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<!DOCTYPE rfc [
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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-09" category="info" tocInclude="true" tocDepth="2" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="AUDIT Decision Receipts">Decision Receipts for Approvals, Declined Actions and Executed Actions in Agent Audit Records</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-09"/>
    <author initials="K." surname="Gruszka" fullname="Konrad Gruszka">
      <organization>b7n0de</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>kontakt@b7n0de.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>AUDIT</keyword>
    <keyword>agent</keyword>
    <keyword>decision receipt</keyword>
    <keyword>in-toto</keyword>
    <keyword>DSSE</keyword>
    <abstract>
<t>The architecture for auditing agent delegation and interactions proposed for
the AUDIT effort names Interaction Records, Action Records and Authorization
Transition Records and leaves their encoding open. This document maps an
existing pair of signed records, the decision receipt and the outcome receipt
of the open-source proofbundle project, onto those record types for three
cases, a human approval, a declined action and an executed action with its
result, and gives each record exact bytes, a signature and digest bindings that
a third party can check offline. Each receipt is created when the decision or
the outcome occurs and is checked by an Auditor post hoc, and a declined or
refused action is a record of its own. For each case the document states what
the receipt adds and what it does not show, and it gives a verification
procedure that runs offline. It requires that an approval be honoured at most
once, even after the record of consumed approvals is rotated. Test vectors for
all three cases, each with a counterexample, are included. The document also
describes, informatively, how a receipt can be registered with a Transparency
Service under RFC 9943 and what a SCITT Receipt then shows and does not show.
It uses existing receipt formats and defines no new predicate or registry. How
the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is out of scope.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The architecture of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH"/> asks that auditing link user
intent, delegation, authorization and execution, and treats authorization as a state
that changes over time. Three of its four record types (its Section 5) matter here.
Interaction Records capture user-facing events such as approvals and refusals, Action
Records capture events at the boundary where an action took effect, and Authorization
Transition Records capture changes in permission state. Its field names are
placeholders (its Section 7), and a canonical data model is a work item (WI-1).</t>
      <t>An Auditor in that architecture does not trust the Agent (its Section 8), so a
record helps only when a third party can check it. That needs exact bytes, a signature
over them and bindings to inputs and evidence by digest. This document shows that the
decision receipt of proofbundle <xref target="PB-DECISION"/>, an in-toto Statement
<xref target="INTOTO-STATEMENT"/> in a DSSE envelope <xref target="DSSE"/>, signed with
Ed25519 <xref target="RFC8032"/> over a payload in the serialization of
<xref target="RFC8785"/>, supplies them together with its companion outcome receipt
<xref target="PB-OUTCOME"/>. It does so for three cases that Agent Guard, the gate of
the proofbundle plugin for two coding agent hosts, is built for, within the limits
of its inspected code that <xref target="implementation-status"/> states:</t>
      <ol>
        <li>a human approval of one action (an Interaction Record of an approval and an
Authorization Transition Record with the trigger user_approval);</li>
        <li>a declined action, with its reason and without an effect;</li>
        <li>an executed action with its result (an Action Record).</li>
      </ol>
      <t>The document maps and verifies. It does not propose the decision receipt as the data model of the architecture and does not change the receipts it describes. The mapping of <xref target="mapping"/> follows revision -01 of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH"/>; a later revision of the architecture can change it.</t>
      <t>A decision receipt is an audit record (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="3.1"/>) that is created when the decision is taken, before the action it decides takes effect, and an outcome receipt is created after the action. An Auditor (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="4.3"/>) checks both post hoc, as records, with the procedure of <xref target="verification"/>, which is the post&#8209;hoc use of records that <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="1"/> describes. A declined or refused action is a record of its own, a decision receipt with the verdict DENY or REFUSE (Case 2 of <xref target="verify-cases"/>). How the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is not a subject of this document. <xref target="approvals-once"/> applies to a relying party when it honours an approval, not to an Auditor.</t>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <t>In this document, these key words apply to a verifier in <xref target="evaluation-receipts"/> and in the procedure of <xref target="verification"/>, to an Auditor that performs the checks of <xref target="sets"/>, to a relying party that lets an action run because of an approval in <xref target="approvals-once"/>, to whoever issues approval records there, and to the use of the test keys of <xref target="vectors"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="terms">
        <name>Terms</name>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>Decision receipt, outcome receipt:</dt>
          <dd>A DSSE envelope whose payload is an in-toto Statement v1 with the predicate
type https://b7n0de.com/proofbundle/predicates/decision-receipt/v0.1 or
https://b7n0de.com/proofbundle/predicates/action-outcome/v0.1.</dd>
          <dt>Payload bytes:</dt>
          <dd>The bytes obtained by base64 decoding the payload member of the envelope. A DSSE signature covers the pre-authentication encoding of payloadType and these bytes.</dd>
          <dt>Content root:</dt>
          <dd>SHA-256 <xref target="RFC6234"/> over the payload bytes. Other digests commit to the byte strings identified by their respective fields. Two receipts with the same content root have the same payload bytes, assuming the collision resistance of SHA-256; their envelopes, signatures and keys can differ.</dd>
          <dt>Approval record:</dt>
          <dd>The record of one human act that approves one action
(<xref target="case-approval"/>).</dd>
          <dt>Relying party:</dt>
          <dd>The component that lets an action run because of a decision.</dd>
          <dt>Consumption state:</dt>
          <dd>The durable record in which a relying party notes each approval it has
honoured.</dd>
          <dt>Consumption scope:</dt>
          <dd>The set of decisions of a relying party within which it honours each approval at most once (<xref target="approvals-once"/>), and within which the first check of <xref target="sets"/> counts released ALLOW decisions.</dd>
          <dt>Decision maker, outcome signer:</dt>
          <dd>The holder of the key that signs a decision receipt, named by decisionMaker.id, and the holder of the key that signs an outcome receipt. The outcome signer is the executor or an observer (<xref target="verify-inputs"/>).</dd>
          <dt>Trust policy:</dt>
          <dd>The configuration of a verifier that says which key it accepts for which decisionMaker.id and for which period and which key may attest which executor.id, and that may name the consumption scope of an Auditor (<xref target="sets"/>). This document does not define its format.</dd>
          <dt>Verifier, Auditor:</dt>
          <dd>A verifier runs the procedure of <xref target="verify-decision"/> to <xref target="verify-outcome"/> on a receipt. An Auditor is a verifier in the role of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="4.3"/> that can also run the checks of <xref target="sets"/> over the receipts it holds.</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>

<section anchor="mapping">
      <name>Mapping the Three Cases onto AUDIT Records</name>
      <t>All decision receipts here use the decisionType preActionAuthorization and
carry validity with audience, nonce and expiresAt. A decision receipt is the gate's
signed view of an event; the human act itself is the approval record, bound by digest.
In the tables, IR stands for Interaction Record, ATR for Authorization Transition Record
and AR for Action Record, followed by a placeholder field of the architecture. The
fields common to all cases map as follows.</t>
      <dl newline="false" spacing="compact" indent="26">
        <dt>event_id</dt><dd>decisionId (outcomeId in an outcome receipt)</dd>
        <dt>trace_id, parent_id</dt><dd>traceContext.traceId, traceContext.parentId</dd>
        <dt>timestamp</dt><dd>decidedAt (performedAt in an outcome receipt)</dd>
        <dt>actor, on_behalf_of</dt><dd>agent.id, principal.id</dd>
        <dt>action</dt><dd>proposedAction (actionType, target, method)</dd>
        <dt>exact action bytes</dt><dd>proposedAction.parametersDigest, where present</dd>
        <dt>authorization.expires_at</dt><dd>validity.expiresAt</dd>
        <dt>delegation_chain</dt><dd>none (delegationRefs is not used here)</dd>
        <dt>record signer</dt><dd>decisionMaker.id, bound to the key by a trust policy</dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Every decision receipt thus names, in principal.id, the user or other party on whose behalf the agent acted, which step 7 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> requires to be a non-empty string; a delegation through further agents is not recorded here (delegationRefs is not used).</t>

      <section anchor="case-approval">
        <name>Case 1, a Human Approval</name>
        <t>A gate asks a person before an action and records the answer. An earlier receipt for the same request, such as one with the verdict ESCALATE, is a separate record; this receipt does not reference it. After the answer the gate decides ALLOW for exactly the approved action. The approval record carries approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest (SHA-256 of the approved action bytes), approvedAt and validUntil. The decision receipt names it in inputSnapshot under the name "approval record".</t>
        <table anchor="tab-approval">
          <name>Case 1</name>
          <thead><tr><th>Record, field</th><th>Decision receipt</th></tr></thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>IR, approval</td><td>approval record, by its digest in inputSnapshot</td></tr>
            <tr><td>IR, actor</td><td>approver in the approval record, equal to principal.id</td></tr>
            <tr><td>ATR, previous_state</td><td>not recorded in this receipt; preceding state must be established separately</td></tr>
            <tr><td>ATR, new_state</td><td>verdict ALLOW for parametersDigest</td></tr>
            <tr><td>ATR, trigger</td><td>reasonCodes contains user_approval</td></tr>
            <tr><td>ATR, actor</td><td>approver in the approval record</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The scope of the new state is one action, identified by its bytes. A second
action, even one with the same name and target, needs a new approval.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="case-declined">
        <name>Case 2, a Declined Action</name>
        <t>A gate declines an action because a rule or a person says no. The receipt
records the verdict DENY or REFUSE with its reasons. It may say in actionOutcome that the
call was blocked, which is the decision maker's own statement. This document treats DENY and REFUSE alike and does not define a difference between them.</t>
        <table anchor="tab-declined">
          <name>Case 2</name>
          <thead><tr><th>Record, field</th><th>Decision receipt</th></tr></thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>IR, refusal</td><td>verdict DENY or REFUSE</td></tr>
            <tr><td>reason</td><td>reasonCodes</td></tr>
            <tr><td>action</td><td>proposedAction with parametersDigest, where present</td></tr>
            <tr><td>no effect</td><td>actionOutcome.status blocked (self-asserted); no outcome with status executed names this decision in the supplied set</td></tr>
            <tr><td>ATR</td><td>none; the state is unchanged</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>A receipt cannot prove that something did not happen. An observer at the boundary can separately report that it observed no effect. The check in <xref target="sets"/> detects a conflicting executed outcome in the supplied set; it does not establish absence of an effect.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="case-executed">
        <name>Case 3, an Executed Action and Its Result</name>
        <t>A gate allows an action, the action runs, and an executor or an observer at
the boundary records what happened in an outcome receipt signed with its own key.
The outcome receipt names the decision by its content root in decisionRef.</t>
        <table anchor="tab-executed">
          <name>Case 3</name>
          <thead><tr><th>Record, field</th><th>Outcome and decision receipt</th></tr></thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>AR, event_id</td><td>outcomeId</td></tr>
            <tr><td>AR, parent_id</td><td>traceContext.parentId of the referenced decision</td></tr>
            <tr><td>decision binding</td><td>decisionRef, the content root of the decision</td></tr>
            <tr><td>AR, timestamp</td><td>performedAt</td></tr>
            <tr><td>AR, actor</td><td>executor.id</td></tr>
            <tr><td>AR, action</td><td>requestedActionDigest, equal to parametersDigest</td></tr>
            <tr><td>result</td><td>status executed, effectDigest</td></tr>
            <tr><td>authorization</td><td>the decision (ALLOW, validity.expiresAt)</td></tr>
            <tr><td>evidence</td><td>evidenceRefs of the decision</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The architecture asks that Action Records be produced at the boundary where the action took effect. Its WI-1-3 distinguishes the Recorder's signing identity from the recorded Agent's identity where they are operationally separate. <xref target="verify-outcome"/> checks that the outcome and decision use different keys and that executor.id differs from decisionMaker.id. Those checks alone do not establish operational separation or that the outcome signer observed the boundary.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="adds">
        <name>What the Receipt Adds</name>
        <ul>
          <li>Exact bytes. The payload is its own serialization under <xref target="RFC8785"/>. A verifier uses the received payload bytes for the signature input and content root. Canonical serialization is used to check equality and to derive the predicate's subject digest, never to repair or replace the received payload.</li>
          <li>A signature. Ed25519 over the DSSE pre-authentication encoding of the payload
type and the payload bytes.</li>
          <li>Binding by digest. The action bytes (parametersDigest, where present), the approval record and
other inputs (inputSnapshot), the policy (policyBoundary.policyDigest), evidence
(evidenceRefs), the decision itself (decisionRef in the outcome) and the observed
effect (effectDigest) are named by SHA-256.</li>
          <li>Stated limits. The member notChecked lists what the decision maker did not
check, and decisionChangeConditions lists what would change the decision.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>A record made after the interaction, such as an outcome receipt, a later countersignature or a settlement, can name the decision by its content root. The content root is the same for every copy of the payload and does not change for as long as the payload bytes are kept; a receipt that supersedes it has its own content root and names it in relationships (<xref target="field-rules"/>). decisionId and validity.nonce serve the exchange in which the decision is made, and this document does not require them to be unique beyond it.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="not-adds">
        <name>What the Receipt Does Not Do</name>
        <ul>
          <li>It does not show that a decision was correct, safe or lawful.</li>
          <li>It does not authenticate the approval. The approval record in this document is not signed by the person it names. A deployment can additionally cite a separately signed approval in inputSnapshot. Validating that signature and establishing its correspondence to the approval record require rules beyond this document. The signed approvals of <xref target="IZMAYLOV"/> are one possible source of such evidence. The proof token of <xref target="YOSSIF"/> is another, a JWS signed by a hardware-protected key that a user-verification event gates for each signature, bound to one named action (Sections 3, 3.7 and 3.13 of <xref target="YOSSIF"/>), which shows that a verified human was present, not which person (Section 6.8.3 of <xref target="YOSSIF"/>). Such a token carries its own signature for a verifier of that format; an entry of inputSnapshot that names it by digest does not carry its signer (<xref target="verify-inputs"/>). A record of an approval that an authorization server signs has the same limit: its signature does not show that the approver actually approved (Section 9.4 of <xref target="LIU"/>). In cases N17, N18 and N22 of <xref target="DPS-RAR"/>, with a test key for the authorization server, such a record passes the checks of Section 7 of <xref target="LIU"/> for an approval the person never gave, for a text other than the one the person was shown, and for a decision recorded before the person signed; only the binding to the person's own signature catches them.</li>
          <li>It does not show that an effect happened. An outcome receipt shows that its
signer stated an effect with a given digest. A digest that cannot be resolved
to bytes shows only that a value was written.</li>
          <li>It does not register anything. Transparency in the sense of <xref target="RFC9943"/> needs a separate registration and a SCITT Receipt; <xref target="registration"/> describes how a receipt of this document can be registered.</li>
          <li>It does not detect a receipt that was never written. An added observer or a
sequence counter can reveal some such receipts, not all (<xref target="security-considerations"/>).</li><li>It does not show that no action ran while an ALLOW was usable. An ALLOW that expires unused leaves no outcome receipt, and the receipts of this document do not establish an absence over its validity or over any other time window (compare <xref target="case-declined"/>).</li>
          <li>Its times are the signer's clock.</li>
          <li>It is not an access token or an authorization grant (<xref target="related"/>). A verified ALLOW is a record of a decision, and the
executing system makes its own authorization check. A pass shows neither that the decision maker or the agent was authorized at the time of the action nor the state of a delegation at that time.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>

