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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction-00" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="TAA Exact State Contraction">ᑕ. (TAA): Exact State Contraction and Source-Bound Exact-Computation Statements</title>

    <author initials="" surname="lmtlssss" fullname="lmtlssss">
      <organization>colony.technology</organization>
      <address>
        <email>lmtlssss@colony.technology</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>

    
    
    <keyword>exact state contraction</keyword> <keyword>COSE</keyword> <keyword>CBOR</keyword> <keyword>SCITT</keyword> <keyword>verifiable computation</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 51?>

<t>This document defines the computer-science term <u format="char-num">ᑕ.</u>, spoken
TAA.  It denotes exact state contraction: a replacement of a
computational representation by a retained state that preserves a
declared observation contract for every admissible input.  The
retained transition and observation maps commute with the full
system, through a surjection onto the retained state, and this
identity preserves every finite observation trace.  The document also
specifies a portable certificate for a checked result: a COSE_Sign1
statement with a deterministic CBOR payload that binds the exact
artifact bytes to a registered predicate, its domain, a verdict, the
exact checker implementation and the evidence.  The statement can be
registered with a SCITT Transparency Service.  A signature
authenticates the issuer's statement; a separate checker establishes
whether the evidence supports it; a transparency receipt establishes
registration, not mathematical correctness.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 69?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>This document names an exact contraction of a computation's state
relative to a stated observation contract.  The retained transition
and observation maps commute with the original computation, and the
definition gives equality of each finite observation trace.  When that
holds, an implementation can store, transmit, check or compose the
retained state in place of the original.  Exactness has a declared
scope: the identities hold over a stated input domain, and a result
that holds only approximately, or only for sampled inputs, is a
different claim.</t>

<t><xref target="term"/> gives the definition, the trace theorem and the printed
notation <u format="char-num">ᑕ.</u>, spoken TAA, as published in <xref target="TAA-PAPER"/>.</t>

<t>A result of this kind is useful to a third party only when the third
party can check it.  <xref target="statement"/> specifies a signed statement that binds
the exact artifact bytes, the claim, the checker and the evidence.
The statement uses COSE <xref target="RFC9052"/> and deterministic CBOR <xref target="RFC8949"/>
and is a Signed Statement in the SCITT architecture <xref target="RFC9943"/>.  The
statement has three distinct layers:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>an issuer signature, which authenticates the issuer's claim;</t>
  <t>an independently checked computational claim, which establishes
the mathematical content; and</t>
  <t>an optional transparency receipt, which establishes registration
with one Transparency Service.</t>
</list></t>

<t>None of these substitutes for the others.</t>

<t>This document is an individual submission.  It has no IETF consensus
and no working-group status.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-terminology"><name>Conventions and Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<t>The following terms are used:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Artifact:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>An exact byte sequence about which a claim is made.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Predicate:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A registered, versioned identifier naming a property of an artifact
together with its checking rule.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Domain:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The declared set of inputs, states or cases over which a predicate
is asserted.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Verdict:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>One of <spanx style="verb">certified</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">broken</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">unknown</spanx> (<xref target="verdicts"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Checker:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>An implementation that decides a predicate for an artifact and its
evidence.  It is identified by name, version and the SHA-256 digest
of its implementation bytes.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Evidence:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The byte sequence the checker consumes in addition to the artifact,
such as a derivation, a counterexample or a set of counts.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Issuer:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The party that signs a statement.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Relying party:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The party that verifies a statement and decides whether to accept
its verdict.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>SHA-256 is the hash function specified in <xref target="RFC6234"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="term"><name>The Term TAA: Exact State Contraction</name>

<section anchor="system-model"><name>System Model</name>

<t>Let M = (S, U, F, Y, G) be an input-driven system.  A state s in S and
an input u in U produce the next state F(s, u) and an observation
G(s, u), with F : S x U -&gt; S and G : S x U -&gt; Y.  The observation G
identifies the property to preserve.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="definition"><name>Definition</name>

