Internet-Draft TAA Exact State Contraction November 2026
lmtlssss Expires 19 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
lmtlssss
colony.technology

ᑕ. (TAA): Exact State Contraction and Source-Bound Exact-Computation Statements

Abstract

This document defines the computer-science term ᑕ. (U+1455 U+002E), spoken TAA. It denotes exact state contraction: a replacement of a computational representation by a retained state that preserves a declared observation contract for every admissible input. The retained transition and observation maps commute with the full system, through a surjection onto the retained state, and this identity preserves every finite observation trace. The document also specifies a portable certificate for a checked result: a COSE_Sign1 statement with a deterministic CBOR payload that binds the exact artifact bytes to a registered predicate, its domain, a verdict, the exact checker implementation and the evidence. The statement can be registered with a SCITT Transparency Service. A signature authenticates the issuer's statement; a separate checker establishes whether the evidence supports it; a transparency receipt establishes registration, not mathematical correctness.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document names an exact contraction of a computation's state relative to a stated observation contract. The retained transition and observation maps commute with the original computation, and the definition gives equality of each finite observation trace. When that holds, an implementation can store, transmit, check or compose the retained state in place of the original. Exactness has a declared scope: the identities hold over a stated input domain, and a result that holds only approximately, or only for sampled inputs, is a different claim.

Section 3 gives the definition, the trace theorem and the printed notation ᑕ. (U+1455 U+002E), spoken TAA, as published in [TAA-PAPER].

A result of this kind is useful to a third party only when the third party can check it. Section 4 specifies a signed statement that binds the exact artifact bytes, the claim, the checker and the evidence. The statement uses COSE [RFC9052] and deterministic CBOR [RFC8949] and is a Signed Statement in the SCITT architecture [RFC9943]. The statement has three distinct layers:

  1. an issuer signature, which authenticates the issuer's claim;

  2. an independently checked computational claim, which establishes the mathematical content; and

  3. an optional transparency receipt, which establishes registration with one Transparency Service.

None of these substitutes for the others.

This document is an individual submission. It has no IETF consensus and no working-group status.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The following terms are used:

Artifact:

An exact byte sequence about which a claim is made.

Predicate:

A registered, versioned identifier naming a property of an artifact together with its checking rule.

Domain:

The declared set of inputs, states or cases over which a predicate is asserted.

Verdict:

One of certified, broken or unknown (Section 4.4).

Checker:

An implementation that decides a predicate for an artifact and its evidence. It is identified by name, version and the SHA-256 digest of its implementation bytes.

Evidence:

The byte sequence the checker consumes in addition to the artifact, such as a derivation, a counterexample or a set of counts.

Issuer:

The party that signs a statement.

Relying party:

The party that verifies a statement and decides whether to accept its verdict.

SHA-256 is the hash function specified in [RFC6234].

3. The Term TAA: Exact State Contraction

3.1. System Model

Let M = (S, U, F, Y, G) be an input-driven system. A state s in S and an input u in U produce the next state F(s, u) and an observation G(s, u), with F : S x U -> S and G : S x U -> Y. The observation G identifies the property to preserve.

3.2. Definition

An exact state contraction of M for G consists of a set Q, the retained state; a surjection pi : S -> Q; and maps F' : Q x U -> Q and G' : Q x U -> Y, such that, for every s in S and u in U:

   pi(F(s, u)) = F'(pi(s), u)                              (1)

   G(s, u)     = G'(pi(s), u)                              (2)

The tuple is denoted TAA_G(M) = (Q, pi, F', G').

The retained maps commute with the full system. Equation (1) states that projecting after a transition equals transitioning the projected state; equation (2) states that the observation depends on the state only through its projection.

The subscript G is necessary. A contraction can preserve one observation while losing information required for another.

The word "exact" is relative to the declared observation and domain. A transformation is called exact under this term only when (1) and (2) have been established for every state and input of its declared domain. Establishing the identities is the obligation of the party making the claim; a checker that cannot establish them returns unknown.

In [TAA-PAPER] the reduced maps are written with an overbar (F-bar, G-bar), the projection with the Greek letter pi, and the tuple as TAA_G(M) with TAA in sans-serif type. This document writes F', G', pi and TAA_G(M).

