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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="MIMI Provider Authentication">Provider Authentication for More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI)</title>

    <author fullname="Mark Atwood">
      <organization>Review Commit, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Seattle</city>
          <region>WA</region>
          <country>US</country>
        </postal>
        <email>mark@reviewcommit.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>

    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>More Instant Messaging Interoperability</workgroup>
    <keyword>MIMI</keyword> <keyword>federation</keyword> <keyword>HTTP Message Signatures</keyword> <keyword>DANE</keyword> <keyword>client authentication</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 71?>

<t>The MIMI protocol requires each provider to authenticate the provider that
sends it a request. It specifies mutually authenticated TLS for this, but
not where the client certificates come from or which trust anchors check
them. The public Web PKI has stopped issuing such certificates. This
document defines how MIMI providers authenticate each other without it.
The mechanism every provider implements is a key published in DNS under
the provider's domain, used to sign each request with HTTP Message
Signatures. DANE client certificates, client certificates from configured
PKIX trust anchors, and locally configured trust lists are defined as
additional mechanisms that a provider can accept by local policy.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        More Instant Messaging Interoperability Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:mimi@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mimi/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mimi/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/MarkAtwood/ietf-mimi-provider-auth"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 84?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>In the MIMI protocol <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>, providers send each other
HTTPS requests: to fetch key material, to submit messages to a room's hub,
and for the hub to fan messages out to the other providers in the room.
Every one of those requests is acted on because of who sent it. A hub
accepts a Commit because it came from a provider whose users are in the
room. A follower accepts a notification because it came from the room's
hub. If the source of a request is not authenticated, any host on the
Internet can claim to be any provider.</t>

<t>Section 4.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> says the TLS connection "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
mutually authenticated" and that the certificates "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> authenticate the
source and target provider domains". It does not say who issues the
source provider's client certificate or which trust anchors the target
uses to check it. <xref target="webpki"/> explains why the answer cannot be "the
public Web PKI". As a result, every deployment today either runs a
private CA and asks each peer to install it, or does not authenticate
peers at all. Neither is open federation, and neither interoperates
without out-of-band setup that the protocol does not describe.</t>

<t>This document fills that gap. It defines:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A mandatory-to-implement mechanism (<xref target="dnskey"/>): the source provider
publishes a public key in DNS under its own domain and signs each
request with HTTP Message Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/>. TLS is
server-authenticated only, using the provider's ordinary server
certificate. This is the same trust model DKIM <xref target="RFC6376"/> uses for
email.</t>
  <t>Three optional mechanisms: DANE client certificates (<xref target="dane"/>), PKIX
client certificates checked against trust anchors the receiver
configures (<xref target="pkix"/>), and trust lists of keys or certificates
configured per peer (<xref target="lists"/>).</t>
  <t>Room for other mechanisms that providers agree on between themselves
(<xref target="other"/>).</t>
  <t>How a receiver combines them by local policy (<xref target="policy"/>), and what it
answers when authentication fails (<xref target="errors"/>).</t>
</list></t>

<t><xref target="protocol-text"/> proposes replacement text for Section 4.1 of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<t>This document uses the terms "provider", "hub" and "follower" as defined
in <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Source provider:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The provider that sends a MIMI protocol request.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Target provider:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The provider that receives it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Source domain:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The domain name of the source provider, as named in the request's
<spanx style="verb">From</spanx> header field (Section 4.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Authenticated domain:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The domain name that a mechanism in this document proves the request
came from.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="webpki"><name>The Web PKI Has Left the Federation</name>

<t>The obvious source of a provider's client certificate used to be the
public CA that issues its server certificate. For years those CAs added
the id-kp-clientAuth extended key usage to server certificates as a matter
of course, and servers presented them as client certificates to their
peers. SMTP with mutual TLS, XMPP server-to-server federation, and a
long list of HTTP APIs relied on this. It was never a promise. It was a
side effect, and it has now been removed.</t>

