocation: the last rows of the revoked key held good
? "trusted_through": row-ref-set,
; any other named row, under a role of the closed registry
? "also": { + also-role => row-ref-set },
}
; The also roles, closed: "ack" names an acknowledgement (a
; revocation snapshot's); "cites" names the row a row cites, as a
; build attestation names its manifest contribution. Any other role
; is a later registration.
also-role = "ack" / "cites"
nonempty-map = { + any => any }
; The statement id (RFC 9943 statement identity): SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this labelled structure. It names a
; statement, one voice; the row id names the row.
statement-id-input = ["CEG-statement-id/2", protected: bstr, payload:
bstr]
statement-id = hash-digest
; The second consent. A statement over an authored payload whose iss
; is not the payload's "author" is accepted only in a role the family
; names (delegate, bound node, ...), and only when its iss is the
; party that role names in the payload, or the CWT sub where the role
; is the attested key; any other iss is Invalid. The second consent
; of a scoped delegates_to is such a statement, by the delegate (the
; sub), over the same payload bytes, and so has the same row id; a
; scoped delegation of this form seats only with it.
second-consent = ceg-statement
; Keys: one AKP COSE_Key (RFC 9964 kty 7) whose alg is the composite
; and whose pub is the composite public key encoding of the pinned
; draft revision: the ML-DSA-65 public key (1952 bytes) then the
; Ed25519 public key (32 bytes). The kid is its RFC 9679 thumbprint,
; computed under the private-use alg and fixed for the key's life. A
; composite key never verifies on one half.
ceg-key = { 1: 7, 3: composite-alg, -1: bstr .size 1984 }
; A key record is a ROW on family key:record (CC 2.4.1.1 renews it by
; supersedes and rotates it by naming it), so these are members of
; its attestation-envelope, not a separate typ. identity_type is a
; SET of roles (CC 4.5.8). The end rule reads "contains", in prose
; (CC 2.4.1.1): a set mixing user or accord_holder with node or agent
; is refused; a record whose set contains user or accord_holder
; carries no valid_until; one whose set contains node or agent
; carries one, unless it is a room key of a private room; a role
; outside both groups takes no end rule of its own; asserted_at <=
; valid_until <= asserted_at + key_record_max_secs * 1000; refused
; key_record_out_of_window otherwise.
key-record-members = {
"key": ceg-key,
"identity_type": [+ tstr], ; a set
"asserted_at": ms-time,
? "valid_until": ms-time,
? "attestation_evidence": attestation-evidence,
* tstr => ceg-value,
}
; The custody of the key's Ed25519 half (CC 4.2.2, CC 4.2.2.1).
; `chain` is X.509 DER, leaf first: a sequence, required where the
; class's mechanism has a chain (Apple_Secure_Enclave,
; YubiKey_5_FIPS, TPM_2_0), refused
; key_record_bad_attestation_evidence otherwise. Where a holder is
; seated, the reader verifies it to the mechanism's attestation root
; and binds the attested key to the record's Ed25519 half.
attestation-evidence = {
"hardware_class": tstr,
? "pq_custody": "same_element" / "removable_offline" /
"software_wrapped",
? "chain": [+ bstr],
}
; A recovery commitment (CC 3.2 T3, CC 4.2.6): [-16, SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array]. `keys` is a set of composite
; keys, sorted by encoding; a holder's recovery commitment has one
; element.
recovery-commitment-input = ["CEG-recovery/2", keys: [+ ceg-key]]
; The signed objects that are not rows, each its own typ, closed: a
; verifier refuses any other typ. No cty; the payload is .cbor the
; rule its typ names, in the deterministic encoding.
ceg-object-statement = #6.18([
protected: bstr .cbor object-protected,
unprotected: unprotected-header,
payload: bstr,
signature: composite-signature,
])
object-protected = {
1: composite-alg,
4: kid,
15: object-claims,
16: object-typ,
}
object-claims = {
1: identity-ref, ; iss
; iat where the object states an instant; a revocation snapshot
; carries none, a genesis bundle floor(asserted_at / 1000)
? 6: uint,
-70003: 2,
}
object-typ = "ceg-genesis-bundle/2" / "ceg-revocation-snapshot/2" /
"ceg-boot-manifest/2"
; The payload rule of ceg-boot-manifest/2 waits on its owner's
; submission; no rule here stands in for it.
ceg-typ = "ceg-row/2" / object-typ
; A signed object that is not a row is named like a row, so prev and
; every row-ref to it have a defined id: SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array, written as a hash-digest. The
; domain label keeps it apart from a row id; like the row id it is
; the same for every voice of a counted object (a genesis bundle).
