Independent Submission S. Das Internet-Draft Independent Inventor Intended status: Informational 16 November 2026 Expires: 20 May 2027 Interoperable Execution-Finality Authority Across Heterogeneous Computing Platforms: Protected Effect Semantics, Cross-Device Authority Continuity, and Resource-Side Enforcement draft-das-cross-platform-finality-authority-00 Abstract Computation is not authority to act. An operating system may authenticate an application, a device may recognize a permission, a cloud service may accept a token, an AI agent may hold a tool credential and a remote application may receive a command, yet none of these facts shows that the consequential operation actually executed is still within the originating authority, scope, current policy and resource state. This document describes an informational architecture for preserving an equivalent protected authorization relationship across heterogeneous platforms such as Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Linux, cloud services, trusted hardware, edge devices and autonomous agents, whose native permission models and enforcement mechanisms differ. Qualified native evidence is translated into a protected canonical effect descriptor, scoped non-bearer enablement is created, and a receiving Finality Sink reconstructs the actual pending operation and enforces authority at a covered boundary. The document covers enforcement-capability qualification, cross-device ownership with source fencing, receipt-gated continuation, protected reauthorization, recovery and an honest account of what each mechanism can and cannot control. Source, Patent Basis and Notices Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615 ("Mothership"), filed 4 June 2026 and published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Where to read the full PCT filing: search "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in Technical Disclosure Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/. Technical source of this document: an Indian provisional specification titled "Systems and Methods for Cross-Platform Interoperable Execution-Finality Control, Protected Authority Continuity, and Consequence Enforcement Across Heterogeneous Operating Systems, Devices, and Autonomous Computing Environments", supplied as a 3,577-page document with 40 distinct numbered Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 embodiments and 60 claims, electronically signed 25 October 2026. The applicant identifies the application as 202631127058, filed 25 October 2026. The PDF text is not a certified Patent Office acknowledgment, so the number and date are applicant-identified and are not independently verified. See [[ipr]] and [[app-j]]. The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines. Human-Originated Invention: the underlying invention is attributed to the human inventor Sangam Kumar Das. AI-Assisted Technical Preparation: this text was prepared with AI assistance and may contain errors; identifiers, dates, standards references and product statements must be verified against primary sources. Non- Endorsement: this is an individual proposal, not an IETF standard; company and product references are prospective research environments only, and no adoption, endorsement, partnership, copying, infringement or implementation is asserted. Security Limitation: protection applies only to effect paths actually covered; no universal operating-system privilege, instantaneous cross-domain revocation, global exactly-once execution, complete physical safety or zero-latency validation is presumed. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Scope and Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Cross-Platform Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Heterogeneous Authorization Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Candidate Acts and Non-Effective State . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Source Authority and Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Platform-Specific Evidence Adapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. iOS, iPadOS and macOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.3. Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.4. Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.5. Cloud and embedded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. Canonical Effect Descriptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11. Enforcement-Capability Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 12. Protected Enforcement Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13. Scoped Finality Enablement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 14. Receiving-Platform Finality Sinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15. Authority Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 16. Cross-Device Ownership and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 17. Revocation and Offline Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 18. Common Workflow CW-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 19. Receipt-Gated Workflow CW-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 20. Reauthorization Workflow CW-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 21. Present-Day Implementability (CW-IMP-1) . . . . . . . . . . . 17 22. Tool Runtime and Agent Handoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 23. Hardware and Cloud Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 23.1. Application-level enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 23.2. Privileged OS service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 23.3. Managed device gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 23.4. Remote resource controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 23.5. Hardware security module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23.6. Secure element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23.7. TPM-backed authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 23.8. Confidential computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 23.9. Trusted execution environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 23.10. Protected virtual machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 23.11. Hardware command buffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 23.12. GPU or accelerator command control . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 23.13. Network egress controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 23.14. Secure display and user confirmation . . . . . . . . . . 24 23.15. Physical actuator controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 24. Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 25. Embodiment Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 25.1. Cluster A: Effect Conflict, Quorums and Cumulative Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 25.2. Cluster B: Receipts, Evidence and Outcome Truth . . . . 27 25.3. Cluster C: Semantic, Privacy and Resource Identity . . . 27 25.4. Cluster D: Authority Across Devices and Organizations . 28 25.5. Cluster E: Tool Execution, Sandboxes and Runtime Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 25.6. Cluster F: Recovery and Irreversible Effects . . . . . . 29 26. Worked Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 26.1. Example A: Android app requests an operation on a protected iOS-associated service. . . . . . . . . . . . 30 26.2. Example B: iOS task delegated to an Android device while authority stays bounded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 26.3. Example C: Windows cloud-management app requests a Linux server configuration change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 26.4. Example D: Agent migrates from phone to cloud with an unresolved financial transaction. . . . . . . . . . . . 32 26.5. Example E: Source device retains a credential after migration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 26.6. Example F: Tool permissions differ between providers though names match. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 26.7. Example G: Model-generated instruction exports a sensitive file to a redirected destination. . . . . . . . . . . . 33 26.8. Example H: Resource alias changes between approval and effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 26.9. Example I: App changes request parameters after approval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 26.10. Example J: Signed receipt falsely claims a remote effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 26.11. Example K: First bounded effect succeeded but independent receipt unavailable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 26.12. Example L: Human reauthorizes a changed action but a physical safety condition is unsatisfied. . . . . . . . 36 26.13. Example M: Credential broker protected while an alternate unrestricted key remains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 26.14. Example N: Disconnected device exercises stale authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 26.15. Example O: Two agents collectively exceed a protected budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 26.16. Example P: Tool update changes effect semantics mid-workflow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 26.17. Example Q: Physical command is irreversible and cannot safely be compensated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 27. Interoperability Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 28. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 29. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 30. Performance and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 31. Prior Art and Existing Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 32. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 33. Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 34. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 35. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Appendix A. Appendix A: Embodiments E1-E40 . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix B. Appendix B: Claims 1-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Appendix C. Appendix C: Architecture Flowcharts . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix D. Appendix D: Data Models and Pseudocode . . . . . . . 103 Appendix E. Appendix E: Threats and Negative Tests . . . . . . . 105 E.1. 1. Authenticated but unauthorized operation . . . . . . 105 E.2. 2. Source permission incorrectly translated . . . . . . 106 E.3. 3. Overbroad destination permission . . . . . . . . . . 107 E.4. 4. Native entitlement mistaken for final authority . . . 107 E.5. 5. Valid credential used on wrong target . . . . . . . . 108 E.6. 6. Malicious authorization adapter . . . . . . . . . . . 109 E.7. 7. Missing critical effect fields . . . . . . . . . . . 109 E.8. 8. Semantic mismatch between platforms . . . . . . . . . 110 E.9. 9. Invalid resource alias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 E.10. 10. Redirected destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 E.11. 11. Wrong effective principal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 E.12. 12. Delegation scope expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E.13. 13. Forged agent authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 E.14. 14. Agent self-reported success . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 E.15. 15. Untrusted tool-output instruction . . . . . . . . . 115 E.16. 16. Prompt injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 E.17. 17. Tool-runtime substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 E.18. 18. Changed executable generation . . . . . . . . . . . 117 E.19. 19. Stale model or algorithm fingerprint . . . . . . . . 118 E.20. 20. Incomplete enforcement coverage . . . . . . . . . . 118 E.21. 21. Observation-only interface misclassified as blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 E.22. 22. Alternate API bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 E.23. 23. Exported secret used outside broker . . . . . . . . 121 E.24. 24. Stale source device after migration . . . . . . . . 121 E.25. 25. Snapshot authority resurrection . . . . . . . . . . 122 E.26. 26. Duplicate cross-device execution . . . . . . . . . . 123 E.27. 27. Unverified source fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 E.28. 28. Destination-side weaker enforcement . . . . . . . . 124 E.29. 29. Cross-domain token replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 E.30. 30. Consumed authorization replay . . . . . . . . . . . 125 E.31. 31. Revocation epoch rollback . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 E.32. 32. Cached permission after revocation . . . . . . . . . 127 E.33. 33. Offline stale authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E.34. 34. Incorrect lease expiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 E.35. 35. Clock manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 E.36. 36. Conflicting resource owners . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 E.37. 37. Missing mandatory owner consent . . . . . . . . . . 130 E.38. 38. Resource quota oversubscription . . . . . . . . . . 131 E.39. 39. Concurrent effect conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 E.40. 40. Unauthorized tool-chain continuation . . . . . . . . 132 E.41. 41. Missing prior-effect receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 E.42. 42. Replayed Interim Effectuation Validator receipt . . 134 E.43. 43. Wrong validator identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 E.44. 44. Untrusted human approval interface . . . . . . . . . 135 E.45. 45. Changed actual operation after approval . . . . . . 136 E.46. 46. Credential rotation race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 E.47. 47. Secret-custody compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 E.48. 48. Policy update self-authorization . . . . . . . . . . 138 E.49. 49. Sandbox-to-host privilege transition . . . . . . . . 139 E.50. 50. Hardware command bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 E.51. 51. Device reset and queue replay . . . . . . . . . . . 140 E.52. 52. Privacy-budget overflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 E.53. 53. Misleading observer evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 E.54. 54. Forged remote-effect receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 E.55. 55. Lost acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 E.56. 56. Duplicate recovery execution . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 E.57. 57. Partial multi-resource effect . . . . . . . . . . . 144 E.58. 58. Unauthorized compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 E.59. 59. Irreversible unsafe operation . . . . . . . . . . . 145 E.60. 60. Unverified formal evidence closure . . . . . . . . . 146 Appendix F. Appendix F: Examiner Keywords and Search Phrases . . 147 Appendix G. Appendix G: Industry and Product Mapping . . . . . . 155 G.1. Apple (iOS, iPadOS, macOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 G.2. Google Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 G.3. Microsoft Windows and Azure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 G.4. Linux ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 G.5. Samsung, Qualcomm, MediaTek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 G.6. OpenAI Agents SDK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 G.7. Anthropic Claude Agent SDK and MCP . . . . . . . . . . . 157 G.8. Google ADK and A2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 G.9. Microsoft agent services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 G.10. AWS agent systems and AWS cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 G.11. Salesforce, IBM watsonx, Alibaba AgentScope . . . . . . . 158 G.12. Oracle, IBM Cloud and other clouds . . . . . . . . . . . 159 G.13. Arm, Intel, AMD, NVIDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 G.14. SAP, ServiceNow, Databricks, Snowflake . . . . . . . . . 160 G.15. Visa, Mastercard, Swift, payment processors . . . . . . . 160 G.16. Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, operators and Open RAN . . . . . 160 G.17. Siemens, Schneider Electric, industrial IoT and robotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Appendix H. Appendix H: Mothership Comparison . . . . . . . . . 161 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Appendix I. Appendix I: IPR and Research Lineage . . . . . . . . 163 Appendix J. Appendix J: Source Verification and Limitations . . 163 J.1. Source Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 J.2. Readiness Report and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 J.3. Self-Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 1. Introduction Interoperability between computing platforms is usually described as the ability to exchange data or requests. A different and harder question is whether two or more environments can preserve an equivalent protected authorization relationship for a consequential operation when their permission models, application isolation, hardware security, execution interfaces and trust assumptions differ. The architecture answers that question without assuming uniform kernels or identical security APIs. Heterogeneous platforms translate qualified authority into operation-specific effect semantics, and a participating resource boundary independently enforces those semantics. This document is understandable without reading the patent. Appendices map the mechanisms to the source specification and to examiner terminology; they are non-normative. 2. Problem Statement A native permission on one platform and a native permission on another with a similar name may not mean the same thing. A credential accepted by a cloud service says who is calling, not which operation is about to take effect. When an unfinished operation moves from a phone to a cloud service, copying its state does not tell anyone whether the old device is still able to act. When a tool is updated, its effect semantics may change while its name stays the same. These problems are about authority for actual effects, not about transport or authentication. The central question is how to keep protected authority meaningful across platforms, and how to say plainly where it stops. 3. Scope and Non-Goals Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * In scope: cross-platform effect semantics, adapters, canonical descriptors, enforcement-capability qualification, scoped non- bearer enablement, destination-side reconstruction, authority consumption, cross-device ownership and fencing, revocation and offline limits, three common workflows (CW-1, CW-2, CW-3), recovery, and 40 embodiment profiles. * Not in scope: a universal wire format; a claim of non- bypassability beyond covered paths; global exactly-once execution; instantaneous revocation; certification; performance numbers; conclusions on novelty, priority or validity. * General concepts of Candidate Acts, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domains, Finality Sinks, scoped effect authority, revocation, anti-replay and actual-effect evidence are earlier work of the same programme and are not presented as first invented by the 25 October filing ([REL-FOUND], [REL-AGENT], [REL-IEV], [REL-CBEA], [PCT-055615]). 4. Terminology BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] terms are used only where a requirement is intentionally stated. Candidate Act A proposed consequential operation held in a Non-Effective State. Canonical Effect Descriptor A versioned, typed representation of the material actual operation. Finality Sink The component at an actual resource boundary that reconstructs the pending operation and permits or withholds the effect. Scoped non-bearer finality enablement Operation-specific, sink-bound permission whose possession alone confers no authority. Enforcement Qualification Record A record of what a platform security mechanism can actually observe, block or consume. Authority epoch A monotonic generation used for ownership, revocation or policy. Source fencing Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Evidence or mechanism that prevents a previous owner from effecting the operation. 5. Cross-Platform Trust Model The foundational sequence is: originating authority, Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, heterogeneous evidence translation, protected canonical effect descriptor, independent protected validation, scoped non-bearer finality enablement, receiving Finality Sink reconstruction, current authority and coverage check, protected consumption, actual consequence, and qualified outcome evidence. See Figure 2. Source operating system Controls the request origin; can prove what it observes, not what a remote sink will do. Adapter Translates native evidence; must itself be qualified; can mistranslate. Protected Enforcement Domain Holds authority, policy, revocation and consumption state; trusted only within its stated environment. Finality Sink Controls the effect at its boundary; cannot control paths it does not cover. Outcome observer Provides evidence within its observation capability. An unauthorized action can still bypass the architecture through any effect path that does not pass a covered sink, through a compromised privileged host, or through a credential copy outside the broker. The draft therefore ties every assurance to the component that can provide it. 6. Heterogeneous Authorization Semantics Platform permission names are not treated as semantically equivalent. An adapter produces an effect-specific claim and records whether the claim is equivalent to, narrower than, or incompatible with the canonical semantics (Figure 6). A native entitlement is advice; it is not final authority for an operation. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Syntactic interoperability (the fields parse) differs from semantic equivalence (the operation means the same). The former never implies the latter. 7. Candidate Acts and Non-Effective State A Candidate Act identifies the proposed operation and binds its action class, resource, destination, parameters, source authority and effect constraints. The Non-Effective State keeps the consequence from taking effect while conditions remain unsatisfied. Forms include protected queues, withheld credentials, uncommitted transactions and isolated command buffers. A simulated hold is insufficient if another effective route remains available. Where mandatory enforcement is unavailable, the defined condition is non- effective, not silently weakened. 8. Source Authority and Delegation The original authority, principal, delegated scope and restrictions are recorded. Delegation across providers keeps a cryptographic lineage in which scope can only narrow (Figure 12). A forged or expanded delegation fails lineage verification. Source authentication is not the same as actual effect authority. Embodiments E7, E28 and E29 address delegation continuity, transitive attenuation and approval quorums. 9. Platform-Specific Evidence Adapters Adapters translate qualified native-platform security information into the protected common representation. For each platform below, the table-like list states what established controls provide, what additional binding is needed, and what is not assumed. 9.1. Android Established native controls Application UID isolation, app permissions, Keystore and hardware- backed keys, StrongBox where available, managed/enterprise device services, app-controlled tool dispatchers, server-side resource enforcement, authorised accessibility interfaces, device state and security updates. Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Native permissions describe what an app may ask the platform to do; they do not describe the specific consequential operation. A binding of permission, operation-specific canonical descriptor and a resource-side check is needed. Not assumed An ordinary Android application has no unrestricted system-wide mediation; enforcement is limited to effects routed through the app dispatcher or a participating resource-side gateway. 9.2. iOS, iPadOS and macOS Established native controls App sandbox, entitlements, Keychain, Secure Enclave, app- controlled effectuation, system-approved extensions, managed apps or enterprise interfaces, server-side enforcement, app-to-app and device-to-device communication, current platform security state. Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority The same operation-specific binding is needed; platform identity of the app is not authority for a particular effect. Not assumed No private kernel hooks, no universal app interception and no access to other apps credentials are assumed. 