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     version="3"
     category="info"
     docName="draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt-00"
     ipr="trust200902"
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Dual-Receipt Profile">A Dual-Receipt Profile for Binding a Decision Statement to an Independent Policy Evaluation Statement</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt-00"/>
    <author fullname="Vince Jones" initials="V." surname="Jones">
      <organization>Entercation Info Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>vince@entercation.info</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="13"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>SCITT</keyword>
    <keyword>transparency</keyword>
    <keyword>receipt</keyword>
    <keyword>fiscal sponsorship</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies a dual-receipt profile for recording one
      disbursement decision as two signed statements, made by two different
      parties and registered with the same Transparency Service. An approver
      acting for a fiscal sponsor signs a Decision Statement. A validator
      acting for a receiving institution signs a Policy Evaluation Statement
      that binds to the Decision Statement's identifier, receipt, and
      signature, and records the outcome of a named policy. The profile
      defines the JSON members of both statements, a canonical encoding based
      on the JSON Canonicalization Scheme, SHA-256 statement identifiers, a
      composite identifier, Merkle tree receipts that use the hashing rules of
      RFC 9162, and a verification procedure. It also states the limits of the
      evidence: a bundle of statements cannot show that no conflicting
      evaluation exists, and the times inside the statements are claims made
      by their signers.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="problem">
        <name>Problem Statement</name>
        <t>In fiscal sponsorship, a sponsoring organization holds and disburses
        funds on behalf of a project. Each disbursement involves at least two
        questions that are answered by different parties: who decided to
        release the funds, and whether that decision satisfied the policy that
        another party, such as a funder or a receiving institution, applies to
        it.</t>
        <t>A single signed statement cannot answer both questions. Its
        signature shows which key signed the payload. If the same signer also
        asserts that the decision satisfied a policy, that assertion is still
        made by the decision maker, so it is self-attested. Adding a policy
        result to the decision payload does not change who signed it.</t>
        <t>This document therefore uses two statements. The approver signs a
        Decision Statement. A validator, holding a different key, verifies the
        Decision Statement and its receipt, evaluates it against a named
        policy, and signs a Policy Evaluation Statement that commits to the
        exact Decision Statement, its receipt, and its signature. Both
        statements are registered with the same Transparency Service, and each
        receives its own Receipt. A verifier who holds both statements and both
        Receipts can check who decided, which policy was applied by whom, and
        that the evaluation was registered after the decision.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope and Non-Goals</name>
        <t>This document defines a JSON profile. It does not use COSE, and the
        Receipt defined in <xref target="receipt"/> is not a COSE Receipt as
        defined in <xref target="RFC9942"/>. This document borrows terminology
        from <xref target="RFC9943"/> but does not claim conformance to
        <xref target="RFC9943"/>, to <xref target="RFC9942"/>, or to any
        Internet-Draft cited in this document.</t>
        <t>Statement identification and relationships between statements are
        open discussion topics. <xref target="I-D.gruszka-scitt-statement-identification"/>
        describes requirements and test cases for identifying signed
        statements and does not select an identification scheme.
        <xref target="I-D.nobuo-scitt-composite-evidence-verification"/>
        describes composite verification of statement graphs. Both are
        individual drafts. The identifier choices in this document are
        specific to this profile and are not offered as answers to those
        discussions.</t>
        <t>This document does not define how keys are issued to approvers and
        validators, how a Transparency Service authenticates issuers, how
        tree heads are distributed or checked for consistency, or what any
        particular disbursement policy contains. It makes no statement about
        tax, accounting, or grant law. Fiscal sponsorship is the motivating
        case; the mechanism does not depend on it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impl">
        <name>Reference Implementation</name>
        <t>A synthetic reference implementation, OIGP version 1.3.6, implements
        this profile and produced the test vectors in
        <xref target="vectors"/>. It uses synthetic organizations, synthetic
        identifiers, and test keys derived from public labels. The vectors
        were re-derived by a separate script that uses only a SHA-256
        library and an Ed25519 library, and shares no code with the reference
        implementation.</t>
        <t>An earlier version of the same software (OIGP 1.3.1-hardened) is
        archived under DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24177899. That version predates the
        dual-receipt profile and does not contain it. Version 1.3.6 has not
        been deposited at the time of writing. The DOI is cited for
        illustration only. It is not an independent audit, review, or
        certification of this profile or of any implementation.</t>
        <t>The reference implementation also carries a legacy field named
        "d2" in its internal decision record, computed as SHA-256 over the
        hexadecimal D1 followed by the decision time. That field is not part
        of this profile and is unrelated to D2 as defined in
        <xref target="terms"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="terms">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and
      "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
      described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
      when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <dl newline="true">
        <dt>Approver:</dt>
        <dd>The party, acting for the fiscal sponsor, that decides a
        disbursement request and signs the Decision Statement.</dd>
        <dt>Validator:</dt>
        <dd>The party, acting for a receiving institution or another relying
        organization, that evaluates a Decision Statement against a policy and
        signs the Policy Evaluation Statement.</dd>
        <dt>Decision Statement:</dt>
        <dd>A signed statement, issued by the Approver, that records one
        decision on one disbursement request (<xref target="stmtA"/>). Also
        called Statement A.</dd>
        <dt>Policy Evaluation Statement:</dt>
        <dd>A signed statement, issued by the Validator, that binds to exactly
        one Decision Statement and records the per-rule results and the overall
