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  <front>
    <title abbrev="WIMSE Architecture">Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-arch-09"/>
    <author initials="J." surname="Salowey" fullname="Joseph Salowey">
      <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
      <address>
        <email>joe@salowey.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho" fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho">
      <organization>Zscaler</organization>
      <address>
        <email>yaroslavros@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig">
      <organization abbrev="UniBw M.">University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Neubiberg</city>
          <region>Bavaria</region>
          <code>85577</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Workload Identity in Multi System Environments</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 53?>

<t>The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being built and deployed as workloads, where a workload is defined as software executing for a specific purpose, potentially comprising one or more running instances.  This document discusses an architecture for designing and standardizing protocols and payloads for conveying workload identity and security context information.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Discussion Venues</name>
      <t>Discussion of this document takes place on the
    Workload Identity in Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list (wimse@ietf.org),
    which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/"/>.</t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
    <eref target="https://github.com/jsalowey/wimse-arch"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 57?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being built and deployed as systems composed of workloads, where a workload is defined as a logical software entity that executes for a specific purpose and may be represented at runtime by one or more workload instances.</t>
      <t>Workloads are provisioned with identity credentials when they start and may also receive trust anchors and security context information. They use these credentials to authenticate communications and use identity and context information to make authorization decisions.</t>
      <t>This architecture considers two credential formats: X.509 certificates, commonly used with Transport Layer Security (TLS), and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), used at the application layer. The choice depends on the application and security context.</t>
      <t>When invoked, a workload may need to interact with other workloads. <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens"/> illustrates an externally facing endpoint invoked using a conventional authorization mechanism, such as an OAuth 2.0 access token. Security context associated with that authorization may need to be passed along the call chain.</t>
      <t>In the rest of the document we describe terminology and use cases, discuss details of the architecture, and describe security considerations for this architecture.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>This document uses the following terms:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Workload</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A workload is an independently addressable and executable software entity that typically interacts with other parts of a larger system. It is a logical entity and need not correspond to a single running process. It may be implemented by one or more workload instances and may expose, consume, or participate in one or more services. Examples include microservices, containers, virtual machines (VMs), or serverless functions.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Workload Instance</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A workload instance is a single running instantiation of a workload, such as a container, a VM, or a serverless invocation. Its lifetime can range from a fraction of a second to handle a single request to months or years for database services or machine learning training jobs. The number of instances of a workload may vary over time due to scaling, failover, or orchestration.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Service</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A service is a function, API, or capability exposed to other entities. A service may be implemented by a single workload, by multiple workload instances of the same workload, or by multiple workloads acting together. A service can have a stable identity that is distinct from the identity of any particular workload instance. When this document refers to service authentication or service authorization, it refers to authentication or authorization of the workload identity used to represent that service in a particular deployment.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Application System</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>An application system is a set of workloads, services, gateways, credential services, and related infrastructure that together implement an application or application function. An application system may be contained within a single trust domain or may interact with services in other trust domains.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Security Context</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A security context provides information needed for a workload to perform its function, often for authorization, accounting, or auditing. It may include user information, software and hardware information, or information about the request and its prior processing. Different pieces of context information may originate from different sources.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Identity Proxy</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The identity proxy is an intermediary that can inspect, replace or augment workload identity and security context information. A transparent network service such as a security gateway may act as an identity proxy, or the role can be implemented in a service performing explicit connection processing, such as an ingress gateway or a Content Delivery Network (CDN) service. The identity proxy <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> introduce additional context based on source identifier, communication properties and administrative policy. This context <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be communicated as a transaction token <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens"/>.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Remote Attestation</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The term "attestation", as defined in <xref target="RFC9683"/>, refers to the process of generating and evaluating remote attestation Evidence. <xref target="RFC9334"/> describes Evidence and the different communication patterns.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Workload Identity Credential</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A credential that contains a workload identifier (<xref target="WIMSE-ID"/>) used for service to service authentication. The credential may be bound to a cryptographic key and may require that the presenter provide proof of possession of the secret key material. Examples of such credentials include Workload Identity Certificates and the Workload Identity Token defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol"/>. Deployments may also deploy bearer tokens as workload identity credentials to interoperate with legacy systems that do not support credentials bound to keys.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Trust Domain</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A trust domain is an administrative scope for workload identities. It defines an identity namespace and common policies for issuing and validating workload identity credentials. Credential issuance within a trust domain is managed by one or more authorized issuers. This scope is analogous to a Kerberos realm <xref target="RFC4120"/>, but does not require a particular credential format or a single issuer. Trust domain identifiers are described in <xref target="trust-domain"/>.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Issuer</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>An issuer is an entity that issues workload identity credentials, such as Workload Identity Tokens or Workload Identity Certificates, on behalf of one or more trust domains. For JWT-based credentials, this corresponds to the issuer role described in <xref target="RFC9901"/>. An issuer is a logical entity that may be implemented by multiple service instances and may use multiple signing keys. Its signing keys are distinct from the workload keys used to prove possession of workload identity credentials.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Trust Anchor</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A trust anchor is a public key and associated data that a relying party explicitly accepts as authoritative for validating credentials within a defined scope, following the terminology in <xref target="RFC9397"/> and <xref target="RFC6024"/>. It can be used to verify credential signatures directly or to validate certificate paths. The associated data constrains the purposes and identity namespaces for which the key is authoritative.</t>
      <t>Trust anchor information can be represented by an X.509 certificate, including a self-signed certificate, or by a raw public key with associated metadata. A securely provisioned cryptographic hash can identify the trusted certificate or public key. In that case, the relying party also needs to obtain the complete certificate or public key and verify it against the hash before using it for signature validation. A key, certificate, or hash does not establish trust by itself: its use for the intended trust domain and purpose must be explicitly authorized through trusted configuration. A certificate's self-signature does not provide that authorization.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Relying Party</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A relying party is an entity that validates a workload identity credential and relies on the resulting authenticated identity. This role can be performed by a workload, a gateway, or another component acting on behalf of a workload.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="architecture">
      <name>Architecture</name>
      <section anchor="whimsical-identity">
        <name>Workload Identity Concepts</name>
        <t>The workload identity architecture consists of three basic building blocks: a trust domain, a workload identifier, and identity credentials. These components are sufficient for establishing authentication, authorization and accounting processes. More complex workload identity constructs can be created from these basic building blocks.</t>
        <section anchor="trust-domain">
          <name>Trust Domain</name>
          <t>Trust domain identifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be fully qualified domain names associated with the organization administering the trust domain. This naming convention helps to avoid identifier collisions; a domain name alone does not establish trust.</t>
          <t>Each relying party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> associate a trust domain with the issuers authorized to issue credentials for that domain and with the corresponding trust anchors and constraints. For Workload Identity Tokens, trusted public keys can be represented as a JWK Set <xref target="RFC7517"/>. For Workload Identity Certificates, trust anchors are used to validate X.509 certification paths. A credential <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be validated using only the trust anchors associated with the trust domain named in its workload identifier, subject to the configured scope of each issuer and key. This mapping and any updates <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be obtained through a secure mechanism that provides authenticity, integrity, and freshness.</t>
          <t>A single organization may define multiple trust domains for different purposes. Each trust domain must have a unique domain identifier. Workload identifiers are scoped within a trust domain as specified in <xref section="4.3" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-ID"/>. Identifiers that differ by trust domain represent distinct workload identities, even if the same underlying workload holds credentials in both domains.</t>