      <section anchor="evaluation-receipts">
        <name>Evaluation Receipts Are Evidence, Never Authorization</name>
        <t>A decision may rest on an evaluation result, such as a test suite that
passed. A Signed Evaluation Receipt <xref target="SER"/> records such a result. It
appears in a decision receipt only as an entry of evidenceRefs whose digest is the
receipt digest, SHA-256 over its payload bytes, as in
<xref target="SER-MAPPINGS"/>. A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat a valid
Signed Evaluation Receipt, or its presence in evidenceRefs, as permission for an
action. In the records of this document only a decision receipt with the verdict
ALLOW, from a key the relying party trusts for decisions, records a permission.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="observations">
        <name>Observations for the Architecture</name>
        <t>This section is informative. At the places below, the mapping of this section needed a reading of revision -01 of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH"/>. They are offered as observations and questions, not as requirements.</t>
        <ul>
          <li>Evidence for a human approval. <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="3"/> associates Interaction Records with the User; Section <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="3.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> says that user-facing systems produce records of prompts and approvals, and Section <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> has the Auditing Service sign records under its own identity. In Case 1, the gate's decision receipt binds an approval record that names a person but is not signed by that person (<xref target="case-approval"/> and <xref target="not-adds"/>). What evidence is needed to bind such a record to that person's act of approval, and when is the person's own signature required? <xref target="YOSSIF"/> offers one form of such evidence, signed by a device key that user verification gates rather than by the person (Sections 1.2 and 3.7 of <xref target="YOSSIF"/>).</li>
          <li>Previous state. The Authorization Transition Record of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="7.4"/>, and its work item WI-1-4 (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="6"/>), carries a previous state, a new state, a trigger and an actor in one record. A decision receipt records only the new state for one action and leaves the previous state to other records (<xref target="case-approval"/>). <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="5"/> reconstructs authorization from the ordered sequence of such records; is a record without the previous state enough for that?</li>
          <li>Binding an Action Record to its authorization. In <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="7.2"/> the parent_id of an Action Record references the Interaction Record that motivated the action, and the authorization appears as scope and expiry. The outcome receipt of Case 3 names the decision receipt by its content root in decisionRef and takes parent_id from that decision (<xref target="case-executed"/>). The examples of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH"/> have no member that binds an Action Record to the authorizing decision by digest.</li>
          <li>Refusals before execution. <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="5"/> includes model responses and agent-to-agent dialogue among Interaction Records. Its work item WI-1-2 (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="6"/>) also includes system events and does not preclude profiles for non-conversational interactions. In Case 2, a gate can decline a proposed action under a rule before execution (<xref target="case-declined"/>). When such a denial is internal to a workflow and is not part of a conversation, is it an Interaction Record, an Action Record of an attempted request, or a different event type?</li>
          <li>Who records an action. <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="3"/> has Action Records generated by the Agent, while <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="5"/> places them at the boundary where the action took effect. Its work item WI-1-3 (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="6"/>) already distinguishes the Recorder's signing identity from the recorded Agent's identity where they are operationally separated. In Case 3 the outcome signer can be an observer that attests the executor's identifier (<xref target="verify-inputs"/> and <xref target="verify-outcome"/>). How should an Action Record and the Auditor's trust policy identify the Recorder separately from the actor whose action is recorded?</li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>