; `author` is the payload's "author", or null where it has none.
object-id-input = ["CEG-object/2", typ: object-typ, author:
identity-ref / null, payload: bstr]
; A revocation snapshot (typ "ceg-revocation-snapshot/2"): a signer's
; own record of the revocations whose past it holds. A set with no
; winner across signers. `seq` orders one signer's own snapshots:
; strictly greater than prev's, refused otherwise; two snapshots of
; one signer with one seq and different content are contested, and
; neither counts. refs carries prev (absent on the first) and, under
; also "ack", the signer's acknowledgement of the head of the
; revocation scope. Its named set is refs with each revoked entry's
; revocation and trusted_through.
revocation-snapshot = {
; the signer, so the object id, prev and seq are one signer's
"author": identity-ref,
"refs": refs,
"seq": uint,
"revoked": [* revoked-entry], ; a set
}
; a tuple; its trusted_through a set
revoked-entry = [key: kid, revocation: row-ref, trusted_through: [*
row-ref]]
; The genesis bundle (typ "ceg-genesis-bundle/2"), the GenesisBundle
; of CC 5.3.4. The first of this form is the ceremony row of CC
; 2.6.1.12: a fresh genesis with no prev, a signed object that is not
; a row. refs.prev names a later bundle's predecessor. `version` is a
; sequence from 1, never ranked: prev's version + 1 where the bundle
; has a prev, a consistency check only. A counted object: one
; statement per holder over one payload, with no "author", so its
; object id takes null. The map is closed. It NAMES rows and never
; copies them: every row it seats stands in refs.also "cites" by
; row-ref (each holder's and each seat's key:record, each seat's
; transport_destination binding). The bundle's own count is the
; canonical conferral of every seat in serve_nodes (CC 4.2.1); each
; statement carries iat, floor(asserted_at / 1000). A recovery (CC
; 2.6.1.11) is a later bundle with ONE statement: iss the holder's
; identity reference, kid the recovery key's thumbprint; it counts
; only where prev's recovery_commitments[iss] equals the commitment
; over the recovery key (constant time). refs.also "cites" names the
; recovery key's key:record and the holder's new signing-key record;
; recovery_commitments[iss] is the next commitment. Checked in prose,
; not here: version is 1 iff refs has no prev; holders, serve_nodes
; and witnesses are pairwise disjoint; the keys of
; recovery_commitments are exactly holders; scope holds infra:attest
; and infra:serve; the three witness members are present together or
; not at all, and witness_quorum is floor(|witnesses| / 2) + 1; each
; statement's iat is floor(asserted_at / 1000).
ceg-genesis-bundle = {
"refs": genesis-refs,
"version": 1..4294967295,
"asserted_at": ms-time,
; the accord's name, as its rows carry it; a name, never an anchor
; (CC 5.3.4)
"family_key_id": tstr,
; a set: the accord's roster, the voices this bundle seats
"holders": [+ identity-ref],
"serve_nodes": [+ identity-ref], ; a set: the seated serve nodes
"charter": genesis-charter,
}
genesis-refs = {
; the predecessor bundle's object id; absent on the first
? "prev": row-ref,
; every row the bundle names: a set
"also": { "cites": row-ref-set },
}
; The accord's charter (CC 2.1, CC 3.2 T3 and T6, CC 4.2.6): the
; parameters no row carries.
genesis-charter = {
; one entry per holder, keyed by its identity-ref
"recovery_commitments": { + identity-ref => hash-digest },
; a set; holds infra:attest and infra:serve (CC 3.2 Rooted)
"scope": [+ tstr],
; absent means 86400 (CC 4.2.1.1)
? "halt_fuse_secs": 1..4294967295,
; absent: attachable by an out-of-band anchor only (CC 3.2 T4a)
? "attach_window_secs": 1..4294967295,
; witnessed mode: the three witness members together
? "witness_cadence_secs": 1..4294967295,
; absence is witnessed mode off; 0 is never written
? "witness_quorum": 2..4294967295,
; a set; each one's key:record stands in refs.also "cites"
? "witnesses": [+ identity-ref],
}
; The accord's rows (CC 4.2.1.1, CC 4.2.1.3): payloads of ordinary
; rows, so these are members of their attestation-envelope, as a key
; record's are. An invocation (the families
; accord:invoke:constitutional, accord:invoke:notify and
; accord:invoke:drill, each over its id) is ONE holder's statement
; over this payload, verified against the holders of the bundle in
; force. There is no inner signature and no text preimage; the row's
; type and family separate the kinds, so the payload carries no
; invocation_kind. The map is closed. The row is a claim, type
; scores; its sub is the accord's family_key_id (the value of
; accord_root). valid_until is later than asserted_at, refused
; valid_until_not_after_asserted_at otherwise (checked in prose).
accord-invocation = {
; the holder who signs: the statement's iss
"author": identity-ref,
; the accord's family_key_id: picks the bundle in force the row is
; verified against
"accord_root": tstr,
; the id of the halt, the notify or the drill
"invocation_id": tstr,
; minted by the holder; single-use within valid_until
"nonce": bstr .size 32,
"asserted_at": ms-time,
; bounds the reuse of the nonce, never the reach of a halt
"valid_until": ms-time,
; a notify only: SHA-256 over its message, a separate object held
; as bytes
? "payload_digest": hash-digest,
}
; A lifecycle row (family accord:lifecycle, over its kind) is counted
; (CC 2.6.1.9): one statement per holder over one payload, with no
; author. Its dimension names its kind, confirmed or active;
; refs.target names the halt it confirms or ends, and refs.head the
; bundle it is counted over. The map is closed.
