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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-kalosha-stb-tls13-02" category="info" submissionType="independent" xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="stb-tls13">STB Cryptographic Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kalosha-stb-tls13-02"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
      <organization>APMI, Belarusian State University</organization>
      <address>
        <email>agievichi@bsu.by</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="N." surname="Kalosha" fullname="Nikolai Kalosha">
      <organization>IM, Academy of Sciences of Belarus</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kalosha@im.bas-net.by</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <abstract>
      <?line 280?>

<t>This specification introduces a subset of STB (STandards of Belarus)
cryptographic algorithms and defines their use in TLS 1.3. The document is
self-contained, i.e., it fully describes the required STB algorithms. It can be
used to develop STB-compliant TLS 1.3 implementations without referring to
the original STB standards.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 288?>

<section anchor="INTRO">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>In the TLS 1.3 protocol <xref target="RFC9846"/>, the client and server negotiate the
following cryptographic parameters:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Hashing and AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) algorithms,
which together define a cipher suite. TLS parties specify their preferred
cipher suites in the handshake hello messages.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) algorithms, which are defined implicitly
through algebraic group identifiers in the <tt>"supported_groups"</tt> and
<tt>"key_share"</tt> extensions of hello messages. By default, KEM is implemented
through the Diffie-Hellman protocol and cyclic groups for this protocol are
assumed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Digital signature algorithms, which are negotiated through the
<tt>"signature_algorithms"</tt> and <tt>"signature_algorithms_cert"</tt> extensions.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Based on these parameters, the TLS algorithmic stack is constructed, covering
key exchange, bulk encryption, message authentication and authentication of
parties. Changing the parameters modifies the stack without redesigning its
structure.</t>
      <t>This specification introduces a subset of cryptographic algorithms standardized
in Belarus and defines their use as TLS 1.3 cryptographic parameters. These
algorithms are deployed across Belarusian IT systems, powering public key
infrastructures, legally recognized digital signatures, identity cards, VPN
services, etc. The specification aims to improve the recognition of the
algorithms, in particular, to obtain assigned code points for the respective
TLS parameters. This would ensure interoperability and facilitate
interactions with external systems.</t>
      <t>National standards of Belarus are designated by the abbreviation STB.
The relevant standards have additionally been assigned short names:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Belt (<xref target="Stb31"/>, introduced in 2007): block cipher-based symmetric
encryption, data authentication, hashing;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Bash (<xref target="Stb77"/>, introduced in 2016): sponge function-based symmetric
encryption, data authentication, hashing;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Bign (<xref target="Stb45"/>, introduced in 2011): elliptic curve-based digital signatures
and key transport.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>These short names are also used to refer to the elements of the standards.</t>
      <t>This document presents a restricted profile of the STB suite, defining only a
subset of the available algorithms and narrowing their operational parameters.
The sole exception to this restriction is <xref target="BASH.Auto"/>, where the complete
functionality of the auxiliary sponge automaton is specified.</t>
      <aside>
        <t>Caution: This document is not a standard and does not have IETF
community consensus. It makes use of cryptographic algorithms that are
national standards for Belarus. Neither the IETF nor the IRTF has analyzed
these algorithms for suitability for any given application, and it may
contain either intended or unintended weaknesses.</t>
      </aside>
    </section>
    <section anchor="NOTATION">
      <name>Notation</name>
      <section anchor="general">
        <name>General</name>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>NIL</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>empty input, error;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>!=</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>not equal;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a^b</tt>, <tt>a^{b}</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>b</tt> is the upper index of <tt>a</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a_b</tt>, <tt>a_{b}</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>b</tt> is the lower index of <tt>a</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a b</tt>, <tt>a * b</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>multiplication;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>{a, b, c, ...}</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the set of elements <tt>a, b, c, ...</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a in S</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>a</tt> belongs to <tt>S</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>alg(u_1, u_2, ...)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>call an algorithm <tt>alg</tt> with inputs <tt>u_1, u_2, ...</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a &lt;- u</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>assign <tt>u</tt> to <tt>a</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a &lt;- S</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for a set <tt>S</tt>, the same as <tt>a &lt;- u</tt>, where <tt>u</tt> is chosen uniformly at
random from <tt>S</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>(a_1, a_2, ...) &lt;- (u_1, u_2, ...)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the same as <tt>a_1 &lt;- u_1</tt>, <tt>a_2 &lt;- u_2, ...</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>(NIL, a_2) &lt;- (u_1, u_2)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the same as <tt>a_2 &lt;- u_2</tt> (<tt>u_1</tt> is ignored);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>a &lt;-&gt; b</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>swap the values of <tt>a</tt> and <tt>b</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="binary-strings-and-integers">
        <name>Binary Strings and Integers</name>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>{0, 1}^*</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the set of all binary strings of finite length
(including the empty string of length <tt>0</tt>);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>|u|</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the bit length of <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>{0, 1}^n</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the set of <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt> such that <tt>|u| = n</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>{0, 1}^{n*}</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the set of <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt> such that <tt>|u|</tt> is a multiple of <tt>n</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u[i]</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt> and <tt>0 &lt;= i &lt; |u|</tt>, the <tt>i</tt>th bit of <tt>u</tt>
(bits are numbered from zero);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u[:m)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^n</tt> and <tt>0 &lt;= m &lt;= n</tt>, the string <tt>u[0]u[1]...u[m-1]</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u[m:)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^n</tt> and <tt>0 &lt;= m &lt;= n</tt>, the string <tt>u[m]u[m+1]...u[n-1]</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u[-m:)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^n</tt> and <tt>0 &lt;= m &lt;= n</tt>, the string <tt>u[n-m]...u[n-1]</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u[m_1:m_2)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^n</tt> and <tt>0 &lt;= m_1 &lt;= m_2 &lt;= n</tt>, the string
<tt>u[m_1]u[m_1+1]...u[m_2-1]</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u || v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^*</tt>, their concatenation, that is, the string <tt>w</tt>
of length <tt>|u| + |v|</tt> such that <tt>w[:|u|) = u</tt> and <tt>w[-|v|:) = v</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Rep(u, m)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt> and a positive integer <tt>m</tt>, the concatenation
of <tt>m</tt> copies of <tt>u</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Split(u, m)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^*</tt> and a positive integer <tt>m</tt>, the tuple:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>()</tt> if <tt>|u| = 0</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>(u)</tt> if <tt>0 &lt; |u| &lt;= m</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>(u[:m), Split(u[m:), m))</tt> if <tt>|u| &gt; m</tt>;</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>U mod m</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for an integer <tt>U</tt> and a positive integer <tt>m</tt>, the integer
<tt>r in {0, 1, ..., m-1}</tt> such that <tt>U - r</tt> is a multiple of <tt>m</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u &amp; v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^n</tt>, the string <tt>w in {0, 1}^n</tt> such that
<tt>w[i] = u[i] * v[i]</tt> (bitwise AND);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u | v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^n</tt>, the string <tt>w in {0, 1}^n</tt> such that
<tt>w[i] = (u[i] * v[i] + u[i] + v[i]) mod 2</tt> (bitwise OR);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u ^ v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^n</tt>, the string <tt>w in {0, 1}^n</tt> such that
<tt>w[i] = (u[i] + v[i]) mod 2</tt> (bitwise exclusive OR);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>~u</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^n</tt>, the string <tt>u ^ Rep(1, n)</tt> (bitwise NOT);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Bin2Int(u)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt>, the number:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>0</tt>, if <tt>|u| = 0</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>128 u[0] + 64 u[1] + ... + u[7]</tt>, if <tt>|u| = 8</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>Bin2Int(u[:8)) + 256 * Bin2Int(u[8:))</tt>, if <tt>|u| &gt; 8</tt>
(binary-to-integer conversion);</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Int2Bin(U, 8n)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for a non-negative integer <tt>U</tt> and a positive integer <tt>n</tt>,
the string <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt> such that <tt>Bin2Int(u) = U mod 2^{8n}</tt>
(integer-to-binary conversion);</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u + v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt>, the string
<tt>Int2Bin(Bin2Int(u) + Bin2Int(v), 8n)</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u - v</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt>, the string <tt>w in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt> such that
<tt>u = w + v</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>Floor(z)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for a real number <tt>z</tt>, the greatest integer less than or equal to <tt>z</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ShLo(u, r)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt> and a positive integer <tt>r &lt; 8n</tt>,
the string <tt>Int2Bin(Floor(Bin2Int(u) / 2^r), 8n)</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>ShHi(u, r)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt> and a positive integer <tt>r &lt; 8n</tt>, the string
<tt>Int2Bin(2^r * Bin2Int(u), 8n)</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>RotHi(u, r)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8n}</tt> and a positive integer <tt>r &lt; 8n</tt>, the string
<tt>ShHi(u, r) ^ ShLo(u, 8n - r)</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="miscellaneous">
        <name>Miscellaneous</name>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>--</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>dash;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>\</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>no line break; used to split large sequences of digits into lines for
convenience;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>0x</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>prefix followed by a hexadecimal representation of <tt>u in {0, 1}^{4*}</tt>:
</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>every four consecutive bits of <tt>u</tt> are represented by a hexadecimal
digit in <tt>{0, 1, ..., 9, A, B, C, D, E, F}</tt> (e.g., <tt>10110001 = 0xB1</tt>);</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>OID(obj)</tt> :</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>an identifier of an object <tt>obj</tt>, a string in <tt>{0, 1}^{8*}</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="conventions">
        <name>Conventions</name>
        <t>for <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., m</tt> :</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the body of the loop is executed <tt>m</tt> times if <tt>m &gt; 1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the body of the loop is executed once if <tt>m = 1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the body of the loop is never executed if <tt>m &lt; 1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>(a_1, a_2, ..., a_m)</tt>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a tuple of <tt>m</tt> elements if <tt>m &gt; 1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a tuple of one element <tt>a_1</tt> if <tt>m = 1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an empty tuple if <tt>m &lt; 1</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>u[m_1]u[m_1+1]...u[m_2-1]</tt>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a string of <tt>m_2 - m_1</tt> elements if <tt>m_2 &gt; m_1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an empty tuple if <tt>m_2 &lt;= m_1</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="BELT">
