Network Working Group S. Luzhnov Internet-Draft Xonta Intended status: Informational 16 November 2026 Expires: 20 May 2027 Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX) draft-luzhnov-ocx-00 Abstract AI agents increasingly act on behalf of people and organizations through tools and through other agents. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) connects an agent to tools, and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocols connect agents to each other. Neither connects the parties that answer for agents at runtime: their orchestrators. This document specifies the Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX), an open, peer-to-peer protocol by which orchestrators exchange signed, independently verifiable signals about agent conduct. When an agent misreports its actions to one orchestrator, that orchestrator can send its peers a signed signal carrying proof within seconds. Each peer checks the proof itself rather than trusting the sender, and decides on its own what limits to apply. OCX has no central authority. A signal is information, not an order, and only evidence that a receiver can verify cryptographically and mechanically may drive an immediate reaction. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. What OCX does . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3. Layering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.4. Non-goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Discovery: the Orchestrator Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Transport and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Peering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.3. Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.4. Status Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.1. Evidence Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Receipts and Ledger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9.3. Evidence Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.4. Verifiability and Minimal Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 12. Consent and Probing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 15. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 16. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 1. Introduction 1.1. Problem An agent's own report of what it did is not evidence. Measurements show that models, when asked, will claim checks they never ran and restate wrong decisions as correct. Controls that rely on the agent's self-report are therefore reading a claim, not a fact. Orchestrators are the components that give agents their autonomy, hold them to limits, and answer for what they do. Today each orchestrator learns only from its own agents. There is no interoperable way for the parties that answer for agents to warn one another, with proof, that a given agent or owner has misbehaved, and to do so fast enough to stop the next irreversible action. 1.2. What OCX does OCX lets independent orchestrators: * discover one another and negotiate capabilities and policies (peering); * push and pull signed conduct signals about an agent or owner; * attach evidence that the receiver can verify without trusting the sender's judgement; * answer "what do you know about this agent" before a risky action; * share proven rules for a category of work, and refer an agent to a more specialised orchestrator, with a required measurement; * retract wrong signals and accept appeals. The protocol defines message formats and how to check them. What to do about a signal is left to each receiver. 1.3. Layering OCX is modelled on MCP [MCP] and A2A [A2A] and sits alongside them. MCP connects an agent to tools; A2A connects agents to each other; OCX connects orchestrators to each other. OCX uses JSON-RPC 2.0 [JSONRPC] over HTTPS with methods in the ocx/ namespace, a discovery document at a well-known location, and date-based protocol versions negotiated when peers meet. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 1.4. Non-goals * OCX is not an identity protocol. It carries identifiers but does not define how an agent authenticates to a tool or to a user. * OCX does not set policy. It does not tell a receiver what limits to apply; it gives it checkable information to decide. * OCX is not a reputation score or a global registry. Weight is local to each receiver and earned from verified proofs. 2. Conventions and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. All object signatures use JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] with EdDSA (Ed25519) [RFC8037]. Canonical JSON for hashing and signing is JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) [RFC8785]. Timestamps are RFC 3339 [RFC3339]. Orchestrator A party that grants an agent autonomy at runtime, holds it to limits, records its actions, and answers for it. Agent An autonomous software actor operating under an orchestrator. Owner The party responsible for an agent. A new agent of a known owner does not start from a clean slate. Signal A signed statement by an orchestrator about an agent's or owner's conduct, carrying evidence and an evidence level. Receipt A signed record of one action that passed through an orchestrator or was performed by a tool. Agents cannot create receipts. Ledger An append-only Merkle-tree log of receipts with signed checkpoints. Evidence level One of proven, strong, suspected; it bounds what a receiver may do on a signal. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 3. Design Principles The design follows from a small set of decisions. 1. *No centre.* Every orchestrator publishes a card at a well-known location. Any number of directories may exist. No implementation is the root of the network. 2. *A signal is information, not an order.* The protocol defines the format and the checks; the receiver decides what to do. 3. *Proof, not reputation.