3.3. Name and Notation

The printed operator is the two-character sequence ᑕ. (U+1455 U+002E): CANADIAN SYLLABICS TA followed by FULL STOP. Its spoken name is TAA. The existing character keeps its linguistic identity in the Unified Canadian Aboriginal Syllabics block; this term assigns a mathematical use to the two characters and does not create them. Where only ASCII is available, this document writes TAA. The software identifier is "taa", with the versioned name "taa.exact-state-contraction.v1"; the identifiers of Section 4 use the lower-case form "taa".

The term names a specified contract and its checkable construction. It does not name every state reduction, every hash or a signature algorithm.

3.4. Trace Preservation

For each initial state s_0 and finite input word u_0, ..., u_(n-1), the system M and the reduced system (Q, U, F', Y, G') give equal observations at every step when the retained initial state is q_0 = pi(s_0).

Proof (from [TAA-PAPER]). Assume q_k = pi(s_k). Equation (1) gives q_(k+1) = F'(q_k, u_k) = pi(F(s_k, u_k)) = pi(s_(k+1)). Equation (2) gives G'(q_k, u_k) = G(s_k, u_k). Since q_0 = pi(s_0), induction proves both statements for each step.

The predicate urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1 (Section 4.5) checks surjectivity of pi and equations (1) and (2) over every pair of a complete finite table.

3.5. Outputs and Witnesses

For relations with multiple witnesses, preservation of the set of output values does not prove preservation of witness multiplicity. A claim of unique witness requires a bijection of the applicable witness fibers or an independent exact count. A claim of unique output requires equality of the applicable output sets. A checker MUST reject a claim whose preservation conditions are missing.

3.6. Scope

The definition gives no claim that arbitrary systems admit a small retained state or that arbitrary program properties are efficiently decidable. When the semantics of a source are unsupported or incomplete, the correct result is unknown. An approximate numerical change is not an exact contraction and MUST NOT be stated with the verdict certified under a predicate defined by this term.

Quotient systems, congruence relations, automata minimization, bisimulation and affine composition are established concepts. This term names their shared preservation contract and fixes its notation; it does not assert priority over them.

4. Source-Bound Exact-Computation Statement

4.1. Layers

A statement is a COSE_Sign1 message [RFC9052]. Its payload is a claim map (Section 4.3). The signature authenticates the issuer's statement; the independent checker establishes whether the evidence supports the declared claim; a SCITT receipt records registration under one service's policy. A relying party evaluates the three separately and requires a receipt only when its policy requires transparency.

4.2. COSE_Sign1 Envelope

A statement:

  • MUST be a COSE_Sign1 message carrying CBOR tag 18;

  • MUST be encoded with the deterministic encoding of Section 4.2 of [RFC8949], at every level, including the protected header bytes and the payload bytes;

  • MUST carry, in the protected header:

    • label 1 (alg): the signature algorithm; this profile uses -8 (EdDSA) [RFC9053] with the Ed25519 curve [RFC8032] (see the note below);

    • label 3 (content type): the text string "application/cbor";

    • label 4 (kid): the issuer key identifier, a byte string;

    • label 15 (CWT Claims) [RFC9597]: a map containing claim 1 (iss), the issuer identifier, and claim 2 (sub), the subject identifier;

  • MUST have an empty unprotected header map; and

  • MUST carry the payload attached (not detached).

The signature is computed over the Sig_structure

   ["Signature1", protected, h'', payload]

of Section 4.4 of [RFC9052], with empty external additional data. An Ed25519 signature is 64 bytes.

Note on the algorithm identifier: [RFC9864] deprecates the polymorphic identifier -8 (EdDSA) and registers the fully specified identifier -19 (Ed25519). This revision keeps -8 so that its statements match the recorded interoperability vectors byte for byte; a later revision would move to -19.

As a SCITT Signed Statement, the message has the media type application/scitt-statement+cose [RFC9943].

4.3. Claim Payload

The payload is a deterministically encoded CBOR map with integer keys. Its structure, in CDDL [RFC8610], is:

exact-claim = {
  1: "taa.exact-computation-claim.v1",
  2: artifact,
  3: claim,
  4: verifier,
  5: evidence,
  6: tstr,                  ; issuance time, RFC 3339 UTC
  ? 7: tstr,                ; superseded statement identifier
}
artifact = {
  1: "sha-256",
  2: bstr .size 32,         ; digest of exact artifact bytes
  3: tstr,                  ; artifact media type
  ? 4: tstr,                ; public location, optional
}
claim = {
  1: tstr,                  ; predicate URI or stable identifier
  2: tstr,                  ; declared input domain
  3: "certified" / "broken" / "unknown",
  4: tstr,                  ; observation or witness contract
  5: [* tstr],              ; assumptions
}
verifier = {
  1: tstr,                  ; implementation identifier
  2: tstr,                  ; exact version
  3: "sha-256",
  4: bstr .size 32,         ; digest of verifier artifact
}
evidence = {
  1: "sha-256",
  2: bstr .size 32,         ; evidence digest
  ? 3: tstr,                ; public evidence location
  ? 4: tstr,                ; evidence media type
}

Key 1 of exact-claim identifies the profile version. A verifier MUST reject a payload with an unknown profile identifier or with duplicate map keys.

