<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
     version="3"
     ipr="trust200902"
     docName="draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility-00"
     category="std"
     submissionType="IETF"
     consensus="true"
     tocInclude="true"
     tocDepth="4"
     sortRefs="true"
     symRefs="true">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="OIDC Cryptographic Agility">Cryptographic Agility for OpenID Connect</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility-00"/>

    <author fullname="Breno de Medeiros" initials="B." surname="de Medeiros">
      <organization abbrev="Google">Google</organization>
      <address>
        <email>breno@google.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>OAuth Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>OpenID Connect</keyword>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword>
    <keyword>Cryptographic Agility</keyword>
    <keyword>JWKS</keyword>
    <keyword>JWS</keyword>
    <keyword>JWT</keyword>
    <keyword>Discovery</keyword>
    <keyword>Metadata</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>
        This specification defines mechanisms to improve cryptographic
        agility in OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 by enabling discovery and
        negotiation of JSON Web Token (JWT) signing algorithms between a
        client and an authorization server. It registers the
        <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
        metadata value in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata"
        registry established by RFC 8414, and registers the
        <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter in the IANA "OAuth
        Parameters" registry established by RFC 6749 for use in both
        authorization requests and <tt>jwks_uri</tt> retrieval requests.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
        OpenID Connect <xref target="OpenID.Core"/> and OAuth 2.0
        deployments rely on JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) <xref target="RFC7519"/>
        protected with JSON Web Signatures (JWS) <xref target="RFC7515"/> to
        convey identity assertions and security tokens. Over time,
        authorization servers and clients must transition between
        cryptographic signing algorithms to adopt stronger primitives or
        deprecate legacy algorithms.
      </t>
      <t>
        In existing deployments using OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
        Metadata <xref target="RFC8414"/> and OpenID Connect Discovery
        <xref target="OpenID.Discovery"/>, transitioning an authorization
        server's signing keys and algorithms presents operational and
        security challenges. In particular, it can be problematic to publish
        keys for multiple signing algorithms simultaneously in a single JSON
        Web Key (JWK) Set <xref target="RFC7517"/> document at the
        <tt>jwks_uri</tt> endpoint without an inline negotiation mechanism
        per request.
      </t>
      <section anchor="rationale">
        <name>Rationale and Best Practices</name>
        <t>
          This specification improves cryptographic agility by enabling
          explicit discovery and per-request negotiation of the cryptographic
          signing algorithm between a client and an authorization server. It
          upholds two best practices:
        </t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1">
          <li>
            <t>
              <strong>Separation of Keys by Security Assurance:</strong>
              Keys associated with different signing algorithms often carry
              varying levels of cryptographic strength, hardware protection,
              or operational security assurance. Partitioning the JWK Set
              response by the requested <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt>
              parameter ensures that keys with varying levels of security
              assurance are not mixed within the same trust document. A
              client requesting a specific signing algorithm retrieves only
              the verification keys corresponding to that algorithm and
              assurance level.
            </t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>
              <strong>Safe Upgrades for Clients with Brittle JWK Set
              Parsing:</strong> Historically, it has been observed that some
              deployed clients implement brittle logic when retrieving and
              parsing the JWK Set document from <tt>jwks_uri</tt>. For
              example, some client implementations might fail to parse the
              entire JWK Set if it contains an unrecognized key type (<tt>kty</tt>), curve (<tt>crv</tt>), or algorithm
              (<tt>alg</tt>), while others assume that only a single signing
              algorithm is present in the document. By establishing a
              convention where a parameterized <tt>jwks_uri</tt> request
              returns the key(s) matching the specified algorithm,
              authorization servers can safely introduce new signing
              algorithms without modifying the format of the default
              <tt>jwks_uri</tt> document returned, and without breaking
              existing clients.
            </t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>