      <name>Belt Algorithms</name>
      <section anchor="BELT.Prelim">
        <name>Preliminaries</name>
        <t>This specification defines the following algorithms of the Belt family:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>belt-block</tt> -- block encryption;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>belt-hash</tt> -- hashing;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>belt-che256</tt> -- authenticated encryption.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The <tt>belt-block</tt> algorithms (encryption and decryption) define a block cipher
that processes 128-bit blocks using 256-bit keys. This cipher is the basic
primitive, all other Belt algorithms are built on top of it.</t>
        <t>The <tt>belt-hash</tt> algorithm implements 256-bit hashing. When processing two
128-bit blocks of data, <tt>belt-block</tt> is invoked 3 times, i.e., the hash rate is
approximately 2/3 of the encryption rate.</t>
        <t>The <tt>belt-che256</tt> algorithms (encryption and decryption) implement AEAD in the
CHE (Counter-Hash-Encrypt) mode <xref target="Agi20"/>. This mode is similar to the
well-known GCM mode <xref target="McGVie04"/>, but it is more robust with respect to nonce
misuse. The nonce length is 128 bits, and the authentication tag length is 64
bits.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BELT.Block">
        <name>Block Encryption</name>
        <t>Block encryption is defined by the encryption algorithm <tt>belt-block</tt> and the
corresponding decryption algorithm. This specification describes only
encryption. The <tt>belt-block</tt> algorithm uses auxiliary transformations <tt>G_5</tt>,
<tt>G_13</tt>, <tt>G_21</tt> which, in turn, use an S-box <tt>H</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="s-box-h">
          <name>S-box <tt>H</tt></name>
          <t>The S-box <tt>H</tt> transforms <tt>x in {0, 1}^8</tt> as follows.</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(x_1, x_2) = Split(x, 4)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Find the octet <tt>y</tt> in row <tt>x_1</tt> and column <tt>x_2</tt> of <xref target="SBOX"/>
(all data in the table are in the hexadecimal notation).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>y</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <table anchor="SBOX">
            <name>The S-box `H`</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left"> </th>
                <th align="left">0</th>
                <th align="left">1</th>
                <th align="left">2</th>
                <th align="left">3</th>
                <th align="left">4</th>
                <th align="left">5</th>
                <th align="left">6</th>
                <th align="left">7</th>
                <th align="left">8</th>
                <th align="left">9</th>
                <th align="left">A</th>
                <th align="left">B</th>
                <th align="left">C</th>
                <th align="left">D</th>
                <th align="left">E</th>
                <th align="left">F</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">0</td>
                <td align="left">B1</td>
                <td align="left">94</td>
                <td align="left">BA</td>
                <td align="left">C8</td>
                <td align="left">0A</td>
                <td align="left">08</td>
                <td align="left">F5</td>
                <td align="left">3B</td>
                <td align="left">36</td>
                <td align="left">6D</td>
                <td align="left">00</td>
                <td align="left">8E</td>
                <td align="left">58</td>
                <td align="left">4A</td>
                <td align="left">5D</td>
                <td align="left">E4</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">1</td>
                <td align="left">85</td>
                <td align="left">04</td>
                <td align="left">FA</td>
                <td align="left">9D</td>
                <td align="left">1B</td>
                <td align="left">B6</td>
                <td align="left">C7</td>
                <td align="left">AC</td>
                <td align="left">25</td>
                <td align="left">2E</td>
                <td align="left">72</td>
                <td align="left">C2</td>
                <td align="left">02</td>
                <td align="left">FD</td>
                <td align="left">CE</td>
                <td align="left">0D</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">2</td>
                <td align="left">5B</td>
                <td align="left">E3</td>
                <td align="left">D6</td>
                <td align="left">12</td>
                <td align="left">17</td>
                <td align="left">B9</td>
                <td align="left">61</td>
                <td align="left">81</td>
                <td align="left">FE</td>
                <td align="left">67</td>
                <td align="left">86</td>
                <td align="left">AD</td>
                <td align="left">71</td>
                <td align="left">6B</td>
                <td align="left">89</td>
                <td align="left">0B</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">3</td>
                <td align="left">5C</td>
                <td align="left">B0</td>
                <td align="left">C0</td>
                <td align="left">FF</td>
                <td align="left">33</td>
                <td align="left">C3</td>
                <td align="left">56</td>
                <td align="left">B8</td>
                <td align="left">35</td>
                <td align="left">C4</td>
                <td align="left">05</td>
                <td align="left">AE</td>
                <td align="left">D8</td>
                <td align="left">E0</td>
                <td align="left">7F</td>
                <td align="left">99</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">4</td>
                <td align="left">E1</td>
                <td align="left">2B</td>
                <td align="left">DC</td>
                <td align="left">1A</td>
                <td align="left">E2</td>
                <td align="left">82</td>
                <td align="left">57</td>
                <td align="left">EC</td>
                <td align="left">70</td>
                <td align="left">3F</td>
                <td align="left">CC</td>
                <td align="left">F0</td>
                <td align="left">95</td>
                <td align="left">EE</td>
                <td align="left">8D</td>
                <td align="left">F1</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">5</td>
                <td align="left">C1</td>
                <td align="left">AB</td>
                <td align="left">76</td>
                <td align="left">38</td>
                <td align="left">9F</td>
                <td align="left">E6</td>
                <td align="left">78</td>
                <td align="left">CA</td>
                <td align="left">F7</td>
                <td align="left">C6</td>
                <td align="left">F8</td>
                <td align="left">60</td>
                <td align="left">D5</td>
                <td align="left">BB</td>
                <td align="left">9C</td>
                <td align="left">4F</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">6</td>
                <td align="left">F3</td>
                <td align="left">3C</td>
                <td align="left">65</td>
                <td align="left">7B</td>
                <td align="left">63</td>
                <td align="left">7C</td>
                <td align="left">30</td>
                <td align="left">6A</td>
                <td align="left">DD</td>
                <td align="left">4E</td>
                <td align="left">A7</td>
                <td align="left">79</td>
                <td align="left">9E</td>
                <td align="left">B2</td>
                <td align="left">3D</td>
                <td align="left">31</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">7</td>
                <td align="left">3E</td>
                <td align="left">98</td>
                <td align="left">B5</td>
                <td align="left">6E</td>
                <td align="left">27</td>
                <td align="left">D3</td>
                <td align="left">BC</td>
                <td align="left">CF</td>
                <td align="left">59</td>
                <td align="left">1E</td>
                <td align="left">18</td>
                <td align="left">1F</td>
                <td align="left">4C</td>
                <td align="left">5A</td>
                <td align="left">B7</td>
                <td align="left">93</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">8</td>
                <td align="left">E9</td>
                <td align="left">DE</td>
                <td align="left">E7</td>
                <td align="left">2C</td>
                <td align="left">8F</td>
                <td align="left">0C</td>
                <td align="left">0F</td>
                <td align="left">A6</td>
                <td align="left">2D</td>
                <td align="left">DB</td>
                <td align="left">49</td>
                <td align="left">F4</td>
                <td align="left">6F</td>
                <td align="left">73</td>
                <td align="left">96</td>
                <td align="left">47</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">9</td>
                <td align="left">06</td>
                <td align="left">07</td>
                <td align="left">53</td>
                <td align="left">16</td>
                <td align="left">ED</td>
                <td align="left">24</td>
                <td align="left">7A</td>
                <td align="left">37</td>
                <td align="left">39</td>
                <td align="left">CB</td>
                <td align="left">A3</td>
                <td align="left">83</td>
                <td align="left">03</td>
                <td align="left">A9</td>
                <td align="left">8B</td>
                <td align="left">F6</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">A</td>
                <td align="left">92</td>
                <td align="left">BD</td>
                <td align="left">9B</td>
                <td align="left">1C</td>
                <td align="left">E5</td>
                <td align="left">D1</td>
                <td align="left">41</td>
                <td align="left">01</td>
                <td align="left">54</td>
                <td align="left">45</td>
                <td align="left">FB</td>
                <td align="left">C9</td>
                <td align="left">5E</td>
                <td align="left">4D</td>
                <td align="left">0E</td>
                <td align="left">F2</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">B</td>
                <td align="left">68</td>
                <td align="left">20</td>
                <td align="left">80</td>
                <td align="left">AA</td>
                <td align="left">22</td>
                <td align="left">7D</td>
                <td align="left">64</td>
                <td align="left">2F</td>
                <td align="left">26</td>
                <td align="left">87</td>
                <td align="left">F9</td>
                <td align="left">34</td>
                <td align="left">90</td>
                <td align="left">40</td>
                <td align="left">55</td>
                <td align="left">11</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">C</td>
                <td align="left">BE</td>
                <td align="left">32</td>
                <td align="left">97</td>
                <td align="left">13</td>
                <td align="left">43</td>
                <td align="left">FC</td>
                <td align="left">9A</td>
                <td align="left">48</td>
                <td align="left">A0</td>
                <td align="left">2A</td>
                <td align="left">88</td>
                <td align="left">5F</td>
                <td align="left">19</td>
                <td align="left">4B</td>
                <td align="left">09</td>
                <td align="left">A1</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">D</td>
                <td align="left">7E</td>
                <td align="left">CD</td>
                <td align="left">A4</td>
                <td align="left">D0</td>
                <td align="left">15</td>
                <td align="left">44</td>
                <td align="left">AF</td>
                <td align="left">8C</td>
                <td align="left">A5</td>
                <td align="left">84</td>
                <td align="left">50</td>
                <td align="left">BF</td>
                <td align="left">66</td>
                <td align="left">D2</td>
                <td align="left">E8</td>
                <td align="left">8A</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">E</td>
                <td align="left">A2</td>
                <td align="left">D7</td>
                <td align="left">46</td>
                <td align="left">52</td>
                <td align="left">42</td>
                <td align="left">A8</td>
                <td align="left">DF</td>
                <td align="left">B3</td>
                <td align="left">69</td>
                <td align="left">74</td>
                <td align="left">C5</td>
                <td align="left">51</td>
                <td align="left">EB</td>
                <td align="left">23</td>
                <td align="left">29</td>
                <td align="left">21</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">F</td>
                <td align="left">D4</td>
                <td align="left">EF</td>
                <td align="left">D9</td>
                <td align="left">B4</td>
                <td align="left">3A</td>
                <td align="left">62</td>
                <td align="left">28</td>
                <td align="left">75</td>
                <td align="left">91</td>
                <td align="left">14</td>
                <td align="left">10</td>
                <td align="left">EA</td>
                <td align="left">77</td>
                <td align="left">6C</td>
                <td align="left">DA</td>
                <td align="left">1D</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <t>The S-box defines a family of constants <tt>BeltH</tt>. The family is parameterized by
integers <tt>u &gt;= 0</tt> and <tt>n &gt; 0</tt> such that <tt>u + n &lt;= 256</tt>. A particular
constant <tt>BeltH(u, n)</tt> is defined as
<tt>H(Int2Bin(u, 8)) || H(Int2Bin(u + 1, 8)) || ... || H(Int2Bin(u + n - 1, 8))</tt>.