          <section anchor="relationships-among-trust-domains-issuers-and-trust-anchors">
            <name>Relationships among Trust Domains, Issuers, and Trust Anchors</name>
            <t>The following table summarizes deployment variants supported by these definitions. Each association describes configured authority for credential validation. It does not by itself imply an independent cryptographic security boundary.</t>
            <table anchor="trust-relationships">
              <name>Trust domain, issuer, and trust anchor relationships.</name>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="left">Relationship</th>
                  <th align="left">Cardinality</th>
                  <th align="left">Deployment Rationale</th>
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Trust domain to issuers</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">Separate issuers for certificates and tokens, or multiple authorized credential services.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Issuer to trust domains</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">A central credential service issues credentials for several domains, with explicit authorization for each domain.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Issuer to signing keys</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">Key rotation or support for different signature algorithms.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Issuer to trust anchors</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">Credentials are validated using directly trusted issuer keys or certificate paths to CA trust anchors.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Trust domain to trust anchors</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">Multiple issuers, algorithm choices, or trust anchor rollover.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Trust anchor to trust domains</td>
                  <td align="left">One or more</td>
                  <td align="left">A common CA trust anchor serves several domains, subject to the applicable constraints.</td>
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            <t>For example, an issuer can use an elliptic-curve signing key and a separate Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) signing key. If both public keys are directly configured as trust anchors, that issuer is associated with two trust anchors, each with its own scope and algorithm policy.</t>
            <t>Conversely, several issuing CAs can use distinct signing keys while their certificate paths terminate at a common trust anchor <xref target="RFC5280"/>. Thus, multiple issuers or signing keys do not necessarily imply multiple trust anchors. The security consequences of shared keys and trust anchors are discussed in <xref target="trust-domain-separation"/>.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="issuer-key-deployments">
            <name>Signing Key Deployment Variants</name>
            <t>The following cases distinguish the logical issuer, the trust domains it serves, and the entities authorized to use a signing key. Each variant offers operational benefits and introduces dependencies that deployments need to consider.</t>
            <table anchor="signing-key-variants">
              <name>Benefits and implications of signing key deployment variants.</name>
              <thead>
                <tr>
                  <th align="left">Deployment variant</th>
                  <th align="left">Benefits</th>
                  <th align="left">Operational and security implications</th>
                </tr>
              </thead>
              <tbody>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Multiple instances of one issuer share a signing key.</td>
                  <td align="left">Simplifies verification-key configuration for replicated issuer instances.</td>
                  <td align="left">Requires coordinated key protection and rotation. Compromise of signing access at an instance can affect the issuer's full scope.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">One issuer uses a signing key across multiple trust domains.</td>
                  <td align="left">Reduces the number of signing keys and associated lifecycle operations.</td>
                  <td align="left">Domain separation relies on issuance policies and relying-party checks. Key compromise affects every domain for which the key is trusted.</td>
                </tr>
                <tr>
                  <td align="left">Separately administered issuers share a signing key.</td>
                  <td align="left">Can ease migration or administrative handover by retaining an existing public verification key.</td>
                  <td align="left">Requires coordination across administrators for key protection, rotation, and compromise response. The shared key alone cannot distinguish which issuer produced a signature.</td>
                </tr>
              </tbody>
            </table>
            <t>Shared use of a signing key can be provided by a common signing service or by distributing the key to authorized instances. These approaches differ in where key material is held and how access is controlled. Sharing a CA trust anchor while retaining separate issuer signing keys is a further deployment choice, discussed in <xref target="trust-domain-separation"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="workload-identifier">
          <name>Workload Identifier</name>
          <t>A workload identifier is a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that uniquely names a workload within a trust domain and is carried in workload identity credentials. Its format, syntax, comparison rules, and validation requirements are defined in <xref target="WIMSE-ID"/>.</t>
          <t>In addition the URI <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include an authority that identifies the trust domain within which the identifier is scoped. The trust domain <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be a fully qualified domain name belonging to the organization defining the trust domain to help provide uniqueness for the trust domain identifier. The scheme and scheme specific part are not defined by this specification. An example of an identifier format that conforms to this definition can be found in <xref target="SPIFFE-ID"/>.</t>
          <t>Two credentials containing the same workload identifier value represent the same workload only when validated under the same trust domain and issuer trust configuration.</t>
          <t>A workload identifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> represent a logical workload, a service implemented by one or more workloads, or a specific workload instance, depending on deployment policy. Relying parties <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> interpret the identifier according to the identity semantics defined by the issuing trust domain.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="workload-identity-credentials">
          <name>Workload Identity Credentials</name>
          <t>An agent provisions the identity credentials to the workload. These credentials are represented in the form of JWT tokens and/or X.509 certificates.</t>
          <t>JWT bearer tokens are presented to another party as a proof of identity. They may be signed to prevent forgery, however since these credentials are often not bound to other information it is possible that they could be stolen and reused elsewhere. To mitigate these risks and make the token more generally useful the WIMSE architecture defines a workload identity credential that binds a JWT to a cryptographic key.</t>
          <t>Both workload identity certificate and workload identity token (WIT) credentials consist of two parts:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>a certificate or WIT is a signed data structure that contains a public key and identity information</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>a corresponding private key</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The workload identity certificate or WIT is presented during authentication, however the private key is kept secret and only used in cryptographic computation to prove that the presenter has access to the private key corresponding to the public key.</t>
          <t>The private key associated with a workload identity credential is security-sensitive key material. It may be generated and managed by the workload itself, by an agent, or by the surrounding platform or infrastructure. In all cases, the key material needs to be generated with sufficient entropy, stored securely, protected from unauthorized access, and rotated according to deployment policy.</t>
          <t>The appropriate lifetime of a workload identity credential and its associated key pair depends on the deployment model, the sensitivity of the workload, the strength of the key protection mechanism, and the expected lifetime of the workload instance. Generating a new key pair for every request is not generally required and may be impractical. However, deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use bounded credential lifetimes and automated renewal so that workload identity credentials and associated key pairs are periodically replaced and can be retired after suspected compromise.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="workload-identity-system-scenarios">
        <name>Workload Identity System Scenarios</name>
        <section anchor="basic-workload-identity-scenario">
          <name>Basic Workload Identity Scenario</name>
          <figure anchor="arch-basic">
            <name>Basic example workload application system.</name>
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              <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
                        +--------------------------------Trust Boundary---------------+
                        |                                                             |
                    .---+-.                                                           |
                    | .---+-.         +--------------+                                |
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                    | |  G  |     |   |              |                   |            |
                    | |  a  |     |   +-------^------+                   |            |
                    | |  t  |     |           |                          |            |
+------------+      | |  e  |     |           | (1)                      |            |
|            | (2)  | |  w  | (3) |           |                          |            |
| App Client +----->| |  a  +-----+   +-------+-------+                  |            |
|            |      | |  y  |         |               |          +-------+------+     |
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                    | |  v  |     |           |                          |            |
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                        |                                                             |
                        |                                                             |
                        +-------------------------------------------------------------+
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          <t>The above diagram presents a basic workload application system.  The large box represents a trust domain within which the workload application is hosted.  Within this example
there are three workloads, a gateway service, that accepts external clients and a CA/credential service that issues workload identity credentials for the trust domain.  External
to the workload application system there is an application client that calls APIs on workloads.</t>
          <t>Here is a brief summary of each component</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Trust Domain</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The large box represents a trust domain of the application that is composed of several workloads.  A trust domain may have a more complex internal structure with more workloads, multiple gateways, internal infrastructure, and other services.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Workload</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Three workloads are shown. Each workload is an independently addressable software entity that may consist of one or more workload instances at runtime.
