SEAT Working Group K. Elekula Internet-Draft Intended status: Informational 15 November 2026 Expires: 19 May 2027 Interoperability, Security Evaluation, and Negative Testing for Attested TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 draft-elekula-seat-attested-tls-testing-01 Abstract This document defines a reproducible framework for interoperability testing, security evaluation, negative testing, and performance measurement of implementations that integrate remote attestation with TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3. The framework complements existing Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT) and Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) specifications. It defines evaluation profiles, test-vector requirements, deployment topology descriptions, decision-state observations, common result classifications, cross-implementation procedures, and security evaluation methods. The framework evaluates the boundaries between transport authentication, attestation capability negotiation, Evidence conveyance, appraisal, authorization, workload identity association, and protected application-data release. It additionally addresses reusable Attestation Results, connection-bound Evidence, cross-connection trust continuity, exporter-derived credentials, key custody, credential lifecycle, multi-Relying-Party isolation, proxy deployments, session resumption, early data, state drift, revocation, privacy, availability, and cryptographic agility. This document introduces a machine-readable evaluation model that connects individual protocol requirements to test vectors, implementation versions, observed results, and reproducible evidence. It does not define a new attestation protocol, Evidence format, TLS or DTLS extension, cryptographic key schedule, universal appraisal policy, or credential format. Protocol-specific behaviour remains governed by the exact specification revision under evaluation. A successful test demonstrates observed behaviour under declared conditions. It does not constitute a security certification or prove that a Target Environment is free from compromise. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 4.5. Evaluation State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.5.1. Transition Observability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.6. Trust-Continuity Lifecycle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.6.1. Trust-Continuity States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.6.2. Invalidation Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.6.3. Maximum Stale-Trust Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.17. Policy Consistency and Authorization Drift . . . . . . 6 6.18. Time, Clock and Freshness Integrity . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.19. Test Harness Integrity and Isolation . . . . . . . . . 7 6.20. Implementation Diversity and Environment Dependence . . 7 7.6. Machine-Readable Test Vector Model . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.6.1. Required Schema Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.6.2. Schema Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.6.3. Secret Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.7. Testbed Topology Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.8. Reproducible Test Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 8.11. ATTEST-EA-011: Exported Authenticator Completion and Directionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.12. ATTEST-BIND-012: Exporter Context Separation . . . . . 12 8.13. ATTEST-POLICY-013: Appraisal and Authorization Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.14. ATTEST-STATE-014: Runtime State Drift . . . . . . . . . 12 8.15. ATTEST-VERIFIER-015: Verifier and Trust-Anchor Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.16. ATTEST-MULTI-ENDPOINT-016: Distributed Credential Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.17. ATTEST-HARNESS-017: Evaluation Integrity . . . . . . . 14 9. Measurement and Reporting Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Statistical Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2. Resource Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.3. Availability and Failure Containment . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.4. Comparative Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11. Additional Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11.1. Security Claims and Evidence Quality . . . . . . . . . 15 11.2. Test Harness as a Security Boundary . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.3. Shared-Key Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.4. Privacy and Data Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.5. Security Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.5. Evaluation State Machine Implementations and test harnesses MUST distinguish the following evaluation states: * CONNECTION_INITIALIZED * TRANSPORT_NEGOTIATING * TRANSPORT_AUTHENTICATED * ATTESTATION_PENDING * EVIDENCE_RECEIVED * EVIDENCE_VALIDATED * APPRAISAL_COMPLETED * IDENTITY_ASSOCIATED * AUTHORIZATION_PENDING * AUTHORIZED * PROTECTED_ACCESS_ENABLED * RESTRICTED * REJECTED * REVOKED * TERMINATED These states describe an evaluation model. They do not prescribe a Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 new TLS or DTLS handshake. A test profile MUST specify which states apply and which transitions are permitted. A successful transport handshake MUST NOT automatically transition an implementation to AUTHORIZED or PROTECTED_ACCESS_ENABLED. Where attestation is mandatory for a protected operation: * Protected application operations MUST NOT be executed before the required authorization decision. * Failure to complete appraisal MUST NOT be interpreted as successful appraisal. * An invalid or unacceptable Attestation Result MUST NOT satisfy an authorization requirement. * A timeout MUST produce a documented policy outcome. * A failed attestation exchange MUST NOT silently become successful through an undocumented fallback. * An implementation MAY allow explicitly designated unprotected operations before attestation completes, provided the profile identifies those operations and their security implications. 4.5.1. Transition Observability Each test MUST identify the observable event corresponding to each relevant transition. Events SHOULD include: * Connection establishment. * Handshake completion. * Peer authentication completion. * Attestation request transmission. * Evidence reception. * Evidence validation. * Appraisal completion. * Identity association. * Authorization decision. * First protected application-data release. * Credential issuance. * Credential invalidation. * Connection termination. The evaluation MUST distinguish the time of an event from the time at which the test harness observed it. Instrumentation delay SHOULD be measured or bounded. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 4.6. Trust-Continuity Lifecycle Model Trust continuity extends the evaluation boundary beyond one transport connection. A test involving trust continuity MUST identify: * The original Attestation Connection. * The resulting Attestation Result or trust-continuity artifact. * The Target Environment to which the artifact applies. * The issuing and validating parties. * The intended Relying Party. * The intended serving endpoint or endpoint set. * The applicable appraisal and authorization policies. * The artifact's validity interval. * The invalidation mechanism. * The re-attestation conditions. 4.6.1. Trust-Continuity States The following abstract states SHOULD be recorded: * NOT_ESTABLISHED * ESTABLISHED * ACTIVE * EXPIRING * EXPIRED * REVOKED * INVALIDATED * REPLACED A protocol MAY use different internal states. The test report MUST map those states to the abstract evaluation model. 4.6.2. Invalidation Conditions Tests MUST independently examine the effects of: * Artifact expiration. * Explicit revocation. * Target Environment state change. * Workload identity change. * Serving endpoint reassignment. * Relying Party change. * Authorization policy change. * Trust-anchor change. * Key compromise. * Verifier compromise or loss of trust. A test MUST distinguish between invalidation of future connections Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 and enforcement on existing connections. The report MUST identify whether established connections are terminated, restricted, permitted to continue, or revalidated. 4.6.3. Maximum Stale-Trust Interval For each trust-continuity deployment, the test MUST report: * Time at which the invalidating event occurred. * Time at which the invalidation became available to the enforcement component. * Time at which the first subsequent connection was rejected or restricted. * Time at which all declared serving endpoints enforced the updated state. The maximum stale-trust interval MUST be reported. If the invalidation mechanism cannot establish a finite upper bound, the report MUST explicitly state that no finite bound was demonstrated. 6.17. Policy Consistency and Authorization Drift The evaluation MUST distinguish the version of the appraisal policy from the version of the authorization policy. Tests SHOULD include: * Appraisal succeeds but authorization fails. * Authorization policy changes after appraisal. * A cached result refers to an obsolete policy version. * Two serving endpoints apply different authorization policies. * A policy update occurs while connections remain active. * A policy service becomes unavailable. * A policy update removes previously authorized access. The report MUST identify which policy version produced each decision. 6.18. Time, Clock and Freshness Integrity Tests MUST document clock assumptions. The evaluation SHOULD include: * Clock skew between Attester, Verifier and Relying Party. * Clock rollback. * Unavailable time synchronization. * Expiration-boundary conditions. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 * Delayed revocation updates. * Stale cache timestamps. * Long-running connections crossing an artifact expiration boundary. Freshness MUST be evaluated according to the selected protocol and policy. A test harness MUST NOT silently substitute its local clock for the protocol-defined time source. 