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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Early Attestation Considered Harmful">Early Attestation Considered Very Harmful (CVE-2026-100833, CVE-2026-100835,CVE-2026-108265, CVE-2026-108266, CVE-2026-108267, CVE-2026-108268, CVE-2026-108269,  CVE-2026-92701, CVE-2026-92702, CVE-2026-108362, CVE-2026-33697, CVE-2026-108361 and others)</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-intra-handshake-fail-62"/>
    <author fullname="Muhammad Usama Sardar">
      <organization abbrev="GA4GH">Global Alliance for Genomics and Health</organization>
      <address>
        <email>muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Viacheslav Dubeyko">
      <organization>CoreWeave</organization>
      <address>
        <email>slava@dubeyko.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Jean-Marie Jacquet">
      <organization>University of Namur</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Namur</city>
          <country>Belgium</country>
        </postal>
        <email>jean-marie.jacquet@unamur.be</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Songbo Bu">
      <organization>Stevens Institute of Technology</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>New York</city>
          <country>USA</country>
        </postal>
        <email>bluedognull@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Chengxin Huang">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <email>aurestarnull@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Haowen Song">
      <organization>Shanghai Guan An Information Technology Co., Ltd.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>havan12050544@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Kaya Ercihan">
      <organization>Switch</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Zurich</city>
          <country>Switzerland</country>
        </postal>
        <email>kaya.ercihan@switch.ch</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="D. K. A." surname="Küçük" fullname="Dr Kubilay Ahmet Küçük">
      <organization>DPhil Oxford University</organization>
      <address>
        <email>dr.kucuk@oxfordalumni.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Sylvain Bellemare">
      <organization>Sureshot Labs</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Japan</country>
        </postal>
        <email>sbellem@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E. C. M." surname="Willems" fullname="Eva C. M. Willems">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Netherlands</country>
        </postal>
        <email>evac.m.willems@proton.me</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Justin DESSENNES SAINTEN">
      <organization>Independent Corporate Risk Consultant</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Paris</city>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>dessennes_sainten@msn.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Massimiliano Brighindi">
      <organization>PHI-OMEGA</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>San Benedetto del Tronto</city>
          <country>Italy</country>
        </postal>
        <email>phiomega.runtime@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Mikerah Quintyne-Collins">
      <organization>HashCloak Inc and Stoffel Labs Inc</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Canada</country>
        </postal>
        <email>mikerah@hashcloak.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Iman Schrock">
      <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>team@emiliaprotocol.ai</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Islam Aboubakarov">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>islamaboubakarov@yahoo.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ammara Gul">
      <organization>Birmingham City University</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>UK</country>
        </postal>
        <email>ammara.gul@bcu.ac.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Venkat Malladi">
      <organization>Verily</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Dallas, TX</city>
          <code>75019</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>vmalladi@verily.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <workgroup>SEAT</workgroup>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <keyword>Intra-handshake attestation</keyword>
    <keyword>Early attestation</keyword>
    <keyword>CVE-2026-33697</keyword>
    <keyword>CVE-2026-92701</keyword>
    <keyword>CVE-2026-92702</keyword>
    <keyword>CVE-2026-100833</keyword>
    <keyword>CVE-2026-100835</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 493?>

<t>The draft aims to provide technical details of <xref target="CVE-2026-100833"/> of CVSS 9.6, <xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-92701"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-92702"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-108362"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-119344"/> of CVSS 9.1, <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> of CVSS 7.5, <xref target="CVE-2026-108361"/> of CVSS 7.2, <xref target="CVE-2026-119345"/> of CVSS 7.2, and 26+ GitHub Security Advisories (GHSAs) against early attestation in the process of getting CVE IDs, which provide substantial technical evidence of how early attestation, such as <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/>, fails in practice, even <strong>without physical access</strong> to the desired machine.
Moreover, since continuous attestation is generally required <xref target="CSA-eBPF"/> <xref target="MITRE-Continuous-Attestation"/>, early attestation adds <strong>unnecessary complexity</strong>.
The results are backed by the research <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>, <xref target="TLS-RA"/>, <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/>, <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> and the artifacts <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/> in state-of-the-art formal analysis tool, ProVerif, under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and review, and have been acknowledged by the relevant stakeholders.
Currently, there is <strong>one CVE of CVSS 9.6, 11 CVEs of CVSS 9.1, one CVE of CVSS 8.2, one CVE of CVSS 7.5, one CVE of CVSS 7.2, and 26+ GHSAs published awaiting CVE IDs against the broader early attestation covering all layers of the ecosystem up to the application</strong>.
The research papers on these are currently either under submission or being prepared for submission.
The artifacts of these papers will be shared with the community under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and review.
Based on our work, all except two implementations of early attestation have been archived, withdrawn, or moved to post-handshake attestation.
In our analysis <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/>, <xref target="ID-Crisis-repo"/>, and <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT) and based on discussions in the CCC Attestation SIG, IETF SEAT WG, IRTF UFMRG, IRTF CFRG, and several other forums, the remaining two implementations of early attestation -- Edgeless Systems Contrast and Meta's AI following withdrawn <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/> -- remain vulnerable due to lack of binding to the underlying connection.
We recommend users of these two implementations to carefully evaluate their systems and understand the risks.
If you are aware of any open-source implementation of early attestation that is not yet covered in this draft, please let us know to responsibly disclose the vulnerabilities to them.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://muhammad-usama-sardar.github.io/intra-handshake-fail/draft-intra-handshake-fail.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 506?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>We first present the executive summary of published GHSAs/CVEs against early attestation and then an overview of the research works that led to those discoveries.</t>
      <section anchor="executive-summary-of-current-status">
        <name>Executive Summary of Current Status</name>
        <t>The table below presents the current status of published GHSAs and CVEs against implementations of early attestation with confirmed scores.
Severity is based on <eref target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss">NIST standard metrics</eref>, where 10.0 is the highest possible vulnerability score. <strong>For TLS reference, Heartbleed was CVSS 7.5</strong>.</t>
        <table>
          <name>Published CVEs/GHSAs for intra-handshake (aka early) attestation</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">CVSS</th>
              <th align="left">Severity</th>
              <th align="left">Number of Published GHSAs</th>
              <th align="left">Number of Published CVEs</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">9.0–10.0</td>
              <td align="left">Critical</td>
              <td align="left">2</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">9.8</td>
              <td align="left">Critical</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">9.6</td>
              <td align="left">Critical</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">9.1</td>
              <td align="left">Critical</td>
              <td align="left">10</td>
              <td align="left">13</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">8.2</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.8</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">2</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.7</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">2</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.6</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.5</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">3</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.4</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">4</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.2</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">2</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.0</td>
              <td align="left">High</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
              <td align="left">2</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">6.5</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">3</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">6.3</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">3</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">5.5</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">5.3</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">4.4</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">4.3</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">4.2</td>
              <td align="left">Medium</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">3.7</td>
              <td align="left">Low</td>
              <td align="left">1</td>
              <td align="left">—</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="intra-handshakefail">
        <name>Intra-handshake.fail</name>
        <t><xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> presents a general approach to analyze the intra-handshake (aka early) attestation proposals, regardless of whether they are within the scope of SEAT charter or not. From a security perspective, one of the key decision factors is the candidate binding mechanism. Some binding mechanisms are within scope of SEAT charter and others are not. The artifacts are available in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/> under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and further research.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>This work resulted in <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> of CVSS 7.5.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="id-crisis">
        <name>ID-Crisis</name>
        <t>A <em>complementary</em> paper <xref target="ID-Crisis"/> presents the identity crisis in pre- and intra-handshake attestation. The formal analysis is available in <xref target="ID-Crisis-repo"/> under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and further research.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="earlyattestationbleed">
        <name>EarlyAttestationBleed</name>
        <t><xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/> presents a formal analysis together with regression tests of the broader attestation ecosystem and discovered three critical-severity vulnerabilities in implementations of early attestation:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Ultraviolet Cocos AI in TDX path resulting in <xref target="CVE-2026-92701"/> of CVSS 9.1.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Ultraviolet Cocos AI in AMD SEV-SNP path resulting in <xref target="CVE-2026-92702"/> of CVSS 9.1.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Edgeless Systems Contrast in policies resulting in <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems2"/> of CVSS 9.0-10.0 and <xref target="CVE-2026-100833"/> of CVSS v3.1 of 9.6.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="architectural-flaws-in-early-attestation">
          <name>Architectural Flaws in Early Attestation</name>
          <t>Sec. 7 of <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/> presents four architectural flaws in early attestation:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>A malicious TLS client retrieves sensitive hardware-level and firmware-level information from the server’s Evidence before the server has authenticated the client.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Early attestation can typically provide information about only boot-time Claims, since
most runtime Claims may not be available at the handshake time.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Re-attestation requires post-handshake attestation. Early attestation thus adds unnecessary complexity.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Early attestation results in high handshake latency, timeouts, and even failures.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="earlyattestationtschss-eat">
        <name>EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT)</name>
        <t><xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> resulted in the following CVEs demonstrating relay and diversion attacks against early attestation implementations/deployments:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Edgeless Systems Contrast</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-112377"/> of CVSS 9.1 against CCC Attestation SIG</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108362"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Privasys</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="CVE-2026-119344"/> of CVSS 9.1 against Cocos AI</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-credits">
      <name>Published GHSAs/CVEs</name>
      <t>The vulnerabilities cover the broader ecosystem, including but not limited to attestation, authentication, authorization, key storage, parsing and resource handling inside the runtime. Any vulnerability in the whole system, and not just attestation, breaks security of the overall system. The key take away is that early attestation adds unnecessary complexity to an already complex system.</t>
      <table>
        <name>GHSAs/CVEs for implementations of early attestation and finders in (roughly) chronological order of publishing -- CVSS scores marked with * are preliminary</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">GHSA/CVE</th>
            <th align="left">CVSS</th>
            <th align="left">Finders</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.8</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, and Jean-Marie Jacquet</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, and Jean-Marie Jacquet</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, and Jean-Marie Jacquet</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.4</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI2"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI3"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems2"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.0-10.0</td>
            <td align="left">Markus Rudy; independently by Songbo Bu and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rustls"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-go"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eov"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eom"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-da"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.4</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-tcu"/></td>
            <td align="left">6.3</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-92701"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-92702"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-83194"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-83192"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-322v-xwfj-63cm">GHSA-322v-xwfj-63cm</eref></td>
            <td align="left">9.8</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-m9p9-3hxp-4j6j">GHSA-m9p9-3hxp-4j6j</eref></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-ppc4-fg56-x397">GHSA-ppc4-fg56-x397</eref></td>
            <td align="left">6.5</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-6j47-3cm6-9cg6">GHSA-6j47-3cm6-9cg6</eref></td>
            <td align="left">8.2</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-4755-rh6c-694j">GHSA-4755-rh6c-694j</eref></td>
            <td align="left">7.4</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8q-88mv-c8vr">GHSA-6f8q-88mv-c8vr</eref></td>
            <td align="left">6.3</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-qqq3-6c47-684v">GHSA-qqq3-6c47-684v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-xxr6-w252-4ggx">GHSA-xxr6-w252-4ggx</eref></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-fmrx-fjqw-37gp">GHSA-fmrx-fjqw-37gp</eref></td>
            <td align="left">7.7</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-f96w-jjf8-xpw3">GHSA-f96w-jjf8-xpw3</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.3</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-fqrx-3wc2-4g49">GHSA-fqrx-3wc2-4g49</eref></td>
            <td align="left">4.4</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-mrgr-34cc-fcg8">GHSA-mrgr-34cc-fcg8</eref></td>
            <td align="left">3.7</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-wqf9-jfmm-f68v">GHSA-wqf9-jfmm-f68v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">4.2</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems3"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.7</td>
            <td align="left">Sebastian Jylanki</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems4"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.8</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI4"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.4</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI5"/></td>
            <td align="left">6.3</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems6"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.6</td>
            <td align="left">Markus Rudy; independently by Songbo Bu and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-100833"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.6</td>
            <td align="left">Markus Rudy; independently by Songbo Bu and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-87853"/></td>
            <td align="left">8.6</td>
            <td align="left">Markus Rudy; independently by Songbo Bu and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-87851"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-q46g-34w4-vhmp">GHSA-wqf9-jfmm-f68v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">Moderate</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar; independently by XOR</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-jj9v-7353-35cv">GHSA-jj9v-7353-35cv</eref></td>
            <td align="left">9.0-10.0</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar; independently by XOR</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-9rfg-55gm-hwvw">GHSA-9rfg-55gm-hwvw</eref></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-ccfw-q8vr-cww3">GHSA-ccfw-q8vr-cww3</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.5</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-ffg7-hfjp-rj7v">GHSA-ffg7-hfjp-rj7v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">6.5</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-cxxj-pvvx-6xcv">GHSA-cxxj-pvvx-6xcv</eref></td>
            <td align="left">4.3</td>
            <td align="left">Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/veraison/services/security/advisories/GHSA-pv6g-4385-q8c8">GHSA-pv6g-4385-q8c8</eref></td>
            <td align="left">6.5</td>
            <td align="left">Chengxin Huang, Songbo Bu, and Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-95996"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-95997"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96017"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96018"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96019"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-112377"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest/security/advisories/GHSA-x3w3-7mvg-hxw5">GHSA-x3w3-7mvg-hxw5</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.9</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest/security/advisories/GHSA-jr5r-w684-fg5m">GHSA-jr5r-w684-fg5m</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.9</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-119344"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-119345"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.2</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-129092"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.0</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBA</td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBA</td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">TBA</td>
            <td align="left">7.0</td>
            <td align="left">Muhammad Usama Sardar and Songbo Bu</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="intra-handshakefail-1">
      <name>Intra-handshake.fail</name>
      <section anchor="overview">
        <name>Overview</name>
        <t><xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> presents the formal specification and analysis of the candidate binding mechanisms for binding in intra-handshake attestation for standardization for attested TLS protocols:</t>
        <table>
          <name>Binding mechanisms, implementations and ProVerif artifacts</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">No.</th>
              <th align="left">Binding mechanism</th>
              <th align="left">Used in</th>
              <th align="left">Artifacts</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">1.</td>
              <td align="left">Client’s TLS nonce</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder1">binder1</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">2.</td>
              <td align="left">Client’s attestation nonce</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder2">binder2</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">3.</td>
              <td align="left">Early exporter</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder3">binder3</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">4.</td>
              <td align="left">Server’s public key</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder4">binder4</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">5.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2 and #3</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder5">binder5</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">6.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2 and #4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/meetings/blob/main/materials/MarkusRudy.contrast-atls-ccc-attestation.pdf">Edgeless Systems Contrast</eref>; <eref target="https://www.sns-itrust6g.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Webinar-Architecting-Trust-CONFIDENTIAL6G.pdf">Cocos AI v0.8.2</eref>;  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref>'s adopted project <eref target="https://github.com/ccc-attestation/attested-tls-poc">intra-handshake attestation</eref>; <eref target="https://ai.meta.com/static-resource/private-processing-technical-whitepaper">Meta's AI updated spec</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder6">binder6</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2, #3, and #4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-06"/></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder7">binder7</eref></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
We provide a formal proof of insecurity of all the above candidate
binding mechanisms of intra-handshake attestation using the
state-of-the-art tool ProVerif and propose a mitigation for the
discovered security vulnerabilities. Our study reveals that it may
not be possible to achieve strong application-traffic (level 3)
binding using intra-handshake attestation alone. This can be exploited
for relay attacks, where an attacker makes a client accept an evidence
from a different machine. So the client cannot be sure that it connects
to its desired server.