Workloads obtain their identity credentials from a Credentials Service (1) and use them to authenticate to other workloads and systems in the process
of sending and receiving requests to and from external systems or other internal workloads.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Gateway Service</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>A gateway service acts as an intermediary between the internal application trust domain and external systems. By exposing external endpoints, it routes incoming requests to the correct internal workloads while ensuring appropriate isolation between the external and internal domains. To provide high availability, a gateway usually consists of multiple resilient instances.
The gateway <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also implement identity proxy functionality including authentication, token exchange, and token transformation.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>CA/Credential Service</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>In this diagram the token/Credential service is a service responsible for issuing workload identities to workloads in the same trust domain. The credentials are often X.509 certificate-based or JWT-based.</t>
          <t>High level flows within the diagram</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(1) Workload Identity Credential Distribution</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Workloads typically retrieve their workload identity credentials early in their lifecycle from a credentials service associated with their trust domain. The protocol interaction for
obtaining credentials varies with deployment and is not detailed here.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(2) Application client Requests</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Clients send API requests to the application. In the example above, the gateway routes the request to the correct workload. In addition, the gateway may assist in authenticating the incoming request and provide information resulting from the authentication to the target workload. The authentication exchange is not covered in detail in this example.
The client request is typically made over HTTPS, but other protocols may be used in some systems. The gateway usually terminates the TLS session so it has visibility into the request in order to route it correctly.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(3) API request to workload 1</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The gateway is configured to forward requests to the correct workload.  The gateway often modifies the request to include specific authentication information about the application client and to remove any information that should not be forwarded internally.  The gateway authenticates the workload before forwarding the request.  This authentication usually uses TLS. The target workload may authenticate the gateway using TLS or some other means. As part of servicing the request the workload must make a request to another workload in the system.  In this scenario the workload is making a request to workload 3 over HTTPS.  Workload 1 may be able to authenticate the identity of workload 3 through the TLS protocol to ensure it is making a request of the right party.  Workload 3 will authenticate workload 1 using its workload identity credentials. If the Workload Identity Credentials are workload identity certificates then this can happen through TLS client authentication (mutual TLS). Alternatively, the workloads can use a JWT based authentication mechanism to authenticate one another. Workload 3 can use the authenticated identity of workload 1 to determine which APIs workload 1 is authorized to invoke, and to associated the authenticated identity with logs and other audit information.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(4) API request to workload 2</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Similarly to the previous flow, the gateway may determine that for another API call, the application client's request needs to be handled by workload 2. The case behaves the same as the previous flow except that the gateway may need to authenticate workload 2 before forwarding traffic to it. Workload 3 will then authorize and audit the request based on the authenticated identity of workload 2. Workload 2 and workload 1 may be authorized to use different APIs on workload 3. If workload 1 or 2 makes an API request that it is not authorized for, then workload 3 will reject the request.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="context-and-workload-identity">
          <name>Context and workload Identity</name>
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            <name>Context example workload application system.</name>
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              | |  G  |                   +----------------+      |
              | |  a  |                                           |
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| Client+---->| |  a  +----->| workload 1 +----->|  workload 2 |  |
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          <t>In many cases the application system uses other security context information about the request during authorization and auditing.  The following is a basic scenario that illustrates the propagation of security context in the workload system.
Some of the components and interactions have been removed from the previous scenario for simplicity.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Context Service
This scenario adds a context service component which is responsible for creating security context based on authentication and other calculations. Context can be represented in many ways; it can be a plaintext data structure, a signed data structure such as a JWT or a pointer used to lookup the context as a data structure stored somewhere else. In one common example, creating the context may involve a token exchange converting an OAuth 2.0 access token into a different token format, such as a transaction token,  that is understood by internal services.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(1) Initial Authentication
In the initial authentication the gateway service obtains credentials it can use with the gateway service. This authentication may involve several steps and may be performed by an external entity such as an identity provider. The authentication process will result in a credential that the gateway service can evaluate. For example, the credential could be an OAuth Access token.
If the client already has an access token that it can use to authenticate to the gateway, such as an X.509 certificate, then it may skip this step.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(2) Application Client Request
The application client makes a request to the gateway over HTTPS.  The client may be authenticated to the gateway through TLS client authentication (mutual TLS) or through a credential such as an access token obtained in step 1.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(3) Establishing the request context
The gateway service requests a security context token (c) from a token service. This process may entail sending an access token (a) along with other information to a token exchange endpoint to obtain the context token, which contains information about the entity accessing the system. This context is typically only relevant to the internal system and is not returned to the client.
The gateway may use alternative mechanisms to get the internal security context information (c).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(4) Forwarding Request to Workload
The gateway forwards the request along with the context information (c) to the appropriate workload. A bearer token, such as an access token (a), is not usually forwarded as it is only meant for external access. The workload uses information in the context token in applying authorization policy to the application client's request.
If the workload does not receive a context token, then it will deny requests that rely on information from the token.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(5) Making Additional Workload Originated Requests
The workload may need to make requests of other workloads. When making these requests, the workload includes the context information so Workload 2 can authorize and audit the request. Workload 2 may have a policy requiring Workload 1 to authenticate its service identity and provide valid context information (c) to access certain APIs.</t>
            </li>
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        </section>
        <section anchor="cross-domain-communication">
          <name>Cross-Domain Communication</name>
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          <t>In many applications workloads must make requests of infrastructure or external services that operate as a different trust domain. Steps 5-7 of <xref target="arch-cross"/> involve a generic cross domain pattern as described in <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining"/>. This document refers to a token service which performs a similar functions with respect to token issuance as the authorization service in <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining"/>. The scenario shows some new components described below.