        result of evaluating it against a named policy
        (<xref target="stmtB"/>). Also called Statement B.</dd>
        <dt>Statement Identifier:</dt>
        <dd>The SHA-256 digest of the canonical encoding of a statement's
        payload (<xref target="ids"/>). D1 denotes the Statement Identifier of
        the Decision Statement. D2 denotes the Statement Identifier of the
        Policy Evaluation Statement.</dd>
        <dt>Signed Statement Digest:</dt>
        <dd>The SHA-256 digest of the canonical encoding of the object
        {"payload": payload, "sig": sig} (<xref target="ids"/>). It identifies
        the exact signed statement that the log commits to.</dd>
        <dt>Composite Identifier:</dt>
        <dd>The SHA-256 digest of the 64-octet concatenation of D1 and D2 as
        raw octets (<xref target="cid"/>).</dd>
        <dt>Receipt:</dt>
        <dd>In this document, a JSON object issued by the Transparency Service
        for one registered statement. It contains a Merkle inclusion proof and
        a signed tree head (<xref target="receipt"/>). It is not a COSE Receipt
        as defined in <xref target="RFC9942"/>.</dd>
        <dt>Transparency Service:</dt>
        <dd>As in <xref target="RFC9943"/>, a service that maintains an
        append-only log of registered statements. In this profile it applies a
        Registration Policy (<xref target="regpol"/>) and issues Receipts.</dd>
        <dt>Signed Tree Head (STH):</dt>
        <dd>A JSON object that states the size and root hash of the log, signed
        by the Transparency Service (<xref target="sth"/>).</dd>
        <dt>Composite:</dt>
        <dd>A JSON object that carries both statements and both Receipts
        (<xref target="composite"/>). Also called a bundle.</dd>
        <dt>Log View:</dt>
        <dd>The complete list of log entries together with a Signed Tree Head
        over all of them (<xref target="completeness"/>).</dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The following notation is used. H(x) is SHA-256 <xref target="RFC6234"/>
      applied to the octet string x, producing 32 octets. "||" denotes
      concatenation of octet strings. hex(x) is the lowercase hexadecimal
      encoding of x, two characters per octet, using only the characters
      "0"-"9" and "a"-"f". unhex(s) is its inverse. canon(v) is the canonical
      encoding of the JSON value v defined in <xref target="canon"/>. A
      "64-hex string" is the hex() of 32 octets; a "128-hex string" is the
      hex() of 64 octets.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Protocol Overview</name>
      <t>The protocol has three phases: decision, evaluation, and
      verification.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-flow">
        <name>Message Flow</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
 Approver             Transparency Service              Validator
    |                          |                            |
    |-- Statement A ---------->|  (1) Decision              |
    |<-------- Receipt A ------|                            |
    |                          |                            |
    |-- Statement A + Receipt A --------------------------->|
    |                          |    (2) Evaluation          |
    |                          |<-------- Statement B ------|
    |                          |------- Receipt B --------->|
    |                          |                            |
              Verifier: A, Receipt A, B, Receipt B
                        (3) Verification
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <section anchor="phase-decision">
        <name>Decision</name>
        <t>The Approver builds a Decision Statement payload, signs canon(payload)
        with its Ed25519 key, and submits the signed statement to the
        Transparency Service. The Transparency Service checks the statement
        against its Registration Policy, appends it to the log, and returns
        Receipt A.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="phase-evaluation">
        <name>Evaluation</name>
        <t>The Validator obtains Statement A and Receipt A. It verifies the
        Approver's signature and Receipt A. If either check fails, the
        Validator <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue a Policy Evaluation Statement
        for those bytes. Otherwise it evaluates every rule of its policy,
        builds a Policy Evaluation Statement payload that binds to D1, to
        Receipt A, and to the Approver's signature, signs it with its own
        Ed25519 key, and registers it with the same Transparency Service. A
        failed rule produces a signed result of "REJECT"; a rejection is
        evidence in the same way as an acceptance. The Transparency Service
        returns Receipt B.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="phase-verification">
        <name>Verification</name>
        <t>A verifier receives a Composite containing both statements and both
        Receipts. It checks both signatures, both Receipts, every binding
        defined in <xref target="binding"/>, and the consistency of the overall
        result with the per-rule results, using the procedure in
        <xref target="verify"/>. With the Composite alone, the verifier can
        confirm that the evaluation exists. It cannot confirm that no other
        evaluation exists. For that it needs a Log View
        (<xref target="completeness"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="arch">
      <name>Dual-Receipt Architecture</name>
      <t>This section defines every JSON object used by the profile. Each object
      <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly the members listed for it, unless
      the object's definition states otherwise. A producer
      <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add members, and a verifier
      <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an object with a missing member, an
      additional member, or a member whose value does not meet the stated
      constraint. All values <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also satisfy the encoding
      profile in <xref target="canon"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="conventions">
        <name>Common Conventions</name>
        <t>Each object type has a fixed type value, carried in its typ
        member:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Decision Statement           oigp.dual-receipt.decision.v1
Policy Evaluation Statement  oigp.dual-receipt.policy-evaluation.v1
Signed Tree Head             oigp.dual-receipt.sth.v1
Composite                    oigp.dual-receipt.composite.v1
]]></artwork>
        <dl newline="true">
          <dt>Key Identifier:</dt>
          <dd>For an Ed25519 public key with 32-octet encoding pk
          (<xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.5"/>), the Key Identifier is
          hex(H(pk)), a 64-hex string.</dd>
          <dt>Timestamp:</dt>
          <dd>A string matching the "timestamp" rule below, which is a
          restriction of the date-time format of <xref target="RFC3339"/>:
          UTC only, uppercase "T" and "Z", and no fractional seconds. The value
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a valid calendar date and time. Seconds range
          from 00 to 59; a leap second ("60") <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.