]]></artwork>
        <t>We responsibly disclosed the vulnerability in intra-handshake attestation -- as noted in <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/> issued -- to the vendors, which resulted in  <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> of CVSS 7.5.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="modeling-other-binding-mechanisms">
        <name>Modeling Other Binding Mechanisms</name>
        <t>The artifacts are quite flexible for modification and testing of different intra-handshake attestation binding mechanisms by simply changing single <tt>rdata</tt> parameter in the Client and Server processes. Folder <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/aggregate">aggregate</eref> contains all analyzed and proposed binding mechanisms in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> to select via comment and uncomment. Other folders contain one specific binding mechanism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="seat-early-attestation">
        <name>SEAT-Early-Attestation</name>
        <t>The draft <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/> is an extension of the provably vulnerable (and withdrawn) draft <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/> with the following two main changes from a formal perspective:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Binder has been updated</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Optional post-handshake attestation part has been added for re-attestation</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The current binder in <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/> does not prevent relay attacks as there is no <strong>shared secret</strong> in the binder. In addition to the formal analysis in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>, see <xref target="TLS-RA"/> for arguments why shared secret is necessary to prevent relay attacks.</t>
        <t>Post-handshake attestation part may prevent relay attacks, but then the <strong>additional complexity</strong> of intra-handshake attestation is unjustified.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="threat-model">
      <name>Threat Model</name>
      <t>The threat model is explained in Sec. 6.1 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> and Sec. 4 of <xref target="ID-Crisis"/>.</t>
      <t>Beyond post-generation leakage of <tt>privEK</tt> considered in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>, the same adversary capability may arise from failures during key generation or entropy provisioning. Platform-attestation keys and workload-controlled TLS keys belong to distinct key-generation domains: for example, in AMD SEV-SNP the VCEK is derived by SNP firmware from chip-unique secrets and a TCB version, while several other platform secrets are specified as CSRNG-generated; by contrast, <tt>privEK</tt> and TLS (EC)DHE private values are typically generated by software executing inside the confidential VM using the guest OS or cryptographic-library random subsystem. Furthermore, SEV-SNP <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt> is supplied by the guest and incorporated into the signed attestation report without being interpreted by SNP firmware; consequently, valid Evidence can authenticate a binding value without attesting the entropy provenance, generation procedure, or exclusive possession of the corresponding private key. The <tt>LEK(privEK)</tt> capability should therefore also encompass predictable or repeated key generation caused by deficient entropy, cloned or rolled-back DRBG state, defective software or firmware, or malicious provisioning. <eref target="https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7055.html">CVE-2025-62626</eref> provides a concrete manufacturer-layer fault model: affected AMD Zen 5 processors could return insufficiently random values from certain <tt>RDSEED</tt> forms while incorrectly signaling success. This does not establish compromise of the AMD-SP-internal CSRNG or of a specific attested-TLS implementation, but demonstrates that ideal-randomness assumptions can fail below the protocol layer; software dependencies such as OpenSSL's <tt>--with-rand-seed=rdcpu</tt> (<eref target="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.5.0/INSTALL.md">OpenSSL 3.5.0 INSTALL.md</eref>), which can use <tt>RDSEED</tt> or <tt>RDRAND</tt> as CSPRNG seed input, illustrate a possible propagation path from hardware entropy interfaces to workload TLS key generation.</t>
      <section anchor="low-level-mapping-of-the-system-model">
        <name>Low-Level Mapping of the System Model</name>
        <t>Figure 2 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> provides a TEE-agnostic protocol-level
abstraction. For a low-level view, the following table maps the abstract
components to representative Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP implementations.</t>
        <table>
          <name>Mapping of the abstract system model to representative CC implementations</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Fig. 2 element</th>
              <th align="left">Intel TDX</th>
              <th align="left">AMD SEV-SNP</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>Physical Machine</strong></td>
              <td align="left">TDX-capable Intel platform</td>
              <td align="left">SEV-SNP-capable AMD platform</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>CC Platform</strong></td>
              <td align="left">CPU HW + TDX Module + attestation infrastructure</td>
              <td align="left">CPU HW + AMD-SP/SNP (system) firmware + RMP/SEV machinery</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>Quoting Agent</strong></td>
              <td align="left">TD QE</td>
              <td align="left">AMD-SP / SNP attestation (VM) firmware</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>Confidential VM</strong></td>
              <td align="left">Trust Domain (TD)</td>
              <td align="left">Part of SNP confidential VM</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>Network stack</strong></td>
              <td align="left">Part of guest OS + TLS library inside TD</td>
              <td align="left">Part of guest OS + TLS library inside SNP guest</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong>HSM/TPM</strong></td>
              <td align="left">Secure element</td>
              <td align="left">Secure element</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong><tt>privAK</tt></strong></td>
              <td align="left">Attestation key of TD Quoting Enclave</td>
              <td align="left">VCEK/VLEK signing key</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong><tt>privEK</tt></strong></td>
              <td align="left">Workload/TLS-side ephemeral key</td>
              <td align="left">Workload/TLS-side ephemeral key</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <strong><tt>privLTK</tt></strong></td>
              <td align="left">Long-term key in secure element</td>
              <td align="left">Long-term key in secure element</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The key material shown in the abstract model belongs to different implementation
and trust domains. The following table provides a corresponding low-level view.</t>
        <table>
          <name>Low-level implementation and key-generation domains</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Component/key</th>
              <th align="left">Runs/lives where?</th>
              <th align="left">Type</th>
              <th align="left">Randomness/key source</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TLS ECDHE</td>
              <td align="left">Inside network stack</td>
              <td align="left">Network stack</td>
              <td align="left">OS/library CSPRNG</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>privEK</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Inside confidential VM</td>
              <td align="left">Guest software</td>
              <td align="left">OS/library CSPRNG</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">AK</td>
              <td align="left">Quoting Agent</td>
              <td align="left">Firmware/enclave/platform key hierarchy</td>
              <td align="left">Platform-specific</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Memory-encryption key</td>
              <td align="left">CC Platform</td>
              <td align="left">Hardware/firmware managed</td>
              <td align="left">Platform RNG/KDF</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>REPORT_DATA</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Created by Guest Software</td>
              <td align="left">Data binding</td>
              <td align="left">No independent entropy requirement</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Per-VM memory-encryption key is used to encrypt confidential VM's RAM.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="detailed-vulnerability-disclosure-timeline-and-public-acknowledgements-by-affected-vendors">
      <name>Detailed Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline and Public Acknowledgements by Affected Vendors</name>
      <table>
        <name>Detailed vulnerability disclosure timeline and acknowledgements</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Event</th>
            <th align="left">Date</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Our initial responsible disclosure to vendor</td>
            <td align="left">07 Oct, 2025</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Acknowledgement by vendor</td>
            <td align="left">14 Dec, 2025</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Information to the <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/6gbqx0XY8WYrH3Mx4vO8n2-uKgY/">IETF</eref></td>
            <td align="left">11 Jan, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://web.archive.org/web/20260227160554/https://www.ultraviolet.rs/blog/tee-tls-privacy/">Public announcement</eref> by vendor</td>
            <td align="left">27 Feb, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Cocos AI published <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.8)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">23 March, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> published  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">26 March, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">26 March, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/rustls/releases/tag/privasys-v0.8.1">Acknowledgment</eref> by Privasys for rustls <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/go/releases/tag/privasys-v0.5.1-go1.26.5">Acknowledgment</eref> by Privasys for go <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">10 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://github.com/ccc-attestation/attested-tls-poc">CCC implementation</eref> declared <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58">vulnerable to relay attacks</eref></td>
            <td align="left">17 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Vulnerable <eref target="https://github.com/ccc-attestation/attested-tls-poc">CCC implementation repo</eref> archived</td>
            <td align="left">22 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Vulnerable draft <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/> withdrawn by authors</td>
            <td align="left">23 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Edgeless Systems published <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">29 July, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Cocos AI published <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI2"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">16 August, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Cocos AI published <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI3"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">16 August, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Edgeless Systems published <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems2"/> [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0-10.0)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">24 August, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> archived</td>
            <td align="left">2 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rustls"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">3 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-go"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">3 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eov"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">3 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eom"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">3 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">3 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys archived early attestation in rustls and moved to post-handshake attestation</td>
            <td align="left">4 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys archived early attestation in go and moved to post-handshake attestation</td>
            <td align="left">4 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-da"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">6 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-tcu"/> [<strong>Severity = MEDIUM (CVSS 6.3)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">6 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-92701"/> published [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">18 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-92702"/> published [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">18 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-83194"/> [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">18 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-83192"/> [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">18 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-322v-xwfj-63cm">GHSA-322v-xwfj-63cm</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-m9p9-3hxp-4j6j">GHSA-m9p9-3hxp-4j6j</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-ppc4-fg56-x397">GHSA-ppc4-fg56-x397</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-6j47-3cm6-9cg6">GHSA-6j47-3cm6-9cg6</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-4755-rh6c-694j">GHSA-4755-rh6c-694j</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-6f8q-88mv-c8vr">GHSA-6f8q-88mv-c8vr</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-qqq3-6c47-684v">GHSA-qqq3-6c47-684v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-xxr6-w252-4ggx">GHSA-xxr6-w252-4ggx</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-fmrx-fjqw-37gp">GHSA-fmrx-fjqw-37gp</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-fmrx-fjqw-37gp">GHSA-f96w-jjf8-xpw3</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-fqrx-3wc2-4g49">GHSA-fqrx-3wc2-4g49</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-mrgr-34cc-fcg8">GHSA-mrgr-34cc-fcg8</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Privasys published <eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-wqf9-jfmm-f68v">GHSA-wqf9-jfmm-f68v</eref></td>
            <td align="left">19 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Edgeless Systems published <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems3"/></td>
            <td align="left">24 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Edgeless Systems published <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems4"/></td>
            <td align="left">24 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Cocos AI published <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI4"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">25 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Cocos AI published <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI5"/>  [<strong>Severity = MODERATE (CVSS 6.3)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">25 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">27 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-87851"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">27 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-100833"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.6)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">27 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-87853"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.6)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">27 September, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-95996"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-95997"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-96017"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-96018"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-96019"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">9 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108361"/> published  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.2)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">12 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-97782"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.2)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">12 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-108362"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">12 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-97781"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">12 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CVE <xref target="CVE-2026-112377"/> published  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">19 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ENISA published EUVD <xref target="EUVD-2026-104535"/>  [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">19 Ocgtober, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">WCM published <eref target="https://github.com/agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest/security/advisories/GHSA-x3w3-7mvg-hxw5">GHSA-x3w3-7mvg-hxw5</eref> [<strong>Severity = MEDIUM (CVSS 5.9)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">19 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">WCM published <eref target="https://github.com/agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest/security/advisories/GHSA-jr5r-w684-fg5m">GHSA-jr5r-w684-fg5m</eref> [<strong>Severity = MEDIUM (CVSS 5.9)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">19 October, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-119344"/> published [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">2 November, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-119345"/> published [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.2)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">2 November, 2026</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-129092"/> published [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.0)</strong>]</td>
            <td align="left">13 November, 2026</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t><strong>Neither the GHSAs nor the CVEs have any dependency whatsoever on the considered threat model with <tt>WeakHash</tt>, <tt>WeakDH</tt>, or <tt>BadElement</tt>.</strong> They hold independent of those, i.e., with <tt>StrongHash</tt> and <tt>StrongDH</tt> and all good elements within a group.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="eu-enisa">
      <name>EU ENISA</name>
      <t>European Union's <eref target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/homepage">ENISA</eref> has independently published the following EUVDs to acknowledge the vulnerabilities.</t>
      <table>
        <name>ENISA's issued EUVDs</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">EUVD</th>
            <th align="left">CVSS</th>
            <th align="left">Severity</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-83194"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-83192"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-87851"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-87853"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.6</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-95996"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-95997"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96017"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96018"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-96019"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-97782"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.2</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-97781"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EUVD-2026-104535"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-cvss-scores">
      <name>Comparison with Other Vulnerabilities in Confidential Computing Literature</name>
      <t>Severity is based on <eref target="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss">NIST metrics</eref>.</t>
      <table>
        <name>Comparison with other vulnerabilities in confidential computing literature</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Vulnerability</th>
            <th align="left">CVE</th>
            <th align="left">CVSS</th>
            <th align="left">Severity</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://wiretap.fail/files/wiretap.pdf">wiretap.fail</eref></td>
            <td align="left">No CVE (<eref target="https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/announcement/intel-security-announcement-2025-10-28-001.html">Intel</eref> and <eref target="https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3040.html">AMD</eref> announcements)</td>
            <td align="left">-</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://tee.fail/files/paper.pdf">TEE.fail</eref></td>
            <td align="left">No CVE</td>
            <td align="left">-</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://ddropattack.eu/ddrop.pdf">DDRop</eref></td>
            <td align="left">No CVE (<eref target="https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/announcement/intel-security-announcement-2026-08-11-001.html">Intel</eref> and <eref target="https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3048.html">AMD</eref> announcements)</td>
            <td align="left">-</td>
            <td align="left">None</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3690230">TDXdown</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/announcement/intel-security-announcement-2024-10-08-001.html">Intel</eref></td>
            <td align="left">2.5</td>
            <td align="left">Low</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://xca-attacks.github.io/staleus/staleus_usenix26.pdf">Staleus</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-54509">CVE-2025-54509</eref></td>
            <td align="left">4.0</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://xca-attacks.github.io/breakfast/breakfast_oakland26.pdf">BreakFAST</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-6197">CVE-2025-61972</eref></td>
            <td align="left">4.2</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://badram.eu/badram.pdf">BadRAM</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3015.html">CVE-2024-21944</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.3</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://xca-attacks.github.io/breakfast/breakfast_oakland26.pdf">BreakFAST</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-61971">CVE-2025-61971</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.9</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://xca-attacks.github.io/fabricked/fabricked_usenix26.pdf">Fabricked</eref></td>
            <td align="left">
              <eref target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=cve-2025-54510">CVE-2025-54510</eref></td>