Components and interactions from previous scenarios are still relevant to this example, but are omitted for simplicity.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Token Service - the token service is responsible for exchanging information that is internal to the system such as service identity and/or security context information for a token that can be presented to an external token service in another trust domain to gain access to infrastructure or an external service.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>External Token Service - the external token service is part of another trust domain.  Workloads in the originating trust domain contact this service to get an access token to authenticate to external services.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Infrastructure Service - this service is often part of the application, but it is managed by an infrastructure provider and may require different information to access it.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>External Service - this service is distinct from the application and hosted in a separate trust domain.  This trust domain often has different access requirements that workloads in the internal trust domain.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Some example interactions in this scenario:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>(1) The application client is making requests with authentication information as in the other scenarios</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(2) The gateway forwards the request to the appropriate workload with the security context information</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(3) The workload needs to access an infrastructure service and, because there is an established trust relationship, it authenticates to the service directly using its workload credentials.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(4) Workload 1 contacts Workload 2 to perform an operation. This request is accompanied by a security context as in the other scenarios.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(5) Workload 2 determines it needs to communicate with an external service.  In order to gain access to this service it must first obtain a token/credential (t) that it can use externally.  It authenticates to the token service using its workload identity credential (c) and provides security context information.  The token service determines what type of externally usable token to issue to the workload for use with the external token service.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(6) Workload 2 uses this new token/credential (t) to request an access token (a) for the external service from the token service.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>(7) Workload 2 uses the access token (a) to access the external service in the other trust domain.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>There can be variations on cross domain workflows. For example, in step 3 the workload was able to use its Workload Identity Credentials to directly access an infrastructure service. It also may be possible for an workload to request an access token for an external service using its Workload Identity Credentials directly with an external token service.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="arch-basic-ops">
        <name>Message Flow and Policy Enforcement in the Basic Scenario</name>
        <t>The basic workload identity scenario described in <xref target="basic-workload-identity-scenario"/> and illustrated in <xref target="arch-basic"/> already sketches a trust domain, a gateway, a CA/credential service, and how an application client reaches multiple workloads. This section takes the same scenario and adds one level of detail for a single workload-to-workload hop: a caller and a callee, identity established with workload identity credentials, and a separate authorization step that may involve policy components.</t>
        <t>In this view, the component enforcing authorization policy acts as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): it allows a request to proceed, blocks it, or applies obligations based on the authenticated peer identity and any relevant security context. A deployment may also use a Policy Decision Point (PDP), to which the enforcing component delegates policy evaluation. Deployments may implement PEP and PDP as separate services, co-locate them with a gateway or sidecar, or embed them in the receiving workload. This document does not define a particular policy language or protocol between PEP and PDP.</t>
        <t>The diagram below is illustrative rather than normative. It shows one common logical layout for how provisioning, connection setup, application-layer authentication, authorization, and response relate when two workloads communicate.</t>
        <figure anchor="arch-basic-ops-fig">
          <name>Logical message flow and policy points (drill-down of the basic scenario).</name>
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                  <text x="176" y="52">(2)</text>
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                  <text x="284" y="100">Workload</text>
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            <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
+------------+               +------------+
|            |      (2)      |            |
|            |<=============>|            |
|            |               |            |
| Workload A |      (3)      | Workload B |
|            |==============>|            |
|            |               |            |
|            |      (5)      |   +--------+
|            |<==============|   |  PEP   |
+------------+               +---+--------+
      ^                        ^     ^
      |            (1)         |     |
  (1) | +----------------------+     | (4)
      | |                            |
      v v                            v
+------------+               +------------+
|            |               |            |
|  CA/       |               |    PDP     |
|  Credential|               | (optional) |
|  Service   |               |            |
+------------+               +------------+
]]></artwork>
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        </figure>
        <t>The CA/credential service issues workload identity credentials; workloads obtain them before using those credentials for authentication. Provisioning details vary by deployment. The PEP is shown as a logical function associated with the callee-side request path. It may be implemented inside Workload B, in a sidecar, in a gateway, or in another component on the request path, as in <xref target="arch-basic"/>.</t>
        <t>The high-level message flow is as follows:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Workload A and Workload B each obtain a workload identity credential from the CA/credential service before using that credential for authentication. The timing, lifetime, and refresh behavior of these credentials are deployment-specific. Normally credentials operate on a slower lifecycle than application requests.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A transport connection is set up for the call. It may use mutual TLS and workload identity certificates, or another transport security mechanism.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Workload A sends a request to Workload B. This may include application-layer authentication using a Workload Identity Token and proof of possession, as defined in the credentials and protocol documents. Workload B authenticates Workload A.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Workload B authorizes the request. The PEP enforces the decision, optionally consulting a PDP. Policy details and message-level authorization formats are out of scope for this architecture.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Workload B returns a response to Workload A, which may be an error or success.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Depending on the protocol binding, peer authentication may occur during step (2) at the transport layer, during step (3) at the application layer, or both, as in the other scenarios in this section.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="workload-identity-use-cases">
        <name>Workload Identity Use Cases</name>
        <section anchor="bootstrapping-workload-identifiers-and-credentials">
          <name>Bootstrapping Workload Identifiers and Credentials</name>
          <t>Workloads need to obtain credentials before they can fully participate in the WIMSE architecture. The architecture does not specify a particular method for credential provisioning, but this section outlines some concepts involved in this process. WIMSE focuses on credentials that consist of a public token and a private key such as X.509 certificate and Workload Identity Token (WIT). This list is not exhaustive of all the ways provisioning can happen.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Direct Provisioning - A workload may receive its WIMSE credential when it is initially created. This is typically done using a deployment-specific mechanism that configures both the private and public portions of the credential for the workload. In direct provisioning the workload does not need to go through additional processes to obtain credentials and the credentials can be used immediately, whereas in the other cases more interactions are needed to obtain usable credentials.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Bootstrap Credentials - A workload may receive a set of bootstrap credentials specific to its deployment mechanism, which are then used by the workload through another process to obtain WIMSE credentials. The workload may use the bootstrap credentials to obtain the private and public parts of the WIMSE credentials, or the workload may generate a private key pair and use the bootstrap credential to authorize an enrollment process to obtain the public credential (X.509 certificate or WIT). <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices"/> describes some ways workloads can be initially providioned with bootstrap credentials.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Attestation - A workload credential provisioning process may use attestation in addition to or instead of bootstrap credentials. Attestation refers to the process of one peer in a communication (known as an "attester") generating attestation evidence, and providing that to a communication peer -- the "relying party", who may request verification of the supplied evidence from a "verifier". The Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> describes evidence and some of the different communication patterns. Attestation in WIMSE is intentionally defined quite broadly, as it may be implemented in several ways that, while aligned with the definitions and architectures described in <xref target="RFC9334"/>, and here, do not rely on any specific implementation, or any specific communication protocol.  <xref target="SPIRE"/> provides an example outside of the RATS protocol work where attestation processes result in credentials being provisioned both to workloads, and the nodes that host them.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Agent Assisted Provisioning - In some architectures, several workloads run on the same node that hosts an agent that assists in the credential provisioning process. The example below illustrates one way in which an agent can participate in the process, reflecting some concepts in the SPIFFE architecture. There are other ways an agent may participate. For example, the agent may not receive direct access to the workload private key but it may be the conduit for providing an encrypted private key which the workload can decrypt through a process that may involve attestation.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <section anchor="agent-assisted-provisioning-example">