<section anchor="verification">
      <name>Offline Verification</name>
      <t>The procedure below needs no network access. Each step either passes or ends
the procedure with a failure named by the step. A later step never repairs an
earlier failure. Where several checks of one step fail, the failure is that of the step; which or how many of the failing members a verifier reports is not part of the result. A requirement that more than one step checks fails at the first of those steps. Wherever this section compares two times, it compares their full value, as if each fraction of a second were padded with zeros to six digits.</t>
      <section anchor="verify-inputs">
        <name>Inputs</name>
        <t>The verifier needs the envelope bytes of each receipt and the Ed25519 public keys selected by its trust policy for the decision signer and, for Case 3, the outcome signer. It also needs the expected decisionMaker.id and, for Case 3, the expected executor.id whose assertion that policy permits under the outcome-signing key. An outcome signer may be an observer rather than the executor.</t>
        <t>The verifier supplies an evaluation time T in UTC, in the form of the timestamps of <xref target="field-rules"/>; it does not take T from a receipt. It also chooses which case of <xref target="verify-cases"/> it checks; it does not take the case from the receipt. Expected audience and nonce and the action and effect byte strings are optional inputs. Case 1 requires the approval record bytes. Inputs or evidence whose bytes are not checked remain digest references, not verified contents. The members inputSnapshot and evidenceRefs name digests and relations, not the issuer or operator of the evidence they name, so a verifier cannot tell from them who issued each item; separate keys do not show independent operators either (step 5 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/>).</t>
        <t>An Auditor that checks a receipt post hoc sets T to the time that its audit asks about and takes that time from its audit context, for example from a record made at the boundary where the action took effect. With a later T, such as the current time of the Auditor, step 9 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> fails for every receipt whose validity has ended. That failure says that the receipt is not usable at T. It does not say that the receipt was invalid when it was issued. A relying party that lets an action run uses its own current time as T (<xref target="approvals-once"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify-decision">
        <name>Decision Receipt</name>
        <ol>
          <li>Envelope. The envelope <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be valid UTF-8 and parse as one JSON text of <xref target="RFC8259"/> that is an object, with no duplicate member names in any object. The envelope bytes <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> begin with the byte order mark U+FEFF, which <xref target="RFC8259" section="8.1"/> forbids adding. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain payload, payloadType and signatures. payloadType <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be application/vnd.in-toto+json. An envelope fails this step where signatures is not an array or where an entry of signatures is not an object whose member sig is a string.</li>
          <li>Payload bytes. Decode payload as base64 <xref target="RFC4648"/> into the
payload bytes P. Here and for sig in step 3, base64 has only the characters of the alphabet of <xref target="RFC4648" section="4"/> and its padding, so no line breaks, and pad bits of zero (<xref target="RFC4648" section="3.5"/>); a payload in another form fails this step. Padding is required, so the base64 text of payload and of sig has a length that is a multiple of four. A sig in another form is not decoded; step 3 counts it as a signature that does not verify, and it does not fail this step.</li>
          <li>Signature. Form PAE = "DSSEv1" SP LEN(type) SP type SP LEN(P) SP P, where SP
is one space, LEN is the length in bytes as ASCII decimal without leading zeros, and
type is the payloadType. At least one entry of signatures <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry a
base64 sig that verifies as an Ed25519 signature over PAE under the expected key. The
keyid member is not used to select a key. The sig of other entries of signatures is not verified. A sig verifies where its S, read as a little-endian integer, is less than the order L of <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1"/> and the group equation of <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.7"/> holds in its form without the cofactor 8; a sig whose S is not less than L <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> verify.</li>
          <li>Canonical form. P <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be valid UTF-8 and parse as one JSON
value with no duplicate member names. The serialization of the parsed value under
<xref target="RFC8785"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be byte for byte equal to P. A verifier
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> continue with a re-serialized form. Numbers are IEEE 754 double precision values under <xref target="RFC8785" section="3.1"/>, so a P with the number 9007199254740993, which becomes 9007199254740992, fails this step, as does a P with an unpaired surrogate (<xref target="RFC8785" section="3.2.2.2"/>). P <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain, anywhere in its parsed value and at any depth, a number whose absolute value is greater than 9007199254740991 and that is written without the frac and exp parts of the grammar in <xref target="RFC8259" section="6"/>, even where P equals its serialization, because under <xref target="RFC7493" section="2.2"/> a receiver cannot be expected to treat such an integer as an exact value. A number written with frac or exp, such as 1e+21, is not covered by that sentence; for such a number this step asks only that P equal its serialization, which a P with 1e+21 does.</li>
          <li>Content root. Compute R = SHA-256(P).</li>
          <li>Statement. _type <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1 and predicateType the decision receipt type of <xref target="terms"/>. subject <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one entry, whose digest.sha256 is SHA-256 over the <xref target="RFC8785"/> serialization of predicate; it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain other entries. Other members of the Statement, of the subject entry and of its digest are not checked. A Statement without predicate fails this step. A Statement whose predicate is not a JSON object fails this step.</li>
          <li>Members. predicate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a JSON object satisfying the field rules of <xref target="field-rules"/>.</li>
          <li>Signer. decisionMaker.id <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an identifier that the trust
policy binds to the key of step 3, and it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the expected decisionMaker.id of <xref target="verify-inputs"/>.</li>
          <li>Validity. decidedAt <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be later than T, and T <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be strictly earlier than expiresAt. Where an expected audience is given, audience <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain it; where an expected nonce is given, nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal it.</li>
          <li>Action bytes. Where the action bytes are given, their SHA-256
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256.</li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify-cases">
        <name>Checks per Case</name>
        <t>The checks of a case follow step 10 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>.</t>
        <dl newline="true" spacing="normal">
          <dt>Case 1, approval.</dt>
          <dd><t>decision.verdict <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ALLOW and decision.reasonCodes <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain user_approval. inputSnapshot <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one entry whose name is "approval record"; it may contain other entries. The approval record bytes A <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be supplied, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hash to that entry's digest, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be their own <xref target="RFC8785"/> serialization.</t><t>A <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a JSON object containing approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest, approvedAt and validUntil. Other members of A are not checked. approvalId, approver and session <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be non-empty strings. actionDigest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the digest form of <xref target="field-rules"/> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal proposedAction.parametersDigest. approver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal principal.id. approvedAt and validUntil <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <xref target="RFC3339"/> UTC timestamps with a trailing "Z" in the form given in <xref target="field-rules"/>. The bounds approvedAt &lt;= decidedAt &lt;= T &lt; validity.expiresAt &lt;= validUntil <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hold.</t></dd>
          <dt>Case 2, declined.</dt>
          <dd>decision.verdict <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be DENY or REFUSE. Where
actionOutcome is present, its status <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be notAttempted, blocked
or refused, and performedAt and outcomeRef <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent or
null. An actionOutcome without status fails this case.</dd>
          <dt>Case 3, executed.</dt>
          <dd>The checks run in this order. First, decision.verdict <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ALLOW. Second, the outcome receipt <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> pass <xref target="verify-outcome"/> against this decision, and an outcome receipt that fails one of its steps fails there. Third, the status of the outcome receipt <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be executed.</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify-outcome">
        <name>Outcome Receipt</name>
        <ol>
          <li>Apply steps 1 to 5 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> separately to the outcome envelope with the expected outcome-signing key, obtaining payload bytes Q. A failure there is a failure of this step. Retain the decision receipt's content root R for the binding check below.</li>
          <li>_type <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1 and predicateType the outcome receipt type. subject <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one entry, whose digest.sha256 is SHA-256 over the <xref target="RFC8785"/> serialization of predicate; it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain other entries, as in step 6 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>. A Statement whose predicate is not a JSON object fails this step.</li>
          <li>Members. predicate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a JSON object satisfying the field rules of <xref target="field-rules"/>.</li>
          <li>Binding. decisionRef.sha256 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the content root R of the decision receipt that passed <xref target="verify-decision"/>, and requestedActionDigest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal its parametersDigest.</li>
          <li>Identity and separation. executor.id <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the expected executor identifier supplied under <xref target="verify-inputs"/>. The verifier's trust policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> permit the outcome-signing key to attest that identifier. That key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> differ from the decision maker's key, and executor.id <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> differ from decisionMaker.id. These checks do not establish that the two keys are controlled by operationally independent parties. The outcome-signing key is the key under which step 1 verified the outcome envelope. Where the trust policy lists the key of the decision maker for outcome receipts too and step 1 verified the envelope under that key, this step fails.</li>
          <li>Result. status executed <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> come with a non-null effectDigest. Where effect bytes are supplied, effectDigest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present, whatever the status, and their SHA-256 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal effectDigest.sha256.</li>
          <li>Time. performedAt <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be earlier than the decision's decidedAt and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be strictly earlier than its validity.expiresAt. No step of this section compares performedAt or another member with T.</li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sets">
        <name>Checks over a Set of Receipts</name>
        <t>An Auditor that holds the receipts and approval records of a run can check three properties that no single receipt shows. These checks are only as complete as the set of receipts the Auditor holds.</t>
        <t>The Auditor supplies the expected signing key for each held receipt under its trust policy and checks every supplied held envelope before the three checks below. A held decision receipt must pass steps 1 to 6 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> under its expected signing key. A held outcome receipt must pass steps 1 to 5 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> under its expected signing key and step 2 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/>. In addition, the predicate of every supplied held receipt must be a JSON object. Where relationships is present in that predicate, the member and its entries must satisfy the field rules of <xref target="field-rules"/> for relationships, including the definitions of the types and the notes that those rules reference. These additional requirements are part of the preliminary checks, and failure of either makes the input invalid.</t>
        <t>The first and second checks count the receipts that pass these preliminary checks under their expected signing keys; a receipt that has expired at the evaluation time T is not left out of either check for that reason.</t>
        <t>The Auditor <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> obtain the relying party's consumption scope from its audit context, or where that names none, from its trust policy; that scope is not inferred from an approvalId alone. First, within that scope, no two distinct released ALLOW decision payloads, identified by different content roots, may cite approval records with the same identity (approvalId, actionDigest and session). Such a pair violates item 1 of <xref target="approvals-once"/>, for an approval identified as in item 2; additional copies or signatures of one payload do not. An ALLOW is released as <xref target="approvals-once"/> defines it; one that the Auditor can show never left the control of the relying party does not count. The first check does not detect two executions that reuse one ALLOW receipt without producing another decision receipt.</t>
        <t>Second, no outcome receipt with status executed may name, in decisionRef, the content root of a receipt whose verdict is not ALLOW. Case 3 of <xref target="verify-cases"/> requires ALLOW for an executed action, so an execution that names a decision with DENY, REFUSE, ESCALATE, DEFER or OBSERVE is the same conflict.</t>
                <t>Third, an entry of relationships of a decision or outcome receipt whose relation is supersedes names the predecessor of its receipt, the receipt that the Auditor holds whose content root is the digest of targetReceiptDigest of that entry. A payload is its own <xref target="RFC8785"/> serialization (step 4 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>), so that content root is the jcs-sha256-v1 digest of the Statement of the predecessor. The Auditor takes the predecessor as the state before the receipt that its issuer declared, not as a statement that this state is correct (<xref target="field-rules"/>), and derives earlier states from the predecessor of each predecessor in turn. An entry fails this check where the Auditor holds no receipt with that content root, or where the entry has targetSubjectDigest and its digest is not the digest.sha256 of the subject entry of the predecessor; no earlier state is derived from such an entry. Entries with another relation are not part of this check, and no earlier state is derived from them. Where a receipt has more than one entry with relation supersedes, each entry is checked on its own and names one predecessor, and the Auditor derives earlier states from each of them.</t>
                <t>For this third check, the lookup of predecessors follows only the entries with relation supersedes of the receipt being verified and, in turn, of each predecessor found; a held receipt that this chain does not reach is subject only to the preliminary checks, and its own entries are not looked up. Either kind of held receipt may be a predecessor of either kind of receipt.</t>
        <t>Apart from these preliminary checks, a held receipt used as a predecessor need not pass the remaining checks of Sections <xref target="verify-decision" format="counter"/> to <xref target="verify-outcome" format="counter"/>. Failure of one of those remaining checks is not, by itself, a failure of this third check. In particular, a historical predecessor is not rejected by this check merely because it has expired at the evaluation time T or does not pass a case of <xref target="verify-cases"/>. This does not waive any check required for a receipt that is also being verified in its own right. An entry of a predecessor, at any depth of the chain, is checked like an entry of the receipt, and where it fails, this third check fails for the receipt.</t>
        <t>If any supplied held envelope fails the preliminary checks above, the input is invalid and the Auditor reports no result for this third check. This applies also to supplied held envelopes that no supersedes entry references. An invalid input is distinct from a supersedes entry that fails because its predecessor is absent from a valid set of held receipts. Passing the preliminary checks does not establish that a predecessor's declared state is correct. The third check does not require that a predecessor concerns the same action as its receipt; it matches digests only.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify-meaning">
        <name>What a Pass Shows</name>
        <t>A pass shows that the holder of the decision maker's key signed exactly these payload bytes. Where action bytes are supplied under <xref target="verify-inputs"/>, their SHA-256 matches proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256. In Case 1, the SHA-256 of the required approval record bytes matches the digest.sha256 value of the unique inputSnapshot entry whose name is "approval record". For Case 3, a pass also shows that the holder of a different key, which the trust policy permits to attest the expected executor.id, signed an outcome with status executed bound to that decision. It does not show that the signer's statements are true, that the approval came from the named person, that the outcome signer observed the boundary, that no other receipt exists, or that the keys were not misused. Nor does it show that the decision maker held its authority, or a delegation that delegationRefs names, at the time of the action; a pass binds only what the steps of <xref target="verification"/> check. A decision maker that did not check its own authority or a delegation at the time of the action can say so in notChecked (<xref target="verify-decision"/>, step 7); such an entry is its own statement and not a result of the steps of <xref target="verification"/>. Those questions belong to the trust policy, to signed approvals, to observers and to transparency registration (<xref target="registration"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registration">
        <name>Registering a Receipt with a Transparency Service</name>
        <t>This section is informative. It describes how the receipts of this document can be registered with a Transparency Service under <xref target="RFC9943"/>. It defines no format, predicate type, media type or registry and adds no requirement to those of <xref target="RFC9943"/>.</t>
        <t>Registration. In SCITT a Signed Statement is a COSE_Sign1 message whose protected header carries CWT Claims with an Issuer Claim and a Subject Claim (<xref target="RFC9943" section="6"/>). A decision receipt or an outcome receipt can be registered in two ways. Its envelope bytes can be the payload of a Signed Statement. Or, as <xref target="RFC9943" section="6.2"/> allows for Statements too large or too sensitive to send to a Transparency Service, the Signed Statement can be made over a hash, here the content root of the receipt. This document does not define how a Signed Statement indicates the hash, its algorithm or its content type; that belongs to a deployment's profile and to the Registration Policy of the Transparency Service (<xref target="RFC9943" section="5.1.1"/>).</t>
        <t>The test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/> gives one example Signed Statement for each of the two ways, with a SCITT Receipt for each.</t>
        <t>Issuer. The Issuer of the Signed Statement is the entity identified by its iss Claim, whose key signs the COSE_Sign1 (Sections <xref target="RFC9943" section="3" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9943" section="6" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9943"/>). It can be the decision maker or the outcome signer, or another party such as the Auditing Service of <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="4.2"/>. The Client that registers a Signed Statement need not be its Issuer (<xref target="RFC9943" section="7"/>). The Issuer's COSE signature is separate from the DSSE signature of the receipt. The COSE signature authenticates the Signed Statement's protected header and payload. The DSSE signature covers the pre-authentication encoding of the receipt's payloadType and decoded payload bytes, not the DSSE envelope as a whole. <xref target="verify-decision"/> or <xref target="verify-outcome"/> checks that DSSE signature and its signer.</t>
        <t>What a SCITT Receipt shows. During Registration the Transparency Service verifies the Issuer's signature and applies its Registration Policy (Sections <xref target="RFC9943" section="5.1.1.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9943" section="6.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9943"/>). It registers the Signed Statement before it releases a Receipt (<xref target="RFC9943" section="6.3"/>), and the Receipt demonstrates inclusion of the Signed Statement in the Verifiable Data Structure of the Transparency Service and can be verified without online access to it (<xref target="RFC9943" section="4"/>). The Transparency Service records the Registration time when it adds the Signed Statement (<xref target="RFC9943" section="7"/>).</t>
        <t>What it does not show. Registering a Statement proves only that it was produced by an Issuer, not that it is accurate (<xref target="RFC9943" section="9.2"/>). Issuers can register some Statements and not others (<xref target="RFC9943" section="9.3"/>), so a Receipt for one receipt says nothing about a receipt that was never registered. The Subject Claim lets Relying Parties identify the Transparent Statements registered for a Subject (<xref target="RFC9943" section="3"/>), not receipts that were never registered. Unless the Registration Policy says otherwise, the order of the Verifiable Data Structure need not be the order of issuance (<xref target="RFC9943" section="9.1"/>). A Receipt does not change what the checks of <xref target="verification"/> show, and it does not make an ALLOW an authorization.</t>
        <t>Verification. A verifier checks the SCITT Receipt for the particular Signed Statement, including its inclusion proof, using the verification key of a Receipt Issuer it trusts and the verification rules for the applicable Verifiable Data Structure (Sections <xref target="RFC9943" section="7" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9943" section="7.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9943"/>). It establishes the binding from the registered Signed Statement to the envelope bytes or content root used in the following checks. If the Signed Statement's COSE payload is detached and this binding depends on the Issuer's signature, it verifies that signature. It then applies <xref target="verification"/> of this document to the receipt. Where the envelope bytes are the Signed Statement's payload, it checks those bytes; where the Signed Statement is made over the content root, it checks an envelope whose computed content root equals the registered value. This latter comparison binds the decoded DSSE payload, not the envelope bytes or the DSSE signature, and does not establish that the DSSE signature existed when the content root was registered. <xref target="RFC9943" section="7.1"/> permits verification of a Receipt without rechecking the Issuer's signature on the Signed Statement; this does not dispense with the binding just described. The signatures of the decision maker and of the outcome signer are checked by <xref target="verification"/> in either case.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="field-rules">
        <name>Field Rules</name>
        <t>Step 7 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> and step 3 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/> apply the rules of this section. <xref target="tab-fields-decision"/> lists every member of the predicate of a decision receipt that this document admits, and <xref target="tab-fields-outcome"/> every member of the predicate of an outcome receipt, each with its full path in predicate, where [] stands for each entry of an array. The rules follow the strict v0.1 form of <xref target="PB-DECISION"/> and <xref target="PB-OUTCOME"/> and their machine schemas, restricted to the members this document admits; where <xref target="verify-decision"/> is stricter, the figures give the stricter rule. This section states these rules itself, and its figures follow those documents as they stand at commit e1fec86351b216af369a2e6ac106dcc41aaf4b4c of <xref target="PB-REPO"/>, where the machine schemas are the same as in version 6.4.0.</t>
        <t>In the column Type, a digest is an object with exactly one member, sha256, whose value is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; a timestamp is an <xref target="RFC3339"/> UTC timestamp with a trailing "Z", with an upper-case "T" and "Z", a date that exists in the calendar, a second from 00 to 59 and, where present, a fraction of a second with one to six digits after the point; a typedDigest is an object whose only members are type, digestAlgorithm, digest and, optionally, purpose, where type is a non-empty string, purpose, where present, a non-empty string, digestAlgorithm jcs-sha256-v1 and digest 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; a relationDigest is an object whose only members are digestAlgorithm, which is jcs-sha256-v1, and digest, which is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; an array of 1 to 64 objects holds at least one and at most 64 entries, each an object; a string is any JSON string, and a non-empty string has at least one character; a boolean is one of the JSON values true or false; any value is any JSON value. The type integer, 0 or more, is a JSON number written without the frac and exp parts of the grammar in <xref target="RFC8259" section="6"/>, from 0 to 9007199254740991; a number written with frac or exp is not such an integer, even where its value is whole. In an array of objects or strings, each entry is an object or a string, and one array may hold both. The type object admits only the members listed for it, and the type open object admits any members. The type names preActionAuthorization and outcome allow only the JSON strings "preActionAuthorization" and "outcome", respectively. The type "0.1." and one or more digits means a string consisting of "0.1." followed by one or more ASCII decimal digits. The notes (1) to (6) follow the figures.</t>
        <t>Required yes means that the member <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present whenever the object or array entry that contains it is present. Only decisionMaker.version, actionOutcome.performedAt and actionOutcome.outcomeRef may be null. Everywhere else a null is not allowed, including inside an open object, in an array of any values and inside a non-null member of type any value. A member that the figures do not list for an object that is not open is not allowed, including at the top level of predicate.</t>
        <t>An entry of relationships that verifies shows a relation that the issuer of the receipt declared to the receipt or subject that its relationDigests name; it is not a statement that the target is correct.</t>
        <figure anchor="tab-fields-decision"><name>Members of the predicate of a decision receipt</name><artwork><![CDATA[
Member  Type  Required
schemaVersion  "0.1." and one or more digits  yes
decisionId  non-empty string  yes
decisionType  preActionAuthorization  yes
decidedAt  timestamp  yes
recordedAt  timestamp  no
decisionMaker  object  yes
decisionMaker.id  non-empty string  yes
decisionMaker.version  any value  no
agent  object  yes
agent.id  non-empty string  yes
agent.version  string  no
agent.configurationDigest  digest  no
principal  object  yes
principal.id  non-empty string  yes
principal.authnContextRef  object  no
principal.authnContextRef.uri  string  no
principal.authnContextRef.digest  digest  no
delegationRefs  array of any values  no
proposedAction  object  yes
proposedAction.actionType  string  yes
proposedAction.target  object  no
proposedAction.target.name  string  no
proposedAction.target.uri  string  no
proposedAction.target.digest  digest  no
proposedAction.method  string  no
proposedAction.parametersDigest  digest  (1)
proposedAction.parametersRef  open object  (1)
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef  object  no
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef.uri  string  no
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef.digest  digest  no
inputSnapshot  array of objects  yes
inputSnapshot[].name  string  no
inputSnapshot[].uri  string  no
inputSnapshot[].digest  digest  yes
inputSnapshot[].mediaType  string  no
policyBoundary  object  yes
policyBoundary.policyEngine  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.policyId  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.decisionPath  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.policyDigest  digest  yes
policyBoundary.bundleRevision  string  no
policyBoundary.validFrom  timestamp  no
policyBoundary.validUntil  timestamp  no
evidenceRefs  array of objects  yes
evidenceRefs[].relation  string  yes
evidenceRefs[].digest  digest  yes
evidenceRefs[].artifactDigest  digest  no
evidenceRefs[].uri  string  no
evidenceRefs[].predicateType  string  no
evidenceRefs[].typedDigest  typedDigest  no
decision  object  yes
decision.verdict  (2)  yes
decision.reasonCodes  non-empty array of non-empty strings  yes
decision.humanReadableSummary  string  no
decision.obligations  array of any values  no
decision.allowedScope  array of any values  no
notChecked  array of objects or strings  yes
notChecked[].field  string  no
notChecked[].reason  string  no
notChecked[].impact  string  no
decisionChangeConditions  array of objects  yes
decisionChangeConditions[].conditionType  string  no
decisionChangeConditions[].description  string  no
decisionChangeConditions[].requiredEvidenceType  string  no
actionOutcome  object  no
actionOutcome.status  (3)  no
actionOutcome.performedAt  timestamp  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef  object  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef.uri  string  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef.digest  digest  no
traceContext  open object  no
privacy  object  yes
privacy.rawInputsIncluded  boolean  yes
privacy.redactionProfile  string  no
privacy.erased  array of any values  no
privacy.masked  array of any values  no
validity  object  yes
validity.audience  non-empty array of non-empty strings  yes
validity.nonce  non-empty string  yes
validity.expiresAt  timestamp  yes
relationships  array of 1 to 64 objects  no
relationships[].relation  (5)  yes
relationships[].targetReceiptDigest  relationDigest  yes
relationships[].targetSubjectDigest  relationDigest  no
relationships[].reason  string  no
relationships[].reasonCode  (6)  no
relationships[].declaredAt  timestamp  no
]]></artwork></figure>
        <figure anchor="tab-fields-outcome"><name>Members of the predicate of an outcome receipt</name><artwork><![CDATA[
Member  Type  Required
schemaVersion  "0.1." and one or more digits  yes
outcomeId  non-empty string  yes
decisionRef  digest  yes
executor  object  yes
executor.id  non-empty string  yes
executor.keyId  string  no
requestedActionDigest  digest  yes
status  (4)  yes
performedAt  timestamp  yes
effectDigest  digest  no
actualActionDigest  digest  no
responseDigest  digest  no
policyPurpose  outcome  no
receiverRefs  array of objects  no
receiverRefs[].relation  non-empty string  yes
receiverRefs[].digest  digest  yes
receiverRefs[].receiverId  string  no
receiverRefs[].receiverKeyId  string  no
receiverRefs[].artifactDigest  digest  no
sequence  object  no
sequence.runId  non-empty string  yes
sequence.seq  integer, 0 or more  yes
recordedAt  timestamp  no
limitations  array of strings  no
traceContext  object  no
traceContext.traceparent  string  no
validity  object  no
validity.audience  array of any values  no
validity.nonce  string  no
relationships  array of 1 to 64 objects  no
relationships[].relation  (5)  yes
relationships[].targetReceiptDigest  relationDigest  yes
relationships[].targetSubjectDigest  relationDigest  no
relationships[].reason  string  no
relationships[].reasonCode  (6)  no
relationships[].declaredAt  timestamp  no
]]></artwork></figure>
        <t>The notes of the figures are as follows. (1) proposedAction <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry parametersDigest, parametersRef or both. This document takes no digest from parametersRef, so with parametersRef alone step 10 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> fails where action bytes are given, and Case 1 of <xref target="verify-cases"/> and step 4 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/> fail. (2) decision.verdict is ALLOW, DENY, REFUSE, ESCALATE, DEFER or OBSERVE. (3) actionOutcome.status is notAttempted, blocked, refused, attempted, executed, failed or unknown. (4) status is executed, refused, failed or partial. (5) relationships[].relation is supersedes, revises, corrects, retracts, renews, derivedFrom or amends. (6) relationships[].reasonCode is correction, rerun, data-update, methodology-update, policy-change, withdrawal or other. <xref target="verify-cases"/> adds rules per case, and steps 8 to 10 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> and steps 4 to 7 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/> add rules across members.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