For example, <tt>BeltH(79, 3) = 0xF1C1AB</tt> (<tt>Int2Bin(79, 8) = 0x4F</tt>).</t>
          <aside>
            <t>Note: <tt>H</tt> is constructed using exponentiation in a finite field of size <tt>2^8</tt>
              <xref target="AgiAfo05"/>. The array <tt>H[0], H[1], ..., H[255]</tt>, where
<tt>H[x] = H(Int2Bin(x, 8))</tt>, is generated by the following algorithm:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>H[10] &lt;- 0x00</tt>, <tt>H[11] &lt;- 0x8E</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>For <tt>x = 12, 13, ..., 9 + 256</tt>:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>t &lt;- H[(x - 1) mod 256]</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t>for <tt>i = 0, 1, ..., 115</tt>:
                    </t>
                    <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                        <t><tt>t &lt;- Clock(t)</tt>;</t>
                      </li>
                    </ol>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>H[x mod 256] &lt;- t</tt>.</t>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Return <tt>H</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
            <t>Here <tt>Clock(t) = (t_2 ^ t_3 ^ t_7 ^ t_8) t_1 t_2 ... t_7</tt> for
<tt>t = t_1 t_2 ... t_8 in {0, 1}^8</tt>.</t>
          </aside>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-transformations-gr">
          <name>The Transformations <tt>G_r</tt></name>
          <t>The transformations <tt>G_5</tt>, <tt>G_13</tt>, <tt>G_21</tt> map the set <tt>{0, 1}^32</tt> to itself.
They are derived from an algorithm <tt>G</tt> by taking <tt>G_r(x) = G(x, r)</tt>.</t>
          <t>The algorithm <tt>G</tt> is defined as follows.</t>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>x in {0, 1}^32</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>r in {5, 13, 21}</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>y in {0, 1}^32</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = Split(x, 8)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>y &lt;- RotHi(H(x_1) || H(x_2) || H(x_3) || H(x_4), r)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>y</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-belt-block-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>belt-block</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^128</tt> -- a plaintext block;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- a key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^128</tt> -- the encrypted block.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>(a, b, c, d) &lt;- Split(X, 32)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>(k[1], k[2], ..., k[56]) &lt;- Split(Rep(K, 7), 32)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., 8</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>b &lt;- b ^ G_5(a + k[7i-6])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>c &lt;- c ^ G_21(d + k[7i-5])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>a &lt;- a - G_13(b + k[7i-4])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>e &lt;- G_21(b + c + k[7i-3]) ^ Int2Bin(i, 32)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>b &lt;- b + e</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>c &lt;- c - e</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>d &lt;- d + G_13(c + k[7i-2])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>b &lt;- b ^ G_21(a + k[7i-1])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>c &lt;- c ^ G_5(d + k[7i])</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>a &lt;-&gt; b</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>c &lt;-&gt; d</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>b &lt;-&gt; c</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y &lt;- b || d || a || c</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>Y</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BELT.Hash">
        <name>Hashing</name>
        <t>Hashing is defined by the <tt>belt-hash</tt> algorithm
which uses the auxiliary algorithm <tt>belt-compress</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-belt-compress-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>belt-compress</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^512</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^128</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^256</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4) = Split(X, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S &lt;- belt-block(X_3 ^ X_4, X_1 || X_2) ^ X_3 ^ X_4</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y_1 &lt;- belt-block(X_1, S || X_4) ^ X_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y_2 &lt;- belt-block(X_2, (S ^ Rep(1, 128)) || X_3) ^ X_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>(S, Y)</tt>, where <tt>Y = Y_1 || Y_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-belt-hash-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>belt-hash</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- data to be hashed.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>H in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- the hash value.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(X_1, X_2, ..., X_n) = Split(X, 256)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>r &lt;- Int2Bin(|X|, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>s &lt;- Rep(0, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>h &lt;- BeltH(0, 32)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>X_n &lt;- X_n || Rep(0, 256 - |X_n|)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>(t, h) &lt;- belt-compress(X_i || h)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>s &lt;- s ^ t</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>(NIL, H) &lt;- belt-compress(r || s || h)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>H</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <aside>
            <t>Note: if <tt>X == NIL</tt>, then <tt>n == 0</tt> and the steps 5 and 6 are not performed.</t>
          </aside>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BELT.AE">
        <name>Authenticated Encryption</name>
        <t>Authenticated encryption is defined by the encryption algorithm <tt>belt-che256</tt>
and the decryption algorithm <tt>belt-che256-inv</tt>.</t>
        <t>128-bit blocks are interpreted as polynomials of degree less than 128 over the
binary field <tt>{0, 1}</tt>. The polynomials are added and multiplied modulo a fixed
irreducible polynomial of degree 128. Thus, operations on polynomials are
performed in a finite field (Galois field, see <xref target="LidNie97"/>) of size <tt>2^128</tt>.</t>
        <t>The transition from blocks to polynomials and the field multiplication are
defined as follows.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>u(x)</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt>, the polynomial:</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>0</tt>, if <tt>|u| = 0</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>u[0] x^7 + u[1] x^6 + ... + u[7]</tt>, if <tt>|u| = 8</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>u[:8)(x) + x^8 u[8:)(x)</tt>, if <tt>|u| &gt; 8</tt>;</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>u(x) mod f(x)</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for a polynomial <tt>u(x)</tt> and a nonzero polynomial <tt>f(x)</tt>,
the remainder of the division of <tt>u(x)</tt> by <tt>f(x)</tt>;</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>u * v</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>u, v in {0, 1}^128</tt>, the string <tt>w in {0, 1}^128</tt> such
that <tt>w(x) = u(x) v(x) mod f(x)</tt>, where <tt>f(x) = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The algorithms use a constant <tt>C in {0, 1}^128</tt> defined as
<tt>C = 0x02 || Rep(0, 120)</tt>. Its polynomial representation is <tt>C(x) = x</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-belt-che256-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>belt-che256</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- plaintext, <tt>|X| &lt; 2^64</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>I in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- associated data, <tt>|I| &lt; 2^64</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- a key;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^128</tt> -- a nonce.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^{|X|}</tt> -- ciphertext;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T in {0, 1}^64</tt> -- the authentication tag.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>(X_1, X_2, ..., X_n) &lt;- Split(X, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>(I_1, I_2, ..., I_m) &lt;- Split(I, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Set:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>s &lt;- belt-block(S, K)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>r &lt;- s</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- BeltH(0, 16)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., m</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (I_i || Rep(0, 128 - |I_i|))</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t * r</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>s &lt;- (s * C) ^ Int2Bin(1, 128)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>Y_i &lt;- X_i ^ belt-block(s, K)[:|X_i|)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (Y_i || Rep(0, 128 - |Y_i|))</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t * r</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (Int2Bin(|I|, 64) || Int2Bin(|X|, 64))</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>t &lt;- belt-block(t * r, K)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T &lt;- t[:64)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>(Y, T)</tt>, where <tt>Y = Y_1 || Y_2 || ... || Y_n</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-belt-che256-inv-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>belt-che256-inv</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- ciphertext, <tt>|Y| &lt; 2^64</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>I in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- associated data, <tt>|I| &lt; 2^64</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T in {0, 1}^64</tt> -- an authentication tag;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- a key;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^128</tt> -- a nonce.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>NIL</tt> -- an authentication error, or <tt>X in {0, 1}^|Y|</tt> -- plaintext.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(Y_1, Y_2, ..., Y_n) = Split(Y, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(I_1, I_2, ..., I_m) = Split(I, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Set:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>s &lt;- belt-block(S, K)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>r &lt;- s</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- BeltH(0, 16)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., m</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (I_i || Rep(0, 128 - |I_i|))</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t * r</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (Y_i || Rep(0, 128 - |Y_i|))</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>t &lt;- t * r</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>t &lt;- t ^ (Int2Bin(|I|, 64) || Int2Bin(|Y|, 64))</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>t &lt;- belt-block(t * r, K)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If <tt>T != t[:64)</tt>, then return <tt>NIL</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>s &lt;- (s * C) ^ Int2Bin(1, 128)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>X_i &lt;- Y_i ^ belt-block(s, K)[:|Y_i|)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>X = X_1 || X_2 || ... || X_n</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="BASH">
      <name>Bash Algorithms</name>
      <section anchor="BASH.Prelim">
        <name>Preliminaries</name>
        <t>This specification defines the following algorithms of the Bash family:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>bash-f</tt> -- the base sponge function;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bash256</tt>, <tt>bash384</tt>, <tt>bash512</tt> -- hashing;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> -- authenticated encryption.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The <tt>bash-f</tt> algorithm implements a 1536-bit sponge function, that is, a
permutation on the set <tt>{0, 1}^1536</tt>. The sponge function is the basic
primitive for all other Bash algorithms. These algorithms use <tt>bash-f</tt> either
directly or through an abstraction layer called a sponge automaton. The
automaton processes a 1536-bit sponge state using a prescribed set of commands
on top of <tt>bash-f</tt>. The design of <tt>bash-f</tt> is explained in <xref target="AMMS17"/>.</t>
        <t>The <tt>bashLLL</tt> algorithm, <tt>LLL in {256, 384, 512}</tt>, implements <tt>LLL</tt>-bit
hashing.</t>
        <t>The <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> algorithms (encryption and decryption) implement AEAD
with 256-bit authentication tags and up to 480-bit preambles. Preambles may
contain customization strings, public data to be authenticated, nonces and
other non-secret objects.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BASH.F">
        <name>The Sponge Function</name>
        <t>The sponge function <tt>bash-f</tt> is defined through an auxiliary algorithm
<tt>bash-s</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-bash-s-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bash-s</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_0, W_1, W_2 in {0, 1}^64</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>m_1, n_1, m_2, n_2 in {1, 2, ..., 63}</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(W_0, W_1, W_2)</tt> -- the transformed input strings.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>T_0 &lt;- RotHi(W_0, m_1)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_0 &lt;- W_0 ^ W_1 ^ W_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T_1 &lt;- W_1 ^ RotHi(W_0, n_1)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_1 &lt;- T_0 ^ T_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_2 &lt;- W_2 ^ RotHi(W_2, m_2) ^ RotHi(T_1, n_2)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T_0 &lt;- ~W_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T_1 &lt;- W_0 | W_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T_2 &lt;- W_0 &amp; W_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T_0 &lt;- T_0 | W_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_1 &lt;- W_1 ^ T_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_2 &lt;- W_2 ^ T_2</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>W_0 &lt;- W_0 ^ T_0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>(W_0, W_1, W_2)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-bash-f-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bash-f</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^1536</tt> -- a state.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^1536</tt> -- the transformed state.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(S_0, S_1, ..., S_23) = Split(S, 64)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>C &lt;- Bin2Int(BeltH(0, 8))</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., 24</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>(m_1, n_1, m_2, n_2) &lt;- (8, 53, 14, 1)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>for <tt>j = 0, 1, ..., 7</tt>:
                  </t>
                  <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                      <t><tt>(S_j, S_{8+j}, S_{16+j}) &lt;-</tt>
                        <tt>bash-s(S_j, S_{8+j}, S_{16+j}, m_1, n_1, m_2, n_2)</tt>.</t>
                    </li>
                    <li>
                      <t><tt>m_1 &lt;- (7 * m_1) mod 64</tt>, <tt>n_1 &lt;- (7 * n_1) mod 64</tt>.