            <name>Agent Assisted Provisioning Example</name>
            <t><xref target="arch-fig"/> illustrates software layering at a host running workloads. During startup, workloads bootstrap their identifiers and credentials with the help of an agent. The agent may be associated with one or more workloads to help ensure that workloads are provisioned with the correct identifiers and credentials. The agent provides attestation evidence and other relevant information to a server. The server validates this information and provides the agent with identifiers and credentials for the workloads it is associated with. The server can use a variety of internal and external means to validate the request against policy. After obtaining credentials from the server, the agent passes them to the workload.</t>
            <figure anchor="arch-fig">
              <name>Host Software Layering in a Workload Identity Architecture.</name>
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  +-----------------+
  |     Server      |
  |                 |
  | +-------------+ |
  | | Attestation | |
  | +-------------+ |
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          | | Credentials                  | |    to
          | |                              | | Workload
          | |                              | | Communication
  +-------+-+------------------------------+-+-----------+
  |       | |                              v V           |
  |       | v                         +----------------+ |
  |  +----+----------+              +-+--------------+ | |
  |  | Agent         |              | Workloads      | | |
  |  |              <+--------------+>               | | |
  |  |            ^  |  Identity    |  ^             +-+ |
  |  +------------+--+  Credentials +--+-------------+   |
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            <t>How the workload obtains its identity credentials and interacts with the agent is subject to different implementations. Some common mechanisms for obtaining this initial identity include:</t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>File System - In this mechanism, the identity credential is provisioned to the workload via the filesystem.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Local API - The identity credential is provided through an API, such as a local domain socket (for example, SPIFFE or QEMU guest agent) or network API (for example, Cloud Provider Metadata Server).</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Environment Variables - Identity credentials may also be injected into workloads using operating system environment variables.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="workload-and-service-authentication">
          <name>Workload and Service Authentication</name>
          <t>One of the most basic use cases for workload identity is authentication of one workload to another. In many deployments, this is described operationally as one service making a request to another service as part of a larger, more complex application. The identifier in the credentials may identify a logical service, a workload that implements that service, or a specific workload instance, depending on the identity model chosen by the issuing trust domain. Following authentication, the identity of the peer can be used to enforce fine-grained authorization policies as described in <xref target="authorization"/> and generate audit trails as described in <xref target="audit-trails"/>.</t>
          <t>Authentication mechanisms are used to establish the identity of the peer before secure communication can proceed. The peer identity is carried in a workload identity credential, even when the credential represents a service-level identity rather than a particular workload instance.</t>
          <t>Workloads often obtain their credentials without relying on pre-provisioned long-lived secrets. Instead, short-lived credentials are established through mechanisms provided by the infrastructure that allow a workload to prove it is running in a given environment. Common delivery patterns are described in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices"/>.</t>
          <t>Once credentials are issued, they are conveyed to peers using common security protocols. Typical mechanisms include:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Mutual TLS authentication using X.509 certificate for both client and server as described in <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Application-layer authentication using cryptographic credentials passed within HTTP message as described in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>These mechanisms can also be used together. For example, a workload identity certificate can be used for transport-layer authentication to an intermediary, while an application-layer Workload Identity Token is used to authenticate the caller to the destination workload, as described in <xref target="layered-workload-authentication"/>.</t>
          <t>These authentication mechanisms establish a cryptographically verifiable identity for the communicating party, which can then be used for further policy enforcement.</t>
          <t><xref target="arch-chain"/> illustrates communication between workloads and services. Two aspects are important
to highlight: First, there is a need to consider the interaction with workloads that are external
to the trust domain (sometimes called cross-domain). Second, the interaction does
not only occur between workloads that directly interact with each other but instead may also
take place across intermediate workloads (in an end-to-end style).</t>
          <figure anchor="arch-chain">
            <name>Workload-to-Workload Communication.</name>
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              <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
  +-----------------+
  |     Workload    |
  |    (external)   |
  |       ^         |
  +-------+---------+
          |
          |
  +-------+-------------------------Trust Boundary---------------+
  |       |                                                      |
  |       |                                                      |
  |  +----+------+ Hop-by-  +-----------+ Hop-by-  +-----------+ |
  |  |    v      | Hop      |           | Hop      |           | |
  |  | Workload  | Security | Workload  | Security | Workload  | |
  |  |          <+----------+>         <+----------+>          | |
  |  |           |          |           |          |           | |
  |  |           |          |           |          |           | |
  |  |    O<-----+----------+-----------+----------+---->O     | |
  |  +-----------+   E2E    +-----------+   E2E    +-----------+ |
  |                                                              |
  |                                                              |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------+
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          </figure>
        </section>
        <section anchor="layered-workload-authentication">
          <name>Layered Workload Authentication</name>
          <t>Some deployments use workload identity credentials at more than one layer of the communication stack. For example, a workload might use a workload identity certificate with TLS to authenticate to a proxy, gateway, load balancer, or service mesh sidecar, while also using an application-layer Workload Identity Token (WIT) or similar credential to authenticate to the destination workload.</t>
          <t>This pattern is common when infrastructure components terminate or originate transport connections on behalf of workloads. In such deployments, the transport-layer credential authenticates the workload, proxy, gateway, or sidecar for the purpose of establishing a secure channel across a particular network segment. The application-layer credential authenticates the workload identity that is relevant to the receiving application. These two authentication events may involve different peers, different trust anchors, and different authorization policies.</t>
          <figure anchor="arch-layered-auth">
            <name>Layered workload authentication through an intermediary.</name>
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                    <text x="192" y="36">Transport-layer</text>
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                    <text x="164" y="68">(e.g.,</text>
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                    <text x="396" y="68">(e.g.,</text>
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              </artwork>
              <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
                 Transport-layer              Transport-layer
                 authentication               authentication
 +------------+   (e.g., TLS)    +---------+   (e.g., TLS)    +------------+
 |            |<---------------->|         |<---------------->|            |
 | Workload A |                  |  Proxy  |                  | Workload B |
 |            |                  | Gateway |                  |            |
 +-----+------+                  +---------+                  +------+-----+
       ^                                                             ^
       |                                                             |
       |        Application-layer authentication and context         |
       +=============================================================+
                    (e.g., WIT with proof of possession)
]]></artwork>
            </artset>
          </figure>
          <t>For example, Workload A may establish a mutually authenticated TLS connection to a gateway using a workload identity certificate. The gateway validates that Workload A is permitted to use the gateway and then forwards the request toward Workload B. Because the TLS connection from Workload A is terminated at the gateway, Workload B cannot rely solely on that transport-layer authentication to identify Workload A. Workload A can therefore include an application-layer credential, such as a WIT, allowing Workload B to authenticate the workload identity of the caller at the application layer.</t>