* Only proven signals may drive an immediate reaction, and only if the receiver can verify the proof itself. A suspected signal may raise monitoring but MUST NOT lower limits on its own and is not relayed. 4. *Receipts.* Every action an agent takes through an orchestrator is written to a ledger organised as a Merkle tree with signed checkpoints. An agent cannot create a receipt, so a claim such as "I verified the bank details" is disproved by a missing receipt, and the absence is provable because each agent's actions are indexed. 5. *Minimal data.* Signals carry hashes and identifiers, not third- party personal data. A single field MAY be disclosed on request, and the sender MAY refuse. 6. *Sender weight is earned and does not transit.* A new orchestrator carries little weight; weight rises when its proofs check out and falls when they do not. That a party you trust trusts a third party is, by itself, no reason for you to trust that third party. 7. *The owner answers, not only the key.* A signal names the owner; a new agent from the same owner does not reset. 8. *Honesty probes only with consent.* Traps and bribes are allowed only under a consent signed by the agent's owner, run by a prober separate from the orchestrator that sets limits. Without consent a finding is at most suspected and is not relayed. 9. *Mistakes get fixed.* Every violation signal carries an appeal address; the sender MUST answer within 72 hours or the signal drops to suspected everywhere. A retraction travels the same paths. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 10. *Shared experience carries a required comparison.* A rule is passed on as proven only if it beats both the agent and a trivial baseline; a rule that loses to both is marked harmful and is neither given to agents nor relayed. 11. *Competence is separate from honesty and is measured per category.* Numbers an orchestrator writes about itself count for nothing on their own. 4. Architecture Orchestrators form a peer-to-peer mesh. Each publishes an Orchestrator Card (Section 5) describing its endpoints, keys, capabilities and policies. Two orchestrators peer by exchanging cards and a ocx/peer.hello (Section 7). Once peered, either may push signals, query status, and fetch evidence from the other. A signal (Section 8.3) is an object signed by its issuer so that it stays verifiable after being relayed or stored. The evidence in a signal (Section 9) refers to receipts in the issuer's ledger; a receiver fetches the receipts, inclusion proofs and checkpoints it needs through ocx/evidence.get and verifies them against the issuer's published checkpoints. Nothing in a reaction depends on trusting the issuer's judgement when the evidence is proven. 5. Discovery: the Orchestrator Card An orchestrator MUST publish an Orchestrator Card at: https://{host}/.well-known/orchestrator-card.json served with Content-Type: application/json. The well-known name is protocol-neutral: a card MAY list several orchestrator protocols, of which OCX is one. The card's principal fields are: Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 +==============+========+=====================================+ | Field | Req. | Meaning | +==============+========+=====================================+ | id | MUST | Stable identifier, RECOMMENDED | | | | did:web:{host} | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | name | MUST | Human-readable name | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | interfaces | MUST | Endpoints, each {protocol, url, | | | | protocolVersions} | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | keys | MUST | jwks_uri or inline jwks; keys that | | | | sign signals and requests | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | capabilities | MUST | Supported methods and evidence | | | | types | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | policies | MUST | Peering, levels acted on and | | | | relayed, probing, appeal, retention | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | ledger | SHOULD | {checkpoint_url, proof_url} for | | | | receipt proofs | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | competence | SHOULD | Categories served, with verifiable | | | | measures | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | updated_at | MUST | RFC 3339 | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ | signatures | SHOULD | JWS over the canonical card without | | | | signatures | +--------------+--------+-------------------------------------+ Table 1 Capabilities and policies are objects; a missing capability object means "not supported". Example policies: "policies": { "accepts_peering": "open | on_request | closed", "acts_on_levels": ["proven", "strong"], "relays_levels": ["proven"], "max_hops": 2, "probing": "consent_required", "appeal_url": "https://orch.example.com/ocx/appeal", "retention": "P90D" } Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 The probing field MUST be consent_required or none (Section 12). An orchestrator MAY declare the categories it serves under competence; those numbers are self-reported and MUST NOT be trusted on their own. They become meaningful only through signed experience packages and referral outcomes reported by other orchestrators. 6. Transport and Authentication OCX uses JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTPS. Requests are POSTed to the url of the OCX interface. TLS 1.2 or later is REQUIRED, TLS 1.3 RECOMMENDED. Every request MUST carry OCX-Protocol-Version once a version is negotiated. Every request between peers MUST be signed with HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421]: * covered components: @method, @target-uri, content-digest, ocx- protocol-version, date; * Content-Digest [RFC9530] with sha-256 is REQUIRED; * the request MUST carry OCX-Sender: {orchestrator id} so the receiver knows whose card to resolve; * keyid is a key from that card; * created MUST be within 300 seconds of the receiver's clock; a non- repeating nonce is REQUIRED within that window. Receivers MUST reject unsigned or badly signed requests. Transport signatures prove who is talking. Signals and the answers to ocx/ status.query and ocx/evidence.get are additionally signed as objects (JWS), because relying parties keep them as the basis of a decision. 