accord-lifecycle = {
"refs": accord-lifecycle-refs,
"dimension": tstr,
"accord_root": tstr,
"invocation_id": tstr,
"nonce": bstr .size 32,
"asserted_at": ms-time,
"valid_until": ms-time,
}
accord-lifecycle-refs = {
; the bundle in force the row is counted over, by its object id
"head": row-ref,
"target": row-ref, ; the halt row it confirms or ends
}
; The transport destination binding (CC 3.3.6.2): the payload of an
; identity:occurrence row, authored and signed by the identity it
; binds. The two X-Wing keys stand at the payload's top level, beside
; the transport_destination map; a seat's binding names its own key
; record in refs under also "cites".
transport-destination-binding = {
"transport_destination": transport-destination,
; on a node that relays, and on every seat
? "transit_xwing_pubkey": bstr .size 1216,
; on a node that relays, and on every serve node
? "onion_hop_xwing_pubkey": bstr .size 1216,
; on a node that opts out of relaying, with no hop key
? "onion_relay": { "opt_out": true },
; on a seat's binding: its key record under also "cites"
? "refs": refs,
; the content-KEM keys of CC 3.3.6.1 where they ride this row
* tstr => ceg-value,
}
; The RNS members of CC 3.3.6.3; destination_hash is recomputed from
; the other four.
transport-destination = {
"reticulum_x25519_pubkey": bstr .size 32,
"reticulum_ed25519_pubkey": bstr .size 32,
"app_name": tstr,
; a sequence: the hash reads the aspects in this order
"aspects": [* tstr],
"destination_hash": bstr .size 16,
}
; Room keys. The seat commitment of a private room: SHA-256 over the
; deterministic encoding of this array, carried as "seat_commitment"
; on the seat row and opened by the binding. `room` is the room's id;
; the member that carries it waits on its owner's submission. `nonce`
; is 32 fresh random bytes. The binding key and the content-KEM keys
; of one identity are distinct bytes, refused at admission otherwise.
seat-commitment-input = ["CEG-seat/2", room: tstr, room_key: kid,
person: identity-ref, nonce: bstr .size 32]
; The HPKE info strings of a binding and of an invitation. The KEM
; key, the binding's two encapsulations and the occurrence keys take
; their bytes from the X-Wing HPKE suite and are fixed with that
; suite's known-answer vectors, not in this file; so does the binding
; seed's derivation label.
hpke-info = "CEG-binding/2" / "CEG-invitation/2"
; Verification has three answers, returned by a verifier and never on
; the wire: Valid; Invalid(reason); Waiting{missing key refs}.
; Invalid under a held key is final. A structural fault is Invalid
; whatever keys are held. A statement whose key record is Waiting is
; Waiting, naming the deepest missing key; a key record Invalid makes
; the statement Invalid. A key held in part is Waiting on the missing
; half. Waiting is never counted.
; Receipts over the provenance log and each stream's log are COSE
; Receipts (RFC 9942) with vds = 1 (RFC9162_SHA256); each witness
; issues its own receipt over the same root, with its instant in the
; protected header; a receipt is issued per batch of a stream, never
; per chunk.
¶
The known-answer vectors of this form are the verifier's
[CC-VECTORS]. [CC] pins each file at a tag of CIRISVerify,
v23.1.1 or v23.2.0 (CC 2.6.5).
They cover the row id, the refusals of non-deterministic encodings,
the order of the sets in refs, a counted row as several
statements, and the three answers of Section 6.4.¶
The row statements file holds four valid statements and 42 refusals, with 17 key records. The composite signature's vectors are checked against the examples of [COMPOSITE-JOSE]. Further files cover the genesis bundles, the recovery commitment, and the accord halt.¶
[CC] also builds schema samples, which are not known-answer vectors. The build of this document checks that the CDDL of Appendix A admits each valid sample and refuses each broken one.¶
An earlier, retired form of the signed object was a JSON object, canonicalised with JCS [RFC8785] and signed by a nested pair of an Ed25519 and an ML-DSA-65 signature. Revision -00 of this document described it. [CC] keeps it as an annex (CC 8.11). No node of the current edition reads it, and no row of the current form names an object of it.¶
Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.¶
The signed object is now the CBOR and COSE form of [CC] 1.0-rc20: a COSE_Sign1 over a deterministically encoded payload, with one composite ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signature.¶
The JSON, JCS and nested-signature sections are replaced by Section 4, Section 5 and Section 6. The earlier form is reduced to Appendix C.¶
The section on a future CBOR and COSE edition is removed.¶
The CDDL appendix is the schema of the CBOR form.¶
The SCITT roles and differences are rewritten: a statement is now a COSE_Sign1 with issuer and subject claims.¶
The admission checks, the withdrawal rules, the halt, the key's end and the conceded limits follow [CC] 1.0-rc20.¶
Other signed objects, receipts and erasable members are described.¶
The canonical-form rules in this document were found and fixed in review by the implementers of CIRISPersist, CIRISVerify and CIRISEdge.¶