          <t>The workload identifiers used at different layers do not necessarily need to be identical. The transport-layer credential might identify a workload instance, node-local proxy, sidecar, or gateway, while the application-layer credential might identify the logical workload or service on whose behalf the request is made. Deployments need to define this relationship in policy, including when identifiers are expected to match, when one authenticated entity is allowed to act on behalf of another, and when the identities represent different roles in the request path. If intermediaries are allowed to inspect, replace, or augment workload identity or security context information, that behavior needs to be explicit and auditable.</t>
          <t>Layered authentication can improve security by allowing infrastructure components to authenticate and authorize use of the network path while allowing destination workloads to authenticate and authorize the application-layer caller. However, it can also introduce ambiguity if the identities are interpreted incorrectly. In particular, a destination workload <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that a transport-layer identity authenticated by an intermediary is the same as the application-layer caller identity unless that relationship is explicitly established by protocol or deployment policy.</t>
          <t>Audit records for layered authentication <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record both the transport-layer identity and the application-layer identity when both are available and relevant. This allows operators to distinguish the workload or infrastructure component that established the secure channel from the workload or service identity used for application-layer authorization.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="authorization">
          <name>Service Authorization</name>
          <t>Once authentication has successfully established the identity of a peer, authorization mechanisms determine whether the authenticated identity is permitted to perform the requested action on the target workload or service. The authenticated identity may represent a logical service, a workload, or a specific workload instance, and authorization policy needs to be written with this distinction in mind.</t>
          <t>Authorization specified by WIMSE is context-aware. It relies on attributes carried in the security context, which may originate from upstream systems such as gateways or identity proxies. This context may be derived from end-user attributes, trust domain policies, or deployment-specific metadata (e.g., environment, service role, workload instance).</t>
          <t>Authorization decisions typically include:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Validating the integrity and provenance of the security context.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Ensuring the authenticated identity has the correct role and attributes to access the requested API or resource.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Applying fine-grained policy rules, which may include path, method, action type, and contextual constraints (e.g., geographic location, time of day).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Authorization checks may also incorporate delegation and impersonation semantics, as described in <xref target="delegation"/>, where upstream workloads are authorized to act on behalf of end-users or other services, within the scope of their issued credentials and policy.</t>
          <t>A key architectural consideration is where authorization is evaluated. For most workload-to-workload or service-to-service interactions (e.g., REST APIs, gRPC, or pub/sub flows), authorization is performed by the callee, ensuring that the target workload or service enforces its own access policies. But in some scenarios, such as database access or operations on complex back-end systems, authorization decisions may be too fine-grained or application-specific to be enforced by the subject of the operation. In these cases, authorization <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be performed by the caller, provided that the caller has sufficient context and policy information to make a correct decision.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="audit-trails">
          <name>Audit Trails</name>
          <t>Auditability is a critical requirement in systems that rely on workload identities and security context. Each authenticated request <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> leave a verifiable and inspectable trace regardless of authentication and authorization decision.</t>
          <t>Audit trails are typically generated at multiple points:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Gateway Services: Log incoming client requests, their authenticated identities and relevant context.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Workloads: Log authenticated peer identities, security context attributes, requested resources, and authorization outcomes.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Identity and Token Services: Log issuance and validation events for workload identity credentials and context tokens.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Audit records may include:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Timestamp of the request</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Source workload identifier</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Target workload identifier</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Authentication method used</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Decision outcome (authorized/denied)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Security context claims</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Delegation/impersonation metadata (if present)</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>To avoid inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information, workloads and services generating audit logs <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> log secrets such as bearer tokens, private keys, or passwords. If logging of credential-related data is necessary for diagnostic or policy purposes, these values <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be redacted, hashed, or otherwise sanitised to prevent misuse.</t>
          <t>WIMSE systems <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure audit logs are tamper-evident and securely stored. Logs may be forwarded to centralized security information and event management (SIEM) systems to enable compliance, threat detection, and incident response.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="seccontext">
          <name>Security Context Establishment and Propagation</name>
          <t>In a typical system of workloads additional information is needed in order for the workload to perform its function. For example, it is common for a workload to require information about a user or other entity that originated the request. Other types of information may include information about the hardware or software that the workload is running or information about what processing and validation has already been done to the request. This type of information is part of the security context that the workload uses during authorization, accounting and auditing. This context is propagated and possibly augmented from workload to workload using tokens. The context may be associated with a specific source or target workload by binding it to a specific workload identifier. This may indicate that the context originated from a specific workload, or that only a specific workload may make use of the context. A workload may also use a workload identity credential to bind a context to one or more transaction so the receiver can verify which workload initiated the transaction and the context that was intended for the transaction.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="delegation">
          <name>Delegation and Impersonation</name>
          <t>Workloads may need to impersonate or act on behalf of another principal in the system. In these scenarios, the workload typically authenticates using its workload identity to a token service, as described in <xref target="OAUTH-TOKEN-XCHANGE"/>. The token service then issues a token that can be used for delegation and impersonation. In many cases, this will not be an identity credential, but rather an authorization or context credential that delegates authority or permits impersonation for specific actions. This token may be bound to a workload identity as described in <xref target="binding"/>.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="accessing-resources-in-other-trust-domains">
          <name>Accessing Resources in Other Trust Domains</name>
          <t>When source workloads send authenticated requests to destination workloads or services, those destination workloads may rely on upstream dependencies to fulfill such requests. Such access patterns are increasingly common in a microservices architecture. While X.509 certificates can be used for point-to-point authentication, services that rely on upstream workloads for answers may use delegation and/or impersonation semantics as described in <xref target="OAUTH-TOKEN-XCHANGE"/>.</t>
          <t>WIMSE credentials constrain the subjects and actors identified in delegation and impersonation tokens to be bound by a trust domain, and to follow their issuing authorities' trust configurations. Upstream workloads should consider the security context of delegation and/or impersonation tokens within and across trust domains, when arriving at authorization decisions.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="asynchronous-and-batch-requests">
          <name>Asynchronous and Batch Requests</name>
          <t>Source workloads may send authenticated asynchronous and batch requests to destination workloads or services. A destination workload may need to fulfill such requests with requests to authorized upstream protected resources and workloads after the source workload credentials have expired. Credentials identifying the original source workload or service as subject may need to be obtained from the credential issuing authority with appropriately down-scoped context needed to access upstream workloads. These credentials should identify the workload performing the asynchronous computation as the actor in the actor chain, but may also identify other principals that the action is taken on behalf of. To mitigate risks associated with long-duration credentials, these credentials should be bound to the Workload Identity Credential, such as a workload identity certificate or Workload Identity Token (WIT), of the acting workload or service.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="cross-boundary-workload-identity">
          <name>Cross-boundary Workload Identity</name>