          Because every Timestamp has the same fixed width and field order,
          comparing two Timestamps as ASCII strings gives the same order as
          comparing the times they denote. The ABNF below uses the core rule
          DIGIT from <xref target="RFC5234"/>.</dd>
        </dl>
        <sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
timestamp = 4DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "T"
            2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT ":" 2DIGIT "Z"
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stmtA">
        <name>Decision Statement Payload</name>
        <t>The Decision Statement payload is a JSON object with exactly the
        following seven members.</t>
        <table anchor="tab-a">
          <name>Decision Statement Members</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Constraint</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>typ</td><td>string</td><td>Decision Statement type value (<xref target="conventions"/>)</td></tr>
            <tr><td>iss</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; Key Identifier of the Approver's key</td></tr>
            <tr><td>draw_no</td><td>integer</td><td>1 to 2^53-1; request number within the pair</td></tr>
            <tr><td>amount_cents</td><td>integer</td><td>1 to 2^53-1; amount in cents</td></tr>
            <tr><td>pair_key</td><td>string</td><td>128-hex; identifies the sponsor-project pair</td></tr>
            <tr><td>status</td><td>string</td><td>"APPROVED" or "DENIED"</td></tr>
            <tr><td>decided_at</td><td>string</td><td>Timestamp of the decision</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>This profile does not carry a currency code. The currency of
        amount_cents is fixed by the sponsorship agreement and is outside the
        scope of this document. The pair_key is an opaque identifier; see
        <xref target="privacy"/> for how it should be derived.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stmtB">
        <name>Policy Evaluation Statement Payload</name>
        <t>The Policy Evaluation Statement payload is a JSON object with
        exactly the following ten members.</t>
        <table anchor="tab-b">
          <name>Policy Evaluation Statement Members</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Constraint</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>typ</td><td>string</td><td>Policy Evaluation Statement type value (<xref target="conventions"/>)</td></tr>
            <tr><td>iss</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; Key Identifier of the Validator's key</td></tr>
            <tr><td>binds_to_statement_id</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; D1</td></tr>
            <tr><td>binds_to_receipt_sha256</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; hex(H(canon(Receipt A)))</td></tr>
            <tr><td>binds_to_signature_sha256</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; hex(H(raw 64-octet signature of Statement A))</td></tr>
            <tr><td>policy_id</td><td>string</td><td>non-empty; names the policy</td></tr>
            <tr><td>policy_sha256</td><td>string</td><td>64-hex; hex(H(canon(policy document)))</td></tr>
            <tr><td>rule_results</td><td>array</td><td>non-empty; see below</td></tr>
            <tr><td>result</td><td>string</td><td>"ACCEPT" or "REJECT"</td></tr>
            <tr><td>evaluated_at</td><td>string</td><td>Timestamp of the evaluation</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Each element of rule_results is an array of exactly two strings: a
        non-empty rule identifier followed by "PASS" or "FAIL". Rule
        identifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique within the array. The order
        of elements is significant, because it is part of the signed bytes;
        the identifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal, in the same order, the rules
        array of the policy document that policy_sha256 names. A verifier
        rejects a statement that omits a rule, adds a rule, repeats a rule, or
        reorders the rules.</t>
        <t>The value of result <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be "ACCEPT" if and only if
        every element of rule_results has the outcome "PASS". Otherwise it
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be "REJECT". The value of evaluated_at
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be earlier than the decided_at of the bound
        Decision Statement.</t>
        <t>The policy document is a JSON object that satisfies
        <xref target="canon"/>. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a member
        policy_id (a non-empty string of at most 64 characters) and a member
        rules (a non-empty array of unique, non-empty rule identifiers). Other
        members are defined by the Validator and are outside the scope of this
        document, except that a verifier needs enough of them to recompute the
        rules it recomputes (<xref target="policy-sec"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signed">
        <name>Signed Statement</name>
        <t>Each statement is transported as a JSON object with exactly three
        members:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>payload:</dt><dd>the payload object (<xref target="stmtA"/> or <xref target="stmtB"/>);</dd>
          <dt>sig:</dt><dd>a 128-hex string, the Ed25519 signature over canon(payload) (<xref target="sigs"/>);</dd>
          <dt>statement_id:</dt><dd>a 64-hex string, the Statement Identifier (<xref target="ids"/>).</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The statement_id member is a convenience copy. It is not signed. A
        verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute it from the payload and
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the statement if the values differ.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sth">
        <name>Signed Tree Head</name>
        <t>A Signed Tree Head is a JSON object with exactly five members:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>typ:</dt><dd>the Signed Tree Head type value (<xref target="conventions"/>);</dd>
          <dt>ts_key_id:</dt><dd>64-hex; Key Identifier of the Transparency Service's key;</dd>
          <dt>tree_size:</dt><dd>integer, 1 to 2^53-1; the number of log entries;</dd>
          <dt>root:</dt><dd>64-hex; the Merkle Tree Hash over all log entries (<xref target="merkle"/>);</dd>
          <dt>registration_policy_sha256:</dt><dd>64-hex; hex(H(canon(Registration Policy))).</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The Transparency Service signs canon(sth) with its Ed25519 key. The
        resulting signature is carried as the 128-hex string sth_sig. A
        Signed Tree Head in this profile contains no time value.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="receipt">
        <name>Receipt</name>
        <t>A Receipt is a JSON object with exactly five members:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>statement_id:</dt><dd>64-hex; the Statement Identifier of the registered statement;</dd>
          <dt>leaf_index:</dt><dd>integer, 0 to tree_size-1; the position of the entry in the log;</dd>
          <dt>audit_path:</dt><dd>array of 64-hex strings; the inclusion proof (<xref target="merkle"/>);</dd>
          <dt>sth:</dt><dd>a Signed Tree Head (<xref target="sth"/>);</dd>
          <dt>sth_sig:</dt><dd>128-hex; the Transparency Service's signature over canon(sth).</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Every member of a Receipt is ASCII text. A Receipt
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry additional members, such as labels or
        markers, because binds_to_receipt_sha256 is computed over the whole
        Receipt.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="composite">
        <name>Composite</name>
        <t>A Composite is a JSON object that <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the
        following members:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>typ:</dt><dd>the Composite type value (<xref target="conventions"/>);</dd>
          <dt>decision_statement:</dt><dd>Statement A as a Signed Statement;</dd>
          <dt>decision_receipt:</dt><dd>Receipt A;</dd>
          <dt>policy_evaluation_statement:</dt><dd>Statement B as a Signed Statement;</dd>
          <dt>policy_evaluation_receipt:</dt><dd>Receipt B.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A producer <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include a member composite_id whose
        value is the Composite Identifier (<xref target="cid"/>) as a 64-hex
        string. The Composite is not signed as a whole; its integrity comes
        from the signatures and Receipts it contains. Other members
        <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present. They are not covered by any signature
        and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> affect the result of verification.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="regpol">
        <name>Registration Policy</name>
        <t>The Transparency Service <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> register a statement
        only if all of the following hold. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check all of
        them before changing any state, so that a refused statement leaves the
        log unchanged.</t>
        <ol>
          <li>The payload typ is the Decision Statement type value or the
          Policy Evaluation Statement type value (<xref target="conventions"/>).</li>
          <li>The payload iss is the Key Identifier of a key that the
          Transparency Service has registered for the role that the typ
          requires: an Approver key for a Decision Statement, a Validator key
          for a Policy Evaluation Statement. The set of Approver keys and the
          set of Validator keys <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be disjoint. The signature
          sig is a valid signature by that key over canon(payload).</li>
          <li>The payload has exactly the members defined for its typ, with
          the defined syntax, and statement_id equals the recomputed Statement
          Identifier.</li>
          <li>For a Decision Statement: no Decision Statement with the same