<t>An exact state contraction of M for G consists of a set Q, the
retained state; a surjection pi : S -&gt; Q; and maps F' : Q x U -&gt; Q and
G' : Q x U -&gt; Y, such that, for every s in S and u in U:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
   pi(F(s, u)) = F'(pi(s), u)                              (1)

   G(s, u)     = G'(pi(s), u)                              (2)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The tuple is denoted TAA_G(M) = (Q, pi, F', G').</t>

<t>The retained maps commute with the full system.  Equation (1) states
that projecting after a transition equals transitioning the projected
state; equation (2) states that the observation depends on the state
only through its projection.</t>

<t>The subscript G is necessary.  A contraction can preserve one
observation while losing information required for another.</t>

<t>The word "exact" is relative to the declared observation and domain.
A transformation is called exact under this term only when (1) and
(2) have been established for every state and input of its declared
domain.  Establishing the identities is the obligation of the party
making the claim; a checker that cannot establish them returns
<spanx style="verb">unknown</spanx>.</t>

<t>In <xref target="TAA-PAPER"/> the reduced maps are written with an overbar (F-bar,
G-bar), the projection with the Greek letter pi, and the tuple as
TAA_G(M) with TAA in sans-serif type.  This document writes F', G',
pi and TAA_G(M).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="name-and-notation"><name>Name and Notation</name>

<t>The printed operator is the two-character sequence
<u format="char-num">ᑕ.</u>: CANADIAN SYLLABICS TA followed by FULL STOP.  Its spoken name is
TAA.  The existing character keeps its linguistic identity in the
Unified Canadian Aboriginal Syllabics block; this term assigns a
mathematical use to the two characters and does not create them.
Where only ASCII is available, this document writes TAA.  The
software identifier is "taa", with the versioned name
"taa.exact-state-contraction.v1"; the identifiers of <xref target="statement"/>
use the lower-case form "taa".</t>

<t>The term names a specified contract and its checkable construction.
It does not name every state reduction, every hash or a signature
algorithm.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="trace"><name>Trace Preservation</name>

<t>For each initial state s_0 and finite input word u_0, ..., u_(n-1),
the system M and the reduced system (Q, U, F', Y, G') give equal
observations at every step when the retained initial state is
q_0 = pi(s_0).</t>

<t>Proof (from <xref target="TAA-PAPER"/>).  Assume q_k = pi(s_k).  Equation (1) gives
q_(k+1) = F'(q_k, u_k) = pi(F(s_k, u_k)) = pi(s_(k+1)).  Equation (2)
gives G'(q_k, u_k) = G(s_k, u_k).  Since q_0 = pi(s_0), induction
proves both statements for each step.</t>

<t>The predicate <spanx style="verb">urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1</spanx> (<xref target="predicates"/>)
checks surjectivity of pi and equations (1) and (2) over every pair of
a complete finite table.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="limits"><name>Outputs and Witnesses</name>

<t>For relations with multiple witnesses, preservation of the set of
output values does not prove preservation of witness multiplicity.  A
claim of unique witness requires a bijection of the applicable
witness fibers or an independent exact count.  A claim of unique
output requires equality of the applicable output sets.  A checker
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a claim whose preservation conditions are missing.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="scope"><name>Scope</name>

<t>The definition gives no claim that arbitrary systems admit a small
retained state or that arbitrary program properties are efficiently
decidable.  When the semantics of a source are unsupported or
incomplete, the correct result is <spanx style="verb">unknown</spanx>.  An approximate
numerical change is not an exact contraction and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be stated
with the verdict <spanx style="verb">certified</spanx> under a predicate defined by this term.</t>

<t>Quotient systems, congruence relations, automata minimization,
bisimulation and affine composition are established concepts.  This
term names their shared preservation contract and fixes its notation;
it does not assert priority over them.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="statement"><name>Source-Bound Exact-Computation Statement</name>