<section anchor="approvals-once">
      <name>Approvals Are Honoured At Most Once</name>
      <t>An approval in Case 1 covers one action and can be used once. Another copy or another signature of the payload of a signed ALLOW that a relying party has released is part of the same honouring and not a second one, as the first check of <xref target="sets"/> counts it. For live use, the relying party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply the time bounds of <xref target="verify-cases"/> with its own current time as T. A historical audit time <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> make an expired approval usable. A relying party that lets an action run because of an approval:</t>
      <ol>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> honour each approval at most once;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> key its consumption state by the identity of the approval (approvalId, actionDigest and session), not by the bytes of one copy of the approval record. Copies or reissues with other metadata count as the same approval. Among copies received for that identity, the relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> honour the approval unless T is strictly earlier than the earliest of the validUntil values, and it does not replace that bound with a later value. This observed bound is not necessarily the original validUntil: an earlier-issued copy with a shorter validity might not have been received. A relying party can claim to enforce the original bound only if it has a trustworthy basis for that bound, independent of the arrival order of copies; otherwise it claims only to enforce the observed bound. Extending validity requires a new approval act and a new approvalId;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> mark the approval as consumed durably before it either allows the action to run or releases a signed ALLOW that cites the approval;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat an approval recorded as consumed in any current, rotated, archived or compacted representation as consumed for as long as item 6 requires that state to be retained;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> honour an approval unless it can consult a complete, durable view of the consumption state required by this section. Rotation, archiving or compaction <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> replace earlier generations if all entries still required by item 6 are preserved. Missing or unreadable state whose required entries have not been preserved elsewhere <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cause refusal;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> drop an entry only if a trustworthy upper bound has been established on the latest time any copy of that approval identity can be honoured, that bound remains enforceable after the entry is dropped, and the bound plus the clock skew the relying party allows has passed. The earliest validUntil among received copies does not by itself establish the bound. Without a trustworthy bound, the consumed identity remains in the durable state required by items 4 and 5.</li>
      </ol>
      <t>A relying party that releases a signed ALLOW citing an approval honours that approval in the sense of item 1, as one that lets the action run does. Releasing a signed ALLOW for an approval and then letting exactly the action it names run are one honouring. A relying party releases a signed ALLOW when the signed decision receipt leaves its control, to the executor, to the agent or to any store that another party can read. A signed ALLOW that never leaves its control, for example one discarded after the durable marking of item 3 failed, is not released and honours no approval. A relying party that is shown again the approval record bytes it has honoured refuses them under item 1. One that is shown a copy with other bytes refuses it under item 1 as well, because item 2 makes the copy the same approval. Releasing the same signed ALLOW again is part of the same honouring and not a second one.</t>
      <t>Whoever issues approval records <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> give a copy or reissue of an approval a validUntil later than that of the approval act it records; a later validity needs a new approval act and a new approvalId. A relying party cannot check this duty on the records it receives, which is why item 2 has it use the earliest of the validUntil values it has received.</t>
      <t>Rotation is the step where this requirement is most easily lost. A record that is full is moved aside so that new approvals can be written; if the relying party then reads only the new generation, approvals of the old one may become usable again. Items 4 and 5 preserve the consumed state without requiring a particular storage format. A decision receipt for Case 1 binds the approval record by digest, so <xref target="sets"/> can expose distinct ALLOW decisions for the same approval identity. Preventing reuse of an approval or of an already issued ALLOW remains the relying party's duty.</t>
    </section>

<section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This section is given per <xref target="RFC7942"/> and is to be removed by the RFC
Editor before publication.</t>
      <t>Each entry gives the known items of <xref target="RFC7942" section="2"/> with their evidence and date; an entry without evidence is not given. This information does not constitute endorsement.</t>
      <section anchor="impl-proofbundle">
        <name>proofbundle</name>
        <t>Maintained by the author of this document, MIT License, contact through <xref target="PB-REPO"/>. Version 6.4.0 on PyPI <xref target="PB-PYPI"/>, built from tag v6.4.0, commit 699545521ec5ef479bb84e61fe7461fc79ed558c, is a Python library and command line interface that produces and verifies the receipts this document describes and produced the seven DSSE vectors of <xref target="vectors-table"/>; its classifier is "Development Status :: 4 - Beta", and <xref target="PB-REPO"/> describes the decision receipt predicate as shipped since version 2.1.0 and the outcome predicate as experimental. Its decision verify and outcome verify commands check receipts of the predicate types of Section 1.2; the exit codes they returned for the vectors of this revision are given below. The commands recorded in <xref target="vectors-table"/> and in the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/> give it no case of <xref target="verify-cases"/>, no approval record and no consumption state of <xref target="approvals-once"/>.</t>
        <t>In the seven command line runs reported in <xref target="vectors-table"/>, the four passing vectors returned exit code 0, the invalid signature of V1-bad returned 1, and the non-canonical payload of V2-bad and the decision binding mismatch of V3-bad each returned 2. For the 149 vectors classified as failing, refused or input-invalid in the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/>, the recorded commands returned a non-zero exit code for 88 and 0 for 61; for its 22 passing vectors they returned 0 for 21 and 2 for V2-micro. Sixteen of the 149 vectors have invalid input to the third check of <xref target="sets"/> and therefore no result for that check. These results do not specify the command line interface's complete exit-code contract.</t>
        <t>The release information above concerns tag v6.4.0, dated 27 October 2026. The test-package results were recorded on 8 November 2026 and, for the eight vectors added on 13 November 2026, on that date. On 15 November 2026 the PyPI listing of proofbundle, https://pypi.org/pypi/proofbundle/json, named version 6.5.0 as the latest; this section describes version 6.4.0.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impl-agent-guard">
        <name>Agent Guard</name>
        <t>Maintained by the author of this document, MIT License, contact through <xref target="PB-REPO"/>. Agent Guard is the name used here for the preview in plugins/proofbundle of <xref target="PB-REPO"/>, which its public README names the proofbundle plugin for Claude Code and Codex. This entry is based on its source and runbook at commit 8bb289c8b41d32c54734155fc00756231093bc2a of 1 November 2026, not on the release tag v6.4.0 and not on a live execution. A separate signing service signs preActionAuthorization decisions with verdict ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE for the writes the receipt pilot supports, and an observer, which the runbook assigns to an operator account separate from the agent session, signs outcome receipts for the effects it matches to decisions. The approval path requires an explicit operator configuration, is not enabled under Codex and binds an approval to the command bytes and its session. The pilot does not produce Case 1 receipts as this document describes them; it writes released_by_owner where the vectors of <xref target="vectors-table"/> write user_approval, and it leaves evidenceRefs empty.</t>
        <t>The signing service treats an approval named in its current or a retained record as honoured; the hook treats a copy of a used approval as used and keeps a digest of each removed identity. Neither layer keeps an original validity per identity, so a later copy of an identity not yet used opens a later window, which item 2 of <xref target="approvals-once"/> does not permit where an earlier copy was received. No conformance of Agent Guard to <xref target="approvals-once"/> and no enforcement of single use in a running host is claimed from these source-level observations.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impl-go">
        <name>Go Verifier of the Test Package</name>
        <t>Written by the author of this document, contact through <xref target="PB-REPO"/>. The prototype in the directory verifier of the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/> is written in Go from the text of this document with the Go standard library only and shares no code with proofbundle. It implements checks of <xref target="verify-decision"/> to <xref target="verify-outcome"/>, <xref target="field-rules"/>, the checks of a relying party in <xref target="approvals-once"/> that the vectors exercise and the second and third checks of <xref target="sets"/>; the test package shows its results for the vectors it holds, not that every condition of those sections is implemented. It agrees with the proofbundle 6.4.0 command line interface on acceptance or rejection of all seven vectors, and all 171 vectors of the test package gave the result recorded for them, on 8 November 2026 and, for the eight vectors added on 13 November 2026, on that date. This does not establish complete equivalence of the verifiers, conformance of Agent Guard to Sections 3 and 4, or enforcement of single use in a running host. No later implementation revision is assessed here.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impl-ccf">
        <name>Registration at a Local scitt-ccf-ledger</name>
        <t>A measurement of the author, not an implementation of this document and not a production service, from tools/scitt_ccf_external/README.md at tag v6.4.0 of <xref target="PB-REPO"/>, lines 341 to 398. On 25 September 2026 a Signed Statement over the <xref target="RFC8785"/> root of an example bundle of proofbundle, not a decision receipt, was submitted for registration in eight forms at an instance of <xref target="SCITT-CCF-LEDGER"/> at commit 00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a, run locally with one node in virtual mode and CCF 7.0.17. The service accepted some of the forms and refused others, and <xref target="SCITT-VERIFIER"/> 0.4.0, built at commit bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0, ran offline on twelve statements; 58 values compared with proofbundle agreed, none differed and 9 were not comparable. It covers no step of <xref target="verification"/> and no registration as <xref target="registration"/> describes it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impl-oga">
        <name>Implementation Written from the Text</name>
        <t>Toshikatsu Oga (The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.) checked the test vectors of several revisions of this document with an implementation written from the text and reported places that read two ways. By his report, it is one Python 3 file per revision with the Python standard library and the Python package cryptography for Ed25519, implementing checks from <xref target="verify-decision"/> to <xref target="sets"/>, <xref target="field-rules"/> and <xref target="approvals-once"/> as present in the respective revision; this entry does not establish complete coverage of those sections or independently verified conformance to them. The results below concern revisions -03 to -06; no result for revision -07 is reported here.</t>
        <t>By his report, its result and failing step agreed with this document for all 7 vectors of Appendix A of revision -03, which prints their expected results, so that check was not blind; for all 17 vectors of Appendices A.3 and A.5 of revision -04; and for the 21 vectors of Appendices A.3 and A.5 of revision -05 other than F15, which was not run against that revision. For an earlier test package of revision -06 with SHA-256 850195e6288dc1716a77aa92c4732b54caa20aacf7661ef24059e314341f001c, made before that revision was submitted and not published, they agreed for all 96 of its vectors; the verdicts were recorded at 08:48:54 UTC on 4 November 2026, before the expected results of that package were read, and F15 was run against the receipt of vector P1 of <xref target="SER"/>.</t>
        <t>The evidence for his reported results is the Acknowledgments section of draft&#8209;gruszka&#8209;audit&#8209;decision&#8209;receipts&#8209;06, dated 15 November 2026, and his message to the author of 7 November 2026. His message of 8 November 2026 reports publication of the implementation for revision -06 as dr_check 0.1.0 under the MIT License. The published reader was inspected on 11 November 2026 at <eref target="https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield/tree/53ea626494f79eec7f935f56406decd7c225ca7d/tools/decision-receipts-reader"/>. On 9 November 2026 the author ran dr_check 0.1.0 at that commit, without network access, on the test package of revision -06 named above; all 96 verdicts agreed with the expected results of that package in both result and failing step, repeating his reported result for that package.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