          <t>As workloads often need to communicate across trust boundaries, extra care needs to be taken when it comes to identity communication to ensure scalability and privacy. (TODO: align with OAuth cross domain identity and authorization)</t>
          <section anchor="egress-identity-generalization">
            <name>Egress Identity Generalization</name>
            <t>A workload communicating with a service or another workload located outside the trust boundary may need to provide modified identity information. The detailed identity of an internal workload instance, or of the internal workload that originated the communication, is often relevant inside the trust boundary but could be excessive for the outside world and expose potentially sensitive internal topology information.</t>
            <t>For example, in a microservices architecture, an internal service may use workload-specific identities that include fine-grained details such as instance names or deployment-specific attributes. When interacting with external systems, exposing such details may inadvertently provide attackers with insights into the internal deployment structure, scaling strategies, security policies, technologies in use, or failover mechanisms, potentially giving them a tactical advantage. In such cases, an identity proxy at the trust boundary can generalize the Workload Identity by replacing the specific microservice instance name with the name of the overall service. This allows external parties to recognize the service while abstracting internal deployment details.</t>
            <t>A security gateway implementing Identity Proxy functionality at the edge of a trust boundary can validate identity information of the workload, perform context-specific authorization of the transaction, and replace workload-specific identity with a generalized one for a given trust domain. This approach ensures that external communications adhere to security and privacy requirements while maintaining interoperability across trust boundaries.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="inbound-gateway-identity-validation">
            <name>Inbound Gateway Identity Validation</name>
            <t>Inbound security gateway is a common design pattern for service protection. This functionality is often found in CDN services, API gateways, load balancers, Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and other security solutions. Workload identity verification of inbound requests should be performed as a part of these security services. After validation of workload identity, the gateway may either leave it unmodified or replace it with its own identity to be validated by the destination.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ai-and-ml-based-intermediaries">
          <name>AI and ML-Based Intermediaries</name>
          <t>Emerging agentic AI systems and other ML-based intermediaries introduce new considerations for workload identity and security context propagation. These systems often act as autonomous agents that perform tasks on behalf of an upstream principal (such as a user or service) and then invoke downstream workloads as part of multi-step workflows.</t>
          <t>From WIMSE perspective, AI intermediaries are a special case of delegated workloads (see <xref target="delegation"/>). They inherit the upstream principal's security context and are expected to operate strictly within the constraints of that delegation. When invoking downstream workloads, the agent <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> propagate the upstream security context, unless it has been explicitly authorized to translate or reduce its scope.</t>
          <t>In some cases, AI systems may generate requests that are not attributable to a specific upstream principal. Such autonomous actions <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be clearly distinguishable from delegated ones, for example through separate workload identities or other attributes associated with the identity.</t>
          <t>Logically distinct agents that need to be independently audited, revoked, or subjected to policy <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> share a workload identity.  When several logically distinct agents present the same workload credential, the authenticated principal remains the shared identity and the individual agent is not independently authenticated. Deployments that need individual agents to be distinguishable for audit, revocation, or downstream policy therefore need a way to identify a workload that is unique to a single logical agent and stable across that agent's requests.</t>
          <t>A further consideration arises when AI agents interact with other AI agents. In these cases, each agent may act both as a delegated workload and as a delegator, creating multi-hop delegation chains. To avoid ambiguity, each hop in the chain <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> explicitly scope and re-bind the security context so that downstream services can reliably evaluate provenance and authorization and trust boundaries. Without such controls, there is a risk that a chain of AI-to-AI interactions could unintentionally extend authority far beyond what was originally granted.</t>
          <figure anchor="arch-ai">
            <name>AI agent communication</name>
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              <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
   +---------+        +-------------+        +-------------+        +-------------+
   |  User / +------->|  AI Agent   +------->|  AI Agent   +------->|  Workload   |
   | Service |        |  (Agent A)  |        |  (Agent B)  |        |  Downstream |
   +---------+        +-------------+        +-------------+        +-------------+
        |                    |                      |                      |
        |     Initial        |  Delegated / Scoped  |  Delegated / Scoped  |
        | Security Context   |   Security context   |   Security context   |
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          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="traffic-interception">
        <name>Traffic Interception</name>
        <t>Workloads communicating with applications may face different threats to traffic interception in different deployments. In many deployments security controls are deployed for internal communications at lower layers to reduce the risk of traffic observation and modification for network communications. When a security layer, such as TLS, is deployed in these environments. TLS may be terminated in various places, including the workload itself, and in various middleware devices, such as load balancers, gateways, proxies, and firewalls. Therefore, protection is provided only between each adjacent pair of TLS endpoints. There are no guarantees of confidentiality, integrity and correct identity passthrough in those middleware devices and services.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="information-disclosure">
        <name>Information Disclosure</name>
        <t>Observation and interception of network traffic is not the only means of disclosure in these systems. Other vectors of information leakage is through disclosure in log files and other observability and troubleshooting mechanisms. For example, an application may log the contents of HTTP headers containing JWT bearer tokens, user names, email addresses and other sensitive information. The information in these logs may be made available to other systems with less stringent access controls, which may result in this information falling into an attackers hands. This creates privacy risks and potential surface for reconnaissance attacks.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="binding">
        <name>Workload Identity Binding to Tokens</name>
        <t><xref target="seccontext"/> describes that one or more workload identities may be incorporated into a security context token to constrain the use of that token.  This workload identity binding may restrict which workloads can present the token or which workloads may consume the token. Workload identity binding can also be used with types of tokens other than security context tokens. Workload identity binding reduces the impact of a stolen token or compromised workload.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="credential-theft">
        <name>Credential Theft</name>
        <t>When the information disclosed to an attacker is a credential, the attacker may be able to use that credential to escalate their privilege, attack another system via lateral movement within the organization or to impersonate a workload.  Bearer credentials are particularly vulnerable to disclosure since they are communicated between systems and may be revealed in communication channels or application logs. Credentials bound to a cryptographic key are typically less vulnerable because the key is not disclosed in the authentication process. However, care must still be taken to prevent disclosure during key management operations.</t>
        <t>Private keys associated with workload identity credentials require appropriate lifecycle management. Deployments should protect these keys using platform mechanisms appropriate to the environment, limit the lifetime of credentials associated with the keys, rotate or replace key pairs periodically, and revoke or stop accepting credentials associated with keys that are suspected to be compromised. Long-running workload instances need a renewal mechanism that allows credentials and keys to be replaced without relying on long-lived static secrets.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-domain-separation">
        <name>Trust Domain Separation</name>
        <t>Trust domain names identify separate identity namespaces. The deployment variants in <xref target="issuer-key-deployments"/> differ in whether signing authority is also separated. If the same private signing key is authorized to issue credentials for multiple trust domains, compromise of that key permits forgery of credentials for all of those domains. Selecting trust anchors according to the trust domain in the workload identifier does not prevent this when the same key is trusted for each domain. Different issuer names do not restore cryptographic separation when their signing key is shared.</t>
        <t>A common X.509 CA trust anchor does not necessarily imply shared issuer signing keys. Separate intermediate CAs with domain-specific constraints, such as applicable name constraints, can restrict their issuing authority if relying parties enforce those constraints <xref target="RFC5280"/>. However, the common root authority remains a shared trust dependency, and compromise of its private key can affect every domain that trusts it.</t>
        <t>The choice among these variants depends on the required availability, administrative independence, and key-management effort. Deployments requiring isolation against compromise of another domain's issuing key need separate signing keys and enforceable domain-specific limits on issuing authority. Their choice of trust anchors also determines which root authorities remain shared dependencies.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authentication-and-authorization">