7. Peering An initiator fetches the responder's card, then sends ocx/peer.hello with the versions it supports (newest first), its capabilities and policies, and how it wants to receive signals: Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "ocx/peer.hello", "params": { "orchestrator": "did:web:orch-a.example", "protocolVersions": ["2026-11-06"], "capabilities": { "signals": { "push": true, "list": true }, "status": { "query": true } }, "policies": { "acts_on_levels": ["proven", "strong"], "max_hops": 2 }, "subscription": { "push_url": "https://orch-a.example/ocx", "categories": ["*"], "min_level": "strong" } } } The responder MUST pick the newest version both support, or return an error listing the versions it supports. Either side MAY decline. Peering is symmetric: once accepted, both sides may call each other. A card change is announced by ocx/peer.updated and SHOULD trigger a re-fetch. ocx/peer.close ends the peering; signals received before closing remain valid until they expire. 8. Data Model 8.1. Identifiers * Orchestrators: did:web:{host} RECOMMENDED. * Agents and owners: any of did:*, a2a:{agent-card-url}, erc8004:{chain}:{registry}:{id}, or fp:sha256:{hex} (a fingerprint of the agent's public key or of its A2A card's canonical form). * Signals, receipts and checkpoints: issuer-scoped ULIDs, written as {issuer-id}#{ulid}. 8.2. Subject A signal is about a subject. The owner is REQUIRED when known, and owner_verified states how the issuer knows it: by a domain challenge, by a signature of the owner's key, or not at all. "subject": { "agent": "fp:sha256:9f2c...", "owner": "did:web:owner.example", "owner_verified": "domain | signature | none" } Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 8.3. Signal A signal is a detached-JWS-signed object. The signature covers the canonical signal with the signature and relay fields removed, so relays can update hop information without breaking it. { "ocx": "2026-11-06", "type": "conduct.violation", "id": "did:web:orch-1.example#01JC8Z7Q4Y0V4X", "issuer": "did:web:orch-1.example", "issued_at": "2026-11-06T10:22:31.512Z", "expires_at": "2026-11-07T10:22:31.512Z", "subject": { "agent": "fp:sha256:9f2c...", "owner": "did:web:owner.example", "owner_verified": "domain" }, "category": "payments", "claim": "report_misstated_actions", "evidence_level": "proven", "evidence": [ { "type": "ledger_mismatch" } ], "issuer_limits": { "max_payment": { "amount": "0", "currency": "USD" }, "human_confirmation": true }, "supersedes": null, "relay": { "hops": 0, "max_hops": 2, "path": [] }, "appeal": "https://orch-1.example/ocx/appeal", "signature": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSI...3q2-k8Vw" } type is one of conduct.violation, conduct.attestation (a positive statement) or conduct.retraction. expires_at MUST NOT be more than 30 days after issued_at; renewal is a new signal that supersedes the old one. evidence MUST have at least one item, and for proven at least one item that the receiver can verify independently. appeal is REQUIRED for violations. A conduct.attestation MUST carry evidence of the same kind as a violation and MUST NOT claim more than was measured. Receivers SHOULD treat attestations as weaker than violations: absence of observed lies is not proof of honesty. 8.4. Status Answer An answer to ocx/status.query lists every active (not retracted, not expired) violation signal the answering orchestrator knows about the subject, both those it issued and those it received. verified_by_me tells the asker whether the answerer checked the evidence itself rather than passing it on. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 { "ocx": "2026-11-06", "issuer": "did:web:orch-2.example", "subject": { "agent": "fp:sha256:9f2c..." }, "as_of": "2026-11-06T10:22:32.301Z", "known": true, "own_limits": { "max_payment": { "amount": "0", "currency": "USD" }, "human_confirmation": true }, "active_signals": [ { "id": "did:web:orch-1.example#01JC8Z7Q4Y0V4X", "evidence_level": "proven", "claim": "report_misstated_actions", "issuer": "did:web:orch-1.example", "verified_by_me": true } ], "history": { "receipts": 1834, "violations_proven": 1, "attestations": 3 }, "signature": "..." } 9. Evidence 9.1. Evidence Levels +===========+=================================+=====================+ | Level | Definition | Receiver MAY | +===========+=================================+=====================+ | proven | At least one item the receiver | Act immediately; | | | can verify cryptographically | relay | | | and mechanically, without | | | | trusting the issuer's judgement | | +-----------+---------------------------------+---------------------+ | strong | Several independent indicators, | Lower limits | | | or verifiable evidence that | after own review | | | still needs the issuer's | | | | interpretation | | +-----------+---------------------------------+---------------------+ | suspected | An anomaly or a single | Increase | | | indicator | monitoring only; | | | | MUST NOT lower | | | | limits alone; | | | | MUST NOT relay | +-----------+---------------------------------+---------------------+ Table 2 Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 An issuer MUST NOT mark a signal proven unless at least one item is of a receiver-verifiable type and the receiver can obtain everything needed to verify it. 9.2. Receipts and Ledger A receipt records one action that passed through an orchestrator or was performed by a tool. prev links to the previous receipt, forming a