<section anchor="related">
      <name>Relation to Other Work</name>
      <t><xref target="GILDA"/> defines one in-toto predicate type, signed in DSSE with <xref target="RFC8785"/> canonical bytes, that carries an authorization decision and the observed effect together with a derived agreement between them, and offers it as a data model for AUDIT records. This document keeps decision and outcome in two receipts signed under different keys and maps three cases onto the architecture; the consumption-state input that <xref target="GILDA"/> names concerns the same kind of state as <xref target="approvals-once"/>. <xref target="GILDA"/> lets records carry a sequence number, so that a record withheld from a party that holds a later record of the same series can be detected (<xref target="GILDA" section="6.3"/>); the decision receipts of this document carry no such member (<xref target="verify-decision"/>). <xref target="GILDA"/> also derives the agreement between decision and effect inside one record (<xref target="GILDA" section="5.3"/>), where this document compares two receipts through decisionRef (<xref target="verify-outcome"/>).</t>
      <t><xref target="IZMAYLOV"/> specifies permissions that a principal signs with a passkey and action receipts signed by the agent, linked to earlier receipts and appended to a log by a recorder. It also defines a passkey-signed approval of one action. Such an approval could supply additional evidence for Case 1. Citing it by digest does not replace the approval record or the checks of <xref target="verify-cases"/>; this document defines no mapping from that format to the approval record. In <xref target="IZMAYLOV"/> each action receipt carries its place in a chain; every receipt after the first also names the preceding receipt by digest. It is signed with the agent's keys or, for a helper, with the keys in the to member of its delegation (<xref target="IZMAYLOV" section="6"/>). Here the decision maker signs a decision receipt and the executor or an observer signs an outcome receipt (<xref target="verify-inputs"/>); a verifier checks that executor.id differs from decisionMaker.id (<xref target="verify-outcome"/>). <xref target="verify-decision"/> does not require a chain of decision receipts; an issuer can name a predecessor in relationships, which the third check of <xref target="sets"/> follows.</t>
      <t><xref target="WRIGHT"/> defines a verdict record that states a result on a claim and
cites its evidence by digest, in any receipt format. A decision or outcome receipt of
this document can be such evidence, and a verdict record can state the result of the
procedure of <xref target="verification"/>. Following <xref target="WRIGHT" section="7"/>, a verdict record cites a receipt of this document as an evidence item by the SHA-256 over its exact envelope bytes; the content root R of step 5 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> is a different digest, over the payload bytes, which a verdict record cites at most by citing those payload bytes as an item of its own.</t>
      <t><xref target="BIRKHOLZ"/> defines an extension of the vCon format for conversations between a human and an AI agent or between AI agents, with their tool invocations and reasoning traces, and replaces the Verifiable Agent Conversation Records format that <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="5"/> names as the principal candidate format for the user-Agent dialogue subtype of Interaction Records. A vCon with such a record can be signed in the signed form of a vCon or in the COSE_Sign1 envelope of Appendix B of <xref target="BIRKHOLZ"/>. A signed conversation record can be cited by digest as additional input. Establishing which entry records a human approval and how it corresponds to the action, approver, session and validity of Case 1 requires a mapping not defined here. The approval record and the checks of <xref target="verify-cases"/> still apply.</t>
      <t><xref target="LEMONNIER"/> describes how a decision record, with the options considered, the reasons, the authority and what the approver was shown, and its action-binding attachment sit under a release statement, a build attestation or an agent action record by typed digest references, and how a verifier checks them offline (Section 3 of <xref target="LEMONNIER"/>). A reference that verifies there shows only that the cited bytes have the digest it carries (Section 5.3 of <xref target="LEMONNIER"/>). A decision receipt of this document records a verdict on one proposed action with its inputs and validity, not the options and reasons behind a decision.</t>
      <t><xref target="KRAUSZ"/> pins each source of an evidence set whose content bytes the issuer received, by a SHA-256 over those bytes exactly as received, without transcoding or normalization, and names what the digest covers (Section 5.3.2 of <xref target="KRAUSZ"/>). A typedDigest and a relationDigest of <xref target="field-rules"/> likewise name the canonicalization their digest is taken over, jcs-sha256-v1. This document does not build the Merkle root over such entries that Section 5.3.3 of <xref target="KRAUSZ"/> defines.</t>
      <t><xref target="RFC9396"/> defines authorization_details, an array of JSON objects each with a type, that carries fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages. A client requests it, the authorization server returns it as granted by the resource owner with the access token, and the authorization server makes it available to the resource server, which enforces it (Sections 2, 7 and 9 of <xref target="RFC9396"/>). It concerns the request and grant of an authorization before the action, between client, authorization server and resource server. A receipt of this document is the signed record that remains afterwards of what a decision maker decided for one proposed action and, in an outcome receipt, of what was executed. A deployment can name an authorization_details value it received, such as the one of a token response, as an entry of inputSnapshot by the SHA-256 of those bytes. <xref target="RFC9396"/> defines no canonical form of such a value and no general comparison of two of them (Section 6.1 of <xref target="RFC9396"/>), and the value given to the client can differ from the one requested (Section 7.1 of <xref target="RFC9396"/>), so such an entry names those bytes only. Step 7 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> checks the form of every inputSnapshot entry. In Case 1, an entry named "approval record" also requires the checks of <xref target="verify-cases"/> on its referenced bytes, including their bindings to principal.id and proposedAction.parametersDigest, regardless of the source of those bytes. For an entry that is not used as that approval record, the procedure does not compare its digest with the bytes it names; the entry remains a digest reference (<xref target="verify-inputs"/>).</t><t>SCITT <xref target="RFC9943"/> registers Signed Statements with a Transparency Service, which returns Receipts. <xref target="registration"/> describes how a decision or outcome receipt can be registered and what a Receipt then shows.</t>
    </section>

<section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Key binding. A receipt is only as trustworthy as the verifier's choice of keys and its policy for the identities those keys may attest. <xref target="verify-decision"/> checks decisionMaker.id; <xref target="verify-outcome"/> checks the expected executor.id under the outcome-signing key. An observer's signature over an executor identifier is not the executor's own signature. A key held in the recorded Agent's process gives an Auditor that does not trust that Agent little assurance. The inspected Agent Guard design uses separate service accounts as described in <xref target="implementation-status"/>.</t>
      <t>Key compromise. Whoever holds the signing key of a decision maker or of an outcome signer can produce receipts with any decidedAt or performedAt, since these times come from the signer's clock, as the paragraph on clocks below says. A check under <xref target="verification"/> does not tell such a receipt from one signed before the key was compromised or replaced. Which keys are accepted for which identity and for which period is set by the verifier's trust policy, not by this document; <xref target="RFC9943"/> likewise leaves revocation strategies for compromised keys out of its scope (<xref target="RFC9943" section="9.4.2"/>). A time anchor outside the signer helps, if it was set before the compromise. Where the envelope bytes are the payload of a registered Signed Statement (<xref target="registration"/>), a Receipt for it shows that the DSSE signature existed when that Signed Statement was registered, and the Transparency Service records the Registration time (<xref target="RFC9943" section="7"/>). Where the Signed Statement is made over the content root, the comparison binds the decoded DSSE payload, not the envelope bytes or the DSSE signature, and does not establish that the DSSE signature existed when the content root was registered (<xref target="registration"/>). The rules of <xref target="approvals-once"/> keep a relying party from honouring one approval more than once; they do not prevent the holder of a compromised decision maker key from signing receipts that cite approvals with new identities.</t>
      <t>Exact bytes. A verifier that re-serializes a payload before checking it can be
led to accept bytes that were never signed, or to compute another content root.
Step 4 refuses such payloads, and vector V2-bad tests one of them.</t>
      <t>Algorithms. <xref target="verification"/> fixes Ed25519 for signatures and SHA-256 for digests. A digest object names its algorithm by its only member, sha256, and a typedDigest or a relationDigest by its digestAlgorithm, which is jcs-sha256-v1. The envelope names no signature algorithm; the verifier uses the Ed25519 public key that its trust policy selects (<xref target="verify-inputs"/>). A verifier that follows <xref target="verification"/> accepts no other algorithm, so a change of algorithm needs a revision of this procedure.</t>
      <t>Replay. An ALLOW for one action must not be usable for another, and an outcome that names another decision must not count as the result of this one. parametersDigest, where present, binds the action bytes, validity binds audience, nonce and expiry, decisionRef binds the outcome, and <xref target="approvals-once"/> requires the relying party to prevent reuse of an approval. V1-bad tests rejection of changed payload bytes under an unchanged signature. V3-bad tests rejection of an outcome bound to a different decision. The seven vectors do not test consumption-state retention or rotation; F13 in the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/> tests refusal of an approval that is recorded as consumed only in an already rotated generation, not the rotation itself.</t>
      <t>Self-assertion. actionOutcome in a decision receipt and an outcome receipt whose
effect cannot be resolved are statements of their signers. A digest that is present
but cannot be resolved to bytes was chosen by the signer.</t>
      <t>Suppression. A decision maker can fail to write a receipt for a decision it does not want seen. Independent observers at the boundary, as the architecture requires for Action Records, reduce this risk. Registration with a Transparency Service helps address selective registration when Relying Parties accept a Signed Statement only if they can discover and verify a Receipt for that Signed Statement from a Transparency Service they trust (Sections <xref target="RFC9943" section="7.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9943" section="9.3" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9943"/>). This document does not ensure that a receipt is produced for every decision. A SCITT Receipt shows inclusion of the registered Signed Statement, not that every receipt was registered (<xref target="registration"/>). Completeness presupposes an expectation of which receipts ought to exist, and this document does not define that expectation.</t>
      <t>Gaps. For outcome receipts, <xref target="PB-OUTCOME"/> defines an optional member sequence, with a run identifier and a counter that an executor can opt into (its sections 4 and 7); <xref target="verify-outcome"/> admits that member. A verifier that holds numbered outcome receipts of a run can report a gap in the numbers it has. Such a gap can reflect withholding or delivery delay; the numbers alone do not establish its cause. Those sequence numbers alone do not show whether receipts above the highest observed number have been withheld, and a run without the member leaves no such trace (compare <xref target="GILDA" section="6.3"/>). The profile of <xref target="verify-decision"/> defines no sequence counter and requires no chain of decision receipts; a predecessor named in relationships (<xref target="sets"/>) is optional and does not show a receipt that was withheld. Records that a Service or Tool emits at the boundary where an action took effect (<xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="4.1"/>) can expose an effect for which the Auditor has no matching decision receipt.</t>
      <t>Clocks. decidedAt and performedAt come from the signers' clocks. Ordering against outside events needs a timestamp or a transparency registration. A verified time-stamp token under <xref target="RFC3161"/> for a hash of the envelope bytes is, like a registration (<xref target="registration"/>), an anchor outside the signer for a verifier that trusts the time-stamping authority. It supports the assertion that those bytes existed no later than genTime plus the applicable accuracy (<xref target="RFC3161" section="2.4.2"/>). If the accuracy field is absent, the accuracy may be available through other means, such as the TSA policy; its absence does not establish zero uncertainty. validity.expiresAt, recordedAt and the times of an approval record are statements of their signer as well; the times of an approval record are the gate's statement, not the person's (<xref target="not-adds"/>). The checks of step 9 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> and of Case 1 in <xref target="verify-cases"/> compare decidedAt, validity.expiresAt and the times of an approval record with each other and with the verifier's time T; none of them compares recordedAt. They do not show when a decision was made or when a person approved.</t>
    </section>

<section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The example receipts in <xref target="vectors"/> carry digests of action bytes, approval records and effects rather than those bytes, and the example decision receipts set privacy.rawInputsIncluded to false. The field rules of <xref target="field-rules"/> allow that member to be true and permit raw content in other admitted members, such as a decision receipt's open traceContext object. A successful check under <xref target="verification"/> does not establish that raw inputs are absent. A digest of a short or predictable input, such as a command line, can be found by trying candidate inputs; a deployment that must hide such inputs keeps the receipts as private as the inputs, or adds a secret salt to the digested bytes. Identifiers such as principal.id, agent.id and traceContext link a person's actions across services, as <xref target="AUDIT-ARCH" section="9"/> describes; pairwise or opaque identifiers reduce that linkage. The approver of an approval record and principal.id can be pseudonymous identifiers or references to a role, and the mapping from them to a person is then kept by the deploying organization. An approval record that names a person identifies that person to everyone who holds it; how long it is held is set by the deployment. Registration shows that the registered Signed Statement existed by the time of registration, not when the decision was taken. Where that Statement is made over the content root, it does not establish that the receipt's DSSE signature existed at that time (<xref target="registration"/>). Where the envelope bytes are the payload of a registered Signed Statement (<xref target="registration"/>), readers of that payload can read the receipt with its identifiers and digests. Registering a Statement over the content root avoids including the receipt's envelope bytes in that Statement, but the Signed Statement still carries its Issuer and Subject Claims and the Transparency Service records the Registration time (Sections <xref target="RFC9943" section="6" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9943" section="7" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9943"/>). Access to the registered data and any detached payload depends on the Transparency Service and any Adjacent Services; Issuers and Clients assess their privacy and security posture before registration (<xref target="RFC9943" section="8"/>).</t>
    </section>