      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Notation and Conventions</name>
        <t>
          The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
          "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
          NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
          "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
          "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
          are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/>
          <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
          capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>
          This specification uses the terms "Authorization Endpoint",
          "Authorization Request", "Authorization Server", "Client", and
          "Token Endpoint" defined by <xref target="RFC6749">OAuth 2.0</xref>;
          the terms "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and "JWK Set" defined by
          <xref target="RFC7517"/>; the term "JSON Web Signature (JWS)"
          defined by <xref target="RFC7515"/>; the term "JSON Web Token
          (JWT)" defined by <xref target="RFC7519"/>; and the term "ID
          Token" defined by <xref target="OpenID.Core">OpenID Connect Core
          1.0</xref>.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="metadata">
      <name>Authorization Server Metadata Extension</name>
      <t>
        This specification defines the following authorization server
        metadata parameter, which is registered in the IANA "OAuth
        Authorization Server Metadata" registry established in Section 7.1
        of <xref target="RFC8414"/>:
      </t>
      <dl newline="true" spacing="normal">
        <dt><tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>
            <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. JSON array containing a list of the JWS
            <xref target="RFC7515"/> signing algorithms (<tt>alg</tt> values)
            supported by the authorization server for signing JWTs
            <xref target="RFC7519"/> issued by the server (such as OpenID
            Connect ID Tokens <xref target="OpenID.Core"/>). The values in
            this list <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be pre-registered algorithm names
            from the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms"
            registry established by <xref target="RFC7518">JSON Web
            Algorithms (JWA)</xref> with an implementation requirement or
            usage of digital signature or MAC. The algorithm value
            <tt>none</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be included. If present,
            this array <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least one element.
          </t>
          <t>
            By convention, the first entry in the
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
            list is the default algorithm that the authorization server
            <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use when no <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt>
            parameter is specified by the client in the authorization
            request, unless the client has registered a different preference
            with the authorization server.
          </t>
          <t>
            An authorization server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> update the order of
            the algorithms in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>,
            thereby updating the default signing algorithm. To allow for
            smooth transitions, the authorization server
            <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> select as a new default an algorithm
            that was previously unlisted, and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> drop
            the former default algorithm completely when changing the
            default, instead leaving it as an optional algorithm (i.e.,
            listed not as the first option in the list) for some time after
            it stops being the default. The duration of time between
            publishing an algorithm and promoting it to the default, or to
            deprecate support for a former default algorithm, is not
            governed by this specification and should be guided by the
            application's context.
          </t>
        </dd>
      </dl>

      <t keepWithNext="true">
        The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Server
        Metadata document snippet advertising support for <tt>RS256</tt> as
        the default signing algorithm, along with <tt>ES256</tt> and the
        post-quantum signature algorithms <tt>ML-DSA-44</tt> and
        <tt>ML-DSA-87</tt> <xref target="RFC9964"/> as additional negotiable
        signing algorithms:
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "issuer": "https://server.example.com",
  "authorization_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/authorize",
  "token_endpoint": "https://server.example.com/token",
  "jwks_uri": "https://server.example.com/jwks.json",
  "response_types_supported": ["code", "id_token", "code id_token"],
  "authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported": [
    "RS256",
    "ES256",
    "ML-DSA-44",
    "ML-DSA-87"
  ]
}
]]></sourcecode>
    </section>

    <section anchor="jwt-signing-algorithm-param">
      <name>The <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> Parameter</name>
      <t>
        This specification defines the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> OAuth
        parameter and registers it in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry
        established by <xref target="RFC6749"/>. The parameter value
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a single case-sensitive string selected from
        the values advertised in the authorization server's
        <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
        metadata parameter.
      </t>
      <t>
        The <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter is available in two
        protocol locations:
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          The OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect Authorization Request (see
          <xref target="authz-request"/>).
        </li>
        <li>
          The <tt>jwks_uri</tt> JWK Set retrieval request (see
          <xref target="jwks-request"/>).
        </li>
      </ul>

      <section anchor="authz-request">
        <name>Usage in the Authorization Request</name>
        <t>
          When sending an authorization request to the authorization
          endpoint, a client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the
          <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter to request that the
          authorization server sign resulting JWTs (such as the ID Token
          returned from the authorization endpoint or token endpoint) using
          the specified algorithm:
        </t>
        <dl newline="true" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The JWS <tt>alg</tt> algorithm value
            that the client requests the authorization server to use when
            signing JWTs resulting from this authorization request. The
            value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of the values listed in the
            authorization server's published
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
            metadata.
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>
          Authorization server processing rules for the
          <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter in an authorization
          request are as follows:
        </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            If the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter is present and
            its value is listed in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>,
            the authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> sign the JWT(s)
            issued as a result of the authorization request (including any
            JWTs issued at the authorization endpoint or at the token
            endpoint when exchanging the resulting authorization code) using
            the requested algorithm.
          </li>
          <li>
            If the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter is omitted from
            the authorization request, the authorization server
            <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the first entry in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
            as the default signing algorithm, unless another algorithm has
            been configured for the client by out-of-band or dynamic
            registration means.
          </li>
          <li>
            If the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter is present more
            than once, or contains a value that is not supported by the
            authorization server (i.e., not present in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>),
            the authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request
            and return an <tt>invalid_request</tt> error response as
            specified in Section 4.1.2.1 of <xref target="RFC6749"/>.
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t keepWithNext="true">
          The following is a non-normative example of an authorization
          request (with line breaks for display purposes only) in which the
          client requests the <tt>ML-DSA-44</tt> signing algorithm:
        </t>
        <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
GET /authorize?
  response_type=code
  &scope=openid%20profile
  &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
  &state=af0ifjsldkj
  &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
  &jwt_signing_algorithm=ML-DSA-44 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>