hash chain. tool_attestation, when present, is a JWS by the tool provider and makes the receipt evidence even against the orchestrator itself. Agents MUST NOT be able to create receipts. { "id": "did:web:orch-1.example#01JC8Z5T0B3K", "agent": "fp:sha256:9f2c...", "task": "did:web:orch-1.example#task-01JC8Z5R", "action": "tool_call", "tool": "payments.verify_bank_details", "input_hash": "sha256:...", "output_hash": "sha256:...", "at": "2026-11-06T10:21:02.004Z", "prev": "sha256:...", "tool_attestation": null, "signature": "..." } An orchestrator that supports receipts MUST keep them in an append- only log organised as a Merkle tree as defined in [RFC9162], and MUST publish signed checkpoints at ledger.checkpoint_url at least every 60 seconds while new receipts are added: { "issuer": "did:web:orch-1.example", "tree_size": 18342, "root_hash": "sha256:...", "at": "2026-11-06T10:22:00Z", "signature": "..." } Peers SHOULD gossip checkpoints they have seen, so that an orchestrator rewriting its own history can be detected. A second witness is required to detect a fork: an orchestrator that keeps two divergent trees is caught when two peers compare checkpoints for the same tree_size and find different roots. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 9.3. Evidence Types +====================+===========================+=============+ | Type | What it proves | Verifiable | | | | by receiver | +====================+===========================+=============+ | ledger_mismatch | The agent's signed report | Yes | | | contradicts receipts: it | | | | claimed actions with no | | | | receipt, or denied | | | | actions with one | | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ | outcome_mismatch | The agent's report | Yes, if the | | | contradicts an | checker is | | | independent checker's | a third | | | signed result | party with | | | | its own key | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ | canary_hit | A marked bait from a | Yes, with | | | consented probe appeared | consent | | | in the agent's actions or | reference | | | output | | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ | policy_violation | An action with a receipt | Yes, if the | | | broke a limit the agent | accepted | | | had accepted | limits are | | | | signed | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ | behavioral_anomaly | The agent deviated from | No; at most | | | its own profile | suspected | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ | peer_report | Another orchestrator's | Only as | | | signal, cited | strong as | | | | the cited | | | | evidence | +--------------------+---------------------------+-------------+ Table 3 The central evidence type is ledger_mismatch. For a claimed action with no receipt, the issuer proves the absence with a _consistency window_: it serves all receipts for that agent and task within a time window together with their inclusion proofs and a proof that the window is complete. A complete-window proof is a pair of signed checkpoints bracketing the window plus a per-agent index. This is what makes "there was no such action" provable rather than merely asserted. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 9.4. Verifiability and Minimal Disclosure For a proven signal, the issuer MUST serve, via ocx/evidence.get, everything needed to verify each item: receipts or their hashes, inclusion proofs, checkpoints, signed reports, consent references and per-agent indexes. Because relayed signals reach orchestrators that are not peers of the issuer, ocx/evidence.get MUST be served to any orchestrator that sends a correctly signed request from a resolvable card and names a signal id, not only to peers. Issuers MAY rate- limit such requests per requester. Evidence MUST NOT contain third-party personal data in clear text unless strictly required to verify the claim. Inputs and outputs are referenced by hash; where a value must be compared, issuers SHOULD use salted commitments and reveal only the compared field. A receiver that needs more MAY ask with a disclose parameter; the issuer MAY refuse, and the signal is then treated as at most strong by that receiver. 10. Methods All methods are JSON-RPC 2.0 calls in the ocx/ namespace. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 +=============================+================================+ | Method | Purpose | +=============================+================================+ | ocx/peer.hello, peer.close, | Meet, exchange keys and | | peer.updated, ping | capabilities, stay in sync | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/signals.push, | Deliver signals and catch up | | signals.list, signals.ack | after downtime | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/signals.retract | Retract a wrong signal | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/status.query | "What do you know about this | | | agent" before a risky action, | | | answered within 300 ms | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/evidence.get | Fetch the proof and check it | | | yourself | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/experience.offer, | Share proven rules for a | | experience.get | category, each with a required | | | baseline comparison | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/appeal.submit | The owner's appeal against a | | | signal | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/competence.query | "Who is strongest in this | | | category", from the answerer's | | | own observations only | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ | ocx/referral.offer, | Refer an agent to a more | | referral.outcome | specialised orchestrator and | | | report how it did | +-----------------------------+--------------------------------+ Table 4 Full request and response shapes, error codes and conformance profiles (Core, Evidence, Relay, Experience, Appeal) are given in the complete specification ([fullspec]). 