A location (artifact key 4, evidence key 3) is a retrieval hint. The digest is the binding.

4.4. Verdicts

certified:

The named checker accepted the predicate for the exact artifact digest over the declared domain.

broken:

The evidence contains a reproducible counterexample to the predicate.

unknown:

The checker established neither result under its method and resource bounds.

A certified output-uniqueness claim requires preservation of the set of possible outputs. A witness-uniqueness claim additionally requires preservation of witness identity or multiplicity (see Section 3.5). The checking rule belongs to the predicate and its checker specification.

4.5. Registered Predicates

The reference interoperability suite [TAA-INTEROP] registers four finite-domain predicates. In its vectors, claim key 2 (domain) is "finite-exact-domain", claim key 4 (contract) is "full-domain-check" and claim key 5 (assumptions) is the empty array.

urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1:

Artifact: a complete finite table of states, inputs, pi, next state, observations, reduced next state and reduced observations. The checker requires pi to be surjective onto the reduced states and checks equations (1) and (2) for every state/input pair. Evidence records the number of pairs checked.

urn:taa:affine-cost-composition:v1:

Artifact: three intervals, each a 5-tuple of integers (f, g, u, v, w). The checker composes an interval a = (f, g, u, v, w) followed by b = (h, k, p, q, r) as (h f, h g + k, u + p f^2, v + 2 p f g + q f, w + p g^2 + q g + r), computes both parenthesizations of the three intervals and requires them to be equal. Each tuple is the scalar case of an affine interval of [TAA-PAPER], with state transition x -> f x + g and cost u x^2 + v x + w (in the paper's notation F_A, b_A, Q_A, q_A and d_A); the formula is the paper's quadratic cost composition, including the state-dependent cross-terms, which the paper proves associative. Evidence records the composed tuple.

urn:taa:output-uniqueness:v1:

Artifact: explicit finite witness fibers, one per input. The checker counts distinct outputs and witnesses in each fiber and requires exactly one distinct output per input. Evidence records both counts.

urn:taa:witness-uniqueness:v1:

Artifact: explicit finite witness fibers. A broken verdict requires the evidence to name an input and two or more distinct witnesses for it, reproduced from the artifact.

Another predicate requires a published domain and an independent checker before it is registered. A verdict asserts exactly the named predicate over its stated domain.

4.6. Relying Party Procedure

A relying party performs these steps in order and rejects the statement at the first failure:

  1. Parse the COSE_Sign1 message. Require tag 18, deterministic encoding and the protected header parameters of Section 4.2.

  2. Select the issuer trust anchor from the protected iss and kid values under local policy.

  3. Verify the signature over the Sig_structure.

  4. Parse the payload. Reject an unknown profile identifier and duplicate keys.

  5. Compute SHA-256 over the supplied artifact bytes and require an exact match with artifact key 2.

  6. Obtain the named checker version and require its digest to match verifier key 4.

  7. Obtain the evidence bytes and require their digest to match evidence key 2.

  8. Run the checker over the artifact, the claim, the assumptions and the evidence.

  9. When local policy requires transparency, verify each SCITT receipt against its Transparency Service.

  10. Accept the verdict only when it matches the checker result and local trust policy.

A relying party MUST NOT treat a valid signature, or a valid receipt, as acceptance of the computational claim. When the artifact bytes are not available to the relying party, it can verify the signature and any receipt but cannot establish the claim.

4.7. Relation to the JSON Certificate

The colony service at the time of writing issues a separate JSON certificate signed with Ed25519 under key identifier "colony-ed25519-20261108". Its signature covers the UTF-8 encoding of a JSON object with the members id, result, family, domain, scope, gadget_id, checksum, issued_at, issuer, public, mark, signature_algorithm and key_id, in that order, with gadget_id and checksum null when absent. The mark member carries the two characters U+1455 U+002E, the printed form of TAA (Section 3).