<t>The Chrome Root Program decides which CAs Chrome trusts, and so,
in practice, which CAs can sell a server certificate. Version 1.8 of its
policy <xref target="CRP"/> states the goal plainly: "to align all PKI hierarchies
included in the Chrome Root Store on the principle of serving only TLS
server authentication use cases". It then sets dates:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Subordinate CA certificates disclosed on or after 15 June 2026 may
assert only id-kp-serverAuth.</t>
  <t>Subscriber certificates issued on or after 15 March 2027 may assert
only id-kp-serverAuth.</t>
  <t>From 15 June 2026, hierarchies found in violation are phased out of
Chrome, 90 days after the violation is detected. Multi-purpose roots
are being removed from the store.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The enforcement is worth reading twice. Chrome does not forbid a CA from
issuing client certificates. It only stops trusting the CA's server
certificates if it does. Since server certificates are the CA's business,
that is not a choice. Let's Encrypt removed the client-authentication
EKU from its default profile on 11 February 2026 and retired its last
profile offering it on 8 July 2026 <xref target="LE-CLIENTAUTH"/>. The other public CAs
are following the same calendar.</t>

<t>None of this was aimed at MIMI, or at SMTP, or at XMPP. Those protocols
were not consulted so much as noticed, the way a road crew notices
whatever happens to be parked on the road. The policy is coherent from
the point of view of a browser: a root store with exactly one purpose is
easier to run, and every change to it now breaks only browsers. It is not
a PKI that any other protocol should build on, and its operator has said
so in writing.</t>

<t>So a MIMI provider cannot obtain a publicly trusted client certificate.
What remains is a private CA, installed by hand at every peer, which turns
an open federation into a set of bilateral agreements. This document
takes the other road. A provider already proves control of its domain to
get a server certificate, and a domain-validated certificate is issued on
the strength of DNS. The provider can publish a key in that same DNS and
leave the CA out of the client side entirely.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="overview"><name>Overview</name>

<t>The source provider always sends its domain in the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> header field
(Section 4.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>). The target provider runs the
mechanisms it accepts, in an order it chooses. A mechanism either
produces an authenticated domain or fails. The request is authenticated
if some mechanism's authenticated domain equals the source domain.</t>

<texttable title="Provider authentication mechanisms">
      <ttcol align='left'>Mechanism</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Credential</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Where the trust comes from</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>DNSSEC</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Section</ttcol>
      <c>DNS keys</c>
      <c>RFC 9421 request signature</c>
      <c>DNS, under the source domain</c>
      <c>Optional</c>
      <c><xref target="dnskey"/></c>
      <c>DANE</c>
      <c>TLS client certificate</c>
      <c>TLSA record, under the source domain</c>
      <c>Required</c>
      <c><xref target="dane"/></c>
      <c>PKIX</c>
      <c>TLS client certificate</c>
      <c>Trust anchors the receiver configures</c>
      <c>No</c>
      <c><xref target="pkix"/></c>
      <c>Trust lists</c>
      <c>Signature or client certificate</c>
      <c>Per-peer configuration</c>
      <c>No</c>
      <c><xref target="lists"/></c>
      <c>Other</c>
      <c>Agreed between providers</c>
      <c>Agreed between providers</c>
      <c>-</c>
      <c><xref target="other"/></c>
</texttable>

<t>Every provider <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> implement both signing and verification for the DNS
key mechanism. This is the only requirement that exists for
interoperability: without one mechanism that every provider implements,
two providers that each conform could have no mechanism in common.
Implementing it does not oblige a provider to accept it. Which mechanisms
a provider accepts, from which peers, is local policy (<xref target="policy"/>).</t>

<t>Responses are not signed. The source provider authenticates the target
provider through the TLS server certificate, as with any HTTPS request.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="dnskey"><name>DNS-Published Keys with HTTP Message Signatures</name>

<section anchor="key-record"><name>Key Records</name>

<t>A provider publishes each signing key as a DNS TXT record <xref target="RFC1035"/> at
the owner name:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<selector>._mimi.<provider-domain>
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The selector is a single DNS label chosen by the provider. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
begin with an underscore. A provider <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish several keys under
different selectors, for rotation or for separate servers.</t>