          Statement Identifier is already in the log, and no Decision Statement
          with the same triple (iss, pair_key, draw_no) is already in the
          log.</li>
          <li>For a Policy Evaluation Statement: binds_to_statement_id is the
          Statement Identifier of a Decision Statement already in the log.</li>
          <li>For a Policy Evaluation Statement: binds_to_signature_sha256
          equals hex(H(unhex(sig))) for that registered Decision
          Statement.</li>
          <li>For a Policy Evaluation Statement: no Policy Evaluation
          Statement with the same pair (binds_to_statement_id, iss) is already
          in the log.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>Rule 7 allows at most one evaluation of a given decision by a given
        Validator. Without it, a Validator could register a "REJECT" and later
        an "ACCEPT" for the same decision, and a holder could present only the
        "ACCEPT". Rule 4 allows at most one decision for a given draw by a
        given Approver. Without it, an Approver could register a "DENIED"
        decision and a later "APPROVED" decision for the same draw, each with
        its own valid evaluation. Rule 2 stops an Approver key from issuing
        evaluations and a Validator key from issuing decisions. The
        Registration Policy is itself a JSON value, and its digest is carried
        in every Signed Tree Head, so a change of policy is visible to every
        verifier.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="math">
      <name>Mathematical Binding</name>
      <section anchor="canon">
        <name>Canonical Encoding</name>
        <t>canon(v) is the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) encoding
        <xref target="RFC8785"/> of the value v, as UTF-8 octets. To remove
        the parts of JCS that commonly differ between implementations, this
        profile restricts every value that is signed, hashed, or placed in a
        Receipt to the following:</t>
        <ul>
          <li>strings whose characters are all in the range U+0020 to U+007E
          (printable ASCII), including member names;</li>
          <li>integers n with -(2^53-1) &lt;= n &lt;= 2^53-1, written without a
          fraction or exponent;</li>
          <li>the literals true and false;</li>
          <li>arrays and objects of these values.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>The literal null, numbers with a fraction or exponent, integers
        outside the range above, and any character outside U+0020 to U+007E
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected. A boolean <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
        accepted where an integer is required. A parser <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        reject an object with duplicate member names, as required by I-JSON
        (<xref target="RFC7493" section="2.3"/>), on which JCS relies.</t>
        <t>Under this restriction, canon(v) is the JSON text
        <xref target="RFC8259"/> of v with object members sorted by name in
        ascending order of their octets, no whitespace between tokens, the
        characters quotation mark and reverse solidus in strings written as
        \" and \\, and every other character written as itself. The
        restriction makes this simplified description and JCS produce the
        same octets: for ASCII names, sorting by UTF-16 code units
        (<xref target="RFC8785" section="3.2.3"/>) equals sorting by octets;
        no control character can occur, so no other escape is produced
        (<xref target="RFC8785" section="3.2.2.2"/>); and every integer in
        range is represented exactly by an IEEE 754 double, so its JCS
        serialization is its plain decimal form
        (<xref target="RFC8785" section="3.2.2.3"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ids">
        <name>Statement Identifiers</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
D1 = H(canon(payload_A))          (32 octets)
D2 = H(canon(payload_B))          (32 octets)
]]></artwork>
        <t>Statement Identifiers are carried as 64-hex strings, for example in
        statement_id and binds_to_statement_id. The digest covers the payload
        only. It does not cover the signature; the signature is bound
        separately (<xref target="binding"/>).</t>
        <t>The exact signed statement has its own digest, the Signed Statement
        Digest:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
SSD = H(canon({"payload": payload, "sig": sig}))     (32 octets)
]]></artwork>
        <t>The SSD changes if either the payload or the signature changes. The
        Statement Identifier changes only if the payload changes. The Merkle
        leaf hash of a statement (<xref target="merkle"/>) is H(0x00 || the
        same canonical octets), so the SSD and the leaf hash are different
        values computed over the same input octets. The SSD is not a member of
        any statement and is not carried in the Composite; a party that needs
        it computes it. A verifier that outputs it uses it only as a name for
        the signed statement, never as input to a check.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sigs">
        <name>Signatures</name>
        <t>All signatures are Ed25519 as specified in
        <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1"/>, without prehashing and
        without context. The message signed is the octet string canon(payload)
        for a statement, and canon(sth) for a Signed Tree Head. A signature is
        64 octets and is carried as a 128-hex string.</t>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify signatures as specified in
        <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.7"/>. In particular it
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a signature whose scalar S is not less than
        the group order L, so that a signature cannot be altered into a second
        valid encoding. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a sig, sth_sig,
        or audit_path value that contains uppercase hexadecimal characters.</t>
        <t>The Approver's key and the Validator's key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
        different. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a Composite in which
        the two public keys it uses for Statement A and Statement B are
        equal.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="merkle">
        <name>Merkle Tree and Inclusion Proofs</name>
        <t>The log entry for a signed statement is the octet string</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
leaf_data = canon({"payload": payload, "sig": sig})
]]></artwork>
        <t>so the log commits to both the payload and the signature. Hashing
        follows <xref target="RFC9162" section="2.1.1"/>:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
leaf hash = H(0x00 || leaf_data)
node hash = H(0x01 || left || right)
]]></artwork>
        <t>The root in a Signed Tree Head is the Merkle Tree Hash over all
        entries in log order, as defined in
        <xref target="RFC9162" section="2.1.1"/>. A verifier checks a Receipt by
        running the algorithm of <xref target="RFC9162" section="2.1.3.2"/>
        with leaf_index, tree_size, the leaf hash, audit_path (each element
        decoded with unhex), and root. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
        the Receipt if leaf_index is not less than tree_size, if any decoded
        value is not 32 octets, or if the algorithm fails.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="binding">
        <name>Binding Rules</name>
        <t>Let A and B be the Decision Statement and the Policy Evaluation
        Statement, RA and RB their Receipts, and p the payload of B. A
        Composite is valid only if all of the following hold.</t>
        <dl newline="false">
          <dt>B1:</dt>
          <dd>p.binds_to_statement_id = hex(D1).</dd>
          <dt>B2:</dt>
          <dd>p.binds_to_receipt_sha256 = hex(H(canon(RA))), where RA is the
          Receipt A object exactly as carried in the Composite.</dd>
          <dt>B3:</dt>
          <dd>p.binds_to_signature_sha256 = hex(H(unhex(A.sig))). The input is
          the 64 raw signature octets, not the 128-character hexadecimal
          text.</dd>
          <dt>B4:</dt>
          <dd>p.policy_sha256 = hex(H(canon(policy))) and p.policy_id =
          policy.policy_id, where policy is the policy document held by the
          verifier. The verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hold the policy document;
          without it, a Validator's result cannot be checked against anything,
          and the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse to verify.</dd>
          <dt>B5:</dt>
          <dd>p.result = "ACCEPT" if and only if p.rule_results is non-empty
          and every element has outcome "PASS".</dd>
          <dt>B6:</dt>
          <dd>RA and RB verify under the same Transparency Service key, and
          RB.leaf_index &gt; RA.leaf_index.</dd>
          <dt>B7:</dt>
          <dd>p.evaluated_at &gt;= A.payload.decided_at, compared as
          Timestamps.</dd>
          <dt>B8:</dt>
          <dd>The key that verifies A differs from the key that verifies
          B.</dd>
          <dt>B9:</dt>
          <dd>The rule identifiers in p.rule_results equal, in order, the rules
          array of the policy document.</dd>
          <dt>B10:</dt>
          <dd>For every rule that the verifier can recompute from the Composite
          and the policy document, the outcome in p.rule_results equals the
          recomputed outcome (<xref target="policy-sec"/>).</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>B3 is implied by B2 when Receipt A verifies, because the leaf
        hash of Statement A covers its signature. B3 is kept because it binds
        the evaluation to the exact signature without the Receipt, which is
        what the Transparency Service checks under Registration Policy rule 6
        (<xref target="regpol"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cid">
        <name>Composite Identifier</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
CID = H(D1 || D2)        (input: 64 octets; output: 32 octets)
]]></artwork>
        <t>D1 and D2 are the 32-octet digests, not their hexadecimal text.