            <td align="left">5.9</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/></td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/></td>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/></td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-92701"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/></td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-92702"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/></td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-100833"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.6</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-112377"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108362"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> (EAT)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/></td>
            <td align="left">9.1</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>The comparison of the above with CVSS up to <strong>10.0</strong> for early attestation indicates that it is not mature yet compared to the rest of the confidential computing stack, and is currently one of the weakest links in the ecosystem.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="more-cves">
      <name>More CVEs</name>
      <t>Further code review and formal analysis has led to the following potential CVEs for intra-handshake (aka early) attestation (currently under review and disclosure):</t>
      <table>
        <name>Expected CVEs for intra-handshake (aka early) attestation under review</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">CVSS</th>
            <th align="left">Severity</th>
            <th align="left">Number of CVEs</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">9.0–10.0</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
            <td align="left">3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">9.8</td>
            <td align="left">Critical</td>
            <td align="left">2</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">8.7</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">7.8</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">3</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">7.7</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">2</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">7.6</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">7.5</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">6</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">7.4</td>
            <td align="left">High</td>
            <td align="left">13</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">6.5</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">10</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">6.3</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">10</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">5.5</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">5.3</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">4.4</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">4.3</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">4.2</td>
            <td align="left">Medium</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">3.7</td>
            <td align="left">Low</td>
            <td align="left">1</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>These are preliminary estimates of scores, not final assigned score. They are still under review.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="vulnerable-implementations">
      <name>Vulnerable Implementations</name>
      <t>As demonstrated in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> and <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/>, at least the following intra-handshake implementations are vulnerable:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><eref target="https://ai.meta.com/static-resource/private-processing-technical-whitepaper">Meta's AI</eref>: <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> and <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><eref target="https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast">Edgeless Systems Contrast</eref>: <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> and <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Both violate the fundamental requirement in SEAT charter of binding to connection.</t>
      <t>While <xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/> and <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems5"/> [<strong>Severity = CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)</strong>] are patched in Contrast v1.16.0, <strong>users of Edgeless Systems Contrast need to trust Edgeless Systems for the provided hardware identifiers</strong>. This keeps Edgeless Systems within the TCB.</t>
      <t>If you are aware of any other intra-handshake attestation implementation, please let us know so that we can check and responsibly disclose the vulnerabilities to them.</t>
      <section anchor="archivedmitigated-implementations">
        <name>Archived/Mitigated Implementations</name>
        <t>The following intra-handshake implementations were vulnerable and have been <strong>archived</strong> or moved to <strong>post</strong>-handshake attestation:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref>'s adopted project <eref target="https://github.com/ccc-attestation/attested-tls-poc">intra-handshake attestation</eref>: declared <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc/pull/58">vulnerable to relay attacks</eref> and <strong>archived</strong></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos">Cocos AI &lt;= v0.8.2</eref>: <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/>  [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.8)</strong>], <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> and <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.5)</strong>]; <strong>migrated</strong> to post-handshake attestation since v0.9.0</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/rustls">Privasys rustls &lt;= privasys-v0.2.0</eref>: <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rustls"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>], <strong>archived</strong> and Privasys migrated to post-handshake attestation</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://github.com/Privasys/go">Privasys go &lt;= privasys-v0.3.0-go1.26.5</eref>: <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-go"/> [<strong>Severity = HIGH (CVSS 7.4)</strong>], <strong>archived</strong> and Privasys migrated to post-handshake attestation</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="vulnerable-protocol-specifications">
      <name>Vulnerable Protocol Specifications</name>
      <t>At least the following protocol specifications with intra-handshake attestation <em>path</em> are vulnerable to <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> and <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-09"/>: symbolic proof of insecurity; <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/> <strong>withdrawn</strong> after the CVE</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/>: symbolic proof of insecurity; draft <strong>archived</strong>
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>violates G3 property in our analysis</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>unnecessary complexity is itself a security concern</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/>: symbolic and (paper-and-pen-based) computational proof of insecurity (originally done for -04 and applies also to -06, -07, and -08)
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>As a SEAT WG participant pointed out, please note that both <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/> and <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/> contain a link to <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/> that contains a link to <xref target="SEAT-vulnerability-report"/> that contains the G3 property (cf. <xref target="sec-corr-goals"/>) that this draft does not satisfy.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Some WG participants successfully reproduced the vulnerability by substituting the right value of <tt>rdata</tt> in the shared formal model <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/> that led to the CVE.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>An informal reasoning is that binder is not <strong>directly</strong> derived from any <strong>shared secret</strong> in this draft.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Unnecessary complexity</strong> is itself a security concern</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <table>
        <name>Summary of vulnerable early attestation drafts</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Spec</th>
            <th align="left">Status</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/></td>
            <td align="left">Withdrawn</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/></td>
            <td align="left">Archived</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/></td>
            <td align="left">Vulnerable</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-binding-levels">
      <name>Binding Levels</name>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>DH shared secret (<tt>gxy</tt>) used as shared secret between client and server</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Handshake traffic key (<tt>htsc</tt>) used for encryption of handshake messages</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Application traffic key (<tt>atsc</tt>) used for encryption of application data</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Please see Sec. 6.2 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> for details.</t>
      <t>In early attestation, Evidence must be conveyed before the server Finished message, and no later carrier is available: SEAT charter precludes modification of the TLS protocol, so no new handshake message can be introduced to convey Evidence after server authentication. Level 3 is therefore unachievable in early attestation alone.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-corr-goals">
      <name>Security Properties (Correlation Goals)</name>
      <t>We consider TLS Server as RATS Attester, which is typical in confidential computing.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Correlation of Evidence to a DH Shared Secret (G1)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Correlation of Evidence to Client’s Handshake Traffic Key (G2)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Correlation of Evidence to Client’s Application Traffic Key (G3)</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Please see Sec. 6.3 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> for details.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="main-results">
      <name>Main Results</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>All analyzed binding mechanisms and the corresponding implementations of intra-handshake attestation are vulnerable to relay attacks.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Early exporter helps achieve level 1 binding.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Our proposed mechanism helps achieve level 2 binding.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It may not be possible to achieve level 3 in intra-handshake attestation alone without additional assumptions.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <table>
        <name>Main results</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Property</th>
            <th align="left">Mechanism #1,2,4,6</th>
            <th align="left">Mechanism #3,5,7</th>
            <th align="left">Proposed mechanism</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">G1 : Correlation of Evidence to <tt>gxy</tt></td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
            <td align="left">✅</td>
            <td align="left">✅</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">G2 : Correlation of Evidence to <tt>kch</tt></td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
            <td align="left">✅</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">G3 : Correlation of Evidence to <tt>kc</tt></td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
            <td align="left">❌</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>Please see Sec. 7.1 and Figure 5 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> for details of attacks.</t>
      <section anchor="expected-results">
        <name>Expected Results</name>
        <table>
          <name>Expected results</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">No.</th>
              <th align="left">Binding mechanism</th>
              <th align="left">Artifacts</th>
              <th align="left">Expected results</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">1.</td>
              <td align="left">Client’s TLS nonce</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder1/">binder1</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder1/log.txt">binder1</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">2.</td>
              <td align="left">Client’s attestation nonce</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder2/">binder2</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder2/log.txt">binder2</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">3.</td>
              <td align="left">Early exporter</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder3/">binder3</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder3/log.txt">binder3</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">4.</td>
              <td align="left">Server’s public key</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder4/">binder4</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder4/log.txt">binder4</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">5.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2 and #3</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder5/">binder5</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder5/log.txt">binder5</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">6.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2 and #4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder6/">binder6</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder6/log.txt">binder6</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">7.</td>
              <td align="left">Combination of #2, #3, and #4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder7/">binder7</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/binder7/log.txt">binder7</eref></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">8.</td>
              <td align="left">Proposed</td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/proposal/">proposal</eref></td>
              <td align="left">
                <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail/tree/main/proposal/log.txt">proposal</eref></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implications-of-findings">
      <name>Implications of Findings</name>
      <section anchor="implications-of-findings-for-ietf-seat-wg">
        <name>Implications of Findings for IETF SEAT WG</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>We believe post-handshake attestation alone, such as <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-seat-expat/">draft-fossati-seat-expat</eref>, can achieve level 3 binding.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Post-handshake attestation requires one additional round trip, in which the Verifying Relying Party conveys the attestation nonce and receives Evidence in return. This is cheaper than re-establishing the connection for each attestation, and it is the only placement that correlates Evidence to an already authenticated peer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The research suggests that recent hybrid proposals (combination of intra-handshake attestation and post-handshake attestation) <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/> and <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> may add <strong>unnecessary complexity</strong> of intra-handshake attestation without adding any security benefit compared to post-handshake attestation alone, such as <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-seat-expat/">draft-fossati-seat-expat</eref>. We are not aware of any <strong>security property</strong> that hybrid proposals can achieve that post-handshake attestation alone cannot achieve.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>As demonstrated by our symbolic analysis using ProVerif, the protocol specifications <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/> and <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> remain vulnerable to CVE-2026-33697. We have also proved that <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation-04"/> and <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/> violate the security theorems in the computational model.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="implications-of-findings-for-ietf-lake-wg">
        <name>Implications of Findings for IETF LAKE WG</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Similar problems occur for protocol specification <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-ra/">lake-ra</eref>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="implications-of-findings-for-ietf-tls-wg">
        <name>Implications of Findings for IETF TLS WG</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-09"/> is vulnerable to <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/>. Thankfully, the authors have withdrawn <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Remote attestation <em>within</em> the handshake is very dangerous, since to our knowledge, it is one of the highest scored published vulnerabilities in confidential computing literature (see <xref target="sec-cvss-scores"/>). For reference, <strong>Heartbleed</strong> was <strong>7.5 CVSS</strong>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Given the high- and critical-severity vulnerabilities, we recommend
that the developers and maintainers of intra-handshake attestation MUST
urgently move to post-handshake attestation.
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="implications-of-findings-for-agent2agent">
        <name>Implications of Findings for Agent2Agent</name>
        <t>The findings of published CVEs/GHSAs up to 10.0 (presented in <xref target="sec-credits"/>) show that intra-handshake attestation can introduce significant security risks for AI agents when relied upon as a security mechanism.</t>
        <t>Attestation can provide evidence about an agent’s technical state, but such evidence should not be equated with governability. For a relying party, governability also depends on whether the agent’s identity, authority and permissions remain aligned with the intended interaction, whether responsibility for its actions can be attributed, and whether authorized parties retain the practical ability to intervene effectively and in time. The findings in this draft reinforce that distinction by showing that even the binding between attestation evidence and the intended session can fail. Successful attestation should therefore be treated as one input into governance, rather than as sufficient evidence that an AI agent remains under effective control.</t>
        <t>In Agent2Agent interactions, this distinction also matters over time and across delegation chains. Attestation evidence obtained at one point does not, by itself, establish that an agent's subsequent actions remain within the authority granted for a particular task, that changes in permissions or delegation have been accounted for, or that intervention remains feasible as agents interact. Relying parties should therefore consider how authorization boundaries, attribution, monitoring, and timely suspension or revocation are maintained throughout the interaction. These are operational governance considerations, not additional security properties established by the formal analysis in this draft.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="technical-details">
      <name>Technical Details</name>
      <section anchor="tool">
        <name>Tool</name>
        <t>We use state-of-the-art symbolic security analysis tool <eref target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833653">ProVerif</eref> for the specification of the protocols.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="modeling">
        <name>Modeling</name>
        <t>The formal model uses the <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis/tree/main/TLS-a/fix">fixed version of diversion attacks in intra-handshake attestation</eref> from our previous work as the starting point to focus on relay attacks in intra-handshake attestation in this work.
The rationale is that we consider it more useful to show the added value of this contribution to the community by using the <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis/tree/main/TLS-a/fix">fixed version of diversion attacks in intra-handshake attestation</eref> as the baseline, rather than showing the same diversion attacks from <xref target="ID-Crisis"/>, and the discovered CVE (<xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/>) -- which the previous analysis could not find -- practically demonstrates the added value.
This modeling choice makes it clear that even with the diversion attacks fixed, high-severity relay attacks would still remain in intra-handshake attestation.</t>
        <t>Note: Similar to the <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis/tree/main/TLS-a/fix">fixed version of diversion attacks in intra-handshake attestation</eref> from our previous work, we model non-PSK-based handshake.
From <xref target="ID-Crisis"/>:</t>
        <ul empty="true">
          <li>
            <t>For modeling TLS 1.3, we consider handshakes based on Diffie-Hellman over either finite fields or elliptic curves, represented as (EC)DHE. This is because we are unaware of any publicly available specification or implementation of attested TLS with PSK-based handshakes.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>While it would be nice to model PSK-based handshake, the rationale is that the correlation properties studied in this work do not necessarily require it.</t>
        <t>Note that this scope restriction does not weaken the level 2 limit of early attestation (cf. <xref target="sec-binding-levels"/>). In a PSK-based handshake, the client's application traffic key is still derived from a transcript that includes the server Finished message. Evidence conveyed earlier in the handshake can therefore not be correlated to it, so G3 remains unachievable and the level 2 limit holds for PSK-based handshakes as well.</t>
        <t>Note: The artifacts consider the case of server authentication only, as client authentication is optional in TLS 1.3. No claims are made about other configurations.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="properties">
        <name>Properties</name>
        <t>Properties in <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> are complemetary to properties in <xref target="ID-Crisis"/>. Sec. 8 of <xref target="ID-Crisis"/> mentions:</t>
        <ul empty="true">
          <li>
            <t>We emphasize that both diversion and relay attacks are orthogonal and thus the two works are complementary.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="technical-vulnerability-report">
        <name>Technical Vulnerability Report</name>
        <t>Technical vulnerability report is available at <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>. It is published at ESORICS 2026.</t>
        <section anchor="vulnerabilities">
          <name>Vulnerabilities</name>
          <t>Sec. 7.1 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> presents the technical details with abstract attack traces of the vulnerabilities.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="mitigations">
          <name>Mitigations</name>
          <t>Sec. 7.2 of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> presents the technical details of the proposed mitigation.