<t>The record data is a list of tag-value pairs. If the record consists of
several character-strings, they are concatenated without separators
before parsing, as in DKIM <xref target="RFC6376"/>. The syntax, in ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/>:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
key-record = %s"v=MIMI1" *( *WSP ";" *WSP tag ) *WSP [";"] *WSP
tag        = tag-name *WSP "=" *WSP tag-value
tag-name   = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" )
tag-value  = *( %x21-3A / %x3C-7E )   ; any VCHAR except ";"
WSP        = SP / HTAB
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The version tag <spanx style="verb">v=MIMI1</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> come first. A record that does not begin
with it is not a MIMI key record and is ignored. This specification
defines two further tags:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>k:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The key type. This document defines <spanx style="verb">ed25519</spanx>, an Ed25519 public key
<xref target="RFC8032"/>. Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support <spanx style="verb">ed25519</spanx>. Other key types <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be
defined later.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>p:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The public key, in base64 with padding. For <spanx style="verb">ed25519</spanx> it is the 32-byte
public key. An empty value means the key under this selector has been
revoked.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore tags they do not recognize, so that later
specifications can add tags.</t>

<t>An example, using the Ed25519 test key from Appendix B.1.4 of
<xref target="RFC9421"/>:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="dns"><![CDATA[
s1._mimi.a.example. 3600 IN TXT (
    "v=MIMI1; k=ed25519; "
    "p=JrQLj5P/89iXES9+vFgrIy29clF9CC/oPPsw3c5D0bs=" )
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="signing"><name>Signing Requests</name>

<t>The source provider signs each MIMI protocol request with HTTP Message
Signatures <xref target="RFC9421"/>. The signature:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover the derived components <spanx style="verb">@method</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">@target-uri</spanx>, and the
<spanx style="verb">from</spanx> header field. Covering <spanx style="verb">from</spanx> binds the signature to the source
domain; without it, a valid signature from one provider could be
attached to a request that claims to come from another.</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover the <spanx style="verb">content-digest</spanx> field <xref target="RFC9530"/> if the request has
content. The <spanx style="verb">Content-Digest</spanx> field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use <spanx style="verb">sha-256</spanx>.</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <spanx style="verb">created</spanx> parameter and the <spanx style="verb">keyid</spanx> parameter, whose
value is the selector of the key that made the signature.</t>
  <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the <spanx style="verb">tag</spanx> parameter with the value <spanx style="verb">mimi</spanx>, so that a
verifier can find the MIMI signature on a request that carries others.</t>
  <t><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> cover other components and include other parameters, such as
<spanx style="verb">expires</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">nonce</spanx>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The signer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> parameter. If present, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match the
key type in the key record (<spanx style="verb">ed25519</spanx> for <spanx style="verb">k=ed25519</spanx>).</t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">@target-uri</spanx> is the URL the source provider requests, taken from the
target provider's directory (Section 5.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>).</t>

<t><xref target="example"/> shows a complete signed request.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="verifying"><name>Verifying Requests</name>

<t>To verify a request, the target provider:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Takes the source domain from the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> header field.</t>
  <t>Selects a signature from the <spanx style="verb">Signature-Input</spanx> field whose <spanx style="verb">tag</spanx>
parameter is <spanx style="verb">mimi</spanx>, or, if there is none, any signature that covers
the components listed in <xref target="signing"/>. A verifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> limit how many
signatures it tries.</t>
  <t>Checks that the signature covers the components required by
<xref target="signing"/> and has <spanx style="verb">created</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">keyid</spanx> parameters.</t>
  <t>Checks <spanx style="verb">created</spanx>. Verifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject a signature created more than
300 seconds in the past or more than 60 seconds in the future. They
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> configure other limits. If <spanx style="verb">expires</spanx> is present and has passed, the
signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.</t>
  <t>Queries TXT records at <spanx style="verb">&lt;keyid&gt;._mimi.&lt;source-domain&gt;</spanx>, and uses the
first record that is a MIMI key record (<xref target="key-record"/>). If there is
none, or its <spanx style="verb">p</spanx> tag is empty, verification fails.</t>
  <t>If the request has content, checks that <spanx style="verb">Content-Digest</spanx> matches it
<xref target="RFC9530"/>.</t>
  <t>Verifies the signature over the signature base <xref target="RFC9421"/> with the
public key.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If all steps succeed, the authenticated domain is the source domain.</t>