        <name>Authentication and Authorization</name>
        <t>Authentication of a workload establishes that the presenter controls the key material associated with the credential and that the credential was issued under the authority of a trusted issuer. This is not sufficient, by itself, to determine whether the workload is permitted to access a resource or perform a requested action.</t>
        <t>Access control requires a separate authorization decision. That decision needs to take into account the authenticated workload identity, the requested resource or operation, the applicable policy, and any relevant security context. The fact that a workload has a valid credential does not imply that it is authorized for all resources in the trust domain.</t>
        <t>Issuers, relying parties, gateways, and workloads need to avoid treating successful authentication as implicit authorization.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="workload-compromise">
        <name>Workload Compromise</name>
        <t>Even the most well-designed and implemented workloads may contain security flaws that allow an attacker to gain limited or full compromise. For example, a server side request forgery may result in the ability for an attacker to force the workload to make requests of other parts of a system even though the rest of the workload functionality may be unaffected. An attacker with this advantage may be able to utilize privileges of the compromised workload to attack other parts of the system. Therefore it is important that communicating workloads apply the principle of least privilege through security controls such as authorization.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-ID">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identifier</title>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Palo Alto Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a canonical identifier for workloads, referred
   to as the Workload Identifier.  A Workload Identifier is a URI that
   uniquely identifies a workload within the context of a specific trust
   domain.  This identifier can be embedded in Workload Identity
   Credentials, including X.509 certificates and JWT-based tokens, to
   support authentication, authorization, and policy enforcement across
   diverse systems.  The Workload Identifier format ensures
   interoperability, facilitates secure identity federation, and enables
   consistent identity semantics.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="SPIFFE" target="https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/SPIFFE.md">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE)</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="May"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPIFFE-ID" target="https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/SPIFFE-ID.md">
          <front>
            <title>The SPIFFE Identity and Verifiable Identity Document</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="May"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPIRE" target="https://spiffe.io/docs/latest/spire-about/spire-concepts/">
          <front>
            <title>SPIRE Concepts</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9683">
          <front>
            <title>Remote Integrity Verification of Network Devices Containing Trusted Platform Modules</title>
            <author fullname="G. C. Fedorkow" initials="G. C." role="editor" surname="Fedorkow"/>
            <author fullname="E. Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit"/>
            <author fullname="J. Fitzgerald-McKay" initials="J." surname="Fitzgerald-McKay"/>
            <date month="December" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that contain Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), as defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), or equivalent hardware implementations that include the protected capabilities, as provided by TPMs.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9683"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9683"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>CyberArk</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>SPIRL</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.  This document defines the simplest, atomic unit
   of this architecture: the protocol between two workloads that need to
   verify each other's identity in order to communicate securely.  The
   scope of this protocol is a single HTTP request-and-response pair.
   To address the needs of different setups, we propose two protocols,
   one at the application level and one that makes use of trusted TLS
   transport.  These two protocols are compatible, in the sense that a
   single call chain can have some calls use one protocol and some use
   the other.  Workload A can call Workload B with mutual TLS
   authentication, while the next call from Workload B to Workload C
   would be authenticated at the application level.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4120">
          <front>
            <title>The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Neuman" initials="C." surname="Neuman"/>
            <author fullname="T. Yu" initials="T." surname="Yu"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hartman" initials="S." surname="Hartman"/>
            <author fullname="K. Raeburn" initials="K." surname="Raeburn"/>
            <date month="July" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol, and it obsoletes RFC 1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than was provided in RFC 1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within those messages. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4120"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4120"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9901">
          <front>
            <title>Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yasuda" initials="K." surname="Yasuda"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a mechanism for the selective disclosure
of individual elements of a JSON data structure used as the payload
of a JSON Web Signature (JWS). The primary use case is the selective
disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9901"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9901"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9397">
          <front>
            <title>Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="M. Pei" initials="M." surname="Pei"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="D. Wheeler" initials="D." surname="Wheeler"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is an environment that enforces the following: any code within the environment cannot be tampered with, and any data used by such code cannot be read or tampered with by any code outside the environment. This architecture document discusses the motivation for designing and standardizing a protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Applications running inside such a TEE.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9397"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9397"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6024">
          <front>
            <title>Trust Anchor Management Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="R. Reddy" initials="R." surname="Reddy"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"/>
            <date month="October" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A trust anchor represents an authoritative entity via a public key and associated data. The public key is used to verify digital signatures, and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative. A relying party uses trust anchors to determine if a digitally signed object is valid by verifying a digital signature using the trust anchor's public key, and by enforcing the constraints expressed in the associated data for the trust anchor. This document describes some of the problems associated with the lack of a standard trust anchor management mechanism and defines requirements for data formats and push-based protocols designed to address these problems. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6024"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6024"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identity Practices</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes industry practices for providing secure
   identities to workloads in container orchestration, cloud platforms,
   and other workload platforms.  It explains how workloads obtain
   credentials for external authentication purposes, without managing
   long-lived secrets directly.  It does not take into account the
   standards work in progress for the WIMSE architecture and associated
   protocols.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-identity-practices-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OAUTH-TOKEN-XCHANGE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 754?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors thank Flemming Andreasen, Brian Campbell, Arjun Garg,
Shlomo Zalman Heigh, Dmitry Izumskiy, Pieter Kasselman, John Kemp,
Josh Kline, Watson Ladd, Steve Lasker, Eliot Lear, Dapeng "Max" Liu,
Jean-François "Jeff" Lombardo, Andrew McCormick, Ken McCracken,
Thibault Meunier, Kathleen Moriarty, Mark Novak, Mingliang Pei,
Yogi Porla, Justin Richer, Muhammad Usama Sardar, Dean H. Saxe,
Arndt Schwenkschuster, Yaron Sheffer, Ned Smith, Dag Sneeggen,
Noah Stride, and Jacob Valentic for their contributions, reviews,
and discussions that helped shape this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-draft-05">
      <name>Changes since draft -05</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Update to gateway service definition and diagram</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>alignment of cross-domain scenario with OAUTH cross-domain chaining</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>rework of authentication section</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>added audit section</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>added AI use case</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-draft-06">
      <name>Changes since draft -06</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Separated Workload from Workload Instance</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Moved workload identifier definition to a separate draft</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Update credential provisioning section</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Add <xref target="arch-basic-ops"/>: message flow and PEP/PDP drill-down of the basic scenario, before use cases</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
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