<tt>m_2 &lt;- (7 * m_2) mod 64</tt>, <tt>n_2 &lt;- (7 * n_2) mod 64</tt>.</t>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>(S_0,  S_1,  S_2,  S_3,  S_4,  S_5,  S_6,  S_7,</tt>
                    <tt>S_8,  S_9,  S_10, S_11, S_12, S_13, S_14, S_15,</tt>
                    <tt>S_16, S_17, S_18, S_19, S_20, S_21, S_22, S_23)</tt>
                    <tt>&lt;-</tt>
                    <tt>(S_15, S_10, S_9,  S_12, S_11, S_14, S_13, S_8,</tt>
                    <tt>S_17, S_16, S_19, S_18, S_21, S_20, S_23, S_22,</tt>
                    <tt>S_6,  S_3,  S_0,  S_5,  S_2,  S_7,  S_4,  S_1)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>S_23 &lt;- S_23 ^ C</tt>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if <tt>C mod 2 = 0</tt>, then <tt>C &lt;- ShLo(C, 1)</tt>
else <tt>C &lt;- ShLo(C, 1) ^ 0xAED8E07F99E12BDC</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>S_0 || S_1 || ... || S_23</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BASH.Auto">
        <name>The Sponge Automaton</name>
        <t>For reasons of completeness, we describe the full functionality of the Bash
automaton. Note that <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> uses only a part of this functionality.</t>
        <section anchor="states-and-parameters">
          <name>States and Parameters</name>
          <t>An automaton processes a state <tt>S in {0, 1}^1536</tt> using the following
parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>l in {128, 192, 256}</tt> -- security level;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>d in {1, 2}</tt> -- capacity level;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>r in {1536 - 2dl, 1536 - l - dl/2}</tt> -- buffer length;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>pos in {0, 1, ..., r - 1}</tt> -- current buffer offset.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Parameters <tt>l</tt> and <tt>d</tt> are set when the automaton is initialized and do not
change thereafter.</t>
          <t>The state <tt>S</tt> is split into two parts:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>The buffer <tt>S[:r)</tt> used for input and output.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The internal memory <tt>S[r:)</tt>. The bit <tt>S[r]</tt> of the memory has a special
purpose: the internal command <tt>commit</tt> inverts it to signal the completion
of the previous command.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="commands">
          <name>Commands</name>
          <t>The state is processed using the following commands:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>start</tt>: initialize;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>commit</tt>: complete execution of the previous command (internal command, can
 only be called from other commands);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>restart</tt>: re-initialize;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>absorb</tt>: process input data;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>squeeze</tt>: extract output data;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>encrypt</tt> / <tt>decrypt</tt>: process plaintext / ciphertext;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>ratchet</tt>: update the state irreversibly.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The processed data are encoded as follows:</t>
          <table anchor="DTYPES">
            <name>Data Types in the Bash Automaton</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Type</th>
                <th align="left">Description</th>
                <th align="left">Code (6 bits)</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>NULL</tt></td>
                <td align="left">Service data</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>000000</tt></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>KEY</tt></td>
                <td align="left">Key</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>000001</tt></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>DATA</tt></td>
                <td align="left">Public input data</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>000010</tt></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>TEXT</tt></td>
                <td align="left">Plaintext or ciphertext</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>000011</tt></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>OUT</tt></td>
                <td align="left">Output data</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <tt>000100</tt></td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <section anchor="the-start-command">
            <name>The <tt>start</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>A in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a preamble (<tt>|A| &lt;= 480</tt>);</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a key (<tt>|K| &lt;= 480</tt>; if <tt>K != NIL</tt>, then <tt>|K| &gt;= l</tt>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t>If <tt>K != NIL</tt>, then <tt>r &lt;- 1536 - l - dl/2</tt>
else <tt>r &lt;- 1536 - 2dl</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>pos &lt;- 8 + |A| + |K|</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S[:pos) &lt;- Int2Bin(|A|/2 + |K|/32, 8) || A || K</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S[pos:1472) &lt;- Rep(0, 256 - |X_n|)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S[1472:) &lt;- Int2Bin(l/4 + d, 64)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Store parameters <tt>(l, d, r, pos)</tt> with state <tt>S</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-commit-command">
            <name>The <tt>commit</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>t in {0, 1}^6</tt> -- data type (see the table above).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>S[pos:pos+8) &lt;- S[pos:pos+8) ^ (t || 01)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S[r] &lt;- S[r] ^ 1</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>pos &lt;- 0</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-restart-command">
            <name>The <tt>restart</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>A in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a preamble (<tt>|A| &lt;= 480</tt>);</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a key (<tt>|K| &lt;= 480</tt>; if <tt>K != NIL</tt>, then <tt>|K| &gt;= l</tt>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t>If <tt>K != NIL</tt>, then:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>commit(KEY)</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>r &lt;- 1536 - l - dl/2</tt>.</t>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Else <tt>commit(NULL)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>pos &lt;- 8 + |A| + |K|</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S[:pos) &lt;- S[:pos) ^ (Int2Bin(|A|/2 + |K|/32, 8) || A || K)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-absorb-command">
            <name>The <tt>absorb</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- input data.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>commit(DATA)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Parse <tt>(X_1, ..., X_n) = Split(X, r)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>pos &lt;- |X_i|</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>S[:pos) &lt;- S[:pos) ^ X_i</tt>.</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t>if <tt>pos = r</tt>, then:
                    </t>
                    <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                        <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>;</t>
                      </li>
                      <li>
                        <t><tt>pos &lt;- 0</tt>.</t>
                      </li>
                    </ol>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-squeeze-command">
            <name>The <tt>squeeze</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>n &gt;= 0</tt> -- output length (multiple of <tt>8</tt>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^n</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>commit(OUT)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y &lt;- NIL</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>While <tt>|Y| + r &lt;= n</tt>:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>Y &lt;- Y || S[:r)</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>.</t>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>pos &lt;- n - |Y|</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y &lt;- Y || S[:pos)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Return <tt>Y</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-encrypt-command">
            <name>The <tt>encrypt</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- plaintext.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^|X|</tt> -- ciphertext.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>commit(TEXT)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Parse <tt>(X_1, ..., X_n) = Split(X, r)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y &lt;- NIL</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>pos &lt;- |X_i|</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>S[:pos) &lt;- S[:pos) ^ X_i</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>Y &lt;- Y || S[:pos)</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t>if <tt>pos = r</tt>, then:
                    </t>
                    <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                        <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>;</t>
                      </li>
                      <li>
                        <t><tt>pos &lt;- 0</tt>.</t>
                      </li>
                    </ol>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Return <tt>Y</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-decrypt-command">
            <name>The <tt>decrypt</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- ciphertext.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^|Y|</tt> -- plaintext.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>commit(TEXT)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Parse <tt>(Y_1, ..., Y_n) = Split(Y, r)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>X &lt;- NIL</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
                </t>
                <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                    <t><tt>pos &lt;- |Y_i|</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>X &lt;- X || (S[:pos) ^ Y_i)</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><tt>S[:pos) &lt;- Y_i</tt>;</t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t>if <tt>pos = r</tt>, then:
                    </t>
                    <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                        <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>;</t>
                      </li>
                      <li>
                        <t><tt>pos &lt;- 0</tt>.</t>
                      </li>
                    </ol>
                  </li>
                </ol>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Return <tt>X</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
          <section anchor="the-ratchet-command">
            <name>The <tt>ratchet</tt> Command</name>
            <t>Input:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Output:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>None.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>Steps:</t>
            <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                <t><tt>T &lt;- S</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>commit(NULL)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>S &lt;- S ^ T</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ol>
          </section>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BASH.Hash">
        <name>Hashing</name>
        <t>Hashing is defined by the <tt>bash-hash</tt> algorithm that depends on the security
level <tt>l in {128, 192, 256}</tt>. The algorithms <tt>bashLLL</tt> are instances of