6.19. Test Harness Integrity and Isolation The test environment MUST distinguish test-harness failures from protocol failures. The harness SHOULD provide: * Isolated credentials and synthetic Evidence. * Controlled policy fixtures. * Deterministic fault injection. * Protected secret storage. * Test execution identifiers. * Versioned test definitions. * Independent observation of enforcement decisions. * Recovery and cleanup procedures. Test credentials MUST NOT be confused with production credentials. A failure in the test harness MUST NOT be classified as a protocol implementation failure without supporting evidence. 6.20. Implementation Diversity and Environment Dependence Cross-implementation tests SHOULD cover differences in: * Cryptographic providers. * Operating systems. * Hardware security boundaries. * Trusted Execution Environments. * Virtualized environments. * Container runtimes. * Certificate and credential libraries. * Verifier implementations. * Network transport characteristics. The report MUST identify dependencies that could affect the result. 7.6. Machine-Readable Test Vector Model A test vector MUST be representable in a machine-readable format. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 JSON is RECOMMENDED for the initial interchange representation. The following is an illustrative record: { "schema": "seat-evaluation-vector", "schema_version": "1.0", "vector": { "id": "ATTEST-BIND-001", "revision": "1", "profile": "A", "category": "connection-binding" }, "protocol": { "name": "TLS", "version": "1.3", "specification": "RFC9846", "attestation_specification": "declared-profile-reference" }, "topology": { "attester": "endpoint-A", "verifier": "verifier-A", "relying_party": "service-A", "serving_endpoint": "endpoint-B", "enforcement_point": "application-gateway" }, "trust_model": { "type": "background-check", "policy_id": "policy-001", "policy_version": "1" }, "binding": { "connection": "required", "endpoint": "required", "role": "required", "workload": "profile-dependent", "audience": "required" }, "attacker": { "capability": "capture-and-replay", "mutation": "reuse-evidence-on-new-connection" }, "expected": { "transport": "success", "attestation": "failure", "authorization": "denied", "protected_access": "blocked" }, "observed": { "transport": "pending", Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 "attestation": "pending", "authorization": "pending", "protected_access": "pending" }, "result": "NOT_TESTED" } The example contains no secret cryptographic material and is not a wire-protocol message. 7.6.1. Required Schema Fields Each record MUST identify: * Schema identifier and version. * Test-vector identifier and revision. * Protocol and protocol revision. * Evaluation profile. * Implementation names and versions. * Topology and component roles. * Trust model. * Policy identifiers and versions. * Required binding dimensions. * Attacker capabilities. * Mutation or test action. * Expected state transitions. * Observed state transitions. * Protected-data enforcement result. * Result classification. * Environment and execution metadata. * Evidence and trace references. * Deviations and limitations. 7.6.2. Schema Evolution A test-vector schema MUST have an explicit version. A schema change that alters interpretation MUST receive a new version. An implementation MUST NOT silently interpret an unknown mandatory field as though the field were absent. Unknown optional fields MAY be ignored if doing so does not change the security meaning of the test. 7.6.3. Secret Exclusion Test-vector records MUST NOT contain: Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 * Private keys. * TLS traffic secrets. * Exporter secret material. * Production credentials. * Raw confidential Evidence. * Protected application data. References to protected artifacts MAY be included using access-controlled identifiers. 7.7. Testbed Topology Description Each topology MUST describe the relevant components and their trust relationships. The topology SHOULD represent: * Attester. * Verifier. * Relying Party. * Attestation endpoint. * Application-serving endpoint. * TLS or DTLS termination points. * Proxy or gateway. * Workload boundary. * Policy service. * Trust-anchor source. * Credential storage. * Enforcement point. For each component, the topology MUST identify applicable capabilities: * Generate Evidence. * Validate Evidence. * Appraise Evidence. * Issue Attestation Results. * Store trust-continuity artifacts. * Possess private keys. * Derive cryptographic material. * Observe plaintext. * Terminate transport security. * Authorize protected operations. A topology MUST distinguish shared infrastructure from independently administered trust domains. 7.8. Reproducible Test Execution Every executed test MUST produce an execution record. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 The record MUST include: * Execution identifier. * Test-vector identifier and revision. * Start and completion timestamps. * Software and hardware environment. * Protocol revisions. * Configuration references. * Cryptographic provider and relevant algorithm selections. * Network conditions. * Fault-injection parameters. * Expected outcome. * Actual outcome. * Result classification. * Deviations. Where randomness is involved, a deterministic test seed MAY be recorded if the implementation and test procedure support reproducibility. Recording a seed MUST NOT require exposing secret random material or weakening production randomness. Tests MUST distinguish repeatable deterministic scenarios from stochastic performance experiments. 8.11. ATTEST-EA-011: Exported Authenticator Completion and Directionality Evaluate Exported Authenticator-based attestation under the selected TLS or DTLS profile. Test: * Valid authenticator request. * Correct certificate and signing key. * Incorrect certificate or signature. * Incorrect request context. * Incorrect direction. * Unrequested client authenticator. * Reused authenticator. * Missing or invalid Finished verification. * Delayed authenticator delivery. Expected results MUST follow RFC 9261 and the applicable SEAT specification. In particular, tests involving TLS client authentication MUST verify the server's handling of the client Finished message before it sends an Exported Authenticator or processes a received Exported Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 Authenticator, as required by RFC 9261. The test MUST identify which party generated, transmitted, validated and accepted the authenticator. 8.12. ATTEST-BIND-012: Exporter Context Separation For a protocol profile that uses TLS exporter material, test: * Correct exporter label. * Correct exporter context. * Incorrect context. * Changed context. * Incorrect output length. * Different negotiated cipher-suite hash. * Cross-connection substitution. * Cross-role substitution. * Cross-protocol substitution. Expected results MUST follow the selected protocol's specified exporter derivation. The framework MUST NOT impose a new exporter label or derivation algorithm. 8.13. ATTEST-POLICY-013: Appraisal and Authorization Separation Supply Evidence that successfully passes appraisal while deliberately failing the Relying Party's authorization policy. Expected: * Evidence appraisal is reported separately. * Authorization is denied. * Protected operations remain blocked. * The result report does not describe appraisal success as authorization success. * Repeat with successful appraisal and successful authorization as the positive control. 8.14. ATTEST-STATE-014: Runtime State Drift Establish a valid trust-continuity artifact. Change the Target Environment state while the artifact remains within its nominal validity interval. Evaluate: * Subsequent connection acceptance. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 * Existing connection behaviour. * Revocation propagation. * Re-attestation requirements. * Workload replacement. * Serving endpoint migration. Expected outcomes MUST follow the selected policy and protocol. The test MUST report the time between the state change and enforcement. 8.15. ATTEST-VERIFIER-015: Verifier and Trust-Anchor Failure Evaluate: * Unavailable Verifier. * Compromised test Verifier. * Invalid Attestation Result. * Untrusted signing authority. * Trust-anchor rotation. * Stale appraisal policy. * Revocation service failure. The report MUST identify whether the system fails closed, fails open, restricts access or defers authorization. A fail-open outcome MUST NOT be classified as successful mandatory attestation. 8.16. ATTEST-MULTI-ENDPOINT-016: Distributed Credential Consistency Establish a trust-continuity artifact for a declared set of serving endpoints. Test: * All endpoints accepting a valid artifact. * One endpoint retaining stale credentials. * Partial credential rollout. * One endpoint being revoked. * A new endpoint joining the deployment. * An endpoint being removed. * Inconsistent policy versions. Expected outcomes MUST reflect the declared artifact scope and invalidation model. The report MUST identify any endpoint that accepts a credential outside its intended scope. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 8.17. ATTEST-HARNESS-017: Evaluation Integrity Alter a test-vector definition after its original registration. Evaluate whether the test system can detect the change. Test modification of: * Expected outcomes. * Protocol revision. * Policy identifier. * Test mutation. * Execution metadata. * Result classification. Expected: the changed definition MUST be identifiable, and reports MUST distinguish the original test from the modified test. An integrity-protected test definition proves which definition was recorded; it does not independently prove that the implementation behaved correctly. 9. Measurement and Reporting Enhancements 9.1. Statistical Reporting Performance tests SHOULD report: * Sample count. * Median. * Mean where useful. * Minimum and maximum. * 90th percentile. * 95th percentile. * 99th percentile. * Variance or dispersion measure. * Measurement uncertainty. Where sample sizes support it, confidence intervals SHOULD be reported. The report MUST state the method used to calculate percentiles and confidence intervals. 9.2. Resource Consumption Measure where applicable: * CPU utilisation. * Memory consumption. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 * Storage consumption. * Network bytes transmitted. * Evidence size. * Attestation Result size. * Cryptographic operation count. * Verifier queue depth. * Concurrent connection capacity. * Power or energy consumption where measurable. 9.3. Availability and Failure Containment Measure: * Maximum concurrent attestation requests. * Queue exhaustion behaviour. * Recovery after Verifier outage. * Cache invalidation delay. * Credential reload time. * Recovery after endpoint failure. * Availability under controlled packet loss. * Resource consumption during negative testing. 9.4. Comparative Evaluation A comparison between two implementations MUST use equivalent: * Test profiles. * Policy requirements. * Hardware or documented hardware differences. * Network conditions. * Workloads. * Cryptographic algorithms. * Measurement boundaries. A performance improvement MUST NOT be presented as a security improvement unless the relevant security property is independently demonstrated. 11. Additional Security Considerations 11.1. Security Claims and Evidence Quality A test report MUST distinguish: * A cryptographically valid statement. * A successfully authenticated Evidence object. * A successfully appraised Target Environment. * A successful authorization decision. * An independently demonstrated implementation property. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 These are different claims and MUST NOT be conflated. 11.2. Test Harness as a Security Boundary The harness can itself become a source of false conclusions. An attacker or misconfigured operator may modify test definitions, suppress failed observations, substitute implementation versions or alter expected outcomes. Test definitions and reports SHOULD be integrity-protected and associated with their execution environment. 11.3. Shared-Key Attribution When a private key is accessible to more than one party, the test report MUST identify all parties that can use or reconstruct that key. A signature produced by a shared private key MUST NOT be interpreted as proof of exclusive authorship. 11.4. Privacy and Data Retention Test reports SHOULD use pseudonymous identifiers. Evidence and sensitive platform measurements SHOULD be retained only as necessary for the declared evaluation purpose. Public reports SHOULD exclude secret values, sensitive platform measurements and unnecessary identifying information. 11.5. Security Certification Passing the tests defined in this document does not establish that an implementation is universally secure. It establishes only the behaviours demonstrated under the declared profiles, conditions, test vectors and implementation versions. 12. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017. [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010. [RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H. and N. Modadugu, "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9147, April 2022. [RFC9261] Sullivan, N., "Exported Authenticators in TLS", RFC 9261, July 2022. [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., et al., "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, January 2023. [RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9846, July 2026. 13.2. Informative References [RFC9943] Birkholz, H., et al., "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, June 2026. [I-D.ietf-seat-use-cases] Mihalcea, I., Ed., "Security Goals and Use Cases for Integrating Remote Attestation with Secure Channel Protocols", draft-ietf-seat-use-cases-01, September 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.many-seat-architecture] Ritz, N., et al., "Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT) Architecture", draft-many-seat-architecture-01, October 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.fossati-seat-expat] Sardar, M. U., et al., "Remote Attestation with Exported Authenticators", draft-fossati-seat-expat-04, September 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.ritz-seat-proxies] Ritz, N., et al., "Bridging Remote Attestation with Secure Channel Protocol Proxies", draft-ritz-seat-proxies-00, July 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.usama-seat-intra-vs-post] Sardar, M. U., "Pre-, Intra- and Post-handshake Attestation", draft-usama-seat-intra-vs-post-04, July 2026, Work in Progress. Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Attested TLS Testing November 2026 [I-D.zhang-seat-selection] Zhang, J., et al., "Balancing Security and Deployability in the Selection of Attested TLS Protocol", draft-zhang-seat-selection-01, July 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.larraia-seat-forward-attestation] Larraia, E. and A. Tsukamoto, "Binding Attestation to Forward TLS Connections", draft-larraia-seat-forward-attestation-00, October 2026, Work in Progress. [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc9147bis] "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-rfc9147bis-02, July 2026, Work in Progress. Author's Address Kayode Oluwole Elekula Independent Researcher Lagos Nigeria Email: kayodeelekula@gmail.com Elekula Expires 19 May 2027 [Page 18]