9.3. Windows Established native controls Process and service identities, AppContainer and isolation mechanisms, security principals, credential protection, TPM-backed keys, protected service brokers, endpoint management, privileged execution interfaces. Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority A broker or service can hold authority, but binding it to the exact pending effect and to a revocation generation is an addition. Not assumed Security principals do not by themselves limit what an authorised principal does with a credential it can export. 9.4. Linux Established native controls Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Process credentials, namespaces, LSMs, seccomp, capabilities, cgroups, containers, hardware-backed keys, service-mesh and workload identity, privileged resource controllers. Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority Kernel controls restrict processes; they do not know an operation- level canonical effect. A resource controller or sink must reconstruct the operation. Not assumed Application-level code cannot independently resist a fully compromised kernel. 9.5. Cloud and embedded Established native controls Cloud IAM, resource-native API authorization, managed identity, confidential computing, HSM/KMS, secure and measured boot, device command controllers, firmware security, trusted peripherals, remote attestation, resource-gateway enforcement. Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority Cloud IAM authorizes API principals; the additional binding is operation-specific, sink-reconstructed and consumed once under protected state. Not assumed Where a direct credential path to the resource remains, a gateway does not control the effect. 10. Canonical Effect Descriptors The Canonical Effect Descriptor is versioned and typed. Candidate fields: descriptor version; original operation and Candidate Act identifiers; originating principal; requesting workload; source and receiving platform; parent task; delegation chain; effect class; effective resource identity; destination or beneficiary; material parameters; allowed transformations; source authority; scope; policy, revocation and resource generations; designated Finality Sink; required evidence; enforcement-coverage reference; validity conditions; protected usage conditions. Mandatory fields depend on the effect; not every application carries all fields. Canonicalization must address Unicode normalization, binary addresses, object ordering, numeric precision, timestamps, resource aliases, URL normalization, redirects, nested operations, unknown Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 critical fields, schema evolution, units, localized strings and application-specific semantics. Unknown critical fields cause rejection. A valid hash of an incorrectly built descriptor does not prove the actual operation has the intended meaning (Figure 7). Illustrative JSON (not a mandatory encoding): { "v": 1, "op": "op-7f3a", "candidate_act": "ca-19", "effect_class": "payment.transfer", "resource": "acct:EXAMPLE-1", "beneficiary": "acct:EXAMPLE-2", "params": {"amount": "100.00", "ccy": "EUR"}, "source_platform": "android", "recv_platform": "linux", "authority_gen": 12, "revocation_gen": 4, "sink": "sink-pay-01", "critical": ["resource","beneficiary","params"] } Figure 1: Illustrative canonical effect descriptor 11. Enforcement-Capability Qualification A security mechanism may provide authentication, authorization advice, logging, observation, notification, isolation, revocation notification, restricted credential use, operation-specific blocking, actual resource-side refusal, protected authority consumption or trusted state verification. These capabilities are not interchangeable. A monitoring API is not a blocking interface because its name contains security; a sandbox does not control an external service that accepts the agent's credentials; a credential broker does not control other copies of credentials (Figure 8, Figure 9). An Enforcement Qualification Record contains: platform; security component; controlled resource; operation class; available observation; ability to block; current component generation; required trust assumption; known alternate effect routes; qualification status; and the event that requires revalidation. Status values are qualified, partially qualified, unresolved and disqualified. Where mandatory blocking is unavailable, the options are to move enforcement to a participating resource-side gateway, to restrict supported effects, or to withhold the protected operation. The claimed protection property is not silently weakened. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 12. Protected Enforcement Domains The Protected Enforcement Domain maintains applicable authority, evidence, policy versions, revocation, consumption counters and technical conditions. An Extended Verification Module Interface supports optional checks on semantic identity, privacy, conflicts, device state, resource limits, evidence, delegation or prior-effect dependencies. A Protected Authority Controller creates, derives or activates scoped finality enablement; a Finality Gate combines mandatory predicates. Domain separation is by control, not by location alone. 13. Scoped Finality Enablement Enablement is operation-specific, sink-bound and non-bearer: possessing it does not authorize arbitrary use (Figure 13). It is bound to the descriptor, the designated sink, current generations and a protected usage condition. A sink that cannot verify the binding refuses. Local authority and the destination sink are distinct (Figure 10). A credential broker can hold the credential, but downstream enforcement must still check the operation (Figure 11). 14. Receiving-Platform Finality Sinks The sink independently obtains or reconstructs the actual pending operation, checks its correspondence to the descriptor and to current sink-local state, and permits or withholds the effect through a controlled enforcement boundary. A sink that only logs is not a sink. A sink controls only effects that pass through it; effect-path discovery and a coverage controller report which routes are covered. 15. Authority Consumption Authorization is consumed under protected monotonic state (Figure 15). A crash between consumption and effect leaves the outcome indeterminate; it is recorded as unknown and is not blindly retried. Authority and revocation epochs are checked at effect time (Figure 14). Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 16. Cross-Device Ownership and Migration The stages are: identify the unfinished operation; establish the current source owner; authenticate the target; verify eligibility; determine effect-capable source routes; prepare transferable computational context; distinguish computational state from finality authority; establish a protected ownership-transition generation; verify source fencing; reconstruct the destination effect scope; establish destination-specific protected authority; verify the actual pending operation at the destination; prevent stale source effectuation; preserve consumed or unresolved effect state; reconcile partial migration failure (Figure 16, Figure 17). Negative scenarios include a suspended or disconnected source, both sides active, snapshot restoration reviving an old worker, a source that retains an API credential, a hardware queue that remains executable, weaker destination trust, an effect before transfer completes, revocation during transfer, a delayed callback to the source, destination retry of an unresolved operation, and accidental merging of two pending operations. Invariant: no duplicated, unauthorized execution authority may arise merely from copying or restoring computational state. Instant global revocation across disconnected devices is not assumed. 17. Revocation and Offline Operation Revocation propagates across domains and invalidates dependent authority; offline authority is bounded by explicit leases and clock uncertainty (Figure 18). Cached permission after revocation, epoch rollback and incorrect lease expiry are threats listed in Appendix E. Delayed revocation is a stated limitation, not a solved problem. 18. Common Workflow CW-1 CW-1 is the modular protected architecture with actual-operation reconstruction, independent protected authority, non-bypassable consequence enforcement and optional advanced mechanisms. Components: Requesting Computational Entity (constructs requests, holds no finality authority automatically); Candidate Act Constructor; Non-Effective Holding Mechanism; Protected Enforcement Domain; Extended Verification Module Interface; Protected Authority Controller; Finality Gate; Finality Sink; Protected State and Evidence Store; Optional Effect Observer; Optional Interim Effectuation Validator; Effectuation-Path Coverage Controller. No implementation need contain every optional module. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 19. Receipt-Gated Workflow CW-2 CW-2 divides an operation into bounded phases. The first phase is independently authorized; a bounded real effect occurs through a participating sink; qualified evidence is obtained; an authorized Interim Effectuation Validator evaluates it; the accepted receipt becomes a required causal condition for the next phase; the successor sink independently checks the receipt-dependent authority. Missing, stale, replayed, unqualified or contradicted evidence does not enable the successor effect (Figure 19, Figure 20). * A test simulation is not a real first effect. * A tool-generated success message is not automatically qualified evidence. * A signed receipt is not automatically true outside the signer's observation capability. * A validator need not relay the original command and is not an unrestricted credential. * Receipts bind to phase, sink, operation, state and authority context. * CW-2 is optional where continuation does not need a receipt. 20. Reauthorization Workflow CW-3 CW-3 covers original task scope, cumulative actual effect, material scope deviation, independent security signals, false positives, conflicting evidence, risk-adaptive suspension, reauthorization eligibility, the exact changed consequence, human or authorized automated approval, protected authority generation, current policy and revocation, limited renewed authority, sink-side verification, repeated deviations, recovery and audit (Figure 21). A human approval or automated reauthorization cannot override unrelated mandatory protections: approval to continue a robotic operation does not establish physical safety, actuator identity or valid prior-effect evidence. An approval screen, a confirmation prompt or an alert acknowledgment is insufficient unless the resulting permission is bound to the actual effect. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 21. Present-Day Implementability (CW-IMP-1) The source's supplementary implementation material (CW-IMP-1) explains how existing technologies can support selected functions: protected application dispatchers, credential brokers, secure enclaves, TEEs, HSMs, secure elements, transactional databases, authenticated receipts, hardware command gates, server-side resource controllers, attestation services, runtime policy engines, monotonic state, recovery journals, isolated services and protected device communication. These provide building blocks; the additional enforcement relationships (operation reconstruction at the sink, operation-bound enablement, source fencing) are what the architecture adds. For every assurance, the component able to provide it is named in Appendix D and in the mechanism list in Section 23. Application code cannot resist a fully compromised kernel; an iOS app has no arbitrary system-wide interception; an Android app cannot mediate all device or app operations; cross-platform non-bypassability is not claimed unless all relevant paths are controlled. 22. Tool Runtime and Agent Handoff Tool installation, update and runtime changes are consequential transitions: authority bound to a prior generation does not carry over without revalidation (Figure 24). Tool outputs are data, not instruction authority. Cross-provider handoff keeps delegation lineage; moving agent context does not move effect authority. Nested tool invocation attenuates authority. Embodiments E10, E20, E24, E25, E26, E27, E28 and E34 apply. Tool names that look equivalent may carry different permissions or effects; compatibility is validated per contract version before authority is accepted. 23. Hardware and Cloud Enforcement For each enforcement alternative the entries state: effects it can control; what an attacker can bypass; whether protected state survives crashes; whether it can prevent replay; whether it can verify current revocation; whether authority is transferable; whether it can attest its enforcement generation; and what happens when it is unavailable. Not every implementation is hardware-rooted, and software-only separation from a fully compromised privileged host is not claimed. 23.1. Application-level enforcement Effects it can control Only effects routed through the application dispatcher. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Attacker bypass A compromised or modified application, or any direct credential path. State survives crashes Only if the application journals durably. Prevents replay Only with a durable counter. Verifies current revocation Only by querying a service. Authority transferable Only by explicit transfer protocol. Attests its enforcement generation No, unless backed by an attestable component. If unavailable Effects through the dispatcher stop; other paths are unaffected. 23.2. Privileged OS service Effects it can control Effects mediated by the service on that host. Attacker bypass A compromised kernel or direct driver access. State survives crashes Depends on service storage. Prevents replay Yes, if state is monotonic. Verifies current revocation If it can reach the revocation source. Authority transferable Not inherently. Attests its enforcement generation Possible with platform attestation. If unavailable Mediated effects stop; the rest is outside control. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 23.3. Managed device gateway Effects it can control Effects of managed devices routed through it. Attacker bypass Unmanaged devices and alternate networks. State survives crashes Yes if stored in the gateway. Prevents replay Yes. Verifies current revocation Yes when online. Authority transferable Gateway-held authority can be moved. Attests its enforcement generation Partly. If unavailable Managed effects stop; others unaffected. 23.4. Remote resource controller Effects it can control Effects at the resource it fronts. Attacker bypass Paths to the resource that bypass the controller. State survives crashes Yes if transactional. Prevents replay Yes. Verifies current revocation Yes when it can reach revocation state. Authority transferable Resource-bound, not transferable. Attests its enforcement generation Possible. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 If unavailable The resource refuses by default; availability falls. 23.5. Hardware security module Effects it can control Cryptographic operations it holds keys for. Attacker bypass Effects outside the key use. State survives crashes Yes, in the module. Prevents replay Via monotonic counters. Verifies current revocation Not by itself. Authority transferable Keys may be non-transferable. Attests its enforcement generation Yes. If unavailable Key use stops. 23.6. Secure element Effects it can control Operations the element signs or authorizes. Attacker bypass Everything not routed through it. State survives crashes Yes. Prevents replay Via counters. Verifies current revocation Not by itself. Authority transferable Typically bound to a device. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Attests its enforcement generation Yes. If unavailable Key use stops. 23.7. TPM-backed authority Effects it can control Operations needing keys sealed to platform state. Attacker bypass Effects not gated by those keys. State survives crashes Yes for sealed state. Prevents replay Via counters. Verifies current revocation No. Authority transferable Bound to platform. Attests its enforcement generation Yes (measured state). If unavailable Sealed secrets become unusable. 23.8. Confidential computing Effects it can control Computation inside the protected environment. Attacker bypass Effects emitted after leaving it. State survives crashes Depends on storage design. Prevents replay Possible. Verifies current revocation Not by itself. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Authority transferable Depends. Attests its enforcement generation Yes, for the environment. If unavailable Environment attestation fails closed. 23.9. Trusted execution environment Effects it can control Operations run in the trusted world. Attacker bypass The normal world and unrelated paths. State survives crashes Depends. Prevents replay Possible. Verifies current revocation Not by itself. Authority transferable Depends. Attests its enforcement generation Yes. If unavailable Trusted operations stop. 23.10. Protected virtual machine Effects it can control Effects the VM boundary mediates. Attacker bypass Host-level compromise and paths outside the VM. State survives crashes Depends. Prevents replay Possible. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Verifies current revocation Not by itself. Authority transferable Migration needs fencing. Attests its enforcement generation Depends. If unavailable VM-mediated effects stop. 23.11. Hardware command buffer Effects it can control Queued device commands. Attacker bypass Direct register or alternate queue access. State survives crashes Depends on device. Prevents replay Depends. Verifies current revocation No. Authority transferable Not transferable. Attests its enforcement generation Device-dependent. If unavailable Queued commands are withheld. 23.12. GPU or accelerator command control Effects it can control Commands through the controlled queue. Attacker bypass Alternate queues or drivers. State survives crashes Depends. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Prevents replay Depends. Verifies current revocation No. Authority transferable No. Attests its enforcement generation Device-dependent. If unavailable Controlled commands stop. 23.13. Network egress controller Effects it can control Traffic crossing the egress point. Attacker bypass Alternate egress paths. State survives crashes Depends. Prevents replay Yes for counters. Verifies current revocation Yes if connected. Authority transferable Not transferable. Attests its enforcement generation Possible. If unavailable Egress blocks; connectivity falls. 23.14. Secure display and user confirmation Effects it can control What the user sees and confirms. Attacker bypass Differences between displayed and executed operation. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 State survives crashes N/A. Prevents replay Single-use confirmation tokens. Verifies current revocation N/A. Authority transferable No. Attests its enforcement generation Platform dependent. If unavailable No confirmation, no operation. 23.15. Physical actuator controller Effects it can control Commands to the actuator. Attacker bypass Direct wiring or an uncontrolled controller. State survives crashes Yes if non-volatile. Prevents replay Yes. Verifies current revocation No. Authority transferable No. Attests its enforcement generation Possible. If unavailable Actuation withheld; safety state must be defined separately. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 24. Failure and Recovery Unknown completion stays unknown. Replay of consumed authority is refused. Recovery is a new Candidate Act with its own authority; compensation is separately authorized. Partial multi-resource effects are contained and reconciled without promising atomicity (Figure 26, Figure 31). Irreversible effects are checked for hazard before effect and, if unsafe, contained (Figure 27). Evidence from a possibly compromised observer is checked by independent attestation (Figure 28). 25. Embodiment Clusters Six clusters group the embodiments. Embodiment numbering E1 to E40 follows the source; the second full section labelled Embodiment 31 is a repeated version, not a forty-first embodiment (Appendix J). 25.1. Cluster A: Effect Conflict, Quorums and Cumulative Resources Embodiments: E1, E5, E11, E13, E22, E29. A quorum approval is not automatically authority to execute. A resource fairness decision is not automatically a valid execution capability. Individually permissible operations may become impermissible when jointly applied; examples are cloud resource allocation, network reconfiguration and payment budgets. * E1: Protected cross-agent effect-conflict arbitration with atomic reservations and sink-bound fencing * E5: Cryptographically verifiable, assistant-neutral resource allocation and protected eligible-demand completeness * E11: Concurrent-effect reconciliation, version-bound reservations and sink-local commit validation * E13: Multi-agent consensus, quorum integrity and non-delegable finality authorization * E22: Multi-resource budgets, delegated quotas and cumulative consequential limits * E29: Independent approval quorums and protected consensus-to- effect separation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 25.2. Cluster B: Receipts, Evidence and Outcome Truth Embodiments: E2, E4, E15, E16, E38, E40. A signature is not truth, and a dispatch acknowledgment is not actual completion. Independent validator identity, observation coverage, consumed authorization and indeterminate outcomes must each be represented. * E2: Identity-bound Interim Effectuation Validation and receipt- constituted causal continuation * E4: Cross-domain actual-consequence witnessing and qualified remote-effect evidence * E15: Cross-domain evidence commitments, non-bearer authority and sink-local monotonic consumption * E16: Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling * E38: Evidence integrity, compromised observers and independent attestation reconstruction * E40: End-to-end effect provenance, protected authority consumption, cross-embodiment closure and formal verification 25.3. Cluster C: Semantic, Privacy and Resource Identity Embodiments: E3, E6, E8, E19, E21, E24, E32, E34. The visible object, the named tool and the identifier may not identify the actual effective resource after rebinding, redirect or contract change. Human approval is meaningful only when bound to the actual operation. * E3: User-referenced semantic object correspondence and authenticated presentation-state binding * E6: Semantic action-contract evolution and effect-compatibility validation * E8: Correlation-aware cumulative privacy exposure and compositional disclosure constraints * E19: Computer-use and transaction-bound human-approval finality Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E21: Actual resource identity, aliases, redirects and dynamic namespace rebinding * E24: Tool-output and instruction provenance through model-driven execution * E32: Data, memory and persistent-knowledge provenance across agent sessions * E34: Tool and resource identity continuity across dynamic service discovery 25.4. Cluster D: Authority Across Devices and Organizations Embodiments: E7, E9, E17, E18, E27, E30, E31, E35, E39. Moving computational state does not establish transfer of effect authority. Loss of source-device communication does not prove the source has been fenced. Offline validity and delayed revocation must be explicit. * E7: Cross-provider delegated agent authority continuity and cryptographic delegation lineage * E9: Cross-device execution-authority ownership, hardware epochs and source fencing * E17: Temporal authority, lease expiration, clock uncertainty and delayed-effect control * E18: Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation * E27: Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non- resurrectable in-flight effects * E30: Resource-owner changes, competing administrative authority and revocation races * E31: Credential and administrative authority rotation, protected key custody and generation fencing * E35: Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation * E39: Conflicting policies and authority precedence among multiple principals and resource owners Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 25.5. Cluster E: Tool Execution, Sandboxes and Runtime Changes Embodiments: E10, E14, E20, E23, E25, E26, E28, E33. Blocking one API route does not prevent an independent direct- credential route. Runtime or policy changes require mandatory revalidation, and a tool output is not an instruction authority. * E10: Model, algorithm and runtime-generation drift with effectuation-time revalidation * E14: Effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection and enforcement-coverage revalidation * E20: Multi-step tool-chain and workflow dependency-bound execution authority * E23: Credential and secret-use finality with non-exportable broker-controlled authority * E25: Agent sandbox privilege transitions and consequential operations escaping sandbox boundaries * E26: Tool installation, updates and runtime lifecycle authority continuity * E28: Nested multi-agent tool invocation chains and transitive authority attenuation * E33: Policy and configuration evolution, dependency impact and non-self-authorizing mutations 25.6. Cluster F: Recovery and Irreversible Effects Embodiments: E12, E16, E18, E27, E35, E36, E37. Unknown completion, replay and partial multi-resource effects must stay visible. Compensation is a separately authorized Candidate Act. No universal rollback or distributed atomicity is promised. * E12: Autonomous recovery, compensating effects and non-replayable recovery authority * E16: Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling * E18: Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E27: Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non- resurrectable in-flight effects * E35: Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation * E36: Multi-resource transactions, partial commits and independently authorized compensation * E37: Irreversible effects, consequence-bound hazard checks and non-compensable operation containment 26. Worked Examples The 17 worked examples follow the chain: original authority, Candidate Act, platform-native inputs, canonical effect, protected verification, destination Finality Sink, outcome evidence, failure and recovery. They are illustrations, not test results. 