        Hashing the 128-character hexadecimal text instead produces a
        different value; <xref target="vectors"/> shows both. The order is
        fixed: H(D2 || D1) is a different value and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
        used.</t>
        <t>The Composite Identifier covers Receipt A indirectly, because the
        payload of B contains binds_to_receipt_sha256. It does not cover
        Receipt B. Registration Policy rule 7 prevents an honest Transparency
        Service from registering the same Policy Evaluation Statement twice,
        but a Transparency Service that did not enforce it could issue two
        different Receipt B values for statements with the same Composite
        Identifier. The Composite Identifier
        is therefore a name for a pair of statements, not evidence that the
        pair is valid.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify">
        <name>Verification Procedure</name>
        <t>A verifier is given a Composite, the Approver's public key, the
        Validator's public key, the Transparency Service's public key,
        the policy document, and optionally a Log View. It performs
        the following steps in order and stops with failure at the first step
        that fails.</t>
        <ol>
          <li>Check that the Composite's typ is the Composite type value
          and that it has the four statement and Receipt members, each a JSON object.</li>
          <li>Check B8 on the two public keys supplied.</li>
          <li>Check Statement A: the encoding profile (<xref target="canon"/>),
          the members of <xref target="stmtA"/>, that iss is the Key Identifier
          of the Approver's key, that sig is a 128-hex string and verifies, and
          that statement_id equals hex(D1).</li>
          <li>Check Receipt A: its members (<xref target="receipt"/>), that
          sth.typ is the Signed Tree Head type value, that sth.ts_key_id is the Key
          Identifier of the Transparency Service's key, that sth_sig verifies
          over canon(sth), that statement_id equals hex(D1), and the inclusion
          proof (<xref target="merkle"/>).</li>
          <li>Check Statement B as in step 3, using <xref target="stmtB"/>, the
          Validator's key, and D2.</li>
          <li>Check Receipt B as in step 4, using D2.</li>
          <li>Check B1, B2, and B3.</li>
          <li>Check B6 and B7.</li>
          <li>If the Composite contains composite_id, check that it equals
          hex(CID).</li>
          <li>Check B4 and B9.</li>
          <li>Check B5.</li>
          <li>Check B10.</li>
          <li>Determine completeness (<xref target="completeness"/>).</li>
        </ol>
        <t>On success, the verifier outputs hex(D1), hex(D2), hex(CID), the
        Signed Statement Digest of each statement, the
        result ("ACCEPT" or "REJECT", as stated by the Validator and checked
        by B5 and B10), the list of rules it recomputed, the list of rules that
        rest on the Validator's assertion alone, and a completeness
        value. A successful verification of a
        Composite whose result is "REJECT" is a verified rejection: the
        evidence is valid, and the Validator did not accept the decision.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="roles">
        <name>Role Separation</name>
        <t>The profile requires two different keys (B8). Two different keys do
        not prove two different organizations: one organization can hold both
        keys. The value of the second statement depends on the Validator being
        independent of the Approver, and that independence is established by
        how keys are issued and registered, which is outside the scope of this
        document. A verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> obtain the Approver's and
        the Validator's public keys from separate, authenticated sources.</t>
        <t>Registration Policy rule 2 (<xref target="regpol"/>) makes the
        Transparency Service enforce the roles: a key registered as an Approver
        cannot register an evaluation, and a key registered as a Validator
        cannot register a decision. A verifier cannot observe that enforcement
        directly; it can only observe its effects through a Log View
        (<xref target="completeness"/>).</t>
        <t>If the Approver and the Validator collude, both statements can be
        valid and still misrepresent what happened. This profile makes such a
        record attributable to both keys; it does not prevent it.</t>
        <t>The Validator <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue a Policy Evaluation
        Statement over a Decision Statement whose signature or Receipt it has
        not verified (<xref target="phase-evaluation"/>). Otherwise the
        Validator's signature would attest to bytes it never checked.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="completeness">
        <name>Completeness: Bundle Versus Log View</name>
        <t>A Composite proves that two statements exist and are registered. It
        cannot prove that no other statement exists. In particular, if a
        Validator registered two evaluations of the same decision, one with
        result "REJECT" and one with result "ACCEPT", a holder could present
        only the "ACCEPT". Registration Policy rules 4 and 7 (<xref target="regpol"/>)
        prevent this at an honest Transparency Service. A verifier who has
        only the Composite <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> report completeness as
        unknown, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report that the evaluation is the
        only one. This is consistent with the approach described in
        <xref target="I-D.nobuo-scitt-composite-evidence-verification"/>,
        which recommends reporting unknown or a warning rather than a pass
        when completeness cannot be checked.</t>
        <t>A verifier that obtains a Log View can check completeness. The Log
        View is authenticated only by the Transparency Service's signature on
        its tree head and by the recomputed root; the verifier does not learn
        from it whether the Transparency Service showed the same log to other
        parties. A Log
        View is a JSON object with members entries (the list of all log
        entries in order, each an object with members payload, sig, and
        statement_id), sth, and sth_sig. The verifier:</t>
        <ol>
          <li>verifies sth_sig over canon(sth) with the Transparency Service's
          key and checks sth.ts_key_id;</li>
          <li>checks that sth.tree_size equals the number of entries;</li>