      <section anchor="jwks-request">
        <name>Usage in the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> Retrieval Request</name>
        <t>
          When retrieving the authorization server's JWK Set document from
          the URL advertised in the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> metadata parameter, a
          client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the
          <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> query parameter in the HTTP
          <tt>GET</tt> request:
        </t>
        <dl newline="true" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. Query parameter added to the
            <tt>jwks_uri</tt> URL indicating the signing algorithm for which
            the client is requesting public verification keys. The value
            <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be selected from the values in the
            authorization server's published
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
            metadata. If the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> already contains query
            parameters, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> append
            <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> using standard
            <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt> query syntax per
            <xref target="RFC3986"/>.
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>
          Authorization server processing rules for <tt>jwks_uri</tt>
          requests are as follows:
        </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            When the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> query parameter is
            omitted from the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> request, the authorization
            server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return a JWK Set containing the
            signing keys corresponding to the first entry in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
            (the default signing algorithm), along with any applicable
            encryption keys as permitted by <xref target="RFC8414"/>. It is
            <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the authorization server exclude
            keys from signing algorithms other than the default, but it
            <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> continue to include signing keys for multiple
            signing algorithms if it previously did so. If including keys
            from multiple signing algorithms, the server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
            still exclude any signing algorithms other than the default.
          </li>
          <li>
            When the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> query parameter is
            present and matches one of the values in
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>,
            the authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return a JWK Set
            containing only the signing keys corresponding to the requested
            algorithm. Keys for other signing algorithms
            <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be included in the returned JWK Set.
          </li>
          <li>
            When the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> query parameter contains
            an unsupported or unrecognized algorithm value, the
            authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> respond with an HTTP
            <tt>400 Bad Request</tt> status code.
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t keepWithNext="true">
          The following is a non-normative example of a <tt>jwks_uri</tt>
          request specifying <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm=ML-DSA-44</tt>:
        </t>
        <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
GET /jwks.json?jwt_signing_algorithm=ML-DSA-44 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
]]></sourcecode>
        <t keepWithNext="true">
          The following is a non-normative example of the corresponding JWK
          Set response containing only <tt>ML-DSA-44</tt> signing keys (with
          the <tt>pub</tt> value abbreviated for readability):
        </t>
        <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "keys": [
    {
      "kty": "AKP",
      "use": "sig",
      "alg": "ML-DSA-44",
      "kid": "2026-mldsa44-key-1",
      "pub": "unH59k4Ru...DZgbTP07e7gEWzw4MFRrndjbDQ"
    }
  ]
}
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>

      <section anchor="algorithm-substitution">
        <name>Preventing Algorithm Substitution and Downgrade Attacks</name>
        <t>
          Because the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter in an
          authorization request is typically transmitted via front-channel
          browser redirection, an attacker capable of modifying URL query
          parameters in transit (for example, via an open redirector, browser
          history manipulation, or a malicious intermediary) might attempt to
          substitute or remove the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> parameter
          to force the use of a weaker signing algorithm than the client
          intended.
        </t>
        <t>
          Clients specifying an algorithm during authorization requests
          <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure that it cannot be substituted between
          the request and response via a URL modification by applying
          appropriate security measures.
        </t>
        <t>
          Specifically, when a client includes <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt>
          in an authorization request:
        </t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            The client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> cryptographically bind the
            requested <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> value to the user's
            local session state associated with the request, or
            cryptographically bind the selected algorithm to the
            <tt>state</tt> parameter sent in the authorization request.
          </li>
          <li>
            Upon receiving the authorization response (and any JWTs obtained
            from the authorization endpoint or token endpoint), the client
            <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> confirm that the <tt>alg</tt> header
            parameter of the received JWS matches the specific algorithm
            bound to that session or <tt>state</tt> value, rather than
            merely checking that the algorithm is in the server's supported
            list. If the <tt>alg</tt> header does not match the bound
            algorithm, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the JWT.
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>