<section anchor="layers"><name>Layers</name>

<t>A statement is a COSE_Sign1 message <xref target="RFC9052"/>.  Its payload is a
claim map (<xref target="payload"/>).  The signature authenticates the issuer's
statement; the independent checker establishes whether the evidence
supports the declared claim; a SCITT receipt records registration
under one service's policy.  A relying party evaluates the three
separately and requires a receipt only when its policy requires
transparency.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="envelope"><name>COSE_Sign1 Envelope</name>

<t>A statement:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a COSE_Sign1 message carrying CBOR tag 18;</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded with the deterministic encoding of
<xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8949"/>, at every level, including the protected
header bytes and the payload bytes;</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry, in the protected header:
  <list style="symbols">
      <t>label 1 (alg): the signature algorithm; this profile uses -8
(EdDSA) <xref target="RFC9053"/> with the Ed25519 curve <xref target="RFC8032"/> (see
the note below);</t>
      <t>label 3 (content type): the text string "application/cbor";</t>
      <t>label 4 (kid): the issuer key identifier, a byte string;</t>
      <t>label 15 (CWT Claims) <xref target="RFC9597"/>: a map containing claim 1 (iss),
the issuer identifier, and claim 2 (sub), the subject identifier;</t>
    </list></t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have an empty unprotected header map; and</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the payload attached (not detached).</t>
</list></t>

<t>The signature is computed over the Sig_structure</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
   ["Signature1", protected, h'', payload]
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>of <xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9052"/>, with empty external additional data.
An Ed25519 signature is 64 bytes.</t>

<t>Note on the algorithm identifier: <xref target="RFC9864"/> deprecates the
polymorphic identifier -8 (EdDSA) and registers the fully specified
identifier -19 (Ed25519).  This revision keeps -8 so that its
statements match the recorded interoperability vectors byte for byte;
a later revision would move to -19.</t>

<t>As a SCITT Signed Statement, the message has the media type
<spanx style="verb">application/scitt-statement+cose</spanx> <xref target="RFC9943"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="payload"><name>Claim Payload</name>

<t>The payload is a deterministically encoded CBOR map with integer
keys.  Its structure, in CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/>, is:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
exact-claim = {
  1: "taa.exact-computation-claim.v1",
  2: artifact,
  3: claim,
  4: verifier,
  5: evidence,
  6: tstr,                  ; issuance time, RFC 3339 UTC
  ? 7: tstr,                ; superseded statement identifier
}
artifact = {
  1: "sha-256",
  2: bstr .size 32,         ; digest of exact artifact bytes
  3: tstr,                  ; artifact media type
  ? 4: tstr,                ; public location, optional
}
claim = {
  1: tstr,                  ; predicate URI or stable identifier
  2: tstr,                  ; declared input domain
  3: "certified" / "broken" / "unknown",
  4: tstr,                  ; observation or witness contract
  5: [* tstr],              ; assumptions
}
verifier = {
  1: tstr,                  ; implementation identifier
  2: tstr,                  ; exact version
  3: "sha-256",
  4: bstr .size 32,         ; digest of verifier artifact
}
evidence = {
  1: "sha-256",
  2: bstr .size 32,         ; evidence digest
  ? 3: tstr,                ; public evidence location
  ? 4: tstr,                ; evidence media type
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>Key 1 of <spanx style="verb">exact-claim</spanx> identifies the profile version.  A verifier
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a payload with an unknown profile identifier or with
duplicate map keys.</t>

<t>A location (artifact key 4, evidence key 3) is a retrieval hint.  The
digest is the binding.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="verdicts"><name>Verdicts</name>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">certified</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The named checker accepted the predicate for the exact artifact
digest over the declared domain.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">broken</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The evidence contains a reproducible counterexample to the
predicate.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">unknown</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The checker established neither result under its method and
resource bounds.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>A <spanx style="verb">certified</spanx> output-uniqueness claim requires preservation of the
set of possible outputs.  A witness-uniqueness claim additionally
requires preservation of witness identity or multiplicity (see
<xref target="limits"/>).  The checking rule belongs to the predicate and its
checker specification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="predicates"><name>Registered Predicates</name>