Sec. 9 of <xref target="ID-Crisis"/> offers 6 solutions.
Sec. 4 and 5 of <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/> offer mitigations.
Sec. 7 of <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/> offers mitigations.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="artifacts">
        <name>Artifacts</name>
        <t>Artifacts are available at <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail-repo"/> under Apache-2.0 License.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-news">
      <name>Media Coverage</name>
      <t>Several cybersecurity and media professionals and bloggers have covered the vulnerabilities to protect the community from the harm of early attestation.</t>
      <t>If you have written an article on this and would like to be added here, please send us a PR at <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail">https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail</eref> or an email with the subject "Media coverage of EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT)/EarlyAttestationBleed/Intra-handshake.fail."</t>
      <section anchor="earlyattestationtschss-eat-1">
        <name>EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT)</name>
        <t><xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/></t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/dWq3C4iisYNpgLogz7za-g">KK Security Talk</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://www.anquan114.com/archives/7472">Security 114</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://al-ice.ai/posts/2026/10/privasys-ra-tls-five-cves-channel-binding-self-disclosure/">al-ice.ai</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.freenode.com/digest/766">freenode</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://nhimg.org/articles/attested-tls-relay-flaws-show-where-confidential-computing-binding-fails/">NHI Management Group</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://nhimg.org/community/nhi-breaches/attested-tls-relay-attacks-what-do-security-teams-need-to-change/">NHI Forum</eref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-100835">
          <name>CVE-2026-100835</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-100835"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://radar.offseq.com/threat/contrast-before-1160-is-susceptible-to-remote-attestation-relay-attacks-cve-2026-100835-3833ee713219f7e3">Threat radar</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://buttondown.com/vulnfeed/archive/vulnfeed-2-critical-cves-2026-09-27-0400-utc/">vulnfeed</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://www.ervik.as/cves/CVE-2026-100835">ervik</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://securityvulnerability.io/vulnerability/CVE-2026-100835">securityvulnerability.io</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CIRCL's <eref target="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-100835">vulnerability</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-112377">
          <name>CVE-2026-112377</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-112377"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://shellbulletin.com/section/vulnerabilities/shut-down-ccc-attestation-tls-poc-on-open/">shellbulletin</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/top-vulnerabilidades-cr%C3%ADticas-20-10-2026/id1877409819?i=1000797192823&amp;l=zh-Hans-CN">Apple podcast</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://www.hackerstorm.com/nvd/search/cveTestReport.php?id=CVE-2026-112377">Hackerstorm</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108362">
          <name>CVE-2026-108362</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108362"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://datasafetimes.com/topic/vulnerabilities/cvss-9-1-privasys-ra-tls-clients-0-11-0-fixes/">datasafetimes</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://firewallchronicle.com/topic/vulnerabilities/privasys-ra-tls-clients-identity-validation-flaw/">firewallchronicle</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://podcasts.apple.com/pl/podcast/top-vulnerabilidades-cr%C3%ADticas-13-10-2026/id1877409819?i=1000796060867&amp;l=pl">Apple podcast</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://phishherald.com/topic/vulnerabilities/orgs-face-impersonation-risk-privasys-ra-tls/">Phish Herald</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108265">
          <name>CVE-2026-108265</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108265"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://circuitobserver.com/section/vulnerabilities/9-1-cve-allows-relay-attack-on-privasys-enclave/">circuitobserver</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://techwirebeat.com/topic/vulnerabilities/organisations-at-risk-privasys-sgx-apps-face/">techwirebeat</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://www.acidpeak.com/product/privasys-enclave-os-mini/">acidpeak</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108266">
          <name>CVE-2026-108266</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108266"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://honeypotdaily.com/category/vulnerabilities/can-attackers-impersonate-privasys-rustls/">honeypotdaily</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://techsecobserver.com/section/vulnerabilities/privasys-rustls-v0-8-1-patches-cve-2026-108266-to/">techsecobserver</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://techsecheadlines.com/section/vulnerabilities/privasys-rustls-ra-tls-binding-flaw-cve-2026/">techsecheadlines</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://cloudsecpulse.com/c/vulnerabilities/orgs-at-risk-critical-privasys-rustls-bug/">cloudsecpulse</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://datasaferadar.com/section/vulnerabilities/privasys-rustls-quote-relay-flaw-bypasses/">datasaferadar</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108267">
          <name>CVE-2026-108267</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108267"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://vectorupdate.com/news/vulnerabilities/update-privasys-go-to-v0-5-1-to-stop-attackers/">vectorupdate</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://cloudsecpulse.com/c/vulnerabilities/privasys-go-flaw-lets-attackers-relay-attestation/">cloudsecpulse</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://redteamtribune.com/topic/vulnerabilities/privasys-go-quote-relay-bug-bypasses-attestation/">redteamtribune</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://darkwebdispatch.com/topic/vulnerabilities/patch-privasys-go-before-v0-5-1-to-block-critical/">darkwebdispatch</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108268">
          <name>CVE-2026-108268</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108268"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://vulnpost.com/news/vulnerabilities/privasys-enclave-os-tls-quote-relay-bug-bypasses/">vulnpost</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://malwarechronicle.com/category/vulnerabilities/update-privasys-enclave-os-now-to-block-critical/">malwarechronicle</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://avd.aliyun.com/detail?id=AVD-2026-108268">avd</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://bitshieldnews.com/section/vulnerabilities/9-1-cvss-privasys-enclave-os-critical-flaw/">bitshieldnews</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-108269">
          <name>CVE-2026-108269</name>
          <t><xref target="CVE-2026-108269"/></t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://cloudsecpulse.com/c/vulnerabilities/organizations-at-risk-critical-privasys-ra-tls/">cloudsecpulse</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://vulnpost.com/news/vulnerabilities/privasys-ra-tls-relay-flaw-bypasses-security-in/">vulnpost</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://netsecobserver.com/news/vulnerabilities/privasys-ra-tls-critical-relay-vulnerability/">netsecobserver</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://datasafetimes.com/topic/vulnerabilities/cvss-9-1-privasys-ra-tls-clients-0-5-0-vulnerable/">datasafetimes</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://sandboxgazette.com/c/vulnerabilities/how-privasys-ra-tls-clients-let-attackers-spoof/">sandboxgazette</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://cloudsecpulse.com/c/vulnerabilities/organizations-at-risk-critical-privasys-ra-tls/">cloudsecpulse</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://redteamlog.com/category/vulnerabilities/privasys-ra-tls-fixes-enclave-session-binding/">redteamlog</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="earlyattestationbleed-1">
        <name>EarlyAttestationBleed</name>
        <t><xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/></t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://freenode.net/article/early-attestation-bugs-crack-cocos-ai-and-contrast-tls-claims">Freenode</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(German) <eref target="https://cybersecurity-news.de/cve-2026-92701-trusted-execution-environments-0-8-2/">Cybersecurity news (CVE-2026-92701)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(German) <eref target="https://cybersecurity-news.de/cve-2026-92702-cocos-ai-0-8-2/">Cybersecurity news (CVE-2026-92702)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://www.anquan114.com/archives/7429">Security 114</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/31Glxqr6ofHylTyrtNsuaQ">KK says security</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/REtESPngXemSro0hjIZyxw">Safe Meow Station</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/864dwIXF5IY04q7ig4uBwg">Digital World Information</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/864dwIXF5IY04q7ig4uBwg">Shusei Consulting</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://freenode.net/digest/518">Freenode 518</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://freenode.net/digest/571">Freenode 571</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://collective.flashbots.net/t/earlyattestationbleed-paper-review/6054">Flashbots</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Japanese) <eref target="https://www.rich-wise.co.jp/cve-info/cve-2026-92701-intel-tdx%E3%81%AE%E8%84%86%E5%BC%B1%E6%80%A7%E3%81%AB%E3%82%88%E3%82%8A%E3%82%BB%E3%82%AD%E3%83%A5%E3%83%AA%E3%83%86%E3%82%A3%E5%AF%BE%E7%AD%96%E3%82%92%E8%AC%9B%E3%81%98%E3%82%8B/">Rich &amp; Wise with Socrates and Plato</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://app.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2026-92701">OpenCVE (CVE-2026-92701)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://app.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2026-92702">OpenCVE (CVE-2026-92702)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>CIRCL's <eref target="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CVE-2026-92701">vulnerability.circl.lu (CVE-2026-92701)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>CIRCL's <eref target="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CVE-2026-92702">vulnerability.circl.lu (CVE-2026-92702)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>GCVE's <eref target="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92701">db.gcve.eu (CVE-2026-92701)</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>GCVE's <eref target="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-92702">db.gcve.eu (CVE-2026-92702)</eref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="cve-2026-100833">
          <name>CVE-2026-100833</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/bulletins/sb26-271">America's Cyber Defense Agency (CISA)</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/cyber-threat-observatory/blob/main/reports/2026-09-27/TIER_3_CVE-2026-100833.md">Alan Turing Institute</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://radar.offseq.com/threat/contrast-edgelesssyscontrast-versions-1140-before-1231-generate-runtime-policies-that-fail-to-detect-d602b2a9f5df6321">Offseq</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://www.thehackerwire.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-100833/">The Hacker wire</eref></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><eref target="https://cvebrief.com/cve/cve-2026-100833/">CVE Brief</eref></t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="intra-handshakefail-2">
        <name>Intra-handshake.fail</name>
        <t><xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/></t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/04/confidential-computings-trust-mechanism-is-broken-the-fix-may-not-exist/5266056">The Register</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Japanese) <eref target="https://blackhatnews.tokyo/archives/119915">BlackHatNewsTokyo</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Several languages) <eref target="https://hackernoon.com/attested-tls-was-supposed-to-be-the-last-trust-boundary-it-isnt-formal-methods-show-how">Hackernoon</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://podcasts.apple.com/eg/podcast/attested-tls-was-supposed-to-be-the-last-trust/id1698517643?i=1000776623286">Apple podcast</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://meterpreter.org/attested-tls-vulnerability-cve-2026-33697/">Information Security News</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://thenextgentechinsider.com/pulse/critical-flaw-discovered-in-confidential-computing-attestation-protocols">TheNextGenTechInsider</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://dailysecurityreview.com/resources/cve-2026-33697-attested-tls-relay-flaw-hits-whatsapp-cocos-ai/">DailySecurityReview</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.scworld.com/brief/confidential-computings-remote-attestation-protocol-may-have-fundamental-flaw">SC World</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://blogs.groupware.org.uk/01-Quantum-Inc/the-handshake-that-cant-keep-its-promise-why-confidential-computings-flaw-changes-the-data-sovereignty-conversation/">01 Quantum</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Russian) <eref target="https://www.securitylab.ru/news/574545.php">Security Lab</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(German) <eref target="https://www.blogspan.net/confidential-computing-attestierung-relay-luecke/">blogspan</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://finance.sina.cn/tech/2026-07-04/detail-inifscxt9953361.d.html">Sina</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://data4biz.com/articles/una-falla-rompe-la-fiducia-del-confidential-computing">data4biz</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Russian) <eref target="https://www.itsec.ru/news/issledovateli-nashli-kriticheskuyu-uyazvimost-v-attested-tls">ITSec</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://post.smzdm.com/p/a82ol990/">smzdm</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://www.donews.com/news/detail/4/6621022.html">donews</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://i.ifeng.com/c/8uUfy0PMmqE">ifeng</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.dugganusa.com/post/confidential-computing-s-whole-pitch-is-trust-the-proof-not-the-cloud-two-years-of-formal-verifi">dugganusa</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://github.com/pduggusa/dugganusa-ietf/tree/main/cve-2026-33697-attestation">dugganusa repo</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=92591A05-07BC-5015-BA3D-B1347B35D684">spoitus</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://news.lavx.hu/article/attested-tls-research-exposes-a-weak-link-in-confidential-computing">lavx news</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.sohu.com/a/1045865934_122004016">sohu</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Persian) <eref target="https://news.ditty.ir/news/attested-tls-relay-flaw-formal-methods/019f6221-26ca-7293-9ee9-5557b3c0b8f8">news.ditty</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Russian) <eref target="https://limpvpn.com/ru/news/attested-tls-whatsapp-privacy-flaw-2026">LiMP VPN</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://daily.dev/posts/kI6PoNzPx">daily.dev</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://warden.veritai.ch/news/researchers-find-attested-tls-flaws-that-weaken-confidential-computing-trust-model">warden</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://db.gcve.eu/sightings/?query=cve-2026-33697">GCVE.eu</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CVE-2026-33697#sightings">vuln.lu</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://coderlegion.com/24087/intra-handshake-attestation-when-more-security-doesnt-mean-better-security">coderlegion</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.anjuna.io/blog/attested-tls-flaw-explained">Anjuna Security</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://privasys.org/blog/binding-attestation-to-the-tls-session/">Privasys</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://caution.co/blog/steve-attesting-the-session.html">Caution</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://freenode.net/digest/67">freenode</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Chinese) <eref target="https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_42376192/category_13096766.html">csdn</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://osintsights.com/confidential-computing-flaws-expose-trust-risks">osintsights</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Turkish) <eref target="https://hardwaremania.com/haber/arastirma-attested-tls-confidential-computing-icin-zayif-kaliyor/">hardwaremania</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://akber.com/sovereignty-in-the-cloud-is-an-illusion/">akber</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/wissenschaft/cloud-souveraenitaet-red-hat-startet-reifegrad-assessments-gegen/69691475">ad-hoc news</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://aimultiple.com/privacy-enhancing-technologies">AIMultiple</eref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="germanys-bsi">
          <name>Germany's BSI</name>
          <t>Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) has attested to it. Carina Hilt, deputy press spokesperson at BSI, told <eref target="https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/04/confidential-computings-trust-mechanism-is-broken-the-fix-may-not-exist/5266056">The Register</eref>:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CC alone cannot satisfy the requirements for digital sovereignty.