<tt>bash-hash</tt> at different security levels: <tt>bashLLL = bash-hash[l]</tt>, <tt>LLL = 2l</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-bash-hash-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bash-hash</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>l in {128, 192, 256}</tt> -- security level.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- data to be hashed.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>H in {0, 1}^{2l}</tt> -- the hash value.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(X_1, X_2, ..., X_n) = Split(X || 01, 1536 - 4l)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>X_n &lt;- X_n || Rep(0, 1536 - 4l - |X_n|)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S &lt;- Rep(0, 1472) || Int2Bin(l/4, {64}</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ..., n</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>S[:1536-4l) &lt;- X_i</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>S &lt;- bash-f(S)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>H &lt;- S[:2l)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>H</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BASH.AE">
        <name>Authenticated Encryption</name>
        <t>Authenticated encryption is defined by the encryption algorithm
<tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> and the decryption algorithm <tt>bash-prg-ae2561-inv</tt>. Both
algorithms use an automaton denoted as <tt>alpha</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-bash-prg-ae2561-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>A in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a preamble (<tt>|A| &lt;= 480</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- plaintext;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>I in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- associated data;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a key (<tt>256 &lt;= |K| &lt;= 480</tt>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^|X|</tt> -- the ciphertext;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- the authentication tag.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>alpha.start[256, 1](A, K)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Process <tt>(X, I)</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>alpha.absorb(I)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>Y &lt;- alpha.encrypt(X)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>T &lt;- alpha.squeeze(l)</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>(Y, T)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <aside>
            <t>Notes:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>If <tt>I = NIL</tt>, step 2.1 may be skipped. If <tt>X = NIL</tt>, step 2.2 can be
simplified to <tt>Y &lt;- NIL</tt>. Skipped or simplified steps must be mirrored in
the decryption algorithm.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>After returning <tt>(Y, T)</tt>, the automaton may be used to process new <tt>(X, I)</tt>
pairs by repeating step 2. Before processing a new pair,
<tt>alpha.restart(A, K)</tt> may be called to update the preamble and/or the key.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>After processing <tt>(X, I)</tt>, <tt>alpha.ratchet(NIL)</tt> may be called to ensure
forward secrecy of <tt>X</tt> even after the state of <tt>alpha</tt> has been compromised.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </aside>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-bash-prg-ae2561-inv-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bash-prg-ae2561-inv</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>A in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a preamble (<tt>|A| &lt;= 480</tt>);</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Y in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- ciphertext;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>I in {0, 1}^{8*}</tt> -- associated data;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>T in {0, 1}^256</tt> -- an authentication tag;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K in {0, 1}^{32*}</tt> -- a key (<tt>256 &lt;= |K| &lt;= 480</tt>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>NIL</tt> -- an authentication error, or <tt>X in {0, 1}^|Y|</tt> -- the decrypted
data.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>alpha.start[256, 1](A, K)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Process <tt>(Y, I, T)</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>alpha.absorb(I)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>X &lt;- alpha.decrypt(Y)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if <tt>T != alpha.squeeze(l)</tt>, then return <tt>NIL</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>X</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <aside>
            <t>Notes:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>During decryption, the variable <tt>X</tt> stores the tentative plaintext until the
authentication tag is verified to be correct (step 2.3). If verification
fails, <tt>X</tt> must be securely erased.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Extensions of the encryption algorithm described in the notes above are
mirrored in the decryption algorithm, with one exception: after <tt>NIL</tt> is
returned, processing of new triples <tt>(Y, I, T)</tt> must be stopped.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </aside>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="BIGN">
      <name>Bign Algorithms</name>
      <section anchor="BIGN.Prelim">
        <name>Preliminaries</name>
        <t>This specification defines the following algorithms of the Bign family:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-genkeypair</tt> -- key pair generation;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-valpubkey</tt> -- public key validation;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-sign</tt> -- signature generation;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-vfy</tt> -- signature verification.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The first two algorithms implement key management, and the last two instantiate
the short Schnorr signature scheme <xref target="Sch91"/> over elliptic curves. Algorithms
operate at three security levels: <tt>l = 128</tt>, <tt>l = 192</tt> and <tt>l = 256</tt>. At level
<tt>l</tt>, the private key, public key and signature consist of <tt>l/4</tt>, <tt>l/2</tt> and
<tt>3l/8</tt> octets, respectively. The elliptic curves used in Bign satisfy the
requirements denoted as <tt>bign-curves</tt> (see <xref target="BIGN.Curves"/>). Three curves
recommended by <xref target="Stb45"/> are defined in <xref target="CURVES"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="BIGN.Curves">
        <name>The <tt>bign-curves</tt> Elliptic Curves</name>
        <t>Bign algorithms use elliptic curves of the short Weierstrass form over
prime finite fields. A curve is described by the following parameters:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>p</tt>: a prime that defines the field <tt>FF_p</tt>. Elements of <tt>FF_p</tt> are integers
of the set <tt>{0, 1, ..., p-1}</tt>, added and multiplied modulo <tt>p</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>a, b in FF_p</tt>: coefficients of the equation <tt>E_{a,b}: y^2 = x^3 + a * x + b</tt>
defining the curve and the set <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt> of its <tt>FF_p</tt>-rational
points. The set <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt> consists of pairs <tt>(x, y)</tt>, <tt>x, y in FF_p</tt>,
satisfying <tt>E_{a,b}</tt> (affine points) and the point at infinity <tt>O</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Points of <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt> are added via the chord-and-tangent rule <xref target="HMV04"/>,
turning <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt> into an Abelian group with zero element <tt>O</tt>.</t>
        <t>Elliptic curve parameters also describe an affine point
<tt>G in E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt> with a zero <tt>x</tt>-coordinate:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>y_G in FF_p</tt>: <tt>y</tt>-coordinate of <tt>G</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q</tt>: the order of <tt>G</tt> in the group <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The point <tt>G</tt> generates a group <tt>GG_q</tt> of order <tt>q</tt>. It consists of points <tt>G</tt>,
<tt>2 G = G + G</tt>, <tt>3 G = 2 G + G</tt>, ..., <tt>(q-1) G</tt> and <tt>q G = O</tt>. In Bign, <tt>GG_q</tt>
always coincides with the entire group <tt>E_{a,b}(FF_p)</tt>.</t>
        <t>The parameters <tt>(p, a, b, y_G, q)</tt> are passed to all Bign algorithms. The
parameters must satisfy general constraints to ensure a well-defined elliptic
curve group, alongside additional requirements for security and efficiency.</t>
        <t>The full list of requirements, called <tt>bign-curves</tt>, is as follows.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>At security level <tt>l in {128, 192, 256}</tt>: <tt>2^{2l-1} &lt; p, q &lt; 2^{2l}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>p</tt> and <tt>q</tt> are primes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>p != q</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>p mod 4 = 3</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>p^m mod q != 1</tt> for <tt>m = 1, 2, ..., 50</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>0 &lt; a, b &lt; p</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b = Bin2Int(belt-hash(t || seed) || belt-hash(t || seed1)) mod p</tt>, where:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><tt>t = Int2Bin(p, 2l) || Int2Bin(a, 2l)</tt>;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>seed in {0, 1}^64</tt> is an initialization parameter for the curve
generation algorithm;</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><tt>seed1 = Int2Bin(Bin2Int(seed) + 1, 64)</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b^{(p-1)/2} mod p = 1</tt>, i.e., <tt>b</tt> is a quadratic residue modulo <tt>p</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>(4 a^3 + 27 b^2) mod p != 0</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>G = (0, y_G)</tt>, where <tt>y_G = b^{(p+1)/4} mod p</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q G = O</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q &gt; p - 2^{l+1}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Let <tt>GG_q^*</tt> be the set of affine (nonzero) points of <tt>GG_q</tt>. Points of
<tt>GG_q^*</tt> are encoded as follows.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>Point2Bin(P, m)</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>for <tt>P = (x, y) in GG_q^*</tt> and positive integer <tt>m &lt;= 4l</tt>, the string
<tt>(Int2Bin(x, 2l) || Int2Bin(y, 2l))[:m)</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-management">
        <name>Key Management</name>
        <t>Algorithms of the Bign family use private keys <tt>d in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt> and
public keys <tt>Q in GG_q^*</tt>. The <tt>bign-genkeypair</tt> algorithm generates a key pair
<tt>(d, Q)</tt>, the <tt>bign-valpubkey</tt> algorithm validates <tt>Q</tt>.</t>
        <t>If necessary, keys are encoded as binary strings <tt>Int2Bin(d, 2l)</tt> and
<tt>Point2Bin(Q, 4l)</tt>.</t>
        <section anchor="the-bign-genkeypair-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bign-genkeypair</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(p, a, b, q, y_G)</tt> -- elliptic curve parameters that describe the group
<tt>GG_q</tt> and its generator <tt>G</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>None.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>d in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt> -- a private key;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Q in GG_q^*</tt> -- the corresponding public key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>d &lt;- {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Q &lt;- d G</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>(d, Q)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-bign-valpubkey-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bign-valpubkey</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(p, a, b, q, y_G)</tt> -- elliptic curve parameters.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>Q = (x_Q, y_Q)</tt> -- a public key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>1</tt> if <tt>Q</tt> is valid, and <tt>0</tt> otherwise.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>If either condition:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t><tt>0 &lt;= x_Q, y_Q &lt; p</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>y_Q^2 mod p = (x_Q^3 + a * x_Q + b) mod p</tt>;</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
              <t>
is violated, then return <tt>0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="digital-signatures">
        <name>Digital Signatures</name>
        <t>Digital signature algorithms are <tt>bign-sign</tt> and <tt>bign-vfy</tt>.