<t>The reference interoperability suite <xref target="TAA-INTEROP"/> registers four
finite-domain predicates.  In its vectors, claim key 2 (domain) is
"finite-exact-domain", claim key 4 (contract) is "full-domain-check"
and claim key 5 (assumptions) is the empty array.</t>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Artifact: a complete finite table of states, inputs, pi, next
state, observations, reduced next state and reduced observations.
The checker requires pi to be surjective onto the reduced states and
checks equations (1) and (2) for every state/input pair.  Evidence
records the number of pairs checked.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">urn:taa:affine-cost-composition:v1</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Artifact: three intervals, each a 5-tuple of integers (f, g, u, v,
w).  The checker composes an interval a = (f, g, u, v, w) followed by
b = (h, k, p, q, r) as (h f, h g + k, u + p f^2, v + 2 p f g + q f,
w + p g^2 + q g + r), computes both parenthesizations of the three
intervals and requires them to be equal.  Each tuple is the scalar case
of an affine interval of <xref target="TAA-PAPER"/>, with state transition
x -&gt; f x + g and cost u x^2 + v x + w (in the paper's notation F_A,
b_A, Q_A, q_A and d_A); the formula is the paper's quadratic cost
composition, including the state-dependent cross-terms, which the
paper proves associative.  Evidence records the composed tuple.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">urn:taa:output-uniqueness:v1</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Artifact: explicit finite witness fibers, one per input.  The
checker counts distinct outputs and witnesses in each fiber and
requires exactly one distinct output per input.  Evidence records
both counts.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">urn:taa:witness-uniqueness:v1</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Artifact: explicit finite witness fibers.  A <spanx style="verb">broken</spanx> verdict
requires the evidence to name an input and two or more distinct
witnesses for it, reproduced from the artifact.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>Another predicate requires a published domain and an independent
checker before it is registered.  A verdict asserts exactly the named
predicate over its stated domain.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="procedure"><name>Relying Party Procedure</name>

<t>A relying party performs these steps in order and rejects the
statement at the first failure:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Parse the COSE_Sign1 message.  Require tag 18, deterministic
encoding and the protected header parameters of <xref target="envelope"/>.</t>
  <t>Select the issuer trust anchor from the protected <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
values under local policy.</t>
  <t>Verify the signature over the Sig_structure.</t>
  <t>Parse the payload.  Reject an unknown profile identifier and
duplicate keys.</t>
  <t>Compute SHA-256 over the supplied artifact bytes and require an
exact match with artifact key 2.</t>
  <t>Obtain the named checker version and require its digest to match
verifier key 4.</t>
  <t>Obtain the evidence bytes and require their digest to match
evidence key 2.</t>
  <t>Run the checker over the artifact, the claim, the assumptions and
the evidence.</t>
  <t>When local policy requires transparency, verify each SCITT receipt
against its Transparency Service.</t>
  <t>Accept the verdict only when it matches the checker result and
local trust policy.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat a valid signature, or a valid receipt,
as acceptance of the computational claim.  When the artifact bytes are
not available to the relying party, it can verify the signature and
any receipt but cannot establish the claim.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="json"><name>Relation to the JSON Certificate</name>

<t>The colony service at the time of writing issues a separate JSON
certificate signed with Ed25519 under key identifier
"colony-ed25519-20261108".  Its signature covers the UTF-8 encoding of
a JSON object with the members id, result, family, domain, scope,
gadget_id, checksum, issued_at, issuer, public, mark,
signature_algorithm and key_id, in that order, with gadget_id and
checksum null when absent.  The mark member carries the two
characters U+1455 U+002E, the printed form of TAA (<xref target="term"/>).</t>