26.1. Example A: Android app requests an operation on a protected iOS- associated service. Original authority Android app permission; user intent Candidate Act Candidate Act held non-effective Platform-native inputs Android UID and Keystore evidence Canonical effect Canonical descriptor: service, resource, parameters Protected verification Descriptor validated; scoped enablement Destination Finality Sink iOS-side sink reconstructs request and consumes enablement Outcome evidence Sink-side evidence of the effect Failure and recovery If the sink cannot reconstruct: refuse; unknown outcome stays UNRESOLVED Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 26.2. Example B: iOS task delegated to an Android device while authority stays bounded. Original authority iOS user authority Candidate Act Candidate Act at the delegate Platform-native inputs Delegation lineage Canonical effect Descriptor with attenuated scope Protected verification Lineage verified Destination Finality Sink Android sink checks bounded scope Outcome evidence Receipt Failure and recovery Scope expansion: refuse 26.3. Example C: Windows cloud-management app requests a Linux server configuration change. Original authority Windows service identity Candidate Act Config change Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Principal and device evidence Canonical effect Descriptor: host, file, diff Protected verification Policy and revocation checked Destination Finality Sink Linux resource controller reconstructs the change Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Outcome evidence Controller evidence Failure and recovery Controller unreachable: stay non-effective 26.4. Example D: Agent migrates from phone to cloud with an unresolved financial transaction. Original authority Phone-held authority Candidate Act Pending Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Source state and fencing evidence Canonical effect Descriptor of the payment Protected verification New ownership generation Destination Finality Sink Cloud sink verifies destination authority Outcome evidence Outcome evidence for the first attempt Failure and recovery Unknown outcome: do not retry blindly 26.5. Example E: Source device retains a credential after migration. Original authority Source authority Candidate Act Pending act Platform-native inputs Credential custody evidence Canonical effect Descriptor bound to generation Protected verification Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Generation fenced Destination Finality Sink Sink rejects old generation Outcome evidence Rejection event Failure and recovery Credential exported: sink refuses it 26.6. Example F: Tool permissions differ between providers though names match. Original authority Provider A tool contract Candidate Act Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Contract versions Canonical effect Descriptor with contract identifier Protected verification Compatibility validation fails Destination Finality Sink Sink refuses Outcome evidence Refusal Failure and recovery Incompatible: withhold 26.7. Example G: Model-generated instruction exports a sensitive file to a redirected destination. Original authority Task authority Candidate Act Export Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Instruction provenance Canonical effect Descriptor with effective destination Protected verification Provenance and destination check Destination Finality Sink Egress sink checks actual destination Outcome evidence Refusal Failure and recovery Redirect: refuse 26.8. Example H: Resource alias changes between approval and effect. Original authority Human approval Candidate Act Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Aliased referent at approval Canonical effect Descriptor with resolved identity Protected verification Revalidate at effect time Destination Finality Sink Sink resolves alias Outcome evidence Evidence of resolution Failure and recovery Changed referent: refuse 26.9. Example I: App changes request parameters after approval. Original authority Approval Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Candidate Act Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Approved parameters Canonical effect Approved descriptor Protected verification Digest binds parameters Destination Finality Sink Sink reconstructs parameters Outcome evidence Mismatch evidence Failure and recovery Different parameters: refuse 26.10. Example J: Signed receipt falsely claims a remote effect. Original authority First-phase authority Candidate Act Phase 1 act Platform-native inputs Receipt Canonical effect Descriptor of phase 1 Protected verification Validator checks signer capability Destination Finality Sink Successor sink refuses continuation Outcome evidence Unverified receipt recorded Failure and recovery Receipt outside observation capability: not accepted Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 26.11. Example K: First bounded effect succeeded but independent receipt unavailable. Original authority Phase 1 authority Candidate Act Phase 2 act held Platform-native inputs No receipt Canonical effect Phase 2 descriptor Protected verification Receipt required Destination Finality Sink Successor sink holds Outcome evidence Pending record Failure and recovery Remain non-effective until receipt or reauthorization 26.12. Example L: Human reauthorizes a changed action but a physical safety condition is unsatisfied. Original authority Reauthorization Candidate Act Revised Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Approval and hazard evidence Canonical effect Descriptor with hazard fields Protected verification Hazard check fails Destination Finality Sink Actuator gate refuses Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Outcome evidence Refusal Failure and recovery Approval does not override safety 26.13. Example M: Credential broker protected while an alternate unrestricted key remains. Original authority Broker authority Candidate Act Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Broker and key inventory Canonical effect Descriptor Protected verification Coverage controller flags alternate key Destination Finality Sink Sink only controls brokered path Outcome evidence Coverage report Failure and recovery Claim limited; alternate path disclosed 26.14. Example N: Disconnected device exercises stale authority. Original authority Cached authority Candidate Act Offline act Platform-native inputs Offline limits and clock bounds Canonical effect Descriptor with lease Protected verification Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Limits exceeded Destination Finality Sink Sink refuses Outcome evidence Refusal Failure and recovery Offline past limit: refuse 26.15. Example O: Two agents collectively exceed a protected budget. Original authority Agent grants Candidate Act Two acts Platform-native inputs Budget state Canonical effect Descriptors with budget refs Protected verification Atomic reservation: second fails Destination Finality Sink Sink applies reservation Outcome evidence Reservation record Failure and recovery Second request refused 26.16. Example P: Tool update changes effect semantics mid-workflow. Original authority Workflow authority Candidate Act Next step act Platform-native inputs Tool generation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Canonical effect Descriptor with generation Protected verification Mismatch triggers revalidation Destination Finality Sink Sink compares generation Outcome evidence Revalidation record Failure and recovery Stop at the step boundary 26.17. Example Q: Physical command is irreversible and cannot safely be compensated. Original authority Operator authority Candidate Act Candidate Act Platform-native inputs Hazard and state evidence Canonical effect Descriptor with irreversibility flag Protected verification Pre-effect hazard check passes or fails Destination Finality Sink Actuator controller gate Outcome evidence Effect observation Failure and recovery If unsafe: contain; no compensation promised Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 27. Interoperability Requirements Where an implementation claims interoperability under this profile, it should carry the fields marked mandatory for the effect class, reject unknown critical fields, use qualified adapters, record qualification status, and treat unavailable enforcement as non- effective. It must not claim protection for effect paths that are not covered. No universal encoding is mandated; CBOR [RFC8949] and JSON are illustrative choices. Records are listed in Appendix D. 28. Security Considerations Guidance follows [RFC3552]. The architecture does not protect against effects through uncovered paths, a compromised privileged host when enforcement runs on that host, or false evidence from an unqualified source. A cryptographic signature or zero-trust label does not by itself prevent any listed threat; each threat in Appendix E names the check that is required. Enforcement qualification records themselves are an attack surface and need freshness and integrity. Resource exhaustion by forcing unresolved states is possible and needs bounded handling. 29. Privacy Considerations Considerations in [RFC6973] apply. Separate valid disclosures may collectively create an unauthorized aggregate disclosure under a policy, so cumulative exposure budgets are tracked (E8). Agent memory, context compression and persistent knowledge carry provenance (E32). A privacy-preserving log does not by itself stop a release; disclosure control must identify the real egress or destination boundary. Execution evidence can itself leak information, so audit minimization and selective disclosure are needed. 30. Performance and Deployment No performance results are claimed. Three paths are distinguished: a fast path (local protected finality checks and current protected- state admission), a warm path (independent policy or semantic validation, resource identity resolution, authority verification, evidence qualification) and a recovery path (reconciliation, revocation propagation, migration, unresolved outcomes, reauthorization). There is no per-token validation, no model- inference interruption, and no remote validator call for harmless operations; enforcement sits at real consequential boundaries. Protected precomputation and local gates can reduce latency. Cross- domain consensus has inherent cost, and behaviour during Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 disconnection must be explicit. A validation plan should measure p50, p95, p99 and p99.9 latency, throughput, memory, energy and battery impact, validator availability, protected-state persistence and recovery correctness on the target hardware. 31. Prior Art and Existing Standards For each mechanism: it already provides authentication, binding or attestation; the remaining problem is keeping authority meaningful for an actual effect across heterogeneous platforms; the additional mechanisms described are operation-specific descriptors, qualification records, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; whether the literature already provides substantially the same relationship was not checked here; evidence for any improvement would need testing. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +===============================+===================================+ | Established mechanism | What it provides and what | | | remains | +===============================+===================================+ | OAuth [RFC6749], token | Authorize and bind callers | | exchange [RFC8693], rich | and requests; they do not | | authorization requests | reconstruct the operation | | [RFC9396], DPoP [RFC9449] | at the sink or consume | | | authority per effect. | +-------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | RATS [RFC9334], EAT | Attest environments and | | [RFC9711], TPM, HSM, Secure | hold keys; attestation | | Enclave, Android Keystore, | shows the environment, not | | Arm CCA, Intel TDX, AMD SEV- | each effect. | | SNP, secure and measured boot | | +-------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Android, Apple, Windows and | Isolate and authorize | | Linux security models | processes; no cross- | | | platform effect semantics. | +-------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | MCP, A2A, agent SDKs, tool | Orchestrate and gate | | gateways, service meshes, | calls; coverage and | | policy enforcement points | operation semantics vary. | +-------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Fencing tokens, leases, | Known distributed-systems | | generation counters, | techniques reused here; | | idempotency keys, journals, | none is claimed as new in | | outbox, consensus, sagas | isolation. | +-------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ Table 1 The examiner discussion (objective technical problem, motivation to combine, reasonable expectation of success, functional interdependence, hindsight) is in Appendix F and is non-normative. 32. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 33. Intellectual Property Rights Human inventor: Sangam Kumar Das. Current patent source: Indian provisional application identified by the applicant as 202631127058, reported filed 25 October 2026, technical title as stated in the note at the start. The source is a 3,577-page PDF with 40 distinct numbered embodiments and 60 formal claims. These details are applicant-identified and must be checked against the official Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 acknowledgment. Foundational application: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2 ([PCT-055615]; WIPO PATENTSCOPE https://patentscope.wipo.int/). The 25 October filing is part of the earlier human-invented DAS Protocols research programme; its cross-platform mechanisms are to be differentiated from the foundational architecture and assessed on their specific features. Related public Internet-Drafts are [REL-FOUND], [REL-IEV] and [REL-CBEA]; newer revisions were not checked. Publication on the Datatracker is not adoption, patent examination or validation. The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines and BCP 78 and BCP 79 ([RFC8179]). A patent statement inside a draft does not replace an official IETF IPR disclosure. No royalty-free, FRAND or other licensing commitment is made here. 34. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, BCP 14, May 2017, . 35. Informative References [IN-127058] Das, S., "Indian provisional application 202631127058 (applicant-identified)", Applicant-identified; not a certified registry record., 25 October 2026, . [PCT-055615] Das, S., "PCT/IB2026/055615 (WO 2026/150382 A2)", Filed 4 June 2026; published 16 July 2026. Verify on PATENTSCOPE., 16 July 2026, . [REL-AGENT] Das, S., "Agent Execution Finality (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-das-agent-execution-finality, 2026, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 [REL-CBEA] Das, S., "Consequence-Bound Execution Authority", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das- consequence-bound-execution-authority, 2026, . [REL-FOUND] Das, S., "Execution Finality Foundations", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-finality- foundations, 2026, . [REL-IEV] Das, S., "Receipt-Gated Independent Effect Verification (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-receipt-gated-iev, 2026, . [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", RFC 3552, July 2003, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, October 2012, . [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, July 2013, . [RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology", RFC 8179, BCP 79, May 2017, . [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, January 2020, . [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 8949, December 2020, . [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, January 2023, . Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 [RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, May 2023, . [RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, September 2023, . [RFC9711] Lundblad, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, April 2025, . [TDC-12542] Das, S., "Technical Disclosure Commons record 12542 (PCT file; title not verified)", Not fetched; verify., 2026, . Appendix A. Appendix A: Embodiments E1-E40 The 40 distinct embodiments follow the source's numbering. Start pages are pages of the supplied 3,577-page PDF, approximate where the source repeats headings (E1 and E2 headings recur near pages 364 and 378). The second full section labelled Embodiment 31 (about pages 2650-2734) is a repeated version and is not counted as an embodiment. Clusters A-F are those of Section 25; an embodiment may belong to more than one cluster. +=====+================================+=========+=======+==========+ | No. | Technical subject | Cluster | Start | Workflow | | | | | page | | +=====+================================+=========+=======+==========+ | E1 | Protected cross-agent effect- | A | 248 | CW-1 | | | conflict arbitration with | | | | | | atomic reservations and sink- | | | | | | bound fencing | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E2 | Identity-bound Interim | B | 295 | CW-1, | | | Effectuation Validation and | | | CW-2 | | | receipt-constituted causal | | | | | | continuation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E3 | User-referenced semantic | C | 363 | CW-1 | | | object correspondence and | | | | | | authenticated presentation- | | | | | | state binding | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E4 | Cross-domain actual- | B | 492 | CW-1 | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | consequence witnessing and | | | | | | qualified remote-effect | | | | | | evidence | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E5 | Cryptographically verifiable, | A | 555 | CW-1 | | | assistant-neutral resource | | | | | | allocation and protected | | | | | | eligible-demand completeness | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E6 | Semantic action-contract | C | 666 | CW-1 | | | evolution and effect- | | | | | | compatibility validation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E7 | Cross-provider delegated | D | 723 | CW-1 | | | agent authority continuity | | | | | | and cryptographic delegation | | | | | | lineage | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E8 | Correlation-aware cumulative | C | 787 | CW-1 | | | privacy exposure and | | | | | | compositional disclosure | | | | | | constraints | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E9 | Cross-device execution- | D | 859 | CW-1 | | | authority ownership, hardware | | | | | | epochs and source fencing | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E10 | Model, algorithm and runtime- | E | 926 | CW-1 | | | generation drift with | | | | | | effectuation-time | | | | | | revalidation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E11 | Concurrent-effect | A | 994 | CW-1 | | | reconciliation, version-bound | | | | | | reservations and sink-local | | | | | | commit validation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E12 | Autonomous recovery, | F | 1063 | CW-1 | | | compensating effects and non- | | | | | | replayable recovery authority | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E13 | Multi-agent consensus, quorum | A | 1140 | CW-1 | | | integrity and non-delegable | | | | | | finality authorization | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E14 | Effectuation-path discovery, | E | 1221 | CW-1 | | | bypass detection and | | | | | | enforcement-coverage | | | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | revalidation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E15 | Cross-domain evidence | B | 1309 | CW-1 | | | commitments, non-bearer | | | | | | authority and sink-local | | | | | | monotonic consumption | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E16 | Crash-consistent finality | B,F | 1384 | CW-1 | | | journaling, one-time | | | | | | authorization and | | | | | | indeterminate outcome | | | | | | handling | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E17 | Temporal authority, lease | D | 1465 | CW-1 | | | expiration, clock uncertainty | | | | | | and delayed-effect control | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E18 | Cross-domain revocation | D,F | 1541 | CW-1 | | | propagation and dependent | | | | | | authority invalidation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E19 | Computer-use and transaction- | C | 1625 | CW-1 | | | bound human-approval finality | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E20 | Multi-step tool-chain and | E | 1683 | CW-1 | | | workflow dependency-bound | | | | | | execution authority | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E21 | Actual resource identity, | C | 1758 | CW-1 | | | aliases, redirects and | | | | | | dynamic namespace rebinding | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E22 | Multi-resource budgets, | A | 1830 | CW-1 | | | delegated quotas and | | | | | | cumulative consequential | | | | | | limits | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E23 | Credential and secret-use | E | 1897 | CW-1 | | | finality with non-exportable | | | | | | broker-controlled authority | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E24 | Tool-output and instruction | C | 2019 | CW-1 | | | provenance through model- | | | | | | driven execution | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E25 | Agent sandbox privilege | E | 2092 | CW-1 | | | transitions and consequential | | | | | | operations escaping sandbox | | | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 47] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | boundaries | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E26 | Tool installation, updates | E | 2169 | CW-1 | | | and runtime lifecycle | | | | | | authority continuity | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E27 | Distributed agent handoff, | D,F | 2246 | CW-1 | | | workload migration and non- | | | | | | resurrectable in-flight | | | | | | effects | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E28 | Nested multi-agent tool | E | 2318 | CW-1 | | | invocation chains and | | | | | | transitive authority | | | | | | attenuation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E29 | Independent approval quorums | A | 2398 | CW-1 | | | and protected consensus-to- | | | | | | effect separation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E30 | Resource-owner changes, | D | 2480 | CW-1 | | | competing administrative | | | | | | authority and revocation | | | | | | races | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E31 | Credential and administrative | D | 2567 | CW-1 | | | authority rotation, protected | | | | | | key custody and generation | | | | | | fencing | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E32 | Data, memory and persistent- | C | 2734 | CW-1 | | | knowledge provenance across | | | | | | agent sessions | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E33 | Policy and configuration | E | 2825 | CW-1 | | | evolution, dependency impact | | | | | | and non-self-authorizing | | | | | | mutations | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E34 | Tool and resource identity | C | 2914 | CW-1 | | | continuity across dynamic | | | | | | service discovery | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E35 | Degraded connectivity, | D,F | 3005 | CW-1 | | | offline effect authority and | | | | | | delayed revocation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E36 | Multi-resource transactions, | F | 3102 | CW-1 | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 48] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | partial commits and | | | | | | independently authorized | | | | | | compensation | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E37 | Irreversible effects, | F | 3192 | CW-1 | | | consequence-bound hazard | | | | | | checks and non-compensable | | | | | | operation containment | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E38 | Evidence integrity, | B | 3282 | CW-1 | | | compromised observers and | | | | | | independent attestation | | | | | | reconstruction | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E39 | Conflicting policies and | D | 3378 | CW-1 | | | authority precedence among | | | | | | multiple principals and | | | | | | resource owners | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ | E40 | End-to-end effect provenance, | B | 3474 | CW-1 | | | protected authority | | | | | | consumption, cross-embodiment | | | | | | closure and formal | | | | | | verification | | | | +-----+--------------------------------+---------+-------+----------+ Table 2 Source statements of the principal candidate inventive concept (excerpts, lightly normalised; extracted automatically, so check against the PDF): * E5: the non-bypassable transformation of a cryptographically verifiable, policy-neutral resource-allocation decision— computed from authenticated eligible demand—into scoped resource-grant authority independently verified at the actual resource Finality Sink, together with protected evidence linking the authorized grant to actual ... * E8: the non-bypassable enforcement of cumulative, recipient- scoped, source-dependent privacy constraints at an actual information-release Finality Sink, wherein the protected system evaluates a new disclosure against relevant previous releases across applications or autonomous agents, atomically reserves the permissible exposure ... Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 49] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E9: a protected cross-device authority-transfer architecture in which an unfinished consequential operation remains subject to authenticated exclusive ownership, qualified source- effectuation fencing, authoritative generation control, and destination- specific non- bearer authority, with the actual destination Finality Sink ... * E11: a protected concurrent-effect finality architecture in which authenticated resource-version and semantic conflict dependencies are bound to operation-specific protected reservations, and a non- bypassable Finality Sink independently reconstructs the actual pending consequential operation and refuses effectuation unless its ... * E13: a protected multi-agent collective authorization architecture in which an originating Candidate Act is bound to a canonical consequential operation, authenticated participants satisfy a current protected quorum and role policy, qualified approval evidence supports scoped non-bearer finality authority, and an independently ... * E14: a protected effectuation-path continuity architecture in which authenticated effect-capable topology and blocking- enforcement evidence support a coverage-bound finality authority, material runtime or hardware path changes invalidate affected protected authority, and an independently enforcing Finality Sink refuses the actual ... * E15: a protected cross-domain evidence-to-effectuation architecture in which collection-time evidence from a first protected instance is independently validated by a second protected instance, the respective evidence states are cross- committed to one specified Candidate Act, scoped non-bearer finality authority is established ... * E16: a crash- consistent protected execution-finality system in which an independently enforcing Finality Sink reconstructs an actual pending consequential operation, verifies current operation-specific non-bearer authority, durably binds a monotonic authority- consumption transition to the corresponding actual- effect ... * E17: bound to an authenticated operation-specific temporal authority envelope, a protected verifier establishes qualified current time evidence under applicable uncertainty and lease- generation conditions, a scoped non-bearer finality enablement remains dependent upon those current conditions, and an independent Finality Sink ... Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 50] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E18: a protected cross- domain revocation-finality system in which an authenticated source-authority revocation is committed to monotonic protected state, an authority-dependency controller identifies and invalidates affected delegated and operation- specific non-bearer finality enablements, participating resource domains establish ... * E19: a protected computer-use execution-finality system in which qualified interface-state evidence and an operation-specific authorized-effect descriptor are bound to a Candidate Act, optional authenticated human confirmation is committed to the same material effect parameters, and an independent Finality Sink reconstructs the ... * E20: a protected autonomous workflow system in which a machine- verifiable dependency mechanism distinguishes computational progress from qualified actual-effect evidence, a protected continuation controller independently establishes current authority and required predecessor predicates for each consequential successor Candidate Act, ... * E21: a protected autonomous resource-identity execution-finality system in which the original source- authorized resource referent and a qualified current resolution relationship are bound to operation-specific non-bearer finality authority, and an independently enforcing Finality Sink reconstructs the actual pending resource target ... * E22: a protected multidimensional autonomous resource-finality architecture in which source-authorized effect budgets are delegated through non-overlapping protected allocations, consequential Candidate Acts receive operation-specific reserved authority and separate non-bearer finality enablement, an independently enforcing Finality ... * E23: a protected autonomous credential-use system in which reusable credential material remains under qualified protected custody, a consequential Candidate Act is independently validated against current originating authority, a separate scoped non- bearer finality enablement is constituted, and a credential-use Finality Sink ... * E24: a protected autonomous execution-finality system in which current originating instruction authority is maintained independently from lower-trust informational provenance and computational derivations, a proposed consequential operation is represented as a non- effective Candidate Act, protected semantic verification establishes ... Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 51] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E25: a protected autonomous sandbox-to-effectuation architecture in which a lower-trust computational workload remains confined within a qualified execution domain, operations crossing a consequential boundary are separately represented and withheld as Candidate Acts, required privilege transitions are constituted as bounded ... * E26: a protected autonomous tool-lifecycle execution-finality system in which pending consequential Candidate Acts are bound to qualified effect-relevant tool and runtime state, material lifecycle changes cause protected selective fencing and current revalidation, operation- specific non-bearer finality is reconstituted where ... * E27: a protected distributed autonomous execution-finality system in which operation-specific source authority is preserved across workload migration through source-domain fencing, qualified destination handoff, monotonic effectuation-ownership generations, independent reconciliation of in-flight real effects, destination- specific ... * E28: a protected autonomous multi-agent execution-finality system in which transitive source-authority restrictions remain independently verifiable through nested and branching delegation relationships, shared consequential allowances are conserved across concurrent descendants, intermediate resource effects are held as ... * E29: a protected autonomous consensus-to-execution-finality architecture in which qualified multi-agent approval is cryptographically and semantically bound to one Candidate Act, conflict and veto predicates are resolved under current protected quorum policy, source and resource authority remain independently mandatory, and an ... * E30: a protected resource-authority-continuity system in which a consequential Candidate Act is associated with authenticated operation-specific source and resource authority dependencies, material ownership and revocation transitions selectively fence pending finality, competing administrative authority claims are resolved ... * E31: a protected autonomous credential-dependent execution- finality system in which reusable credential custody is separated from ordinary agent computation, the actual Candidate Act is bound to credential generation and source-authority dependencies, material credential transitions trigger protected finality fencing and current ... Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 52] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E32: a protected autonomous memory-to-effect-finality system in which persistent information is governed by independent source- provenance and storage-finality controls, cross-session retrieval is conditioned upon current authority without promoting retrieved data into independent instruction authority, and consequential operations ... * E33: a protected autonomous policy-to-effect-finality system in which policy changes are separately non- effective Candidate Acts governed by competent meta-authority, qualified semantic impact and dependency analysis selectively fence affected pending operations, actual policy activation is independently enforced, and subsequent ... * E34: a protected autonomous resource-identity-to-execution- finality system in which a held Candidate Act is associated with authorized actual resource and tool-effect conditions, dynamic discovery and tool substitution are qualified under protected identity-continuity rules, material changes fence pending finality, and an ... * E35: a protected autonomous partition-aware execution-finality system in which source-authorized consequential operations are classified by current connectivity requirements, selected prepartition authority is attenuated into bounded sink-specific offline allocations, actual local effects remain non-effective until independently ... * E36: a protected autonomous multi-resource transaction-finality system in which source-authorized transactions are decomposed into independently non-effective constituent effects, protected actual- effect receipts control causal successor release without expanding source authority, partial-commit containment preserves completed and ... * E37: a protected autonomous consequence-to-effectuation-finality system in which a source-authorized irreversible operation remains non-effective until the actual effectuation frontier is identified, current hazard and resource predicates are independently qualified, material changes fence pending authority, and a scoped non-bearer ... * E38: a protected autonomous evidence-integrity execution-finality system in which a source-authorized Candidate Act remains non- effective while collection-time and independently acquired execution-time observations are qualified for observer identity, competence, continuity, independence, and actual effect correspondence; ... Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 53] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * E39: an autonomous multi-authority execution-finality system in which source-authorized consequential Candidate Acts remain non- effective while competent operation-specific authority provenance, delegation, restrictions, policy precedence, and conflict conditions are qualified; unresolved mandatory authority fences effectuation; ... Embodiments without an extracted statement: E1, E2, E3, E4, E6, E7, E10, E12, E40. The requested 20-point analysis (objective, components, authority, candidate operation, effect-critical data, protected state, enforcement interface, predicate, inputs and outputs, evidence, attack scenarios, negative outcomes, recovery, test method, performance, existing foundations, narrower features, industry integration, workflow relationship, mothership relationship) was done at cluster level in Section 25 and in the threat, example and industry appendices, not individually for each of the 40 embodiments; per-embodiment pseudocode and data structures from the source were not extracted. Appendix B. Appendix B: Claims 1-60 Non-normative. The claims are not requirements of this document. The consolidated claims contain four independent claims: 1 (system, dependents 2-30), 31 (method, 32-42), 43 (apparatus, 44-52) and 53 (migration, 54-60). Forty embodiments do not correspond to forty independent claims, and no missing dependent claims were invented. Independent versus dependent was determined from the claim text, and the dependency shown is the first claim number referenced. Excerpts are from the extracted text (ligatures repaired automatically); check them against the PDF. +===+===========+====+=========+====================+===============+ |No.|Type |Dep.|Group | Source limitation | Realization | | | | | | (excerpt) | wording | | | | | | | (whole claim) | +===+===========+====+=========+====================+===============+ |1 |Independent|- |System | A computer- | none named in | | | | | | implemented | the claim | | | | | | system for | text | | | | | | interoperable | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | execution- | | | | | | | finality control | | | | | | | across | | | | | | | heterogeneous | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environments, the | | | | | | | system | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 54] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | comprising: (a) a | | | | | | | first ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |2 |Dependent |1 |System | the first and | none named in | | | | | | second computing | the claim | | | | | | environments | text | | | | | | comprise | | | | | | | different | | | | | | | operating | | | | | | | systems, | | | | | | | different | | | | | | | administrative | | | | | | | domains, | | | | | | | different device- | | | | | | | security | | | | | | | architectures, or | | | | | | | different ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |3 |Dependent |2 |System | the first | none named in | | | | | | computing | the claim | | | | | | environment | text | | | | | | comprises an | | | | | | | Android-based | | | | | | | device and the | | | | | | | second computing | | | | | | | environment | | | | | | | comprises an iOS- | | | | | | | based device, and | | | | | | | wherein a | | | | | | | consequential ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |4 |Dependent |2 |System | the first | none named in | | | | | | computing | the claim | | | | | | environment | text | | | | | | comprises an iOS- | | | | | | | based device and | | | | | | | the second | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environment | | | | | | | comprises an | | | | | | | Android-based | | | | | | | device, and | | | | | | | wherein the | | | | | | | second computing | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |5 |Dependent |2 |System | the heterogeneous | none named in | | | | | | computing | the claim | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 55] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | environments | text | | | | | | comprise any | | | | | | | compatible | | | | | | | combination of | | | | | | | mobile operating | | | | | | | systems, desktop | | | | | | | operating | | | | | | | systems, | | | | | | | virtualized | | | | | | | execution | | | | | | | environments, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |6 |Dependent |1 |System | the heterogeneous | none named in | | | | | | authorization- | the claim | | | | | | source adapter | text | | | | | | comprises a typed | | | | | | | interface | | | | | | | identifying a | | | | | | | technical | | | | | | | security property | | | | | | | established by a | | | | | | | corresponding | | | | | | | underlying | | | | | | | mechanism, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |7 |Dependent |1 |System | the qualified | cryptographic | | | | | | evidence | terms | | | | | | comprises one or | | | | | | | more of an | | | | | | | operating-system | | | | | | | permission, | | | | | | | application | | | | | | | entitlement, | | | | | | | source | | | | | | | authorization | | | | | | | grant, structured | | | | | | | authorization | | | | | | | detail, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |8 |Dependent |1 |System | the protected | none named in | | | | | | canonical effect | the claim | | | | | | descriptor | text | | | | | | comprises a | | | | | | | selected | | | | | | | combination of a | | | | | | | Candidate Act | | | | | | | identifier, | | | | | | | originating | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 56] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | authority | | | | | | | reference, actual | | | | | | | operation class, | | | | | | | actual ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |9 |Dependent |1 |System | the protected | none named in | | | | | | authorization-to- | the claim | | | | | | effect | text | | | | | | translation | | | | | | | controller | | | | | | | resolves the | | | | | | | operation | | | | | | | semantics | | | | | | | according to an | | | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | action contract | | | | | | | or resource- | | | | | | | interface ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |10 |Dependent |1 |System | the Protected | none named in | | | | | | Enforcement | the claim | | | | | | Domain maintains | text | | | | | | a protected | | | | | | | relationship | | | | | | | between an | | | | | | | originating | | | | | | | source grant and | | | | | | | one or more | | | | | | | dependent | | | | | | | delegated | | | | | | | authorizations, | | | | | | | Candidate ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |11 |Dependent |1 |System | the protected | none named in | | | | | | validation | the claim | | | | | | evidence | text | | | | | | comprises | | | | | | | collection-time | | | | | | | evidence | | | | | | | established by a | | | | | | | first protected | | | | | | | validation | | | | | | | instance and | | | | | | | execution-time | | | | | | | evidence | | | | | | | established by a | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 57] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 |12 |Dependent |1 |System | a structured | none named in | | | | | | application | the claim | | | | | | action, | text | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | intent object, | | | | | | | agent tool | | | | | | | invocation, | | | | | | | interprocess | | | | | | | service request, | | | | | | | or remote | | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | function call is | | | | | | | represented as | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |13 |Dependent |1 |System | the Non-Effective | none named in | | | | | | Holding Mechanism | the claim | | | | | | comprises one or | text | | | | | | more of a blocked | | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | function | | | | | | | dispatch, | | | | | | | withheld network | | | | | | | transmission, | | | | | | | uncommitted | | | | | | | storage | | | | | | | operation, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |14 |Dependent |1 |System | a proposed | none named in | | | | | | application | the claim | | | | | | action or | text | | | | | | autonomous | | | | | | | workflow | | | | | | | comprises | | | | | | | multiple | | | | | | | distinguishable | | | | | | | consequential | | | | | | | effects, and | | | | | | | wherein at least | | | | | | | two of the | | | | | | | consequential | | | | | | | effects are ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |15 |Dependent |1 |System | The system as | none named in | | | | | | claimed in claim | the claim | | | | | | 1, further | text | | | | | | comprising an | | | | | | | Enforcement- | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 58] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | Coverage | | | | | | | Qualification | | | | | | | Controller | | | | | | | configured to | | | | | | | maintain a | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | enforcement- | | | | | | | qualification | | | | | | | record ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |16 |Dependent |15 |System | an observation- | none named in | | | | | | only security | the claim | | | | | | monitor, | text | | | | | | notification | | | | | | | interface, | | | | | | | advisory security | | | | | | | policy, or post- | | | | | | | effect audit | | | | | | | mechanism is | | | | | | | prevented from | | | | | | | satisfying a fl | | | | | | | mandatory ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |17 |Dependent |15 |System | the Enforcement- | none named in | | | | | | Coverage | the claim | | | | | | Qualification | text | | | | | | Controller | | | | | | | identifies a | | | | | | | plurality of | | | | | | | interfaces | | | | | | | capable of | | | | | | | producing a | | | | | | | governed effect | | | | | | | and requires each | | | | | | | interface within | | | | | | | an ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |18 |Dependent |15 |System | a material change | hardware | | | | | | in an operating- | terms | | | | | | system security | | | | | | | interface, | | | | | | | sandbox | | | | | | | entitlement, | | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | dispatch | | | | | | | configuration, | | | | | | | privileged | | | | | | | intermediary, | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 59] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | network route, | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |19 |Dependent |1 |System | the Protected | none named in | | | | | | Enforcement | the claim | | | | | | Domain maintains | text | | | | | | a current | | | | | | | revocation | | | | | | | generation | | | | | | | associated with | | | | | | | an originating | | | | | | | authorization | | | | | | | grant and | | | | | | | identifies scoped | | | | | | | finality | | | | | | | enablements ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |20 |Dependent |19 |System | the designated | none named in | | | | | | Finality Sink | the claim | | | | | | verifies an | text | | | | | | applicable | | | | | | | current | | | | | | | revocation | | | | | | | generation or | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | authorization- | | | | | | | status condition, | | | | | | | and wherein an | | | | | | | earlier active- | | | | | | | token ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |21 |Dependent |1 |System | the scoped non- | none named in | | | | | | bearer finality | the claim | | | | | | enablement is | text | | | | | | maintained within | | | | | | | a protected | | | | | | | controller or | | | | | | | sink-local | | | | | | | protected state | | | | | | | and is | | | | | | | represented to | | | | | | | the requesting | | | | | | | computational ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |22 |Dependent |21 |System | the scoped non- | none named in | | | | | | bearer finality | the claim | | | | | | enablement | text | | | | | | comprises a | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 60] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | permitted-use | | | | | | | count or unique | | | | | | | consumption | | | | | | | reference, and | | | | | | | wherein the | | | | | | | designated | | | | | | | Finality Sink | | | | | | | enforces a | | | | | | | protected ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |23 |Dependent |21 |System | the scoped non- | none named in | | | | | | bearer finality | the claim | | | | | | enablement is | text | | | | | | bound to one or | | | | | | | more of the | | | | | | | designated | | | | | | | Finality Sink, | | | | | | | actual resource, | | | | | | | permitted effect, | | | | | | | originating | | | | | | | authority, | | | | | | | validity ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |24 |Dependent |1 |System | the designated | none named in | | | | | | Finality Sink | the claim | | | | | | determines at | text | | | | | | least one | | | | | | | security-relevant | | | | | | | descriptor | | | | | | | element from the | | | | | | | actual operation | | | | | | | presented at the | | | | | | | controlled | | | | | | | effectuation | | | | | | | interface ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |25 |Dependent |24 |System | the designated | none named in | | | | | | Finality Sink | the claim | | | | | | verifies one or | text | | | | | | more of an actual | | | | | | | destination, | | | | | | | resource | | | | | | | identity, | | | | | | | recipient, | | | | | | | outgoing payload | | | | | | | commitment, | | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | function | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 61] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | parameter, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |26 |Dependent |1 |System | the designated | none named in | | | | | | Finality Sink | the claim | | | | | | comprises a | text | | | | | | transactional | | | | | | | resource | | | | | | | controller | | | | | | | configured to | | | | | | | atomically | | | | | | | commit, within an | | | | | | | applicable | | | | | | | transaction | | | | | | | boundary, a | | | | | | | protected ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |27 |Dependent |1 |System | The system as | none named in | | | | | | claimed in claim | the claim | | | | | | 1, further | text | | | | | | comprising a | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | credential broker | | | | | | | configured to | | | | | | | retain a reusable | | | | | | | resource | | | | | | | credential | | | | | | | outside the | | | | | | | requesting ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |28 |Dependent |1 |System | a governed | none named in | | | | | | consequential | the claim | | | | | | operation | text | | | | | | comprises | | | | | | | transmission of | | | | | | | information | | | | | | | through a network | | | | | | | interface, and | | | | | | | wherein protected | | | | | | | authorization | | | | | | | evidence binds | | | | | | | the permitted ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |29 |Dependent |1 |System | the first | none named in | | | | | | computing | the claim | | | | | | environment, the | text | | | | | | Protected | | | | | | | Enforcement | | | | | | | Domain, and the | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 62] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | designated | | | | | | | Finality Sink | | | | | | | reside in at | | | | | | | least two | | | | | | | independently | | | | | | | administered | | | | | | | domains, and ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |30 |Dependent |1 |System | a computing | none named in | | | | | | environment | the claim | | | | | | operates with | text | | | | | | intermittent | | | | | | | connectivity and | | | | | | | the Protected | | | | | | | Enforcement | | | | | | | Domain | | | | | | | establishes a | | | | | | | bounded of ine | | | | | | | authority | | | | | | | comprising one or | | | | | | | more ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |31 |Independent|- |Method | A computer- | none named in | | | | | | implemented | the claim | | | | | | method for | text | | | | | | enforcing | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | execution- | | | | | | | finality control | | | | | | | across | | | | | | | heterogeneous | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environments, the | | | | | | | method | | | | | | | comprising: (a) | | | | | | | receiving, from | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |32 |Dependent |31 |Method | obtaining | none named in | | | | | | qualified | the claim | | | | | | evidence and | text | | | | | | independently | | | | | | | validating the | | | | | | | proposed | | | | | | | consequential | | | | | | | operation | | | | | | | comprise | | | | | | | collecting | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 63] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | evidence at a | | | | | | | first protected | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |33 |Dependent |31 |Method | producing the | none named in | | | | | | protected | the claim | | | | | | canonical effect | text | | | | | | descriptor | | | | | | | comprises | | | | | | | converting | | | | | | | heterogeneous | | | | | | | native-platform | | | | | | | permission or | | | | | | | authorization | | | | | | | information into | | | | | | | a typed effect | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |34 |Dependent |31 |Method | The method as | none named in | | | | | | claimed in claim | the claim | | | | | | 31, further | text | | | | | | comprising | | | | | | | detecting a | | | | | | | material change | | | | | | | in resource | | | | | | | identity, | | | | | | | resource | | | | | | | generation, | | | | | | | effective | | | | | | | recipient, | | | | | | | operation | | | | | | | parameters, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |35 |Dependent |31 |Method | The method as | none named in | | | | | | claimed in claim | the claim | | | | | | 31, further | text | | | | | | comprising | | | | | | | obtaining an | | | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | revocation event | | | | | | | or current | | | | | | | revoked-state | | | | | | | indication, | | | | | | | identifying | | | | | | | pending finality | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 64] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 |36 |Dependent |31 |Method | the designated | hardware | | | | | | Finality Sink | terms | | | | | | comprises a | | | | | | | qualified | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | application | | | | | | | dispatcher, | | | | | | | privileged | | | | | | | interprocess | | | | | | | broker, network | | | | | | | gateway, storage | | | | | | | controller, | | | | | | | remote service | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |37 |Dependent |31 |Method | successful user | cryptographic | | | | | | approval, | terms | | | | | | application | | | | | | | authentication, | | | | | | | cryptographic | | | | | | | signature | | | | | | | verification, | | | | | | | credential | | | | | | | introspection, or | | | | | | | operating-system | | | | | | | permission | | | | | | | validation is ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |38 |Dependent |31 |Method | original source | none named in | | | | | | authority, | the claim | | | | | | delegated | text | | | | | | authority, | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | evidence, or | | | | | | | finality- | | | | | | | enablement state | | | | | | | is maintained in | | | | | | | a protected | | | | | | | storage or | | | | | | | controller domain | | | | | | | not modifiable | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |39 |Dependent |31 |Method | The method as | none named in | | | | | | claimed in claim | the claim | | | | | | 31, further | text | | | | | | comprising | | | | | | | revalidating the | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 65] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | actual pending | | | | | | | operation at the | | | | | | | designated | | | | | | | Finality Sink | | | | | | | using current | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | resource or ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |40 |Dependent |31 |Method | an unsuccessful | none named in | | | | | | or unavailable | the claim | | | | | | mandatory | text | | | | | | validator, | | | | | | | invalid finality | | | | | | | enablement, | | | | | | | unresolved | | | | | | | operation | | | | | | | semantics, stale | | | | | | | authority | | | | | | | generation, or | | | | | | | unqualified | | | | | | | effectuation ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |41 |Dependent |31 |Method | absence of an | none named in | | | | | | acknowledgment or | the claim | | | | | | an uncertain | text | | | | | | remote result | | | | | | | does not | | | | | | | automatically | | | | | | | restore consumed | | | | | | | authority or | | | | | | | authorize an | | | | | | | unrestricted | | | | | | | retry of the | | | | | | | operation. | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |42 |Dependent |41 |Method | a successor | none named in | | | | | | consequential | the claim | | | | | | operation depends | text | | | | | | upon an earlier | | | | | | | real effect and | | | | | | | is withheld until | | | | | | | an authenticated | | | | | | | receipt | | | | | | | concerning the | | | | | | | earlier effect | | | | | | | has been accepted | | | | | | | by ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 66] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 |43 |Independent|- |Apparatus| A protected | none named in | | | | | | computing | the claim | | | | | | apparatus for | text | | | | | | enforcing | | | | | | | interoperable | | | | | | | execution- | | | | | | | finality | | | | | | | authorization at | | | | | | | a consequential | | | | | | | resource | | | | | | | boundary, the | | | | | | | apparatus | | | | | | | comprising: (a) | | | | | | | at least ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |44 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the apparatus | none named in | | | | | | comprises a | the claim | | | | | | mobile computing | text | | | | | | device, desktop | | | | | | | computer, server, | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | application- | | | | | | | execution | | | | | | | component, | | | | | | | embedded | | | | | | | controller, | | | | | | | secure processor, | | | | | | | cloud ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |45 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the apparatus is | none named in | | | | | | associated with | the claim | | | | | | an iOS-based or | text | | | | | | iPadOS-based | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environment and | | | | | | | the resource | | | | | | | interface | | | | | | | comprises an | | | | | | | authorized | | | | | | | application | | | | | | | function, | | | | | | | protected ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |46 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the apparatus is | hardware | | | | | | associated with | terms | | | | | | an Android- based | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environment and | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 67] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | the resource | | | | | | | interface | | | | | | | comprises a | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | application | | | | | | | dispatcher, | | | | | | | privileged | | | | | | | service, ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |47 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the resource | none named in | | | | | | interface | the claim | | | | | | comprises an | text | | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | interprocess | | | | | | | communication | | | | | | | broker separately | | | | | | | controlled from | | | | | | | the requesting | | | | | | | computational | | | | | | | entity, and | | | | | | | wherein the ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |48 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the apparatus | none named in | | | | | | implements | the claim | | | | | | destination-side | text | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | enforcement for a | | | | | | | remote | | | | | | | application or | | | | | | | service, thereby | | | | | | | permitting | | | | | | | interoperability | | | | | | | with a requesting | | | | | | | operating ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |49 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the effectuation | hardware | | | | | | controller | terms | | | | | | comprises a | | | | | | | hardware- | | | | | | | supported command | | | | | | | gate, protected | | | | | | | storage | | | | | | | controller, | | | | | | | secure processor, | | | | | | | device command | | | | | | | controller, or | | | | | | | hardware-backed | | | | | | | ... | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 68] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |50 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the interoperable | none named in | | | | | | authority- | the claim | | | | | | verification | text | | | | | | component | | | | | | | maintains a | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | enforcement- | | | | | | | qualification | | | | | | | record and | | | | | | | rejects a claimed | | | | | | | mandatory | | | | | | | enforcement | | | | | | | property when an | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |51 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the canonical | none named in | | | | | | effect descriptor | the claim | | | | | | is represented | text | | | | | | using a typed | | | | | | | structured | | | | | | | encoding or | | | | | | | deterministic | | | | | | | binary | | | | | | | representation de | | | | | | | ning | | | | | | | canonicalization | | | | | | | rules for ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |52 |Dependent |43 |Apparatus| the interoperable | none named in | | | | | | authority- | the claim | | | | | | verification | text | | | | | | component | | | | | | | verifies | | | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | principal | | | | | | | attribution, | | | | | | | originating task | | | | | | | authority, and | | | | | | | permitted effect | | | | | | | scope | | | | | | | independently of | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |53 |Independent|- |Migration| A computer- | none named in | | | | | | implemented | the claim | | | | | | system for | text | | | | | | protected | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 69] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | migration of | | | | | | | consequential | | | | | | | execution | | | | | | | authority between | | | | | | | heterogeneous | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environments, the | | | | | | | system | | | | | | | comprising: (a) a | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |54 |Dependent |53 |Migration| the protected | none named in | | | | | | authority- | the claim | | | | | | ownership | text | | | | | | controller | | | | | | | maintains a | | | | | | | monotonic | | | | | | | ownership epoch, | | | | | | | protected | | | | | | | generation | | | | | | | counter, | | | | | | | authenticated | | | | | | | fencing | | | | | | | reference, or | | | | | | | authoritative ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |55 |Dependent |53 |Migration| verification of | hardware | | | | | | the source- | terms | | | | | | fencing condition | | | | | | | comprises | | | | | | | verifying | | | | | | | restriction, | | | | | | | invalidation, or | | | | | | | isolation of at | | | | | | | least one effect- | | | | | | | capable source- | | | | | | | device interface, | | | | | | | pending ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |56 |Dependent |53 |Migration| the source and | none named in | | | | | | destination | the claim | | | | | | execution | text | | | | | | environments | | | | | | | comprise | | | | | | | respectively | | | | | | | different mobile | | | | | | | or desktop | | | | | | | operating | | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 70] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | systems, | | | | | | | including an | | | | | | | Android-based | | | | | | | environment and | | | | | | | an ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |57 |Dependent |53 |Migration| loss of | none named in | | | | | | communication | the claim | | | | | | with the source | text | | | | | | execution | | | | | | | environment does | | | | | | | not automatically | | | | | | | establish | | | | | | | successful source | | | | | | | fencing, and | | | | | | | wherein | | | | | | | activation of | | | | | | | exclusive | | | | | | | destination ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |58 |Dependent |53 |Migration| a migration, | none named in | | | | | | crash recovery, | the claim | | | | | | process restart, | text | | | | | | device | | | | | | | replacement, or | | | | | | | restored | | | | | | | computational | | | | | | | snapshot is | | | | | | | prevented from | | | | | | | restoring a | | | | | | | previously | | | | | | | consumed finality | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |59 |Dependent |53 |Migration| a plurality of un | none named in | | | | | | nished Candidate | the claim | | | | | | Acts are | text | | | | | | transferred | | | | | | | between computing | | | | | | | environments and | | | | | | | each Candidate | | | | | | | Act is associated | | | | | | | with a separately | | | | | | | verifiable | | | | | | | operation scope, | | | | | | | ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ |60 |Dependent |53 |Migration| the source and | hardware | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 71] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | | | destination | terms | | | | | | execution | | | | | | | environments | | | | | | | comprise | | | | | | | respective | | | | | | | combinations of | | | | | | | mobile devices, | | | | | | | virtual machines, | | | | | | | confidential- | | | | | | | computing | | | | | | | environments, | | | | | | | cloud ... | | +---+-----------+----+---------+--------------------+---------------+ Table 3 Group-level fields (necessary components, operative condition, enforcement boundary, existing coverage, prior-art terms) follow. A per-claim chart of these fields was not produced; candidate additional limitations and per-claim implementation examples are not given, to avoid inventing limitations. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 72] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +=========+====================+=================+=================+ |Group | Technical focus | What existing | Search terms | | | | work covers | | +=========+====================+=================+=================+ |System | Heterogeneous | Authentication, | cross platform | |(1-30) | authorization | OAuth-style | execution | | | translation and | authorization | finality; | | | protected actual- | and attestation | permission | | | effect enforcement | exist [RFC6749] | translation; | | | | [RFC9334]; the | canonical | | | | claim concerns | effect | | | | translation to | descriptor; | | | | a canonical | destination | | | | descriptor and | side | | | | sink-side | verification | | | | reconstruction. | | +---------+--------------------+-----------------+-----------------+ |Method | Operation-specific | Same standards | method | |(31-42) | cross-platform | context. | enforcing | | | execution-finality | | execution | | | procedure | | finality | | | | | heterogeneous; | | | | | scoped non- | | | | | bearer | | | | | enablement; | | | | | protected | | | | | consumption | +---------+--------------------+-----------------+-----------------+ |Apparatus| Receiving-platform | Resource | finality sink | |(43-52) | protected Finality | gateways and | apparatus; | | | Sink | policy | actual pending | | | | enforcement | operation | | | | points exist. | reconstruction; | | | | | sink local | | | | | authority check | +---------+--------------------+-----------------+-----------------+ |Migration| Cross-device | Fencing tokens, | cross device | |(53-60) | authority transfer | leases and | authority | | | and source fencing | generation | migration; | | | | counters exist | source fencing; | | | | as techniques. | ownership | | | | | epoch; snapshot | | | | | resurrection | +---------+--------------------+-----------------+-----------------+ Table 4 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 73] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Appendix C. Appendix C: Architecture Flowcharts The 30 diagrams below are conceptual ASCII figures; each names its boundary. Mermaid versions are not included because a single XML file was requested. +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Originating user, application or AI agent | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Source operating system | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Candidate Act (Non-Effective State) | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Source authority qualification | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Platform evidence and semantic translation adapter | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Protected Canonical Effect Descriptor | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Protected Enforcement Domain | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Mandatory conditions satisfied? NO: deny / hold / | | reconcile | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 74] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | YES: scoped non-bearer finality enablement | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Receiving-platform Finality Sink: reconstruct actual | | operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Sink-local authority and consumption check | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Actual consequence through a covered path | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Qualified outcome evidence / recovery | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Controls only effect paths the sink actually covers. Figure 2: Whole cross-platform protected architecture Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 75] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Android app builds Candidate Act | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Keystore-backed evidence of app and device | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Adapter -> canonical descriptor | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Protected domain verifies authority | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | iOS-side service sink reconstructs request | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Sink on the receiving side; ordinary apps do not mediate other apps. Figure 3: Android-to-iOS consequential operation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 76] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | iOS app builds Candidate Act | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Keychain / Secure Enclave evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Adapter -> canonical descriptor | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Protected domain verifies authority | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Android-side sink reconstructs request | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: No private kernel hooks are assumed. Figure 4: iOS-to-Android operation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 77] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Windows or Linux workload | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Workload identity and TPM/key evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Descriptor of cloud API effect | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Protected domain: policy, revocation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Cloud resource gate reconstructs API call | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Effect; outcome evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: A direct cloud credential outside the gate is an uncovered path. Figure 5: Windows/Linux to cloud resource Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 78] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Native permission or entitlement | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Platform adapter (qualified) | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Effect-specific authority claim | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Compare with canonical semantics | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Translation result: equivalent / narrower / reject | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Permission names are not assumed equivalent. Figure 6: Cross-platform authority translation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 79] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Native operation request | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Resolve effective resource, beneficiary, parameters | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Normalize (units, encoding, aliases) | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Reject unknown critical fields | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Bind to authority, policy, revocation generations | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Descriptor digest and protected record | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: A valid hash of a wrongly built descriptor proves nothing about meaning. Figure 7: Canonical effect-descriptor construction Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 80] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Security component and controlled resource | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Determine observed vs blocking vs consumption control | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Check generation and trust assumptions | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | List known alternate effect routes | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Qualified / partial / unresolved / disqualified | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Unavailable blocking leads to restriction or withholding, not silent weakening. Figure 8: Platform enforcement-capability qualification Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 81] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Interface offers notification or logs? | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Yes: classify as observation only | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Interface can refuse the operation? | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Yes: blocking candidate; check coverage | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Move enforcement to a resource-side gateway if not | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Product names do not decide the class. Figure 9: Observation-only versus blocking interfaces Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 82] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Local protected authority holds enablement | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Send operation-specific non-bearer enablement | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Destination sink reconstructs actual operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Check current authority and consumption | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Permit or refuse | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: The local authority is not the destination sink. Figure 10: Protected local authority and destination sink Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 83] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Workload requests credential use | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Broker checks operation binding | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Broker activates operation-bound credential | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Downstream resource enforces scope | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Other credential copies remain uncovered | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Broker does not control other copies of credentials. Figure 11: Credential broker with downstream enforcement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 84] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Provider A agent holds authority | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Delegation lineage record with attenuation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Provider B agent receives bounded scope | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Descriptor and enablement per operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Sink verifies lineage | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Scope can only narrow. Figure 12: Cross-provider AI-agent delegation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 85] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Verified descriptor | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Create enablement bound to operation, sink, state | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Enablement is not a bearer token | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Sink checks binding at use | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Used once; consumed | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Possession alone confers no authority. Figure 13: Scoped non-bearer enablement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 86] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Authority generation N | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Revocation event raises epoch | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Sink compares epoch at effect time | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Older epoch: refuse | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Record decision | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: No global instant revocation is assumed. Figure 14: Authority and revocation epochs Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 87] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Enablement presented | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Check monotonic consumption state | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Unconsumed: mark consumed atomically | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Consumed: refuse | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Crash: unknown stays unresolved | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Consumption state must survive crashes. Figure 15: Protected replay and use consumption Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 88] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Identify unfinished operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Authenticate target environment | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Move computational context (not authority) | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | New ownership generation; fence source | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Destination reconstructs scope and verifies pending | | operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Reconcile partial failure | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: State movement is not authority transfer. Figure 16: Source-to-destination migration Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 89] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Source owner generation N | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Fencing request or evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Source confirms or sink rejects older generation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Loss of contact is not proof of fencing | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Destination generation N+1 active | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Fencing is evidenced, not assumed. Figure 17: Source-device fencing Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 90] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Offline lease with bounded scope | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Clock uncertainty bounds applied | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Operate within limits | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Reconnect: reconcile revocations | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Past limits: refuse | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Offline limits are explicit. Figure 18: Offline authority and delayed revocation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 91] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Operation split into phases | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Phase 1 independently authorized | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Bounded real effect through a sink | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Qualified evidence obtained | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Validator evaluates evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: A test simulation is not a real first effect. Figure 19: CW-2 bounded real effect +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Accepted effect receipt | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Receipt becomes causal condition for phase 2 | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Successor sink checks receipt-dependent authority | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Missing, stale or contradicted: no successor effect | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: A validator is not an unrestricted credential. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 92] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Figure 20: CW-2 receipt-constituted continuation +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Cumulative actual effect vs original scope | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Independent security signals correlated | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Risk-adaptive suspension | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Exact changed consequence presented | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Approval bound to actual effect; limited renewed | | authority | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Approval does not override unrelated mandatory protections. Figure 21: CW-3 detected deviation and reauthorization Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 93] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Agent A and B propose effects | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Effect footprints compared | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Atomic reservation at sink | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Conflict: one proceeds, one held | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Sink-bound fencing | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Reservation is not execution authority. Figure 22: Cross-agent conflict reservation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 94] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | User sees object label | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Resolve to actual resource identity | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Bind in descriptor | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Re-resolve at effect time | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Changed referent: refuse | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Names do not identify effective resources. Figure 23: Resource alias and semantic referent Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 95] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Tool or runtime updated | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Generation changes | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Authority bound to old generation invalid | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Revalidate contracts and policy | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Resume under new authority only | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Updates are consequential transitions. Figure 24: Tool-runtime update and policy revalidation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 96] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Operation inside sandbox | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Crosses sandbox boundary | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Boundary effect check | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Separate controller decides | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Independent effect evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: A sandbox does not control an external service that accepts the credential. Figure 25: Sandbox escape-effect boundary Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 97] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Effects across resources R1..Rn | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Per-sink commit results | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Partial commit detected | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Compensation as separate Candidate Act | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Reconcile; no atomicity promised | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Compensation needs its own authority. Figure 26: Multi-resource partial-commit reconciliation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 98] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Candidate irreversible command | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Hazard and state evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Pre-effect hazard check | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Fail: contain and hold | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Pass: scoped enablement; observe effect | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Not a safety certification. Figure 27: Irreversible physical-effect hazard qualification Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 99] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Observer reports effect | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Check observer qualification and coverage | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Independent attestation or second source | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Conflict: UNRESOLVED | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Evidence record | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Misleading observers are assumed possible. Figure 28: Compromised-observer evidence checking Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 100] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Several principals and owners | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Collect applicable policies | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Apply precedence rules | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Mandatory consent present? | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Permit or hold | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Unresolved conflict withholds the effect. Figure 29: Policy precedence among several resource owners Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 101] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Authorization record | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Consumption record | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Outcome evidence | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Closure check for the selected operation | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Closed or open with reasons | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: Closure requires all required evidence. Figure 30: Protected evidence and authorization closure Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 102] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Failure or crash | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Read journal and consumption state | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Outcome known? NO: indeterminate | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | Recovery Candidate Act (new authority) | +----------------------------------------------------------+ | v +----------------------------------------------------------+ | No blind replay | +----------------------------------------------------------+ Boundary: No universal rollback is promised. Figure 31: Failure, rollback and crash-consistent recovery Appendix D. Appendix D: Data Models and Pseudocode Records are transport-neutral field lists. No mandatory universal encoding is defined; CBOR or JSON may be used where an interoperability case justifies it. SourceAuthorityRecord original authority; principal; source platform; delegated scope; current generation; restrictions PlatformQualificationRecord native permission; actual security capability; protected component; effect-path scope; qualification generation CandidateActRecord proposed operation; original task; target; effect class; initiating workload CanonicalEffectDescriptor material executable effect semantics (see the main text) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 103] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 ProtectedValidationEvidence qualified source; predicate; current state; protected evidence ScopedFinalityEnablement operation-specific, sink-bound, non-bearer permission under protected state AuthorityTransferRecord source owner; destination owner; epochs; fencing evidence; transfer status ResourceSinkRecord sink identity; controlled effect path; operation visibility; consumption state PriorEffectReceipt qualified evidence of a bounded earlier effect ContinuationAuthorityRecord successor-specific, receipt-dependent authorization (CW-2) ReauthorizationRecord current revised permission (CW-3) OutcomeEvidenceRecord source-qualified effect evidence; unresolved outcome classification ClosureRecord required enforcement, authorization, consumption and outcome evidence for the operation FUNCTION SINK_DECIDE(enablement, pending_op, state): desc = RECONSTRUCT(pending_op) IF desc IS NONE: RETURN REFUSE_UNRESOLVED IF DIGEST(desc) != enablement.descriptor_digest: RETURN REFUSE IF enablement.sink != SELF: RETURN REFUSE IF state.revocation_epoch > enablement.revocation_gen: RETURN REFUSE IF state.owner_generation != enablement.owner_gen: RETURN REFUSE IF NOT COVERED_PATH(pending_op): RETURN REFUSE_NOT_COVERED IF NOT CONSUME_ATOMIC(enablement.id): RETURN REFUSE_CONSUMED RETURN PERMIT Figure 32: Finality Sink decision (illustrative) Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 104] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 FUNCTION QUALIFY(component, op_class): caps = MEASURE_CAPABILITIES(component) IF NOT caps.can_block: RETURN DISQUALIFIED_FOR_BLOCKING IF ALTERNATE_ROUTES(component, op_class): RETURN PARTIAL IF NOT FRESH(component.generation): RETURN UNRESOLVED RETURN QUALIFIED Figure 33: Enforcement qualification (illustrative) FUNCTION MIGRATE(op, source, dest): IF NOT AUTHENTICATED(dest): RETURN ABORT gen = NEW_OWNER_GENERATION(op) IF NOT FENCED(source, gen): RETURN HOLD_UNRESOLVED scope = RECONSTRUCT_SCOPE(op, dest) enable = ISSUE_ENABLEMENT(op, dest, gen, scope) RETURN enable // state copy confers no authority Figure 34: Cross-device migration (illustrative) FUNCTION BUILD_DESCRIPTOR(native_op): r = RESOLVE_EFFECTIVE_RESOURCE(native_op) FOR f IN CRITICAL_FIELDS(native_op.class): IF f NOT IN native_op: RETURN REJECT d = NORMALIZE(native_op, r) IF HAS_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL(d): RETURN REJECT RETURN d Figure 35: Descriptor construction (illustrative) Appendix E. Appendix E: Threats and Negative Tests Sixty threats. Embodiment references are the editor's mapping. Fields for failure response, residual risk and actual-effect observation use common wording; attacker capability, boundary, invariant, check and test are specific to each entry. Tests are ideas, not executed results. E.1. 1. Authenticated but unauthorized operation Attacker capability Holds valid credentials Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment E15 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 105] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Protected invariant Authentication is not operation authority Required technical check Sink reconstructs operation and checks scoped enablement Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Valid credential, no enablement: effect refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.2. 2. Source permission incorrectly translated Attacker capability Misconfigured or malicious adapter Affected boundary Adapter Relevant embodiment E6 Protected invariant Translation preserves meaning Required technical check Qualify adapter generation; compare descriptor to native evidence Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 106] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Concrete test Adapter widens scope: validation fails Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.3. 3. Overbroad destination permission Attacker capability Destination grants more than source Affected boundary Destination sink Relevant embodiment E9 Protected invariant Destination scope <= source scope Required technical check Reconstruct destination scope from source authority Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Broader destination right: not enabled Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.4. 4. Native entitlement mistaken for final authority Attacker capability App with entitlement Affected boundary Platform Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 107] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Relevant embodiment E15 Protected invariant Entitlement is advice, not finality Required technical check Require scoped non-bearer enablement Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Entitled app without enablement: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.5. 5. Valid credential used on wrong target Attacker capability Holds credential Affected boundary Resource Relevant embodiment E21 Protected invariant Effective resource identity matches Required technical check Resolve actual resource at the sink Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 108] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Credential for A used on B: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.6. 6. Malicious authorization adapter Attacker capability Controls an adapter Affected boundary Adapter Relevant embodiment E38 Protected invariant Adapters are qualified, not trusted by default Required technical check Independent attestation of adapter generation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Unqualified adapter: UNRESOLVED Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.7. 7. Missing critical effect fields Attacker capability Omits fields Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 109] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Affected boundary Descriptor Relevant embodiment E6 Protected invariant Unknown or missing critical fields reject Required technical check Reject on missing critical field Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Drop beneficiary field: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.8. 8. Semantic mismatch between platforms Attacker capability Exploits differing meaning Affected boundary Adapter/descriptor Relevant embodiment E6 Protected invariant Equivalence is semantic, not syntactic Required technical check Contract-compatibility validation Failure response Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 110] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Same name, different effect: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.9. 9. Invalid resource alias Attacker capability Alias manipulation Affected boundary Resource Relevant embodiment E21 Protected invariant Alias resolves to approved resource Required technical check Resolve at effectuation time Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Alias rebinding: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 111] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E.10. 10. Redirected destination Attacker capability Redirect injection Affected boundary Destination Relevant embodiment E21 Protected invariant Final destination equals approved Required technical check Check effective destination Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Redirect to other host: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.11. 11. Wrong effective principal Attacker capability Confuses principals Affected boundary Delegation Relevant embodiment E7 Protected invariant Effective principal equals authorised Required technical check Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 112] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Bind principal in descriptor Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Delegate acts as other principal: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.12. 12. Delegation scope expansion Attacker capability Nested agent Affected boundary Delegation chain Relevant embodiment E28 Protected invariant Attenuation only Required technical check Verify lineage attenuation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Child exceeds parent: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 113] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.13. 13. Forged agent authority Attacker capability Forger Affected boundary Delegation Relevant embodiment E7 Protected invariant Authority has verifiable lineage Required technical check Verify cryptographic lineage Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Forged delegation: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.14. 