That JSON certificate is a different byte format with a different signature structure. It is not a statement under this profile. An implementation claims conformance to this profile only after its COSE issuer and verifier satisfy Section 4.2 through Section 4.6 and pass the interoperability vectors.

5. SCITT Interoperability

A statement under this profile is a Signed Statement in the sense of [RFC9943]. The issuer and subject are carried in the CWT Claims protected header parameter [RFC9597]. An issuer can register the statement with a Transparency Service and obtain a receipt [RFC9942]. A receipt proves inclusion in that service's log under its registration policy. It establishes registration, not mathematical correctness, and a Transparency Service is not required to run the checker.

Different issuers can use the same payload profile. A relying party checks the named predicate and the evidence, not the issuer's identity alone. A self-signed statement can be acceptable under local policy; its signature does not establish correctness. A statement authenticated only with a key shared with a central service, such as an HMAC key, does not support third-party offline verification.

6. Example

This example is the recorded vector finite-trace of [TAA-INTEROP]. It is signed with a published test-only Ed25519 key, derived from the 32-byte seed 00 01 02 ... 1f, whose public key is:

   03a107bff3ce10be1d70dd18e74bc099
   67e4d6309ba50d5f1ddc8664125531b8

The key and the issuer identifier "urn:taa:interop:issuer:test-only" are test fixtures and MUST NOT be trusted as a production issuer.

The artifact is a four-state machine with two inputs, contracted to two retained states. Its exact bytes are one line of JSON followed by a line feed; it is shown here with line breaks added:

{"states":["A","B","C","D"],"inputs":["zero","one"],
 "pi":[0,0,1,1],
 "next":[[1,2],[0,3],[3,0],[2,1]],
 "observations":[[0,1],[0,1],[1,0],[1,0]],
 "reduced_next":[[0,1],[1,0]],
 "reduced_observations":[[0,1],[1,0]]}

Here pi maps A and B to retained state 0 and C and D to retained state 1. For each of the 8 state/input pairs, pi(next) equals reduced_next at pi(state), and the observation equals reduced_observations at pi(state), so (1) and (2) hold over the complete table.

The evidence bytes are:

{"checked_pairs":8,"finite_trace_preserved":true}

followed by a line feed. The SHA-256 digests are:

   artifact:
     526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c91
     06a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d3098c72
   evidence:
     184f1d1f4c89d3154e495193c7b5fe60
     9833e13e22cb1b43abb05643b71b98bf
   checker:
     f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7
     a75f7c7f4ca3c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec

The checker digest is that of the independent Python checker interop/python/verify.py, named "taa-reference-python-independent" version "1.0.0".

The statement, in CBOR extended diagnostic notation (Appendix G of [RFC8610]), with the embedded byte strings shown decoded:

18([
  / protected / << {
    1: -8,                          / alg: EdDSA /
    3: "application/cbor",          / content type /
    4: 'taa-interop-test-01',       / kid /
    15: {                           / CWT Claims /
      1: "urn:taa:interop:issuer:test-only",   / iss /
      2: "urn:taa:interop:artifact"            / sub /
    }
  } >>,
  / unprotected / {},
  / payload / << {
    1: "taa.exact-computation-claim.v1",
    2: {
      1: "sha-256",
      2: h'526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c91
           06a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d3098c72',
      3: "application/json"
    },
    3: {
      1: "urn:taa:finite-trace-preservation:v1",
      2: "finite-exact-domain",
      3: "certified",
      4: "full-domain-check",
      5: []
    },
    4: {
      1: "taa-reference-python-independent",
      2: "1.0.0",
      3: "sha-256",
      4: h'f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7
           a75f7c7f4ca3c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec'
    },
    5: {
      1: "sha-256",
      2: h'184f1d1f4c89d3154e495193c7b5fe60
           9833e13e22cb1b43abb05643b71b98bf',
      4: "application/json"
    },
    6: "2026-11-08T00:00:00Z"
  } >>,
  / signature / h'e7ea3b4d9aa0e6ff98069ee3c09e792f
                  40a4fd16e4e5b4191616830f6f559d2c
                  d36996b1b8572c59b3e275897b5c4b5c
                  212a6a48e40f1f0aa10af95899cd0806'
])

The complete statement is 546 bytes; its SHA-256 digest is 95ebc6e8 a9364fd2 33910a92 aa8bdb24 1d8b93e0 373e920e 0b87f303 b711c621. The bytes are listed in Appendix A. This vector carries no transparency receipt.