<t>That JSON certificate is a different byte format with a different
signature structure.  It is not a statement under this profile.  An
implementation claims conformance to this profile only after its COSE
issuer and verifier satisfy <xref target="envelope"/> through <xref target="procedure"/> and pass the
interoperability vectors.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="scitt"><name>SCITT Interoperability</name>

<t>A statement under this profile is a Signed Statement in the sense of
<xref target="RFC9943"/>.  The issuer and subject are carried in the CWT Claims
protected header parameter <xref target="RFC9597"/>.  An issuer
can register the statement with a Transparency Service and obtain a
receipt <xref target="RFC9942"/>.  A receipt proves inclusion in that service's
log under its registration policy.  It establishes registration, not
mathematical correctness, and a Transparency Service is not required
to run the checker.</t>

<t>Different issuers can use the same payload profile.  A relying party
checks the named predicate and the evidence, not the issuer's
identity alone.  A self-signed statement can be acceptable under local policy;
its signature does not establish correctness.  A statement
authenticated only with a key shared with a central service, such as
an HMAC key, does not support third-party offline verification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="example"><name>Example</name>

<t>This example is the recorded vector <spanx style="verb">finite-trace</spanx> of <xref target="TAA-INTEROP"/>.
It is signed with a published test-only Ed25519 key, derived from the
32-byte seed 00 01 02 ... 1f, whose public key is:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
   03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc099
   67e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The key and the issuer identifier "urn:taa:interop:issuer:test-only"
are test fixtures and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be trusted as a production issuer.</t>

<t>The artifact is a four-state machine with two inputs, contracted to
two retained states.  Its exact bytes are one line of JSON followed by
a line feed; it is shown here with line breaks added:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{"states":["A","B","C","D"],"inputs":["zero","one"],
 "pi":[0,0,1,1],
 "next":[[1,2],[0,3],[3,0],[2,1]],
 "observations":[[0,1],[0,1],[1,0],[1,0]],
 "reduced_next":[[0,1],[1,0]],
 "reduced_observations":[[0,1],[1,0]]}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>Here pi maps A and B to retained state 0 and C and D to retained
state 1.  For each of the 8 state/input pairs, pi(next) equals
reduced_next at pi(state), and the observation equals
reduced_observations at pi(state), so (1) and (2) hold over the
complete table.</t>

<t>The evidence bytes are:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{"checked_pairs":8,"finite_trace_preserved":true}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>followed by a line feed.  The SHA-256 digests are:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
   artifact:
     526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c91
     06a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d3098c72
   evidence:
     184f1d1f4c89d3154e495193c7b5fe60
     9833e13e22cb1b43abb05643b71b98bf
   checker:
     f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7
     a75f7c7f4ca3c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The checker digest is that of the independent Python checker
<spanx style="verb">interop/python/verify.py</spanx>, named "taa-reference-python-independent"
version "1.0.0".</t>

<t>The statement, in CBOR extended diagnostic notation
(<xref section="G" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>), with the embedded byte strings shown
decoded:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
18([
  / protected / << {
    1: -8,                          / alg: EdDSA /
    3: "application/cbor",          / content type /
    4: 'taa-interop-test-01',       / kid /
    15: {                           / CWT Claims /
      1: "urn:taa:interop:issuer:test-only",   / iss /
      2: "urn:taa:interop:artifact"            / sub /
    }
  } >>,
  / unprotected / {},
  / payload / << {
    1: "taa.exact-computation-claim.v1",
    2: {
      1: "sha-256",
      2: h'526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c91
           06a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d3098c72',
      3: "application/json"
    },
    3: {
      1: "urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1",
      2: "finite-exact-domain",
      3: "certified",
      4: "full-domain-check",
      5: []
    },
    4: {
      1: "taa-reference-python-independent",
      2: "1.0.0",
      3: "sha-256",
      4: h'f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7
           a75f7c7f4ca3c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec'
    },
    5: {
      1: "sha-256",
      2: h'184f1d1f4c89d3154e495193c7b5fe60
           9833e13e22cb1b43abb05643b71b98bf',
      4: "application/json"
    },
    6: "2026-11-08T00:00:00Z"
  } >>,
  / signature / h'e7ea3b4d9aa0e6ff98069ee3c09e792f
                  40a4fd16e4e5b4191616830f6f559d2c
                  d36996b1b8572c59b3e275897b5c4b5c
                  212a6a48e40f1f0aa10af95899cd0806'
])
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The complete statement is 546 bytes; its SHA-256 digest is
95ebc6e8 a9364fd2 33910a92 aa8bdb24 1d8b93e0 373e920e 0b87f303
b711c621.  The bytes are listed in <xref target="example-bytes"/>.  This vector
carries no transparency receipt.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="impl"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations at the time
of writing, following <xref target="RFC7942"/>.  It is to be removed before
publication as an RFC.</t>