]]></artwork>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
dependencies on other services, such as identity and key
management etc., are also not mitigated by CC.
]]></artwork>
          <t>CC refers to Confidential Computing, and attested TLS is the core trust mechanism of CC.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="general-potential-objections">
      <name>General Potential Objections</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/k_uGnkjn8-eqZgNRHyhOdvTA-bg/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/k_uGnkjn8-eqZgNRHyhOdvTA-bg/</eref></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="reviews">
      <name>Reviews</name>
      <section anchor="conference-reviews">
        <name>Conference Reviews</name>
        <t><xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/> has been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication at ESORICS 2026.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ietfirtf">
        <name>IETF/IRTF</name>
        <t>Several participants of the IETF/IRTF have attested to the results by independently reproducing the results and reviewing the code. Some of the participants have independently reproduced the results by developing their own formal models and a proof-of-concept implementation of the vulnerabilities. Some of the messages are mentioned below (<strong>excluding</strong> the messages of authors of <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>):</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/B7F1Dj_rjs8I0Kg3yCp3Rap0XeE/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/B7F1Dj_rjs8I0Kg3yCp3Rap0XeE/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aEV9dUFotAQzHndk23qBcwBT3as/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aEV9dUFotAQzHndk23qBcwBT3as/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3Hv0E1sfXsvyBtl6AgY8j-SHHiw/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3Hv0E1sfXsvyBtl6AgY8j-SHHiw/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5LJ6i9svomnhpyPHWPejM7fMmXQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5LJ6i9svomnhpyPHWPejM7fMmXQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/V_YqGUY3fEwaFwwyfA9DshpHet0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/V_YqGUY3fEwaFwwyfA9DshpHet0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JF_cwmHHEbrJ_W5V6yEetWWnii4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JF_cwmHHEbrJ_W5V6yEetWWnii4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/P_CYTycg0KG7cbKauFA-kVgX2jo/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/P_CYTycg0KG7cbKauFA-kVgX2jo/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ZJjJXpYwZ5nCVmz_W4FK6XiFEY4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ZJjJXpYwZ5nCVmz_W4FK6XiFEY4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/4so3LxHOOXHS1wnvhuoeWWgeCHk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/4so3LxHOOXHS1wnvhuoeWWgeCHk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Q6Jmc58v0c1lDV3ujIY0AX_ofGA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Q6Jmc58v0c1lDV3ujIY0AX_ofGA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/n4Me5QPCvwhxcEJndWePyishcoo/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/n4Me5QPCvwhxcEJndWePyishcoo/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/beRzNNvwMifkRfJPfxecGoHpTDs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/beRzNNvwMifkRfJPfxecGoHpTDs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/U5YHd91lYjiqCTt9BZyVDNFeUpM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/U5YHd91lYjiqCTt9BZyVDNFeUpM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aFCo4BMRDSUynvN9AQJatPjnXag/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aFCo4BMRDSUynvN9AQJatPjnXag/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/wb_Ys9MZd9u9oM2Bk-8tv7fvXGg/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/wb_Ys9MZd9u9oM2Bk-8tv7fvXGg/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ov8f-7cZKK5RZ-Mmjc6IhVSB-Fk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ov8f-7cZKK5RZ-Mmjc6IhVSB-Fk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2uUuaD1DygjNDM4GT_-rYbwTiJk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2uUuaD1DygjNDM4GT_-rYbwTiJk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/pB39abN1QrH4_ATM_E78vxPTuxk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/pB39abN1QrH4_ATM_E78vxPTuxk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/PxKCxMHe-SAiR9uhOOllrK4mUA4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/PxKCxMHe-SAiR9uhOOllrK4mUA4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/T1xupUBwqYEBSHCTXgSHXZtdqz8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/T1xupUBwqYEBSHCTXgSHXZtdqz8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/hRw46FwgmVdi9fqZm2fjKbln_IA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/hRw46FwgmVdi9fqZm2fjKbln_IA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UG7yE_klmRSxNy2HX6fzuFonDjM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UG7yE_klmRSxNy2HX6fzuFonDjM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2hpeIldeFfE6o9q6L9Vkt00ACKA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2hpeIldeFfE6o9q6L9Vkt00ACKA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/gc2ij0vboehS_-v10-SNslxaZC0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/gc2ij0vboehS_-v10-SNslxaZC0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/oO4mAfq5HJZptDDNrSnd7zDdX18/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/oO4mAfq5HJZptDDNrSnd7zDdX18/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/XuJc_yEJPCMIuYcv2OM7XDogRCU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/XuJc_yEJPCMIuYcv2OM7XDogRCU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/nVHlnbFIEh-cPQeMuDVOqx5YvWQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/nVHlnbFIEh-cPQeMuDVOqx5YvWQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xVU3C7qUOngcip7B4ZO5MJUT9Xg/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xVU3C7qUOngcip7B4ZO5MJUT9Xg/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/1gCcPw-7NopDRzzBzA3dFIgo3Rs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/1gCcPw-7NopDRzzBzA3dFIgo3Rs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/t8aobzB374lWiLzrVrORY7kGYyQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/t8aobzB374lWiLzrVrORY7kGYyQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/m3UyB6XLQzxaucejE_o8Pn41uSI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/m3UyB6XLQzxaucejE_o8Pn41uSI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/gqHqcbbKva_oGE-jEDZu243gf-4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/gqHqcbbKva_oGE-jEDZu243gf-4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/QD8QB1WVL-toNovGQ2Tk6DmmeEM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/QD8QB1WVL-toNovGQ2Tk6DmmeEM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vXN2pifZ5GXcC1xLwSfLCnUcFUE/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vXN2pifZ5GXcC1xLwSfLCnUcFUE/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/MGFXinb85XSaLkqjBEhmBZC7PcI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/MGFXinb85XSaLkqjBEhmBZC7PcI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/js9VI4PB8yYmhg2ObaZB1a22fL4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/js9VI4PB8yYmhg2ObaZB1a22fL4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/0RzORzX_VdlY5UQ_MWMmxZlnrjs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/0RzORzX_VdlY5UQ_MWMmxZlnrjs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/W3MH1BDSUbm1WUPxGQihaIc1zTk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/W3MH1BDSUbm1WUPxGQihaIc1zTk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2_aGylmFHoLmqN7BBcYVoH-rNJk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2_aGylmFHoLmqN7BBcYVoH-rNJk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/7SYSuB83Kmr9qCb1V1F94n9W33U/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/7SYSuB83Kmr9qCb1V1F94n9W33U/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/0SWfg2YNEAOtJQ7Zsf1xl4O-AOo/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/0SWfg2YNEAOtJQ7Zsf1xl4O-AOo/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/1mfNw-bw8KsdJbl4saL99Fz4iec/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/1mfNw-bw8KsdJbl4saL99Fz4iec/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/VyifG8zP5aworb_S1NR9FEUEXW0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/VyifG8zP5aworb_S1NR9FEUEXW0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/CYwvM75z6rTId2A3ZZvZJmHxOig/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/CYwvM75z6rTId2A3ZZvZJmHxOig/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/29xFZX5C4oSGkpZAvXT_7YLW2Vc/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/29xFZX5C4oSGkpZAvXT_7YLW2Vc/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/u1HxYW9cJfVpi3Cf9q06ehwpYGE/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/u1HxYW9cJfVpi3Cf9q06ehwpYGE/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SG_A0016a-KMnXAkGtMUxokZmjc/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SG_A0016a-KMnXAkGtMUxokZmjc/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3w7-OW2CAVr0-QBz97eAMxB_nMI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3w7-OW2CAVr0-QBz97eAMxB_nMI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UnybcafvQ2D-IhUfTV228WQFNhA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UnybcafvQ2D-IhUfTV228WQFNhA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rmVNeFbjax26l31n5pitHIxOQkk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rmVNeFbjax26l31n5pitHIxOQkk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/DghJdG3ysbPFKMQe8czz-tcIMq0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/DghJdG3ysbPFKMQe8czz-tcIMq0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rZLacid2wnEtaJwSbiIIft3T0FI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rZLacid2wnEtaJwSbiIIft3T0FI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/_kEBODNsTWjgadb5xnlj86dvhcs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/_kEBODNsTWjgadb5xnlj86dvhcs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/qP3XC0MarFFA3SMbBpWWJtxACNA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/qP3XC0MarFFA3SMbBpWWJtxACNA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/kkjQhi4yvJ_iAwYrPw1crFh-m-0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/kkjQhi4yvJ_iAwYrPw1crFh-m-0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vBkdKtKzTt4F91VprfKIndgmT2o/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vBkdKtKzTt4F91VprfKIndgmT2o/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Huu_AFu11BTrdxK3I8hmw2jjp8Q/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Huu_AFu11BTrdxK3I8hmw2jjp8Q/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/oOnioxkB__QZIvhFn5naW6jIXzg/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/oOnioxkB__QZIvhFn5naW6jIXzg/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/iWsCCAl8YZ-pOTA7siNUGsfliHQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/iWsCCAl8YZ-pOTA7siNUGsfliHQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-HGPUR5CvuVWcOAg37cSxwoATm0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-HGPUR5CvuVWcOAg37cSxwoATm0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/LnLYE7bGQOmCxVXq6stiOtKwc1s/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/LnLYE7bGQOmCxVXq6stiOtKwc1s/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/o_bIJhOdB4j1g0nczxPZwFXtCo8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/o_bIJhOdB4j1g0nczxPZwFXtCo8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/hy4qVQJQGR82-bskQ_UGI6iel1Y/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/hy4qVQJQGR82-bskQ_UGI6iel1Y/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3J3s_YFnf9IQ87Tv2c1q4f36xKQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3J3s_YFnf9IQ87Tv2c1q4f36xKQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JWKMYY1YG1E2iS_HyQ4rDmOsDGw/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JWKMYY1YG1E2iS_HyQ4rDmOsDGw/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rK1nDSewAbVL_weOp98knYZcg6s/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/rK1nDSewAbVL_weOp98knYZcg6s/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Wjuz0fIj8tjYocUmiZZXcSwwFHw/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/Wjuz0fIj8tjYocUmiZZXcSwwFHw/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SYiV4KZNr20re6QkGmyWS3pPteA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SYiV4KZNr20re6QkGmyWS3pPteA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ZYgxm1ibt6p4dL7xF1YNdl0XSpc/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/ZYgxm1ibt6p4dL7xF1YNdl0XSpc/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/6LKgOp22YRxGTYb-i-BxiMGzMW4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/6LKgOp22YRxGTYb-i-BxiMGzMW4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3oHcKPtXLfBUYCZoN1nnO6e1F-s/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3oHcKPtXLfBUYCZoN1nnO6e1F-s/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aSybH9ihnNjN7SjdhhY_XtxhMtc/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/aSybH9ihnNjN7SjdhhY_XtxhMtc/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/d_G8r7LMGjA45BPexZwsfmmAtJY/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/d_G8r7LMGjA45BPexZwsfmmAtJY/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/u-za86_YJ0spwBXBwTVQzwiOCrU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/u-za86_YJ0spwBXBwTVQzwiOCrU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/P4IMdvCx8lSEKrCiJIjbpBCRr4g/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/P4IMdvCx8lSEKrCiJIjbpBCRr4g/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-AO9yFJoflV1wDwwch45dmqkmyo/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-AO9yFJoflV1wDwwch45dmqkmyo/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/H0LqHfBasQml69Y-9Zl_njfsE8s/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/H0LqHfBasQml69Y-9Zl_njfsE8s/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3hOGlYyc_yntmvT0tjYxldlwaxM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/3hOGlYyc_yntmvT0tjYxldlwaxM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JbwL9cdl6fiP0vBGgASUUDmaPy8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/JbwL9cdl6fiP0vBGgASUUDmaPy8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/TtewHbMGKBQOKD2sqrgTrnpCOkI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/TtewHbMGKBQOKD2sqrgTrnpCOkI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UsIj6o7wf4hX_uCL51TCTv-wFxU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/UsIj6o7wf4hX_uCL51TCTv-wFxU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/a6c8D6PBDRe0x4DAqXM3t4EPc4c/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/a6c8D6PBDRe0x4DAqXM3t4EPc4c/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/prB537Jht2kELVCSrTRktjbp7Y4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/prB537Jht2kELVCSrTRktjbp7Y4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/RPnKYfUCD_MRw3hnA00zg684yGM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/RPnKYfUCD_MRw3hnA00zg684yGM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/nMH_0sLLU5MekoEnzWKJnIJmaSk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/nMH_0sLLU5MekoEnzWKJnIJmaSk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/GJCA31mgAehlgFPRu_yHA10lKPI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/GJCA31mgAehlgFPRu_yHA10lKPI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/9f-21JMK6s1Pdcob6mPo06rNwmQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/9f-21JMK6s1Pdcob6mPo06rNwmQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/8qq_GFT391IEbGZZQUtYMONX9U0/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/8qq_GFT391IEbGZZQUtYMONX9U0/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xzu2UlClYMkG8gNSOClxGJgwnOI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xzu2UlClYMkG8gNSOClxGJgwnOI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Exploit: <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/MfxWpRtlTqPElX8vX4v8uiN65TU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/MfxWpRtlTqPElX8vX4v8uiN65TU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/PkU0jW_xHAF18rZmtZJ2A2p_wHs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/PkU0jW_xHAF18rZmtZJ2A2p_wHs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/jZmdYKQlfherbhowIEmZRw2HF1c/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/jZmdYKQlfherbhowIEmZRw2HF1c/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-0j6UpsD_CebqPPMNkDJCjySqEI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/-0j6UpsD_CebqPPMNkDJCjySqEI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ssDrZRFW4s6CSaYeA9ImH0PPQ10/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ssDrZRFW4s6CSaYeA9ImH0PPQ10/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/OPBI_Wd-RoTzzdh5D0JZoWlNGI8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/OPBI_Wd-RoTzzdh5D0JZoWlNGI8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/nfrdr1T9Pdp6D_kj2Et3XZk-hOY/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/nfrdr1T9Pdp6D_kj2Et3XZk-hOY/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/gMMvtP1IXsXFfb0X5nMhRTaLLok/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/gMMvtP1IXsXFfb0X5nMhRTaLLok/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/yaGG4sVf4pCfJ0HNPPRv3Xg0cG8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/yaGG4sVf4pCfJ0HNPPRv3Xg0cG8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/DaA1jDQNF-bdO5x-dkVbSzlHcD4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/DaA1jDQNF-bdO5x-dkVbSzlHcD4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ptkHZUDzSoYnD6R5zln6HcE1cv4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/ptkHZUDzSoYnD6R5zln6HcE1cv4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/n1-mBLW1m4TKiGsQqOhOIkbNxVs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/n1-mBLW1m4TKiGsQqOhOIkbNxVs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/mBHcB8YRR0HVcyihhjm11XqRhWE/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/mBHcB8YRR0HVcyihhjm11XqRhWE/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/zY3vdP_TZKZIdK_kpcrwWQuYf8s/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/zY3vdP_TZKZIdK_kpcrwWQuYf8s/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/QcXGunfoT1OKrBI_FRsgpNsXvn4/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/QcXGunfoT1OKrBI_FRsgpNsXvn4/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/FSh0tTa7h1NcaeVZENqz6wg45C8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/FSh0tTa7h1NcaeVZENqz6wg45C8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5uos1xo5lkLisK-9RGJWLJaAnmk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5uos1xo5lkLisK-9RGJWLJaAnmk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2Vyb3hcqRoJF4tLkJOxs2CueNuw/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/2Vyb3hcqRoJF4tLkJOxs2CueNuw/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/9mDNq-Fv3-9726qe_te0nfYKMaM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/9mDNq-Fv3-9726qe_te0nfYKMaM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/KwtGScLIYvUCW2A0HxAS5s9XMMo/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/KwtGScLIYvUCW2A0HxAS5s9XMMo/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SpLBEi5_nMr51gSng5oqS1uTlxU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/SpLBEi5_nMr51gSng5oqS1uTlxU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/b2laJbuyFQQr6Q1nUCbpKa_PNz8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/b2laJbuyFQQr6Q1nUCbpKa_PNz8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/V-3QA8_dX1A5mdKxoVy-1z_8RlA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/V-3QA8_dX1A5mdKxoVy-1z_8RlA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vjIo3JCMjHglRNaSSHNOqjKgDxs/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/vjIo3JCMjHglRNaSSHNOqjKgDxs/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/pE1j3aP-qvaUgT-Q88JextCIlcc/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/pE1j3aP-qvaUgT-Q88JextCIlcc/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/uojEp8S21Ftf2osLCJNoR8xPzKA/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/uojEp8S21Ftf2osLCJNoR8xPzKA/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xP6PxDJhAH9bnefUjlKc0f96ak8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/xP6PxDJhAH9bnefUjlKc0f96ak8/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/krTrXMiNIPyYzVDvlXlJB0UvaSk/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/krTrXMiNIPyYzVDvlXlJB0UvaSk/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5dHBv3DyUy4Fprh71i90x6pHPCY/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/5dHBv3DyUy4Fprh71i90x6pHPCY/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/HErXLOWPTDmOK6RMVO8J0lEGCyU/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/HErXLOWPTDmOK6RMVO8J0lEGCyU/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/QqstD1bsKrZrfQ_VQU-Z9KhYnxM/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/QqstD1bsKrZrfQ_VQU-Z9KhYnxM/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/Oh4lBsX5wtnqPJM1cPOkt1mPOAQ/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/Oh4lBsX5wtnqPJM1cPOkt1mPOAQ/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/dMAZ-uAbZIlUxiDbO_0ZBVh4q90/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/dMAZ-uAbZIlUxiDbO_0ZBVh4q90/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/FRdzVOJ5OBs4M1yuFk_ntxYl1yI/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/FRdzVOJ5OBs4M1yuFk_ntxYl1yI/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/qr4w7FinCkG1qt27aCCjJKruP5E/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/qr4w7FinCkG1qt27aCCjJKruP5E/</eref></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/mf_CtbtSDHPz3uMHRXele2vwYr8/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/mf_CtbtSDHPz3uMHRXele2vwYr8/</eref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <section anchor="main-questions">