          <li>recomputes, for every entry, statement_id from its payload, and
          rejects the Log View if any claimed value differs;</li>
          <li>recomputes the root over all entries (<xref target="merkle"/>)
          and checks that it equals sth.root;</li>
          <li>checks that exactly one entry has the Statement Identifier
          hex(D1), and that exactly one entry is a Decision Statement with the
          same iss, pair_key, and draw_no as Statement A (no rival
          decision);</li>
          <li>checks that exactly one entry is a Policy Evaluation Statement
          with binds_to_statement_id equal to hex(D1) and iss equal to the
          Validator's Key Identifier, and that its Statement Identifier equals
          hex(D2).</li>
        </ol>
        <t>If all checks pass, the verifier reports completeness as checked
        for that Log View. This check is only as strong as the Log View. A
        Transparency Service that shows different logs to different parties
        (a split view) is not detected by it. Detecting a split view requires
        consistency proofs between tree heads and a way for parties to compare
        the tree heads they have seen. Both are outside the scope of this
        document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="time">
        <name>Limits of Timestamps</name>
        <t>The values decided_at and evaluated_at are claims made by the
        Approver and the Validator, inside payloads that they sign. They are
        not trusted time. Rule B7 checks only that the two claims are
        consistent with each other. The Signed Tree Head in this profile
        carries no time.</t>
        <t>The only ordering evidence that does not depend on the signers is
        leaf position: rule B6 shows that the evaluation was registered after
        the decision in the same log. That shows order, not time. A
        deployment that needs evidence of when a statement existed needs an
        independent time source, such as a trusted timestamp over the
        statement or the tree head. That is outside the scope of this
        document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="canon-sec">
        <name>Canonicalization and Parsing</name>
        <t>Signatures and identifiers are computed over canon(v), not over the
        bytes that were received. Two implementations that canonicalize the
        same value differently will disagree on every signature and
        identifier. The restrictions in <xref target="canon"/> remove the
        known sources of disagreement: non-ASCII text, control characters,
        floating-point numbers, large integers, and duplicate member names. An
        implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject values outside the
        restrictions rather than attempt to normalize them.</t>
        <t>Hexadecimal strings are compared as strings. Requiring lowercase
        removes a second representation of the same octets.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="keys">
        <name>Keys and Algorithms</name>
        <t>This profile defines no key revocation or rotation mechanism. A
        compromised Approver or Validator key can produce valid statements
        until the Transparency Service stops accepting it. This profile
        defines a single algorithm, Ed25519. A future profile with other
        algorithms would use different typ values.</t>
        <t>The test keys in <xref target="vectors"/> are derived from public
        labels. They provide no security and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used
        outside testing.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="policy-sec">
        <name>Meaning of Policy Results</name>
        <t>A verifier can recompute only the rules whose inputs are in the
        Composite and the policy document. In the reference implementation these
        are R1_DECISION_SIGNATURE_VALID, R2_DECISION_RECEIPT_VALID,
        R3_PAIR_KEY_MATCH, R4_STATUS_APPROVED, and R6_DECIDED_WITHIN_WINDOW. The
        verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute each of them and reject the
        Composite if a signed outcome differs (B10). The remaining rules,
        R5_AMOUNT_WITHIN_REMAINING_CAP and R7_DRAW_NOT_SEEN_BEFORE, depend on
        the Validator's history of earlier evaluations, which a verifier cannot
        check from one Composite. For those rules the outcome is the
        Validator's assertion, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> report them
        as asserted and not as verified. The policy_sha256 member binds the
        evaluation to a specific policy document. It does not establish what
        that document means.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="privacy">
        <name>Privacy</name>
        <t>Everything in a registered payload is visible to anyone who can
        read the log, including amounts, request numbers, decision outcomes,
        times, and pair_key. Deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat the log
        as public.</t>
        <t>The pair_key links all statements about one sponsor-project pair.
        If pair_key is an unkeyed hash of a low-entropy value, such as a
        nine-digit tax identification number, it can be reversed by trying
        every possible value. A deployment that needs pair_key not to reveal
        the parties <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> derive it with a keyed function, such
        as HMAC with a key that is not published. The reference implementation
        uses an unkeyed derivation over synthetic identifiers and is not an
        example of how to protect real identifiers.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9162" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162">
  <front>
    <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
    <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
    <author fullname="E. Messeri" initials="E." surname="Messeri"/>
    <author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling"/>
    <date month="December" year="2021"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
    <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
    <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
    <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
    <date month="June" year="2020"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032">
  <front>
    <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
    <date month="January" year="2017"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234">
  <front>
    <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