<t>The reference suite <xref target="TAA-INTEROP"/> (repository
github.com/lmtlssss/speedrunpapi, commit
4438b7b3bab6da12839d1756e7d2b40f029ee146) contains an issuer and a
verifier in Node.js and a verifier, re-signer and negative-case
generator in Python.  The recorded run of 8 November 2026 reports:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>4 registered predicates and 4 signed vectors;</t>
  <t>4 vectors verified by the Node verifier and 4 by the Python
verifier;</t>
  <t>4 vectors re-signed in Python with byte-identical results;</t>
  <t>16 altered statements rejected by the Node verifier and 16 by the
Python verifier (altered signature, artifact bytes, evidence bytes
and envelope tag); and</t>
  <t>5 correctly signed statements carrying false mathematical claims
rejected by the independent checker.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The vectors use a test-only key and carry no SCITT receipt.  The
production JSON certificate service (<xref target="json"/>) is a separate
implementation and does not issue statements under this profile.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>The signature authenticates the issuer's statement; the independent
checker establishes whether the evidence supports the declared claim.
A relying party that accepts a verdict without running the checker
(step 8 of <xref target="procedure"/>) trusts the issuer for the mathematics.</t>

<t>A checker can contain an implementation error, and a claim can omit
a necessary assumption.  Binding the checker by digest makes the
checker that was used identifiable; it does not make it correct.
Relying parties <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a checker that is independent of the
issuer's optimizer or analyzer.</t>

<t>Every artifact, evidence file and checker version <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be bound by
its exact SHA-256 digest.  A URL is a retrieval hint and provides no
binding.</t>

<t>The verdict <spanx style="verb">certified</spanx> for output uniqueness does not imply witness
uniqueness (<xref target="limits"/>).  A relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> promote one claim to
the other.</t>

<t>An issuer key can be compromised or revoked, and a statement can be
superseded (payload key 7).  Resolution of these cases is local trust
policy.  The test-only key in <xref target="example"/> is public; statements signed
with it carry no assurance.</t>

<t>A SCITT receipt records registration under one Transparency
Service's policy.  It establishes registration in that service's log,
not computational correctness.</t>

<t>Artifacts and evidence can contain proprietary source.  An issuer
<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> place private source or private evidence at a public
location.  When the artifact stays private, third parties can verify
only the signature and any receipt.</t>