          <name>Main Questions</name>
          <t>In short, five main questions have been raised by WG participants in support of our work:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>What <strong>security property</strong> hybrid (intra- + post-handshake attestation) provides that post-handshake attestation alone cannot provide?</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Since continuous attestation is required in most use cases <xref target="CSA-eBPF"/> <xref target="MITRE-Continuous-Attestation"/>, how is <strong>additional complexity</strong> of <strong>intra</strong>-handshake attestation justified? Use cases with one-time attestation can be covered by doing attestation round immediately after Connection Establishment Time: see <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-seat-intra-vs-post-04.html#section-6-2">reference</eref>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>What is the benefit of doing <strong>signatures</strong> of remote attestation <strong>within</strong> the handshake (as this latency can be exploited)? We add that <strong>verification</strong> of signatures within the handshake is also time consuming, which can be exploited too. See <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-seat-intra-vs-post-04.html#section-4.2.4">reference</eref>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>How evidence is bound to the secure channel without involving any <strong>shared secret</strong>? See <xref target="TLS-RA"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>How does a verifying relying party get the legitimate PIIDs and CHIP_IDs?</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="guidance-text">
          <name>Guidance Text</name>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Evidence MUST be bound to the secure channel. Failure to do so results in
relay attacks <xref target="CVE-2026-33697"/>, <xref target="EUVD-2026-16488"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Verifier MUST have access to legitimate hardware identifiers of the
Attester. Failure to do so results in relay attacks <xref target="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Verifier MUST carefully check the binding. Failure to do so results in
relay attacks <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI2"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Cocos-AI3"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Binder MUST contain shared secrets. Failure to do so results in relay
attacks <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rustls"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-go"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eov"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-eom"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-da"/>, <xref target="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-tcu"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="researchers-outside-of-ietfirtf">
        <name>Researchers outside of IETF/IRTF</name>
        <t>Some researchers have approached us confirming the proof-of-concept of the vulnerabilities in intra-handshake attestation. More information will be added once their pre-prints/papers are public.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>All of this document is about the <strong>insecurity</strong> of <strong>intra</strong>-handshake (aka early) attestation.</t>
      <t>By no means should the vendors mentioned in this draft be considered less secure than any other vendors implementing intra-handshake attestation solutions. In particular, those who have closed-source implementations are most likely more vulnerable than the open-source ones, since the former cannot easily be reviewed by the security community. Even extensive security reviews -- of closed-source implementations -- by cybersecurity firms often do not perform formal analysis, and thus such reviews may miss corner cases and subtle vulnerabilities.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ethical-considerations">
      <name>Ethical Considerations</name>
      <t>Eva C. M. Willems contributed the discussion of AI-agent governability, distinguishing technical attestation from the broader conditions for effective governance.</t>
      <t>We (i.e., the super set of all authors involved in this research, including but not limited to Muhammad Usama Sardar, Mariam Moustafa, Tuomas Aura, Viacheslav Dubeyko, Jean-Marie Jacquet, Songbo Bu, Chengxin Huang, Haowen Song, Kaya Ercihan, Dr. Kubilay Ahmet Küçük, Sylvain Bellemare, Eva C. M. Willems, Justin DESSENNES SAINTEN, Massimiliano Brighindi, Mikerah Quintyne-Collins, and Iman Schrock) are ethical researchers aiming to protect the community from the potential harm caused by the exploitability of the vulnerabilities in early attestation. The finders of <xref target="sec-credits"/> have <strong>responsibly disclosed</strong> the vulnerabilities to the respective developers and maintainers following their respective disclosure processes and provided them the proposed mitigations and requested them to take rapid action.</t>
      <t>We have released only the formal analysis for published CVE-2026-33697. To minimize exploit in the wild, we have not publicly released the proof-of-concept exploit code.</t>
      <t>We have not retrieved any real data from any real system. We have not released any key to any public forum or to any person.</t>
      <section anchor="evidence-of-explanation-of-vulnerabilities-to-the-authors-of-vulnerable-drafts">
        <name>Evidence of Explanation of Vulnerabilities to the Authors of Vulnerable Drafts</name>
        <t>To the best of our abilities, knowledge, and understanding, we have tried to explain the vulnerabilities to the authors of vulnerable drafts <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-09"/>, <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/>, and <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> first privately in several meetings and then later on publicly for at least half a year at several forums, including but not limited to CCC Attestation SIG and IETF/IRTF. Please see the (non-exhaustive list of) recordings <xref target="sec-recordings"/> and the archives <xref target="sec-archives"/> below. We sincerely thank the authors of <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10"/> for withdrawing their draft to protect further exploits mentioned in <xref target="sec-news"/>.
We also sincerely thank the author of <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> for archiving the draft.</t>
        <section anchor="sec-recordings">
          <name>Recordings</name>
          <table>
            <name>Evidence of several explanations of vulnerabilities to the authors of vulnerable drafts</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Event/Host</th>
                <th align="left">Venue</th>
                <th align="left">Date(s)</th>
                <th align="left">Evidence</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">HotRFC @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/127/">IETF 127</eref></td>
                <td align="left">San Francisco, USA (Virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">15 November, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/127/materials/slides-127-hotrfc-sessa-confidential-computing-and-digital-sovereignty-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/_c7VYycfRXA?t=3962">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/hackathons/127-hackathon/">IETF 126 Hackathon</eref></td>
                <td align="left">San Francisco, USA (Virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">15 November, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/127/hackathon#earlyattestationbleed-earlyattestationtsch%C3%BCss-eat-and-co-cve-2026-100835-of-cvss-91-and-41-other-cves-of-up-to-expected-cvss-100-on-early-attestation">Hackathon project</eref>, <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/127/materials/slides-127-hackathon-sessd-earlyattestationbleed-and-earlyattestationtschuss-01">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/d44apZBtXwI?t=1027">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://biohackathon-europe.org/">BioHackathon Europe</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Barcelona, Spain (Virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">9-13 Nov, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/elixir-europe/biohackathon-projects-2026/blob/main/27.md">Proposal</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://ripe93.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/sessions/137/">Security WG</eref> @ <eref target="https://ripe93.ripe.net/">RIPE 93</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Sofia, Bulgaria (Virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">27 Oct, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://ripe93.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/sessions/137/GJXMGP/">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://pretalx.ripe.net/media/ripe-93/submissions/GJXMGP/resources/20261027_RIPE_93_Sec_e4tTL66.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://ripe93.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/sessions/137/transcript/">transcript</eref>, <eref target="https://ripe93.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/sessions/137/GJXMGP/#video">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">System Boot and Security MC @ <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/">Linux Plumbers Conference 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Prague, Czechia</td>
                <td align="left">5 Oct, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/contributions/2585/">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/contributions/2585/attachments/2040/4688/20261005_LPC_2026_Security.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL6EX8hcFKc">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">BoF @ <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/">Linux Plumbers Conference 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Prague, Czechia</td>
                <td align="left">5 Oct, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/contributions/2640/">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://lpc.events/event/20/contributions/2640/attachments/2049/4690/20261005_LPC_2026_BoF.pdf">slides</eref>, video</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/event/14th-plenary/">GA4GH 14th Plenary Meeting</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Singapore</td>
                <td align="left">28 Sept-2 Oct, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/415074362_Presentation_Safeguarding_GA4GH_Ecosystem_from_High-and_Critical-Severity_Vulnerabilities_in_Former_GIF_Design_for_Attested_TLS_draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/GA4GH-14th-Plenary-Meeting-Report.pdf">report</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/Rm4SttVkJWM?t=3153">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://fg-pet.gi.de/veranstaltung/16th-privacy-enhancing-techniques-convention">PET-CON 2026.2: 16th Privacy Enhancing Techniques Convention</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Lübeck, Germany</td>
                <td align="left">28-29 Sept, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/414897198_Presentation_EarlyAttestationBleed_Three_Critical-severity_Vulnerabilities_of_CVSS_90_in_Confidential_Computing">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://sites.google.com/di.uniroma1.it/esorics2026/">ESORICS 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Rome, Italy</td>
                <td align="left">14-18 Sept, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/414416257_Intra-handshakefail_CVE-2026-33697_High-severity_CVE_in_Attested_TLS">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2026-rats-03/session/rats">IETF RATS Interim meeting</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">14 Sept, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2026-rats-03/materials/slides-interim-2026-rats-03-sessa-protecting-the-rats-ecosystem-from-critical-severity-vulnerabilities-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/y5_SR0-DzH0?t=255">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Hackathon @ <eref target="https://summit.riot-os.org/2026/">RIOT Summit 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Grenoble, France</td>
                <td align="left">4 September, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://notes.inria.fr/2ppogr2fTSKusRog3RXbPQ?view#topic-security-analysis-of-attested-tls-and-attested-edhoc">topic synopsis</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://summit.riot-os.org/2026/">RIOT Summit 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Grenoble, France</td>
                <td align="left">2-4 September, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://summit.riot-os.org/2026/blog/speakers/muhammad-usama-sardar/">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/413988306_Security_Analysis_of_Attested_TLS_and_Attested_EDHOC">slides</eref>, video</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/work_stream/data-security/">Data Security Work Stream (DSWS)</eref> at the <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/">Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH)</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">24 Aug, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/413569575_High-Severity_Vulnerabilities_in_Former_GIF_Design_for_Attested_TLS_draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://us02web.zoom.us/rec/share/UAn381deia-aMNmjGHhMqxocc1HcyF7ksLlaeeKefxO4bSC2mHPzwPQPYGe2dnZR.zfleYCmmtiteo_NS">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Confidential AI Public Side Meeting @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/126/">IETF 126</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">21 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/126attendees/odgd_xmhjQXiR_aLYdqtVvDJeF4/">plan</eref>, <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/410954219_Proposed_RG_Confidential_Computing_for_Agentic_AI">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SEAT @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/126/">IETF 126</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">21 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-seat-binding-properties-of-expat-00.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/Fb5Hzh1mp1E?t=4189">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/126/hackathon/hackdemo">IETF 126 Hackdemo Happy Hour</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">20 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/126/hackathon#cve-2026-33697-cvss-75-intra-handshakefail">Hackathon project</eref>, <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/126/hackathon/hackdemo">demo</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Confidential Computing Public Side Meeting @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/126/">IETF 126</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">20 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/126attendees/V9BKZJ_DGkZPdlnjBaUeyluhbqQ/">plan</eref>, <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/410954219_Proposed_RG_Confidential_Computing_for_Agentic_AI">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">HotRFC @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/126/">IETF 126</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">19 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-hotrfc-sessa-15-confidential-computing-and-digital-sovereignty-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/FDHWRijxKso?t=3285">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/hackathons/126-hackathon/">IETF 126 Hackathon</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">19 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/126/hackathon#cve-2026-33697-cvss-75-intra-handshakefail">Hackathon project</eref>, <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-hackathon-sessd-intra-handshakefail-cve-2026-33697-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/GRqyrDIEgEw?t=1340">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">IEPG @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/126/">IETF 126</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Vienna, Austria</td>
                <td align="left">19 July, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-iepg-sessa-05-intra-handshakefail-cve-2026-33697-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/g8q_u19vXzk?t=4404">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.wissenschaftsnacht-dresden.de/programm/detailansicht/confidential-computing-15585">Workshop</eref> @ <eref target="https://www.wissenschaftsnacht-dresden.de/en/">Dresden Science Night 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Dresden</td>
                <td align="left">26 June, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.wissenschaftsnacht-dresden.de/programm/detailansicht/confidential-computing-15585">demo</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://output-dd.de/">Output 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Dresden</td>
                <td align="left">25 June, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://output-dd.de/projekte/relay-attacks-in-intra-handshake-attestation-for-confidential-agentic-ai-systems/">demo</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://events.linuxfoundation.org/confidential-computing-summit/">Confidential Computing Summit 2026</eref> (presented by Jens Albers)</td>
                <td align="left">San Francisco, USA</td>
                <td align="left">23-24 June, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411851358_Standardization_of_Attested_TLS">poster</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://confidentialcontainers.org/">Confidential Containers Community Meeting</eref> @ <eref target="https://www.cncf.io/">Cloud Native Computing Foundation</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">30 April, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411849492_Relay_Attacks_in_Intra-handshake_Attestation">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://zoom.us/rec/share/3thZhsRi-BZJL-GqjnwGzh7inbltuKIlpVjqMlWp6WRdMTZ66Z8p-8YjaaeOfbhX.CoH6YBukaKua0gkt">video</eref> around timestamp 00:27:00</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">GIF Project showcase @ <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/event/april-connect-2026/">GA4GH April Connect 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Montreal, Canada (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">17 April, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/412136610_Trusted_Research_Environment_TRE_Open_Suite">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/Kr9oxp1fdn0?t=1083">video</eref>, <eref target="https://www.ga4gh.org/document/arpril-connect-2026-meeting-report/">report</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://sos-vo.org/group/hotsos/">NSA Symposium on Hot Topics in the Science of Security (HotSoS) 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">16 April, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://sos-vo.org/group/hotsos/2026/sardar">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://sos-vo.org/system/files/2026-04/20260416_HotSoS%20%281%29.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://sos-vo.org/group/hotsos/2026/sardar">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://fg-pet.gi.de/veranstaltung/15th-privacy-enhancing-techniques-convention">PET-CON 2026.1: 15th Privacy Enhancing Techniques Convention</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Karlsruhe, Germany</td>
                <td align="left">16-17 April, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411849502_Formal_Analysis_of_Attested_TLS">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411852738_Formal_Analysis_of_Attested_TLS_and_Standardization_in_the_IETF">poster</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://gtmfs2026.sciencesconf.org/program?lang=en">GTMFS 2026: Annual Meeting of the WG "Formal Methods in Security"</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Luz-Saint-Sauveur, France</td>
