| Internet-Draft | Web4 Delegated Authority | September 2026 |
| Jacobs | Expires 16 March 2027 | [Page] |
This document defines signed, bounded, time-limited, and revocable authority mandates for agents and nodes and links governed actions to their authority.¶
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 March 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document defines a public mandate object for bounded and revocable authority delegated to an agent or node without exposing private reasoning or model state.¶
A mandate MUST identify the mandate, grantor, grantee, permitted actions, prohibited actions where applicable, resource scope, policy, validity period, delegation rules, status mechanism, and proof.¶
{
"mandate_id": "urn:web4:mandate:01JEXAMPLE",
"grantor_id": "did:example:principal-1",
"grantee_id": "did:example:agent-7",
"permitted_actions": ["submit_assessment"],
"prohibited_actions": ["change_policy"],
"policy_id": "urn:web4:policy:delegation:v1",
"maximum_delegation_depth": 0,
"status_uri": "https://status.example/mandates/01JEXAMPLE",
"proof": {
"type": "ExampleProof",
"verification_method": "did:example:principal-1#key-1",
"value": "BASE64URL-SIGNATURE"
}
}¶
The grantor MUST have authority to issue the mandate. Acceptance MUST NOT expand granted authority.¶
A delegated mandate MUST identify its parent and MUST never expand action scope, resource scope, validity, or delegation depth.¶
Each governed action MUST identify the mandate relied upon, actor, action type, target, performance time, and resulting receipt.¶
A policy MAY require human approval for named actions. The requirement and outcome MUST be externally identifiable without exposing private deliberation.¶
A mandate MUST provide a resolvable status and authorized revocation path. Revocation MUST prevent new authorization while preserving historical receipts.¶
Conformance MUST NOT require disclosure of chain-of-thought, planning logic, policy optimization, model weights, or private model state.¶
Broader Web4 architectural work is described informatively in [I-D.reilly-web4]. Informative research materials MAY be published as versioned scholarly artifacts, including DOI-addressable records.¶
A research artifact is not required for conformance unless expressly incorporated as a Normative Reference by a named profile. Referencing or verifying an artifact does not establish the truth of its conclusions, regulatory approval, certification, security, legal compliance, or IETF endorsement.¶
A Conforming Implementation MUST NOT require access to KCoordinate, KQAS, or another protected internal assessment method unless a separate deployment agreement selects that implementation.¶
Implementations MUST authenticate issuers, validate proof integrity, check proof purpose, enforce temporal validity, and resolve current status before relying on an object.¶
Implementations MUST address identifier confusion, issuer impersonation, key compromise, algorithm downgrade, replay, stale status, unauthorized supersession, cross-policy confusion, canonicalization ambiguity, denial of service, and fail-open handling of indeterminate validity.¶
Evidence commitments can confirm correspondence with committed bytes but do not prove truth, completeness, legality, provenance, or fitness for purpose. Profiles SHOULD define privacy-preserving commitment procedures for low-entropy artifacts.¶
Implementations MUST prevent privilege escalation, delegation-depth bypass, mandate replay, confused-deputy behavior, and post-revocation authorization.¶
Persistent identifiers, status queries, proofs, policy references, and linked receipts can enable correlation. Implementations MUST minimize disclosed data and SHOULD use unlinkable or pairwise identifiers where they satisfy policy.¶
Private evidence MAY remain undisclosed and be represented by a cryptographic commitment. Retention and erasure requirements MUST be specified by policy and account for applicable obligations.¶
This document requests no IANA actions.¶