7. Implementation Status

This section records the status of known implementations at the time of writing, following [RFC7942]. It is to be removed before publication as an RFC.

The reference suite [TAA-INTEROP] (repository github.com/lmtlssss/speedrunpapi, commit 4438b7b3bab6da12839d1756e7d2b40f029ee146) contains an issuer and a verifier in Node.js and a verifier, re-signer and negative-case generator in Python. The recorded run of 8 November 2026 reports:

The vectors use a test-only key and carry no SCITT receipt. The production JSON certificate service (Section 4.7) is a separate implementation and does not issue statements under this profile.

8. Security Considerations

The signature authenticates the issuer's statement; the independent checker establishes whether the evidence supports the declared claim. A relying party that accepts a verdict without running the checker (step 8 of Section 4.6) trusts the issuer for the mathematics.

A checker can contain an implementation error, and a claim can omit a necessary assumption. Binding the checker by digest makes the checker that was used identifiable; it does not make it correct. Relying parties SHOULD use a checker that is independent of the issuer's optimizer or analyzer.

Every artifact, evidence file and checker version MUST be bound by its exact SHA-256 digest. A URL is a retrieval hint and provides no binding.

The verdict certified for output uniqueness does not imply witness uniqueness (Section 3.5). A relying party MUST NOT promote one claim to the other.

An issuer key can be compromised or revoked, and a statement can be superseded (payload key 7). Resolution of these cases is local trust policy. The test-only key in Section 6 is public; statements signed with it carry no assurance.

A SCITT receipt records registration under one Transparency Service's policy. It establishes registration in that service's log, not computational correctness.

Artifacts and evidence can contain proprietary source. An issuer SHOULD NOT place private source or private evidence at a public location. When the artifact stays private, third parties can verify only the signature and any receipt.

Non-deterministic encodings allow distinct byte strings with the same meaning. Verifiers MUST reject a statement whose re-encoding under deterministic CBOR differs from the received bytes.

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions. It uses the media type application/scitt-statement+cose registered by [RFC9943]. The predicate identifiers of Section 4.5 are URNs in the "taa" namespace as used by the reference suite; this document does not request registration of a URN namespace.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC8949]
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
[RFC9053]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.
[RFC9597]
Looker, T. and M.B. Jones, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers", RFC 9597, DOI 10.17487/RFC9597, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9597>.
[RFC9943]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.

10.2. Informative References

[RFC6234]
Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC9864]
Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864, DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9864>.
[RFC9942]
Steele, O., Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts", RFC 9942, DOI 10.17487/RFC9942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9942>.
[TAA-INTEROP]
colony.technology, "SCITT exact-computation interoperability v1", , <https://github.com/lmtlssss/speedrunpapi/tree/main/standards/scitt-exact-computation/interop>.
[TAA-PAPER]
lmtlssss, "Exact State Contraction: A Definition, Preservation Theorem, and Notation Proposal", Version 1.0, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24054438, , <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24054438>.

Appendix A. Example Statement Bytes

The 546 bytes of the statement in Section 6, in hexadecimal:

   d284586aa4012703706170706c69636174696f6e2f63626f7204537461612d69
   6e7465726f702d746573742d30310fa201782075726e3a7461613a696e746572
   6f703a6973737565723a746573742d6f6e6c7902781875726e3a7461613a696e
   7465726f703a6172746966616374a059016ea601781e7461612e65786163742d
   636f6d7075746174696f6e2d636c61696d2e763102a301677368612d32353602
   5820526908245c3d28bf92805cc006fa3c9106a936a8f39900e8e82f3e31d309
   8c7203706170706c69636174696f6e2f6a736f6e03a501782475726e3a746161
   3a66696e6974652d74726163652d707265736572766174696f6e3a7631027366
   696e6974652d65786163742d646f6d61696e0369636572746966696564047166
   756c6c2d646f6d61696e2d636865636b058004a40178207461612d7265666572
   656e63652d707974686f6e2d696e646570656e64656e740265312e302e300367
   7368612d323536045820f15555290f463b81baee7157061000f7a75f7c7f4ca3
   c5819f11730f6e3ac9ec05a301677368612d323536025820184f1d1f4c89d315
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   0806

Author's Address

lmtlssss
colony.technology