                <td align="left">24-26 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411853715_Relay_Attacks_in_Intra-handshake_Attestation">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">CFRG @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/125/">IETF 125</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">19 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/materials/slides-125-cfrg-relay-attacks-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/IfKgbO74Lt4?t=6054">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">SEAT @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/125/">IETF 125</eref> (relay)</td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">17 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/materials/slides-125-seat-security-analysis-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/hX7genEkN7w?t=676">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">Side meeting @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/125/">IETF 125</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">16 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/403474373_Proposed_RG_Confidential_AI">slides</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">LAKE @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/125/">IETF 125</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">16 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/materials/slides-125-lake-formal-analysis-of-attested-edhoc-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/JzfLpbnhl0A?t=3117">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">HotRFC @ <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/125/">IETF 125</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">15 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/materials/slides-125-hotrfc-sessa-formal-proof-of-insecurity-of-intra-handshake-attestation-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/OtOo7Nogisw?t=3514">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/hackathons/125-hackathon/">IETF 125 Hackathon</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Shenzhen, China (virtual)</td>
                <td align="left">14-15 Mar, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://wiki.ietf.org/en/meeting/125/hackathon#relay-attacks-in-intra-handshake-attestation-for-confidential-agentic-ai-systems">Hackathon project</eref>, <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/125/materials/slides-125-hackathon-sessd-relay-attacks-in-intra-handshake-attestation-00">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/62A58qH19MI?t=2270">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">10 Feb, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/CCC-Att-meetings/blob/main/materials/MuhammadUsamaSardar_RelayAttacksGen_20260210.pdf">slides</eref>; <eref target="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idqwb0hFlhs&amp;list=PLmfkUJc39uMhZsNGmpx-qD-uCoQyMglIp&amp;t=1061s">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2026-rats-01/session/rats">IETF RATS Interim meeting</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">9 Feb, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2026-rats-01/materials/slides-interim-2026-rats-01-sessa-relayattacks-00.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://youtu.be/gURY61dViPw?t=1474">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/track/confidential-computing/">Confidential Computing</eref> devroom at <eref target="https://fosdem.org/2026/">FOSDEM 2026</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Brussels, Belgium</td>
                <td align="left">31 Jan-1 Feb, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/GHGFBM-attestedtls/">abstract</eref>, <eref target="https://fosdem.org/2026/events/attachments/GHGFBM-attestedtls/slides/267432/20260201_60u9e0n.pdf">slides</eref>, <eref target="https://video.fosdem.org/2026/ud6215/GHGFBM-attestedtls.av1.webm">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">27 Jan, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/CCC-Att-meetings/blob/main/materials/MuhammadUsamaSardar_RelayAttacksProposal_20260127.pdf">slides</eref>; <eref target="https://youtu.be/P04tLJcSxfM?list=PLmfkUJc39uMhZsNGmpx-qD-uCoQyMglIp&amp;t=434">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">13 Jan, 2026</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/CCC-Att-meetings/blob/main/materials/MuhammadUsamaSardar_RelayAttacks_20260113.pdf">slides</eref>; <eref target="https://youtu.be/cSrCZNyo7_g?list=PLmfkUJc39uMhZsNGmpx-qD-uCoQyMglIp&amp;t=1083">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">16 Dec, 2025</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/meetings/blob/main/materials/MuhammadUsamaSardar_Binding_Properties_20251216.pdf">slides</eref>; <eref target="https://youtu.be/w_MrjMeHyP8?list=PLmfkUJc39uMhZsNGmpx-qD-uCoQyMglIp&amp;t=593">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation">CCC Attestation SIG</eref></td>
                <td align="left">Virtual</td>
                <td align="left">2 Dec, 2025</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/CCC-Att-meetings/blob/main/materials/MuhammadUsamaSardar_Open_Questions_20251202.pdf">slides</eref>; <eref target="https://youtu.be/16aGZ-oZidg?list=PLmfkUJc39uMhZsNGmpx-qD-uCoQyMglIp&amp;t=2920">video</eref></td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-archives">
          <name>Archives</name>
          <t>Since January'26, we have publicly informed the authors of vulnerable drafts <xref target="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-09"/>, <xref target="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation"/>, and <xref target="I-D.ritz-seat-facts"/> and shared our results with the community for review and to raise awareness on high- and critical-severity vulnerabilities and apply appropriate mitigations for the safety of their users:</t>
          <section anchor="intra-handshakefail-3">
            <name>Intra-handshake.fail</name>
            <section anchor="ietfhttpswwwietforg">
              <name><eref target="https://www.ietf.org/">IETF</eref></name>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/x3eQxFjQFJLceae6l4_NgXnmsDY/">SEAT WG</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/6gbqx0XY8WYrH3Mx4vO8n2-uKgY/">RATS WG</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/8lyqHh9y7_Lv6b1iXhpUqYrp0M0/">TLS WG</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/Tovtl7wgvzwJWT2I2ZwnhoIOnYQ/">LAKE WG</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/jBZVk7YySwpaFqydAfxW33kNZPY/">SAAG</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/practical-cybersecurity/d65WPaC0WbZRwxTBclnTkf7SmRs/">Practical Cybersecurity list</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Agent2agent list <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/agent2agent/ubz7uXCs--YzuSWyXNNsmWf_tSQ/">thread1</eref> and <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/agent2agent/xHhjA94fzed6ONIvPRgwTT-WRmA/">thread2</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmsc/QC2adIcYkxiTlniEcc7ggk86BAY/">DSMC list</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/hackathon/PIrJ2O_QqcNUAnMIn_Vh22ImWMc/">Hackathon</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/126attendees/V9BKZJ_DGkZPdlnjBaUeyluhbqQ/">126attendees</eref></t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </section>
            <section anchor="irtfhttpswwwirtforg">
              <name><eref target="https://www.irtf.org/">IRTF</eref></name>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>UFMRG: <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/ZWK0uMM92OdwlPbgXBvQApDpe5Q/">thread1</eref> and <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/ZRhR7o1HrWxfGDfgRJMR65RBkDE/">thread2</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>CFRG <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/NbxHIw9H_xpSYbgfO_n7lVIFeWs/">thread1</eref> and <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/U5YHd91lYjiqCTt9BZyVDNFeUpM/">thread2</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/din/_8LE3Ru1xX16hgGJwryMTRwRoaA/">DINRG</eref></t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </section>
            <section anchor="ccchttpsconfidentialcomputingio">
              <name><eref target="https://confidentialcomputing.io/">CCC</eref></name>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Attestation SIG: <eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/attestation/topic/117207133">thread1</eref> and <eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/attestation/message/334">thread2</eref></t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>TAC: <eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/tac/topic/117932193">thread1</eref> and <eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/tac/topic/120068850">thread2</eref></t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </section>
            <section anchor="ocphttpswwwopencomputeorg">
              <name><eref target="https://www.opencompute.org/">OCP</eref></name>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>OCP Security: <eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/topic/117932716">message1</eref>, <eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/topic/intra_handshake_fail/120069056">message2</eref>, <eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/topic/intra_handshake_fail/120483814">message3</eref> and <eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/topic/intra_handshake_fail/120524635">message4</eref></t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </section>
          </section>
          <section anchor="earlyattestationbleed-2">
            <name>EarlyAttestationBleed</name>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/ZQKdp07P4UeTushAC1q9eBBtp0s/">IRTF UFMRG</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2026-rats-03/materials/slides-interim-2026-rats-03-sessa-protecting-the-rats-ecosystem-from-critical-severity-vulnerabilities-00">IETF RATS</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/attestation/topic/121496347">Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC)</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://lists.aaif.io/g/wg-security-privacy/topic/contribution/121504323">Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF) Security &amp; Privacy</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/message/1263">OCP Security</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://sympa.inria.fr/sympa/arc/proverif/2026-09/msg00000.html">ProVerif</eref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </section>
          <section anchor="earlyattestationtschss-eat-2">
            <name>EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT)</name>
            <t><xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/></t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ufmrg/8RPCf502JFmsBui5rUZw38l76Rk/">IRTF UFMRG</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://lists.aaif.io/g/wg-security-privacy/topic/contribution/121847989">Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF) Security &amp; Privacy</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://ocp-all.groups.io/g/OCP-Security/message/1279">OCP Security</eref></t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t><eref target="https://lists.confidentialcomputing.io/g/attestation/message/343">Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC)</eref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
            <t>If you know any other relevant mailing list that we should inform for protection of users, please let us know.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributions">
      <name>Contributions</name>
      <t>Contributions to the draft are welcome at <eref target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail">https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail</eref>.</t>
      <t>Wenn Sie nur Deutsch sprechen, können Sie sich gerne per E-Mail an den Erstautor wenden. Wir haben Mitglieder, die Ihnen bei der Übersetzung Ihres Beitrags helfen können.</t>
      <t>如果您只会说中文，非常欢迎您通过电子邮件联系第四位作者。我们有成员可以协助翻译您的投稿。</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="Intra-handshake.fail" target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/408219182_Intra-handshakefail_CVE-2026-33697_High-severity_CVE_in_Attested_TLS">
          <front>
            <title>Intra-handshake.fail (CVE-2026-33697): High-severity CVE in Attested TLS</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Dubeyko">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J.-M." surname="Jacquet">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Intra-handshake.fail-repo" target="https://github.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake.fail">
          <front>
            <title>Intra-handshake.fail (CVE-2026-33697): High-severity CVE in Attested TLS</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="V." surname="Dubeyko">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J.-M." surname="Jacquet">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-33697" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-33697">
          <front>
            <title>CoCoS attested TLS is vulnerable to relay attacks via extracted ephemeral TLS keys</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-16488" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-16488">
          <front>
            <title>CoCoS attested TLS is vulnerable to relay attacks via extracted ephemeral TLS keys</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-92701" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-92701">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to session-misbinding attacks for Intel TDX verifier path</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-92702" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-92702">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation can accept Evidence with nil, empty, or omitted reportData in the AMD SEV-SNP path</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108265" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108265">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108265</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108266" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108266">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108266</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108267" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108267">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108267</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108268" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108268">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108268</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108269" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108269">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108269</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-83194" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-83194">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-83194</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-83192" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-83192">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-83192</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Cocos-AI" target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-vfgg-mvxx-mgg7">
          <front>
            <title>CoCoS attested TLS is vulnerable to relay attacks via extracted ephemeral TLS keys</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Ultraviolet Cocos AI">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Cocos-AI2" target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-4px3-wj2x-xx47">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos AI intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to session-misbinding attacks for Intel TDX verifier path</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Ultraviolet Cocos AI">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Cocos-AI3" target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-4r6g-mp48-j2rw">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos AI intra-handshake attested TLS implementation can accept Evidence with nil, empty, or omitted reportData in the AMD SEV-SNP path</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Ultraviolet Cocos AI">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems" target="https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-hjgc-jc5v-fw7h">
          <front>
            <title>Remote attestation is susceptible to relay attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems2" target="https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-m2qg-wrxv-h898">
          <front>
            <title>Generated policies don't detect all image substitutions</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems3" target="https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-rxcv-p3px-m3c3">
          <front>
            <title>Existing Mesh CA key can cross manifest boundaries during Contrast peer recovery</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems4" target="https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-376m-h37w-4rvq">
          <front>
            <title>Node installer leaves the host containerd configuration world-writable (0666), allowing local privilege escalation</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems5" target="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jw33-f4wc-8736">
          <front>
            <title>Contrast before 1.16.0 is susceptible to remote attestation relay attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SEAT-vulnerability-report" target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/seat/x3eQxFjQFJLceae6l4_NgXnmsDY/">
          <front>
            <title>Relay Attacks in Intra-handshake Attestation for Confidential Agentic AI Systems</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-rustls" target="https://github.com/Privasys/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-j6qv-435v-r492">
          <front>
            <title>Privasys RA-TLS challenge mode did not bind attestation evidence to the TLS session</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-go" target="https://github.com/Privasys/go/security/advisories/GHSA-7jfw-53rm-phh2">
          <front>
            <title>Privasys Go fork: RA-TLS challenge mode did not bind attestation evidence to the TLS session</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-eov" target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-virtual/security/advisories/GHSA-p5fp-g94g-g9m9">
          <front>
            <title>enclave-os-virtual: RA-TLS challenge certificates were not bound to the TLS session</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-eom" target="https://github.com/Privasys/enclave-os-mini/security/advisories/GHSA-49qm-4pj3-w2c6">
          <front>
            <title>enclave-os-mini: RA-TLS challenge certificates were not bound to the TLS session</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-rtc" target="https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-5qrc-v874-mxvx">
          <front>
            <title>ra-tls-clients: RA-TLS challenge verifier accepted quotes not bound to the TLS session</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-da" target="https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-pj2x-5wqv-fh57">
          <front>
            <title>Privasys Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to Diversion Attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Privasys-rtc-tcu" target="https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-gg8q-mfhh-wrrc">
          <front>
            <title>Privasys Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to TOCTOU Attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Privasys">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Cocos-AI4" target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-v5m8-5wxc-vjgp">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to Diversion Attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Ultraviolet Cocos AI">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Cocos-AI5" target="https://github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos/security/advisories/GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975">
          <front>
            <title>Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to TOCTOU Attacks</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Ultraviolet Cocos AI">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-Crisis">
          <front>
            <title>Identity Crisis in Confidential Computing: Formal Analysis of Attested TLS</title>
            <author fullname="Muhammad Usama Sardar" initials="M." surname="Sardar">
              <organization>TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mariam Moustafa" initials="M." surname="Moustafa">
              <organization>Aalto University, Espoo, Finland</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tuomas Aura" initials="T." surname="Aura">
              <organization>Aalto University, Espoo, Finland</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="June" year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Proceedings of the ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security" value="pp. 547-560"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/3779208.3785387"/>
          <refcontent>ACM</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-Crisis-repo" target="https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis">
          <front>
            <title>Identity Crisis in Confidential Computing: Formal Analysis of Attested TLS</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Moustafa">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Aura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="refTLS">
          <front>
            <title>Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate</title>