    <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
    <date month="May" year="2011"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3339" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339">
  <front>
    <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
    <author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>
    <author fullname="C. Newman" initials="C." surname="Newman"/>
    <date month="July" year="2002"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">
  <front>
    <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
    <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray"/>
    <date month="December" year="2017"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC7493" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493">
  <front>
    <title>The I-JSON Message Format</title>
    <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray"/>
    <date month="March" year="2015"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7493"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7493"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">
  <front>
    <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>
    <date month="January" year="2008"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
</reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC9942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9942">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts</title>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9942"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9943" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9943">
  <front>
    <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
    <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I-D.gruszka-scitt-statement-identification" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification-00">
  <front>
    <title>Requirements and Test Cases for Identifying SCITT Signed Statements</title>
    <author fullname="Konrad Gruszka" initials="K." surname="Gruszka">
      <organization>b7n0de</organization>
    </author>
    <date day="10" month="October" year="2026"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification-00"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I-D.nobuo-scitt-composite-evidence-verification" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nobuo-scitt-composite-evidence-verification-00">
  <front>
    <title>Composite Evidence Verification for SCITT Statement Graphs</title>
    <author fullname="Nobuo Aoki" initials="N." surname="Aoki">
      <organization>The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI)</organization>
    </author>
    <date day="7" month="July" year="2026"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nobuo-scitt-composite-evidence-verification-00"/>
</reference>
      </references>
    </references>

    <section anchor="vectors" numbered="true">
      <name>Test Vectors</name>
      <t>This appendix is not normative. All values were produced by the
      reference implementation (<xref target="impl"/>) and checked with
      independent libraries. Long values are split across lines for display
      only: to recover a value, remove the line breaks and nothing else. No
      line begins or ends with a space.</t>
      <section anchor="vec-keys">
        <name>Keys</name>
        <t>Each Ed25519 private key seed is H of the ASCII label shown. These
        keys are for testing only.</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Approver:   label "SYN-SPONSOR-APPROVER"
  seed
    07dcf5901a847584c6d699876b832e9a276101e34dac0bcd4712afde1ffa36b2
  public key
    6c7a7dc5c82d38893fa89e4e3257eedf42286bbe5e477ea8db37df8b56654275
  Key Identifier
    d1b38349f2ad6bc1034aa1ef5e04dcb9d95f4747a3095510d7566812aad56480

Validator:  label "SYN-VALIDATOR-RECEIVING-INSTITUTION"
  seed
    06c953ee14c1a18de9f02caa340d7309d573e91825555b778895dd862ea06992
  public key
    cb2ae047137b4b162510272f4d65369085d12502f5d894c4e4ca2fea92abd5e0
  Key Identifier
    bc82064d3506fe4003f1d7076221dab60be5fb300331d98d8d77a473c5527f27

Transparency Service:  label "SYN-TRANSPARENCY-SERVICE"
  seed
    c90a51ec12752ed4f8df8ca654420a674af3fa03b63b34224006ce4593af8c72
  public key
    97cfbab282d8e7fd2fc23def8bed1370f286b9cd2214b9564bf2cb7a741dece0
  Key Identifier
    6be48ea80f7346b5e1d4c016afbd9257f14428848c3dea277a7034fe9824c2a2
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vec-log">
        <name>Log Contents</name>
        <t>The log holds four entries. Entries 0 and 1 are an earlier decision
        (draw 1) and its evaluation. Entries 2 and 3 are the
        Decision Statement and the Policy Evaluation Statement shown below
        (draw 2). Receipt A was issued at tree size 3 and Receipt B at
        tree size 4.</t>
        <t>Registration Policy, canonical form:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_registration_policy"><![CDATA[
{"accepts":["oigp.dual-receipt.decision.v1","oigp.dual-receipt.p
olicy-evaluation.v1"],"id":"OIGP-TS-REG-4","requires":["payloa
d typ is one of the accepted type values","iss is a registered k
ey for the role the typ requires (decision: approver; policy_eva
luation: validator); approver and validator key sets are disjoin
t; sig is a valid Ed25519 signature by that key over canon(paylo
ad)","payload has exactly the members defined for its typ, wit
h the defined syntax; statement_id equals the recomputed Stateme
nt Identifier","decision: not already registered; at most one de
cision per (iss, pair_key, draw_no)","policy_evaluation: binds_t
o_statement_id is the Statement Identifier of a registered decis
ion","policy_evaluation: binds_to_signature_sha256 equals SHA-25
6 of that decision's raw 64-byte signature","policy_evaluation
: at most one per (binds_to_statement_id, iss)"]}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
registration_policy_sha256
  fcd189e9f7b8f3857f8f7fd9011654ffefb7511c84ae816c2f13b89331e033d1
]]></artwork>
        <t>Validator policy document, canonical form:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_policy"><![CDATA[
{"approver_key_id":"d1b38349f2ad6bc1034aa1ef5e04dcb9d95f4747a309
5510d7566812aad56480","award_cap_cents":5000000,"expected_pair_k
ey":"94d4f37aec87057b2ec3a72529ec5e143619117d46c3a66ebeede4b8ffe
01dc1e6c58dcf4f4a8d896004b6dd0285223284ccae00d53eb5d1e2d35d3e583
8d4bb","policy_id":"OIGP-VAL-POLICY-1","rules":["R1_DECISION_SIG
NATURE_VALID","R2_DECISION_RECEIPT_VALID","R3_PAIR_KEY_MATCH","R
4_STATUS_APPROVED","R5_AMOUNT_WITHIN_REMAINING_CAP","R6_DECIDED_
WITHIN_WINDOW","R7_DRAW_NOT_SEEN_BEFORE"],"ts_key_id":"6be48ea80
f7346b5e1d4c016afbd9257f14428848c3dea277a7034fe9824c2a2","window