<t>A verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a DNSSEC-validating resolver <xref target="RFC4033"/> when one is
available. If validation of the key record's response is "bogus",
verification fails. A verifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>, by local policy, require the response
to be "secure".</t>

<t>A verifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> cache key records for their DNS TTL. It <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> cache a
negative or failed lookup for longer than the negative-caching TTL, so
that a newly published key works promptly.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="rotation"><name>Key Rotation and Revocation</name>

<t>To rotate keys, a provider publishes the new key under a new selector,
waits at least the TTL of the record, starts signing with the new
selector, and then removes the old record. To revoke a key at once, it
replaces the old record's <spanx style="verb">p</spanx> value with an empty value; this takes effect
as caches expire. A short TTL on key records shortens both delays.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="dane"><name>DANE Client Certificates</name>

<t>A provider that prefers TLS-layer authentication <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> present a client
certificate that is authenticated by a DANE TLSA record, as specified in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth"/>. It uses Format 1 of that specification,
with the service label <spanx style="verb">_mimi</spanx>:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
_mimi._client.<provider-domain>
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The TLSA record data and its matching rules are as in <xref target="RFC6698"/> and
<xref target="RFC7671"/>. The source domain's zone <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be DNSSEC-signed, and the
target provider <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the TLSA records as usable only if their
validation status is "secure"; that is what DANE's security rests on.</t>

<t>The target provider requests a client certificate in the TLS handshake.
It may not know the source domain until it reads the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> header field
of the first request. It then looks up the TLSA records for that domain
and checks the client certificate against them. If they match, the
authenticated domain is the source domain. The source provider <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> send
the DANE Client Identity TLS extension defined in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth"/> so that the target can fetch the records
during the handshake.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="pkix"><name>PKIX Client Certificates from Configured Trust Anchors</name>

<t>Some providers operate where a PKIX hierarchy that still issues client
certificates is required or already deployed: government PKIs, sector and
enterprise PKIs, and federation operators that run a CA for their
members. Such a provider <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> present a client certificate from that
hierarchy, which is the mechanism Section 4.1 of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> describes today.</t>

<t>The certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain a subjectAltName dNSName that is the provider
domain. If it contains an extended key usage extension, that extension
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include id-kp-clientAuth.</t>

<t>The target provider validates the certificate path per <xref target="RFC5280"/> against
trust anchors it configures for this purpose, applying whatever
certificate policy constraints its deployment requires. It matches the
provider domain against the certificate as a DNS-ID per <xref target="RFC9525"/>; it
does not use the subject common name. If both succeed, the authenticated
domain is the matched DNS name.</t>

<t>A target provider <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use a public Web PKI root store, such as the
one its operating system or TLS library ships for server authentication,
as the trust anchors for this mechanism. The CAs in those stores no longer
issue client certificates (<xref target="webpki"/>), and the ones that still might are
the ones the store is about to drop.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="lists"><name>Trust Lists</name>

<t>A target provider <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> configure, per peer domain, the keys or certificates
it accepts from that peer:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>An Ed25519 public key and its selector. Requests are verified as in
<xref target="verifying"/>, except that the key comes from configuration rather than
DNS.</t>
  <t>A certificate, a public key, or a CA certificate. The client certificate
is checked against it at the TLS layer.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The authenticated domain is the peer domain the entry is configured for.
This is how most deployments authenticate peers today, and it remains
useful for private federations and testing. It requires out-of-band setup
for every peer, so a provider that relies only on it cannot reach
providers it has not been configured for.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="other"><name>Other Mechanisms</name>