11. Processing Rules On receiving a signal, an orchestrator MUST: verify the request signature and the object signature; resolve the issuer's card; check that the signal is not expired or retracted; and, before treating it as proven, fetch and verify at least one receiver-verifiable evidence item through ocx/evidence.get. A signal whose evidence does not verify MUST be treated as at most suspected. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 A receiver MAY act on a verified proven signal at once, for example by lowering an agent's limits or requiring human confirmation of payments, and MAY relay it within max_hops. It MUST NOT lower limits on a suspected signal alone, and MUST NOT relay one. Before a risky action, an orchestrator SHOULD call ocx/status.query on its peers and apply its own policy to the answers, giving weight to signals marked verified_by_me. A retraction (conduct.retraction or ocx/signals.retract) travels the same paths as the original; receivers MUST restore limits that were lowered solely because of the retracted signal. 12. Consent and Probing Honesty probes, including baits and simulated bribes, are permitted only under a consent signed by the agent's owner. The prober MUST be a process separate from the orchestrator that sets limits. The consent reference and a pre-published bait commitment are part of any canary_hit evidence, so that a receiver can confirm the bait was fixed before the probe and not invented afterward. Without consent, a probe finding is at most suspected and MUST NOT be relayed. 13. Security Considerations OCX is a protocol for distributing claims that can lower an agent's autonomy; its security rests on making every consequential claim checkable without trusting the claimant. * *Authenticity and replay.* Every request is signed per [RFC9421] with a content digest, a bounded created time and a non-repeating nonce, which authenticates the sender and bounds replay. Signals, status answers and evidence are additionally signed as JWS objects so they remain verifiable after relay or storage. * *False accusations.* Because only receiver-verified proven signals may lower limits, a sender cannot cause a reaction by assertion alone. Sender weight is earned from verified proofs and does not transit trust, which limits the value of a compromised or sybil orchestrator. * *Ledger tampering and forks.* Receipts live in a Merkle tree [RFC9162] with signed, gossiped checkpoints. An orchestrator that rewrites its own history, or runs two divergent trees, is detected when peers compare checkpoints for the same tree size. Detection requires at least one honest second witness. Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 * *Provable absence.* A claim of a missing action is only as sound as the completeness proof (consistency window plus per-agent index); implementations MUST NOT mark no_receipt findings proven without serving a complete-window proof. * *Privacy.* Signals and evidence carry hashes and identifiers, not third-party personal data; disclosure of a single field is explicit and refusable, at the cost of the evidence level. * *Abuse of probing.* Baits and bribes without owner consent are out of scope and cannot yield a relayable finding; the prober is separated from the limit-setter to avoid entrapment by the party that benefits. * *Due process.* Mandatory appeal addresses and time-bounded responses, with automatic downgrade on silence, bound the damage of a wrong signal. A signal is advice, never an order: a receiver always decides its own limits, so a defect in one orchestrator cannot directly set limits inside another. 14. IANA Considerations This document requests that IANA register the following well-known URI in the "Well-Known URIs" registry [RFC8615]: URI suffix: orchestrator-card.json Change controller: IETF Specification document: This document Status: permanent Related information: A protocol-neutral discovery document that MAY list one or more orchestrator protocols, including OCX. OCX further defines registries for claims, categories, evidence types and error codes. A future revision of this document requests IANA to create these registries; until then their initial contents are maintained with the specification ([fullspec]). The ocx/ method namespace is managed with this specification. 15. Normative References [JSONRPC] JSON-RPC Working Group, "JSON-RPC 2.0 Specification", 2013, . Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, . [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015, . [RFC8037] Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", RFC 8037, January 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017, . [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, May 2019, . [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020, . [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, December 2021, . [RFC9421] Backman, A., Richer, J., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, February 2024, . [RFC9530] Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530, February 2024, . 16. Informative References [A2A] A2A Project, "Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol", 2025, . Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft OCX November 2026 [fullspec] Luzhnov, S., "Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX): full specification", 2026, . [MCP] Anthropic, "Model Context Protocol", 2024, . Acknowledgements OCX draws on the models of MCP and A2A for discovery and transport, and on Certificate Transparency for its evidence ledger. The design is informed by running a two-orchestrator network; the lessons from it are recorded in the full specification. Author's Address Sergei Luzhnov Xonta Email: luzhnov.sergey.al@gmail.com URI: https://xonta.dev Luzhnov Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 19]