      <section anchor="key-isolation">
        <name>Key Isolation Across Security Assurance Levels</name>
        <t>
          Mixing verification keys of different cryptographic strengths or
          security assurance levels within a single JWK Set document creates
          a risk that a compromise of a lower-assurance key or weaker
          algorithm could be used to forge tokens accepted by clients that
          intended to rely on a higher-assurance algorithm.
        </t>
        <t>
          To mitigate this risk, authorization servers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
          ensure that a <tt>jwks_uri</tt> response for a given
          <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt> contains only keys designated for
          that algorithm. When authorization servers indicate support for
          JWT algorithm selection via the metadata parameter
          <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>,
          clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> indicate their preferred algorithm
          during the authorization request (unless the preference is already
          otherwise registered with the authorization server) and
          <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> specify the <tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt>
          during the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> retrieval.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="tls-requirements">
        <name>Transport-Layer Security</name>
        <t>
          All requests to retrieve authorization server metadata and JWK Set
          documents from <tt>jwks_uri</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use TLS in
          accordance with Section 6.1 of <xref target="RFC8414"/> and
          <xref target="BCP195"/> to protect the integrity and authenticity
          of the discovered algorithms and public verification keys.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>

      <section anchor="iana-as-metadata">
        <name>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration</name>
        <t>
          This specification requests that IANA register the following value
          in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
          <xref target="IANA.OAuth.Parameters"/> established by
          <xref target="RFC8414"/>:
        </t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>Metadata Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <tt>authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported</tt>
          </dd>
          <dt>Metadata Description:</dt>
          <dd>
            JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing algorithms
            (<tt>alg</tt> values) from <xref target="RFC7518"/> supported by
            the authorization server for signing JWTs, where the first entry
            is the default algorithm used by the server when no algorithm
            parameter is specified.
          </dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt>
          <dd>IESG</dd>
          <dt>Specification Document(s):</dt>
          <dd><xref target="metadata"/> of this specification</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>

      <section anchor="iana-oauth-parameters">
        <name>OAuth Parameters Registration</name>
        <t>
          This specification requests that IANA register the following
          parameter in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry
          <xref target="IANA.OAuth.Parameters"/> established by
          <xref target="RFC6749"/>:
        </t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="compact">
          <dt>Parameter name:</dt>
          <dd><tt>jwt_signing_algorithm</tt></dd>
          <dt>Parameter usage location:</dt>
          <dd>authorization request, <tt>jwks_uri</tt> request</dd>
          <dt>Change controller:</dt>
          <dd>IESG</dd>
          <dt>Specification document(s):</dt>
          <dd>
            <xref target="jwt-signing-algorithm-param"/> of this
            specification
          </dd>
          <dt>Related information:</dt>
          <dd>None</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>

      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>

        <reference anchor="BCP195" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer"/>
            <author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="P. Saint-Andre"/>
            <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="T. Fossati"/>
            <date year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9325"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9325"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"/>
            <date year="1997" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="T. Berners-Lee"/>
            <author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="R. Fielding"/>
            <author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter"/>
            <date year="2005" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC6749" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="Hardt" fullname="D. Hardt" role="editor"/>
            <date year="2012" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC7515" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="J. Bradley"/>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="N. Sakimura"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC7518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC7519" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="J. Bradley"/>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="N. Sakimura"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"/>
            <date year="2017" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC8414" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="N. Sakimura"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="J. Bradley"/>
            <date year="2018" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
        </reference>
      </references>

      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>

        <reference anchor="IANA.OAuth.Parameters" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Parameters</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="OpenID.Core" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="Nat Sakimura"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"/>
            <author initials="B." surname="de Medeiros" fullname="Breno de Medeiros"/>
            <author initials="C." surname="Mortimore" fullname="Chuck Mortimore"/>
            <date year="2014" month="November" day="8"/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="OpenID.Discovery" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="Nat Sakimura"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"/>
            <author initials="E." surname="Jay" fullname="Edmund Jay"/>
            <date year="2014" month="November" day="8"/>
          </front>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC9964" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9964">
          <front>
            <title>ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Prorock" fullname="Michael Prorock"/>
            <author initials="O." surname="Steele" fullname="Orie Steele"/>
            <date year="2026" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9964"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9964"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
</rfc>