<t>Providers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> authenticate each other with other mechanisms that they
have agreed on, whether bilaterally, within a federation, or by following
another specification. This document does not describe such mechanisms
and does not need to. A provider that accepts one treats it like any
mechanism in this document: it produces an authenticated domain, and the
rules in <xref target="policy"/> apply to it, including that the authenticated domain
equal the source domain.</t>

<t>Using another mechanism with some peers does not change the requirement
in <xref target="overview"/> to implement the DNS key mechanism, which is how a
provider reaches peers it has agreed nothing with.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="policy"><name>Local Policy</name>

<t>Each target provider decides which mechanisms it accepts, in which order,
and whether the choice differs per peer. Some examples:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>An open provider accepts DNS keys from anyone and the other mechanisms
from peers that use them.</t>
  <t>A provider in a regulated environment accepts only PKIX certificates
under its sector's trust anchors, and DNS keys only with DNSSEC.</t>
  <t>A private federation accepts only trust-listed peers.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A target provider <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept a request without authentication during a
transition, for example to log which peers would fail before it starts
refusing them. This is outside this specification, and such a provider
gets none of the protection in <xref target="security"/>.</t>

<t>Whatever mechanism is used, the authenticated domain <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal the source
domain. This matters especially for the TLS-layer mechanisms: an HTTP
connection authenticated with one provider's client certificate <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
be used to authenticate a request whose <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> header field names another
provider. Without this check, a provider with any valid credential could
impersonate any other.</t>

<t>Authentication says only which provider sent the request. Whether that
provider is allowed to make it, for example whether a notification really
comes from the room's hub, is decided by <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> and by
the room's policy.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="errors"><name>Errors</name>

<t>If no accepted mechanism authenticates the source domain, the target
provider answers with status 403 (Forbidden) <xref target="RFC9110"/>. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include an
<spanx style="verb">Accept-Signature</spanx> field (Section 5.1 of <xref target="RFC9421"/>) describing the
signature it requires, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include a problem details body <xref target="RFC9457"/>
saying why authentication failed.</t>

<t>Status 401 (Unauthorized) is not used, because <xref target="RFC9110"/> requires a 401
response to carry a <spanx style="verb">WWW-Authenticate</spanx> challenge, and none of these
mechanisms is an HTTP authentication scheme.</t>

<t>A target provider <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> say in its response which mechanisms it
tried or why each one failed beyond what the source provider needs to fix
its configuration.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="protocol-text"><name>Replacement Text for the MIMI Protocol</name>

<t>This section proposes replacing the last paragraph of Section 4.1 of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> ("The TLS connection underlying the HTTPS
connection <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be mutually authenticated...") with:</t>

<ul empty="true"><li>
  <t>The TLS connection underlying the HTTPS connection authenticates the
target provider domain, according to <xref target="RFC9525"></xref>. The target provider
authenticates the source provider domain using one of the mechanisms
in [this document]. Every provider implements the DNS key mechanism of
[this document], Section 5; which mechanisms a provider accepts is local
policy, and providers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use other mechanisms they have agreed on.</t>
</li></ul>

<t>It also replaces the reference to <xref target="RFC6125"/>, which <xref target="RFC9525"/>
obsoletes. The second sentence of the paragraph in Section 9 of
<xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> that relies on "mutually-authenticated TLS"
would change to refer to provider authentication generally.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="dns-as-the-root-of-trust"><name>DNS as the Root of Trust</name>

<t>Without DNSSEC, the DNS key mechanism is as strong as the target
provider's view of DNS for the source domain. An attacker who can forge
DNS responses to the target, or who controls the source domain's
delegation, can substitute a key. This is the same exposure DKIM has. It
is also the exposure domain-validated certificates have: a CA validates
domain control through DNS or through HTTP to an address DNS gave it. An
attacker who controls DNS for a domain can get a public server
certificate for it. The DNS key mechanism removes the CA from the client
side; it does not remove a protection that the Web PKI provided.</t>