The <tt>bign-sign</tt> algorithm signs messages using a private key <tt>d</tt>,
and <tt>bign-vfy</tt> verifies signatures using the corresponding public key <tt>Q</tt>.</t>
        <t>A message <tt>X</tt> to be signed is preprocessed by a hash algorithm <tt>h</tt> that produces
<tt>2l</tt>-bit hash value <tt>H = h(X)</tt>. To distinguish between different hash
algorithms, <tt>H</tt> is used along with a string <tt>OID(h)</tt> that uniquely identifies
<tt>h</tt>. This is the DER encoding of the ASN.1 object identifier for <tt>h</tt>.</t>
        <t>During the signing process, an ephemeral key pair is generated. This can be
done either in probabilistic mode, using <tt>bign-genkeypair</tt>, or in deterministic
mode, by using <tt>H</tt> and <tt>d</tt>.</t>
        <t>The deterministic mode of <tt>bign-sign</tt> is implemented using the auxiliary
<tt>bign-genk</tt> algorithm.</t>
        <section anchor="the-bign-genk-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bign-genk</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(p, a, b, y_G, q)</tt> -- elliptic curve parameters;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>OID(h)</tt> -- an identifier of a hash algorithm <tt>h</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>d in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt> -- a private key;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>H in {0, 1}^{2l}</tt> -- a hash value.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>k in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt> -- an ephemeral private key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Pick an arbitrary <tt>t in {0, 1}^*</tt> (<tt>t</tt> can be the empty string).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>K &lt;- belt-hash(OID(h) || Int2Bin(d, 2l) || t)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>r &lt;- H</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Parse <tt>(r_1, r_2, ..., r_n) = Split(r, 128)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For <tt>i = 1, 2, ...</tt>:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t>if <tt>n = 2</tt>, then:
                  </t>
                  <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                      <t><tt>s &lt;- r_1</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if <tt>n = 3</tt>, then:
                  </t>
                  <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                      <t><tt>s &lt;- r_1 ^ r_2</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                    <li>
                      <t><tt>r_1 &lt;- r_2</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if <tt>n = 4</tt>, then:
                  </t>
                  <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                      <t><tt>s &lt;- r_1 ^ r_2 ^ r_3</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                    <li>
                      <t><tt>r_1 &lt;- r_2</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                    <li>
                      <t><tt>r_2 &lt;- r_3</tt>;</t>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>r_{n-1} &lt;- belt-block(s, K) ^ r_n ^ Int2Bin(i, 128)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>r_n &lt;- s</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>r &lt;- r_1 || r_2 || ... || r_n</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if <tt>i mod 2n = 0</tt> and <tt>Bin2Int(r) in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt>, break.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>k &lt;- Bin2Int(r)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>k</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-bign-sign-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bign-sign</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(p, a, b, y_G, q)</tt> -- elliptic curve parameters that describe the security
level <tt>l</tt>, the group <tt>GG_q</tt> and its generator <tt>G</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>h</tt> -- a hash algorithm with the identifier <tt>OID(h)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- a message to be signed;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>d in {1, 2, ..., q-1}</tt> -- a private key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^{3l}</tt> -- the signature.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><tt>H &lt;- h(X)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If the signing mode is probabilistic, then:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>(k, R) &lt;- bign-genkeypair()</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Else, if the signing mode is deterministic, then:
              </t>
              <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
                  <t><tt>k &lt;- bign-genk(d, H)</tt>;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>R &lt;- k G</tt>.</t>
                </li>
              </ol>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S_0 &lt;- belt-hash(OID(h) || Point2Bin(R, 2l) || H)[:l)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S_1 &lt;- Int2Bin((k - Bin2Int(H) - (Bin2Int(S_0) + 2^l)d)) mod q, 2l)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S &lt;- S_0 || S_1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>S</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="the-bign-vfy-algorithm">
          <name>The <tt>bign-vfy</tt> Algorithm</name>
          <t>Parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>(p, a, b, y_G, q)</tt> -- elliptic curve parameters that describe the security
level <tt>l</tt>, the group <tt>GG_q</tt> and its generator <tt>G</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>h</tt> -- a hash algorithm with the identifier <tt>OID(h)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Input:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>X in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- a signed message;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>S in {0, 1}^*</tt> -- a signature;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>Q in GG_q^*</tt> -- a public key.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Output:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>1</tt>, if the signature is valid, and <tt>0</tt> otherwise.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Steps:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>If <tt>|S| != 3l</tt>, then return <tt>0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Parse <tt>S = S_0 || S_1</tt>, where <tt>|S_0| = l</tt> and <tt>|S_1| = 2l</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If <tt>Bin2Int(S_1) &gt;= q</tt>, then return <tt>0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>H &lt;- h(X)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>R &lt;- ((Bin2Int(S_1) + Bin2Int(H)) mod q)G + (Bin2Int(S_0) + 2^l)Q</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If <tt>R = O</tt>, then return <tt>0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>t &lt;- belt-hash(OID(h) || Point2Bin(R, 2l) || H)[:l)</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If <tt>S_0 != t</tt>, then return <tt>0</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Return <tt>1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="BTLS">
      <name>Cryptographic Parameters for TLS</name>
      <section anchor="cipher-suites">
        <name>Cipher Suites</name>
        <t>This specification defines the following cipher suites for TLS 1.3 <xref target="Stb90"/>.</t>
        <table anchor="SUITES">
          <name>STB Cipher Suites</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Cipher Suite</th>
              <th align="left">Value</th>
              <th align="left">AEAD</th>
              <th align="left">Hash</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>TLS_BELT_CHE256_BELT_HASH</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>{0x00, 0x72}</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>belt-che256</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>belt-hash</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>TLS_BASH_PRG_AE2561_BASH256</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>{0x00, 0x73}</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bash256</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Supporting the <tt>TLS_BASH_PRG_AE2561_BASH256</tt> cipher suite is mandated by this
specification. Implementation of <tt>TLS_BELT_CHE256_BELT_HASH</tt> is optional.</t>
        <t>Both cipher suites assign <tt>key_length = 32</tt> and <tt>iv_length = 16</tt> (see
<xref target="RFC9846"/>, Section 7.3).</t>
        <t>In the TLS record protocol, associated data for authenticated encryption
is composed of the <tt>opaque_type</tt>, <tt>legacy_record_version</tt> and <tt>length</tt> fields
of the <tt>TLSCiphertext</tt> structure, 5 bytes in total.</t>
        <t>When <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> is used, the associated data <tt>I in {0, 1}^40</tt> is
combined with the nonce <tt>S in {0, 1}^128</tt> to form the preamble <tt>A</tt>:
<tt>A &lt;- S || I || Rep(0, 24)</tt>. Step 2.1 (<tt>alpha.absorb(I)</tt>) is skipped during both
encryption and decryption.</t>
        <t>In the <tt>belt-che256</tt> and <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> algorithms, authentication tags are 8
and 32 bytes long, respectively. An authentication tag <tt>T</tt> is appended to a
ciphertext <tt>Y</tt>, producing the authenticated ciphertext <tt>Y || T</tt> saved to
<tt>TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record</tt>.</t>
        <t>A <tt>belt-che256</tt> key must be updated after processing <tt>2^32</tt> TLS records.
There are no usage limits for <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt> keys.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-diffie-hellman-protocol">
        <name>The Diffie-Hellman Protocol</name>
        <t>The Diffie-Hellman protocol is instantiated as follows.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The base cyclic group is a group of elliptic curve points that
satisfies the <tt>bign-curves</tt> requirements (see <xref target="BIGN.Curves"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Ephemeral private and public keys are generated using the
<tt>bign-genkeypair</tt> algorithm.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Parties validate each other's public keys using the
<tt>bign-valpubkey</tt> algorithm.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Parties compute the shared secret <tt>K</tt> as follows: <tt>K = uV</tt>, where <tt>u</tt> is the
ephemeral private key (scalar), <tt>V</tt> is the ephemeral public key of the
opposite party (point on the curve). Curve operations are defined in <xref target="BIGN"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The shared secret <tt>K</tt>, an affine point of the elliptic curve, is encoded as
<tt>Point2Bin(K, 4l)</tt> (see <xref target="BIGN.Curves"/>), where <tt>l</tt> is the security level.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="elliptic-curves">
        <name>Elliptic Curves</name>
        <t>The Diffie-Hellman protocol uses the elliptic curves <tt>bign-curve256v1</tt>,
<tt>bign-curve384v1</tt> and <tt>bign-curve512v1</tt> defined in <xref target="CURVES"/>.</t>
        <t>The group identifiers are added to the <tt>NamedGroup</tt> enumeration (see
<xref target="RFC9846"/>, Section 4.3.7):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   enum {
     ...
     bign_curve256v1(42),
     bign_curve384v1(43),
     bign_curve512v1(44)
     ...
   } NamedGroup;
]]></artwork>
        <t>The identifiers are used in the <tt>supported_groups</tt> and <tt>key_share</tt>
extensions.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="digital-signature-algorithms">
        <name>Digital Signature Algorithms</name>
        <t>Bign digital signature generation and verification algorithms are instantiated
with three combinations of elliptic curve parameters and hash algorithms for
message preprocessing. These are the resulting compound algorithms.</t>
        <table anchor="DSALGS">
          <name>Digital Signature Algorithms</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Compound Algorithm</th>
              <th align="left">Elliptic Curve</th>
              <th align="left">Hash Algorithm</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-with-hbelt</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-curve256v1</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>belt-hash</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-with-bash384</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-curve384v1</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bash384</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-with-bash512</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bign-curve512v1</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bash512</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The digital signature algorithm identifiers are added to the <tt>SignatureScheme</tt>
enumeration (see <xref target="RFC9846"/>, Section 4.3.3):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   enum {
     ...
     bign_with_hbelt(0x0710),
     bign_with_bash384(0x0711),
     bign_with_bash512(0x0712)
     ...
   } SignatureScheme;
]]></artwork>
        <t>The identifiers are used in the <tt>signature_algorithms</tt> and
<tt>signature_algorithms_cert</tt> extensions.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="IANA">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA has assigned the following entries to the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry:</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Value</th>
            <th align="left">Description</th>
            <th align="left">DTLS-OK</th>
            <th align="left">Recommended</th>
            <th align="left">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>0x00, 0x72</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TLS_BELT_CHE256_BELT_HASH</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>0x00, 0x73</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>TLS_BASH_PRG_AE2561_BASH256</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>IANA has assigned the following entries to the "TLS Supported Groups" registry:</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Value</th>
            <th align="left">Description</th>
            <th align="left">DTLS-OK</th>
            <th align="left">Recommended</th>
            <th align="left">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>42</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-curve256v1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>43</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-curve384v1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>44</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-curve512v1</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>IANA has assigned the following entries to the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry:</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Value</th>
            <th align="left">Description</th>
            <th align="left">Recommended</th>
            <th align="left">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>0x0710</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-with-hbelt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>0x0711</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-with-bash384</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>0x0712</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>bign-with-bash512</tt></td>
            <td align="left">N</td>
            <td align="left">This document</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="SEC">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security of TLS 1.3 with STB cryptographic parameters depends on the
the underlying algorithms.</t>
      <t>The security-driven design rationale of the <tt>belt-block</tt> and
<tt>bash-f</tt> algorithms, the core primitives of the Belt and Bash families,
is provided in <xref target="AGMK02"/> and <xref target="AMMS17"/>.</t>
      <t>Security analysis of <tt>belt-hash</tt> in <xref target="Agi26"/> shows that under an idealized
internal compression function, the collision attack requires approximately
<tt>2^{128}</tt> operations, and the preimage and second-preimage attacks require at
least <tt>2^{192}</tt> operations. Both complexities are achievable, although the
latter holds only if the resulting preimages are relatively long and of a
weakly controlled format. Thus, while the collision security of <tt>belt-hash</tt>
matches that of an ideal (random) 256-bit hash function, its preimage security
is lower. However, structural constraints on preimages prevent this lower
security bound from being exploited in TLS 1.3. In particular, the Bign digital
signature that uses <tt>belt-hash</tt> for internal hashing is potentially affected at
the security level <tt>l = 256</tt>, where inverting <tt>belt-hash</tt> in under <tt>2^{256}</tt>
operations could accelerate signature forgery. But since the forgery attack
requires the preimage to be a short string with a highly restricted format,
the attack becomes infeasible.</t>
      <t>The security of <tt>belt-che256</tt> is analyzed in <xref target="Agi20"/>. The security guarantees
established in that analysis are justified provided that the total number of
128-bit blocks processed by the underlying <tt>belt-block</tt> cipher is significantly
less than <tt>2^{64}</tt>. This constraint is directly addressed in the definition of
the <tt>TLS_BELT_CHE256_BELT_HASH</tt> ciphersuite, which requires rekeying