_end":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","window_start":"2026-11-01T00:00:00
Z"}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
policy_sha256
  607162ca8978a96c2ae485007b98ac7b0c7c33500d88160bbd05b4c29e2c3604
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vec-a">
        <name>Decision Statement</name>
        <t>canon(payload_A):</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_payload_A"><![CDATA[
{"amount_cents":1000000,"decided_at":"2026-11-13T16:00:00Z","dra
w_no":2,"iss":"d1b38349f2ad6bc1034aa1ef5e04dcb9d95f4747a3095510d
7566812aad56480","pair_key":"94d4f37aec87057b2ec3a72529ec5e14361
9117d46c3a66ebeede4b8ffe01dc1e6c58dcf4f4a8d896004b6dd0285223284c
cae00d53eb5d1e2d35d3e5838d4bb","status":"APPROVED","typ":"oigp.d
ual-receipt.decision.v1"}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
D1 = H(canon(payload_A))
  dfeb582c87775fbcc7fcc948d85fd6dda8a516329a7f40b3ecc8a97349c9a1fd
]]></artwork>
        <t>sig_A, Ed25519 over canon(payload_A) with the Approver's key:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="sig_A"><![CDATA[
3f9bae4e1596aec77c5ce3627a22ae692bd7cdcf73099356239dda27f901e019
65b7c1b4af0f32074fb4afb4e7083c398a6d22d598ffcdabc7bb7d09dc987a0c
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
SSD_A = H(canon({"payload": payload_A, "sig": sig_A}))
  8b1a85865ee64127a810b6e3998551332242b3c17d2f943dc11f9f027c09ed22
leaf hash of entry 2
  1c1f91e46a359b3bc0699d65f24dda045153047b21534eee61409a15fabd8d6e
]]></artwork>
        <t>canon(Receipt A):</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_receipt_A"><![CDATA[
{"audit_path":["c0a4faa03f716e057b2f21871e1fb7beb165f7159e7f2a91
461dfba22ce19543"],"leaf_index":2,"statement_id":"dfeb582c87775f
bcc7fcc948d85fd6dda8a516329a7f40b3ecc8a97349c9a1fd","sth":{"regi
stration_policy_sha256":"fcd189e9f7b8f3857f8f7fd9011654ffefb7511
c84ae816c2f13b89331e033d1","root":"1a7a8c1940b945aa6b7b79467c097
afb226a59f5c2f53679397a7baece62b650","tree_size":3,"ts_key_id":"
6be48ea80f7346b5e1d4c016afbd9257f14428848c3dea277a7034fe9824c2a2
","typ":"oigp.dual-receipt.sth.v1"},"sth_sig":"66125a2a3ab6f5f94
ea12928070b233cf2c2c6489c98575f0e116bc960b78f235a403ec98bd516289
4918767ab91054a39edb3f40a495566952780617361be0b"}
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vec-b">
        <name>Policy Evaluation Statement</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
binds_to_receipt_sha256 = H(canon(Receipt A))
  f1767607768d3dca872a47d35ba8e98585b6ae8b2c8e2a334bbd05831e1bebf7
binds_to_signature_sha256 = H(64 raw octets of sig_A)
  9eaa4ae5549b8bd8075f03eb960ce4830dead0b9d1d59cdba57352a440bc0d36
for contrast only, H(128-character hex text of sig_A)
  09d71800fff8bc8d3d1fd6dfd7509a8b3a325967060901f11ddc61f9d7a81da5
]]></artwork>
        <t>canon(payload_B):</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_payload_B"><![CDATA[
{"binds_to_receipt_sha256":"f1767607768d3dca872a47d35ba8e98585b6
ae8b2c8e2a334bbd05831e1bebf7","binds_to_signature_sha256":"9eaa4
ae5549b8bd8075f03eb960ce4830dead0b9d1d59cdba57352a440bc0d36","bi
nds_to_statement_id":"dfeb582c87775fbcc7fcc948d85fd6dda8a516329a
7f40b3ecc8a97349c9a1fd","evaluated_at":"2026-11-13T16:05:00Z","i
ss":"bc82064d3506fe4003f1d7076221dab60be5fb300331d98d8d77a473c55
27f27","policy_id":"OIGP-VAL-POLICY-1","policy_sha256":"607162ca
8978a96c2ae485007b98ac7b0c7c33500d88160bbd05b4c29e2c3604","resul
t":"ACCEPT","rule_results":[["R1_DECISION_SIGNATURE_VALID","PASS
"],["R2_DECISION_RECEIPT_VALID","PASS"],["R3_PAIR_KEY_MATCH","PA
SS"],["R4_STATUS_APPROVED","PASS"],["R5_AMOUNT_WITHIN_REMAINING_
CAP","PASS"],["R6_DECIDED_WITHIN_WINDOW","PASS"],["R7_DRAW_NOT_S
EEN_BEFORE","PASS"]],"typ":"oigp.dual-receipt.policy-evaluation.
v1"}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
D2 = H(canon(payload_B))
  c0f094c8ef3f6004ff50e96a0be39f15366496f62e009398d1537fe4cbb80316
]]></artwork>
        <t>sig_B, Ed25519 over canon(payload_B) with the Validator's key:</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="sig_B"><![CDATA[
a9e4b1cd020566bfee6e11901a69b486b435f64a05a007c0380ad0fd6c247562
6705403c6793ceecb723d4015cfe7876ae25f18deca479bc9824b659f612b603
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
SSD_B = H(canon({"payload": payload_B, "sig": sig_B}))
  8fff0fbcb3b77f8995bc38b95cb5e724264db03677e2b394a831795c62b4ff93
leaf hash of entry 3
  98d398b545e375b62211dc9cbe993a6aad3d35966ad5c267ae9bcf1e1197057e
]]></artwork>
        <t>canon(Receipt B):</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="canon_receipt_B"><![CDATA[
{"audit_path":["1c1f91e46a359b3bc0699d65f24dda045153047b21534eee
61409a15fabd8d6e","c0a4faa03f716e057b2f21871e1fb7beb165f7159e7f2
a91461dfba22ce19543"],"leaf_index":3,"statement_id":"c0f094c8ef3
f6004ff50e96a0be39f15366496f62e009398d1537fe4cbb80316","sth":{"r
egistration_policy_sha256":"fcd189e9f7b8f3857f8f7fd9011654ffefb7
511c84ae816c2f13b89331e033d1","root":"bb844d9add6fb9c4357cc370af
02cad2d93307e1992ccd62bfd029261da371d6","tree_size":4,"ts_key_id
":"6be48ea80f7346b5e1d4c016afbd9257f14428848c3dea277a7034fe9824c
2a2","typ":"oigp.dual-receipt.sth.v1"},"sth_sig":"7548ac637a78b3
a152f842c0b6f5f331ce26921e9ed151b0d62062bb19f31ffc771d138d68c4eb
6a8beeb8c45043023b822049df98b3c069d8b6acddef8c4a00"}
]]></artwork>
        <t>The audit path of Receipt B has two elements. The first is the leaf
        hash of entry 2; the second is the hash of the subtree over
        entries 0 and 1.</t>
        <artwork type="ascii-art" name="audit_path_B"><![CDATA[
1c1f91e46a359b3bc0699d65f24dda045153047b21534eee61409a15fabd8d6e
c0a4faa03f716e057b2f21871e1fb7beb165f7159e7f2a91461dfba22ce19543
]]></artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
root at tree size 3 (Receipt A)
  1a7a8c1940b945aa6b7b79467c097afb226a59f5c2f53679397a7baece62b650
root at tree size 4 (Receipt B)
  bb844d9add6fb9c4357cc370af02cad2d93307e1992ccd62bfd029261da371d6
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vec-cid">
        <name>Composite Identifier</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
CID = H(D1 || D2), 64-octet input
  364383c7d24a9f1902243cd206cfb35fe77b637ee38ffc5290861e3d4bbe38b8
for contrast only, H(128-character hex text of D1 then D2)
  f590a04993bbc2d009b2baec7c642b3f81abdcfd04c3e91eb474fe753d8a21f0
]]></artwork>
        <t>Given the Composite, the three public keys above, the policy
        document, and the full Log View, the reference verifier output result
        "ACCEPT" and completeness checked. Entries 0 and 1 are not reproduced
        in this appendix, so a reader can check every value above but cannot
        repeat the completeness check from this document alone.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