<t>With DNSSEC, the key is authenticated by the zone's signature, and an
off-path attacker cannot forge it. Deployments that need that assurance
can require it (<xref target="verifying"/>) or use DANE (<xref target="dane"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replay"><name>Replay</name>

<t>A signature is valid for any copy of the request within the <spanx style="verb">created</spanx>
window. An attacker who records a signed request can replay it in that
window, to the same target, provided the attacker can see the request at
all; it is sent over TLS. Signers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include a <spanx style="verb">nonce</spanx> parameter and
verifiers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> track nonces for the window. Most MIMI requests are either
idempotent or carry MLS messages that the hub will reject the second
time, which limits the damage.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="key-compromise"><name>Key Compromise</name>

<t>A provider whose signing key is compromised revokes it as described in
<xref target="rotation"/>. Until caches expire, the attacker can sign requests as the
provider. The record's TTL bounds that time.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="downgrade-between-mechanisms"><name>Downgrade Between Mechanisms</name>

<t>An attacker cannot downgrade a target provider from a mechanism it
requires to one it does not accept, since the target decides alone. A
target that accepts several mechanisms is as strong as the weakest of
them for any peer it accepts them from.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="same-connection-impersonation"><name>Same-Connection Impersonation</name>

<t>See the requirement in <xref target="policy"/> that the authenticated domain equal the
source domain on every request, including requests on a connection whose
client certificate was already accepted.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="privacy-considerations"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<t>Key lookups tell the target provider's DNS resolver, and anyone who can
observe its queries, which source providers the target provider hears
from. This is the same information the source provider's TLS connection
already reveals to a network observer, and it is about providers, not
users. Caching reduces it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="underscored-and-globally-scoped-dns-node-names"><name>Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names</name>

<t>IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "Underscored and
Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry <xref target="RFC8552"/>:</t>

<texttable title="Underscored node name">
      <ttcol align='left'>RR Type</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>_NODE NAME</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c>TXT</c>
      <c>_mimi</c>
      <c>RFC XXXX</c>
</texttable>