            <author fullname="Karthikeyan Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Bruno Blanchet" initials="B." surname="Blanchet">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nadim Kobeissi" initials="N." surname="Kobeissi">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)" value="pp. 483-502"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/sp.2017.26"/>
          <refcontent>IEEE</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS-RA" target="https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc25/presentation/weinhold">
          <front>
            <title>Separate but together: integrating remote attestation into TLS</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Carsten Weinhold">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Ionuț Mihalcea">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Yogesh Deshpande">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Hannes Tschofenig">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Yaron Sheffer">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Thomas Fossati">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Michael Roitzsch">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="July"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CSA-eBPF" target="https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2026/09/09/mitre-s-new-framework-securing-the-ebpf-layer-your-ai-depends-on">
          <front>
            <title>MITRE's New Framework: Securing the eBPF Layer Your AI Depends On</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Cloud Security Alliance">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MITRE-Continuous-Attestation" target="https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/publication/framework-continuous-remote-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Framework for Continuous Remote Attestation</title>
            <author initials="" surname="MITRE's Confidential Computing Layered Attestation Working Group">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EarlyAttestationBleed" target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/414529199_EarlyAttestationBleed_Three_Critical-severity_Vulnerabilities_of_CVSS_90_in_Confidential_Computing">
          <front>
            <title>EarlyAttestationBleed: Three Critical-severity Vulnerabilities of CVSS ≥ 9.0 in Confidential Computing</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Songbo Bu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-100835" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-100835">
          <front>
            <title>Contrast before 1.16.0 Remote Attestation Relay Attack</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-87851" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-87851">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-87851</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-100833" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-100833">
          <front>
            <title>Contrast before 1.23.1 Image Substitution via Policy Generation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GHSA-Edgeless-Systems6" target="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-MJJ6-PX65-JQ92">
          <front>
            <title>Contrast (edgelesssys/contrast) versions 1.14.0 before 1.23.1 generate runtime policies that fail to detect all container image substitutions.</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Edgeless Systems">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-87853" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-87853">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-87853</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108362" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108362">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108362</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-108361" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-108361">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-108361</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-112377" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-112377">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-112377</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-95996" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-95996">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-95996</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-95997" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-95997">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-95997</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-96017" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-96017">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-96017</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-96018" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-96018">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-96018</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-96019" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-96019">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-96019</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-97782" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-97782">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-97782</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-97781" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-97781">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-97781</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUVD-2026-104535" target="https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-104535">
          <front>
            <title>EUVD-2026-104535</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ENISA</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-119344" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-119344">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-119344</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-119345" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-119345">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-119345</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CVE-2026-129092" target="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129092">
          <front>
            <title>CVE-2026-129092</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CVE</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EarlyAttestationTschuess" target="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/417343302_EarlyAttestationTschuss_EAT">
          <front>
            <title>EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT): 8+ Critical-Severity Vulnerabilities of CVSS 9.1 Resulting in End of Life of Early Attestation</title>
            <author initials="M. U." surname="Sardar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="" surname="Songbo Bu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The TLS handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers
   using static, long-term credentials.  In some cases, it is also
   desirable to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in a secure
   state.  Such an assurance can be achieved using remote attestation
   which is a process by which an entity produces Evidence about itself
   that another party can use to appraise whether that entity is found
   in a secure state.  This document describes a TLS extension that
   enables the negotiation of remote attestation and binds the TLS
   authentication key to the attested platform state.  This enables an
   entity capable of producing attestation Evidence, such as a
   confidential workload running in a Trusted Execution Environment
   (TEE), or an IoT device that is trying to authenticate itself to a
   network access point, to present a more comprehensive set of security
   metrics to its peer.  This extension has been designed to allow the
   peers to use any attestation technology, in any remote attestation
   topology, and to use them mutually.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation-04">
          <front>
            <title>Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy.K" initials="T." surname="Reddy.K">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="May" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The TLS handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers
   using static, long-term credentials.  In some cases, it is also
   desirable to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in a secure
   state.  Such an assurance can be achieved using remote attestation
   which is a process by which an entity produces Evidence about itself
   that another party can use to appraise whether that entity is found
   in a secure state.  This document describes a series of TLS
   extensions that enable the binding of the TLS authentication key to a
   remote attestation session.  This enables an entity capable of
   producing attestation Evidence, such as a confidential workload
   running in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), or an IoT device
   that is trying to authenticate itself to a network access point, to
   present a more comprehensive set of security metrics to its peer.
   These extensions have been designed to allow the peers to use any
   attestation technology, in any remote attestation topology, and to
   use them mutually.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-06">
          <front>
            <title>Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Howard" initials="P." surname="Howard">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arto Niemi" initials="A." surname="Niemi">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The TLS handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers
   using static, long-term credentials.  In some cases, it is also
   desirable to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in a secure
   state.  Such an assurance can be achieved using attestation which is
   a process by which an entity produces evidence about itself that
   another party can use to appraise whether that entity is found in a
   secure state.  This document describes a series of protocol
   extensions to the TLS 1.3 handshake that enables the binding of the
   TLS authentication key to a remote attestation session.  This enables
   an entity capable of producing attestation evidence, such as a
   confidential workload running in a Trusted Execution Environment
   (TEE), or an IoT device that is trying to authenticate itself to a
   network access point, to present a more comprehensive set of security
   metrics to its peer.  These extensions have been designed to allow
   the peers to use any attestation technology, in any remote
   attestation topology, and mutually.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fossati-tls-attestation-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-09">
          <front>
            <title>Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Howard" initials="P." surname="Howard">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arto Niemi" initials="A." surname="Niemi">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="April" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The TLS handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers
   using static, long-term credentials.  In some cases, it is also
   desirable to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in a secure
   state.  Such an assurance can be achieved using attestation which is
   a process by which an entity produces evidence about itself that
   another party can use to appraise whether that entity is found in a
   secure state.  This document describes a series of protocol
   extensions to the TLS 1.3 handshake that enables the binding of the
   TLS authentication key to a remote attestation session.  This enables
   an entity capable of producing attestation evidence, such as a
   confidential workload running in a Trusted Execution Environment
   (TEE), or an IoT device that is trying to authenticate itself to a
   network access point, to present a more comprehensive set of security
   metrics to its peer.  These extensions have been designed to allow
   the peers to use any attestation technology, in any remote
   attestation topology, and mutually.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fossati-tls-attestation-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10">
          <front>
            <title>Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Howard" initials="P." surname="Howard">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arto Niemi" initials="A." surname="Niemi">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This draft has been withdrawn.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-tls-attestation/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/yaronf/draft-tls-attestation.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fossati-tls-attestation-10"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ritz-seat-facts">
          <front>
            <title>Factor-based Attestation and Credential Transport Scheme (FACTS) over TLS 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="Nathanael Ritz" initials="N." surname="Ritz">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="March" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes FACTS (Factor-based Attestation and
   Credential Transport Scheme) over TLS 1.3.  Conceptually acting as
   "multi-factor authentication" for machine identities, factor-based
   attestation derives session trust from multiple independent
   cryptographic inputs rather than a single point of failure.
   Specifically, it utilizes a dual-key scheme that binds identity to
   attestation evidence through the use of key encapsulation material
   keys (KEM) and traditional identity signing keys (IK), establishing
   per-session freshness.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ritz-seat-facts-00"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1544?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Acknowledgment does not necessarily imply attestation. It implies that the authors found the feedback and discussion useful in improving the formal analysis, the corresponding paper, or this draft.</t>
      <t>This draft benefits from several years of research on attested TLS, in particular some of the recent works mentioned below:</t>
      <t><strong>EarlyAttestationTschüss (EAT)</strong> <xref target="EarlyAttestationTschuess"/></t>
      <t>We wish to express our sincere appreciation to the following for their review and discussions:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Bertrand Foing</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Markus Rudy</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Sammy Kerata Oina</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Kaya Ercihan</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>David Kaplan</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Elena Reshetova</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Artem Bityutskiy</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Mateusz Bronk</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><strong>EarlyAttestationBleed</strong> <xref target="EarlyAttestationBleed"/></t>
      <t>We wish to express our sincere appreciation to the following for their review:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Sammy Kerata Oina</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Drasko Draskovic</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Markus Rudy</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Kaya Ercihan</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Jan Kahmen</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Peg Jones</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Bertrand Foing</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Rebekah Overdorf</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Tobias Pulls</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><strong>Intra-handshake.fail</strong> <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/></t>
      <t>We gratefully acknowledge the following for insightful discussions and helpful reviews on <xref target="Intra-handshake.fail"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Eric Rescorla</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Juho Forsén</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Markus Rudy</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Mariam Moustafa</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Bruno Blanchet</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Steve Kremer</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Tjaden Hess</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Martin Thomson</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Yuning Jiang</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Pavel Nikonorov</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Casey Wilson</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Anonymous ESORICS 2026 reviewers</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Marco Anisetti (ESORICS 2026 shepherd)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Danko Miladinovic</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Rongkuan He</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Peeter Laud</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Stephen Holmes</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Ammara Gul</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Atul Prakash</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Paul Syverson</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Jan Tobias Muehlberg</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>John Preuß Mattsson</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Britta Hale</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Werner Staub</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Songbo Bu</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Haowen Song</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Chengxin Huang</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Steve Luo</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Andrew Miller</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Kubilay Ahmet Küçük</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Iman Schrock</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Sophie Schmieg</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Davyd Okaianchenko</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Alistair Woodman</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Göran Selander</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Tom Sato</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Jakub Maria Plutowski</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Martin Friedrich</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Patrick Duggan</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Serhii Nikolaichuk</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Deb Cooley</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><strong>Identity Crisis</strong> <xref target="ID-Crisis"/></t>
      <t>We would like to thank our co-authors of paper <xref target="ID-Crisis"/> for their valuable contributions:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Mariam Moustafa</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Tuomas Aura</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>We also gratefully acknowledge the following for insightful discussions and helpful feedback:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Ionut Mihalcea</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Jean-Marie Jacquet</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Thomas Fossati</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Eric Rescorla</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Hannes Tschofenig</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Yaron Sheffer</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Laurence Lundblade</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Giridhar Mandyam</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Christopher Patton</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Jonathan Hoyland</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Richard Barnes</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><strong>refTLS</strong> <xref target="refTLS"/></t>
      <t>We sincerely thank the following for the foundational formal model of draft 20 of TLS 1.3 in their work <xref target="refTLS"/> that we have used as the foundation of all of this work:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Karthikeyan Bhargavan</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Bruno Blanchet</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Nadim Kobeissi</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><strong>General</strong></t>
      <t>Several others at the IETF, IRTF, CCC, and GA4GH have contributed by providing feedback over the years. A non-exhaustive list of contributors is <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-iepg-sessa-05-intra-handshakefail-cve-2026-33697-00#page=17">here</eref>.</t>
      <t>Muhammad Usama Sardar is funded by German Research Foundation ("Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.")</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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