<tt>belt-che256</tt> after processing <tt>2^{32}</tt> TLS records.</t>
      <t>The <tt>bash256</tt> algorithm follows an overwrite mode of sponge-based hash
functions <xref target="BDPV11"/>. In this mode, security guarantees of <tt>bash256</tt>-based
HMAC--and, in turn, HKDF--can be justified using the approach of <xref target="Bel06"/>,
where the underlying <tt>bash-f</tt> algorithm is treated as a classical compression
function, or directly within the framework of sponge-based cryptography
(see Section 5.1.3 of <xref target="BDPV11a"/>).</t>
      <t>The security of the Bign signature algorithms, which instantiate the short
Schnorr signature, is justified, for example, in <xref target="BloLee19"/>. The
deterministic mode of <tt>bign-sign</tt> avoids drawbacks of the usual
probabilistic mode, where the weaknesses of RNG / PRNG can yield reuse of
ephemeral keys and thus compromise the private key. We recommend using the
deterministic mode with a randomly generated <tt>t</tt>, the deterministic mode with a
fixed <tt>t</tt>, and the probabilistic mode, in this order of preference.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9846">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 8446, which specified TLS 1.3. This document obsoletes RFC 5246 (specifying TLS 1.2) and RFCs 5077, 6961, 7627, and 8422, all of which pertain to TLS 1.2 or earlier, and updates RFCs 5705 and 6066. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="AgiAfo05" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/024">
          <front>
            <title>Exponential S-boxes</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Afonenko" fullname="Andrey Afonenko">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2005"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Vesti NAN Belarusi" value="1, pp. 106-112"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGMK02" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31178">
          <front>
            <title>BelT Block Cipher</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Galinskij" fullname="Victor Galinskij">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="N." surname="Mikulich" fullname="Nikolai Mikulich">
              <organization>National Center of Information Security of Belarus</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Yu Kharin" fullname="Yuriy Kharin">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2002"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Upravlenie Zashhhitoj Informacii" value="6(4), pp. 407-412 (In Russian)"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Agi20" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/331">
          <front>
            <title>The Counter mode with encrypted nonces and its extension to AE</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Mat. Vopr. Kriptogr." value="11(2), pp. 7-24"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Agi26">
          <front>
            <title>On the security of belt-hash and belt-compress</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Pre-proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Current Trends in Cryptology (CTCrypt'2026), pp. 445-470</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AMMS17" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/587">
          <front>
            <title>Bash-f: another LRX sponge function</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Agievich" fullname="Sergey Agievich">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Marchuk" fullname="Vadim Marchuk">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Maslau" fullname="Alexander Maslau">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Semenov" fullname="Vladislav Semenov">
              <organization>Belarusian State University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Mat. Vopr. Kriptogr." value="8(2), pp. 7-28"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Bel06" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/043">
          <front>
            <title>New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Bellare" fullname="Mihir Bellare">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2006"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BDPV11" target="https://keccak.team/files/CSF-0.1.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Cryptographic sponge functions</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Bertoni" fullname="Guido Bertoni">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Daemen" fullname="Joan Daemen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Peters" fullname="Michael Peters">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="Van Assche" fullname="Gilles Van Assche">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BDPV11a" target="https://keccak.team/files/Keccak-submission-3.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>The Keccak SHA-3 submission</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Bertoni" fullname="Guido Bertoni">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Daemen" fullname="Joan Daemen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Peters" fullname="Michael Peters">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="Van Assche" fullname="Gilles Van Assche">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Submission to NIST (Round 3)</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BloLee19" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1105">
          <front>
            <title>On the Multi-user Security of Short Schnorr Signatures with Preprocessing</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Blocki" fullname="Jeremiah Blocki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Lee" fullname="Seunghoon Lee">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2019"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2022, pp. 614-643</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Che10">
          <front>
            <title>Discrete Logarithm Problems with Auxiliary Inputs</title>
            <author initials="J. H." surname="Cheon" fullname="Jung Hee Cheon">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2010"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="J. Cryptology" value="vol. 23, pp. 457-476"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="HMV04">
          <front>
            <title>Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Hankerson" fullname="Darrel Hankerson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Menezes" fullname="Alfred Menezes">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Vanstone" fullname="Scott Vanstone">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2004"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>New York: Springer</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LidNie97">
          <front>
            <title>Finite Fields</title>
            <author initials="R." surname="Lidl" fullname="Rudolf Lidl">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Niederreiter" fullname="Harald Niederreiter">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1997"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cambridge University Press</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="McGVie04" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193">
          <front>
            <title>The security and performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation</title>
            <author initials="D. A." surname="McGrew" fullname="David McGrew">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Viega" fullname="John Viega">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2004"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>INDOCRYPT 2004</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Sch91">
          <front>
            <title>Efficient Signature Generation by Smart Cards</title>
            <author initials="C. P." surname="Schnorr" fullname="Claus P. Schnorr">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1991"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="J. Cryptology" value="4(3), pp. 161-174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Stb31">
          <front>
            <title>STB 34.101.31-2020. Information technology and security. Encryption and integrity control algorithms</title>
            <author initials="" surname="The State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Stb45">
          <front>
            <title>STB 34.101.45-2013. Information technology and security. Digital signature and key transport algorithms based on elliptic curves</title>
            <author initials="" surname="The State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2013"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Stb77">
          <front>
            <title>STB 34.101.77-2020. Information technology and security. Sponge-bases cryptographic algorithms</title>
            <author initials="" surname="The State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Stb90">
          <front>
            <title>STB 34.101.90-2026. Information technology and security. The Transport Layer Security Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="" surname="The State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1641?>

<section anchor="CURVES">
      <name>Recommended Elliptic Curves</name>
      <t>The following elliptic curves are recommended for the Bign family:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>bign-curve256v1</tt> -- a curve at the security level <tt>l = 128</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>bign-curve384v1</tt> -- a curve at the security level <tt>l = 192</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>bign-curve512v1</tt> -- a curve at the security level <tt>l = 256</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The recommended curves satisfy the <tt>bign-curves</tt> requirements 1 -- 12
and the following additional requirements:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1" start="13"><li>
          <t><tt>p</tt> is the largest suitable prime that does not exceed <tt>2^{2l}</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>a = p - 3</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The numbers <tt>q-1</tt> and <tt>q+1</tt> both have large prime factors.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Requirements 13 and 14 speed up reduction modulo <tt>p</tt> and point doubling.
Requirement 15 provides protection against Cheon's attack <xref target="Che10"/>. This
attack is not directly applicable to the Bign algorithms; the purpose of the
requirement is to mitigate risks of using the recommended curves outside of
Bign.</t>
      <t>For each security level, the recommended curve was generated as follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>50 curves satisfying the requirements 1 -- 13 were constructed from the
smallest possible <tt>Bin2Int(seed)</tt> values, starting at <tt>0</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>among these curves, the one that yields the maximum of <tt>min(gpf(q-1),
gpf(q+1))</tt> was chosen.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Here <tt>gpf(n)</tt> denotes the greatest prime factor of <tt>n</tt>.</t>
      <t>The recommended curves are defined below by parameters <tt>(p, a, b, y_G, q)</tt>.
Seeds used to construct the curves and factorizations of <tt>q-1</tt> and <tt>q+1</tt> are
also given. Large prime divisors are denoted by <tt>r_m</tt>, where <tt>m</tt> is the
divisor's bit length.</t>
      <section anchor="the-bign-curve256v1-curve">
        <name>The <tt>bign-curve256v1</tt> Curve</name>
        <t>Parameters:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>p = 2^256 - 189</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>a = p - 3</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b = 5418994543382917476470141667052323987242043847840803114498787\</tt>
              <tt>1676190519198705</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>y_G = 48835626907528736105417095645674365354469331933013114027389\</tt>
              <tt>791773001019124371</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q = 2^256 - 51359303463308904523350978545619999225</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Additional details:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>seed = 0x5E38010000000000</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q - 1 = 2 * 3 * 5 * 59 * 2707 * 8287 * r_{221}</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q + 1 = 2^3 * 7 * 449 * 31327 * r_{227}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-bign-curve384v1-curve">
        <name>The <tt>bign-curve384v1</tt> Curve</name>
        <t>Parameters:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>p = 2^384 - 317</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>a = p - 3</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b = 9305714544225430607690103672579840289571010502599374151660380\</tt>
              <tt>432967684614892230431863267093750334370523665755520868</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>y_G = 14354597912740189857575301128892105630080584412759834680227\</tt>
              <tt>804744167703823413075975665088124941253511968357604377681</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q = 2^384 -</tt>
              <tt>9886438520659958522437788006980660965037549058207958390857</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Additional details:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>seed = 0x23AF000000000000</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q - 1 = 2 * 3 * 13 * 23 * 1217 * r_{363}</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q + 1 = 2^3 * 5 * 17 * r_{375}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-bign-curve512v1-curve">
        <name>The <tt>bign-curve512v1</tt> Curve</name>
        <t>Parameters:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>p = 2^512 - 569</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>a = p - 3</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>b = 5693315954776639630120063851326436520321079941853637540614063\</tt>
              <tt>30518654910952117316642438613460648635268246458383207794163900221\</tt>
              <tt>6168909012147763529108397200</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>y_G = 88068524280977427056041105285534523859274846872460955723526\</tt>
              <tt>40065245926924845204146464197290441971825763243615352431448274721\</tt>
              <tt>410823777569490499978268765629</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q = 2^512 - 34941104250934712071732195640491222284153110230636945\</tt>
              <tt>247985077724188765679887</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Additional details:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>seed = 0xAE17020000000000</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q - 1 = 2^4 * 23 * 79 * 767957 * 4433647 * 103529265929 * r_{419}</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>q + 1 = 2 * 3^2 * 5 * 19 * 13997 * 93740551 * 20778982613 * r_{427}</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ASN1">
      <name>ASN.1 Definitions</name>
      <section anchor="identifiers">
        <name>Identifiers</name>
        <t>To support STB algorithms in X.509 certificates <xref target="RFC5280"/>, this specification
introduces the following ASN.1 object identifiers:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-with-hbelt</tt>, <tt>bign-with-bash384</tt> and <tt>bign-with-bash512</tt> for the
algorithms of the same name;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-pubkey</tt> for public keys of the Bign algorithms;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>bign-curve256v1</tt>, <tt>bign-curve384v1</tt> and <tt>bign-curve512v1</tt> for the
recommended curves of the same name.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The identifiers are defined as follows:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   stb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) by(112) 0 2 0}

   belt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {stb 34 101 31}
   belt-hash OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {belt 81}

   bash OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {stb 34 101 77}
   bash256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bash 11}
   bash384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bash 12}
   bash512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bash 13}

   bign OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {stb 34 101 45}

   bign-with-hbelt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign 12}
   bign-with-bash384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign 14}
   bign-with-bash512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign 15}

   bign-keys OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign keys(2)}
   bign-pubkey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign-keys 1}

   bign-curves OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign curves(3)}
   bign-curve256v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign-curves 1}
   bign-curve384v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign-curves 2}
   bign-curve512v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {bign-curves 3}
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="public-keys">
        <name>Public Keys</name>
        <t>At a security level <tt>l</tt>, the public key <tt>Q</tt> is represented as the binary string
<tt>Point2Bin(Q, 4l)</tt>. It is described by the following ASN.1 type:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   PublicKey ::= BIT STRING (SIZE(512|768|1024)).