</section>
<section anchor="service-name"><name>Service Name</name>

<t>IANA is requested to register the following in the "Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" <xref target="RFC6335"/>, for the DANE client
identity owner name in <xref target="dane"/>:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Service Name:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>mimi</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Transport Protocol:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>tcp</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Assignee:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>IESG</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Contact:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>IETF Chair</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Description:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) protocol</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Reference:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>RFC XXXX</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Port Number:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>none</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC1035">
  <front>
    <title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
    <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
    <date month="November" year="1987"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used in the implementation of the Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC4033">
  <front>
    <title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
    <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
    <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
    <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
    <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
    <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
    <date month="March" year="2005"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4033"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC5234">
  <front>
    <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>
    <date month="January" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC5280">
  <front>
    <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
    <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
    <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
    <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
    <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
    <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
    <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
    <date month="May" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6698">
  <front>
    <title>The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA</title>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <author fullname="J. Schlyter" initials="J." surname="Schlyter"/>
    <date month="August" year="2012"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS client software, but no change in TLS server software. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6698"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6698"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7671">
  <front>
    <title>The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates and Operational Guidance</title>
    <author fullname="V. Dukhovni" initials="V." surname="Dukhovni"/>
    <author fullname="W. Hardaker" initials="W." surname="Hardaker"/>
    <date month="October" year="2015"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document clarifies and updates the DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA specification (RFC 6698), based on subsequent implementation experience. It also contains guidance for implementers, operators, and protocol developers who want to use DANE records.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7671"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7671"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8032">
  <front>
    <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
    <date month="January" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8552">
  <front>
    <title>Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker"/>
    <date month="March" year="2019"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Formally, any DNS Resource Record (RR) may occur under any domain name. However, some services use an operational convention for defining specific interpretations of an RRset by locating the records in a DNS branch under the parent domain to which the RRset actually applies. The top of this subordinate branch is defined by a naming convention that uses a reserved node name, which begins with the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). The underscored naming construct defines a semantic scope for DNS record types that are associated with the parent domain above the underscored branch. This specification explores the nature of this DNS usage and defines the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA. The purpose of this registry is to avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored name for different services.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="222"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8552"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8552"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9110">
  <front>
    <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
    <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
    <date month="June" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
      <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9421">
  <front>
    <title>HTTP Message Signatures</title>
    <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
    <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
    <author fullname="M. Sporny" initials="M." surname="Sporny"/>
    <date month="February" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9421"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9421"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9525">
  <front>
    <title>Service Identity in TLS</title>
    <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
    <author fullname="R. Salz" initials="R." surname="Salz"/>
    <date month="November" year="2023"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificates. This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6125.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9525"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9525"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9530">
  <front>
    <title>Digest Fields</title>
    <author fullname="R. Polli" initials="R." surname="Polli"/>
    <author fullname="L. Pardue" initials="L." surname="Pardue"/>
    <date month="February" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests. The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP message content. The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP representations. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for receiving the respective Integrity fields.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9530"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9530"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol">
   <front>
      <title>More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) using HTTPS and MLS</title>
      <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
         <organization>Cisco</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Matthew Hodgson" initials="M." surname="Hodgson">
         <organization>The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Konrad Kohbrok" initials="K." surname="Kohbrok">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         <organization>Rohan Mahy Consulting Services</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Travis Ralston" initials="T." surname="Ralston">
         <organization>The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Raphael Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies the More Instant Messaging Interoperability
   (MIMI) transport protocol, which allows users of different messaging
   providers to interoperate in group chats (rooms), including to send
   and receive messages, share room policy, and add participants to and
   remove participants from rooms.  MIMI describes messages between
   providers, leaving most aspects of the provider-internal client-
   server communication up to the provider.  MIMI integrates the
   Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol to provide end-to-end
   security assurances, including authentication of protocol
   participants, confidentiality of messages exchanged within a room,
   and agreement on the state of the room.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mimi-protocol-07"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth">
   <front>
      <title>TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records</title>
      <author fullname="Shumon Huque" initials="S." surname="Huque">
         <organization>Salesforce</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Viktor Dukhovni" initials="V." surname="Dukhovni">
         <organization>OpenSSL Corporation</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="4" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol
   describes how to publish Transport Layer Security (TLS) server
   certificates or public keys in the DNS, using the TLSA resource
   record.  This document describes how to use the TLSA record to
   publish client certificates or public keys, and also the rules and
   considerations for using them with TLS.  In addition, it defines a
   new TLS extension, DANE Client Identity, to convey the client&#x27;s
   domain name identity to the server.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-17"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC6125">
  <front>
    <title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
    <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
    <author fullname="J. Hodges" initials="J." surname="Hodges"/>
    <date month="March" year="2011"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6125"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6125"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6335">
  <front>
    <title>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry</title>
    <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
    <author fullname="L. Eggert" initials="L." surname="Eggert"/>
    <author fullname="J. Touch" initials="J." surname="Touch"/>
    <author fullname="M. Westerlund" initials="M." surname="Westerlund"/>
    <author fullname="S. Cheshire" initials="S." surname="Cheshire"/>
    <date month="August" year="2011"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines the procedures that the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) uses when handling assignment and other requests related to the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number registry. It also discusses the rationale and principles behind these procedures and how they facilitate the long-term sustainability of the registry.</t>
      <t>This document updates IANA's procedures by obsoleting the previous UDP and TCP port assignment procedures defined in Sections 8 and 9.1 of the IANA Allocation Guidelines, and it updates the IANA service name and port assignment procedures for UDP-Lite, the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), and the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). It also updates the DNS SRV specification to clarify what a service name is and how it is registered. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="165"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6335"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6335"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC6376">
  <front>
    <title>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Hansen"/>
    <author fullname="M. Kucherawy" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Kucherawy"/>
    <date month="September" year="2011"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or organization that owns the signing domain to claim some responsibility for a message by associating the domain with the message. This can be an author's organization, an operational relay, or one of their agents. DKIM separates the question of the identity of the Signer of the message from the purported author of the message. Assertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and by querying the Signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key. Message transit from author to recipient is through relays that typically make no substantive change to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature.</t>
      <t>This memo obsoletes RFC 4871 and RFC 5672. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="76"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6376"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6376"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8792">
  <front>
    <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
    <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
    <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
    <date month="June" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9457">
  <front>
    <title>Problem Details for HTTP APIs</title>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="E. Wilde" initials="E." surname="Wilde"/>
    <author fullname="S. Dalal" initials="S." surname="Dalal"/>
    <date month="July" year="2023"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines a "problem detail" to carry machine-readable details of errors in HTTP response content to avoid the need to define new error response formats for HTTP APIs.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7807.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9457"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9457"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="CRP" target="https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/crp/policy">
  <front>
    <title>Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Google</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="February" day="05"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="LE-CLIENTAUTH" target="https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authentication/">
  <front>
    <title>Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Let's Encrypt</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="May" day="14"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 618?>