<section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Bradner"><organization/></author>
            <date year="1997" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2017" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Rundgren"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Jordan"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2020" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7493" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493">
          <front>
            <title>The I-JSON Message Format</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Bray" role="editor"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2015" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7493"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7493"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">
          <front>
            <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Bray" fullname="T. Bray" role="editor"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2017" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032">
          <front>
            <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2017" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234">
          <front>
            <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Hansen"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2011" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2006" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3339" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339">
          <front>
            <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Klyne"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Newman"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2002" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DSSE" target="https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/blob/v1.0.2/protocol.md">
          <front>
            <title>DSSE: Dead Simple Signing Envelope, protocol specification, version 1.0.2</title>
            <author><organization>Secure Systems Lab</organization></author>
            <date year="2024" month="May" day="28"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="INTOTO-STATEMENT" target="https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/v1.2.0/spec/v1/statement.md">
          <front>
            <title>in-toto Attestation Framework: Statement layer, v1 (release v1.2.0)</title>
            <author><organization>in-toto project</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="March" day="18"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="AUDIT-ARCH" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Kuehlewind"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="7"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GILDA" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03">
          <front>
            <title>An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Gilda"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="29"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KRAUSZ" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krausz-verification-state-03">
          <front>
            <title>The verification.* Constraint Family: Pre-Action Fail-Closed Gates for AI Agent Decisions</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Krausz"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="1"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-krausz-verification-state-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LEMONNIER" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01">
          <front>
            <title>Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them</title>
            <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="2"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCITT-CCF-LEDGER" target="https://github.com/microsoft/scitt-ccf-ledger/tree/00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a">
          <front>
            <title>scitt-ccf-ledger, commit 00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a</title>
            <author><organization>Microsoft</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="24"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCITT-VERIFIER" target="https://github.com/microsoft/scitt-verifier/tree/bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0">
          <front>
            <title>scitt-verifier, commit bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0</title>
            <author><organization>Microsoft</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="24"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IZMAYLOV" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02">
          <front>
            <title>Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents</title>
            <author initials="P." surname="Izmaylov"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="31"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="YOSSIF" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yossif-psea-03">
          <front>
            <title>PSEA Token Profile: An EAT Profile for Action-Bound, User-Verification-Gated Transaction-Confirmation Evidence</title>
            <author initials="M. K." surname="Yossif"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="8"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-yossif-psea-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LIU" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-oauth-authorization-evidence-02">
          <front>
            <title>Authorization Evidence and Audit Trail for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Liu"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Zhu"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Krishnan"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Parecki"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="2"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-oauth-authorization-evidence-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DPS-RAR" target="https://github.com/Laurent-Lemonnier/dps-scitt-decision-layer/tree/c0a7bd2b6e80b294be326f6401d89a25a50da17e/interop/rar">
          <front>
            <title>dps-scitt-decision-layer, interop/rar, commit c0a7bd2b6e80b294be326f6401d89a25a50da17e</title>
            <author><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="9"/>
          </front>
        </reference><reference anchor="WRIGHT" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wright-verdict-record-02">
          <front>
            <title>Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Wright"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="2"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wright-verdict-record-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BIRKHOLZ" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-birkholz-vcon-ai-agent-extension-00">
          <front>
            <title>An AI Agent Extension for Virtualized Conversations (vCon)</title>
            <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="D. G." surname="Petrie"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="T." surname="McCarthy-Howe"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Rosenberg"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="O." surname="Steele"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="2"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-birkholz-vcon-ai-agent-extension-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SER" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-signed-evaluation-receipts-04">
          <front>
            <title>Signed Evaluation Receipts</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Gruszka"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="26"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gruszka-signed-evaluation-receipts-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SER-MAPPINGS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-evaluation-receipt-mappings-04">
          <front>
            <title>Citing Signed Evaluation Receipts from Existing Envelopes</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Gruszka"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="26"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gruszka-evaluation-receipt-mappings-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9943" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9943">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
            <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Fournet"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Lasker"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3161" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3161">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Adams"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Cain"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Pinkas"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="R." surname="Zuccherato"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2001" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3161"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3161"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8949" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Bormann"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2020" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Schaad"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2022" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9053" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Schaad"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2022" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9053"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9053"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9396" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Richer"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Campbell"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2023" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9396"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9396"/>
        </reference><reference anchor="RFC9597" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9597">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Looker"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="M.B." surname="Jones"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2024" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9597"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9597"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9679" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9679">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Isobe"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="O." surname="Steele"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2024" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9679"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9679"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9995" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9995">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Hash Envelope</title>
            <author initials="O." surname="Steele"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Lasker"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9995"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9995"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9162" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Laurie"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="E." surname="Messeri"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="R." surname="Stradling"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2021" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9942">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts</title>
            <author initials="O." surname="Steele"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Fournet"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2026" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"><organization/></author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Farrel"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2016" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PB-DECISION" target="https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/v6.4.0/docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md">
          <front>
            <title>Decision Receipt predicate decision-receipt/v0.1</title>
            <author><organization>proofbundle project</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>proofbundle, tag v6.4.0, docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PB-OUTCOME" target="https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/v6.4.0/docs/predicates/action-outcome.md">
          <front>
            <title>Action Outcome predicate action-outcome/v0.1</title>
            <author><organization>proofbundle project</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>proofbundle, tag v6.4.0, docs/predicates/action-outcome.md</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PB-PYPI" target="https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/6.4.0/">
          <front>
            <title>proofbundle 6.4.0</title>
            <author><organization>Python Package Index</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="28"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCITT-COSE" target="https://pypi.org/project/scitt-cose/0.5.0/">
          <front>
            <title>scitt-cose 0.5.0</title>
            <author><organization>Action State Group</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PB-REPO" target="https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle">
          <front>
            <title>proofbundle source repository</title>
            <author><organization>proofbundle project</organization></author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="2"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="JCS-JS" target="https://www.npmjs.com/package/canonicalize/v/2.1.0">
          <front>
            <title>canonicalize 2.1.0, a JavaScript implementation of RFC 8785</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman"><organization/></author>
            <date year="2025" month="March" day="18"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>

<section anchor="vectors">
      <name>Test Vectors</name>
      <t>The seven DSSE vectors described in <xref target="vectors-table"/> were generated with proofbundle 6.4.0 from PyPI. All vectors and keys in this appendix are for testing only. Each key seed is SHA-256 over a public ASCII label, so that every byte can be rebuilt; these keys <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used for any real receipt. Ed25519 is deterministic, so the signatures below follow from the seeds and the payloads.</t>
      <section anchor="vectors-keys">
        <name>Test Keys and Inputs</name>
        <t>Each key is given by its label, Ed25519 seed (hex), public key (base64) and keyid. The key labelled gate-1 signs the decision receipts; the key labelled observer-1 signs the outcome receipts. For these tests, the trust policy accepts decisionMaker.id gate-1 under the gate-1 key and permits the observer-1 key to attest executor.id forge:agent-42-bot. The key label observer-1 does not assert that the observer is the executing account.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
gate-1
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key gate-1
100fa92fa6464c141f791a96327f555c1c0cfbf3095af986537e50c3c4335f8c
TWfs75IN1In3CNI8TnyIOUHgtwilOPGcRFQLJ670CJc=
SHA256:NjZMAelLq9XON3pxV5tR5hZjX99NkQyw4gGJSRc2gP8

observer-1
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key observer-1
f03ad5b668ad225ea15fd9fd272fc8df84be59f467da86b0f2ad0a5ad26f4ddd
4hDsi5TCL+A+9SB7k2l4EkY7XePUheE+zE9mBazt2Fs=
SHA256:q/d0VZCREBObUFi8PWKWXEF4lVNeYPuGn0GuOqd1ij0
]]></artwork>
        <t>Each input is given by a name, its bytes, its size and its SHA-256. "\n" stands
for one line feed byte. The bytes of ap, a3 and e3 are the serialization under
<xref target="RFC8785"/> of the JSON value shown, on one line and without white space.
In ap, SHA-256(a1) stands for the JSON string of the 64
lowercase hexadecimal digits of the SHA-256 of a1. pol is the policy named by every
policyDigest. B is the payload of vector P1 of
<xref target="SER"/>, Appendix A.2.1, cited by V3-decision, F17 and F89 and carried by F15, vectors of the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/>; its bytes are given in base64 <xref target="RFC4648"/>.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a1 "git push origin refs/heads/topic:refs/heads/topic\n"
50 bytes, SHA-256
dec54f771352454097310ae4bd6608c0070ebebb3955c6be013c1b3a8e310bd0
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a1x "git push --force origin refs/heads/topic:refs/heads/main\n"
57 bytes, SHA-256
b683418806875ff79c6fa190c50edab0b96577ad8062de5ba7b41dc1d9c363fb
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a2 "gh pr merge 7 --repo acme/widgets --merge\n"
42 bytes, SHA-256
5a7549948a1441addb710f5ada59e06dbce25cc5a59accf14f140379f47adb5b
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
pol "example gate rules, revision 1\n"
31 bytes, SHA-256
43789b41915ae0febcd13263d293101af5ab041eb7c234e1cbe625d6312815f6
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
ap, 231 bytes, SHA-256
88e5b6d69b3e4bc250a42aeffea0414d406e5f04ba4f991ee432a78231da1170
{
 "actionDigest": {
  "sha256": SHA-256(a1)
 },
 "approvalId": "appr-001",
 "approvedAt": "2026-10-15T09:00:00Z",
 "approver": "user-123",
 "session": "sess-1",
 "validUntil": "2026-10-15T09:15:00Z"
}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a3, 81 bytes, SHA-256
9165c850b7e03cd59578efa1769be74c5386cff5ce96df6b59e25d38ad6f88b4
{
 "body": "All required checks passed for 4f1c2a9.",
 "pull": 7,
 "repo": "acme/widgets"
}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
e3, 93 bytes, SHA-256
d3d824cf55168298c0f651244853ec9d9620ea09087abe899243ceb8f9df3a6d
{
 "author": "agent-42-bot",
 "body": "All required checks passed for 4f1c2a9.",
 "id": 9001,
 "pull": 7
}
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
B, 458 bytes, SHA-256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]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vectors-statements">
        <name>Statements</name>
        <t>The payload bytes of each vector are the serialization under
<xref target="RFC8785"/> of a Statement {"_type": "https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1",
"predicateType": P, "predicate": D, "subject": [{"name": N, "digest": {"sha256": H}}]},
where H is SHA-256 over the serialization of D. For a decision receipt P is the
decision receipt type and N is "decision:" followed by decisionId; for an outcome
receipt P is the outcome receipt type and N is "outcome:" followed by outcomeId. </t>
        <t>The predicate of V1-good is given below as a list of assignments that starts from the
predicate named in its first line, {} being the empty object; the Statements of the other vectors are in the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/>. An assignment sets the
member at the path to the JSON value shown. A path is a sequence of member names joined by dots, where a decimal index i in square brackets after a name selects element i of an array; missing objects on the path are created, and an assignment to element i of an array with i elements appends it. Members not named keep their value. SHA-256(x) stands for the JSON string of the 64
lowercase hexadecimal digits of the SHA-256 of input x, and R(V) for that of the
payload bytes of vector V.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
V1-good, from {}
agent.id = "agent-42"
decidedAt = "2026-10-15T09:00:05Z"
decision.reasonCodes = ["user_approval"]
decision.verdict = "ALLOW"
decisionChangeConditions = []
decisionChangeConditions[0].conditionType = "ruleChange"
decisionChangeConditions[0].description =
 "a changed gate, mode or rule of the gate"
decisionId = "dec-0001"
decisionMaker.id = "gate-1"
decisionType = "preActionAuthorization"
evidenceRefs = []
inputSnapshot = []
inputSnapshot[0].digest.sha256 = SHA-256(a1)
inputSnapshot[0].mediaType = "text/plain"
inputSnapshot[0].name = "approved bytes"
inputSnapshot[1].digest.sha256 = SHA-256(ap)
inputSnapshot[1].mediaType = "application/json"
inputSnapshot[1].name = "approval record"
notChecked = []
notChecked[0].field = "content"
notChecked[0].impact = "an approved text can be wrong"
notChecked[0].reason =
 "the gate does not judge whether the text is true"
policyBoundary.bundleRevision = "1"
policyBoundary.decisionPath = "outbound-gate/allow-write"
policyBoundary.policyDigest.sha256 = SHA-256(pol)
policyBoundary.policyEngine = "proofbundle-pilot/github-write"
policyBoundary.policyId = "outbound-gate-rules"
principal.id = "user-123"
privacy.rawInputsIncluded = false
proposedAction.actionType = "git.push"
proposedAction.method = "write"
proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256 = SHA-256(a1)
proposedAction.target.name =
 "https://git.example/acme/widgets refs/heads/topic"
proposedAction.target.uri = "https://git.example/acme/widgets"
schemaVersion = "0.1.0"
traceContext.parentId = "int-002"
traceContext.traceId = "trace-abc"
validity.audience = ["observer-1"]
validity.expiresAt = "2026-10-15T09:05:05Z"
validity.nonce = "dec-0001"
]]></artwork>
        <t>V1-bad has the payload bytes of V1-good with every occurrence of the
hexadecimal SHA-256 of a1 replaced by that of a1x, and keeps the signature of V1-good.
V2-bad has as payload bytes the output of Python's json.dumps(s, sort_keys=True) for
the Statement s of V2-good, with a space after each comma and colon, and is validly
signed over them by gate-1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vectors-table">
        <name>Results</name>
        <t>Every envelope is {"payload": base64 of the payload bytes, "payloadType":
"application/vnd.in-toto+json", "signatures": [{"keyid": keyid of the signer,
"sig": signature}]}. Each of the two blocks below gives the vector, the evaluation time T, the
expected result with the exit code of the proofbundle 6.4.0 command line interface,
the payload size and signer, the SHA-256 of the payload bytes (the content root where
the payload is canonical) and the signature in base64 on two lines. The expected
audience is observer-1 and the expected nonce is the decisionId. decision verify ran
with --strict, --aud, --nonce and --verification-time T; outcome verify with --strict,
--expected-decision-ref R(V3-decision) and --decision-maker-id gate-1.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
V1-good, T 2026-10-15T09:01:00Z, pass, exit 0
1829 bytes, signed by gate-1
b9dfd26537542632013d0df166141a788551b4987dfa33b060d5b5ebba78dfb1
GkvzPjklV5ZbtomNRXbS4+O4MIOSw8xGmA0diAEYKEm0
s4Q9qLkL1j7+e5RZnT9l56tfB2utDoNycACsSvSoDw==
]]></artwork>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
V1-bad, T 2026-10-15T09:01:00Z, fail at step 3, exit 1
1829 bytes, signed by gate-1
69eb87fb33a29153182b0e0c89a444023cc00c82fe7c8db1c7e0893363b2c926
GkvzPjklV5ZbtomNRXbS4+O4MIOSw8xGmA0diAEYKEm0
s4Q9qLkL1j7+e5RZnT9l56tfB2utDoNycACsSvSoDw==
]]></artwork>
        <t>The blocks above give V1-good and V1-bad in full. The other five vectors of this appendix are in the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/>, with their payload bytes, envelopes and Statements; <xref target="tab-vectors-a3"/> gives for each its name, the procedure it is judged by, its expected result with the evaluation time T and the exit code of the proofbundle 6.4.0 command line interface, and the SHA-256 of its receipt file in the test package.</t>
        <figure anchor="tab-vectors-a3"><name>Further vectors of Appendix A.3</name><artwork><![CDATA[
V2-good: Case 2 of Section 3.3, using a2
  T 2026-10-15T09:06:00Z, pass, exit 0
  3e3b7d575b712ada2c813ee98fd3b0c80d788e2558444a34338510c9978fa47a