]]></artwork>
        <t>In X.509 certificates, the public key is described as follows:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     algorithm         AlgorithmIdentifier,
     subjectPublicKey  PublicKey
   }

   AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
     algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER (bign-pubkey),
     parameters  DomainParameters
   }

   DomainParameters ::= CHOICE {
     named  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
        (bign-curve256v1|bign-curve384v1|bign-curve512v1)
   }
]]></artwork>
        <aside>
          <t>Note: This specification narrows the options for <tt>DomainParameters</tt> offered
by <xref target="Stb45"/>.</t>
        </aside>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="TEST">
      <name>Test vectors</name>
      <section anchor="test-vectors-for-belt-algorithms">
        <name>Test Vectors for Belt algorithms</name>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-belt-block">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>belt-block</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 16)
K = BeltH(128, 32)
Y = belt-block(X, K):
  0x69CCA1C93557C9E3D66BC3E0FA88FA6E
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-belt-compress">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>belt-compress</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 64)
(S, Y) = belt-compress(X):
  0x46FE7425C9B181EB41DFEE3E72163D5A,
  0xED2F5481D593F40D87FCE37D6BC1A2E1\
    B7D1A2CC975C82D3C0497488C90D99D8
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-belt-che256">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>belt-che256</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 15)
I = BeltH(16, 32)
K = BeltH(128, 32)
S = BeltH(192, 16)
(Y, T) = belt-che256(X, I, K, S):
  0xBF3DAEAF5D18D2BCC30EA62D2E70A4,
  0x548622B844123FF7
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Y = BeltH(64, 20)
I = BeltH(80, 32)
K = BeltH(160, 32)
S = BeltH(208, 16)
T = 0x7D9D4F59D40D197D
X = belt-che256-inv(Y, I, T, K, S):
  0x2BABF43EB37B5398A9068F31A3C758\
    B762F44AA9
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-belt-hash">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>belt-hash</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 13)
Y = belt-hash(X):
  0xABEF9725D4C5A83597A367D14494CC25\
    42F20F659DDFECC961A3EC550CBA8C75
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 32)
Y = belt-hash(X):
  0x749E4C3653AECE5E48DB4761227742EB\
    6DBE13F4A80F7BEFF1A9CF8D10EE7786
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 48)
Y = belt-hash(X):
  0x9D02EE446FB6A29FE5C982D4B13AF9D3\
    E90861BC4CEF27CF306BFB0B174A154A
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bash-algorithms">
        <name>Test Vectors for Bash Algorithms</name>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bash256">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bash256</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = NIL
Y = bash256(X):
  0x114C3DFAE373D9BCBC3602D6386F2D6A\
    2059BA1BF9048DBAA5146A6CB775709D
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 127)
Y = bash256(X):
  0x3D7F4EFA00E9BA33FEED259986567DCF\
    5C6D12D51057A968F14F06CC0F905961
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 128)
Y = bash256(X):
  0xD7F428311254B8B2D00F7F9EEFBD8F30\
    25FA87C4BABD1BDDBE87E35B7AC80DD6
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 135)
Y = bash256(X):
  0x1393FA1B65172F2D18946AEAE576FA1C\
    F54FDD354A0CB2974A997DC4865D3100
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bash384">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bash384</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 95)
Y = bash384(X):
  0x64334AF830D33F63E9ACDFA184E32522\
    103FFF5C6860110A2CD369EDBC04387C\
    501D8F92F749AE4DE15A8305C353D64D
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 96)
Y = bash384(X):
  0xD06EFBC16FD6C0880CBFC6A4E3D65AB1\
    01FA82826934190FAABEBFBFFEDE93B2\
    2B85EA72A7FB3147A133A5A8FEBD8320
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 108)
Y = bash384(X):
  0xFF763296571E2377E71A1538070CC0DE\
    88888606F32EEE6B082788D246686B00\
    FC05A17405C5517699DA44B7EF5F55AB
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bash512">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bash512</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 63)
Y = bash512(X):
  0x2A66C87C189C12E255239406123BDEDB\
    F19955EAF0808B2AD705E249220845E2\
    0F4786FB6765D0B5C48984B1B16556EF\
    19EA8192B985E4233D9C09508D6339E7
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 64)
Y = bash512(X):
  0x07ABBF8580E7E5A321E9B940F667AE20\
    9E2952CEF557978AE743DB086BAB4885\
    B708233C3F5541DF8AAFC3611482FDE4\
    98E58B3379A6622DAC2664C9C118A162
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 127)
Y = bash512(X):
  0x526073918F97928E9D15508385F42F03\
    ADE3211A23900A30131F8A1E3E1EE21C\
    C09D13CFF6981101235D895746A4643F\
    0AA62B0A7BC98A269E4507A257F0D4EE
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 192)
Y = bash512(X):
  0x8724C7FF8A2A83F22E38CB9763777B96\
    A70ABA3444F214C763D93CD6D19FCFDE\
    6C3D3931857C4FF6CCCD49BD99852FE9\
    EAA7495ECCDD96B571E0EDCF47F89768
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bash-prg-ae2561">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bash-prg-ae2561</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
A = BeltH(0, 16)
K = BeltH(32, 32)
X = Rep(0, 1536)
I = BeltH(64, 49)
(Y, T) = bash-prg-ae2561(A, X, I, K):
  0x690673766C3E848CAC7C05169FFB7B77\
    51E52A011040E5602573FAF991044A00\
    4329EEF7BED8E6875830A91854D1BD2E\
    DC6FC2FF37851DBAC249DF400A0549EA\
    2E0C811D499E1FF1E5E32FAE7F0532FA\
    4051D0F9E300D9B1DBF119AC8CFFC48D\
    D3CBF1CA0DBA5DD97481C88DF0BE4127\
    85E40988B31585537948B80F5A9C49E0\
    8DD684A7DCA871C380DFDC4C4DFBE61F\
    50D2D0FBD24D8B9D32974A347247D001\
    BAD5B168440025693967E77394DC088B\
    0ECCFA8D291BA13D44F60B06E2EDB351,
  0xCDE5AF6EF9A14B7D0C191B869A6343ED\
    6A4E9AAB4EE00A579E9E682D0EC051E3
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bign-algorithms">
        <name>Test Vectors for Bign Algorithms</name>
        <section anchor="settings">
          <name>Settings</name>
          <t>Test vectors are constructed using the settings given below.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Elliptic curve parameters: <tt>bign-curve256v1</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>A private key <tt>d</tt>:</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Int2Bin(d, 256):
  0x1F66B5B84B7339674533F0329C74F218\
    34281FED0732429E0C79235FC273E269
]]></artwork>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>A public key <tt>Q</tt>:</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Point2Bin(Q, 512):
  0xBD1A5650179D79E03FCEE49D4C2BD5DD\
    F54CE46D0CF11E4FF87BF7A890857FD0\
    7AC6A60361E8C8173491686D461B2826\
    190C2EDA5909054A9AB84D2AB9D99A90
]]></artwork>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>A hashing algorithm <tt>h</tt>: <tt>belt-hash</tt> with
<tt>OID(belt-hash) = 0x06092A7000020022651F51</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bign-genk">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bign-genk</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
H:
  0xABEF9725D4C5A83597A367D14494CC25\
    42F20F659DDFECC961A3EC550CBA8C75
t = NIL
K:
  0xD61E3A910550E3BCAD5BF4F526FB8DAA\
    DEA9C132E0BAEE03169DF4DF9BD6C20C
Int2Bin(k = bign-genk(d, H), 256):
  0x829614D8411DBBC4E1F2471A40045864\
    40FD8C9553FAB6A1A45CE417AE97111E
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
H:
  0x9D02EE446FB6A29FE5C982D4B13AF9D3\
    E90861BC4CEF27CF306BFB0B174A154A
t:
  0xBE32971343FC9A48A02A885F194B09A1\
    7ECDA4D01544AF
K:
  0xAE44316332A85C3B9F6B31EEEADFF088\
    D30FE507021AC86A3EC8E0874ED33648
Int2Bin(k = bign-genk(d, H), 256):
  0x7ADC8713283EBFA547A2AD9CDFB245AE\
    0F7B968DF0F91CB785D1F932A3583107
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bign-sign">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bign-sign</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 13)
H:
  0xABEF9725D4C5A83597A367D14494CC25\
    42F20F659DDFECC961A3EC550CBA8C75
Int2Bin(k, 256):
  0x4C0E74B2CD5811AD21F23DE7E0FA742C\
    3ED6EC483C461CE15C33A77AA308B7D2
Point2Bin(R, 512):
  0xCCEEF1A313A406649D15DA0A851D486A\
    695B641B20611776252FFDCE39C71060\
    7C9EA1F33C23D20DFCB8485A88BE6523\
    A28ECC3215B47FA289D6C9BE1CE837C0
S = bign-sign(X, d):
  0xE36B7F0377AE4C524027C387FADF1B20\
    CE72F1530B71F2B5FD3A8C584FE2E1AE\
    D20082E30C8AF65011F4FB54649DFD3D
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="test-vectors-for-bign-vfy">
          <name>Test Vectors for <tt>bign-vfy</tt></name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
X = BeltH(0, 48)
S:
  0x47A63C8B9C936E94B5FAB3D9CBD78366\
    290F3210E163EEC8DB4E921E8479D413\
    8F112CC23E6DCE65EC5FF21DF4231C28
H:
  0x9D02EE446FB6A29FE5C982D4B13AF9D3\
    E90861BC4CEF27CF306BFB0B174A154A
Point2Bin(R, 512):
  0x1D5A382B962D4ED06193258CA6DE535D\
    8FD7FACB853171E932EF93B5EE800120\
    03DBB7B5BD07036380BAFA47FCA7E6CA\
    3F179EDDD1AE5086647909183628EDDC
t:
  0x47A63C8B9C936E94B5FAB3D9CBD78366
bign-vfy(X, S, Q):
  1
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <contact initials="N." surname="Kozlovskaya" fullname="Nastassia Kozlovskaya">
        <organization>APMI, Belarusian State University</organization>
        <address>
      </address>
      </contact>
    </section>
  </back>
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