14. Agent self-reported success Attacker capability Agent Affected boundary Evidence Relevant embodiment E4 Protected invariant Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 114] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Self-report is not qualified evidence Required technical check Require source-qualified evidence Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Self-reported success: UNRESOLVED Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.15. 15. Untrusted tool-output instruction Attacker capability Tool output author Affected boundary Model-driven execution Relevant embodiment E24 Protected invariant Output is data, not authority Required technical check Track instruction provenance Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 115] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Output instructs transfer: no enablement Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.16. 16. Prompt injection Attacker capability Injected text Affected boundary Model input Relevant embodiment E24 Protected invariant Instruction authority has provenance Required technical check Provenance check before effect Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Injected instruction cannot enable Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.17. 17. Tool-runtime substitution Attacker capability Swaps runtime Affected boundary Tool lifecycle Relevant embodiment Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 116] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E26 Protected invariant Runtime generation continuity Required technical check Revalidate on generation change Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Swapped runtime: revalidate Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.18. 18. Changed executable generation Attacker capability Updates tool Affected boundary Runtime Relevant embodiment E10 Protected invariant Authority bound to generation Required technical check Effectuation-time generation check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 117] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Old authority on new generation: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.19. 19. Stale model or algorithm fingerprint Attacker capability Model drift Affected boundary Runtime Relevant embodiment E10 Protected invariant Fingerprint current at effect time Required technical check Compare fingerprint at sink Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Stale fingerprint: revalidate Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.20. 20. Incomplete enforcement coverage Attacker capability Uses uncovered path Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 118] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Affected boundary Coverage Relevant embodiment E14 Protected invariant Claims limited to covered paths Required technical check Coverage controller reports paths Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Uncovered path: claim not made Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.21. 21. Observation-only interface misclassified as blocking Attacker capability Misclassification Affected boundary Qualification Relevant embodiment E14 Protected invariant Capability classes differ Required technical check Qualification record Failure response Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 119] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Monitor API marked blocking: disqualify Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.22. 22. Alternate API bypass Attacker capability Uses another API Affected boundary Effect path Relevant embodiment E14 Protected invariant All effect paths covered or disclosed Required technical check Path discovery and coverage Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Alternate API used: detected or disclosed Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 120] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E.23. 23. Exported secret used outside broker Attacker capability Exports secret Affected boundary Credential custody Relevant embodiment E23 Protected invariant Non-exportable custody Required technical check Broker-bound activation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Exported key: not accepted by sink Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.24. 24. Stale source device after migration Attacker capability Old device Affected boundary Source Relevant embodiment E9 Protected invariant Source fenced Required technical check Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 121] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Fence and generation check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Old device acts: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.25. 25. Snapshot authority resurrection Attacker capability Restores snapshot Affected boundary Migration Relevant embodiment E27 Protected invariant State copy is not authority Required technical check Generation fencing Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Restored worker refused Actual-effect observation requirement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 122] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.26. 26. Duplicate cross-device execution Attacker capability Two devices Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment E9 Protected invariant Single owner generation Required technical check Sink consumption check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Second execution refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.27. 27. Unverified source fencing Attacker capability Claims fenced Affected boundary Source Relevant embodiment E9 Protected invariant Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 123] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Fencing is evidenced Required technical check Require fencing evidence Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test No evidence: UNRESOLVED Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.28. 28. Destination-side weaker enforcement Attacker capability Weak destination Affected boundary Destination Relevant embodiment E9 Protected invariant Enforcement capability equivalent or restricted Required technical check Qualification comparison Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 124] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Weaker destination: restrict or withhold Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.29. 29. Cross-domain token replay Attacker capability Replays token Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment E15 Protected invariant Non-bearer enablement Required technical check Bind to operation and sink Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Replay elsewhere: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.30. 30. Consumed authorization replay Attacker capability Replays consumed Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 125] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E16 Protected invariant One-time consumption Required technical check Monotonic consumption Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Second use: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.31. 31. Revocation epoch rollback Attacker capability Rolls back state Affected boundary Revocation Relevant embodiment E18 Protected invariant Epochs monotonic Required technical check Verify epoch monotonicity Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 126] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Older epoch: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.32. 32. Cached permission after revocation Attacker capability Uses cache Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment E18 Protected invariant Revocation checked at effect Required technical check Check current revocation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Cached allow after revoke: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.33. 33. Offline stale authority Attacker capability Disconnected device Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 127] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Affected boundary Offline Relevant embodiment E35 Protected invariant Offline limits explicit Required technical check Bounded offline authority Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Past limit: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.34. 34. Incorrect lease expiry Attacker capability Clock error Affected boundary Lease Relevant embodiment E17 Protected invariant Lease honours clock uncertainty Required technical check Use uncertainty bounds Failure response Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 128] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Near expiry: conservative Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.35. 35. Clock manipulation Attacker capability Alters clock Affected boundary Time Relevant embodiment E17 Protected invariant Time not solely trusted Required technical check Independent time or counters Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Skewed clock: reject Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 129] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E.36. 36. Conflicting resource owners Attacker capability Competing owners Affected boundary Resource Relevant embodiment E30 Protected invariant Precedence resolved Required technical check Owner consent check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Conflicting owners: UNRESOLVED Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.37. 37. Missing mandatory owner consent Attacker capability Omits owner Affected boundary Resource Relevant embodiment E39 Protected invariant Mandatory consent present Required technical check Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 130] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Consent check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test No consent: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.38. 38. Resource quota oversubscription Attacker capability Parallel requests Affected boundary Budget Relevant embodiment E22 Protected invariant Cumulative limits Required technical check Atomic reservation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Over budget: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 131] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.39. 39. Concurrent effect conflict Attacker capability Concurrent actors Affected boundary Sink Relevant embodiment E11 Protected invariant Version-bound reservations Required technical check Sink commit validation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Conflict: one refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.40. 40. Unauthorized tool-chain continuation Attacker capability Skips step Affected boundary Workflow Relevant embodiment E20 Protected invariant Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 132] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Dependencies satisfied Required technical check Dependency-bound authority Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Skipped step: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.41. 41. Missing prior-effect receipt Attacker capability Omits receipt Affected boundary CW-2 Relevant embodiment E2 Protected invariant Receipt required for continuation Required technical check Successor sink checks receipt Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 133] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 No receipt: no successor effect Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.42. 42. Replayed Interim Effectuation Validator receipt Attacker capability Replays Affected boundary CW-2 Relevant embodiment E2 Protected invariant Receipt bound to phase and operation Required technical check Bind receipt context Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Replayed receipt: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.43. 43. Wrong validator identity Attacker capability Impersonates validator Affected boundary CW-2 Relevant embodiment Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 134] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E2 Protected invariant Validator identity authenticated Required technical check Identity check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Wrong validator: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.44. 44. Untrusted human approval interface Attacker capability Spoofed UI Affected boundary Approval Relevant embodiment E19 Protected invariant Approval bound to actual operation Required technical check Authenticated interface state Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 135] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Spoofed UI: not accepted Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.45. 45. Changed actual operation after approval Attacker capability Mutates request Affected boundary Approval Relevant embodiment E19 Protected invariant Approved equals executed Required technical check Sink reconstruction Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Post-approval change: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.46. 46. Credential rotation race Attacker capability Race Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 136] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Affected boundary Credential Relevant embodiment E31 Protected invariant Generation fencing Required technical check Generation check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Old generation: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.47. 47. Secret-custody compromise Attacker capability Compromises custody Affected boundary Custody Relevant embodiment E23 Protected invariant Custody qualification Required technical check Attest custody Failure response Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 137] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Unqualified custody: restrict Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.48. 48. Policy update self-authorization Attacker capability Agent edits policy Affected boundary Policy Relevant embodiment E33 Protected invariant Mutations not self-authorizing Required technical check Independent approval of policy change Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Self-approved change: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 138] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E.49. 49. Sandbox-to-host privilege transition Attacker capability Escapes sandbox Affected boundary Sandbox Relevant embodiment E25 Protected invariant Effects crossing boundary checked Required technical check Boundary effect check Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Escaping op: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.50. 50. Hardware command bypass Attacker capability Direct device access Affected boundary Hardware Relevant embodiment E14 Protected invariant Command path coverage Required technical check Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 139] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hardware gate or disclose gap Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Direct command: refused or disclosed Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.51. 51. Device reset and queue replay Attacker capability Resets device Affected boundary Hardware Relevant embodiment E16 Protected invariant No replay after reset Required technical check Persistent consumption Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Replayed queue: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 140] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.52. 52. Privacy-budget overflow Attacker capability Many small disclosures Affected boundary Privacy Relevant embodiment E8 Protected invariant Cumulative exposure Required technical check Compositional budget Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Aggregate over limit: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.53. 53. Misleading observer evidence Attacker capability Observer lies Affected boundary Evidence Relevant embodiment E38 Protected invariant Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 141] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Observer qualification Required technical check Independent attestation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Misleading evidence: UNRESOLVED Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.54. 54. Forged remote-effect receipt Attacker capability Forger Affected boundary Evidence Relevant embodiment E4 Protected invariant Receipt from source-authoritative signer Required technical check Verify signer capability Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 142] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Receipt outside signer observation: not accepted Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.55. 55. Lost acknowledgment Attacker capability Network loss Affected boundary Recovery Relevant embodiment E16 Protected invariant Unknown outcome stays unknown Required technical check Indeterminate state Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test No ack: UNRESOLVED, no blind retry Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.56. 56. Duplicate recovery execution Attacker capability Repeated recovery Affected boundary Recovery Relevant embodiment Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 143] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 E12 Protected invariant Recovery authority non-replayable Required technical check Consume recovery authority Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Second recovery: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.57. 57. Partial multi-resource effect Attacker capability Partial failure Affected boundary Transaction Relevant embodiment E36 Protected invariant Partial state contained Required technical check Cross-sink reconciliation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 144] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Partial commit: contained Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.58. 58. Unauthorized compensation Attacker capability Rolls back without authority Affected boundary Recovery Relevant embodiment E12 Protected invariant Compensation separately authorised Required technical check Compensation Candidate Act Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Unauthorised rollback: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.59. 59. Irreversible unsafe operation Attacker capability Triggers irreversible act Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 145] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Affected boundary Physical Relevant embodiment E37 Protected invariant Hazard check before effect Required technical check Consequence-bound hazard validation Failure response Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Unsafe irreversible: refused Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. E.60. 60. Unverified formal evidence closure Attacker capability Claims closure Affected boundary Closure Relevant embodiment E40 Protected invariant Closure requires evidence Required technical check Closure record check Failure response Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 146] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection. Residual risk Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact. Concrete test Missing evidence: not closed Actual-effect observation requirement Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success. Appendix F. Appendix F: Examiner Keywords and Search Phrases Non-normative. Terms were composed by the editor from the claims, embodiment subjects and the source's own term lists, with industry synonyms added. Clusters map to embodiment and claim ranges at cluster level, not term by term. Keywords (214): +==================+=============+=================================+ | Cluster | Embodiments | Keywords | | | / claims | | +==================+=============+=================================+ | Core | 1-60 | Protected Execution Finality, | | architecture | | Candidate Act, Actual Pending | | | | Operation, Non-Effective State, | | | | Protected Enforcement Domain, | | | | Finality Gate, Finality Sink, | | | | Scoped Finality Authority, Non- | | | | Bearer Execution Handle, | | | | Consequence-Bound | | | | Authorization, Source-Authority | | | | Envelope, Actual-Effect | | | | Reconstruction, execution | | | | finality, policy enforcement | | | | point, resource-side | | | | enforcement, operation | | | | reconstruction, authorization- | | | | to-effect translation | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Cross-platform | 1, 31, 43 | Cross-Platform Execution | | interoperability | | Authority, Android iOS | | | | Interoperability, Heterogeneous | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 147] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | Authorization Semantics, | | | | Permission Translation, | | | | Canonical Effect Descriptor, | | | | Native Security Substrate, | | | | Cross-Platform Effect | | | | Equivalence, Destination-Side | | | | Enforcement, Receiving-Platform | | | | Verification, heterogeneous | | | | operating systems, mobile | | | | desktop cloud embedded, vendor- | | | | independent security semantics, | | | | cross-OS authorization, | | | | permission mapping, entitlement | | | | mapping, capability translation | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Platform | 1-52 | Enforcement-Capability | | assurance | | Qualification, Mandatory | | | | Blocking Capability, | | | | Observation-Only Security | | | | Interface, Effectuation-Path | | | | Coverage, Alternative Effect | | | | Path, Credential Broker, | | | | Protected Application | | | | Dispatcher, Source Security | | | | Evidence, Protected Service | | | | Identity, policy decision | | | | point, security API capability, | | | | coverage gap, bypass path, | | | | mandatory access control, | | | | hardware-backed keystore, | | | | StrongBox, Secure Enclave, TPM, | | | | HSM, KMS | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Autonomous | E7, E20, | Cross-Provider Agent | | agents | E24, E28 | Delegation, Agent Tool | | | | Execution, MCP Security, Agent- | | | | to-Agent Authorization, Multi- | | | | Agent Orchestration, Tool | | | | Semantic Continuity, Agent | | | | Handoff, AI Runtime Security, | | | | Agent Context Migration, Nested | | | | Tool Authority, agent sandbox, | | | | tool gateway, prompt injection, | | | | tool-output provenance, agent | | | | SDK, A2A, Model Context | | | | Protocol, delegation chain, | | | | transitive attenuation, agent | | | | identity | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 148] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Cryptographic | E15, E23 | Sender-Constrained Capability, | | authorization | | Scope-Limited Authorization, | | | | Protected Consumption, | | | | Revocation Epoch, Authority | | | | Generation, Replay-Resistant | | | | Permission, Trusted Execution | | | | Environment, Hardware-Rooted | | | | Authority, Attestation, proof | | | | of possession, DPoP, token | | | | exchange, rich authorization | | | | request, CBOR, COSE, JWT, CWT, | | | | mutual TLS, workload identity, | | | | capability token, one-time | | | | authorization | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Resource and | E21, E34, | Resource Alias Binding, Dynamic | | identity | E9 | Namespace Rebinding, Object | | continuity | | Identity, Redirect | | | | Verification, Original Source | | | | Principal, Resource Ownership | | | | Epoch, Cross-Device Authority | | | | Migration, Stale Source | | | | Fencing, Snapshot Resurrection, | | | | effective resource identity, | | | | URL normalization, service | | | | discovery identity, alias | | | | resolution, namespace | | | | rebinding, ownership | | | | generation, fencing token, | | | | lease, generation counter, | | | | device handoff, session | | | | continuity | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Evidence and | E2, E4, | Authenticated Effect Evidence, | | outcome | E16, E38 | Interim Effectuation Validator, | | | | Evidence-Carrying Receipt, | | | | Receipt-Gated Continuation, | | | | Actual Effect Witness, Remote | | | | Outcome Reconciliation, Crash- | | | | Consistent Effect Journal, | | | | Unknown Outcome, Effect | | | | Provenance, indeterminate | | | | outcome, idempotency key, | | | | transactional outbox, write- | | | | ahead journal, receipt | | | | validation, observer | | | | attestation, compromised | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 149] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | observer, outcome evidence, | | | | audit log, saga, compensation | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Privacy and | E8, E19, | Cumulative Privacy Exposure, | | safety | E37 | Compositional Disclosure | | | | Budget, Physical Hazard | | | | Validation, Irreversible | | | | Effect, Secure Human Approval, | | | | Transaction-Bound Consent, | | | | Protected Recovery Authority, | | | | Non-Compensable Consequence, | | | | data egress control, privacy | | | | budget, differential | | | | disclosure, secure display, | | | | what-you-see-is-what-you-sign, | | | | human-in-the-loop approval, | | | | consent binding, hazard check, | | | | safety interlock, physical | | | | actuator, recipient change, | | | | selective disclosure | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Formal assurance | E40 | Enforcement Composition Graph, | | | | Protected Authority-Consumption | | | | Invariant, Effect-Path | | | | Reachability, Cross-Domain | | | | Safety Invariant, Machine- | | | | Checkable Finality, Formal | | | | State Transition, Negative | | | | Effect Verification, model | | | | checking, TLA+, invariant, | | | | reachability analysis, state | | | | machine verification, closure | | | | condition, proof obligation, | | | | safety property, liveness | | | | property, refinement, temporal | | | | logic, finality closure, | | | | coverage proof | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Distributed and | E1, E11, | effect conflict arbitration, | | concurrency | E13, E22, | atomic reservation, version- | | | E29 | bound reservation, quorum, | | | | Byzantine agreement, consensus, | | | | approval quorum, resource | | | | quota, cumulative budget, | | | | delegated quota, sink-local | | | | commit, optimistic concurrency, | | | | compare-and-swap, two-phase | | | | commit, distributed lock, lease | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 150] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | | expiry, clock uncertainty, | | | | delayed revocation, offline | | | | operation, network partition | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ | Runtime and | E10, E14, | model drift, runtime | | lifecycle | E25, E26, | generation, algorithm | | | E33 | fingerprint, tool update, | | | | installation attestation, | | | | supply-chain integrity, sandbox | | | | escape, privilege transition, | | | | container boundary, policy | | | | evolution, configuration drift, | | | | change-impact analysis, non- | | | | self-authorizing mutation, | | | | effectuation-path discovery, | | | | bypass detection, runtime | | | | revalidation, software bill of | | | | materials, secure boot, | | | | measured boot, remote | | | | attestation | +------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+ Table 5 Compound phrases (110): +================+=================================================+ | Cluster | Phrases | +================+=================================================+ | Core | protected execution finality; candidate act in | | | non-effective state; actual pending operation | | | reconstruction; scoped non-bearer finality | | | enablement; finality sink verification; | | | protected enforcement domain; consequence-bound | | | authorization; authorization-to-effect | | | translation; source authority envelope; actual | | | effect reconstruction | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Cross-platform | cross-platform execution authority; Android iOS | | | effect authorization; heterogeneous | | | authorization semantics; permission translation | | | adapter; canonical effect descriptor; native | | | security substrate; destination-side finality | | | verification; receiving-platform sink; cross- | | | platform effect equivalence; vendor-independent | | | authority semantics | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Platform | enforcement capability qualification; mandatory | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 151] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | blocking capability; observation-only security | | | interface; effectuation path coverage; | | | alternate effect path; credential broker | | | downstream enforcement; protected application | | | dispatcher; source security evidence; platform | | | qualification record; unavailable enforcement | | | non-effective | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Agents | cross-provider agent delegation; agent tool | | | execution authorization; MCP protected | | | operation semantics; agent-to-agent authority; | | | tool contract evolution; tool semantic | | | continuity; agent handoff authority; nested | | | tool authority attenuation; model-driven tool | | | output provenance; agent sandbox privilege | | | transition | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Cryptographic | sender-constrained capability; scope-limited | | | authorization; protected authority consumption; | | | revocation epoch check; authority generation | | | counter; replay-resistant operation permission; | | | hardware-rooted finality; non-exportable | | | credential custody; one-time execution | | | authorization; operation-bound broker | | | activation | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Identity | resource alias binding; dynamic namespace | | | rebinding; effective resource identity; | | | redirect destination verification; original | | | source principal; resource ownership epoch; | | | cross-device authority migration; stale source | | | fencing; snapshot authority resurrection; non- | | | resurrectable in-flight effect | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Evidence | authenticated effect evidence; interim | | | effectuation validator; receipt-gated | | | continuation; evidence-carrying receipt; actual | | | effect witness; remote outcome reconciliation; | | | crash-consistent finality journal; | | | indeterminate outcome handling; effect | | | provenance chain; compromised observer | | | containment | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Privacy and | cumulative privacy exposure; compositional | | safety | disclosure budget; physical hazard validation; | | | irreversible effect containment; transaction- | | | bound human approval; protected recovery | | | authority; non-compensable consequence; | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 152] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | | authenticated presentation state; secure | | | approval interface; scope-limited disclosure | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Formal | enforcement composition graph; authority | | | consumption invariant; effect path | | | reachability; cross-domain safety invariant; | | | machine-checkable finality closure; negative | | | effect verification; formal state transition | | | model; closure record verification; coverage | | | revalidation; bypass detection | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Distributed | cross-agent effect conflict arbitration; atomic | | | effect reservation; sink-bound fencing; | | | version-bound reservation; independent approval | | | quorum; consensus-to-effect separation; multi- | | | resource budget; delegated quota; partial | | | commit containment; independently authorized | | | compensation | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | Runtime | model algorithm drift revalidation; tool | | | runtime lifecycle authority; installation-time | | | authority attestation; policy mutation non- | | | self-authorizing; configuration change impact; | | | credential rotation generation fencing; offline | | | effect authority; delayed revocation | | | propagation; conflicting policy precedence; | | | resource owner change revocation race | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------+ Table 6 Boolean search phrases (25): 1. "cross platform" AND "execution finality" 2. "Android" AND "iOS" AND "effect authorization" 3. "heterogeneous operating systems" AND "authority continuity" 4. "permission translation" AND "actual operation" 5. "canonical effect descriptor" AND "enforcement" 6. "native permission" AND "consequence bound" 7. "source authority" AND "receiving platform" 8. "destination side" AND "finality verification" Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 153] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 9. "cross device migration" AND "source fencing" 10. "execution ownership epoch" AND "revocation" 11. "non bearer capability" AND "effectuation" 12. "effect path coverage" AND "alternative credential" 13. "agent tool" AND "execution time authorization" 14. "MCP" AND "protected operation semantics" 15. "tool contract evolution" AND "authority" 16. "credential broker" AND "actual effect" 17. "agent delegation" AND "non transferable authority" 18. "receipt gated continuation" AND "actual effect" 19. "resource alias" AND "authorization correspondence" 20. "human approval" AND "transaction bound" 21. "runtime update" AND "finality authority" 22. "sandbox" AND "escaping operation" 23. "offline authority" AND "delayed revocation" 24. "policy mutation" AND "non self authorizing" 25. "cross domain evidence" AND "authority consumption" Examiner discussion, to be tested against the filed texts and not decided here: the objective technical problem (keeping protected authority meaningful for an actual effect across platforms); motivation to combine the established mechanisms of the prior-art table; reasonable expectation of success given the platform limits described; functional interdependence of descriptor, qualification, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; and avoidance of hindsight. Isolated well-known mechanisms are not claimed as novel. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 154] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Appendix G. Appendix G: Industry and Product Mapping Prospective, non-normative. The rows describe where a check of this kind would sit if integrated, and what it would examine. Product capabilities were not verified against current official documentation in this session, and no adoption, endorsement, implementation, copying or infringement is asserted. The alignment is AI-generated and must be cross-checked against the original PCT filings. Latency and legacy compatibility depend on the loop tier and on whether an existing resource-side gate exists; required changes are the addition of operation reconstruction and consumption at the sink. G.1. Apple (iOS, iPadOS, macOS) Proposed integration boundary App-level dispatcher with Secure Enclave-held keys, and a server- side resource sink What is checked or rejected Operation-specific enablement tied to the reconstructed request Residual bypass risk Calls using app-held credentials outside the dispatcher Why it matters Platform identity of an app does not name the exact effect Unknown or not verifiable No system-wide interception by ordinary apps G.2. Google Android Proposed integration boundary App dispatcher with Keystore/StrongBox keys; enterprise-managed gateways; server sink What is checked or rejected Same, plus device-state evidence Residual bypass risk Unmanaged routes and exported credentials Why it matters Different OEM capabilities need qualification records Unknown or not verifiable Ordinary apps cannot mediate other apps Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 155] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 G.3. Microsoft Windows and Azure Proposed integration boundary Protected service broker with TPM-backed keys; Azure resource-side checks What is checked or rejected Operation binding and revocation generation Residual bypass risk Principals that can export credentials Why it matters Identity differs from operation-specific authority Unknown or not verifiable Local administrators outside the broker G.4. Linux ecosystems Proposed integration boundary Resource controller with workload identity and LSM/seccomp confinement What is checked or rejected Operation reconstruction at the controller Residual bypass risk Direct credentials held by workloads Why it matters Process confinement does not know the effect Unknown or not verifiable Fully compromised kernel G.5. Samsung, Qualcomm, MediaTek Proposed integration boundary Hardware-backed key stores and TEEs as enforcement substrate What is checked or rejected Attestable enforcement generation Residual bypass risk Normal-world paths Why it matters Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 156] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Capability differs by chipset and OEM Unknown or not verifiable Chipset firmware behaviour G.6. OpenAI Agents SDK Proposed integration boundary Tool-call dispatcher gate before executing a tool with consequences What is checked or rejected Canonical effect descriptor and enablement per call Residual bypass risk Direct API keys held by the tool Why it matters Tool names do not identify effects Unknown or not verifiable What a hosted tool does internally G.7. Anthropic Claude Agent SDK and MCP Proposed integration boundary Tool-dispatch layer and MCP server resource side What is checked or rejected Operation provenance and tool contract version Residual bypass risk Credentials available outside the dispatcher Why it matters Tool-output text is data, not authority Unknown or not verifiable Server-side behaviour not exposed G.8. Google ADK and A2A Proposed integration boundary Delegation hand-off between agents What is checked or rejected Delegation lineage with attenuation Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 157] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Residual bypass risk Direct calls between agents outside the lineage Why it matters Cross-provider handoff must not widen scope Unknown or not verifiable Remote agent internal state G.9. Microsoft agent services Proposed integration boundary Agent runtime dispatcher with managed identity What is checked or rejected Runtime-generation revalidation Residual bypass risk Managed identity used elsewhere Why it matters Identity is not operation authority Unknown or not verifiable Service internals G.10. AWS agent systems and AWS cloud Proposed integration boundary Resource-side gate beside IAM; KMS-held keys What is checked or rejected Sink reconstruction of the API call Residual bypass risk Paths using unrestricted keys Why it matters IAM authorizes principals, not specific effect Unknown or not verifiable Services not routed through the gate G.11. Salesforce, IBM watsonx, Alibaba AgentScope Proposed integration boundary Agent action dispatcher Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 158] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 What is checked or rejected Action-contract compatibility Residual bypass risk Direct connectors Why it matters Different tool contracts under similar names Unknown or not verifiable Connector internals G.12. Oracle, IBM Cloud and other clouds Proposed integration boundary Resource gateway and HSM/KMS custody What is checked or rejected Consumed authorization and revocation epochs Residual bypass risk Other credential routes Why it matters Differing IAM semantics Unknown or not verifiable Provider internals G.13. Arm, Intel, AMD, NVIDIA Proposed integration boundary TEE or confidential-computing attestation as enforcement evidence What is checked or rejected Attested enforcement generation Residual bypass risk Effects after leaving the enclave Why it matters Attestation shows environment, not each effect Unknown or not verifiable Microarchitectural limits Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 159] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 G.14. SAP, ServiceNow, Databricks, Snowflake Proposed integration boundary Enterprise workflow or data-platform gate What is checked or rejected Dependency-bound workflow authority; disclosure budgets Residual bypass risk Direct database credentials Why it matters Data egress paths vary Unknown or not verifiable Platform-internal jobs G.15. Visa, Mastercard, Swift, payment processors Proposed integration boundary Payment execution gate beside the processor What is checked or rejected Reconstruction of amount, payee and currency; consumed once Residual bypass risk Alternate payment rails Why it matters Authorization of a payment is separate Unknown or not verifiable Settlement finality outside the gate G.16. Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, operators and Open RAN Proposed integration boundary Network-management and exposure gates What is checked or rejected Operation reconstruction and revocation propagation Residual bypass risk Vendor-private interfaces Why it matters Multi-vendor semantics differ Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 160] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Unknown or not verifiable Vendor-internal behaviour G.17. Siemens, Schneider Electric, industrial IoT and robotics Proposed integration boundary Actuator or command-controller gate What is checked or rejected Hazard check and irreversible-effect containment Residual bypass risk Direct actuator wiring Why it matters Not a safety certification Unknown or not verifiable Physical effects without sensors Appendix H. Appendix H: Mothership Comparison This table is the editor's preliminary sorting based on the work's own description of the earlier programme. The foundational JSON (Technical_Disclosure_1.json) was not available and the Datatracker drafts were not read, so no comparison of actual filed texts was done and no patentability or priority conclusion is made. +===================+=========================+==================+ | Concept | Relationship to earlier | Status | | | work | | +===================+=========================+==================+ | Candidate Acts, | Foundational | Not new in | | Non-Effective | (Mothership programme) | October | | State, Protected | | | | Enforcement | | | | Domains, Finality | | | | Sinks, scoped | | | | effect authority, | | | | revocation, anti- | | | | replay, actual- | | | | effect evidence | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Native-permission | Applies earlier | To examine | | semantic | principles to platforms | against filed | | differences | | texts | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Platform-specific | Specific implementation | To examine | Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 161] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 | authority | of authorization-to- | | | adapters | effect translation | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Canonical effect | Related to operation | Cross-platform | | descriptors | reconstruction | canonicalization | | | | issues may be | | | | additional | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Native | Potentially additional | To examine | | enforcement | | | | capability | | | | qualification | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Cross-platform | Potentially additional | To examine | | source-authority | | | | continuity | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Protected cross- | Potentially additional | To examine | | device authority | | | | ownership and | | | | stale-source | | | | fencing | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Unavailable | Honest limitation | To examine | | enforcement | handling | | | capabilities; | | | | credential-broker | | | | limitations | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Platform upgrade | Related to runtime | To examine | | and security API | lifecycle | | | changes | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Cross-provider | Application of | To examine | | AI-agent handoffs | delegation continuity | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Hardware and | Potentially additional | To examine | | software | | | | enforcement | | | | equivalence; | | | | partial coverage | | | | and alternative | | | | paths | | | +-------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ Table 7 Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 162] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 Appendix I. Appendix I: IPR and Research Lineage * Foundational: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2 ([PCT-055615]; read at [TDC-12542]). * This source: Indian provisional identified by the applicant as 202631127058, reported filed 25 October 2026 ([IN-127058]); not verified against an official acknowledgment. * Earlier applicant-reported Indian provisional references: 202631129178 (29 October 2026), 202631130246 (31 October 2026), 202631131650 (3 November 2026) and 202631136555 (15 November 2026). * Related drafts: draft-das-execution-finality-foundations, draft- das-agent-execution-finality, draft-das-receipt-gated-iev, draft- das-consequence-bound-execution-authority (status not checked). * Whether later claims benefit from the PCT priority is a legal question and not decided here. Appendix J. Appendix J: Source Verification and Limitations J.1. Source Verification * Source: 3,577-page PDF; text extracted with pdftotext; embodiment boundaries located from END OF EMBODIMENT markers; claims 1-60 parsed in sequence. * Duplicate E31: two full sections labelled Embodiment 31 (about pages 2567-2650 and 2650-2734). A sentence-level comparison found the same number of sentences in each, and the differences seen were whitespace and bullet-glyph artefacts of the extraction. They are treated as one embodiment. * CW-1 begins near page 15, CW-2 near page 63, CW-3 near page 119 and CW-IMP-1 near page 178 of the PDF; these were located but not read in full. * The source was read selectively. Per-embodiment fields, formal predicates, diagrams, machine-verifiable records, reference software and cross-embodiment combinations in the source were not individually extracted. * The application number and date are applicant-identified; the PDF signature date is 25 October 2026 and is not a certified acknowledgment. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 163] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 * Technical_Disclosure_1.json was not available; Datatracker drafts and vendor documentation were not read; RFC titles are from the editor's knowledge. * No code was executed and no tests or benchmarks are reported. J.2. Readiness Report and Limitations * Section prose, threats, examples, industry rows and platform notes are written by the editor from the work's own task description and general technical knowledge, not extracted from the 3,577 pages. * Overlap with the four earlier drafts must be checked before submission. * Formal IETF IPR disclosure is pending. J.3. Self-Audit 1. Correct October 25 PDF used (3,577 pages): yes. 2. All 40 distinct embodiments covered: yes, at the level stated in Appendix A. 3. Duplicate E31 not counted twice: yes. 4. Claims 1-60 included: yes (excerpts). 5. Independent claims 1, 31, 43 and 53 distinguished: yes. 6. CW-1, CW-2 and CW-3 kept separate: yes. 7. CW-IMP-1 summarised: yes, from the task description; the source section was located but not read in full. 8. Interoperability not confused with data exchange: yes. 9. Source authentication not equated with effect authority: yes. 10. Permission names not assumed equivalent: yes. 11. Descriptors carry material properties: yes. 12. Platform capabilities evaluated realistically: yes. 13. Observation-only interfaces not called blocking: yes. 14. Unavailable enforcement leads to non-effective condition: yes. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 164] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 15. Task-state movement distinguished from authority transfer: yes. 16. Source fencing supported by evidence: yes. 17. Epochs and revocation checked: yes. 18. Offline limits explicit: yes. 19. Receipt validation not audit logging: yes. 20. Earlier success distinguished from unverified acknowledgment: yes. 21. Human approval does not override other restrictions: yes. 22. Protected consumption enforced: yes. 23. Destination reconstruction explicit: yes. 24. Alternative paths in threat model: yes. 25. No private Android or iOS APIs invented: yes. 26. Hardware and software claims match trust assumptions: yes. 27. Standards credited: yes. 28. No benchmark invented: yes. 29. Companies not implied to adopt: yes. 30. Filing metadata flagged as applicant-identified: yes. 31. Mothership attribution stated: yes. 32. Earlier principles not called new in October: yes. 33. Examiner terms include industry equivalents: yes. 34. Security and privacy sections present: yes. 35. IANA section correct: yes. 36. References resolvable and current: not verified. 37. IPR without invented licensing: yes. 38. Useful without patent annexes: yes. Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 165] Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026 39. Per-embodiment 20-point analysis: partial (cluster level). 40. Per-claim 14-field chart: partial (group level). Author's Address Sangam Kumar Das Independent Inventor Balasore 756001 Odisha India Phone: +91 98613 63532 Email: info@sangamdas.com Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page 166]