V2-bad: V2-good not canonical, see Appendix A.2
  T 2026-10-15T09:06:00Z, fail at step 4, exit 2
  afa39fd7086e4c5af7ef5c7b8cf0ceeaedcb0af26a07ac8082efeb4874b0f424

V3-decision: Case 3, the pair with V3-good
  T 2026-10-15T09:11:00Z, pass, exit 0
  b28dc232b4bb98044a962714c99f1343df3e136246e434bf0f7fdd72dbb925ed

V3-good: Case 3 with V3-decision and e3
  pass, exit 0
  436fb6f6f19cecbd67df9f468556807eab5003ddb8eb60c8b9c2f708e3e9bb66

V3-bad: V3-good with decisionRef R(V1-good)
  fail at step 4 of Section 3.4, exit 2
  2a0fe3ab106095df99e1ee41b938e04678973b7a4fed14c0482f63eca6472d05
]]></artwork></figure>
        <t>The payload bytes of V1-good, V2-good, V3-decision, V3-good and V3-bad and the
inputs ap, a3, e3 and B are each equal to three serializations of their parsed value:
Python's json.dumps with sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":") and either setting of
ensure_ascii; the rfc8785 package 0.1.4 for Python; and the independent JavaScript
implementation <xref target="JCS-JS"/>. The values contain no floating-point numbers
and no characters outside ASCII, which keeps these serializations equal. The payload
of V2-bad differs from all of them, as intended.</t>
        <t>Each result is that of one procedure. V1-good is judged by <xref target="verify-decision"/> with Case 1 of <xref target="verify-cases"/>, using a1 and ap; V1-bad fails at step 3 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>, before any check of Case 1. V2-good is judged by <xref target="verify-decision"/> with Case 2, using a2; V2-bad fails at step 4 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>. V3-good is judged as Case 3, by <xref target="verify-decision"/> for V3-decision and <xref target="verify-outcome"/> for V3-good, with e3 as effect bytes, no action bytes for step 10 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>, and forge:agent-42-bot as expected executor.id; V3-bad fails at step 4 of <xref target="verify-outcome"/>. V3-decision is judged by the same Case 3 procedure as V3-good and passes; it has no result of its own, and its pass is that of the pair with V3-good. The exit code of proofbundle decision verify for V3-decision reflects <xref target="verify-decision"/> alone. In the test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/>, V3-decision and F31 to F34, which are derived from it, are each checked as the pair with V3-good.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vectors-registration">
        <name>Signed Statements for Registration</name>
        <t>The test package of <xref target="vectors-failure"/> holds, for V2-good, one Signed Statement for each way of registration in <xref target="registration"/>, a SCITT Receipt for each and the counterexamples, with the test keys issuer-1 and receipt-issuer-1, built like the keys of <xref target="vectors-keys"/>, and the text that gives their bytes and describes how they are built and checked. The Signed Statements are COSE_Sign1 messages of <xref target="RFC9052"/> with an EdDSA signature of <xref target="RFC9053"/>, CWT Claims of <xref target="RFC9597"/> and a kid that is a COSE Key Thumbprint of <xref target="RFC9679"/>, in the deterministic encoding of <xref target="RFC8949"/>; the second uses the COSE Hash Envelope of <xref target="RFC9995"/>. The Receipts are those of <xref target="RFC9942"/> over a Merkle Tree of <xref target="RFC9162"/>, generated for illustration with scitt-cose 0.5.0 <xref target="SCITT-COSE"/>, and no Transparency Service issued them.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vectors-failure">
        <name>Test Package and Further Vectors</name>
        <t>Appendix A.3 gives a passing and a failing vector for each case of <xref target="verify-cases"/>, V1-good and V1-bad for Case 1, V2-good and V2-bad for Case 2, and V3-decision and V3-good with V3-bad for Case 3 and <xref target="verify-outcome"/>. For every vector but F38 the expected audience is observer&#8209;1, and the expected nonce is the decisionId of the vector of <xref target="vectors-table"/> or of F10 that it is derived from; F38 alone is checked with the expected audience observer&#8209;2, which its receipt does not name, and F39 alone with another expected nonce. V1-accept is V1-good checked by a relying party whose consumption state is the empty JSON array; it passes, and no item of <xref target="approvals-once"/> refuses it.</t>
        <t>The other failure vectors, F1 to F9, F11 to F93 and F95 to F125 with F17-outcome, the passing vectors V2-micro, V2-num, V2-rel, V3-rel, V3-seq, F94, V1-accept, V2-ref and V3-late, K1 to K29 of the third check of <xref target="sets"/> and S1 and S2 of its second check are in the test package archive draft&#8209;gruszka&#8209;audit&#8209;decision&#8209;receipts&#8209;08&#8209;test&#8209;vectors.tar.gz, with SHA-256 a76c704a221c63bbceef8baf4c228f81502754a0a56ebe0a68513df373c9140b. The URL <eref target="https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/raw/32b7fe6a61031026040cb1f0d22a0b156b97c040/drafts/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-08-test-vectors.tar.gz"/> identifies that exact archive file at a fixed commit of the public proofbundle repository, not merely its unpacked directory. The package holds every vector of <xref target="vectors"/> with the inputs it uses and the result and step expected for it, a description of how each vector is derived and checked with the exit codes of the proofbundle 6.4.0 command line interface, the Signed Statements and SCITT Receipts that <xref target="vectors-registration"/> names with the text that describes them, a verifier of <xref target="verification"/> and <xref target="approvals-once"/> written in Go from this document, and a script that runs every vector against that verifier offline. Its file MANIFEST.sha256 gives the SHA-256 of each other file.</t>
        <t>F19 to F71 in the test package were added for requirements of this document that F1 to F18 leave without a vector and that can be checked on a receipt and its inputs; the test package records the step at which each fails. The six requirements named below have no vector because a receipt and its inputs do not show whether they are met. They are not the only requirements without a vector; others lack one too, among them the first check of <xref target="sets"/> and the conditions of item 6 of <xref target="approvals-once"/>, and a requirement with a vector need not have one that separates each condition it states. The vectors therefore do not show that every requirement that can be checked on a receipt and its inputs is tested. The consumption scope of <xref target="sets"/>, the rule of <xref target="vectors"/> that the test keys are not used for real receipts and the rule of <xref target="approvals-once"/> for whoever issues approval records cannot be checked on a receipt. The two sentences of the opening paragraph of <xref target="approvals-once"/> that have the relying party apply its own current time as T and keep a historical audit time from making an expired approval usable, and item 3 of <xref target="approvals-once"/>, which orders durable marking before release, state duties of the relying party outside the procedures of <xref target="verification"/>. The second check of <xref target="sets"/> has the vectors S1 and S2, which the verifier of the test package checks (<xref target="impl-go"/>); its first check has no vector.</t>
        <t><xref target="tab-vectors-further"/> names each further vector by group, with the vector it is derived from, its change and its expected result, and gives for each vector the SHA-256 of the receipt file that the recorded command of its test package entry checks; the README of the test package describes them in prose, and its file MANIFEST.sha256 gives the path of each file. A changed payload is signed again by the key that signed its base, with the subject digest taken over the new predicate. For K1 to K29 and S1 and S2, the receipt passes, and Expected gives the result of the third or second check of <xref target="sets"/> over the receipts held, each held under the key that signed it unless the list says otherwise; an invalid input gives no result for that check. F10 is V1-good with decidedAt 2026-10-15T09:20:00Z, decisionId and validity.nonce dec-0004, validity.expiresAt 2026-10-15T09:25:00Z and the approval record ap2, ap with validUntil 2026-10-15T09:30:00Z, in inputSnapshot[1]; c1 is the consumption state of a relying party that has honoured ap. F90 is refused under item 2 of <xref target="approvals-once"/>. The other vectors of the test package, F1 to F9, F11 to F88 and F17-outcome, are described only in the package.</t>
        <figure anchor="tab-vectors-further"><name>Further vectors and the SHA-256 of their files</name><artwork><![CDATA[
Decision receipts, Section 3.2; Expected names the step of Section
3.2:

F91, F92, F93, from V2-good: member n, 2^53 plus 2, 2^53, -2^53; step
  4
F91  b2b3257777b7bcb262a821602f9a8ec41422c924717cc957f25a4de7b1c9a967
F92  894a24eb9ab0957f2ded0af613770052002d877b297abef38b77bf796d5836b1
F93  5eaeca6ce8746984f645436767f727e808c8d284b92108cd5c2f9dc88753d2b3

F94, from V2-good: member n, 1e+21; passes
F94  6362d8c83b6384c0997ff13695026e9027b8ae16b1bedfd3247ff60a73378c69

V2-num, from V2-good: member n, 1.5e-7; passes
     b0084cb8b2230a7712fcb600e94d6d3fd9ff7ec1539cd23a2cf16d71eef56290

F95, from V2-good: payload without padding; step 2
F95  94d3120c96819760cf93830638304a5ab8fe5828ca9215050a7edc54745b3785

F96, F97, from V2-good: envelope member NaN or Infinity; step 1
F96  0596668f05aa4aa2a7ad990a507917565e3dc3e90a559bfe860b1343d9ff1de5
F97  180ec51cba15d6281971490ebd643b86ce9c9b31136a98a16fe53749a42c953a

F117, F118, F119, from V1-good: second entry of signatures; step 1
F117 0a42b0123c743fee8dec8166ca449a39a3b955ae885e81467141e48e1902f15a
F118 bba56c5960c48800fcf424e0c69caae65f26e81484b6ef8adee4ff4b0d85f378
F119 ea0321a75a2dfe245fde8678cb7e59f7455fb0b06a24547331d7afd6f634fdb4

F123, from V1-good: S replaced by S plus L; step 3
F123 e4685ea2d1c148c3d00b3ef7f8bc849fb3b9538010bb561d31c04207178b1bc7

F120, from V2-good: predicate a JSON string; step 6
F120 3d73fe2aafed0ad10c9fb83187f7c497508bd9a2b2bb0c03665811885411d0a7

V2-rel, from V2-good: entry of relationships; passes
     4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

F98 to F107, from V2-good: relationships, one rule each; step 7
F98  71d1058d89a9364669ef2502569e5dfaeb359c68ac91aa8a3d303acc59b42385
F99  aca0769bce7ffa77bbc190e49bd8aae0a9ef3d907646299e75439dbad3f41b0c
F100 10631f19d806aaf9cdd6ab8639d21065decfd994e47380ac2b7a199fcffaf3cc
F101 e2ce032c1485ff2f2b2b2f314f7bdb7e0c5d2df2d2049e937b87570405be753f
F102 0201b71fa66c2db76c77e348519126853e7d5c2a2dc8de69942e7fb8f1a25996
F103 37471a238e99e3889dc3fff4436fb8c60a0985af98a13f8450765294733b859b
F104 a3fb77ab21bfdced86aae20519563494ee45e32ffd4e3bb89c7943e715cd03a3
F105 a687b88fc5832b632cc92c6a7d4c1f37d578cde32412e4abd5bd83b0aa6c2220
F106 df1649155b2134d75b3d30c8ed2823535701d9f841c37b6707c0313e4e170006
F107 eeb0e9fb931fc020bd7a89f759d974819f985a3d4f22777d0fe446132bac257f

F124, from V2-good: rawInputsIncluded a string; step 7
F124 06d03339405182e89c441789f73f47ee2aaec623f286bca6ee3f3f98311a5f9c

F122, from V1-good: expected id gate-2; step 8
F122 cce69757bdd3426f505db28b635cb9ab738bc47cd7ec5c497578ebcd062ae7a5

V2-ref, from V2-good: parametersRef alone; passes
     3f8ba601c4109e27fbd26baf89b52bb4aaaa7e86794cfb3effdedd7c34f75fcb

F125, from V2-ref: with action bytes; step 10
F125 3f8ba601c4109e27fbd26baf89b52bb4aaaa7e86794cfb3effdedd7c34f75fcb

Cases, outcome receipts and relying party, Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 4;
Expected names the step of Section 3.4, the case of Section 3.3 or
the refusal under Section 4:

F89, from V1-good: no approval record entry; Case 1
F89  3ad856b6077a153bafe70b197059a7d1e10e413080ae0a891f116bedae88d9ca

V3-rel, from V3-good: entry of relationships; passes
     39a24a14623ee4f9ecd1caa068dfe0d1f49f46d4d965afbc5bce9ea299a7d0e5

F108 to F114, from V3-good: relationships, one rule each; step 3
F108 cbdef86b33a3b04cf6341937b451d22a7466796a939857c2cee386e3af000851
F109 58bf9bebaa6e603df0706ccfddeadbe5c0323e63ee61b6fe2ec6a43d9a76954c
F110 84ed6e1d1f44d6dfa8d67ee9aa31d19249ef4c731e1330fa0b43f6a137efee96
F111 45c0ca3aa613a1403d52098b7e1c6826fae654717cf0ee03a3abe9612aba40a1
F112 687cc56388b83df77934bc34f85c3ed7e8d961962b291dd6b4425e09e87414fe
F113 5f82e7313f2cd702c39f7c62f99b3b06a346feba4148376d4c7211f53ebe7d4f
F114 de78754372b184f4e8458b16ddb350e3973759aca45de1b86fac6548ec1692ec

V3-seq, from V3-good: sequence, seq 1; passes
     83fa5144543213c7923219e78efa65ea11bf6d9a42eba9353c0ba65c7592d715

F115, from V3-good: seq written 1.0; step 1
F115 62469a5a925eb7d92db340b29d5e5c99d16ded5eaaed65fecec79216f6f2d820

F116, from V3-good: seq written 1e+21; step 3
F116 a897b9da00f85da3e73d5d22f14eff902b4b986d7a7d7fbdb2b22fa9ea2393ef

F121, from V3-good: predicate an empty array; step 2
F121 7ddc903e6397cf88516ca0990f82634dd89cb896654051acf785fbd4ac9e2727

V3-late, from V3-good: performedAt after T; passes
     8786418598d415d88673c12ef0f200376036e00b1b4454056b5a7f0ee2c04076

F10, from V1-good: ap2 and c1, see below; refused under item 1
F10  4069c22d741d9f4a08bc41d53664324f345dc58f88d2ff6211171749fe2b1c40
ap2  37ec7f3fa06f086626268a6c818ba5b5af7fd16ba292735ce964a83c42c0357c
c1   f13fce72c54f1872232c0339fa98b33ffe5142f72481cd31e378bc6a680b6f6a