<t>Non-deterministic encodings allow distinct byte strings with the same
meaning.  Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a statement whose re-encoding under
deterministic CBOR differs from the received bytes.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document has no IANA actions.  It uses the media type
<spanx style="verb">application/scitt-statement+cose</spanx> registered by <xref target="RFC9943"/>.  The
predicate identifiers of <xref target="predicates"/> are URNs in the "taa"
namespace as used by the reference suite; this document does not
request registration of a URN namespace.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC8032">
  <front>
    <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
    <date month="January" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8610">
  <front>
    <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <date month="June" year="2019"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8949">
  <front>
    <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <date month="December" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9052">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
    <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
    <date month="August" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
      <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9053">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms</title>
    <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
    <date month="August" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052).</t>
      <t>This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9053"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9053"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9597">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers</title>
    <author fullname="T. Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker"/>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <date month="June" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes how to include CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims in the header parameters of any CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) structure. This functionality helps to facilitate applications that wish to make use of CWT claims in encrypted COSE structures and/or COSE structures featuring detached signatures, while having some of those claims be available before decryption and/or without inspecting the detached payload. Another use case is using CWT claims with payloads that are not CWT Claims Sets, including payloads that are not CBOR at all.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9597"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9597"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9943">
  <front>
    <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
    <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>



    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC6234">
  <front>
    <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
    <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
    <date month="May" year="2011"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9864">
  <front>
    <title>Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <date month="October" year="2025"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that fully specify the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), and hash functions, as being "fully specified". It refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that require additional information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed as being "polymorphic". This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) polymorphic algorithm identifiers, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers. It deprecates those polymorphic algorithm identifiers.</t>
      <t>This specification updates RFCs 7518, 8037, and 9053. It deprecates polymorphic algorithms defined by RFCs 8037 and 9053 and provides fully-specified replacements for them. It adds to the instructions to designated experts in RFCs 7518 and 9053.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9864"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9864"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9942">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts</title>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts prove properties of a Verifiable Data Structure (VDS) to a verifier. VDSs and associated Proof Types enable security properties, such as minimal disclosure, transparency, and non-equivocation. Transparency helps maintain trust over time and has been applied to certificates, end-to-end encrypted messaging systems, and supply chain security. This specification enables concise transparency-oriented systems by building on Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for Merkle inclusion and consistency proofs.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9942"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="TAA-PAPER" >
  <front>
    <title>Exact State Contraction: A Definition, Preservation Theorem, and Notation Proposal</title>
    <author initials="" surname="lmtlssss" fullname="lmtlssss">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="08"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Version" value="1.0"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.5281/zenodo.24054438"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="TAA-INTEROP" target="https://github.com/lmtlssss/speedrunpapi/tree/main/standards/scitt-exact-computation/interop">
  <front>
    <title>SCITT exact-computation interoperability v1</title>
    <author >
      <organization>colony.technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="08"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 689?>

<section anchor="example-bytes"><name>Example Statement Bytes</name>

<t>The 546 bytes of the statement in <xref target="example"/>, in hexadecimal:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
   d284586aa4012703706170706c69636174696f6e2f63626f7204537461612d69
   6e7465726f702d746573742d30310fa201782075726e3a7461613a696e746572
   6f703a6973737565723a746573742d6f6e6c7902781875726e3a7461613a696e
   7465726f703a6172746966616374a059016ea601781e7461612e65786163742d
   636f6d7075746174696f6e2d636c61696d2e763102a301677368612d32353602
   5820526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c9106a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d309
   8c7203706170706c69636174696f6e2f6a736f6e03a501782475726e3a746161
   3a66696e6974652d74726163652d707265736572766174696f6e3a7631027366
   696e6974652d65786163742d646f6d61696e0369636572746966696564047166
   756c6c2d646f6d61696e2d636865636b058004a40178207461612d7265666572
   656e63652d707974686f6e2d696e646570656e64656e740265312e302e300367
   7368612d323536045820f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7a75f7c7f4ca3
   c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec05a301677368612d323536025820184f1d1f4c89d315
   4e495193c7b5fe609833e13e22cb1b43abb05643b71b98bf04706170706c6963
   6174696f6e2f6a736f6e0674323032362d31312d30385430303a30303a30305a
   5840e7ea3b4d9aa0e6ff98069ee3c09e792f40a4fd16e4e5b4191616830f6f55
   9d2cd36996b1b8572c59b3e275897b5c4b5c212a6a48e40f1f0aa10af95899cd
   0806
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>


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