<section anchor="example"><name>Example Signed Request</name>

<t>The source provider a.example sends a notification to b.example. The
content (<spanx style="verb">example MIMI notify body</spanx>, shown as text for brevity) stands in
for a real MIMI message. The key is the one shown in <xref target="key-record"/>, whose
private part is the Ed25519 test key from Appendix B.1.4 of <xref target="RFC9421"/>.</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /v1/notify/a.example/r/clubhouse HTTP/1.1
Host: b.example
From: mimi@a.example
Content-Type: application/mimi-protocol
Content-Digest: \
  sha-256=:ltvFi/ijqMH79/ThrwZ/JykItjIYFA06v8rfqBdj7dY=:
Signature-Input: mimi=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \
  "from");created=1794700800;keyid="s1";tag="mimi"
Signature: mimi=:OBXnNmTPY+Gcxbn+BKcfqCpK7GrkCGO+Ab0/PS956byMzzcArSV\
  EeJWA95WiYjfLJ9vMsEaCRab3geIFr5FpCw==:

example MIMI notify body
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The signature base is:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

"@method": POST
"@target-uri": https://b.example/v1/notify/a.example/r/clubhouse
"content-digest": sha-256=:ltvFi/ijqMH79/ThrwZ/JykItjIYFA06v8rfqBdj7dY=:
"from": mimi@a.example
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" "from")\
  ;created=1794700800;keyid="s1";tag="mimi"
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The target provider b.example reads <spanx style="verb">a.example</spanx> from <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, looks up
<spanx style="verb">s1._mimi.a.example</spanx>, and verifies the Ed25519 signature over this base.
Ed25519 signatures are deterministic, so an implementation can check its
signer against these bytes.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="open-issues"><name>Open Issues</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Section 4.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/> has an editor's note asking
whether <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> is the right field for the source domain. If the WG
replaces it, the signature covers the new field instead.</t>
  <t>The directory document could advertise which mechanisms a provider
accepts, so a source provider knows before its first request. This
document does not define that.</t>
  <t>Keys could also be published in the directory document instead of DNS.
That would rest their trust on the target's TLS server certificate,
which is to say on the Web PKI, which is the thing this document is
trying to stop depending on for the client side.</t>
  <t>Whether nonces should be required rather than optional.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>(Boilerplate as per <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7942"/>:)</t>

<t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of
this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in
<xref target="RFC7942"/>.  The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in
progressing drafts to RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any
individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the
IETF.  Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the
information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a
catalog of available implementations or their features.  Readers
are advised to note that other implementations may exist.</t>

<t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"/>, "this will allow reviewers and working
groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the
benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented
protocols more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups
to use this information as they see fit".
<?line -22?></t>

<t>mimid (Review Commit, LLC): an open-source MIMI provider. It implements
RFC 9421 signing and verification with the profile in <xref target="signing"/>, with
keys from trust lists (<xref target="lists"/>). The DNS key mechanism, PKIX and DANE
client certificates are being implemented. It signs every outbound request
and can either refuse or log unauthenticated inbound requests.</t>

</section>


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