F90, from F10: received ap, honoured nothing; refused under item 2
F90  4069c22d741d9f4a08bc41d53664324f345dc58f88d2ff6211171749fe2b1c40

V1-accept, from V1-good: consumption state the empty JSON array;
  passes, not refused
     cce69757bdd3426f505db28b635cb9ab738bc47cd7ec5c497578ebcd062ae7a5

Third check of Section 3.5:

K1, from V2-rel: V1-good, V2-num held; passes
K1   4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K2, from V2-rel: other targetSubjectDigest; fails
K2   cfb435deb29634a4bb182e3ad7a27c4d6ed442ba003846fe6e6767191556ff0d

K3, from V2-rel: V2-good, V2-num held; fails
K3   4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K4, from V3-rel: V1-good held; passes
K4   39a24a14623ee4f9ecd1caa068dfe0d1f49f46d4d965afbc5bce9ea299a7d0e5

K5, from V3-rel: V2-good held; fails
K5   39a24a14623ee4f9ecd1caa068dfe0d1f49f46d4d965afbc5bce9ea299a7d0e5

K6, from V2-rel: predecessor's signature changed; invalid
K6   4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K7, from V2-rel: names F30, held; passes
K7   b1bdc7f03d1277924592bd4b7a2816e8a84233b44572eb7a796c429dba0aa93e

K8, from V2-rel: other held signature changed; invalid
K8   4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K9, from V2-rel: names V3-good, held; passes
K9   06b298e8a8a3d990ef6aa1069540362a058bc542ed17bdc9254f1d421492c14e

K10, from V3-rel: names V3-good, held; passes
K10  66e4aec0fd020ba1d911bbf300d8d6034aea3e43dd658f31a0c445fe3f52e5ee

K11, from V2-rel: V1-good under the observer-1 key; invalid
K11  4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K12, from V2-rel: chain of three, signature changed; invalid
K12  d7dab97bace7752ccbe9ed7d99591021a2eece45c125b2d923022ee21ae2c4ab

K13, from V2-rel: chain of three, V1-good absent; fails
K13  d7dab97bace7752ccbe9ed7d99591021a2eece45c125b2d923022ee21ae2c4ab

K14, from V2-rel: chain of three, all held; passes
K14  d7dab97bace7752ccbe9ed7d99591021a2eece45c125b2d923022ee21ae2c4ab

K15, K16, from V2-rel, V3-rel: predicate held not an object; invalid
K15  1094df61875f0dce09fbc40258307d9503132b91421c27c90de3e82630a9b5ce
K16  77ec7b9349e98f9c54c01ffc3981941019d6b59df011a6039e6ed2309f60bc27

K17 to K22, from V2-rel, V3-rel: relationships held malformed;
  invalid
K17  7767687021c5b2e6459e5cf3267b804306fd414987b23fda863961047e96df7e
K18  0f7bd6ab2fd159195f7bf0486d2b712494976baae5a98f3b9dbca83854bd970a
K19  d958e9d21d2100c168107018d50c08d6e0766e162d8769ef24737e4d7bd895ae
K20  da06b9567f39374c89e3f225a946c6c0503cd85b9209cbfe8587a4ae290b5c6e
K21  feaaeee4a0f8737f76ff3bcd0697f778a189572a75e80309e499a315eb486005
K22  151eb1cac4acede5eb26e7e008595997d879c29f1d24216fd5e408a4895f92a4

K23, K24, K25, from V2-rel: the same, named by no entry; invalid
K23  4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8
K24  4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8
K25  4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K26, from V2-rel: F120 held, named by no entry; invalid
K26  4f4d24aff9d1ae7f1f116e2075741617a783bb22fc1d4d7a944b3b0836f546b8

K27, from V2-good: V2-rel held, V1-good not; passes
K27  3e3b7d575b712ada2c813ee98fd3b0c80d788e2558444a34338510c9978fa47a

K28, from V2-rel: second supersedes, not held; fails
K28  25579db4807dd8cc2f296a6e2a9aa8afb888fdc1bbf30c468a9a37c3229d131c

K29, from V2-rel: corrects, target not held; passes
K29  d329f5d6d54c1f604010128749dcc9d2a555fa500e616e9e4e75b77d75d5a7a5

Second check of Section 3.5:

S1, from V3-good: ESCALATE decision and its executed outcome held;
  fails
S1   436fb6f6f19cecbd67df9f468556807eab5003ddb8eb60c8b9c2f708e3e9bb66

S2, from V3-good: V3-decision and V3-good held; passes
S2   436fb6f6f19cecbd67df9f468556807eab5003ddb8eb60c8b9c2f708e3e9bb66
]]></artwork></figure>
        <t>No vector separates the equation with the cofactor from the one without. F89 illustrates rejection despite the presence of evaluation evidence, but does not establish that a verifier enforces the second half of the rule of <xref target="evaluation-receipts"/>. F17 fails at the verdict check of Case 3 whatever its evidenceRefs hold and only illustrates that rule. V1-good and V2-rel decide different actions, and a DENY changes no state (<xref target="case-declined"/>), so K1 to K5 show only how the third check matches digests, not a sequence of states of one action (<xref target="case-approval"/>).</t>
        <t>F10 passes receipt verification and is refused by the relying party under <xref target="approvals-once"/>, with c1 under item 1, because item 2 makes ap2, a copy of ap with other metadata, the same approval. The proofbundle 6.4.0 command receives no consumption state, and its acceptance of F10 does not test consumption-state enforcement. <xref target="vectors"/> defines no consumption scope, so <xref target="sets"/> gives no result for F10; within one scope, V1-good and F10 would form a pair that its first check reports.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="changes">
      <name>Changes</name>
      <t>This section is to be removed before publication.</t>
      <section anchor="changes-from-08">
        <name>Changes from -08</name>
        <t>Each paragraph of this section describes one change from -08.</t>
        <t><xref target="vectors-failure"/> says again, as -07 did, that F38 is checked with the expected audience observer-2, which its receipt does not name. -08 said that every vector is checked with the expected audience observer-1, which does not match the test package.</t>
        <t><xref target="impl-oga"/> says again, as -07 did, that the earlier test package of revision -06 was not published; -08 left this out.</t>
        <t><xref target="mapping"/> says that every decision receipt names, in principal.id, the party on whose behalf the agent acted.</t>
        <t><xref target="adds"/> says that a record made after the interaction can name the decision by its content root, which is the same for every copy of the payload, and that this document does not require decisionId and validity.nonce to be unique beyond the exchange in which the decision is made.</t>
        <t><xref target="implementation-status"/> is shorter and keeps every implementation it names. Among the details it leaves out are, in <xref target="impl-proofbundle"/>, the file that holds the licence of proofbundle; in <xref target="impl-agent-guard"/>, the time window of an approval, the order of the signed ALLOW and the hook's record of its use, what the pilot writes into inputSnapshot, traceContext and actionOutcome, how a full record is rotated, the cases in which the service and the hook refuse, and the state at an earlier commit; in <xref target="impl-go"/>, how the Go verifier applies the preliminary checks of the third check of <xref target="sets"/>; and in <xref target="impl-ccf"/>, that the forms were registered twice with fresh keys, that the receipt of each accepted form verified with the key set that the service served, and where the twelve statements came from.</t>
        <t><xref target="impl-proofbundle"/> says that the decision verify and outcome verify commands of proofbundle check receipts of the predicate types of Section 1.2 and gives the exit codes they returned for the vectors, in place of saying that proofbundle covers those checks.</t>
        <t><xref target="impl-go"/> says that the verifier of the test package implements checks of the sections it names and that the test package shows its results for the vectors it holds, not that every condition of those sections is implemented.</t>
        <t><xref target="security-considerations"/> says, under Clocks, that validity.expiresAt, recordedAt and the times of an approval record are statements of their signer, which of them the checks of step 9 of <xref target="verify-decision"/> and of Case 1 compare, and that these checks do not show when a decision was made or when a person approved.</t>
        <t><xref target="security-considerations"/> says that vector V2-bad tests one of the payloads that step 4 refuses.</t>
        <t><xref target="vectors-statements"/> no longer prints the Statements of V2-good, V3-decision, V3-good and V3-bad, and <xref target="vectors-table"/> gives V1-good and V1-bad in full and names the other five vectors in <xref target="tab-vectors-a3"/>, with their expected results and the SHA-256 of their files in the test package.</t>
        <t><xref target="vectors-failure"/> summarizes F10 and ap2, describes c1 and identifies their files in the test package by SHA-256 in place of printed blocks, leaves out the explanation of items 1, 4 and 5 of <xref target="approvals-once"/> on the vectors, and lists the further vectors in <xref target="tab-vectors-further"/>, with the SHA-256 of each file, in place of four tables.</t>
        <t><xref target="vectors-failure"/> says that F19 to F71 were added for requirements that F1 to F18 leave without a vector, and that the requirements without a vector include, besides the six it names, the first check of <xref target="sets"/> and the conditions of item 6 of <xref target="approvals-once"/>.</t>
        <t>This appendix lists the changes from -08 before those from -07 and gives each change from -07 as one item of a list.</t>
        <t>The test package is the one of -08, unchanged.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="changes-from-07">
        <name>Changes from -07</name>
        <t>Each item of this list names one change from -07.</t>
        <ul spacing="compact">
          <li>Test package: vectors of -07 kept, new ones in expected-08.</li>
          <li><xref target="not-adds"/>, <xref target="verify-meaning"/>: a pass shows no authority at the time of the action.</li>
          <li><xref target="verify-inputs"/>: evidence named without its issuer.</li>
          <li><xref target="terms"/>, <xref target="verify-decision"/>, <xref target="sets"/>: three clarifications.</li>
          <li><xref target="sets"/>: predecessor lookup follows the chain only; K27.</li>
          <li>Step 8 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>: expected decisionMaker.id; F122.</li>
          <li><xref target="sets"/>: a failing entry of a predecessor at any depth fails the third check; K13.</li>
          <li>Step 3 of <xref target="verify-decision"/>: no cofactor, S below L; F123.</li>
          <li><xref target="sets"/>: each supersedes entry checked on its own.</li>
          <li><xref target="approvals-once"/>: re-release of a signed ALLOW is no new honouring.</li>
          <li><xref target="approvals-once"/>: a copy or new signature of a released signed ALLOW is no new honouring.</li>
          <li><xref target="sets"/>: the third check does not require a predecessor of the same action.</li>
          <li>Go verifier: names the step of <xref target="verify-outcome"/> where a held outcome receipt fails the preliminary checks of <xref target="sets"/>.</li>
          <li><xref target="vectors-failure"/>: adds V1-accept.</li>
          <li>Package README: forms of consumption state and copies.</li>
          <li>Package README: F95 to F125 in one range, shorter lines.</li>
          <li><xref target="sets"/>: first and second checks count receipts that pass the preliminary checks, also after expiry.</li>
          <li><xref target="privacy-considerations"/>: approver and principal.id may be pseudonymous.</li>
          <li><xref target="not-adds"/>, <xref target="observations"/>: <xref target="YOSSIF"/> as a possible source of evidence.</li>
          <li><xref target="not-adds"/> names <xref target="LIU"/> for the same limit of an approval record that an authorization server signs, and the cases of <xref target="DPS-RAR"/> that show it.</li>
          <li><xref target="related"/>: <xref target="RFC9396"/>; a receipt is no authorization grant.</li>
          <li><xref target="verify-meaning"/>: a decision maker can state unchecked authority in notChecked, as its own statement.</li>
          <li><xref target="not-adds"/>: no absence over a time window shown.</li>
          <li><xref target="impl-oga"/>: version, licence and link of dr_check.</li>
          <li><xref target="verify-cases"/>: checks of a case follow step 10.</li>
          <li><xref target="vectors-failure"/>: further requirements lack a vector.</li>
          <li><xref target="terms"/>: consumption state and further terms.</li>
          <li><xref target="verify-inputs"/>: the time T of a post-hoc Auditor.</li>
          <li><xref target="security-considerations"/>: only Ed25519 and SHA-256.</li>
          <li>Abstract: shorter, same statements.</li>
          <li><xref target="vectors-failure"/>: vectors without the revision adding them.</li>
          <li><xref target="case-declined"/>: verdict DENY or REFUSE.</li>
          <li><xref target="impl-go"/>: names the Go verifier.</li>
          <li><xref target="related"/>: paragraph on <xref target="KRAUSZ"/> in three sentences.</li>
          <li>Section 3.4, step 5: outcome-signing key named, same meaning.</li>
          <li>Section 3.3, Case 3: checks in the order they run.</li>
          <li>Section 3.8: other words, same meaning.</li>
          <li>Section 4: an approval in Case 1 covers one action and can be used once; Section 7: an ALLOW for one action must not be usable for another.</li>
          <li>Section 3: time comparison stated once; step 9 shorter.</li>
          <li>Appendix A.5: a vector need not cover each condition.</li>
          <li>Section 5.2: shorter, same observations.</li>
          <li>Section 3.5: held receipts and preliminary checks first.</li>
          <li>Section 3.8: every type defined in one place.</li>
          <li>Section 3.5, second check: any verdict other than ALLOW.</li>
          <li>Section 2.2: DENY and REFUSE treated alike.</li>
          <li>Test package: adds F124, V2-ref, F125, V3-late, K28, K29.</li>
          <li>Go verifier: second check of <xref target="sets"/>; S1 and S2.</li>
          <li><xref target="vectors-failure"/>: renamed, further vectors by group.</li>
          <li><xref target="vectors-table"/>: V3-bad fails at step 4 of Section 3.4.</li>
          <li>Appendix B of -08: changes from -07, with earlier changes listed in -07.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="changes-earlier">
        <name>Earlier Changes</name>
        <t>Appendix B of revision -07 of this document lists the changes made in revisions -01 to -07.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Toshikatsu Oga (The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.) checked the test vectors of several revisions with an implementation written from the text and reported places that read two ways.</t>
      <t>The author used AI tools to help draft this document and to generate and
cross-check its examples. The author reviewed the entire text and is responsible
for it.</t>
      <t>Citing adjacent work in the References does not imply that its authors endorse this
document.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
